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Trends in Communist Propaganda

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
In Communist Propaganda

Confidential

2 OCTOBER 1974
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CHINA

PRC 25TH ANNIVERSARY: CHOU EN-LAI REAPPEARS, STRESSES UNITY

The celebration of the PRC's 25th anniversary was highlighted by the reappearance of the ailing Chou En-lai whose toast at the 30 September "grand reception" he hosted was his first public speech since late May. The anniversary was also marked by parties and cultural events in Peking's parks on 1 October. In his toast at the reception on the 30th, Chou emphasized that current policies, including the campaign against Lin and Confucius, must continue, but he stressed the need for unity both within China and among the peoples of the world. Chou singled out as the major achievements of the past quarter-century the victories over Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao and the "imperialist and social-imperialist blockade."

The traditional PEOPLE'S DAILY-RED FLAG-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY joint editorial this year concentrated on domestic affairs, sounding themes noted by Chou in citing the need for unity but warning that line struggles within the party "will continue for a long time to come." While the editorial called for continuing the movement to criticize Lin and Confucius, it hinted strongly that current restraints on mass activism will continue. It directed organizations where "mass investigations have been more or less completed" to devote their main attention to study and criticism, recommending that they read Mao and the Marxist classics. Recent media criticism of Lin's military record was reiterated by the editorial, which said that "especially for the present" study and criticism should concentrate on Mao's military writings and Lin's military line. As in previous such editorials since Lin's purge, the PLA was assigned no specific civil tasks but was told to "thoroughly implement" Mao's military line.

The editorial did not give details on economic progress since 1949, but claimed that socialist construction was "briskly advancing" and that a "fairly complete system of industry and of national economy as a whole based on socialist agriculture" was forming. A number of more specific economic advances were claimed in NCNA articles related to National Day. The editorial called for fulfilling the yearly economic plan and the fourth five-year plan, which is scheduled for completion next year. Unlike last year, the editorial did not call for preparations for the next, fourth National People's Congress.

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As it had last year, Peking's joint editorial all but ignored foreign affairs, restricting comment to a brief review of the present "excellent" international situation, characterized by "great disorder" in which the United States and the Soviet Union are beset by difficulties while the third world is advancing. The editorial revived Peking's usual pledge to liberate Taiwan, which had been omitted last year.

LEADERSHIP China's ailing leaders came out in nearly full
APPEARANCES force for the festivities, with only Mao and
 old Marshal Liu Po-cheng failing to appear in
either Peking or the provinces. Of China's five vice chairmen, only Chou and Wang Hung-wen had appeared in public since the 31 July Army Day reception. The most surprising appearance was that of Kang Sheng, who attended the 30 September reception in a wheelchair. Except for his reported attendance at last year's party congress, Kang Sheng had been out of sight for more than three years. Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng, who was under heavy poster attack last spring and who failed to appear on Army Day, showed up in his Liaoning provincial base. Yeh Chien-ying attended both the reception and the festivities in the parks on the 1st. NCNA on 1 October reported the appearance of all provincially based Politburo members in either Peking or their provinces. Tachai leader Chen Yung-kuei attended festivities in Peking, as did alternate Politburo member Wu Kuei-hsien.

As with Army Day, several newly rehabilitated former PRC leaders reappeared, most notably Hsiao Hua, former chief of the PLA General Political Department who was purged in 1967. Hsiao and former Acting Chief of the General Staff Yang Cheng-wu, who appeared on Army Day, were the most prominent PLA figures purged when the cultural revolution began devouring its own. Neither has apparently been given a new post, each being listed by NCNA merely as "present at the reception." A number of other purged leaders were also listed in this category, including Fu Chung-pi, the only member of Yang's alleged clique not to appear on Army Day. Other former leaders appearing included several government ministers, former Northeast Bureau chief Sung Jer-chiung, and former provincial first secretaries Ouyang Chin of Heilungkiang and Lin Tieh of Hopeh.

Several non-Politburo provincial leaders also showed up in Peking for the celebrations, led by Lanchow Military Region Commander Han Hsien-chu, who had made no public appearances since January and who seems to be under attack for allowing a subordinate to publish a pamphlet in 1971 praising Lin Piao's military genius.

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Another provincial leader thought to be under attack, Heilungkiang chief Wang Chia-tao, also put in a Peking appearance. Wang has been out of public view since last spring and was criticized in posters. Shansi first secretary Hsieh Chih-hua also showed up, listed--like Han and Wang--as a member of the Central Committee. Hsieh had made no previous appearances this year and has apparently been criticized for allowing the production of the opera "Three Trips to Taoyuan," which was attacked throughout China last spring. A fourth leader whose presence in Peking seems directly related to provincial squabbles is Mao Yuan-hsin, who may be involved in investigations into the status of Li Te-sheng. Mao, long rumored to be the Chairman's nephew, has been a party secretary in Liaoning since December 1972 and was a Red Guard activist there during the cultural revolution. He has not appeared publicly since last January, when he attended a New Year's rally just after Li's arrival in Liaoning. Liaoning party Standing Committee member Chang Shu-te also attended the reception, according to NCNA, which placed him with Mao as "also present" near the bottom of its lengthy namelist.

FOREIGN GUESTS AT RECEPTIONS Foreign guests in Peking for the celebration attended the "grand reception" and the festivities in the Peking parks. Most prominent among the guests not usually based in Peking was DRV Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, not previously reported present in Peking. Visitors of Chinese ancestry were treated somewhat differently this year than in the past. The traditional PRC State Council party on the 30th was attended this year by "Overseas Chinese and foreigners of Chinese origin," but "compatriots" from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao who had attended in past years were not reported present. Unlike past practice, only low-level PRC officials attended the State Council reception and there was no report of speeches. Former high-ranking Kuomintang official Shang Chen sat at the head table at the Peking grand reception, which was also attended by a number of Overseas Chinese and "compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao" according to NCNA on 1 October.

A 30 September NCNA report of the PRC embassy reception in Moscow disclosed that, like last year, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev led the Soviet delegation. Though Ilichev has recently undertaken duties related to the Cyprus crisis, NCNA once again identified him as head of the Soviet delegation to the border talks. In describing the Soviet reception, NCNA was even more curt than last year, omitting the first names of all Soviet attendees while citing the full names of other guests.

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MOSCOW COMMENT Initial Soviet comment on the 25th PRC anniversary has followed Moscow's recent line stressing Soviet determination to rebuff ideological deviation and the "splittist" policies of the Maoist leadership while highlighting longstanding protestations of Soviet desire to normalize state relations. The usual greetings message from the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers for the first time in recent years did not list the "Chairman of the PRC" among its recipients. Addressed to the Chinese NPC and the PRC State Council, the greetings pointed out past Soviet aid for China, professed friendship for the Chinese people, and attempted to underline Moscow's desire for normalized relations by citing recent Soviet proposals for treaties with the PRC on the non-use of force and nonaggression. TASS summaries of commentaries on the anniversary in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA have taken a similar approach, predictably pointing out that Peking remains intransigent in the face of the Soviet initiatives. PRAVDA commentator Andrey Krushinskiy may have been hinting at enhanced Soviet interest in an international communist conference when he noted, in reference to Brezhnev's report to the 24th CPSU Congress, that Moscow would continue to denounce Maoist policies and would work for the "cohesion of the socialist countries and the world communist movement on a Marxist-Leninist basis"--formulas absent from his commentary on the date last year. As he had last year, Krushinskiy went on to cite Brezhnev remarks to underscore Moscow's continuing commitment to normalize state relations.

HANOI OBSERVANCE This year's DRV treatment of PRC National Day followed the pattern of 1973. The occasion was observed in Hanoi with the standard grand meeting, a Chinese embassy reception, and leader greetings. Pham Van Dong led DRV officials at the 1 October PRC embassy reception, providing a slightly lower-level representation than last year, when Truong Chinh led the turnout. As in 1973, this year's DRV leaders' message noted the Marxist-Leninist and proletarian internationalist basis of Vietnamese-Chinese solidarity and praised the willingness of the Chinese to fulfill their "internationalist duty" in supporting Vietnam. The greetings this year were more effusive than in 1973, noting China's "wholehearted support and great, all-round and effective assistance. . . ."

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ENERGY

MOSCOW SEES "IMPERIALIST PLOT" IN WESTERN OIL PRICE MOVES

Soviet media have in stereotyped fashion portrayed the current U.S.-led Western efforts to deal with rising oil prices, inflation, and other economic ills as an "imperialist plot" against the oil-producing states and the Third World. Moscow has for the most part ignored the "oil weapon" argument voiced prominently following the Arab-Israeli war last October, and instead has endorsed the defense of higher oil prices on economic grounds advanced by spokesmen for members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. While backing the oil producers, Moscow at the same time has accorded circumspect treatment to major U.S. statements on the oil issue by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger.

As in the past, Moscow's treatment of the oil issues in broadcasts to Arab audiences--in contrast to general TASS reports and other radio beamings--has reflected markedly harsher treatment of the U.S. role, going as far as directly linking "U.S. leaders" and what Moscow calls "an extensive campaign of blackmail and pressure" against OPEC states. To reassure Soviet consumers and Moscow's oil-dependent allies, Moscow has recently reiterated that the USSR itself has enormous petroleum and energy reserves and that no shortage is likely because of planned "socialist" exploitation.

TREATMENT OF
FORD, KISSINGER

TASS provided only sketchy reportage on UN General Assembly speeches on the oil price issue by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, President Ford's 23 September major address at the Detroit World Energy Conference, and also his address to the 30 September opening of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meeting. For example, TASS noted simply that President Ford's Detroit speech "contained a warning" to OPEC countries that had increased oil prices, without further details. Secretary Kissinger's UN statement received similar treatment. However, negative reaction to these speeches by Arab and OPEC leaders was replayed at length, indirectly revealing alleged U.S. threats of "retaliatory measures" including the use of food deliveries as an "instrument of policy" and playing up "indignation" and "shock" in the Arab world.

At the same time, Moscow Arabic-language broadcasts have openly attributed to President Ford, quoting Arab press sources, warnings on the oil question and U.S. proposals revealing an intention to "set up a bloc hostile to the interests" of the OPEC members. A 30 September Arabic commentary on Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress

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typically was more outspoken, claiming that "feverish attempts" were being made to overcome the Western economic crisis and that the United States "has threatened" to halt economic aid and end food supplies to countries raising oil prices or reducing oil production. The commentary's explanation for the current oil price concern reflected the view--also reiterated recently by Soviet oil commentator Rachkov--that OPEC countries were forced to review and raise oil prices because of Western inflation and actions by "international monopolies" to fan the flames of the energy crisis and extract "exorbitant profits" from it. The solution to the energy crisis, according to Radio Peace and Progress, lies not in "political pressure and intimidation" against developing countries but in "stripping monopolies of their power" and establishing international economic cooperation "based on equality."

U.S. ECONOMIC, Moscow described as a "failure" the 26-27 September
OIL MEETINGS Camp David conference of the Western "Big Five"
finance and foreign ministers of the United States,
Britain, France, West Germany and Japan. TASS reports on 30 September noted that the "Big Five" "failed to solve a single pressing economic problem" at their conference, which revealed "serious differences" and "acute contradictions" among the participants. The secrecy surrounding the session, TASS noted, stemmed from the participants' belief that such a forum "rightly" might be regarded as "an imperialist plot against the oil-producing countries." TASS noted that various press reports described recent pronouncements by "highly placed U.S. officials"--an obvious reference to President Ford and Kissinger--as couched in "particularly harsh tones."

A 2 October TASS report on the Washington International Monetary Fund conference noted "the danger of a prolonged, serious economic recession" was the main topic for the session, which it said displayed "profound disagreements between the imperialist states and the developing countries." President Ford's opening speech to the IMF, Moscow radio noted on the 1st, stressed that "serious and complex" problems faced the Western countries.

Commenting on recent U.S. statements on energy and the new IMF session, TASS commentator Kiselev on the 27th described at some length the "broad campaign of pressure" on oil-producing countries launched by "U.S. leaders'" speeches at the UN General Assembly. He noted that this envisaged not only reducing foodstuff supplies to Arab OPEC members and ending U.S. assistance, but also forming a "united front" of oil-importing states, plans for the diplomatic and political "isolation" of oil-exporting countries and depriving them of Third World countries' support by enticing the latter with increased foodstuff

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supplies, as well as plans for recycling OPEC oil revenues back to oil-importing nations. Kiselev charged in doctrinaire terms that once more "imperialist circles" sought to solve their own economic difficulties "at the expense of peoples of other countries" who were "exercising their sovereign right in freely disposing of their natural riches."

Rachkov, in a 17 September Moscow Arabic-language commentary, had defended the 13 September OPEC action to raise oil taxes by 30 cents a barrel as a "self-defense" action aimed at oil companies, not at consumers, in order to reduce the "huge profits of the monopolies themselves," and in that sense called the tax a "special fine imposed by the developing countries on imperialism" for its failure to overcome chronic inflation problems. Rachkov stressed that "there is no doubt" that the solidarity of the oil-rich Arab countries and other OPEC members with the other developing countries "struggling against imperialism and suffering poverty and backwardness" will help find a "useful way" to dispose of OPEC oil revenues linked to the "common struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism."

Atypical in recent Moscow output was a 7 September Moscow commentary broadcast to Arab listeners which raised the "oil weapon" issue and the U.S.-Israeli relationship in remarking on allegedly increased "Israeli intrigues" aimed at increasing Middle East tension. Noting expanded U.S.-Israeli cooperation and Congressional approval of aid to Israel, the commentary stressed that Israel had to rely on the United States for oil for its "war machine," and that because some Arab countries supplied oil to the United States, "a hole is being drilled in the barrier of Arab boycott of Israel."

OIL MONOPOLIES' CONSPIRACY CHARGE Moscow Arabic-language commentaries on 1 October revived an alleged linkage between U.S. oil policy and the Arab-Israeli conflict in a new context. Quoting French press reports, one commentator charged that a recent Teheran meeting, headed by former CIA director and now Ambassador to Iran Helms, had discussed a "campaign of intimidation" against the oil-producing Middle East countries and that the U.S. oil monopolies had become more active as part of this campaign. This proved, the commentator added, that the Arab states faced a "new conspiracy" by oil monopolies seeking to undermine Arab unity, halt economic consolidation among the Arabs, and force them to yield to "monopolist capital." Another Moscow Arabic commentary the same day pegged to the same "conspiracy" theory cited Arab press reports alleging there was a link between U.S. oil policy and "attempts by Zionist circles in the West to obstruct the settling of the Middle East issue."

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SOVIET OIL Moscow at the same time continues to exude
ASSURANCES confidence and assurance on the USSR's own
 oil and energy resources. A 20 September Moscow
foreign-language broadcast claimed that a recently completed
estimate of all Soviet oil resources had concluded that the
USSR's "potential oil resources" were greater than those of any other
country and that "in a year's time" the Soviet Union would
be the "world's biggest oil producer." Another Moscow foreign-
language commentary on the 21st claimed that the USSR ranked first
in the world in natural gas and coal deposits, and these were
being developed by a comprehensive approach which "only socialism
can adopt," in contrast to the crisis-ridden capitalistic system.

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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR PLAYS DOWN SPLIT IN PALESTINIAN RANKS, PROMOTES PLO

Moscow has provided only limited comment thus far on the 26 September announcement by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) that it had decided to withdraw from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and would continue its armed conflict with Israel outside the PLO. On 27 September TASS and Moscow radio's Arabic service carried a brief, identical report on the PFLP announcement, which as the only explanation for the decision noted part of a statement by the PFLP that it could not accept current PLO political policy. Moscow omitted the PFLP spokesman's denunciation of the PLO leadership for seeking a negotiated "surrender settlement" through political cooperation with Egypt's President Sadat and through alleged U.S.-PLO contacts. Moscow avoided original comment on the development, but it cast the PFLP decision in a critical light by citing the Lebanese press to the effect that the decision "at this present stage" would hinder the PLO in its task of restoring the Palestinians' legitimate rights.

Moscow's handling probably reflects mixed feelings over the PFLP decision. On the one hand, this highly visible display of Palestinian disarray occurred at a time when Moscow has been advocating Palestinian representation at the Geneva conference and supporting discussion of the Palestinian issue--as a separate political issue and not merely a refugee problem--at the current session of the UN General Assembly. The public display of strong disagreement among the Palestinians themselves as to which organization and approach best serve Palestinian interests undoubtedly causes problems for the Moscow media in continuing public support.

On the other hand, the fact of the Palestinians' disagreement may cause Moscow less problem than its timing. In the past Moscow has strongly criticized the PFLP and its leader, George Habash, as irresponsible extremists who oppose a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict and who foster disunity in the Palestinian movement. A 14 August article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA denounced Habash for his "logic, obviously adopted from Peking, that peace and socialism are incompatible" and implied he was serving Palestinian enemies through his "pseudo-revolutionariness larded with Maoist demagogy." PFLP withdrawal from the--by contrast--more moderate and responsible PLO may therefore be viewed by Moscow as likely to facilitate the PLO's efforts to gain increased international political support.

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Soviet media references to Palestinian affairs since the PFLP's withdrawal indicate Moscow is continuing, as in the past, to support the PLO. The references have not, however, suggested any significant increase in that support. Moscow radio, for example, in a broadcast to Arab listeners on 30 September reported without comment a remark attributed to the leader of a U.S. Communist Party delegation in Lebanon that American communists "view the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestine Arab people." The broadcast added that the delegation had been invited by the "DPFLP [Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], one of the main organizations in the Palestinian resistance movement and a member of the PLO." In another Arabic-service broadcast on 30 September, Moscow was probably alluding to the PLO-PFLP split when it urged all Arab states to unite in a common front in order to support the "Palestinian Arab people and their legitimate representatives."

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C Y P R U S

BREZHNEV, GROMYKO REGISTER MOSCOW'S GROWING CONCERN

Recent statements by both Brezhnev and Gromyko follow the pattern of Soviet comment early in September which began to level thinly veiled criticism at Turkish policy toward Cyprus. Discussion of Cyprus comprised a major portion of a 25 September Brezhnev speech at a dinner for visiting Hungarian First Secretary Kadar. And Gromyko in his 24 September address to the UN General Assembly stressed that Moscow considers the Cyprus crisis to be of international importance.

Both leaders reiterated the need to remove the issue from NATO hands and promoted the Soviet Union's 22 August proposal for an enlarged conference on Cyprus within the UN framework. Both Gromyko and Brezhnev seemed to suggest concern that international interest could wane now that military warfare has stopped and Turkey is concentrating on establishing an "autonomous administration" in the area occupied by Turkish troops. Gromyko took issue with those who are "of the impression that this is an event of local significance."

Brezhnev's speech on the 25th was clearly designed to focus attention on the Cyprus situation. Following a discussion of Soviet-Hungarian relations, he made only a few remarks about socialist unity and relations with the United States and then concentrated primarily on Cyprus. Brezhnev also brought out the need for concern about Cyprus in implying that the future of the island is not totally unrelated to the future of Europe. He noted that "events in Cyprus persistently remind one of the fact that if we want a lasting peace in Europe we still have to struggle for its effectively." But Brezhnev stopped short of directly linking Cyprus to European detente, in line with the Soviet position at the European security talks that European and Mediterranean security problems can be dealt with separately. Moscow has consistently opposed Yugoslavia's position that the two are interrelated, in order to avoid getting the security talks involved with issues that could postpone reaching its major objectives at the CSCE talks.

Brezhnev's criticism of Turkey's role--and Greece's--in the crisis was transparent. While Gromyko referred to Turkey only in the most oblique terms, Brezhnev noted that "two NATO member countries" were responsible for the bloodshed on Cyprus. He went further in registering "small wonder" that Greece subsequently withdrew its military forces from NATO after its "public and new leadership" saw that NATO is "least of all concerned" with protecting small countries.

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Moscow has also carried reports on U.S. Congressional votes cutting off military aid to Turkey and on Greek Foreign Minister Mavros' 1 October speech at the National Press Club. TASS reported Senator Eagleton as defending the military aid cut-off by saying that Ankara had used U.S. weapons "not for defense but for other purposes," and it opened its report on Mavros' remarks by attributing to him the statement that "Turkey's armed intrusion into Cyprus has created a very dangerous situation jeopardizing world peace."

Neither Brezhnev nor Gromyko referred directly to partition, restating only Moscow's standard call for restoration of "independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" and for withdrawal of foreign troops. Moscow media, however, have acknowledged that partitioning is taking place. NEW TIMES pointed out on the 27th that Cyprus is already "actually split in half . . . as a result of the interference of foreign troops."

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

KADAR VISIT REFLECTS IMPROVED MOSCOW-BUDAPEST CLIMATE

The speeches by First Secretary Kadar and his Soviet hosts, as well as the final communique on the Hungarian leader's 25-30 September visit to the USSR, reflected a warmer atmosphere than had prevailed during Brezhnev's November 1972 visit to Budapest although there are indications that some Soviet-Hungarian problems remain.* In contrast to the strained atmosphere during his visit to Hungary two years ago, Brezhnev in a 25 September Kremlin dinner speech had warm praise for Kadar, who, in his remarks, repeatedly lauded Brezhnev and underscored Hungary's long-standing indebtedness to the USSR and solidarity with the Soviet bloc.

The visit produced no Soviet endorsement of Budapest's New Economic Management system or any indication that the USSR had agreed to make long-range commitments for deliveries of essential raw materials for Hungarian industry--a long-standing bone of contention which had antedated Brezhnev's 1972 visit. On the score of communist unity, Kadar specifically endorsed international party conferences, while Brezhnev and Suslov in their speeches avoided direct reference to the subject. Peking was not explicitly mentioned in the major pronouncements during Kadar's visit.

The CPSU had hosted a visit from another prominent Hungarian party figure immediately before Kadar's trip to the USSR: TASS on 5 September reported a meeting in Moscow between Brezhnev and MSZMP Politburo member and secretary Karoly Nemeth, who has been conjectured as a possible alternative to Kadar as Hungarian party first secretary. The report explained only that Nemeth was visiting Moscow "at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee" and said the "warm, friendly" talks had dealt with CPSU-MSZMP cooperation and international topics. Nemeth was also a member of Kadar's party-government delegation on the present visit.

BILATERAL RELATIONS The present visit was the third bilateral meeting this year between Brezhnev and Kadar, who also had bilateral talks at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in the Polish capital in April and in the

* Brezhnev's visit to Hungary two years ago had been marked by a cool reception given him when he delivered a major speech in the Csepel works, a speech which omitted the customary tribute to his host, Kadar. See the TRENDS of 6 December 1972, pages 12-15.

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Crimea on 5 August. The Soviet leader observed the amenities in his 25 September Kremlin dinner speech in toasting Kadar as "the seasoned revolutionary, prominent figure of the international communist movement, and loyal friend of the Soviet Union and the party of Lenin." In response, Kadar praised Brezhnev as an "outstanding militant of the international communist movement, who rightly commands sincere respect and appreciation throughout the world." In his speech at a friendship rally at the Kirov plant in Leningrad on the 27th, attended by Suslov though not by Brezhnev, Kadar added further praise for the Soviet leader as "that great friend of our people, outstanding exponent of the international communist and workers movement and consistent militant for the cause of peace." Suslov, at the Kirov plant rally, coupled his tribute to Kadar with an assurance to the effect that "the CPSU does not and could not pursue a policy toward fraternal Hungary any other than" one aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation.

The joint communique on Kadar's visit goes beyond the one two years ago when it specifies "complete" mutual understanding as well as mutual satisfaction over the "high level of development" of fraternal bilateral ties. (The 1972 document had merely noted the need for "further development of all-round fraternal cooperation" between the two parties and states.) But the current communique recorded only generalized Soviet approval for Hungary's socialist construction, ignoring the specifics of the New Economic Management system instituted by the Hungarians at the start of 1968. The MSZMP, at its November 1973 plenum, had modified some of the decentralized planning and market economy features of the system objected to by Moscow, while insisting that the essential elements of the system were still valid. Moscow's dissatisfaction with the system had accounted for the failure of Premier Fock, in March 1972, to secure long-range Soviet commitments for raw material deliveries to Budapest. Fock at that time took the unprecedented step of publicly revealing this disagreement in an airport interview on his return from Moscow. The 30 September communique merely voiced satisfaction with progress in Soviet-Hungarian economic cooperation, goods turnover, and coordination of five-year economic plans. The document tied the Hungarians firmly to the CEMA long-range economic integration program, as well as to the "coordinated" foreign policy of the socialist community.

Unlike the speeches during Brezhnev's 1972 visit to Budapest, those during Kadar's current visit showed little defensiveness on the state of relations between the two countries. Kadar did

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show some defensiveness, in his Leningrad speech, in under-scoring Hungary's socialist credentials and reliability as a member of the socialist camp, against the backdrop of a recollection of the 1956 "counterrevolution." He declared that the Hungarian party had broken away from the old methods.

It has done away with the former faults and settled its account with the traitors and has overcome the grave situation. The dreams of international and domestic reaction, who had become brazenly bold, were shattered. Today in Hungary, a stable workers regime, enjoying the support of the entire people, is in power. A socialist society is being built and the Hungarian People's Republic, alongside the Soviet Union, stands as an unshakable member of the Warsaw Pact, the CEMA community, . . . the world socialist system.

COMMUNIST UNITY The communique on Kadar's visit reflected Moscow's continued reluctance to explicitly endorse the proposed European and world conferences of communist parties. Thus it noted that the two parties "attach great importance to collective forms of work" by communist parties "both in the regional and in the global framework" and confirm their readiness to support "practical steps" in this direction. Kadar in his Kremlin dinner speech on the 25th had said his party considered it useful to "convoke regional" party conferences and "gradually to prepare for a new world conference." Two days later, in Leningrad, the Hungarian leader registered a more direct call to "start preparations" for a new world conclave and to "prepare now and then convene" an all-European party conference. Kadar had been one of the initial supporters of a new world conference, calling for such a gathering during a visit to Budapest by Bulgaria's Zhivkov on 3 December 1973. Soviet broadcasts on 26 and 27 September dealing with Kadar's remarks on the communist movement duly included, respectively, his Moscow and Leningrad appeals for new party conferences. However, a TASS report on the 30th focusing on passages in the communique dealing with the communist movement omitted the document's veiled reference to regional and global collective work by communist parties.

The communique put the CPSU and MSZMP on record as waging uncompromising struggle against "every manifestation of anticommunism, nationalism, and chauvinism, against right and left opportunism." The absence of direct reference to the Chinese in this connection

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was in line with the pattern generally followed at the recent round of 30th liberation anniversary observances in Warsaw in July, Bucharest in August, and Sofia in September. At these meetings, attended by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny, respectively, only Zhivkov had explicitly denounced "the Maoists." A Moscow radio commentary broadcast in Romanian on the 28th recalled Zhivkov's 8 September attack on the Maoists as a preface to highlighting Kadar's call on the 25th for gradual preparations for a new world conference.

MOSCOW BELATEDLY NOTES YUGOSLAV TRIAL OF PRO-SOVIET GROUP

Moscow's belated first public mention on 27 September of the arrest and trial of a pro-Soviet group in Yugoslavia--revealed by Tito on 12 September--provided few details and predictably avoided the issue of Soviet involvement in the affair. The acknowledgment, by TASS commentator Vladimir Goncharov, was transmitted by TASS, broadcast by Moscow radio, to Yugoslav among other audiences, and published in PRAVDA.

The thrust of Goncharov's article was clearly to discredit Western press reports about Soviet troops massing to invade Yugoslavia. The pro-Soviet group itself was given only minor attention, Goncharov noting after a lengthy diatribe against rumors about Soviet military intentions that "in order to thicken this new anti-Soviet concoction, these gentlemen go so far as to make wild fabrications alleging that the Soviet Union is preparing to 'invade Yugoslavia' in connection with the discovery in the country of . . . a 'pro-Soviet plot,' no less!" Avoiding details about the incident, Goncharov reported only that the group "opposed the existing system in the country" and that "double-dyed anti-Soviets" have interpreted the arrest and trial of the group "to their liking . . ."

Despite the use of such terms as "fabrications" and "malicious inventions," Goncharov refrained from categorically denying Soviet involvement with the group. At the same time he referred to Soviet-Yugoslav relations in low-key fashion, pointing out that Western press speculation was directed against the "good" and "friendly" relations between the two countries.

Prior to Moscow's acknowledgment of the affair only bloc maverick Romania had mentioned it, having promptly reported Tito's 12 September speech. But on 28 September, the day after the Soviet commentary, Budapest's party daily NEPSZABADSAG carried an

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editorial article which concentrated on squelching rumors about Warsaw Pact involvement and seemed to appeal to Belgrade to forget the affair. Unlike the Moscow comment, however, it dealt directly with the issue of the pro-Soviet group, including a mention of the "fabrication" that the group had received support from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. NEPSZABADSAG, like TASS commentator Goncharov, criticized the Western press for "putting a sensation-mongering and tendentious slant on the matter" in order to "poison" relations with Belgrade. In quoting from "the paper of our Yugoslav sister party, KOMUNIST" that "part of the foreign press regarded the arrest as a good opportunity for creating a sensation and to make much ado over the matter," NEPSZABADSAG seemed to imply that both parties had agreed in principle at least that a continued public discussion would not be beneficial.

In what appeared to be an almost formal appeal to Belgrade to bury the issue, NEPSZABADSAG emphasized the "extensive cooperation" between the two countries and parties, which it said "we trust, will continue to develop in the future," adding that "it lies in the interests of both parties and both peoples to reject the fabrications intended to disturb our relations. . . ."

Peking has also mentioned the affair for the first time, NCNA on the 27th quoting TANJUG on details of the case and selectively quoting Western press reports to indicate strong Soviet involvement.

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C U B A

CASTRO ASSAILS PRESIDENT FORD ON CIA, U.S. OIL POLICY

Premier Castro, speaking on a 28 September Cuban anniversary that coincided with the visit of U.S. Senators Javits and Pell, delivered one of his harshest statements on the United States in recent years. Not unexpectedly, Castro used his first public address since President Ford's 16 September remarks and later speeches on two sensitive topics--the CIA and U.S. economic relations with underdeveloped nations--to launch strong criticism of the President and denounce the U.S. role in Chile and U.S. policy toward oil-producing countries.* In contrast, Soviet handling of Castro's speech eliminated all references to U.S. policy toward oil-producing states and gave only brief attention to Castro's attack on the CIA.

CASTRO ON FORD Speaking on the 14th anniversary of the founding
DEFENSE OF CIA of the Cuban Committees for the Defense of the
 Revolution, Castro declared that President
Ford's defense of CIA activities in Chile was an arrogant expression of U.S. willingness "to intervene by any means, regardless of how illegal, dirty, or criminal," in Latin American affairs. Castro said that the world had reacted indignantly to the "full and confessed confirmation" of U.S. Government participation in the events "which ended with the overthrow and death" of President Allende.

One day before he met with visiting Senators Javits and Pell, the Cuban leader blasted U.S. "acts of aggression" in Latin America and gave a list of supposed offenses directed against Cuba and other Latin countries. He then asked rhetorically, "What does the shameless OAS have to say about this?" Speaking in his usual vein, he called the OAS "prostituted" and urged Latins to abandon it in favor of a regional organization, such as the Organization of African Units, which would exclude the United States.

ATTACK ON U.S. Reflecting earlier Cuban press comments on the
OIL STRATEGY President's and Secretary Kissinger's recent
 speeches on the oil price issue, Castro held
the United States responsible for worldwide inflation and defended

* Recent Cuban press comment on CIA-Chile revelations and Ford's press conference are discussed in the TRENDS of 18 September, page 8, and 25 September, page 19.

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the OPEC's position as a "just reaction" to the exploitative methods of large transnational companies. Castro quoted portions of President Ford's speech at the Detroit World Energy Conference and asserted that U.S. strategy aimed at dividing the nations of the Third World and isolating the oil producers. Castro insisted that it was "unjust" to blame OPEC for inflation, because the responsibility "fundamentally rests with the United States itself," as a result of its "society of consumption" and vast expenditures in Vietnam. He noted that Cuba, "with the generous aid of the Soviet Union," had not suffered any energy crisis and stood ready to back the "nonaligned countries" if they joined in an emphatic answer to the "threats and pressures" of the United States. Castro encouraged oil-exporting nations to avoid investing their revenues in capitalist countries.

Castro, who has been courting Venezuelan President Perez since the latter's inauguration this year gave special support to Perez' rejection of President Ford's oil thesis. Since Venezuela made public a letter in which Perez voiced his objections to Ford's UN speech, the Cuban press has lauded Perez for his defiance of "what appears to be a return to the big stick policy." Castro continued this line in his speech, noting that the Venezuelan government had responded "vigorously and with dignity" to Ford's speeches. The Cuban leader promised to continue his backing for the Venezuelan position and vowed that "Venezuela will not be alone in this hemisphere as Cuba was."

Castro did not mention the U.S. senatorial visit. Cuban coverage of it had been light until the broadcast of a "Letter from Freddy" on October 1.* In what was called the first of a two-part report, "Freddy" devoted most of his space to praising Castro's speech but added "the talks appear to have been fruitful" and predicted that they "will be repeated on a large scale." Several short Soviet reports on the weekend visit of Javits and Pell to Cuba seemed to offer mild encouragement to such contacts. Admitting that the trip was undertaken "despite the opinion of the State Department," a TASS report on the 27th concluded that this was the "first real step to normalize relations" between the two nations. The visit, the Moscow domestic radio noted on the 28th, was "proof of growing feelings" in congress and public opinion in favor of "abrogating the policy of boycotting Cuba--a policy that has failed."

* The Freddy letters, fictitious reports supposedly sent from a Cuban expatriate now living in the United States, are a device used by commentator Guido Garcia Inclan to treat sensitive topics.

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MOSCOW HANDLING OF CASTRO SPEECH Soviet media, which since Brezhnev's visit to Cuba in January have given cautious indications of Soviet support for the "normalization" of U.S.-Cuban relations, gave slight coverage to Castro's speech. The only available Soviet reaction thus far, a TASS English-language report on the 29th, said that Castro "stressed the need for united action" by petroleum producers and underdeveloped countries. However, nothing was said of Castro's attack on the U.S. oil statements, although the Soviet media have replayed criticism from other countries.

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VIETNAM

DRV REVEALS HIGH-LEVEL AGRICULTURAL CONFERENCE HELD IN AUGUST

Hanoi media have belatedly publicized an eight-day "lowland and midland" agricultural conference that began on 5 August in one of the DRV's top rice-producing provinces. According to the initial 28 September Hanoi radio report, the conference was sponsored by the party Secretariat and heard addresses by First Secretary Le Duan, Premier Pham Van Dong, and VWP Central Committee Secretaries To Huu and Hoang Anh. The leaders' speeches confirmed the regime's continuing preoccupation with increasing farm output and disclosed plans for a movement to reorganize agriculture and improve its lower-level management. Also on the 28th, Hanoi radio broadcast excerpts from a 16 September Central Committee Secretariat directive, which had been discussed in draft form at the conference, detailing the provisions of North Vietnam's latest approach to its agricultural problems.

The holding of the conference in the delta province of Thai Binh--touted in the report as "the first five-ton province"--and the leadoff assertion in the report that the fifth month-spring crop has been "highly successful" seem calculated to inspire and encourage even further successes in increasing food production. Hanoi has only recently been claiming a "highly" successful harvest for its fifth month-spring crop. Earlier reports, possibly because all the statistics were not yet compiled, were more cautious. For example, the 16 September NHAN DAN editorial on spring crop preparations reported the latest harvest as only "fairly successful."

Subsequent Hanoi broadcasts of what appear to be texts of the speeches by Le Duan and Hoang Anh are not available in translation as of this writing, but it is clear from summary versions that the primary concern is food production and the feeding of the people; at the same time the stated intent of the new movement is to advance agriculture toward the ultimate goal of large-scale socialist production. The order of agricultural priorities was made clear by Le Duan in his closing day address to the conference. He declared the country must "strive to meet the people's requirements in grain and foodstuffs; rapidly accelerate production of export goods; and meet industry's demands for raw material and labor." These latest goals show little change, allowing for war-time exigencies, from those enunciated by the 19th VWP plenum held in 1971. Thus, the 19th plenum resolution called for agriculture to "provide a full supply of grain and food products to

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meet the needs of the army and people; provide a supply of raw materials for industry and produce many agricultural products for exportation in exchange for materials, equipment, and machinery; and provide a full supply of manpower for combat, combat support, industry, and other sectors."

Former Central Agricultural Commission Chairman Hoang Anh's important role at the conference suggests he remains as one of the regime's top agricultural spokesmen. Although Anh was relieved of his position as head of the Agricultural Commission in a broad reorganization of the government in late April, he has continued to carry out many of the duties associated with his former post and on at least one occasion he was again identified, perhaps by mistake, as the chairman of the Agricultural Commission--in a 27 July NHAN DAN account of a message from the commission on the 10th-month rice crop.*

The directive--"on the reorganization of agricultural production and gradual improvement of agricultural management"--enumerated the many shortcomings facing agriculture, admitting that there has been a slowness in even recognizing the problems that need to be solved. Measures planned to reorganize agriculture as called for in the directive are discussed in terms of the roles played by cooperatives, villages, districts, provinces and central level branches, and party organizations.

The directive recalled plans--first announced by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi in his National Assembly speech last February and again by National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh at the youth conference the same month--to hold in 1974 a nationwide congress of peasant members of agricultural cooperatives to "discuss and adopt" a statute on high-level cooperatives. In what may be an indication that the original plans for the congress have been watered down, the directive only vaguely called for "promoting" the congress, without specifying when it would be held or at what level. While the directive did mention the statute in this same context, it failed to provide any details on its future adoption, merely asking that its implementation be discussed in coordination with the reorganization of management and production.

* For a discussion of his removal and the reorganization, see the TRENDS of 1 May 1974, pages 2-3.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

HANOI, PEKING, THAI CP DIVERGE ON THAILAND ISSUES

Almost a year after the installation of the Thai civilian government led by Prime Minister Sanya Thammasak, comment from Hanoi, Peking and Thai Communist Party media reflects divergent attitudes toward the regime and its ties with the United States. During the Indochina war the two communist states and the Thai CP had assumed a virtual united front and were uniformly critical of Bangkok and its links with Washington. This unanimity has disappeared under the impact of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, the peace agreements in Vietnam and Laos, the gradual reduction of U.S. military forces in Thailand, and the return of civilian rule to Bangkok.

Presently only Hanoi shows acute sensitivity over the U.S. military presence in Thailand and close Bangkok-Washington cooperation in Southeast Asia, viewing U.S.-Thai "collusion" as a direct threat to Indochina. By contrast, with the improvement of Sino-U.S. relations over the past two years, Peking media now largely ignore the U.S. presence and refrain from linking Thailand to the situation in Indochina. At the same time, Peking's corresponding desire to improve bilateral Thai-PRC relations has been reflected in a drastic reduction in Chinese criticism of Bangkok's internal policies. The Thai CP clandestine radio station based in China--the "Voice of the People of Thailand"--has continued to criticize the Thai Government and the presence of U.S. military forces, but has played down the relationship of those forces to Indochina.

HANOI For a brief period after the January 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam, Hanoi appeared willing to moderate its traditionally hostile attitude toward the Thanom Kittikhachon military government in Bangkok. Evidence of a more favorable climate on both sides for accommodation surfaced when DRV and PRC delegations to the Joint Military Commission cordially met with Thai officials during a stopover in Bangkok on 28 January 1973 en route to their posts in Saigon. Hanoi media, while not publicizing the stopover, began treating Thailand and the Thanom government less critically than in the past. Thus, whereas a 12 January 1973 Hanoi radio commentary on U.S. bases in Thailand had assailed Thanom personally as a "vile U.S. lackey," only a month later a 15 February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on Secretary Kissinger's visit in Bangkok used such neutral terms as "Kittikhachon, Thailand's leader" and "Thai authorities" in referring to the Bangkok government.

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A harsher Hanoi attitude toward Bangkok reemerged only after the transfer of U.S. command headquarters from South Vietnam to Thailand, when it was apparent that Thailand would continue to play a major role in the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia. Thus, a 22 April Hanoi radio commentary deplored evidence of Thai cooperation with the United States and criticized the "reactionary Thai ruling clique," and North Vietnamese media in the following days resumed attacking Bangkok leaders by name. The reduced U.S. profile in Indochina following the 15 August 1973 halt to bombing in Cambodia and the concurrent U.S.-Thai agreement on the initial stage of U.S. military withdrawal brought no moderation to Hanoi's invective. A 27 August NHAN DAN commentary pegged to the U.S. withdrawal announcement questioned Washington's intentions and accused the "Thanom Kittikhachon reactionary administration" of tailing after the United States in a futile effort to make the Nixon Doctrine succeed in Southeast Asia.

Hanoi welcomed the overthrow of the Thanom government in October 1973 but was cautious about public evaluation of the new civilian administration under Sanya, seeming to adopt a wait-and-see attitude toward the latter's promises to improve relations with Indochinese countries. After several months of restraint, a 12 May 1974 NHAN DAN article finally voiced Hanoi's negative assessment of the Sanya regime and charged that it had failed to follow through on its announced intentions to improve relations. The article, attributed to "Observer," particularly condemned the continued U.S. military presence in Thailand, Bangkok allegations about a DRV threat to Thai security, and Bangkok's policies toward Vietnamese nationals in Thailand. Specifying conditions for establishing "friendly relations" with Thailand, Observer asserted that Bangkok must "stop its collusion" with Washington against Vietnam, refrain from slandering DRV intentions toward Thailand, and release Vietnamese residents in Thailand who had been "illegally detained."

The Observer article did not include a U.S. withdrawal from Thailand among its conditions for improved DRV-Thai relations, but the demand for a U.S. pullout has been repeatedly voiced in authoritative Hanoi statements. Hanoi's intention to pressure Bangkok on this question was underlined in a 7 September 1974 DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement that interpreted recently proposed Thai legislation to expand Bangkok's control over U.S. forces as a plot to legalize the U.S. military presence. The bill's sponsor, former foreign minister Thanat Khoman--an

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independent-minded legislator whose views are frequently cited favorably in Thai communist broadcasts--was pointedly criticized by accompanying Hanoi comment. The spokesman's statement supported the Thai people's struggle for complete U.S. withdrawal and said that an end to Thai Government involvement in U.S. moves against Indochinese countries remained "a basic condition" for the establishment of friendly DRV-Thai relations.

PEKING Peking began to moderate criticism of the U.S. military presence in Thailand almost a year before the Paris peace agreement, reflecting the changes in Sino-U.S. relations at the time of President Nixon's February 1972 visit to China. The Chinese had previously joined the Vietnamese in condemning U.S. forces in Thailand and the use of Thai-based planes in Indochina, but by early 1972 Peking's increasingly sanguine view of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia resulted in a marked decline in such criticism. There was no comparable moderation in PRC criticism of the Bangkok government until August 1972, when Peking media abandoned previous abusive attacks on the "Thanom-Prapath clique." In September and October 1972 Peking took its first step toward improving bilateral PRC-Thai relations by welcoming official Thai envoys to China.

Peking's new line was clearly demonstrated in its comment on the 30th anniversary of the Thai CP on 1 December 1972. Departing from past practice, Chinese media did not publicize the PRC leaders' message of greetings on the occasion. The message itself, as carried by VOPT, seemed calculated to minimize Peking's long-standing identification with the Thai insurgency. The message generally praised the Thai party for its "great contribution to the liberation struggle" in Thailand but did not mention the Thai Government, instead referring to "local reactionaries." It conspicuously avoided associating the Chinese with the strategy of people's war in Thailand and did not mention Chinese support.

Following the signing of the Paris agreement, Peking media have occasionally noted the U.S. military presence in Thailand but have exhibited none of Hanoi's concern about it. Thus, Peking media reports on the August 1973 U.S.-Thai agreement on the first stage of U.S. military withdrawals did not echo Vietnamese skepticism about the move or cite reports that the United States planned to retain a permanent residual force.

Peking's general caution in its treatment of Bangkok authorities continued after the assumption of power by Sanya in October 1973. However, Chinese media have shown somewhat less restraint than

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during Thanom's rule. Since the change in the Thai Government, NCNA has carried more reports on fighting and urban unrest in Thailand and has given somewhat more attention to the Thai CP. Most recently, for example, NCNA marked the 7 August anniversary of the Thai insurrection--an anniversary ignored by Peking media in the previous year--with accounts of VOPT comment dwelling upon insurgent battle successes. NCNA duly noted the comment's focus on armed struggle as the proper route to liberation but omitted references to the United States and mentioned the Sanya government only once.

THAI CP The Voice of the People of Thailand broadcasts have never reflected any moderation of the Thai CP's hostility toward the authorities in Bangkok, despite the change in the stance of the Thai communists' Chinese mentors. The party has also continued to criticize the U.S. military presence in Thailand as an affront to Thai sovereignty, although since the Vietnam peace agreement it has paid less attention to the relationship of these forces to Indochina.

Thai CP propaganda after the change of government in October 1973 dismissed the Sanya regime as basically the same "reactionary clique" that had ruled Thailand for years. The communists have also continued to call for armed struggle to seize power, although the increased importance of the mass movements that brought the downfall of the Thanom administration has been recognized in expanded VOPT comment encouraging urban political movements, demonstrations, and strikes.

The party's more favorable assessment of political trends in Thai cities has also given a more optimistic cast to its view of the overall situation in Thailand. Thus, while Thai CP comment in 1972 on the 7 August anniversary of their insurrection underlined the difficulties facing their struggle, this year the VOPT editorial on the anniversary dwelt upon the achievements of the political struggle in the past year and characterized the insurgents' situation as "excellent."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 23 - 29 SEPTEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2754 items)</u>			<u>Peking (791 items)</u>		
Hungarian Party Leader	(--)	11%	Philippines First Lady	(4%)	14%*
Kadar in USSR			Imelda Marcos in PRC		
[Suslov Friendship	(--)	3%]	UNGA Session	(6%)	7%
Rally Speech			Mauritanian President	(13%)	5%**
UNGA Session	(8%)	6%	Daddah in PRC, DPRK		
[Gromyko Speech	(--)	3%]	Mozambique Independence	(3%)	3%
24 September			Yugoslavia	(--)	3%
Asian Peace and Security	(--)	6%	[Anti-Regime	(--)	2%]
Conference, Samarkand			Group Exposed		
[Brezhnev Greetings	(--)	3%]	Criticism of Lin Piao	(5%)	3%
China	(7%)	5%	and Confucius		
Guinea Bissau Indepen-	(--)	4%			
dence Declaration					
First Anniversary					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Imelda Marcos.

** This figure excludes brief reports on Chou En-lai's meeting with Daddah.