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Trends In Communist Propaganda

27 Nov 74

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No. 48

**Confidential**

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# **TRENDS**


**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

27 NOVEMBER 1974  
(VOL. XXV, NO. 48)

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## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

### VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT SEEN AS MAJOR STEP TOWARD ARMS ACCORD

The agreement on the principles of a new accord to limit strategic offensive weapons registered in the U.S.-Soviet Joint Statement of 24 November has been the keynote of heavy Soviet publicity devoted to the recently concluded Soviet-American summit at Vladivostok. Although the publicity has been longer on atmospheric than on substance, it has clearly conveyed the impression that the decisions reached at Vladivostok have laid the basis for further progress in the strategic arms limitation talks and imparted a strong forward thrust to U.S.-Soviet relations generally.

**PUBLICITY FOR SUMMIT** Although President Ford's visit to Vladivostok was billed as a "working meeting" and thus not due the full protocolary fanfare of the three formal summits since May 1972, Soviet media have treated it as a first-class international event. Press and radio coverage has stressed the international significance of the meeting, and reports of foreign reaction have been extensively replayed to foreign and domestic audiences. Dramatic images of the bustle in the press center have been liberally used to reinforce this impression of international interest. Live coverage of the proceedings was apparently restricted because of the time difference between Vladivostok and Moscow, but Moscow radio and TV provided documentary coverage of some of the events. PRAVDA and other central newspapers carried front-page features on the summit from the 23d through the 25th, including a biography and portrait of President Ford in their issues of the 23d.

**SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES** It was apparent in the preliminary buildup for Vladivostok that the issue of a new agreement to supplement the May 1972 "interim agreement" on strategic offensive weapons would be a main item on the agenda. Since the issuance on the 24th of the joint statement, which outlines the procedures and timetable to be followed in reaching a new accord, this success has been hailed as the main achievement of the meeting.

A PRAVDA dispatch on the 25th described it as "important evidence of the good will of both sides and of their sincere aspiration to achieve the implementation of the objective they had set--to curb the arms race and preclude the possibility of a military confrontation between our countries." It went on to predict that the new

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accord that had been projected would constitute "an important turning point in limiting the arms race." IZVESTIYA on the 26th described it as an "essential step forward." It stressed the importance of the role the two leaders had played in reaching an agreement. They had been able, it said, to "untie the knots that had developed at lower-level meetings."

Aside from this elliptical reference to earlier unresolved issues, the media have largely ignored the technical aspects of the agreement. There has been no reference to the issue of American "forward-based systems"--the issue which the Soviets had heretofore insisted was a major stumbling block to an accord. Nor has there been any reference to the significance of the new agreement in resolving the MIRV issue, a point that had been of particular concern to the United States. Even the principles of the new agreement announced in the joint statement have been barely mentioned in Soviet media. What Moscow has stressed, rather, is the political significance of the new agreement, which it interprets as indicating that a new chapter has been opened in the SALT talks.

On other substantive issues the Soviet media have stuck rather close to the points mentioned by Brezhnev in his speech at a dinner for President Ford on the 24th. In addition to the generalities about Soviet-American relations and strategic issues, they included a particular stress on the need for cooperative efforts to settle acute international problems, and the desirability of increased trade to establish a "material base" for detente.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT      Monitored Soviet media as of 26 November had not ventured beyond the framework of authoritative statements to offer self-initiated comment on the summit. The only general assessment to date is Brezhnev's brief comment on the results of the summit in his speech in Ulan Bator on the 26th. It contained two points of note: (1) a particularly forceful expression of confidence in the prospects for successful progress at SALT; and (2) a foreshortening of the time span agreed on for reaching an accord on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. Whereas the joint statement had specified that this work should be completed "in 1975," Brezhnev said that the agreement provided that the negotiations should be completed "in the nearest months."

Moscow has not yet commented on President Ford's briefing of congressional leaders on the 26th detailing the specifics of the arms limitation agreement. TASS has reported, however, that the

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briefing took place, and it has quoted congressional sources as being highly pleased with the results. It has not mentioned the speculation that has followed in the U.S. press concerning the numerical ceilings that will purportedly be applied to the delivery systems of both sides and to their MIRV vehicles.

EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REACTION      Cautiously favorable assessments of the Vladivostok summit by Moscow's orthodox East European allies and Yugoslavs viewed the event as a fitting continuation of the two-year-long detente process and an augury of good things to come in the personal relationship between Brezhnev and President Ford. Most uniformly singled out for praise was the two leaders' agreement on signing a strategic arms limitation accord next year to cover the period through 1985. Thus, a Prague radio talk on the 24th stressed that, as distinct from the previous Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow last June, the Vladivostok meeting "has brought forward concrete fundamental principles" in the form of the 1975 "deadline" and the January starting date for renewed arms limitation talks. The Belgrade radio on the 25th, in welcoming the summit's contribution to detente, predicted at the same time that the signing of a strategic arms agreement next year would be "a significant political point" scored by President Ford in his campaign for reelection. Another Yugoslav comment on the 24th also uniquely raised the issue of China, citing Secretary Kissinger's trip to Peking immediately after the summit as evidence that the United States was not pursuing detente with Moscow at the PRC's expense.

In noting the mutual "good will" prevailing at the summit talks, the East Berlin radio on the 25th cited remarks by the President on his return to Washington to the effect that his Vladivostok visit had been "the beginning of a productive personal relationship" with the Soviet leader. In the only critical allusion to former President Nixon by Moscow's East European allies, a Budapest radio commentator the same day noted a public prediction by Secretary Kissinger of a more cordial relationship between Brezhnev and President Ford than had been possible with the allegedly more reticent "previous American President."

As with the previous U.S.-Soviet summits, Romanian media have only briefly reported the Vladivostok talks, without comment. The Albanian party daily ZERI I POPULLIT on the 22d typically denounced in advance the upcoming talks between "the chieftains of U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism."

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ASIAN COMMUNIST MEDIA REACTION      Mongolia, Moscow's closest Asian ally, also has hailed the results of the meeting. A 25 November MONTSAME account of Brezhnev's arrival in Ulan Bator from the Vladivostok conference expressed the MPR's confidence that the talks would "help the cause of international detente." A 26 November TASS account of Tsedenbal's speech at the MPR's 50th anniversary celebrations that day quoted him as saying the Vladivostok meeting was another "important step" in improving Soviet-American relations and bringing about international relaxation.

Peking has briefly reported the Vladivostok meeting, but has not mentioned the U.S.-Soviet statement on arms control. NCNA on 24 November noted that President Ford had met Brezhnev in Vladivostok on 23 and 24 November, citing U.S. and Soviet news agencies.

The Vietnamese communist response to President Ford's trip to the Soviet Union has been limited to a brief Hanoi radio report on 24 November, citing TASS, that the President had arrived in Vladivostok on the 23d for summit talks with Brezhnev, and another on the 25th noting that the talks had concluded on the 24th and a joint communique signed concerning "relations between the two countries, the questions of limiting strategic nuclear weapons, the conference on European security and cooperation, and a number of other international issues." The report of the 24th also noted Ford's invitation to Brezhnev to visit the United States in 1975.

Although monitored North Korean media have dealt with the Japan and Korea visits, they have not yet specifically mentioned the President's continuation of his journey on to Vladivostok, though there have been some barbed comments obliquely alluding to the U.S.-Soviet talks. A 24 November NODONG SINMUN editorial article stated: "It is a delusion to expect the U.S. imperialists to bring about peace, and begging the U.S. imperialists for peace is as ridiculous as looking for fish in a tree top."

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW SAYS PRC MESSAGE OFFERS NO BASIS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING

In what appears to be a carefully orchestrated move, Moscow on 26 November broke its three week silence on the purportedly new Chinese position on border negotiations, a position unveiled in Peking's 6 November greetings message on the anniversary of the October Revolution.\* The Chinese stance was rejected in a Soviet telegram, released on the 26th, replying to the Chinese message and in remarks by Brezhnev in his speech in Ulan Bator the same day. Without directly referring to the new PRC position, Brezhnev said that "at first glance it would seem that the leaders of the PRC also come out for normalizing relations," but he added: "their words are divorced from their deeds."

The official Soviet reply, in the telegram from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers to their Chinese counterparts, expressed "thanks" for the congratulations but noted that talks must be held without any "preliminary conditions" and claimed that the Chinese proposal was merely a "repetition of the former position of the leadership of the PRC." Brezhnev, speaking on the 50th anniversary of the proclamation of the Mongolian People's Republic, reiterated Soviet opposition to any preliminary negotiations and recalled the Soviet offer to conclude nonaggression and nonuse of force pacts on that basis. He termed the Chinese demands for Soviet recognition of the existence of disputed areas "unacceptable" and announced "we reject it."

Although the Soviets have dismissed the significance of the Chinese offer, Soviet media continue to show extraordinary sensitivity over the issue--monitored Soviet media have still not mentioned the new Chinese border stance to domestic audiences. The Soviet reply telegram thus far has been transmitted only in TASS English. While last year PRAVDA had published the full text of the Chinese greetings, this year the paper did not, glossing over the passage dealing with the border in reporting the PRC greetings. The only Soviet media mention of the border provision prior to 26 November was a 20 November Moscow Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to Asia, which cited world press comment playing down the significance of the message. The initial Soviet disapproval had been communicated indirectly in a recent series of reports by Moscow's allies that publicized

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\* The PRC message is discussed in the TRENDS of 13 November, page 3.

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refutation of the Chinese position by unnamed Soviet officials.\* Continuing to explicate the Soviet position, the GDR radio on 26 November linked the Soviet telegram and Brezhnev's speech as a reaffirmation of Soviet readiness to negotiate, which it said at the same time rejected the Chinese leadership's "intentions of attaching strings."

BACKGROUND Peking's October anniversary message had claimed that a "mutual understanding" reached at the September 1969 Chou-Kosygin meeting in Peking provided for mutual nonaggression and nonuse of force as part of a preliminary package accord to be reached before starting overall border negotiations. The message claimed that the "understanding" linked the nonaggression and nonuse of force provisions with the longstanding Chinese demand that the Soviets agree to withdraw forces from disputed areas along the border. The Soviets have always rejected any such preconditions, and Moscow has claimed that it initially offered Peking a draft treaty on the nonuse of force on 15 January 1971 and a draft nonaggression treaty on 14 June 1973, but was rebuffed on both occasions.

The Chinese message marked the first PRC media claim that an understanding had been reached during the Chou-Kosygin talks, although the Hong Kong communist daily TA KUNG PAO in January 1970, and subsequent Chinese remarks to Western newsmen--including Chou En-lai's 26 October 1973 interview with the New York TIMES--have referred to a Chou-Kosygin agreement. Neither these reports nor official Chinese statements had claimed that the agreement mentioned nonaggression or nonuse of force.

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\* The bloc media response is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 November, page 13.

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## K O R E A

## PYONGYANG CONDEMNS FORD "WAR JUNKET" TO SOUTH KOREA

North Korea harshly criticized President Ford's 22-23 November visit to South Korea, characterizing it as an attempt to prop up the government of ROK President Pak Chong-hui in order to retain the South as a U.S. military base for aggression in Asia. A 23 November DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, Pyongyang's most authoritative comment on the visit, called the trip a "war junket" which "fully disclosed the powder-reeking bellicose nature" of the President and likened his offer of aid to Seoul to "jumping with gasoline into a blazing fire." Pyongyang media generally stopped short, however, of portraying the visit as a prelude to a new Korean war.\*

The Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement noted that in the U.S.-ROK joint communique released in Seoul, President Ford pledged he "has no plans" to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, but it did not specifically condemn that stand or call for such a withdrawal in the name of the DPRK government. It also failed to note that the Ford-Pak communique directly linked the question of troops to the pledge of "prompt and effective assistance to repel armed attack" against the ROK "in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty." The DPRK spokesman's statement did quote the promise of "prompt and effective assistance," but it inaccurately said that such assistance would be forthcoming "in case war breaks out," rather than using the communique's phrase "assistance to repel armed attack." Both the spokesman's statement and a 24 November NODONG SINMUN editorial article reviewing the visit and the communique failed to mention the defense treaty, but a 21 November NODONG SINMUN editorial commenting on the U.S. claim that its troops are in South Korea under that treaty blasted the agreement, calling it "illegal" and "aggressive."

In reviewing the communique, the Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement made no mention at all of current Korean issues before the United Nations, thereby ignoring communique references to the UN General Assembly debate on the UN presence in the South. Other North Korean reaction to the Ford visit, however, did raise the UN issue. Editorials in NODONG SINMUN on 21 and 24 November and a commentary in MINJU CHOSEN on the 22d all claimed the President's

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\* This theme had been heavily emphasized during President Johnson's November 1966 visit to Korea.

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trip evidenced Washington's "predicament" in facing opposition to its position in the United Nations on the Korean question. It was not made clear, however, how the visit to Seoul could improve the U.S. position at the United Nations.

Pyongyang pictured the President's stop in Japan as an effort to strengthen a U.S.-Japan-ROK alliance and to facilitate Japanese economic penetration of the South.

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## ARAB - ISRAELI ISSUE

## USSR HAILS PLO "VICTORY" AT UNGA, ARAFAT VISIT TO MOSCOW

While continuing to express Soviet support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Moscow has dealt chiefly in generalities in comment hailing the results of the 13-22 November UNGA debate on the Palestine question as a "great victory" for the PLO and in treating the current visit to Moscow of a PLO delegation as proof of Soviet-Palestinian solidarity. Comment on the 22 November UNGA resolution, which affirmed a series of Palestinian rights and granted the PLO permanent UNGA observer status, has avoided points of controversial interpretation, such as the meaning of the term "Palestine" and its relation to present-day Israel. Rather, in line with expanded Soviet public support of the PLO in recent months, Moscow has sought to depict that organization as responsible and reasonable and has stressed that the UNGA deliberations demonstrated broad international support for the Palestinians' "just cause." Israeli policy has been represented not only as being unreasonably opposed to any positive changes on the Palestinian question but also as bent on maintaining a state of dangerous tension in the Mideast.

Typifying much of the comment, Soviet Middle East expert and former PRAVDA editor Igor Belyayev, on the 24 November Moscow radio observers' roundtable, claimed the UNGA debate had successfully initiated a "new stage" in the Palestinian movement and was a "great achievement" for those who want a just Mideast settlement. Belyayev denounced Israel's "negative position" toward the PLO and toward "early renewal" of the Geneva conference as evidence that Tel Aviv "is still an opponent of a truly political settlement." Belyayev made no further connection between the Palestinian issue and the Geneva conference, but other comment has continued to press for speedy resumption of the conference with PLO participation. A Timoshkin radio commentary on the 23d, for instance, declared that the PLO should be represented at Geneva with "rights equal" to the other participants. TASS in a dispatch from New York on the 26th reported that the Arab League had called for early resumption of the conference with the PLO attending "as an equal side." TASS reported without comment an Arab official's statement that the PLO, "in conformity with the UNGA resolution, is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at the Geneva conference."

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BREZHNEV REMARKS,  
U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

Speaking in Ulan Bator on the 26th, en route home from the Vladivostok summit conference, Brezhnev again stressed the importance of "earliest resumption" of the Geneva conference, but he did not use the occasion to reiterate Soviet support for Palestinian representation at Geneva. The U.S.-Soviet joint communique on the 23-24 November Ford-Brezhnev talks said only that the sides believed the Geneva conference should play an important part in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and should "resume its work as soon as possible." The 3 July joint U.S.-Soviet communique on former President Nixon's talks in Moscow had said that "the question of other participants from the Middle East" should be discussed "at the conference."

The current communique, like that in July, called for a settlement which should take into account the "legitimate interests" of all peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people, and respect for the right of all states in the area to independent existence. In his Ulan Bator speech Brezhnev repeated the Soviet view of a settlement based on liberation of all Arab lands occupied in 1967, realization of the Palestinians' right to "create their own statehood, to self-determination," as well as "reliable and authoritative guarantees" of the security and independence of all countries in the conflict.

PLO DELEGATION  
IN MOSCOW

In the light of Moscow's persistent urgings for a renewed Geneva conference, the PLO position on this issue is likely to be high on the agenda during current talks between Soviet leaders and the PLO delegation, led by Yasir 'Arafat, now in Moscow. According to the Beirut DAILY STAR on 22 November, the head of the PLO delegation to the UNGA, Faruq al-Qaddumi, had said on the 21st that the PLO would not go to Geneva on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, "since they ignore the national rights of the Palestinians," but that any invitation would be decided upon by the Palestine National Council (PNC). Both al-Qaddumi and the PNC chairman are members of the PLO delegation now in Moscow. A Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 26th pegged to the delegation's visit called it "perhaps the most representative PLO delegation ever to go abroad," noting that it included 'Arafat, PNC chairman al-Fahum, and "other leading figures" of the Palestinian resistance movement.

Soviet media have already given the delegation more than the usual publicity accorded to Palestinian visitors, but still with some

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restraint. Thus, TASS on the 25th, in reporting the delegation's arrival, avoided any mention of the source of the invitation to the Palestinians. Until the visit of a PLO delegation last summer, such visits had been sponsored by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization. The communique on the early August visit noted 'Arafat's talks with CPSU officials Ponomarev and Ulyanovskiy and said the PLO leader had also been received by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov.

The present visit further upgrades the PLO's status: TASS on the 27th reported that the delegation met with Kosygin as well as Ponomarev "in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding." And, according to a prediction of the Beirut daily AN-NAHAR on the 22d, the visit may be marked by the first acknowledged meeting between Brezhnev and 'Arafat. Soviet comment has noted that the PLO delegation arrived in Moscow "under special circumstances"--with the recent PLO diplomatic successes at the UN and, as a Moscow radio broadcast on the 26th asserted, "frantic efforts by the Israeli aggressors and their protectors to foil a Mideast settlement." Possibly forecasting an announcement of increased public support of the PLO, Moscow media have stressed that Soviet support of the Palestinian cause will continue, and that the PLO delegation visit "should be viewed in this light."

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## ROMANIAN PARTY CONGRESS

## CEAUSESCU REMAINS MINDFUL OF MOSCOW IN ASSERTING INDEPENDENCE

Romanian Communist Party chief Ceausescu's 25 November opening speech to the 11th party congress reasserted his decade-long espousal of Romanian independence within the socialist camp, thus indicating his confidence that Moscow would continue to tolerate, within limits, Romania's maverick position. Ceausescu acknowledged those limits by calling for continued cooperation within the Warsaw Pact and pledging to continue close relations with Moscow, referring in particular to Romania's economic dependence on the Soviet Union. Seemingly less defensive than in his speech to the 10th congress in 1969, Ceausescu lowered his tone of self-justification for Romania's independent stance and muted his criticism of the concept of a "guiding center" for the communist movement, shifting instead to a more confident call for a "new type of unity" among communist and socialist parties and a "new international economic and political order" to close the gap between rich and poor nations. Romanian self-justification and criticism of monolithic communism, however, were amply present in the first Party Program submitted to the congress for adoption.

Moscow's willingness to endure Ceausescu's utterances of independence and criticism of Moscow's orthodox line was reflected in the level of the delegation sent to the congress. CPSU Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko, who led a delegation to the Yugoslav congress earlier this year, headed the Soviet delegation to Bucharest, and all other Pact members' delegations were headed by Politburo members. In 1969, Moscow and the other Pact members had sent only Secretariat-level delegations to convey displeasure with Romania's wayward position on a number of issues. Moscow made it clear, however, that the upgrading of this year's delegation did not signal any trend toward endorsement of Bucharest's party line, stressing heavily in its CPSU greetings message, carried in PRAVDA and broadcast to Romania on the opening day of the congress, the need for "unity and cohesion" of the communist movement as well as "close coordination" in international affairs.

Ceausescu was careful in his remarks to pay due respect to the Soviet Union, as he had in 1969, and he again took pains to balance his remarks with like regard for the PRC, which as Belgrade's TANJUG pointed out, maintained its policy of not attending congresses of other communist parties. While praising Moscow's "very significant

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role" in initiating the current trend toward detente, Ceausescu at the same time pointed out that the PRC's international role "has also grown." And although he stressed "with great satisfaction" the development of Romania's relations with the Soviet Union, Ceausescu effusively noted "with great joy the ascending trend of cooperation relations" with the PRC. While Ceausescu generally balanced his pro-Moscow and pro-Peking remarks, he judiciously underlined that in international exchanges and economic cooperation the Soviet Union is Romania's "major partner" and acknowledged Bucharest's "determination . . . to act with all resolution" to continue developing relations with Moscow.

Ceausescu also gave a positive assessment of Romania's relations with the orthodox regimes of East Europe, but his fulsome praise singling out Yugoslav relations as "a model of cooperation based on fully equal rights between two socialist, neighborly and friendly countries" implied criticism of other Pact countries' dealings with Romania.

Predictably, Ceausescu's remarks reaffirmed his antipathy toward supranational bodies; CEMA was not even mentioned. Although he called for continued development of "cooperation" among the states and armies of the Warsaw Pact "in view of the contemporary situation," Ceausescu linked that cooperation to the need to develop "each national army" and the defense of "each people," as opposed to developing a unified command structure. In line with his emphasis on detente, Ceausescu reiterated his call for strengthening the "political aspect" of the Pact and, unlike his 1969 speech, eschewed any reference to U.S., NATO or imperialist "aggressiveness." In a single reference to the United States, which in 1969 he had heavily criticized--especially for its role in Vietnam, Ceausescu described U.S.-Romanian relations as "greatly developed," particularly as a result of his summit talks, and stated that "conditions exist" for continued development of "economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation."

The congress has also served to focus attention on party acclaim for Ceausescu's personal direction of foreign and domestic policies. One proposal for his reelection as secretary general asked that he be named to that post for life--an honor which he declined while pledging "to serve the party and people as long as I am able under good conditions."

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## PORTUGAL

### PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY BEGINS PROGRAM ON LISBON RADIO

A month after the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) clandestine "Radio Free Portugal" announced a cessation of its broadcasting, one of the Lisbon radio stations began a regular weekly feature on the party. Radio Clube Portugues on 25 November carried an announcement at 2105 GMT (2205 local) following the hourly news summary that "in the political hour today we are broadcasting a program of the Portuguese Communist Party." Then after several items on PCP activities both abroad and in Portugal, a closing announcement at 2130 GMT said:

You have been listening to the voice of the Portuguese Communist Party, a program broadcast every Monday at 2200 hours (local time) by the Lisbon mediumwave transmitter of Radio Clube Portugues. The Portuguese Communist Party will reply to your questions. Cooperate with us. Write to the working center of the PCP, 26 Avenida Antonio Serpa, Lisbon. Give us your views and opinions of this program.

Radio Clube Portugues was commercially operated before the 25 April military coup and reportedly was the first radio station to be occupied during the coup.

Radio Free Portugal was first heard in March 1962 with Portuguese language programs directed at Portugal, presumably transmitted from Romania. The final days of this radio were devoted to the textual broadcasting of the documents and speeches from the 20 October PCP 20th congress, the first legally held PCP congress since 1926. Following the lengthy broadcasts of the congress materials, the radio announced on a 26 October morning program that it was closing down because of the "new conditions created" by the 25 April coup. The radio observed that it was suspending operations because, as the PCP "has repeated" in its documents and through its leaders, "once a truly democratic order was set up it would be the first to respect the law and to demand that others also respect it." After briefly reviewing its 12 years of struggle against "fascism" and the colonial war, the radio concluded that its mission was now "accomplished" and became silent. It has not been heard to transmit any programs since the 26 October announcement.

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## VIETNAM

## HANOI, FRONT DENOUNCE SOUTH VIETNAM ANTIGOVERNMENT LEADER

Hanoi and PRG media have publicly denounced Father Tran Huu Thanh, the leader of the People's Anticorruption Movement (PACM) in South Vietnam, for not advocating Thieu's overthrow and for including Thieu and GVN Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem in an advisory guidance council which Thanh has proposed establishing to set government policy. The Catholic-oriented PACM--along with other antigovernment coalitions that have sprung up since early September in South Vietnam--has consistently received prominent publicity in Vietnamese communist media for its anti-Thieu activities. However, Hanoi and PRG propaganda are not known to have identified Father Thanh's role in the PACM prior to the current attacks on him, instead referring to the leader of the movement in the past simply as "a priest."

Communist dissatisfaction with Tran Huu Thanh was first noted in a 20 November Liberation Radio broadcast commenting on the "urban struggle" in the South and on remarks made by Thanh in a speech on the 17th. According to the broadcast, Thanh "waved the struggle banner in the opposite direction and checked the people's advance" by failing to recognize the existence of two administrations in the South and by not dealing with the role of the third force. While conceding that Thanh had asked for implementation of the Paris agreement, Liberation Radio apparently felt this was scant recompense and decried his failure to demand the overthrow of Thieu as a stand "completely contrary to the urban compatriots' desires."

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 21st, picking up on the same theme, accused Thanh of being a "U.S. lackey" who is "sidetracking the urbanites' struggle" and described Thanh's proposed advisory council as a "maneuver" to protect and maintain Thieu. In an attempt to disparage Thanh's motives and paint him as an agent of the United States, the commentary claimed that he had been an "intimate" adviser of former President Ngo Dinh Diem, that he had trained psywar officers for the ARVN, and that he had "acclaimed" the large-scale introduction of U.S. troops into Vietnam.

A 22 November NHAN DAN commentary repeated the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN charges, adding that Father Thanh had all along been attempting to subvert the movements opposing the South Vietnamese government and claiming that, "for months now, Father Tran Huu Thanh . . . has been

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actively interfering in other anti-Thieu movements." His proposals made on the 17th, NHAN DAN said, revealed his "true colors." While the NHAN DAN commentary specifically named Father Thanh as the PACM leader, Hanoi and Front propaganda have not yet been noted criticizing the PACM itself.

While the communists' denunciation of Thanh represents their first open break with a prominent antigovernment leader, their media treatment of the movement has revealed a distrust for certain of those involved since its inception in early September.\* For example, a 14 September NHAN DAN editorial on the demonstrations in Hue on the 8th suggested that the United States was covertly orchestrating the actions of the opposition, declaring: "The United States is keeping a finger in the current anti-Thieu struggle movement in the cities of South Vietnam in order to lead this movement in a direction favorable to it, while at the same time readying new horses. Supported by the CIA and other international reactionary powers, a number of people are taking advantage of the current situation to accumulate political capital."

In sharp contrast to the ambivalent stance marking their initial treatment of Father Thanh, Hanoi and Front propaganda had responded with an immediate negative reaction when South Vietnam labor leader Tran Quoc Buu voiced criticism of the Thieu regime in remarks on 29 October. Liberation Radio on the 30th and a signed NHAN DAN article on 1 November unequivocally labeled Buu a "U.S. lackey" in the pay of the CIA and characterized his criticisms of Thieu as nothing but a "new farce staged by the United States."

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\* For a discussion of early communist reaction to antigovernment demonstrations, see the TRENDS of 18 September 1974, page 2.

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## SOVIET SUPPORT PLEDGED DURING LE DUC THO STOPOVER IN MOSCOW

The Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) delegation headed by Politburo member Le Duc Tho and Secretariat member Xuan Thuy made a 20-25 November stopover in Moscow while en route to Paris for a visit at the invitation of the French Communist Party. On 22 November the Vietnamese held talks with Politburo member Suslov and Secretariat member Katushev. Hanoi reports did not indicate the content of the discussions, but a 24 November IZVESTIYA report on the meeting noted that the Soviet side "highly assessed" the work of the VWP in building North Vietnam and achieving peace, and stressed the Soviet intention to continue rendering "comprehensive assistance and effective support." The Saigon administration was "resolutely condemned" by the Soviets for undermining the Paris peace agreement and frustrating a political settlement, while typically the United States was criticized only in a reference to "outside imperialist forces." On his previous trip to Paris, in December 1973 to hold talks with Secretary Kissinger, Le Duc Tho had met only with Katushev. However, on his return from Paris, Tho held talks on 29 December with Politburo members Suslov and Ponomarev, as well as with Katushev.

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## CORRECTION

The article in the 20 November 1974 TRENDS on the departure for Paris of the North Vietnamese delegation led by Le Duc Tho, at the end of the third paragraph in the report on officials who saw off the delegation, erroneously identified Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi as the DRV Foreign Minister. North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh was not present at the departure.

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## ASIAN SECURITY

## SOVIET LEADERS, COMMENTATORS PROMOTE COLLECTIVE SECURITY PLAN

Soviet leaders utilized the recent visits to Moscow by Sri Lanka Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to press the 1969 Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system. This question was also referred to by Brezhnev, in his 26 November Ulaan Bataar address commemorating Mongolian National Day, in which he drew attention to the "quests of many states" for security in Asia and the need for "practical steps" to achieve Asian security through collective efforts. In addition, Soviet media have portrayed a conference on establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, held in New Delhi on 14-16 November, as an indication that the collective security proposal was gaining wider public acceptance.

Soviet Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny advised Asian collective security in speeches given, respectively, at banquets on the 11th for the Sri Lanka Prime Minister and on the 18th for the Shah of Iran. Kosygin noted that the Soviet Union viewed "with respect" the "political initiatives" of Asian countries, such as proposals for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and the neutralization of Southeast Asia, and urged that all Asian states contribute to securing collective security in Asia. Prime Minister Bandaranaike made no mention of Asian security in her speech and continued to withhold endorsement of the Soviet collective security concept in the final communique on her visit. The 17 November joint communique noted that the Sri Lanka side outlined its view on the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal and that the Soviet side "supported the idea."

Podgorny's reiteration of the collective security proposal at the banquet for the Shah drew no Iranian endorsement, although Iran previously had explicitly stated intention to help realize a system of Asian collective security, in joint Soviet-Iranian communiqués on Kosygin's March 1973 visit to Teheran and Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda's August 1973 trip to Moscow. The joint statement on the current visit noted only that "particular attention was paid to the advisability of intensifying efforts to set up an Asian security system based on joint efforts of all Asian states"--a general reference resembling the language of the joint communique on the Shah's last visit to Moscow in October 1972.

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Soviet propaganda coverage of the New Delhi "international conference for liquidation of foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean and for turning it into a zone of peace" related the "zone of peace" proposal to the Soviet collective security plan, obscuring the differences between the two ideas. Moscow radio commentator Antonov, in a 12 November broadcast to South Asia, asserted that the South Asian "public" was "linking the setting up of such a zone with the idea of insuring security in Asia on a collective basis." PRAVDA correspondent Skalkin, in a 21 November article, commented that the Sri Lanka proposal for a zone of peace and the Malaysian scheme for neutralization of Southeast Asia confirm the "pertinence and timeliness" of the Soviet proposal for ensuring security in Southeast Asia by collective efforts. Soviet press reports on the conference publicized the arrival of a U.S. Navy task force in the Indian Ocean and quoted Indian External Affairs Minister Chavan as saying "the Soviet Union has no military bases in the Indian Ocean." The Delhi ISI's apparent text of Chavan's 14 November speech at the conference included no such reference to Soviet bases, but reiterated Indian "anxiety" over the American base at Diego Garcia and the possibility that it might increase "great power rivalry" in the Indian Ocean basin.

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## OAS CONFERENCE

## USSR, CUBA SEE QUITO RESULTS AS DEFEAT FOR U.S., OAS SYSTEM

Following the failure of the OAS foreign ministers' meeting in Quito on 8-12 November to lift the sanctions imposed against Cuba 10 years ago, Moscow has called the conference a "self-exposure" of the enemies of detente and a defeat for the United States and the inter-American defense system maintained through the Rio Pact. Havana, which usually disclaims interest in OAS policies, has been slow to comment directly on the conference and instead has emphasized the growing opportunities for bilateral relations. In his only speech since the Quito meeting, Castro on 22 November remarked in passing that Cuba might "some day" establish diplomatic relations with the United States, but he made no mention of the OAS. Other than Cuban reportage on the meeting, the OAS conference has been dealt with in only two "Letter from Freddy" features on Havana's domestic service, one of which predicted that "the 'Cuba problem' will not be resolved in the OAS . . . but rather in the U.S. Senate."

MOSCOW COMMENT        Since 22 August, when Panama re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba and precipitated the move toward an OAS review of the 1964 sanctions that drew a cordon sanitaire around Cuba, Moscow has maintained a steady campaign in favor of ending the sanctions and normalizing relations between Cuba and other Western Hemisphere nations, especially the United States. The re-integration of Cuba into the Americas has been described as an inevitable outgrowth of detente and of the failure of "U.S. imperialist circles" to "suffocate" Cuba with an economic blockade and diplomatic boycott. Thus, in his 6 November Kremlin speech, Foreign Minister Gromyko declared that "We are confident that, just as the imperialist policy of nonrecognition of the GDR has failed, so will fail the blockade of another socialist country, fraternal Cuba."

PRAVDA commentator Geyvandov had observed on 26 September that the isolation of Cuba was an "anachronism," a "vestige of the cold war" in an age of "irrepressibly growing desire" for independent policies in Latin America. While thus appealing to Latins' sensitivities by reminding them that "U.S. diktat" should not govern the hemisphere, Moscow at the same time, with an eye to the United States and the countries which generally follow the U.S. lead, portrayed Castro as a reasonable leader who had established extensive ties with capitalist countries and who was "ready to start talks" with the United States.

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Since the Quito conference Moscow has claimed that, although the pro-Cuba resolution had been defeated by the "outmoded procedure" of the OAS and the "intensive psychological struggle" waged by the United States, the conference outcome was nevertheless a victory for "ideological pluralism" in the hemisphere because the majority had supported the resolution. PRAVDA's Listov commented on the 14th that the conference represented the end of the United States' "complete sway" in the organization and a "landmark signifying the defeat" of supporters of the blockade. In the 17 November Moscow radio observers' roundtable, IZVESTIYA's Mikhaylov agreed that the United States had "suffered a defeat in Quito" because most Latin countries had proved their unwillingness to "follow in Washington's footsteps." Mikhaylov added that a "fresh wind" was blowing in Latin America and that the "spirit of detente" could be detected in the region.

HAVANA TREATMENT      In the months preceding the foreign ministers' meeting, Havana media attempted to maintain a balance between Castro's stated commitment to Marxist principles and third world solidarity and the image---developed in the last few years---of the Cuban regime as mature and willing to deal with, rather than subvert, noncommunist governments that followed "anti-imperialist" policies. Thus Cuba praised the "progressive" regimes of such noncommunist states as Peru and Panama in recent months, while at the same time Castro strongly reaffirmed his Marxism-Leninism and castigated the "illegal, dirty and criminal" U.S. policies in attempting to control events in Chile, Cuba and other third world nations. The OAS has generally been branded a "bastard daughter of imperialism" and unworthy of Cuba's concern, but Castro has not always concealed an interest in OAS policies. In an interview published in L'HUMANITE on 24 October, for example, the Cuban premier admitted that the OAS blockade "has in fact caused us great harm" and, without mentioning Quito, predicted that "the Latin American countries are going to end Cuba's isolation within the OAS itself."

Castro made no reference to the OAS in his 22 November address to the Revolutionary Armed Forces, in which he promised that "our defense will never depend on the good faith of the imperialists" even if diplomatic relations should "some day" be restored with the United States. The most open Cuban comments on the conference results are found, not unexpectedly, in two "Letter from Freddy" features, broadcast by Havana on 20 and 26 November. In his first letter Freddy wrote that Cuba was unconcerned with the official actions taken in Quito, but encouraged by the fact that "the more worthy countries alined with Cuba." Freddy stated flatly that

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"they can keep their OAS" because Cuba was interested only in the prospects of forming an all-Latin organization. Freddy's second letter indicated that the U.S. Senate might be forced to take the lead in solving the "Cuba problem" because of the U.S. need for Cuban sugar and Venezuelan oil. Freddy noted that "those who sought to break the world and pollute the atmosphere hurt themselves," and he predicted that the U.S. need for "black gold and white gold" might now determine U.S. policy toward Cuba.

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## U S S R

## KOMMUNIST, PRAVDA DIFFER IN ASSESSING PAST DECADE

A November KOMMUNIST editorial reviewing the decade since the October 1964 plenum which put Brezhnev and Kosygin in power has deviated sharply from PRAVDA and other central newspapers in characterizing the achievements of the era. Whereas PRAVDA and the others had downplayed the achievements associated with Kosygin and stressed the achievements associated with Brezhnev, KOMMUNIST did just the opposite. It stressed the role of collectivity in the leadership, the 1965 economic reform, the importance of a "scientific," rather than a "party," approach to running the economy, and so on. It may be relevant to note that V.G. Afanasyev, a prolific writer on the themes of scientific management of the economy and the economic reform, was recently named chief editor of KOMMUNIST.

PRO-BREZHNEV ARTICLES      The observance of the anniversary of the October 1964 plenum had been initiated by PRAVDA with a long 13 October editorial article bearing a sharp pro-Brezhnev slant. It cited Brezhnev as heading the Politburo, barely mentioned the fact that the principle of collectivity was reestablished by the October 1964 plenum, and stressed the March 1965 plenum and its agricultural reforms, which are associated with Brezhnev, while totally ignoring the September 1965 plenum and the economic reform associated with Kosygin.\*

PRAVDA's statement was treated as authoritative, being reprinted in most republic papers. A few other newspapers--IZVESTIYA, SOVIET RUSSIA and RURAL LIFE--carried their own articles, but they followed PRAVDA's pro-Brezhnev slant. IZVESTIYA's 15 October editorial appeared to be written from the same outline as PRAVDA's, repeating all major points, except for the identification of Brezhnev as head of the Politburo. The 14 October SOVIET RUSSIA article, written by Ryazan First Secretary N.S. Priyetzhev, was even closer to the PRAVDA model, since it did include the Brezhnev identification along with all the other points. The anniversary article in the 15 October RURAL LIFE, written by conservative V. Stepanov, also followed the PRAVDA model in playing up the March 1965 agricultural reforms and in downgrading the September 1965 economic reform. The March plenum got a 32-line paragraph; the September plenum one brief sentence, with no mention of its having enacted a reform. The RURAL LIFE

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\* See the TRENDS of 17 October 1974, page 6.

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article did, however, mention the restoration of collectivity by the October 1964 plenum, and it did not identify Brezhnev as head of the Politburo.

Stepanov also wrote PARTY LIFE's article on the October 1964 anniversary, closely following the pattern of his RURAL LIFE article. As chief editor of KOMMUNIST in May 1965, Stepanov had attacked the stress on material needs and incentives, at a time when Kosygin was developing his economic reform proposals. Stepanov was demoted in December 1965 from chief editor to member of KOMMUNIST's editorial board, a post he still holds.

KOMMUNIST EDITORIAL In contrast to the preceding articles, the KOMMUNIST editorial stressed collectivity in leadership and scientific management of the economy. Although it acknowledged Brezhnev's primacy by including the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev formula, it discussed collectivity in detail and stressed that it applied at all levels. Its main concentration, however, was on a theme which seemed to challenge Brezhnev's drive for more par' control over the economy. It stressed the idea that economic decisions must be made on strictly scientific bases, by economic specialists. It cited Lenin's warning against economically untrained leaders who think they can substitute zeal for economic knowledge and "dilettantes" who seek to solve all problems by "communist decree-mongering." It stressed the importance of specialists, stating that it is "mainly specialists, with the proper training, who are filling the ranks of our leading cadres now."

The article praised the September 1965 plenum decisions for asserting a "scientific approach to leadership of industry" and declared that the economic reform had been adopted only after long experiments and careful study of results. Apparently reflecting the present debate over a new reorganization of the economic mechanism, it argued that it is "extremely important" to base any changes in the administrative structure on the results of experimentation and conclusions of modern management science. Implicitly acknowledging the political sensitivities of this argument, the article went on to try to square it with Brezhnev's known positions on the "party style" of economic management. It said: "Of course, the introduction of scientific principles and methods in planned administration of the socialist economy does not mean giving it features of organizational autonomy or apolitical technocratism; state administration of the economy fully retains a political, party character." Brezhnev had attacked "technocratism" at the December 1973 plenum and had called for reasserting a "party approach" throughout the economy. The editorial also took up Brezhnev's call for a "party style," but it defined this innocuously as the showing of initiative, a sense of responsibility, and intolerance toward shortcomings.

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A hint of political independence had also appeared in the preceding issue of KOMMUNIST. In an editorial review of a newly published collection of Kosygin speeches, the journal declared that "attempts at self-isolation by any state, and the ignoring of other countries' achievements in science and culture turn into failures in economics, impoverishment of spiritual life, and loss of a feeling of reality in politics."

#### YEVTUSHENKO ATTACKS CENSORSHIP AND WRITERS' CONFORMITY

Poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko has attempted to reassert his independence by attacking censorship and writers' collaboration with the authorities, in recent contributions to the humor magazine KROKODIL and the youth paper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. In a poem in a September KROKODIL, he compared officials who entice writers into compromising their ideas to a big rat who devours the writer. (The poem was apparently so objectionable that, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, the KROKODIL editor was given a reprimand.) In the subsequent 13 November KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article, Yevtushenko urged poets to speak out and suggested that he was a bold fighter against censorship who has been unfairly attacked by more unyielding writers. Yevtushenko has frequently been criticized by others for cooperating with the authorities, and despite his occasional acts of defiance--such as protesting the deportation of Solzhenitsyn earlier this year--he suffers little serious retaliation from the authorities.

The KROKODIL poem, entitled "Kompromiss Kompromissovich," dealt with the corrupting influence of material goods on writers. In it, the authorities ("Kompromiss Kompromissovich") "buy" writers with "trinkets" (apartments, cars, clothes) and whisper: "Don't cause trouble, just change a line." "He encourages heavy drinking, even a little debauchery. Sinners are advantageous: he who has sinned will be a coward." In the end, "Kompromiss Kompromissovich, 'the friend,' like a gentle, polite rat, quietly devours us." To drive home the point, the poem is accompanied by a picture of a huge rat swallowing a writer.

In the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article Yevtushenko described Pushkin's characteristics, comparing him favorably with today's poets. He pointedly noted that one can find no "psychological bureaucratism or spiritual regimentation" in Pushkin, that Pushkin excoriated not only racists in "far-off America," but also Russian scoundrels and ignoramuses, and that no one can be a poet "who does not strive at least in part to be like him." Clearly suggesting a parallel to

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his own situation, Yevtushenko recalled that Pushkin had to fight with editors of journals "even though this was difficult under the surveillance of tsarist censorship," and Pushkin had to "wreck his nerves in the daily struggle" with people like Benkendorf (the tsar's adviser and secret police chief) and Bulgarin (a powerful reactionary writer and policy spy), while also "listening to reproaches from some radicals of that time who did not understand his tasks."

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## NOTES

KISSINGER IN PEKING: Except for changes necessitated by Premier Chou En-lai's illness, China's handling of Secretary Kissinger's 25-29 November visit to Peking is thus far almost a carbon copy of the treatment accorded his last visit in November 1973. Teng Hsiao-ping has substituted for Chou as the principal negotiator in the formal talks, assisted by Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua. As last year, Kissinger was greeted at the airport by the foreign minister and given a formal banquet that evening. Foreign Minister Chiao offered a toast at the banquet, noting Sino-U.S. differences but declaring that "on the whole Chinese-American relations have in these years been moving ahead." He also expressed the belief that the current visit would "contribute to the further implementation" of the Shanghai communique. Chiao made special mention of "the pioneering role Mr. Richard Nixon played" and expressed "appreciation" for President Ford's pledge to continue implementing the Shanghai communique. Last year Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had reviewed developments favorably, affirming that "a good start" had been made and that the goal of normalized relations "can be attained." As last year, Peking has not chosen to characterize the atmosphere of the current formal talks nor of the Secretary's meeting with Prime Minister Chou in the hospital on 25 November.

PYONGYANG ON DMZ TUNNEL INCIDENT: North Korea has denied any knowledge of the tunnel dug under the Demilitarized Zone into the South, lumping it together with other "incidents" it claims Seoul has manufactured to increase tension in the area. Pyongyang has met the South's barrage of publicity with a low key response, issuing no authoritative statement on the issue but burying--in a 23 November Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement issued on President Ford's visit to South Korea--its claim that the United States and the ROK had "fabricated a 'tunnel incident' farce" prior to the visit. North Korean media have drawn special attention to the timing of the tunnel discovery, linking it both to the President's visit and the UN debate on Korea and concluding that it was thus an attempt to justify the presence of U.S. troops and lend weight to Seoul's claim that it was threatened by invasion from the North. The sharpest and most extensive North Korean statement on the affair came in a 20 November NODONG SINMUN commentary, after Seoul announced it would bring the incident to the attention of the United Nations.

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REACTION TO TANAKA RESIGNATION: While thus far neither Peking nor Pyongyang media have commented on the 26 November resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, Moscow reacted promptly, describing as the main cause of Tanaka's demise the "crisis" within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party brought on by Japan's domestic economic situation and the party's declining electoral fortunes. A dispatch by IZVESTIYA's Tokyo correspondent, carried by TASS on the 26th, alluded to unspecified "Japanese-American contradictions" as a contributing factor. Moscow has ascribed only a minor role in Tanaka's resignation to the furor over his financial dealings that broke out in October, and the initial TASS item reporting the resignation did not even mention his financial troubles.

PERU EXPELS "SUBVERSIVES": Moscow and Havana praised recent announcements by the Peruvian military government that several CIA operatives had been expelled from Peru and that the 1962 Peace Corps contract with the United States had been terminated, forcing the withdrawal of 137 Peace Corps volunteers in Peru. Soviet and Cuban media have not mentioned reports that the accused intelligence agents were in fact U.S. Foreign Service officers who routinely left the country at the end of tours of duty; similarly, in noting local criticism recently aroused by a controversial contract with Japan, Moscow and Havana have repeated Peruvian Government derision of the critics without explaining the reason for the criticism. The media hailed the Peruvian Government's expulsion of "subversives" as a wise decision and a blow to U.S. policy. Thus, Moscow commentator Rovstovtsev reported on 15 November that the supposed "CIA agents" had been involved in "dirty dealings" such as smuggling foodstuffs out of the country in order to create scarcity and discontent. The same commentator on the 18th observed that Peru was correct in ridding itself of the volunteers because they had served as "transmitters of U.S. policy and ideology." PRENSA LATINA's Renaldo Alvarez reported that the U.S. motive in establishing the Peace Corps had been to create an espionage outfit, and he quoted an article in TRICONTINENTAL magazine, published in Havana, which claimed that the Corps' current purpose was "to do espionage work for the CIA."



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## APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 18 - 24 NOVEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2557 items)</u>			<u>Peking (978 items)</u>		
Ford-Brezhnev Talks	(--)	15%	UNGA Session	(9%)	18%
[Joint Communique	(--)	3%]	[Palestine Debate	(3%)	9%]
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	2%]	[Nuclear-Free Zones	(--)	5%]
Zambia President Kaunda	(--)	5%	Criticism of Lin Piao	(7%)	10%
in USSR			and Confucius		
[Podgorny Speeches	(--)	3%]	World Food Conference,	(4%)	5%
Mongolian 50th Anniver-	(2%)	5%	Rome		
sary			South Yemen Chairman	(14%)	4%
Shah of Iran in USSR	(--)	4%	in PRC, DPRK		
China	(6%)	4%	Indochina	(6%)	3%
UNGA Palestine Debate	(2%)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.