

██████████ TCP 45-74

STATSPED  
Approved For Release 1995/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070046-8

Trends in Communist Propaganda

6 Nov 74

C 1 of 1  
(Vol. XXV, No. 45)

**Confidential**


**F B I S**

# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.



**STATSPEC**

National Security Information  
Unauthorized disclosure subject to  
criminal sanctions

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CONTENTS

CYPRUS	
Soviet Conference Idea Pushed, Criticism of Turkey Avoided . . . . .	1
MIDDLE EAST	
Belyayev Outspoken on U.S., USSR Policies, Brezhnev Trip, PLO. . . . .	3
U.S.-EAST EUROPE RELATIONS	
Romania, Yugoslavia Voice Satisfaction With Kissinger Visits . . . . .	8
USSR-FRG	
Brezhnev Sets Adamant Moscow Tone on West Berlin Issue . . . . .	10
CEMA-EC RELATIONS	
Brezhnev-Schmidt Statement Endorses "Official" Contacts. . . . .	13
MBFR-CSCE	
Warsaw Pact "Compromise" Proposal Labeled "Genuine Concession" . . . . .	15
INDOCHINA	
Communists Optimistic About Current Strategy in South Vietnam. . . . .	17
North Vietnamese Conference Discusses Local Military Tasks . . . . .	19
Cambodian Front Economic Delegation Visits Hanoi, Peking . . . . .	20
CHINA	
Campaign Focuses on Production, Unity; Hits Factionalism . . . . .	23
Peking Asks Cadres to Inspire Production Through Manual Labor. . . . .	24
USSR	
Rehabilitation of Molotov Hinted in New Encyclopedia Article . . . . .	26
NOTES	
Cuban "Counterrevolutionary"; Pyongyang Stress on Loyalty, Ideology; PRC Pig Raising . . . . .	23
APPENDIX	
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. . . . .	i

6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 1 -

## C Y P R U S

## SOVIET CONFERENCE IDEA PUSHED, CRITICISM OF TURKEY AVOIDED

Moscow gave minimal attention to the UNGA debate on Cyprus, welcoming with qualifications the resolution adopted on 1 November. A TASS dispatch by Romantsov on the 2d noted approvingly that the resolution urged respect for Cyprus' independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonaligned policy and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign military forces, but nevertheless complained that it was not without flaws. It was silent, Romantsov said, about the factors causing the tragedy and failed to reflect "some constructive proposals" for solving the problem--an implicit reference to the proposal in the 22 August Soviet Government statement for an international conference under UN auspices. Again pressing for acceptance of the Soviet initiative, Romantsov interpreted the UNGA resolution's "provision for further UN responsibility" as recognition of the value of "the proposals" for an international conference.

**TURKISH ROLE** Soviet media continue to accuse "leading NATO circles" of attempting to impose a solution and trying to make the Cypriot people reconcile themselves to the "fact of partition." Criticism of Turkey's role is still expressed only indirectly: A commentator on Moscow radio's international roundtable on 3 November professed to be impressed by the Greek Cypriot refugees' "surprising maturity" in blaming the tragedy on the former Greek junta, NATO, the CIA, and Cypriot EOKA-B terrorists, when "it was easiest for them to accuse those causing their fear and flight--the Turkish army." And a Gerasimov English-language commentary on the 4th remarked that territory producing 70 percent of Cyprus' gross national product "continues to be occupied by foreign troops."

Soviet opposition to geographical federation was reportedly expressed by Podgorny to a Turkish parliamentary delegation which visited the Soviet Union in mid-October. According to the 30 October Istanbul HURRIYET, Podgorny told the visitors that the USSR would like "administration given to the Turkish Cypriots in local organizations where the Turkish Cypriots were in the majority," and he insisted that all foreign forces must immediately leave the island. TASS in reporting Podgorny's meeting with the delegation said only that Podgorny explained the Soviet stand on the Cyprus issue and stressed the importance of Moscow's proposal for a conference under UN auspices. Commenting

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 2 -

on this meeting, a broadcast by the Turkish-language clandestine "Our Radio" on 23 October attacked the head of the Turkish delegation for reportedly saying that Turkey had used "other means" to settle the Cyprus issue. In one of its strongest denunciations of Turkey's Cyprus policy, Our Radio accused Ankara of having "engendered bloodshed, terror, destruction and the hysteria of ardent chauvinism," occupying more than half of Cyprus, dividing the island and imposing the "American imperialist" plan to convert Cyprus into a U.S. and NATO base.

A Turkish-language commentary broadcast on the 22d, after the parliamentary delegation's visit, seemed to suggest that Moscow would not be averse to exploiting Ankara's problems with Washington over military aid. TASS had reported without comment the Congressional struggle to pass a resolution banning military aid to Turkey over Presidential veto, and the compromise bill signed on 18 October under which aid would continue until 10 December provided, TASS noted, that "Turkey observe the cease-fire in Cyprus, not increase its troop contingent in Cyprus, and not send to Cyprus the 'tools of war' it receives from the United States." The 22 October broadcast to Turkey, praising in generalities Moscow's "policy of developing good-neighborly relations" with Ankara, called this policy of particular importance for Turkey at a time when "Turkey is meeting with certain difficulties in a series of international problems, including its relations with its NATO allies."

Moscow for the most part has not brought up the Cyprus problem in discussing the governmental crisis in Turkey stemming from Prime Minister Ecevit's resignation on 18 September. But an article by Shmarov in NEW TIMES (No. 41, 11 October) on the governmental situation observed that the interparty friction in Ecevit's coalition government had been intensified by Turkey's acute economic difficulties. Shmarov remarked that the financial problems had been aggravated by the "heavy cost" of maintaining Turkish troops in Cyprus. While the government, Shmarov said, hoped to cover these expenditures "by means of an 'Operation Peace' government bond issue," economists believed these hopes to be unfounded.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 3 -

## MIDDLE EAST

## BELYAYEV OUTSPOKEN ON U.S., USSR POLICIES, BREZHNEV TRIP, PLO

One of the Soviet Union's top Middle East specialists, Igor P. Belyayev, has suggested recently that Moscow intends to project a more active and visible presence in that area, beginning with Brezhnev's visit to several Arab countries in January 1975. An undated interview, which internal evidence indicates was held within the past three weeks, was published on 4 November by the independent Beirut daily AN-NAHAR. Belyayev was remarkably candid in responding to a series of topical and politically sensitive questions. He addressed such issues as the political calculations underlying Brezhnev's forthcoming trip, Soviet policy on the possible formation of an independent Palestinian state and/or government-in-exile, the influence of past and present U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, and the differences in U.S. and Soviet approaches to a final peace settlement.

Belyayev--along with his former PRAVDA colleague Primakov--exercised similar frankness in the past in forthrightly discussing substantive Middle East issues and Soviet policies. AN-NAHAR described Belyayev as PRAVDA's "chief commentator and expert on the Middle East and Arab-Soviet affairs," noting that as a PRAVDA correspondent in Cairo from 1957-1963 he had established a close relationship with Egyptian President Nasir and since 1963 "has visited the area once or more every year and held contacts with senior officials."\*

**BREZHNEV VISIT** In discussing Soviet motives for Brezhnev's first visit to the Middle East since becoming party leader in late 1964, Belyayev for the most part eschewed stereotyped praise for the trip's contribution to peaceful and cooperative interstate relations. He instead emphasized, in plainspoken terms, Moscow's intention to assert its interests in the Middle East more forcefully than heretofore:

I believe it is time for the Soviet Union to show that it will have a very active and

---

\* From 1957-1970 Belyayev was associated with PRAVDA and wrote extensively on Middle East topics. At one time, he was a deputy foreign editor; at another, the editor of PRAVDA's Asia and Africa department. Since late 1970 he has been identified as deputy director of the Africa Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences, but has occasionally contributed articles to PRAVDA and other journals.

- 4 -

positive role in the area. It is time for us to show that we are in the area, we have a presence in it, and that we are not negativists. From this stems the importance of Brezhnev's visit.

In this context Belyayev expressed Moscow's evident resentment over charges that it has thus far played a "negative," if not negligible, role in the diplomatic efforts to arrange a Middle East settlement. He recalled that Brezhnev had "once" replied to "certain journalists" who had raised this criticism. (Brezhnev in fact had responded testily last March to French journalists who had remarked on the "impression" that the USSR had in some measure withdrawn itself from the Mideast problem. Calling that impression "superficial," Brezhnev insisted that "not for a minute did we leave the Middle East outside the sphere of our attention.") Belyayev stressed that the USSR had in fact made positive preliminary steps toward arranging a peace settlement, but that "the activity of certain politicians in the region eclipsed our efforts." Belyayev was distinctly defensive on the issue, claiming that "the Soviet Union's role in the Middle East crisis is being misunderstood" and asserting, as a corrective, that the USSR was doing everything possible to arrange a just and lasting peace. He added that, "however, this peace cannot be contrary to Soviet interests."

USSR-EGYPT            Belyayev did not mention the 14-18 October visit to  
RELATIONS            Moscow of an Egyptian Government delegation, headed  
                         by Foreign Minister Fahmi, during which a joint  
Soviet-Egyptian "announcement" on the 15th had first officially  
stated that Brezhnev would visit Egypt in January 1975.\* But  
Belyayev did confirm reports by some Arab media that Brezhnev  
would visit unspecified "other Arab countries" in addition to  
Egypt--AN-NAHAR speculated they would be Iraq, Algeria and Syria.  
The inclusion of additional countries on Brezhnev's itinerary,  
presumably to increase the scope and significance of the tour,  
would at the same time dilute the political impact of Brezhnev's  
first visit to Cairo to try to mend strained Soviet-Egyptian  
relations and return as-Sadat's Moscow visits. Belyayev did not  
pursue this particular point, but when asked if Brezhnev's trip  
would begin a new chapter in Soviet relations with the countries  
visited, he drew a distinction between expectations of "strengthening

---

\* For details of the Fahmi delegation visit, see the TRENDS of  
23 October 1974, pages 1-7.



6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 5 -

and improving relations with Egypt" and "consolidating traditional relations" with the other countries involved.

Some of Belyayev's additional comments on Brezhnev's trip testified to persistent strains in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Rather than presenting a forward-looking view of these relations, for example, Belyayev highlighted the existence "recently" of a "misunderstanding between the Egyptian and Soviet leaderships." He also charged that "certain elements in Egypt, especially among the rightists and traditionalists, and several journalists," have wanted Soviet-Egyptian relations to worsen, playing a "dishonest game" in asserting that "America will solve the problems of Egypt and the Arab world."

Asked what tangible results he foresaw from Brezhnev's visit to Egypt, Belyayev refrained from predicting concrete agreements that might be announced during the visit itself. He expressed, rather, a general belief that the visit would lead to improved Soviet-Egyptian cooperation in several fields and that the discussions would cover Soviet military assistance, scientific, technical and educational matters, and economic questions, including Egypt's desire for the USSR "to contribute to the five-year development plan." Belyayev added, "As for nuclear cooperation, if this question is raised seriously by Egypt, then it will be discussed during the visit."

PALESTINIAN ISSUES      Belyayev's remarks on Soviet policy toward the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the complex of issues related to the Palestinian question, although generally consistent with Soviet comment in recent months, were more explicit on several key points and suggested that Moscow's support of the PLO might be expected to increase. Thus, asked whether Brezhnev during his trip to the Middle East would meet with PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat, Belyayev responded, "Why not? Such a meeting is quite logical and conforms with our Palestinian policy," qualifying his remarks only by adding that such a meeting would depend on the trip agenda. A question regarding Soviet policy toward the creation of an independent Palestinian state evoked the reply that the Palestinians must find a way to establish such a state and that 'Arafat was told by Soviet officials during his visit to Moscow last summer that the USSR supported the idea.\* Belyayev expanded, "This means, in practice, that the Soviet

\* Neither the AN-NAHAR interviewer or Belyayev mentioned the resolution on the Palestinian question at the 26-29 October Arab summit in Rabat. For a discussion of 'Arafat's visit to Moscow 30 July-3 August 1974, see the TRENDS of 7 August 1974, pages 12-14. For details on the Rabat conference, see the TRENDS of 31 October 1974, pages 4-5.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 6 -

Union will support this state and help it when it is established. We are ready to cooperate in all fields." On the related question of a government-in-exile being formed while the Palestinians await land for a new national state, Belyayev responded that Moscow would consider it a "positive step" and "will surely recognize it." Belyayev also ventured that the United States would in time, despite statements to the contrary, recognize the PLO.

**U.S. POLICY** Belyayev sought at several points in the interview to draw a picture of diminishing U.S. influence in Middle East affairs, while seeking to convey a contrasting impression of emergent Soviet diplomatic activity. Alleging a belief by "certain people" in "American miracles that will solve the Arabs' problems," for instance, Belyayev referred disdainfully to the miracles' "limited and modest results." He also asserted that Secretary Kissinger--who arrived in Cairo the day after AN-NAHAR published Belyayev's interview--"is no longer strong enough to exert real pressure on Israel," charging in addition that U.S. policy has not only failed to deliver "era of happiness, prosperity, and stability" in the Middle East but has had the opposite effect. Belyayev criticized "unilateral diplomacy" and, in line with Moscow's comment over the past year, contrasted the U.S. approach with "the more suitable way to a real solution"--resumption of the Geneva conference.

**GENEVA TALKS** Although reiterating a standard Soviet call, Belyayev expressed Moscow's advocacy of a renewed Geneva conference in forceful language.

We say: Anyone who wants a real solution must go to Geneva. This is the real keystone. We do not believe in so-called "quiet and secret diplomacy." The Soviet Union must participate in every effort and in every tangible action to achieve a just peace in the Middle East. We insist on this. . . . The United States wants the Geneva conference to be the final stage, at which what has been agreed upon will be signed. This is wrong.

Belyayev also expressed concern that the Geneva conference may not occur "before April or May or even before the coming summer" and claimed that the date could be advanced if the Arab states took a unanimous position on the issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

Other Soviet comment has also been criticizing "quiet diplomacy" and insisting that the Soviet Union be a party to efforts for a settlement. Thus a Losev commentary broadcast in English to North America on 31 October charged "groups in the United States" with trying to postpone the Geneva conference and supplant a comprehensive settlement with partial decisions and separate agreements. Losev accused the same American "groups" with also attempting to eliminate the Soviet Union from a Mideast settlement and to "impair Soviet interests," and he asserted that "there can be no fair peace settlement in present conditions without the active participation of the Soviet Union."

Earlier, a Vladimirov article in the October INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (signed to press 19 September) had been unusually explicit in outlining Soviet views of Geneva conference procedure. While comment normally has gone no further than to press for the speediest resumption of the talks, Vladimirov claimed that an important benefit of the Geneva machinery lay in the fact that it made it possible to examine simultaneously "the whole complex or several key questions while using the most varied forms of talks and contacts such as plenary sessions, committees, working groups, and bilateral and multilateral meetings and contacts of other sorts." He indicated still another reason why Moscow preferred the Geneva arrangement: It provides the opportunity to overcome such obstacles as "the absence of diplomatic relations between any particular participants"--implicitly, Israel and the Soviet Union.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

## U. S. - EAST EUROPE RELATIONS

## ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA VOICE SATISFACTION WITH KISSINGER VISITS

Bucharest and Belgrade responded to Secretary Kissinger's brief 3-4 November visits with positive assessments of their relations with the United States. Both Ceausescu and Tito indicated satisfaction with their talks and also voiced support for the Secretary's subsequent visit to the Mideast regarding an Arab-Israeli settlement. Belgrade media were markedly effusive about the visit in the wake of the Secretary's favorable comments on nonalignment in a recent speech in New Delhi.

Bucharest's preoccupation in its relations with the United States--the receiving of most-favored-nation status--was exhibited during the visit. The issue was highlighted by Ceausescu during a 3 November interview with U.S. and other foreign newsmen and reported by AGERPRES. Noting "satisfaction" with the development of "relations of friendship and cooperation" between the two countries, he pointed out that "some problems" do exist but singled out only MFN as a sorepoint. Ceausescu also made a point of stating that the Secretary had assured him Romania would receive MFN status "in the near future" and added that they had thus agreed to initiate negotiations on a trade agreement. Ceausescu's mildly positive assessment of U.S.-Romanian relations was balanced with his characterization of Soviet-Romanian relations as "proceeding in good condition" and based on the reality that "we are neighbors, socialist countries--and our relations develop correspondingly." Bucharest media have not originated additional comment beyond that by Ceausescu.

TALKS IN Belgrade's welcoming remarks preceding the Secretary's  
YUGOSLAVIA visit emphasized his New Delhi speech. BORBA on  
3 November, for example, described them as "a completely fresh assessment" of nonalignment acknowledging the "full sovereignty, equality and independence of the policy of small countries, a formula paying tribute to the positive role of nonaligned policy in international life." Against such a background, the media assessed the Secretary's Belgrade visit as one of "exceptionally great interest" and as "one of the very important events" in relations between the two countries. They uniformly predicted that the Secretary's talks with Tito and other leaders would conclude "satisfactorily" so long as he recognized that Yugoslavia's nonaligned role necessitated that it sometimes take international positions in opposition to the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
FBI'S TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 9 -

Comment following the talks suggested that their outcome furthered the enthusiasm surrounding the visit. Tito himself characterized his discussions as "very good" and noted "identical views" on "many things," adding that he and the Secretary had "agreed that we will continue to further strengthen our relations, which have thus far not been bad." Outspoken Zagreb radio commentator Milika Sundic, who provided the harshest criticism of Secretary Kissinger and U.S. foreign policy prior to the talks, concluded afterward that they "were more cordial, more comprehensive and more useful than could have been expected." And TANJUG's diplomatic editor Velimir Budimir, noting that "official Yugoslav quarters" had assessed the talks "very favorably," praised U.S. acceptance of Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment, emphasizing the Secretary's "assurances" of "U.S. interest in keeping Yugoslavia as she is today." Budimir concluded that U.S. support for Belgrade's nonaligned position "undoubtedly" suggested that both sides planned to intensify bilateral relations "in all fields," pointing out, however, that "no concrete arrangements were considered in that respect. . . ." (Monitored Belgrade media have not commented on a 5 November Washington POST report that Tito and Secretary Kissinger discussed possible U.S. arms supplies to Yugoslavia.)

Belgrade's enthusiasm also seemed mixed with a certain pique that Washington in the past did not give Belgrade proper attention in view of Yugoslavia's own perception of its nonaligned international position. Comment repeatedly referred to the shortness of the seven-hour visit and the paucity of high-level contacts between the two countries and called for more frequent, regular contacts. This was the Secretary's first official visit to Yugoslavia; Secretary Rogers visited Belgrade in July 1972 during a tour of East European capitals.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

## USSR - FRG

## BREZHNEV SETS ADAMANT MOSCOW TONE ON WEST BERLIN ISSUE

During and since the 28-31 October visit to the USSR by FRG Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher, Moscow has been at pains to convey an adamant public stance against any possible concessions to Bonn on West Berlin. Brezhnev, for instance, made clear in his 28 October dinner speech that Moscow was not receptive to reopening "settled" issues involving West Berlin and that any FRG attempts to do so would be unproductive. Moscow's public posture is in sharp contrast with that portrayed by West German leaders' public statements and FRG press reports, which have implied that Moscow privately did not totally obstruct progress. The West Germans indicated that progress was made in Moscow on meeting Bonn's interests in West Berlin, particularly regarding energy supplies to West Berlin and the participation of West Berlin institutions and inhabitants with those of the FRG in bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union.

**BREZHNEV REMARKS** Brezhnev discussed the West Berlin issue in unusually strong terms in his 28 October speech, which on that question reflected the tone of his 6 October speech at GDR anniversary ceremonies in East Berlin in criticizing Bonn's policies on West Berlin. Implicitly referring to pre-visit remarks by Schmidt and Genscher connecting FRG interests in West Berlin with the signing of any future USSR-FRG bilateral economic agreements, Brezhnev told his guests that

attempts are made to create obstacles for mutual understanding in the areas where, it seemed, obstacles have already been overcome. So it happens with the West Berlin issue, which was settled when the four-party agreement was concluded. The agreement, as it is generally admitted, makes it possible to solve successfully practical problems related to West Berlin. Strict observance of the agreement--this is what is needed so that the West Berlin issue should no longer cloud the political atmosphere in the center of Europe. We would like to think that the Federal Government proceeds from the same view.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 11 -

Disagreement over how to acknowledge that the current talks dealt with various aspects of the September 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was reflected in Brezhnev's remarks and the joint statement on the current visit. The Schmidt visit joint statement, released by TASS on the 30th, ambiguously said that the two sides had "discussed the range of questions" regarding implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement "in that portion of it which bears on their bilateral relations and in this context confirmed the joint statement of 21 May 1973." Brezhnev's speech merely used the phrase calling for "strict observance" of the Quadripartite Agreement, without adding a call for its "full implementation," on which the FRG insists. The phrase "full implementation" reflects the wording of the Big Four agreement that West Germany's ties with West Berlin should continue and be strengthened. Both phrases had appeared in the 21 May 1973 FRG-Soviet statement on Brezhnev's visit to the FRG, which declared that Brezhnev and then Chancellor Brandt were unanimous that "strict observance and full implementation" of the Quadripartite Agreement were essential to firm detente in Central Europe and to improve relations between the states concerned, particularly the Soviet Union and the FRG.

PRESS, RADIO COMMENT      Prior to the Schmidt visit, Soviet commentators had reiterated Soviet reluctance to reopen the "settled" West Berlin issue. Nikolay Polyanov, IZVESTIYA first deputy chief editor and German expert, noted in the 27 October Moscow radio observers roundtable that West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and cannot be governed by it--the passage from the Quadripartite Agreement usually cited by Moscow and East Berlin in discussing West Berlin-FRG relations. In a similar vein, Moscow Radio's German specialist Gennadiy Siderov on the 24th ridiculed West German suggestions that Schmidt should "make West Berlin the hinge" of the Moscow talks and insure that discussion of West Berlin was "the focus of the exchange of opinions and the main objective of the visit." In a followup commentary on 1 November, Siderov concluded that "efforts to divert" the Moscow-Bonn dialog "from the main issue were not crowned with success."

In an apparent attempt to lay the West Berlin issue to rest for now, TASS director general Leonid Zamyatin observed on Moscow radio on the 2d that the entire West Berlin question was "settled" in the 1971 agreement, which "created a good basis for the maintenance of a normal, peaceful situation" for West Berlin. Zamyatin placed full blame on Bonn for any difficulties arising over West Berlin, saying: "If the known frictions arise, then the reason for them is

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 12 -

that on the FRG side frequent attempts are made to, as it were, touch up this agreement for their benefit, to evade its pivotal provision--that West Berlin does not belong to and is not governed by the FRG." Pointing out that "the problem only arises when there are violations" of the Quadripartite Agreement, Zamyatin quoted the full passage from the 1973 joint statement and labeled as "far-fetched" the raising of the "so-called West Berlin problem" by the West German press.

CONFIDENTIAL



.. 13 -

## CEMA - EC RELATIONS

## BREZHNEV-SCHMIDT STATEMENT ENDORSES "OFFICIAL" CONTACTS

A brief endorsement of the establishment of organizational ties between CEMA and the Common Market, in the 30 October joint statement issued by Brezhnev and FRG Chancellor Schmidt at the end of the latter's Moscow visit, was the first such official Soviet endorsement since Brezhnev first called for CEMA-EC ties in his 21 December 1972 address on the USSR's 50th anniversary. The joint statement, carried by TASS, said the two leaders agreed that "establishment of official contacts between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the European Economic Community would help broaden and intensify economic contacts between the European countries on the basis of respect for their interests."

Commentaries in support of organizational contacts had appeared sporadically in the media of Moscow and its CEMA allies in the wake of Brezhnev's 1972 endorsement. These commentaries have proliferated in the recent period, a period marked by the 11 October UN General Assembly decision to grant observer status to both CEMA and the EC. Thus, a Kharlanov article in PRAVDA on 8 October noted that West European newspapers were calling increasingly for CEMA-EC contacts "between the organizations themselves," in addition to the existing bilateral trade ties between member countries of the two bodies. The PRAVDA article added, in the same vein as Brezhnev's 1972 speech, that such contacts would be desirable provided the EC did not exert pressure or pose preconditions which could interfere with bilateral economic relations between the respective member states.

A subsequent Chernyshev article in the 13 October KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA stressed that East-West detente had, despite the efforts of its opponents, "created a favorable situation for the further expansion of international business ties, including those between the EC and CEMA." Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 16th echoed the 8 October PRAVDA article in stressing that Moscow and its allies favored CEMA-EC contacts only if bilateral ties were not disrupted. The paper noted that the EC foreign ministers meeting which opened in Luxembourg on the 15th would discuss the question of CEMA-EC contacts.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 14 -

Perhaps to conceal their concern over the status of the bilateral trade agreements, the CEMA countries have not reported the EC countries' decision to cancel such agreements as of next January and to replace them with trade pacts between the EC organization and individual East European countries, including the GDR. Western news reports that CEMA Secretary General Fadeyev has invited EC Commission President Ortoli to visit Moscow before the end of the year, presumably to discuss the EC decision, have likewise not been confirmed by Soviet bloc media.\*

Continued Soviet bloc caution was further underscored in the absence of any mention of CEMA-EC contacts in PRAVDA's report on the 15-17 October CEMA Executive Committee session in the Soviet capital. In addition to announcing routine decisions on intra-CEMA cooperation, the report confined itself to hailing the UN decision on granting CEMA observer status and to a lengthy commemoration of the 10th anniversary of Yugoslav participation in CEMA.

Soviet followup comment on Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow has included only an occasional mention, without elaboration, of the fact that he and Brezhnev had endorsed the establishment of CEMA-EC contacts.

---

\* For discussion of an approach made by Fadeyev to the EC last year, see the TRENDS of 3 October 1973, pages 12-13.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 15 -

M B F R - C S C E

## WARSAW PACT "COMPROMISE" PROPOSAL LABELED "GENUINE CONCESSION"

Moscow and its East European allies have argued publicly that the "new" Warsaw Pact proposal formally introduced by Soviet delegate Oleg Khlestov at the 31 October plenary session of the Vienna force reduction talks is a "concrete" and "compromise" Pact initiative demonstrating the socialist states' "good will" and effort to get the talks moving.\* They have labeled the new proposal a "genuine concession" which, according to TASS on the 31st, takes into account "a number of elements" in the Western stand, includes steps that are "easy to implement," and allows for early advancement at Vienna with "practical results already next year." Comment stressed that "if the Western states show sufficient realism" in responding, as Prague's RUDE PRAVO put it on the 1st, to the "flexibility" demonstrated in the Pact initiative, the socialist states believe the Vienna talks "could take a significant step forward."

Soviet and East European media did not go beyond such laudatory generalities about the Pact proposal until Hungary's NEPSZABADSAG on 2 November published an article by Peter Vajda. He elaborated that the new proposal "suggests a reduction of each side's forces by 20,000 soldiers in 1975, as part of the planned 'first phase,' in such a manner that first the Soviet Union and the United States would reduce their forces and then, in the second half of the year, the rest of the countries participating in the talks." Vajda compared the original Pact proposal with the standing NATO proposal and concluded that the new initiative met Western demands for a first-phase combined Soviet-U.S. reduction, which would then be followed by reductions by the other direct participants in the talks later in the year.

Although available comment on the new move has not mentioned whether air force units or nuclear-armed weapons were included in the new negotiating position, an East Berlin radio commentator on the 4th seemingly alluded to these when he expressed hope that the Pact's "readiness for compromise will also give an impulse to the NATO states to review their positions on other issues that have hindered rapid progress in Vienna."

---

\* See the TRENDS of 31 October 1974, pages 7-9, for a discussion of comment leading up to the new proposal.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 17 -

## INDOCHINA

## COMMUNISTS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT CURRENT STRATEGY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Hanoi comment on alleged GVN military and political weaknesses appears to anticipate a continuing communist strategy of limited military pressure on government forces, based on an underlying assumption that time is working against Saigon. Commentaries present an optimistic evaluation of the situation from the communist vantage point, claiming that the "people" are in "an ascending position" whereas the "enemy is in a declining position." In 1972 a similar formulation was linked to calls for main force attacks to take advantage of the situation and change the balance of forces,\* but current comment advocates no drastic action.

A 6 November NHAN DAN editorial typically added to its evaluation of the ascending and declining forces a prediction that the "people" will continue to advance "steadily" and that the enemy will certainly decline "steadily." The editorial cited reports on alleged communist rainy season achievements to sustain its view that "reality on the battlefield reflects a highly encouraging situation." It maintained that government forces have been unable to launch large counterattacks as they did before, that they are becoming "increasingly passive," and that they are spread thin and lack strategic reserve forces.

Similar points were made in a 31 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary which candidly acknowledged initial communist problems in the wake of the January 1973 Paris peace agreement. The commentary noted that initial ARVN military successes after the Paris agreement had encouraged the United States to believe that the South Vietnamese army could stand on its own. Contrary to these calculations, the commentary asserted, the ARVN's performance and capabilities have steadily declined and the

---

\* Six days prior to the 1972 offensive the North Vietnamese military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor) pressed this evaluation of forces and the need for major attacks, and a similar view was reflected in reports on the 20th party plenum, released after the start of the offensive. (See the TRENDS of 12 April 1972, pages 13-15.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 18 -

continuing war is "seriously gnawing at the combat strength of the Saigon armed forces." Among other things, the paper cited a report in the French press that 1,000 of Saigon's 1,800 aircraft are grounded because of insufficient fuel or poor maintenance and asserted that Saigon's total volume of ammunition only equals the amount used monthly in 1972.

The commentary also claimed that Saigon's initial apparent successes in pacification have proved transitory. Thus, it noted that after the peace agreement, when there were no major uprisings in GVN areas, it appeared that pacification had been successful and that, with a "quiet rearbase," the ARVN could concentrate its forces on the frontline. Rejecting this picture, the commentary claimed that Saigon's subsequent relinquishment of posts in the Mekong Delta indicated the actual instability of its hold on the people. The paper maintained that the GVN "outer defense line was broken" in the 1972 offensive and that "the war is now taking place right in populated areas of the delta." The growing anti-Thieu movement in urban areas was similarly seen as undermining optimistic allied expectations.

The commentary also pointed out that U.S. policy after the peace agreement depended in part on the role of a continuing U.S. deterrent force in the area. The paper did not rule out the possibility that this deterrent force might be used, but, in effect underlining the success of the communists' strategy of limited military pressure, it noted that the deterrent strategy and policy of "containing the revolution" have "failed to keep the puppet forces from sustaining repeated counterblows. . . ."

The possibility that the Ford Administration could not get Congressional approval for the reintroduction of U.S. air or naval forces into Indochina is raised in some other comment. Thus, an 18 October NHAN DAN article by the regular commentator Tran Kien questioned rhetorically whether Congress would accede to such an Administration request in view of previous Congressional abrogation of the Tonkin Gulf resolution and reduction of aid to Saigon, the impact of inflation and the energy shortage, the declining international position of the United States, and dissatisfaction with President Ford among the "majority" of the U.S. people.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 19 -

## NORTH VIETNAMESE CONFERENCE DISCUSSES LOCAL MILITARY TASKS

North Vietnam's local military forces came under high-level review at a "recent" national conference held by the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Secretariat and the Central Military Party Committee and addressed by VWP First Secretary Le Duan, DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, and Colonel General Hoang Van Thai. The brief Hanoi accounts available thus far provide little information on the content of the speeches, although a 5 November radio report on the conference indicated that both Le Duan and Giap broadly surveyed the military situation as well as local military tasks, and that the defense minister made a "profound analysis" of past military "victories."

According to a 6 November QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, the conference was held to disseminate a directive of the VWP Central Committee Secretariat and a resolution of the Central Military Party Committee on local military tasks. The report on the conference noted that the participants pledged to implement the directive and resolution as well as the instructions given them by Le Duan. The Central Military Party Committee resolution is not known to have been carried by Hanoi media. However, a 21 October Hanoi radio summary of the Secretariat directive indicated that it had set forth several major tasks--ranging from the education of cadres and people about national defense to resolving the relationship between the requirements for building up the local military forces and the need to engage in production and socialist construction.

Judging by the radio summary, Le Duan in his speech at the conference underlined the importance of the struggle for "independence and freedom" and the achievement of "national liberation and reunification," but also pointed out the significance of economic construction in North Vietnam. The first secretary maintained that the tasks involved in the democratic national revolution in the South and the socialist revolution in the North are "inseparable," and he called for the close coordination of the development of local armed forces with the implementation of production plans.

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the conference noted that the situation in South Vietnam "has exerted and will constantly exert an impact on the North," requiring vigilance and readiness to cope with "all eventualities." In addition to discussing the local forces' responsibilities for defending their areas, the editorial called upon localities to mobilize material and human resources to give "reinforcements to the frontline" and to replenish army

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 20 -

units with "many outstanding cadres and combatants." The editorial not only noted that local areas should meet the regular recruitment drive but that local areas must be prepared to meet "requirements of expanding the army when necessary."

## CAMBODIAN FRONT ECONOMIC DELEGATION VISITS HANOI, PEKING

An "economic and financial" delegation from the Cambodian "liberated zone" has begun an aid-seeking tour of foreign countries, visiting Hanoi from 28 October to 3 November and traveling on to Peking. Led by Ieng Sary, "special advisor" to RGNU Deputy Prime Minister and chief insurgent leader Khieu Samphan, the delegation has been given high-level receptions in both capitals. Ieng Sary previously headed a delegation to Hanoi in 1971, but the last high-level delegation from the Cambodian interior to tour abroad was one led by Khieu Samphan that traveled last spring to a number of nonaligned and communist countries, including North Vietnam and China. The only aid agreement announced during Khieu Samphan's trip was a 26 May 1974 agreement covering Chinese military aid to the insurgents for 1974.

HANOI Even with the warm reception given the Cambodian delegation in Hanoi, the narrow economic focus of its mission has resulted in somewhat less effusive treatment than marked Ieng Sary's other official visit to the DRV as the head of an RGNU-FUNK military-diplomatic delegation in November 1971. That visit, unlike the present stay, resulted in a formal communique and prompted two Hanoi mass meetings and authoritative comment in the leading Hanoi dailies. Just as in 1971, however, the delegation this time was received by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, on 30 and 29 October respectively. These meetings, and one with Le Duc Tho on the 31st, were all said to have occurred in an atmosphere full of "fraternal militant solidarity." DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, who hosted Ieng Sary in 1971, performed similar honors at the start of the delegation's visit by speaking at a reception for the Cambodians on 28 October; but economic expert Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, who returned to Hanoi from China on the 28th, spoke at a reception on 2 November and saw the delegates off on the 3d.

DRV Vice Premier Dang Viet Chau and Minister Dang Thi attended all the different meetings with the Cambodians, as well as the two receptions, and held separate discussions with the visitors over "economic relations between Vietnam and Cambodia" on 29 October and 1 November. (Chau is the vice premier in charge of finance,

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 21 -

trade, and banking matters, while Dang Thi heads the National Reunification Commission and negotiated the DRV-Lao economic aid agreements in September.) The content of the economic discussions was not publicized, but the presence of two Cambodian officials in charge of regional rubber production committees suggests that exploitation of rubber plantations in the "liberated zone" was one of the topics covered. The nationalization of the plantations had been announced in a 20 July 1974 communique from the office of Kheiu Samphan.

In remarks at the Hanoi receptions, Ieng Sary stressed that the delegation's visit was "the beginning of a great developmental step in the economic and financial relations between our two countries at present as well as in the future." While lauding recent production drives in the liberated zone and the self-reliant spirit of the Cambodians, he acknowledged that the insurgents were "poor in capital and technology" and "will be very glad to receive sincere and unconditional aid from friendly countries." He highlighted the importance of visits to the DRV's "medium- and small-size factories, dams, and worksites" to learn from the Vietnamese "valuable experience." Stressing the importance that development of a prosperous liberated zone had for a possibly long-term struggle to defeat the United States and Lon Nol, Ieng Sary asserted that the "production battle ground" would be vital in the Front liberation drive "no matter how long it may last."

Consistent with past practice, Hanoi did not issue a formal aid agreement with the Cambodians, but DRV spokesmen promised to fulfill their "international duty" in support of the Front. Foreign Minister Trinh on 28 October pledged continued "support and assistance" and backing for Sihanouk's five points. Le Thanh Nghi on 2 November said that the delegation's visit was "a fine success" and embodied "a new developmental step" in "the cooperation and mutual trust between our two countries." A 4 November NHAN DAN commentary said the visit provided the Vietnamese people with an opportunity "to reaffirm their determination to fulfill their internationalist obligation toward their Cambodian brothers."

PEKING Arriving in China on 3 November, the Cambodians were greeted at the airport by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and prominent RGNU officials in Peking, held talks that evening with Politburo Standing Committee Member Chang Chun-chiao and Li, and were feted at a banquet hosted by Li and attended by Chang. Li also held talks with the delegates on the 4th and accompanied Ieng Sary at the Peking airport that day to greet Prince Sihanouk,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 22 -

who was returning from a trip to Algeria. Lower-ranking Chinese economic and trade officials attended both meetings with the Cambodians, and the meeting on the 3d included PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Chang Tsai-chien and Political Commissar of the PLA General Logistic Department Chang Chih-ming.

Speaking at the banquet on the 3d, Li lauded the insurgents' "correct line of people's war" against the "traitorous Lon Nol clique," praised the "remarkable achievements" of the Cambodians' recent "mass production campaign," gave generalized support for Sihanouk's stance on a Cambodian settlement, and promised that the Chinese Government and people would "go all out to support" the Cambodian struggle. While routinely describing the present difficulties of the Lon Nol government, Li offered Peking's first authoritative criticism of last July's Lon Nol peace offer, asserting that "not long ago, the traitorous Phnom Penh clique under U.S. instigation made a 'peace negotiation' proposal in an attempt to hoodwink public opinion." Though noting the offer had been attacked in Cambodia and by world public opinion, Li discreetly avoided an explicit Chinese condemnation of the move.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 23 -

## C H I N A

## CAMPAIGN FOCUSES ON PRODUCTION, UNITY; HITS FACTIONALISM

An article in the November issue of RED FLAG entitled "Master the Dialectical Method of One Dividing into Two" has offered an ideological rationale for shifting the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign away from mass criticism and making it a force to aid economic production. Evidently addressing the objections of those apparently opposed to the recent calls for all groups to unite behind the nationwide production drive, the article argued that class struggle is "sometimes tense, sometimes not so tense," and chided those who pay "no attention to the different stages" of class struggle and mistakenly "struggle against everyone and negate the alliance." The article explained that "we do not mean to negate struggle while stressing unity." Struggle should be continued, it was carefully noted, but only by the method of "putting facts on the table and reasoning things out." Stressing the need to continue criticism of Lin and Confucius and to strengthen party leadership over production, the article urged that greater efforts be made to increase production of agricultural and light industrial goods in order to "provide us with more daily necessities" and help speed the development of heavy industry.

The RED FLAG article's concern for strengthening unity and increasing production has been echoed in several recent provincial broadcasts denouncing factionalism. Two unusually frank broadcasts from Chengtu, for example, revealed that central calls for unity apparently are being misinterpreted or ignored by local groups. A 27 October broadcast of a SZECHWAN NEWSLETTER commentator's article pointed out that calls for unity should not be read as a sign for "small factions to band together." The broadcast stressed the need to avoid "harming comrades" and getting sidetracked into settling "old accounts." A 29 October Chengtu broadcast of another SZECHWAN NEWSLETTER commentator's article warned errant party members to turn away from "bourgeois factionalism" and to strengthen their party spirit. The need for greater "harmony among ourselves" was urged in a HUNAN DAILY editorial, broadcast by Changsha radio on 23 October, which stressed closing ranks politically and striking out only at genuine enemies of the people.

The most specific warning against allowing factionalism to disrupt the current stage of the campaign was contained in a 31 October Taiyuan report on a recent provincial meeting held to map out

CONFIDENTIAL

- 24 -

fourth quarter production tasks in Shansi. Local officials at the meeting warned against "settling accounts later or launching revenge attacks on those . . . who put up big character posters about us during the movement." The meeting concluded that errant cadres must be given a chance to correct their mistakes by carrying out "self-criticism" and the masses must be educated to look ahead to the future, rather than getting "tangled in settling old scores."

#### PEKING ASKS CADRES TO INSPIRE PRODUCTION THROUGH MANUAL LABOR

A 31 October PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary on the example set by Inner Mongolian leaders who did manual labor at a rail station in Huhehot has inspired emulation by a number of other PRC provincial leaders, including party Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng, according to Liaoning radio on 4 November. The PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary claimed that rail efficiency had "rapidly increased" as a result of these cadres' labors and called for the practice to be "widely popularized" on a permanent basis, especially in units which have "an important influence on the whole situation." Thus far almost all cadres reported doing manual labor have worked in either rail transport or coal production, indicating the importance accorded production problems that have long infested both fields. A 4 November NCNA roundup of cadre labor activities in seven provinces claimed that the participation of provincial cadres in productive labor has "greatly inspired" the workers and that lower level cadres are also joining the movement.

The attention to cadre labor apparently follows recent central instructions stressing the need to improve economic production in key areas. A 31 October Huhehot account of cadre labor in Inner Mongolia stated that provincial leaders were taking part in manual labor in order to "swiftly implement the important instruction of the party Central Committee." The labor movement lends further emphasis to the attention recently accorded economic production efforts in the PRC, as preparations apparently advance for a "leap forward" next year, the final year of the current five-year plan.

Provincial reports stress that the leaders' attention to labor has already helped resolve rail transport loading problems. The 4 November Shenyang report on cadre labor claimed that on 1 November (Li Te-sheng's first day on the job), one Shenyang station set a new record in loading and unloading boxcars; it added that the Liaoning party committee has ordered leading cadres

CONFIDENTIAL

6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 25 -

at all levels to join in the winter railway transport task. Heilungkiang on 4 November broadcast comments by a railroad worker who, "inspired" by the example, pledged that all workers would "work hard with added vigor." A Heilungkiang railroad official pointed up the seriousness of the rail problem in noting that the cadres' example had spurred the workers to ship out coal accumulated at the rail yard for the past 10 days. Canton radio on 4 November reported that the speed of railway loading "has been greatly accelerated" and carried remarks by First Secretary Chao Tzu-yang promising that the rail station leadership would adopt new measures to further tap production potentials.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 26 -

## U S S R

## REHABILITATION OF MOLOTOV HINTED IN NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLE

An article on former Soviet Premier V.M. Molotov, appearing in the recently available volume 16 of the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA, lends credence to rumors that he has been or will be restored to party membership. The article on the 84-year old Molotov is the first in any post-1957 Soviet encyclopedia to accord favorable treatment to a member of the disgraced "antiparty group" involved in the unsuccessful 1957 coup attempt against Khrushchev. In completely ignoring Molotov's role as a ringleader in the coup and his subsequent public disgrace, the article is in striking contrast to a 1971 encyclopedia entry on former Premier N.A. Bulganin, whose obloquy as a member of the antiparty group is clearly specified, even though Bulganin was only a marginal participant and was not even punished initially.

The Bulganin article, in volume 4 of the encyclopedia, issued in January 1971, stated directly that he had been expelled from the Presidium "for participation in the anti-party group"--the 1957 attempt by Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, L.M. Kaganovich and Bulganin to remove Khrushchev. It also noted that he had had the title "Marshal of the Soviet Union" from 1947 to 1958, indicating for the first time that Bulganin had been stripped of his military rank when he was belatedly denounced and removed as premier in late 1958.

In contrast, the Molotov article, in a volume signed to press 11 April, simply notes that he had been first deputy premier, foreign minister and member of the Presidium until 1957, ambassador to Mongolia until 1960, and then representative at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna until 1962, when he retired on pension. In addition, unlike Bulganin's article, Molotov's was accompanied by a photo.

Molotov's treatment is similar to that of former President K.E. Voroshilov, who though marginally associated with the anti-party group was never really disgraced, and who in the last years before his death in February 1969 was again treated as a national hero and given great publicity. A 1971 volume of the new encyclopedia carried an article with photo on Voroshilov similar to the 1974 entry on Molotov. Voroshilov's collaboration with the anti-party group had not been publicly revealed until the early 1960's, and even after accusations against him at the 1961 22d CPSU Congress he had remained a member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 27 -

Further comparisons are not possible since the new edition of the encyclopedia which carries the Bulganin and Molotov articles has carried no articles on the other anti-party group leaders Kaganovich and Malenkov, and other encyclopedias issued since 1957--the SMALL SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA, the UKRAINIAN SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA, and the SOVIET HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA--have carried no articles on any of the anti-party group members.

BACKGROUND ON EXPULSIONS      The question of expelling Molotov and the others and even bringing them to trial for Stalin-era crimes was bitterly contested under Khrushchev. Although Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich were expelled from the Presidium and denounced as criminals by Khrushchev and his followers after the 1957 coup attempt, efforts to further punish them were consistently blocked. Only after a deluge of accusations of murder and other crimes at the 22d Congress in late 1961 were Molotov and some others finally expelled from the party. Even at that, the only confirmation of the expulsions came in Suslov's February 1964 plenum speech, where he harshly assailed Molotov and the anti-party group and then condemned the Chinese for expressing sympathy for persons "thrown out of the ranks of our party." Suslov mentioned only Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov as members of the anti-party group, suggesting that Bulganin was not regarded as such a serious offender and had not been expelled from the party. The 1971 encyclopedia entry on Bulganin may reflect his continued party membership; similarly, the encyclopedia's recognition of Molotov while ignoring Malenkov and Kaganovich suggests that Molotov may already have been readmitted to the party.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 NOVEMBER 1974

- 28 -

## NOTES

CUBAN "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY": Cuban media have publicized a long interview with a Cuban "counterrevolutionary" who has returned to the fold. Text of the interview with ex-emigre Carlos Rivero Callado, conducted by Radio Havana, was broadcast by Havana's international service on 3 November. Havana has said that Rivero returned "recently" but has not said when the interview took place; the timing of its release may have been with an eye to the opening of the OAS meeting in Quito on 8 November. Rivero Callado, who left Cuba in 1959 and took part in the Bay of Pigs invasion, described his disillusionment with the "disloyalty, cynicism and perversity" of the capitalist system and his decision to support the Castro regime. He gave details of an emigre terrorist campaign whose past targets, he asserted, included Castro and Salvador Allende and which currently is aimed at assassinating Secretary Kissinger and diplomats from Latin American countries voting to lift the OAS sanctions imposed against Cuba. Charging that the terrorist organizations had worked with the CIA in the past, he said that they now received "arms, equipment and money" from the Pinochet regime in Chile. Rivero also claimed that "not all the names have been revealed" of Cuban emigres involved in Watergate activities. Moscow's reaction to the interview, in TASS and Moscow radio reports, noted Rivero's charges against the CIA but chiefly singled out his accusations that the Chilean Government was "trying to unfold criminal activities" in other countries by using "ultraright reactionary groups and all kind of riff-raff."

PYONGYANG STRESS ON LOYALTY, IDEOLOGY: A 2 November NODONG SINMUN editorial marking the fourth anniversary of the Korean Workers Party Fifth Congress reflects increased DPRK attention to the need for loyalty to the Pyongyang leadership. The current editorial interjects elements not raised in last year's anniversary editorial when it cites--in two different passages--the need to follow the Central Committee and repeatedly stresses the need for loyalty to Kim Il-sung. As in previous years, the editorial concentrates on the economic goals of the Fifth Congress, but it departs from earlier practice in pointing out that of the "two fortresses" (ideological and material) standing in the path of communist society, the ideological fortress must necessarily be captured before the material can be achieved. Increased attention to Kim began to appear in DPRK media early in 1974, and during the past few months there have been a number of unusual mentions of the party Central Committee or "party center."

CONFIDENTIAL



- 29 -

PRC PIG RAISING: Greater stress on collective pig raising in several Chinese provinces indicates dissatisfaction with the overall progress being made in pig raising. Lack of progress toward the long-held Maoist goal of "one pig, one person" was most clearly illustrated by a 29 October HEILUNGKIANG DAILY commentary which claimed increases of 10,000 pigs per year for the past three years. While the commentary did not point out the extent to which pig production was lagging--the province's human population probably increased by over 400,000 each year--it vented displeasure by noting that the ideological struggle was still acute and warned against "allowing the spontaneous influences of capitalism to grow and lead pig raising into capitalism." The report noted in passing that support must be given to pig raising by individual commune members, but stressed that the collective effort had the potential for "large-scale, rapid development." Recent reports from Tsinghai province and Hainan Island have also stated that the one pig per capita goal can be reached only through collective efforts. Reports of provincial conferences in Tsinghai on 14 October and Heilungkiang on 1 November called for more party attention to the problem. Tsinghai called for creating hog-raising committees at provincial, county, and commune levels, and both provinces called for personal attention to the problem by chiefs or designated deputies at all levels. Collective pig raising has been a sensitive issue since the Chinese great leap forward, during which millions of pigs were slaughtered by peasants resisting collectivization efforts. The current campaign does not appear to pose an immediate threat to individual ownership of pigs through any change in the public-private "walk on two legs" policy of recent years. However, recent provincial calls for a "new leap forward" next year and criticisms of rural capitalism suggest that the next five-year plan may call for some increase in the level of socialism in the countryside.

CONFIDENTIAL

- i -

## APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 28 OCTOBER - 3 NOVEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2657 items)</u>			<u>Peking (915 items)</u>		
FRG Chancellor Schmidt in USSR	(2%)	10%	Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(8%)	9%
[Brezhnev Dinner Speech	(--)	3%]	UNGA Session	(6%)	9%
Algerian Revolution 20th Anniversary	(--)	6%	Arab Summit Conference, Rabat	(1%)	6%
China	(5%)	5%	[Chou Greetings	(1%)	3%]
Kissinger in USSR	(4%)	4%	Albania	(--)	6%
[Communique	(1%)	3%]	[Chou, Teng	(--)	3%]
Kosygin Speech at Kirghiz SSR 50th Anniversary	(--)	3%	Congratulations on Leaders' Reappoint- ments		
Portuguese State Minister Cunhal in USSR	(--)	3%	Vietnam	(4%)	5%
			[DRV/PRC Economic, Military Aid Agreement	(1%)	2%]
			Economic Crisis in the West	(6%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.