

CIA FDD TRANS NO 904

SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL

JOURNAL VOYENNAYA MYSL', NO 8, 1964

23 APRIL 1965

FDD TRANS NO 904

1 OF 2



RECORD COPY

FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLATION
Number 904 23 April 1965

SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL

No 8, 1964

SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL
VOYENNAYA MYSL', No 8, 1964

Table of Contents

Page

The Lessons of the Beginning Period of the Great Patriotic War, by Mar SU S. S. Biryuzov	1
Instilling Resolute Qualities in Soviet Commanders, by Maj Gen A. Surchenko	33
Encirclement and Annihilation of Groupings of Defending Troops, by Maj Gen B. Golovchiner	45
Certain Tendencies in the Development of Antiaircraft and Antirocket Defense, by Cols I. Zheltikov and V. Igolkin	53
Methods of Organizing and Conducting Military Science Conferences, by Col M. Kir'yan	66
Twenty Years of the Bulgarian People's Army, by Col Gen D. Dzhurov, Minister of National Defense of Bulgaria	81
Self-Propelled Artillery of the Armies of the Capitalist Countries, by Col V. Zharov	(Not translated)
To Fulfill All Requirements of Modern Military Theory and Practice (A review of the journal <u>Voyenny Vestnik</u>), by Lt Col L. Saltykov	91
Myth and Reality in the "Crucial Decisions" of US Strategy, by Col A. Koronenko	(Not translated)

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Voyennaya Mysl' (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministry's Military Publishing House, Moscow. This translation is from issue No 8, August 1964, which was signed for the press 23 July 1964. The articles, "Self-Propelled Artillery of the Armies of the Capitalist Countries," by Col V. ZHAROV, and "Myth and Reality in the 'Crucial Decisions' of US Strategy," by Col A. KORONENKO, are not considered of sufficient interest to warrant dissemination.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

by Mar SU S. S. DIRYUZOV

CPYRGHT

1 September 1964 marks 25 years from the day when German fascism nurtured by world reaction plunged mankind into the depth of a second World War. This war, which lasted for six years, drew into its orbit almost all the countries of Europe, a majority of the states of Asia, the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean basins, and enveloped significant African territory. More than 80 percent of the owl population participated in it either directly or indirectly.

The war brought uncounted hardships to hundreds of millions of people, brought forth great human suffering and the destruction of material and cultural values, and created difficulties for many generations of people. It took away almost 500 million human lives. According to foreign economists, who are accustomed to evaluating world events in money, wartime destruction in Europe totalled more than 260 billion dollars. (Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945, World War II, 1939-1945, Voenizdat, 1958, p 828) The war put a great strain on the economies of all the warring states. Direct military expenditures alone are valued at 1,117 billion dollars. (Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945, World War II, 1939-1945, Voenizdat, 1958, p 827).

As is known, World War II began between two groups of imperialist countries pursuing irreconcilable political and economic contradictions in their struggle for a new redivision of the world and spheres of influence. The imperialists have more than once attempted to resolve these contradictions at the expense of the USSR, the existence of which they consider a major danger to themselves. On this occasion the aggressors based their main goal at destroying the socialist state they despised. The imperialists, however, miscalculated. World War II ended with results unforeseen by them. Despite their calculations a great and irrevocable wound was dealt the capitalist system itself. The fascism of Hitler and Mussolini was buried under the clouds of war, imperialist Japan suffered a crushing defeat, and a number of European and Asian countries were separated from the capitalist system and formed, together with the Soviet Union, a united and powerful socialist camp.

A component part and decisive event of World War II was the great patriotic war of the Soviet people against facist Germany, its satellites and imperialist Japan. Results of the struggle of the Soviet armed forces had a determined influence on the entire course of World War II. In the fight with the Hitlerite military machine the Soviet Union won a universal and historic victory, defeating the most reactionary forces of international imperialism. The Soviet people not only preserved the honor, freedom, and independence of its motherland, but also saved many peoples of the world from fascist slavery.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

An important place in the course of the great patriotic war was held by its beginning period, which for a number of reasons was for our motherland and its armed forces the most difficult and most strenuous.

A study of the events of the beginning period of the great patriotic war and the lessons derived from this experience are of practical significance even in modern conditions since the danger of war has not diminished. Moreover, the peculiar political methods and particularly the anti-Communist ideology widely employed by the imperialists when preparing for World War II are in many respects being applied by them at the present time to prepare for a new world war.

Several of the Lessons of the Preparedness of the Soviet Union to Repel the Fascist Aggressor

The international situation in the years preceding the beginning of the great patriotic war was characterized by an aggravation of the common crisis of capitalism and increased imperialist aggression by the fascist states.

German imperialism, which suffered defeat in World War I, owing to the direct political and financial aid of American, English, and French monopolies succeeded in restoring and increasing its economic power by the end of the 30's and with relative rapidity in arming its army with new combat equipment. The ruling circles of the imperialist powers attempted to unite all reactionary forces under the flag of "a crusade" against Communism. The role of the striking force was assigned to fascist Germany, which by their calculations would crush the Soviet Union.

The openly aggressive cry of the German militarist "Drang nach Osten" fully responded to the aspirations of the ruling circles of the West, the true intention of which was to destroy our country and at the same time to weaken Germany in order to establish complete rule in the world and to dictate its own conditions to everyone.

German occupation of the Rhineland and the Austrian anschluss met no opposition from the governments of the US, England, and France. They granted Germany one concession after another. The high point in the policies of the states in regard to small countries and to the preparation for war against the Soviet Union was the "Munich Pact," as a result of which the Czechoslovakian Republic was hurled under the feet of the fascist conquerors.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

The Soviet Union had not ceased to struggle against the advancing threat of a world war. The Soviet government constantly called upon all peace-loving peoples to unite all their efforts and to create a united front of states for suppressing the aggressive aspirations of German fascism. But the ruling circles of the West, blinded by hatred for a socialist country, did not wish to undertake any concrete practical steps to restrain the aggressor.

The 1939 agreement between the governments of the USSR, England, and France to elaborate joint measures for counteracting fascist aggression is a vivid example of this. The Soviet government, true to the principles of collective security, sought in the agreement the acceptance of commitments mutually guaranteeing the interests of all the participants and the conclusion of an agreement between them on mutual aid. However, the English and French governments in the hope of warding off an attack by Hitlerite Germany and directing it against the Soviet Union did not agree to the conclusion of such an agreement and virtually cut off the talks.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government even with such unfavorable conditions did everything necessary and possible to save our country, the only socialist state in the world, from the danger hanging over it. In August 1939 they decided to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany, as suggested by the German government. The conclusion of this pact was a great victory for Soviet foreign policy and wrecked the provocative plans of the imperialist warmongers. The Soviet people removed the immediate danger of their forming a united imperialist coalition against the USSR and gained some time for strengthening the defense capability of the country and were saved from the danger of being drawn into a war in a situation most unfavorable for them.

The calculations of the imperialists of turning fascist Germany against the Soviet Union had already proved to be wrong at this stage. Despite their hopes World War II began between capitalist states.

On 1 September 1939 fascist Germany attacked bourgeois-owned Poland which could not withstand the blows of the German army. The swift advance of the Hitlerite masses to the East created an immediate threat to the Soviet Union from the West. On the decision of the government Soviet troops in December 1939 entered the western Ukraine and western Belorussia and, bringing to the people of these areas long awaited freedom, they extended our state border to the west by 200 to 300 kilometers.

PYRGHT

With the beginning of World War II the governments of England and France did not, nevertheless, lose hope of turning the war against the USSR. They tried to raise up against the Soviet Union the Baltic States neighboring it. Anti-Soviet intrigues were spewed up in the Baltic States and fascist Germany. But these attempts failed. In August 1940 Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania in accordance with the wills of the peoples of these states became a part of the USSR.

The war of bourgeois Finland against the USSR, provoked by the imperialists at the end of 1939, soon ended in the defeat of Finland and the signing of a peace agreement according to which the USSR border in the area of Leningrad was extended to the northwest.

In the summer of 1940 the Soviet Union achieved the return by Rumania of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. Thus, the USSR border was significantly extended to the West. Unfortunately, as we have seen earlier, this new border was not prepared defensively and in the fortified areas in the old border a majority of its armament had been removed which was one of the reasons for the swift invasion of Hitler's troops into Soviet territory.

Exploiting the lack of decisive actions by France and England, the German fascist troops in April 1940 easily occupied Denmark and Norway. Subsequently, in May 1940 they broke through the defense of the ally troops and occupied Holland, Belgium, and Northern France, reached the coast of the English Channel, occupied Paris and forced the French government to capitulate.

Intoxicated by easy victories in the West, Germany in the second half of 1940 began immediate preparation for war against the USSR.

In the beginning of the war by fascist Germany against the USSR almost all European countries had either been defeated by it, incorporated into the anti-Soviet bloc, or held a friendly attitude of "neutrality" towards Germany.

Only Great Britain, which was threatened with a loss of its colonies and of its own independence, continued to carry out the war against Germany. However, the German-fascist ruling circles considered that England did not represent a serious danger to Germany and would not interfere with the successful conduct of its war against the Soviet Union.

As a result of the establishment of Hitler's rule in the European countries and the carrying out of significant measures for strengthening and further militarizing the economic base, aggression by fascist Germany was yet further expanded and strengthened. Germany could utilize the material and human resources of the Western European countries which it

CPYRGHT

It was almost completely mobilized, excellently equipped, and possessed the experience for conducting combat operations.

As the threat of attack by fascist Germany grew the Communist Party and Soviet government promoted much work to strengthen the defense capability of our country.

In the five years preceding the war particular attention was paid to the industrialization of the country. Heavy machine construction, the largest field of industry, was established. Great successes were achieved by the chemical industry and non-ferrous metallurgy.

Long before the war the party emphasized the construction of new enterprises in the Eastern areas of the USSR. In Siberia a second coal and metallurgical base was established. Between the Volga and the Urals, in the Far North and Far East deposits of coal and oil were extracted. New industrial centers arose along the Volga, in Kazakhstan, in the Middle Asian republics, and in the Transcaucasus.

This long-range policy of our party was fully justified. The industrial base, created in the Eastern USSR, was a powerful source of supply for the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War.

Along with industrialization socialist reorganization of agriculture played a great role in strengthening the defensive capability of the country. As a result of the victory of the kolkhoz system our agriculture became extremely strong and mechanized. In 1940 more than 500,000 tractors, approximately 200,000 combines, and 228,000 trucks worked in the fields of the country. The productivity of agriculture increased. Owing to the work of the party and government in strengthening this important area of the economy agriculture proved itself able to withstand difficult experiences during the war and to insure the supply of the army with food and industry with raw materials.

As a result of the successes of socialist construction both in the areas of industry as well as in agriculture, the Soviet Union in a historically short time was transformed into a powerful industrial and agricultural power.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Considering the manifest threat of an attack by Hitler's Germany, the Communist Party and government resolved to immediately broaden the production capability of the defense industry. Allocations for military needs were significantly increased, old military factories were reconstructed and new ones built, their specializations were carried out according to types of military equipment and a large part of the means of production was renovated.

Because of its rate of growth in the pre-war years the gross output of the defense industry significantly outstripped other areas of industry. As a result of this technical mastery the Soviet armed forces grew quickly. Thus in 1939, in comparison with 1930, the issue of tanks increased 43 times, aircraft 6.5 times, artillery 7 times, machine guns 5.5 times. Naval tonnage increased 2.3 times. The mechanized power of the Soviet army was increased. In 1939 there was already 13 mechanical horsepower for every soldier.

However, one must observe that several types of our combat equipment in the armament of the army was antiquated. A lag was mainly observed in the area of the production of certain types of aircraft, tanks, and automatic weapons.

But thanks to the efforts of the Party this lag was overcome. In a relatively short time our scientists, designers, and workers created new types of rifle armament and drafted artillery systems with high combat qualities. The army began to be equipped with rocket weapons. Tanks T-34 and KV appeared, armed with powerful armor, armament, and good practicability and maneuverability. Along with the increase in the technical equipping of the armed forces measures for significantly increasing their numbers were taken.

In the pre-war years changes also took place in the organization of the armed forces. Measures were carried out to strengthen the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense and new military districts were established. Particular significance was given to the harmonious development of the various arms.

The military operations carried out by the Soviet army in 1938-1940 and also the first period of World War II showed that artillery and mortars were very important for defeating live forces and combat equipment of the enemy on the field of battle. Thus, the Soviet command took steps to saturate the ground troops with them.

Before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War armored troops were in the stage of reformation. The fact is that on the basis of incorrect conclusions from the limited experience of the war in Spain the mechanized corps established by us in the middle 1930's were disbanded and the basic tank troop sovedineniye was the tank brigade.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

operations in Poland and France, which demonstrated the great importance of large armoured soyedineniya, the Soviet command in July 1940 began to develop mechanized corps and tank and motorized division. But there proved to be little time to effect these measures. As a consequence of which a majority of the soyedineniya were understaffed at the beginning of the war.

Measures were taken to rearm Air Force units with new type of aircraft (LAGG-3, MIG-3, Pe-2, and others) which had begun to be put into production on the eve of the war. A number of new chastis were established. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the war the plan to rearm the Air Forces had not been completed.

Several airborne corps were formed in 1941. The establishment of new special troops chastis and rear services chastis and installations was begun.

In the Navy destroyer, submarine, and torpedo boat soyedineniya were formed and basic soyedineniya were strengthened with new ships. In all naval theaters systems for basing the fleet were established and the construction of naval bases was carried out.

Therefore, owing to the efforts of the party and all the Soviet people much work was being done on the eve of the war for preparing our country and the armed forces to repel aggression. But for a number of reasons measures in all these areas were not carried out to completion. The Stalin personality cult played a greatly negative role in this.

Great harm to the combat capability of the armed forces was caused by the unfounded repressions and extermination of a great number of remarkable commanders and political workers, particularly from the numbers of the leadership personnel. A whole series of military districts, armies, corps, and divisions were, in the fullest sense of the word, decapitated. To replace this loss in the beginning of the war was, because of the lack of time, impossible and a significant part of the military cadre who replaced the repressed commanders and military leaders were inexperienced and unprepared to direct troops in large scale battles. Thus, Stalin's arbitrariness played directly into the hands of the enemy.

The Stalin personality cult had an extremely negative influence on the development of Soviet military thought in the prewar years. The arbitrary rule and policy of dictation in questions of theory impeded the mastery of the Leninist military and theoretical inheritance, fettered the initiative of military scientists, and retarded the

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
COPYRIGHT

development of military science. Searched for ready formulas and quotations were substituted for creative research in military and theoretical questions. As a result many questions of theory and practice were resolved without calculation of those changes which had occurred in the means and methods of conducting war.

Thus, in spite of the fundamental changes which were introduced by World War II in the content and character of the beginning period of the war, we continued to consider it as that portion of time from the beginning of military operations until the entry of the main mass of the armed forces into the war. Thus, military operations were conceived as comparatively limited in scale, chiefly as the operations of troops in defense and battling for superiority in the air with the simultaneous conduct of mobilization, concentration, and deployment of the main forces. The course of the events in the first days of World War II showed the error of this opinion.

Such aspects of combat operations as defense were insufficiently understood. While recognizing its rightful place along with offensive operations, our prewar theory considered that defense must be conducted only in individual areas. Therefore questions of defense on a strategic scale were poorly developed. They were also insufficiently developed in operational and tactical elements.

Major deficiencies were also permitted in the military engineering preparation of possible theaters of military operations. Thus, the fortified regions located on the old state border between the Soviet Union and the western oblasts were not improved and even dismantled prior to the war without basis and obviously in error. During this same time, the construction of fortified regions along the new borders was essentially begun just at the beginning of the war.

It is known for certain that the well-known Soviet military fortification specialist and engineer Lt Gen D. M. KARBYSHEV, who had much experience in the fortification of the southern borders of the Soviet Republic, long before the beginning of the war repeatedly and persistently sent requests to the People's Commissariat of Defense concerning the construction of fortifications along the western border. However, no one listened to his sensible voice. Several days before the German invasion, Lt Gen D. M. KARBYSHEV was sent to the western oblasts of the country and, of course, was unable to accomplish anything. In the beginning of the war Dmitriy Mikhaylovich was badly wounded and taken prisoner. He died a martyr's death from the terrible tortures of the fascists, a national hero.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-8

of theaters for military operations was the absence of rear defensive boundaries at operational depth. The carrying capacity of the railroads was insufficient, especially in the western oblasts. The railroad junctions remained in poorly developed condition and many lines had only single tracks. Roads too were not sufficiently developed. All of this made the concentration and deployment of troops very difficult.

The increasing threat of an attack by Germany on the Soviet Union demanded that urgent measures be taken for the immediate preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces for the defense of the state borders. However, for a variety of reasons and primarily because of inexcusable miscalculations by Stalin, the General Staff, and also the Intelligence Administration in evaluating the military and strategic situation which had developed on the eve of the war, the measures which were taken were far from sufficient. In spite of the clear evidence that Germany was preparing for aggression against the USSR, Stalin believed that the Soviet-German pact for nonaggression guaranteed that Germany would not make war on our country for at least a short while. Moreover he and the General Staff had positive data concerning the concentration of German troops along our borders and their preparation for attacking the Soviet Union. However, Stalin considered these data as provocative and that they supposedly would incite the Soviet government to take retaliatory steps which could have been used by the Germans to break the pact of nonaggression. As a result of these tragically mistaken conclusions, our troops were not given orders to increase combat readiness. The Armed Forces continued at peacetime status.

An important influence on the weakening of attentiveness of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces was rendered by the Tass announcement, published in the Soviet press on 14 June 1964, which, in spite of irrefutable facts, denied the possibility of an attack by Germany on the Soviet Union and explained that the motives for the concentration of German troops on our borders was of no concern for the Soviet-German relationship. This was an unexplainable and inadmissible act of misinforming the Soviet people.

Much of the guilt for the insufficient preparation of the Soviet Armed Forces for war lies on the former leaders of the People's Commissariat for Defense and especially the General Staff who made many mistakes in decisions concerning operational and mobilizational planning.

The incorrect evaluation of the content of the beginning period of the coming war led to the conclusion that a decisive offensive by the aggressor would be preceded by operations of limited character and that therefore our troops could in the course of battle occupy their defensive positions under the protection of comparatively small forces. It was not taken into consideration that the German army was completely mobilized and able at any time to begin a wide-scale offensive.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-8

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

As a result of the calculations conducted in evaluating the military and political situation, only border chasti were located immediately at the border. The main troop force located in the border districts was deployed in camps which were rather well removed from the border. The deployment of troops in the border districts was such that they could not rapidly be moved to certain boundaries and necessary concentrations could not be developed.

According to the calculations of the General Staff, it would take several days after the announcement of mobilization to bring the troops of the border districts to a wartime footing.

The readiness of our air forces for war was also insufficient. The construction of air fields in the western regions had not been completed and there were few reserve air fields. Aviation chasti were deployed densely on peacetime air fields which were known to the enemy and an overwhelming majority of them were not dispersed to field air bases, which is one of the main reasons for the heavy losses of our aviation in the first days of the war.

Also the antiaircraft artillery was not prepared to repulse the aerial enemy. There was too little of it. Also, antiaircraft artillery chasti and podrazdeleniya were not afforded sufficient manpower which greatly decreased their capability for combating the aerial enemy.

The plans of the General Staff for protecting the national boundary were delayed. This was one of the most important reasons why the troops defending the border military districts were unable to deploy to defensive boundaries according to stipulated plans.

The conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the USSR and Japan in April 1941 made it possible in May to begin the transfer of some soyedineniya from the internal regions of the country to the western borders. However, the transfer, concentration, and deployment of these troops was carried out extremely slowly and with great caution, again to avoid giving Germany cause for provocation.

Thus, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union a concentration of forces large enough to repulse the sudden enemy invasion had not been developed. The troops located near the border did not receive combat orders to occupy defensive boundaries in time. The Soviet troops were not given advance warning concerning the readiness of the enemy to attack.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

... districts, seeing the obvious threat of attack by the German army, attempted to bring their troops to complete combat readiness and to place them in defensive boundaries and positions. However, Stalin, who personally decided all important military question, each time forbid them to do this in order not to provoke a conflict or war with the Germans.

On the eve of the treacherous attack by the German army, the troops of the border military districts continued to live and study in the conditions of peacetime. L. M. SANDALOV, who was chief-of-staff of an army at that time, describes this very convincingly in his book Perezhitoye (Experiences). "The evening of 21 June was an ordinary Saturday evening for the troops and commanders of the 4th Army. They rested, watched a play, or attended a movie or a presentation by a group of artists. Meanwhile in the other 4th Army, on the other side of the Bug, they were preparing for destruction." L. M. SANDALOV cites an extract from the 21 June 1941 memoirs of the German general, GUDERIAN who, with the open cynicism of the bandit, impatiently awaited the night of the attack and in no way expected his death. He writes, "Careful observation of the Russians on 21 June convinced me that they had no suspicion of our intentions. As was seen from the observation post, the changing of the guard in the courtyard of the Brest Fortress was accompanied by the sounds of an orchestra. No Russian soldiers occupied the shore fortifications along the Bug River."

Only on the night of 21 June, when all information irrefutably pointed to the preparation of Germany to attack the USSR, did the People's Commissariat of Defense give orders to immediately bring the troops to combat readiness. These orders were greatly delayed in reaching the troops and were in essence only a formal act, since the time for their execution had actually already passed. In some headquarters these orders were not even deciphered. By dawn our garrisons, military camps, and airfields, where moored aircraft stood row after row, were subjected to powerful surprise strikes by aircraft and the fiery strikes of enemy artillery. The western boundaries of our native land were enveloped in the flames of war.

Military Operations in the Beginning Period of World War II

Thus, having treacherously broken the nonaggression pact, fascist Germany started a war against the Soviet Union. The German command sent 190 earlier mobilized and deployed divisions into our country, using approximately 5,000 aircraft, over 3,700 tanks, and 50,000 guns

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

and mortars in their attacks. The enemy began this war without carrying out reconnaissance operations against the defending troops. He unleashed decisive attacks with large strike concentrations in three strategic areas, the northwest, the west, and the southwest.

Our generation well remembers the first days and months of World War II. It has been confirmed by documentation that the German attacks were a surprise for the troops of our border military districts who were caught by surprise and began combat operations in the most difficult conditions. Many divisions were scattered: artillery regiments were in artillery camps and on firing ranges, special chastii -- in training, and rifle soyedineniya and chastii -- in permanent disposition points or in camps.

The lack of a timely decision to bring the Soviet troops to combat readiness and occupy proper regions and boundaries near the state borders had extremely bad consequences for us and essentially predetermined the major setbacks and defeats of the Soviet Army in the beginning period of the war.

The sudden and large scale attacks delivered in the first hours of the war by German aircraft and artillery against the troops of the border districts followed by the attacks and invasion of large columns of tanks made it impossible to organize the entry of troops into the battle. Having been caught by surprise our troops, in spite of the bravery and heroism displayed by individuals, were not able to contain the onslaught of the enemy armies. With heavy fighting and large losses they began to retreat, many of them being trapped by enemy encirclements.

With the concentration of large forces on the main axes of attack, composed for the most part of motorized and armored troops supported by powerful aviation forces, the enemy achieved a decisive superiority in forces and means in these areas, seized the initiative, delivered serious defeats to the troops of the border districts, and managed to penetrate deeply into the USSR in the first days of the war.

The strategic concentrations of our ground troops, deployed in the beginning of the war in the territory of the border districts, were scattered. As the result of great losses, many soyedineniya ceased to exist. The reserves which were brought up from the rear and hastily thrown into battle were not able to stop the offensive of the German troops. The rapid tempo of the enemy advance upset the mobilization of material and personnel in the border regions and prohibited the evacuation of people and material into the depth of the country. Since the enemy had seized much territory in the Western regions of the USSR, our fighting army was deprived of huge supplies of fuel, ammunition, and weapons.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

The lack of reliable reporting communications with the troops and subordinate staffs deprived commanders and staffs of all levels, right up to the General Staff and the Stavka of the High Command, of the possibility of receiving trustworthy information concerning the situation at the front and the condition of the troops. This caused major mistakes in guiding combat operations to be made by the General Staff and front commanders. Thus, as a result of an incorrect evaluation of the situation and the condition and capabilities of our troops, on the evening of 22 June the People's Commissariat of Defense was ordered to move the troops at the front to the attack in order to defeat the attacking enemy forces and transfer combat operations to enemy territory. Obviously this order could not be executed by the troops at the fronts who, having suffered large losses in the first enemy attacks, were scattered, isolated from each other, and retreating in small units. Often orders for the withdrawal of our troops to advantageous natural boundaries in the rear were not received by the units involved or were received too late when the route for the withdrawal and sometimes the boundary itself were already taken by the enemy.

As a result of the retreat of Soviet troops from the border regions, our naval bases were subjected to attacks by enemy ground sovedineniya. Therefore from the first days of the war, the main efforts of our Navy were not directed against the enemy's naval power, but were instead used to defend their own bases and their evacuation and also to protect the coastal flanks of ground troops ob'yedineniya.

Thus, we waged armed combat in the beginning period of the war under very difficult conditions. This combat was characterized both by the lack of a stable continuous front and chiefly by the execution of defensive and retreat operations which were, as a rule, accompanied by large losses in the personnel and equipment and the extensive loss of territory.

Having the strategic initiative, a great superiority in attack forces, and absolute air superiority, the enemy could maneuver his forces freely and due to the absence of a continuous front could envelop the defenses of our sovedineniya and ob'yedineniya. After the unsuccessful outcome of the border fighting, the Soviet command had insufficient air, mechanized, and tank forces to cut off the enemy's maneuvers and paralyze his attacking forces.

The conduct of a strategic defense in the beginning period of the war was made even more difficult since the enemy by delivering powerful attacks successfully breached our strategic front, enveloped our flanks, and encircled Soviet troops. This is what happened at the very beginning of the war in Belorussia and then in the Uman' and Kiev

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

region. The defeat of our troops at Kiev in September 1941 was to a great degree the fault of Stalin, who, in spite of a warning concerning the complete defeat threatening the Kiev forces and the request by the Military Council of the Southwestern Front for the timely withdrawal of the troops out of the bulge, refused to allow the retreat which led to the grave defeat of the troops in this area.

There were major defects in the organization of defensive and retreat operations. As a rule defenses were organized hastily over a wide front with uniform distribution of forces along the front. The defense lacked necessary depth and had a linear character. The almost complete absence of antitank weapons had an especially fatal effect on the strength of the defense. Bottles filled with fuel oil were often the only means available to be used against powerful tank attacks in battalions and regiments. There were no antitank guns at that time and the 44-millimeter shells used by our antitank artillery were ineffective. There was not enough field artillery or tanks. In practice this defense was not able to withstand attacks from enemy tank forces.

True, much work was done on the construction of defensive lines in the rear of the Soviet forces on the main axes of the German offensive. However, they could not be used with full effectiveness. The forces and means were not available at the fronts. Reserves moved forward from the rear areas to the front lines were thrown into combat in units as they arrived and were not effective in changing the situation to our advantage.

There was an especially great lack of skill in the organization and execution of retreat operations and troops were left completely without any sort of support to be trapped. Some soyedineniya and chasty retreated in a disordered fashion and a large amount of combat equipment and heavy weapons were lost or destroyed due to the absence of fuel for tractors and machines. It was impossible to find fuel at the front lines. Encircled chasty were almost never given enough support and usually operated at the discretion of their commanders.

All of this can be explained to a significant degree by the fact that many chasty and soyedineniya commanders and commanders of operational ob'yedineniya did not possess combat experience and skills in directing troops, especially in operational elements, and thus did not know how to organize defense and retreat operations correctly or to break out of encirclements.

In the beginning of the war our troops were used in offensive operations. However, they had serious deficiencies. A basic defect was the unjustified haste with which the senior echelons attempted to execute attacks. The lack of success in the majority of offensive

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

battles and operations by frontal attack was to a great degree the consequence of their poor organization and the scanty of aircraft and antiaircraft artillery. The established strike forces were not afforded sufficient superiority in forces and means over the enemy. The attacking forces were given little or no time for preparation. Therefore the goals of offensive battles and operations, as a rule, were not achieved.

The consequences of the surprise attack by fascist Germany were grave for us. By the end of September the enemy had penetrated along main axes 600-850 kilometers into our territory. The Soviet Union lost a large portion of the Karelo-Finnish SSR and the Leningradskaya Oblast, all of the Baltics and Belorussia, a large portion of Smolenskaya Oblast and many other oblasts in the western part of the Russian Federation, Moldavia, the rich agricultural and industrial regions of the right bank Ukraine, and part of the left bank Ukraine, with their large populations. Important naval bases on the Baltic Sea fell into the enemy's hands and the Black Sea Fleet was paralyzed.

However, these difficult experiences did not break the combat spirit of the Soviet Army nor shake the determination of our people who rallied around the Communist Party with more solidarity. The Party's titanic activity in organizing the repulsing of the enemy at the front and preparing the military industry in the rear and its impassioned revolutionary word strengthened the belief of the Soviet people in victory and led our Soviet Army to victory. In bitter defensive battles our Armed Forces destroyed and exhausted the enemy and imposed huge losses in personnel and combat equipment on him. As the enemy penetrated deeper into Soviet territory, the resistance of our troops increased and the front was consolidated.

When new forces were brought up from the depth of the country and placed into battle and better technical and combat means were made available, the power of our counterattacks was increased as was the tenacity of chasty and soyedineniya in defense. The organization of the preparation and execution of combat operations was corrected, command and line personnel gradually acquired combat experience, and the control of troops was improved. All of this had a telling effect on the results of operations carried out by our troops in repulsing enemy attacks. This is illustrated by the fact that the average daily advance of the enemy at the end of September in comparison with the first 20 days of the war was shortened from 20-30 kilometers to 2-3 kilometers.

In bitter fighting on the approaches to Leningrad, Soviet troops threw back all attempts by the enemy to seize this important strategic region. The enemy suffered especially heavy losses there.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

was cut off in time by the battle of Smolensk. On the right bank Ukraine the German command also was unsuccessful in its attempts to destroy the Soviet troops in order subsequently to quickly seize all of the southern regions of the Soviet Union.

True, in the south of our country, the enemy enjoyed considerable success, but he was successful here only by developing a large superiority in forces by directing two army ob'yedineniya of the "Center" army to the south.

Although the enemy did not achieve any of his established strategic war goals on time, he continued to attack, he retained the initiative, and the situation at the front continued to be complicated at the end of September.

Due to the unsuccessful outcome of our combat operations on the left bank Ukraine in September 1941 and the large-scale redeployment of German troops conducted by the German command in the Moscow area, very threatening situations developed in October in the zones of the Western, Bryansk, and Southwestern fronts.

This time the Soviet High Command saw the threat to Moscow on time and took measures to develop a solid defense on the approaches to the capital of our native land and to reinforce the troops of the fronts with new forces and means, including many new types of combat equipment and weapons which were being made available by the military industry in the depth of the country.

Due to the heroic efforts and the growing skill of the Soviet troops, both offensives against Moscow undertaken by the enemy in October and November were stopped. The enemy suffered serious losses and exhausted basic reserves. An important role in stopping the German advance on Moscow was played by the offensive operations carried out by Soviet troops on the flanks of the active units of the Soviet-German front, in the Tikhvin and Rostov areas, under the leadership of Army Gen K. A. MERETSKOV, Mar SU S. K. TIMOSHENCKO, and Col Gen Ya. T. CHEREVICHENKO which prevented the German command from reinforcing groups of the "Center" army with groups from the "North" and "South" armies.

By stopping the German offensive against Moscow, the Soviet people and their army showed their great strength by stopping the enemy and inflicting heavy destruction on his forces under difficult conditions.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Thus, in intensive fighting, the troops under the command of D. D. LELYUSHENKO, V. I. KUZNETSOV, K. K. ROKOSSOVSKIY, L. A. GOVOROV, I. V. GOLDIN, P. A. BELOV, and other commanders inflicted serious losses in manpower and equipment on the enemy, reduced his offensive capabilities, and brought him to a halt on approaches close to Moscow. This was the beginning of the turning point in the course of the war and of the constantly increasing capabilities of the Soviet Army.

Situational turning points also developed in other decisive areas of the Soviet-German front. In the second half of November at Tikhvin and Rostov Soviet troops began to change over from defensive to offensive operations. Almost simultaneously the German army lost the initiative for offensive operations and for the first time in World War II transferred to the defense under the influence of constantly increasing strikes by the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Soviet Armed Forces gradually seized the initiative from the enemy and prepared to deliver a crushing attack against him.

The first successes achieved in stopping Hitler's aggressive plans would not have been possible without the heroic labor of all of the Soviet people who gave their Armed Forces everything possible. Due to the efforts of the Communist Party and Soviet government, the national economy of our country was quickly transferred to a war footing, supplies to troops operating at the front were improved, and a large number of reserve chasty and soyedineniya were established. Simultaneously with the increase in the number of soyedineniya in the operational army, large reserves were established for the Headquarters of the High Command. The strength of the Soviet Army grew enormously.

By the beginning of December, the enemy had lost his superiority in tanks and aircraft. New combat equipment, replacement units, and new chasty and soyedineniya were made available to the army and reserve armies were engaged which were very important in changing the overall relationship of forces on the Soviet-German front. However, the numerical relationship between the forces was not all that was changed. More and more Soviet tanks and aircraft which were qualitatively superior to those of the Germans appeared on the battlefield. The army was supplied with automatic and antitank guns at an increasing rate. There was a qualitative change in the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. Soviet soldiers had been hardened by intense battle, chasty and soyedineniya were strengthened organizationally, and command personnel accumulated much experience in controlling combat operations in complex conditions.

All of this indicated that the period of strategic defense which the Soviet Armed Forces were forced to assume in the beginning period of the war had come to an end. The main enemy groups were exhausted

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

and disheartened and had been brought to a stop everywhere. The primary strategic goal which the party and the state had assigned to the Armed Forces had been achieved. Thus, the beginning period of the war was over. The war began the next period of its development which was begun by our Armed Forces turning to a counteroffensive and then to a general strategic offensive.

The counteroffensive of the troops at Tikhvin and Rostov-on-Don and the historic victory at Moscow were the precursors of the complete destruction of the German horde. The Soviet Army seized the strategic initiative from the hands of the enemy and developed conditions for the subsequent deployment of offensive operations.

The defeat of the German troops at Moscow was a shining victory for the Soviet Armed Forces and was recorded in history as a prominent military event of World War II. It was the first major defeat of the Germans and it shook the German military machine to its foundations. The Soviet forces had done away with the propaganda developed by Hitler concerning the invincibility of the German army.

In those days not only the plans for a lightning war, but all the strategic plans of the German command collapsed. Hitler's Germany was unavoidably faced with the necessity for carrying on a protracted war.

The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces at Moscow had worldwide historical importance. It inspired the people of the world to battle for liberation from the fascist invaders and had an important influence on subsequent stages of World War II. Many historical facts illustrate this.

Thus, William Foster, chairman of the Central Committee of the US Communist Party, in giving his evaluation of the victory gained by the Soviet people in the winter of 1941-42, wrote prophetically: "The wounds given to the fascist monster by the Red Army saved the world from the threat of Hitler." The widest response to our victory at Moscow came from the countries of Europe. Maurice Torez said, "All of France celebrates the first victories of the Red Army and the successes of the Soviet offensive in the winter of 1941-42 with delight and enthusiasm."

In January 1942 members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and other prominent persons and politicians of Germany published an address to the German people in which they wrote, "We express our deepest solidarity with the great Soviet people and our limitless delight with their heroic Red Army who with their honor and lives are

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

barbarians. Being conscious of our debt to our people, we will fulfill it until the end. Until our last breath and without sparing our strength or our life, we will struggle on the many great fronts of the people until Hitler's tyranny is completely destroyed and done away with." This address was signed by B. Pik, W. Ulbricht, and others.

Many bourgeois personages who were hostile to the socialist order of our country were forced to admit that the victory at Moscow had great importance on the course of World War II. The intense battle on the Soviet-German front drew into its orbit the main forces of fascist Germany and essentially paralyzed the operations of the Wehrmacht in all other theaters of World War II. Churchill wrote on this subject "While the German armies carried on a mortal battle in the East, the threat of an invasion of England decreased." In his evaluation of the defeat of the Wehrmacht by the Soviet Army at Moscow, he confessed that "the resistance of the Russians broke the backbone of the German armies." In a telegram to the Soviet government, General de Gaulle wrote, "By throwing its power against the aggressor, the USSR has now given oppressed people certainty in their liberation. I have no doubts that due to the heroism of the Soviet armies the efforts of the allies will be crowned with victory."

A brief analysis of the course of the military operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the summer and fall of 1941 allows certain conclusions to be drawn concerning the beginning period of World War II to determine its duration and content.

Unfortunately, until now there has been no single interpretation of the beginning period of World War II in our historic literature. There are two points of view on this subject. The advocates of one believe that the beginning period of the war was concluded with the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and with the engaging of the reserve armies in the conflict, i.e., in the middle of July 1941. Advocates of the other point of view say that the beginning period of the war continued until the beginning of December 1941 when the offensive of the German armies was stopped and conditions were developed for the Soviet forces to turn to the counteroffensive.

It must be said that this debate is not an idle one. The correct understanding and generalization of the experience of the most important lessons of the beginning period of the past war permit us to understand thoroughly the character of armed conflict in modern conditions and with calculation of this experience to work out the most expedient methods for preparing and conducting operations and combat actions in the beginning period of a future war.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

The advocates of the first, in our opinion, are defending a plan which is long obsolete in which the basic content of the beginning period of the war is considered the mobilization, concentration, and deployment of the first strategic echelon of the armed forces. The deployment and conduct of military actions on a large scale are not included in its content.

However, as is well known, World War II was begun by the armed forces of fascist Germany which were mobilized and deployed at an earlier date. This is how the attack by Hitler's aggressors was carried out against the Soviet Union. Actually Stalin as the Supreme Commander in Chief and our General Staff made both theoretical and practical errors. A superficially shallow understanding of new phenomena peculiar to the beginning period of World War II caused us to make grave errors in preparing the Armed Forces and the country as a whole for the war, in deploying groupings of forces, organizing defenses, and changing the national economy to military production. We can now state with complete certainty that events in the beginning period of World War II would literally have had a different character if our Armed Forces had been brought to combat readiness on time and deployed in proper concentrations for conducting decisive combat operations to stop the attacks of the aggressor.

Some people are inclined to relate the conclusion of the beginning period of World War II to the end of July 1941 using indicators such as the development of relative stability of the front in certain areas as main criteria for determining the content and duration of this period.

However, even if these criteria are found to be true, they can hardly be oriented to the end of July 1941. An analysis of the course of combat operations shows that no serious shifts occurred in combat operations at the front by the end of July or even by the beginning of October. Not one continuous or really stable front had been developed in any strategic areas by this time. In spite of the engagement of our strategic reserves, the correlation of forces had still not been equalized.

Then what must be used as a basis for determining the content duration of the beginning period of the war?

It seems to us that it would be most correct from the scientific point of view to use the achievement of determined or, more precisely, the most immediate strategic goals of the war as a basis for determining

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

When the course of events on the Soviet-German front are evaluated from this point of view it is not difficult to see that the most immediate strategic goals of our Armed Forces had not been achieved by either the 10th or the 30th of July 1941. The enemy was continuing to attack and he still retained the initiative.

In the difficult conditions of the first days of the war when the front of the Soviet troops had been breached in many areas and the rapid eastern advance of the enemy armies threatened the seizure of the vital center of our country, the Soviet Supreme Command advanced the following most immediate strategic goal: to establish a strategic defense to stop the enemy advance and at the same time to foil his plans for a lightning war. All the efforts of our country and Armed Forces were directed toward the achievement of this goal during the summer and fall of 1941. This goal was achieved only by the beginning of December 1941 when our troops successfully stopped the enemy advance.

The achievement of the most immediate strategic goal placed before the Armed Forces by the Soviet Supreme Command and the thwarting of the German plan for a lightning war in itself indicated the end of the beginning period of the war and the transfer of the armed conflict to a new phase.

Thus, the basic content of the beginning period of World War II was the conduct of a forced strategic defense by the Soviet Armed Forces which had the goal of destroying the attacking enemy forces and developing conditions for seizing the strategic initiative. Other simultaneous undertakings during this period included measures for mobilization, the establishment of new ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya, the concentration of reserves on the most important areas, the evacuation of industry to the depth of the country, and the transfer of the national economy to a wartime footing.

The relatively long duration of the beginning period of World War II was the consequence of the many major mistakes and omissions which we made prior to and during the war. These were spoken of before.

For the German army the main content of the beginning period of the war was also the achievement of the most immediate strategic goals: the defeat of the main forces of the Soviet Army in the Western party of the Soviet Union and the occupation of Leningrad, Moscow, and Donets Basin. It was not faced with the task of mobilizing and deploying its main forces since this had been done before the beginning of the war.

The whole German economy had been put on a military basis ahead of

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
The beginning period of World War II must be understood.

We have already discussed the reasons for our lack of success in the beginning of the war. The disclosure and thorough analysis of these reasons have great practical importance for the correct determination of measures for the preparation of the Armed Forces and the whole country for a future war which is contemplated by the aggressive forces of the imperialist states against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist fraternity. This is the main value of the lessons of the past for us.

CPYRGHT

World War II was concluded by the complete defeat of fascist Germany, its satellites, and imperialist Japan. This victory has no equal in all of world history, but the road to it was a long and difficult one.

For about 4 years the Soviet Armed Forces were forced to conduct a difficult struggle against a stronger army which was evaluated by Western military authorities as unbeatable. An incredible display of moral and physical strength was required from all of our people.

It may be said with certainty that no other state would have been able to withstand the unfavorable circumstance which was imposed on us in the beginning period of the war. However, the Soviet Army was able in these difficult conditions to preserve its combat capability and its high moral and combat qualities not only to stop the enemy, but to give him a crushing blow.

The defeat of the German forces at Moscow was followed by the historically unparalleled defeat of the German army on the Volga. Then with its attacks growing constantly stronger, the Soviet Army threw the German invaders far to the West and completely liberated the occupied area of our native land. In 1945 operations were carried on in the territory of the Eastern European countries and the territory of the aggressor himself to completely defeat the German forces, the Hitler's Germany capitulated.

The victorious outcome of World War II signified the ruin of the second invasion by imperialists on our native land. It meant the complete failure of the wild plans of German fascism to win world supremacy.

As they celebrated victory over German fascism, the people of the world hoped that Germany which had initiated 2 world wars would never again become the breeding ground for militarism and aggression. East Germany where the communist party, the party of the workers, is in power came to stand firmly on the position of peace. However, most unfortunately, the development of West Germany took a different path. The representatives of large capital which have seized power there are using the tremendous aid of the US, England, and France to intensify the preparation of West Germany for a new war by developing a spirit of national revenge in every way possible. The reconstructed military machine of West Germany is headed by Hitler's generals.

Much was changed in the years following World War II. In a short time the Soviet Union rebuilt everything that was destroyed during the war. New cities, mines, factories, plants, electric stations, etc. rose out of the ruins and ashes. The people of the socialist camp went with certainty along the path for the construction of a brilliant

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
PYRGHT

future for mankind and communism. The struggle for peace has become much more intense and embraces many millions of people of various nationalities and political convictions. The chains of colonial slavery are being broken and more and more new countries are entering the family of free nations.

The forces which are guarding the peace under the leadership of the world socialist system now have all necessary means to restrain the imperialist instigators of war. Thus, a world war ceases to be fatally inescapable.

Much has been changed in these years, but the essence of imperialism and the desire for world supremacy have not been changed. The Communist Party teaches and warns us that the soil for an aggressive war will remain as long as imperialism remains. Although World War II did not strengthen the position of imperialism, but rather imposed irreparable losses on the whole capitalist system, the ruling classes of the West have not benefited from these lessons. In their brutal hatred of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp, they are feverishly preparing a third world war.

With the West German revenge seekers, American imperialism is now the main pretender to world supremacy and the main force of aggression and war. In preparing for the unleashing of a new war, they are copying the same unsavory methods employed by Hitler's Germany in preparation for World War II. Again under the pretense of defending against the threat of communism, aggressive blocs are gathered together and enlarged, the socialist countries are encircled by a multitude of military bases, and a never-ceasing arms race is continued in the forms of developing, testing, and accumulating new types of military equipment, especially stores of nuclear and rocket weapons.

The ruling circles of the Western powers have again given the West German Army the role of a strike force in the struggle against the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp. As they connive with the sinister revenge-seeking plans of German imperialists in designing a new war, they spare no effort to restore West German militarism. By means of generous aid from the US, West Germany has already developed the strongest army in all of the capitalist countries of Western Europe, equipped with all types of modern military equipment. The monopolistic circles in the US and their allies are attempting to place destructive nuclear weapons in the hands of the German revenge seekers. Former generals in Hitler's army, including military criminals have not only become commanders of the West German army, but occupy responsible posts in NATO.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT

Like the German fascists and the leaders of the aggressive imperialist bloc consider surprise attack as the basic means for unleashing a war against the countries of socialism in modern conditions. The preparations for this sort of attack are being put together now in a process of general preparation for war which goes on daily and hourly and penetrates the most important realms of political, economic, and military life of the main capitalist states.

Immediate preparations for a surprise attack are being implemented by the leaders of the US-English coalition both in the development of a material basis and in providing the proper conditions for such an attack. Thus, large groupings of strategic attack forces and armed forces are being stationed in theaters of military operations and large supplies of material and technical means are being built up.

It has been learned from speeches made by the US Minister of Defense and from bourgeois press sources that more than 830 intercontinental rocket sites are being deployed on US territory and that 21 atomic rocket-carrying submarines have been commissioned with 15 of them armed with polaris rockets. The US strategic aviation fleet numbers approximately 1,300 aircraft. The countries taking part in the aggressive bloc and the countries allied with the US by treaties for mutual defense have approximately 180 divisions, including the 80 divisions of the NATO countries. The NATO naval forces have over 1,200 large ships, including 19 attack aircraft carriers.

All of the concentrations of military forces in the imperialist military bloc and especially strategic attack weapons are maintained at the highest level of combat readiness. Intercontinental rockets are kept ready for launch and half of all strategic aircraft are ready to take off within 15 minutes to deliver attacks against earlier assigned targets. More than 10 strategic bombers with nuclear bombs are constantly in the air and atomic submarines patrol the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Vanguard detachments of the US navy are deployed in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean.

Thus, the US and NATO commands pursue a single goal, to develop all the conditions for the surprise unleashing of aggression.

These facts have caused us to consider the beginning period of a modern war very seriously. Experience of the past teaches that once a state becomes complacent toward the possibility of surprise aggressive action, it will suffer much destruction from the very outset or will lose the war within a short time. For this reason we must never allow mistakes in the evaluation of the military and political situation or in maintaining the combat readiness of our Armed Forces.

CPYRGHT

The first nuclear strike in a future war will create conditions in a future war for the achievement of results in its beginning period which cannot compare with the results of the beginning period of the past war. The first nuclear strike can immediately lead to the disorganization of the government, military control, and the whole rear area of a country and to stopping the systematic deployment of the armed forces and all measures being conducted for mobilization. All of this will have a telling effect on the operation of armed forces deployed in theaters of military operations. The results of the first days of military operations may have a decisive influence on the subsequent course of a war.

The equipping of armies with new means of waging combat, the changes in methods in waging war, and the character of the preparations of the imperialist states for a future war produce a basis for the supposition that, if it is begun, the beginning period of a future war will be very different from the beginning period of past wars both in content and in duration.

It is evident that in a future war both sides will immediately execute the most decisive and violent military operations which will embrace both the front and deep rear areas. As they prepare a new world war, the imperialist aggressive bloc are establishing their as goal the disruption of the economy of the socialist countries and the defeat of our troops by means of large scale nuclear strikes. Thus the Soviet Armed Forces are compelled to set for themselves a no less decisive goal: by means of retaliatory operation to crush the aggressor, rout his armed forces, destroy important military installations, demolish his economic potential, seize the strategic initiative, and develop conditions for the achievement of complete victory over the enemy within a minimal period of time.

Modern means of destruction permit the most immediate strategic goals of a war to be reached within a much shorter time period than was possible in World War II. Therefore concerning the duration of the beginning period of a future war, it will evidently be much shorter than in past wars. Of course, it would be very difficult to determine its duration exactly. However, it can be said with complete certainty that it will not be counted in months, but probably in several days or at most weeks.

Combat operations in the beginning period of a nuclear war will be conducted by methods which are principally different from the methods which were employed in past wars. Military and political strategic goals in the past were achieved by defeating the enemy armed forces on the battlefield to open paths for the attacking troops to seize vitally important areas and centers of the enemy. The most important battles

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

occurred on ground and naval theaters of military operations where the opposing forces operated in direct contact with each other. True, during World War II weapons which were effective against installations in the rear areas of the enemy, for instance bombers, were available. However, in spite of their importance, they did not play a decisive role in the achievement of assigned goals.

With the employment of nuclear and rocket weapons it becomes possible simultaneously to destroy both groupings of armed forces deployed on theaters of military operations and installations in deep rear areas, including those located in distant continents. Thus, the task of destroying installations in deep rear areas of the enemy acquires primary significance in modern conditions. It must be expected that the main battles of a future war will at once involve the depth of the territories of the belligerents.

Nuclear strikes may lead to the complete disorganization of the state and military control of the main countries in the enemy bloc and small countries may be wiped from the face of the earth. Areas of complete destruction and radioactive contamination will be formed over large territories. Some western military specialists have computed that it is sufficient to explode 100 2-megaton nuclear charges in a state with a developed economy and a territory measuring 300-500 thousand square kilometers to transform it into an empty wilderness. All of this must exert a decisive influence on the subsequent course and even the outcome of a war.

However, nuclear attacks will not be the only means for achieving the goals of a war, particularly in its beginning period. Simultaneously, or on the heels of nuclear strikes, active operations will be begun in ground and naval theaters to defeat concentrations of enemy armed forces and seize the enemy's territory.

In ground theaters both sides will attempt to achieve established goals chiefly by attacking, which inescapably will lead to large meeting engagements. Defeat of defending concentrations will be achieved mainly by delivering nuclear and rocket strikes. Important possibilities for conducting highly maneuverable operations on a wide scale will appear. There will be no continuous fronts either in the beginning period or during the course of the war. Combat operations as a rule will develop in separate areas and both sides will attempt to make deep penetrations into enemy territory. The operations of airborne landing troops who will be landed in deep rear areas will acquire special significance.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Military operations in naval theaters will also take on a decisive character. In naval operations as in operations by the ground troops, the most important missions will be executed by nuclear weapons. The aggressor's naval concentrations will be defeated by submarine operating in coordination with rocket-armed naval aircraft. Destroying important installations along the coastline and combating enemy atomic submarines will be very important.

Defending the rear areas of the country and the armed forces from enemy nuclear strikes will be of exceedingly great importance. The successful execution of this task will in many ways predetermine the subsequent course of military operations.

In the beginning period of the war military operations will be conducted mainly by those armed forces which are combat ready. It is primarily these troops, the strategic nuclear arms, and the air defense troops who are entrusted with the responsibility for the execution of the most immediate strategic goals.

Of course measures will be taken in the beginning part of the war to reinforce these troops by deploying newly mobilized formations. They will form the second strategic echelon and will be entrusted with the execution of subsequent missions of the war.

Simultaneously with the conduct of decisive combat operations and the mobilization and deployment of armed forces, the economy of the country will immediately be changed over to supply the needs of the war.

This is our impression of the content and duration of the beginning period of a future war and the character of combat operations by armed forces during this period.

Analysis of the historical character of the beginning period of a nuclear war permits us to make the conclusion that to ward off the first attacks of an aggressor and to successfully develop subsequent military operations, and the outcome of the war itself will all depend to a decisive degree on how well the nation and the armed forces are prepared to repulse a surprise attack and how able they are in the first minutes to decisively and effectively employ all of their combat might and all of their means for waging war to defeat the aggressor.

This compels us to develop our armed forces, equip them with modern military equipment, and mobilize their development timely and attentively with calculation of the character of a future war and the economic capability of our state, to persistently master methods of conducting war, and to prepare theaters of military operations beforehand. Thus, we are always bound to be led by that V. I. Lenin said, "We must accompany our steps toward peace with the effort of all of our military readiness...."

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
COPYRIGHT

In the last few years due to the constant efforts of the Communist Party, the Soviet Government, and especially N. S. KHRUSHCHEV for strengthening the defensive might of our country, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union have been fully re-equipped with modern new equipment.

The main event of these years has been the establishment of the Strategic Rocket Troops, the branch of the Armed Forces which has become the basic nuclear might of our country.

The PVO Strany Troops have received further development based on their being equipped with rockets of various types, the latest anti-rocket weapons, and also modern fighter-interceptors.

The technical equipment of our Ground Troops, Air Forces, and Navy has been improved greatly, chiefly due to the extensive implementation of nuclear and rocket weapons in these branches of the armed forces.

Using the achievements of Soviet economics, sciences, and technology, the party and state are doing everything necessary to bring about our constant qualitative and quantitative military and technical superiority over the armies of the leading capitalist states.

When determining the composition of our Armed Forces it must be taken into consideration that the states of the aggressive imperialist blocs maintain large concentrations of forces and means in peacetime and are able to begin and carry on combat operations without additional mobilization or preliminary deployment. Naturally this forces us to maintain our Armed Forces at such a level in peacetime that they can be certain of executing their missions and achieving the strategic goals of the beginning period of a war in case an aggressor carries out a nuclear attack.

The constant threat of an enemy surprise attack on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the suddenness with which military actions will develop in the beginning period of the war, and the incomparably colossal destructive power of nuclear weapons cause exceedingly high requirements for the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Special responsibility for timeliness in delivering retaliatory strikes against an aggressor and for repulsing his attacks is placed on the Strategic Rocket Troops and the PVO Strany Troops. They must have exceptionally high combat readiness. The strategic nuclear arms must be maintained at such a level of preparedness that they can attack an enemy with all their destructive power at any time and, in the case of the PVO Strany Troops, can repulse and destroy the enemy's means of nuclear attack while in flight from any direction, regardless of attack density.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

The aggressor must know and clearly foresee that he will not remain unpunished if he executes a surprise attack. Now, one such factor as surprise attack is clearly insufficient to seize the strategic initiative. The side whose economy and Armed Forces are more vulnerable to nuclear attack will lose the initiative. The limited size of their territories, the high concentration of economic installations, and a lack of a class unity of their people all compose the Achilles heel of the imperialist state. Victory in a future war will go to those who have unified interests between the workers and the state, a high moral spirit on the part of the population, and unity of the people and the Armed Forces.

The most important element in the preparation of the Armed Forces is the training of the personnel in the methods for conducting combat operations and in the ability to use weapons and combat equipment skillfully, and the development among the soldiers of a feeling of high responsibility for the defense of the socialist Motherland and persistence in the execution of combat assignments.

In preparing the Armed Forces for War and in particular in the correct training of personnel, the development of the theoretical bases of military art and their assimilation in the course of combat and operational training are of great importance. We have developed a completely contemporary theory for conducting combat operations which is reflected in conforming regulations and manuals. As new combat weapons and the process of troop training are developed, this theory must constantly be perfected and made more precise.

One reason for the serious shortcomings of our Armed Forces in the beginning period of World War II was the unsatisfactory preparation of theaters for military operations. After full analysis of this historic lesson, we must also keep in mind that the unlimited spaciousness of nuclear and rocket war makes it necessary for states to consider the problem of the timely preparation of not only theaters for military operations, but of all the territory of a nation. Now the preparation of theaters for military operations and the territory of a nation for war must be conducted both to develop the necessary conditions for the deployment and operations of concentrations of armed forces and to permit the organized activity of the whole national economy in conditions imposed by the enemy's use of nuclear weapons.

The character of modern war demands that the preparation of a nation's whole economy for war be timely and comprehensive. Thus, we must never forget Lenin's well-known pronouncement that it is impossible to conduct modern war against imperialism without the most serious economic preparation.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

By considering the danger of the enemy inflicting serious destruction on economic installations during the beginning period of the war and the subsequent difficulties in mobilizing industry, the necessity is apparent for the timely and determined production of military equipment reserves, material means, reserve industrial capabilities, and strategic materiel reserves.

The maintenance of industrial vitality by dispersing industrial installations, duplicating production capabilities, and executing proper measures for atomic defense takes on primary importance.

Along with the preparation of the economy, the preparation of the population for war is of utmost importance. The boundary lines between the front and the rear areas will largely be done away with in a future war. Therefore the preparation of the population for war takes on exceedingly great importance. This preparation must be directed primarily to the development of Soviet patriotism, certainty in the superiority of the socialist system over capitalism, love and devotion to the Motherland, the Communist Party, and the ideals of Communism, high political vigilance, and readiness to defeat an aggressor completely if he makes an attempt to encroach upon the countries of the socialist system.

The preparation of the nation's population to take measures for the rapid elimination of the effects of an enemy nuclear attack and the re-establishment of economic vitality has become a major problem. This preparation must be conducted chiefly within the civil defense system whose role has grown immeasurably.

The correct scientific prediction of the character of a future war and especially of its beginning period has become exceedingly important in modern conditions. Such a prediction is necessary for the purposeful resolution of all problems in preparing the nation and the Armed Forces to repulse an aggressor and to not allow the slightest mistake in this most responsible matter.

In the last few years in the Soviet Armed Forces, important theoretical work has been carried on to investigate the possible character and methods of waging a future war. However, it must be said that this research is not completed. It must be kept in mind that military matters are not static. The means of conducting war must be constantly developed and perfected and scientific work directed to finding the most effective means of their employment to certainly defeat an aggressor must not fall behind.

As before important problems for the further study of questions concerning the beginning period of future war must be considered by Soviet military and theoretical thought. It must not be forgotten that, no matter what the revolution in military affairs may be, new

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

ments of their development. The task of military research is to employ the Marxist-Leninist method for asserting the laws of public life to reveal tendencies in the development of the phenomena of war, to establish general laws for these phenomena, and to use them creatively for contemporary conditions with consideration of those changes which have occurred in the means, character, and methods of conducting war.

These, briefly, have been the lessons of the past war and the most important conclusions which must be considered in preparing the nation and the Armed Forces for the future war which is being prepared by the imperialists.

A quarter of a century separates us from that time when the Germans unleashed World War II. This war was a difficult experience for millions of the world's people. The attention which we give to this war today is designed to illuminate the memory of the terrible tragedy of those years productively and to mobilize all forces for the defense of peace.

The modern international situation indicates that the lessons of history have not been taken seriously by the aggressive forces. They are again preparing to commit treason against mankind in the form of a thermonuclear war. Thus, the Communist Party and Soviet Government are doing everything necessary so that the defense of our native land will meet contemporary requirements. N. S. KHRUSHCHEV at the 22d Party Congress said, "The Soviet people know the habits of aggressors well. We have not forgotten the years of World War II, the treacherous and base attacks of Hitler's Germany on the Soviet Union. In the face of the military threats created by the imperialists, there is no place for satisfaction and carelessness."

Due to the successes achieved in our country in the development of economics, science, and technology, the Soviet Armed Forces are now equipped with the most effective means for conducting war, primarily with nuclear and rocket weapons, which are superior to the similar weapons of the leading imperialist armies both in quality and power. The Soviet Union attentively observes the intrigues of the aggressors and maintains its Armed Forces in concentrations and at a level of combat readiness which permit the immediate delivery of crushing retaliatory blows against the aggressor. This is the pledge of the invincibility of our native land and of all countries of the socialist fraternity.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Marxism-Leninism considers man and equipment as a close reciprocal and dialectical unity which requires that constant attention be devoted to man who develops and operates equipment.

Combat equipment in addition to the strictly material and physical consequences of its use has an important influence on the mental processes of people in combat. M. V. Frunze noted in regard to this question that "very often success is not determined by the enemy doing physical damage to part of the combat force, but by this action having a depressing effect on the mental processes of that force which remains, by destroying its capability for resistance." (M. V. Frunze, Selected Works, Vol II Voenizdat, 1957, p 346).

Naturally the destructive power of modern weapons and the extensiveness of their use have a much greater effect on the moral condition of each soldier than ever occurred in past wars. The moral factor has acquired very great importance in modern conditions and the moral qualities of personnel have a much greater influence on the achievement of success than ever before. Thus, the requirements for the moral and combat qualities of officers and generals, for mental stability, bravery, and readiness for self sacrifice in the defense of their native land, have grown immeasurably.

The rapid and sharp changes of situations and problems which must be met by chastt and soyedineniya and the necessity for making decisions in minimal amounts of time require that every officer and general should know different skills for directing great numbers of people on the battlefield. Only those officers and generals who possess fine technical and military knowledge, inflexible wills, persistence, decisiveness, and the ability to overcome any barriers to the achievement of a goal can now control modern combat and operations and execute combat missions thoroughly and thoughtfully.

The work of a military commander makes great demands on his intellect. Only a creative mind can penetrate to the essence of phenomena and occurrences, find the essential, and notice the complex inter-relationship between objects and phenomena. For example, to correctly evaluate a situation and choose a target for a nuclear strike, the inter-relationship between many combat elements must be seen and an officer must always be ready to make a correct decision in a rapidly changing situation.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

The basis of the high moral and combat qualities of a Soviet commander is his selfless devotion to the ideal of communism, his ideological certainty, the development of firm responsibility for matters entrusted to him, full military knowledge, and a dialectical approach to the phenomena of life which he meets within his daily activity. These are exactly the priceless qualities which were brightly manifested by our commanders in the rigorous days of war and which aided them in the successful execution of complex combat tasks to gain victory over a strong and dangerous enemy.

The most importance source for the inculcation of courage and firmness of will for us has been and is the great history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As the intellect, honor, and conscience of our epoch the party personifies firm moral substance, revolutionary boldness, and unflagging will and educates our command cadres in the essence of strict revolutionary vigilance and high combat readiness.

The inculcation of moral and combat qualities among Soviet officers and generals enters organically into the work conducted by our Party for the formation of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook among laborers and to mobilize their labor and political activity in the struggle for the development of Communism and keep them constantly ready to rise up in the defense of the socialist motherland.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Government affords a great honor to Soviet commanders by trusting them with their most valuable commodity, people. It gives them full responsibility for all operations connected with the continual perfection of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. The party pays continuous attention to the ideological convictions and strength of command cadres and trains them in the essence of Leninist requirements to study the Leninist style of work and troop leadership.

One of the most important moral and combat qualities is resoluteness. Resoluteness includes the mastery of a man over himself, his ability to control his own conduct and direct his actions toward the achievement of consciously established goals. After determining a personal goal, a resolute person sequentially and persistently achieves its fulfillment in any complex and difficult circumstances. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin is to us an example of a man with an exceedingly strong will and a brilliant master in unifying the wills of millions of civilian and military personnel, the army and the nation.

Every man needs a strong will, but a military commander needs it to a much greater degree. Modern combat is unparalleled for testing the moral and physical strength of a man. Only the commander with a firm and inflexible will can endure the test of war and be ready for any unexpected eventuality without losing his courage in the most difficult circumstances.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRIGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85-00875R000300090003-3

The wills of distinguished commanders are distinguished by their complexity and intricacies and are characterized by many various qualities or manifestations of will. The most characteristic of these are self-mastery, decisiveness, persistence, energy, initiative, and independence. We shall investigate each of these briefly with the consideration that these positive command qualities compose a unity and are dependent upon each other.

The ability and skill of a commander to control himself, his activity and conduct and a complex combat situation, to manifest persistence and composure in the face of danger, and to overcome various barriers and difficulties to the fulfillment of an assignment determine the command quality known as self-mastery.

The most important indications of self mastery are self restraint, a steady temperament, and the skill to correctly perceive events without exaggerating danger.

A commander's decisiveness is shown by his ability to make decisions rapidly and accept full responsibility for them regardless of risk involved in resorting to very different methods of operation. A commander acts boldly and decisively, basing his actions on a correct evaluation of a situation and a sober conclusion regarding the forces and means and the strong and weak aspects of the enemy. However, boldness and decisiveness are insufficient for making decisions. It is characteristic for people with weak wills to make decisions and not to carry them out. The essence of the resolute activity of a man is not in making bold decisions, but in carrying them to victorious completion and in putting decisions into practice which may require much persistent effort. Nothing in combat can hinder the fully resolute commander from the achievement of a goal.

A certain flexibility must be combined with firmness and persistence. It sometimes happens that a decision which is made subsequently loses its value. Then the resolute commander without wavering changes it and organizes the activity of his subordinates in accordance with the altered conditions. Sometimes more rather than less resoluteness is required to change a decision which has been made earlier. Thus, we must speak of the necessity to differentiate between persistence and obstinacy. The obstinate man attempts to have his own way regardless of the expediency of his actions which has nothing in common with the positive traits of the man who is endowed with persistence.

Persistence is inseparably connected with the activities characterized by energy. Inertness and passiveness are foreign to the activity of the resolute commander who is intent on the achievement of a established goal. Inertness which borders on inactivity is always harmful to the timely execution of combat assignments. Unjustified losses. In modern war this may be followed by even more drastic consequences.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85-00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

people, including officers and generals, are spurred to courageous conduct by motives which are primarily of a social character. It is namely the ideals of the new socialist society which have a powerful positive influence on the completely resolute and courageous activity of commanders in the Soviet Armed Forces. The courage of Soviet military commanders, officers, and generals has its deep roots in the socialist social order, the ideology of the Soviet man, and the heroic traditions of the Soviet people.

Initiative is a very important quality which, as already mentioned, is inseparably connected with the resolute activity of a commander. To act creatively, to know how to thrust one's will on the enemy, to upset his plans, and achieve success is impossible without initiative. The history of war teaches that even a superiority in strength may be unrealistic if a commander does not manifest activity and initiative. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this in modern war. Now it is especially dangerous to wait inactively for orders from a senior commander and avoid critical situations. The rapid development of events and changes in situations in modern war will often make it necessary for a commander to take the initiative in making decisions within the framework of the overall plan without waiting for orders from a senior commander. This has always been true, but it is especially important in modern conditions when in a decisive moment a commander must manifest his will and take initiative upon himself. He must not remain inactive fearing to accept responsibility for the outcome of a battle.

The ability to take initiative, to project goals for plans of actions independently, to refrain from the inexpedient and untimely, and to manifest a sharp sense of responsibility for his own actions are invaluable qualities for a commander. Initiative and independence have always been basic conditions for success in combat, but they are especially necessary in modern war. Of course, any decision must be thought out in detail and carefully considered in the light of standing orders and the actual possibilities for the achievement of success on the field of battle.

The readiness and ability of a commander to subordinate his will to that of his senior commander, to show high exactingness toward himself and his subordinates, and to strive for faultless and precise compliance to military regulations and orders are not in opposition to initiative. Accurate execution does not exclude the manifestation of initiative or a creative approach to carrying out assigned tasks. The higher a commander's conscious responsibility for matters entrusted to him, the more creative and independent will be his actions.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

The resolute qualities which we are speaking of are illustrated in the ability of a commander to influence his subordinates properly. However, it must not be forgotten that this influence has nothing in common with rudeness. The will of a commander must not be shown by shouting or administration by bare injunction, nor by ignoring the opinion of staffs and subordinate groups on the part of officers and generals who are one-man commanders. It is well known that those military commanders of our army who are most exacting toward their troops have always combined strength with deep sensitivity and an open manner toward people. Their resolute conduct has always been an example worthy of imitation.

The resolute will of a commander has great importance on the moral condition of his subordinates by instilling them with a certainty in victory over the enemy. Subordinates who see their commander composed and sure of himself and issuing clear and accurate orders even in critical moments begin themselves to act with greater energy, persistence, and initiative and unquestioningly follow their commander, take pride in him, and attempt to imitate him.

As is known, war is full of dangerous situations and fear as a reaction to danger is experienced at one time or another by every soldier. The difference between the bold and the fainthearted is that the first is able to suppress this feeling regardless of the danger that threatens him, but the second loses his self-control and composure and wavers from one extreme to another. By overcoming fear for his life, a man can take heroic, bold, and decisive actions.

In overcoming the feeling of fear for one's life, a decisive role belongs to a conscious feeling of military honor, responsibility for the completion of assigned tasks, and a developed feeling of discipline. An ideological certainty, a belief in the right of a matter, and a well developed consciousness of military honor permit the instinct for self-preservation to be conquered and compel the completion of heroic victories. The bravery of Soviet soldiers and the mass heroism displayed in World War II against Hitler's fascists cannot be interpreted as a complete absence of fear, but as an active suppression of it, self control, and the ability to subordinate all activity to the honor and interests of the motherland.

Thorough knowledge of new weapons, their destructive power, and means of defending against them and the ability to conduct effective combat operations in conditions involving the use of weapons of mass destruction have great importance in suppressing the feelings of fear in modern war. This knowledge and ability engender confidence in oneself and in victory over the enemy. They give rise to healthy optimism which helps both commanders of all ranks and levels and their subordinates to overcome difficulties and carry out assigned missions.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85-00875R000300090003-3

and what seem at first glance hopeless situations, when to many it seems that all strength is exhausted and it is impossible to continue a battle, the resolute commander does not lose his self-control. Using his knowledge and skills, he musters his courage and decisiveness to develop the conditions necessary for victory. On the other hand, a spineless and indecisive commander allows victory to slip from his grasp even when conditions are in his favor.

There are many examples in military history where troops have broken off a battle at the very moment when a small additional effort would have led to victory, but the commander was not resolute or persistent. Thus, combat is not a competition with the enemy in knowledge, experience, and skills in using forces and means, but a contest in strength of wills, persistence, and fortitude.

Some foreign military specialists are inclined to believe that in conditions of great danger all people naturally experience the disorganizing influence of fear when their resolute qualities are depressed. In reality with the conditions indicated above, the resolute commander experiences feelings which not only depress energy, but agitate his activity. The excitement of combat is connected with elevating the conscious and resolute activity of emotional experiences which takes the character of high inspiration.

As evidenced by the experiences of war, the courageous and resolute commander is inspired by combat to the lofty goal of victory over the enemy which completely occupies his conscious thought processes and excites his emotions which enables him to show a firm resoluteness and influence the troops under his command. Inspiration and certainty in victory penetrate all of a commander's desires, influence all of his conscious activity to permit him to overcome all reversals and difficulties to be victorious over suffering and deprivations.

The resolute qualities of a commander are always manifested by certain actions. For example, when a commander must abstain from a certain activity, this action will be internal, but expressed as patient and calm expectation of the development of a situation more conducive to external activity by the commander.

However, the resolute and courageous actions of a commander both in peaceful conditions involving the training and education of troops and especially in periods of military action must not take the form of what is called dashing behavior. True boldness has nothing in common with dashing behavior. Boldness is one of the most valuable and necessary resolute qualities of a commander. It is an important component in his courage in making decisions and in guiding combat operations. Thoughtless

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85-00875R000300090003-3

combat situation and to prohibiting the execution of combat missions.

CPYRGHT

In this vein, one more thought must be expressed. We are speaking of the bravery of a commander as another element of his resolute activity. Psychologists and military specialists speak of bravery as a quality which is manifested in a combat situation. The definition of bravery is very broad and is not completely determined by its contents. Some consider bravery to be identical to courage. Others differentiate it from courage and define it as a complex quality of a man's character. In our opinion, it approaches boldness in a psychological sense, but sometimes manifests traits peculiar to courage. The bravery of a commander is shown when he makes bold decisions and courageously puts them into practice.

Soviet regulations emphasize that success is always on the side of those who conduct battle boldly and bravely, persistently put their decisions into practice, manifest initiative, and without fearing responsibility undertake the defeat of the enemy even with inferior forces. Only under the leadership of a decisive and resolute commander who is capable of making correct and competent decisions in the most complex conditions without being indecisive in their implementation can success be achieved in combat. Thus, the development and perfection of resolute qualities is of paramount importance in the training of all officers, generals, and admirals of our Armed Forces.

An indispensable condition for the manifestation of resolute qualities of a commander is his mastery of combat knowledge. Excellent military training makes it possible for a commander to understand thoroughly all factors in a complex and quickly changing situation, demonstrate his will for victory with conviction, correctly use all available forces and means for the defeat of the enemy, and skillfully select the most advantageous and expedient approaches and methods for combat operations. In the war years, M. I. Kalinin said, "A thorough knowledge of military affairs permits military creativity on the field of combat."

The command cadres of our Armed Forces are the sort of guiding force which binds troops together, leads them into battle, and directs them. To be in step with the time and meet the requirements presented to them by the party and the government, our officers and generals must not only master the theory and practice of conducting combat operations and have outstanding knowledge of military equipment and its capabilities, but they must also show unflagging vigilance and comprehend the organization and weaponry of the capitalist army, their military doctrines, regulations, and approaches to conducting armed warfare.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

As well as the qualities. They are not given to a man by nature. Rather, they are a result of the training which he receives in his family, schools, groups, and society. The formation of resolute command qualities among future officers is begun when they are still in military schools, during the process of combat and political training, and by the strict fulfillment of established rules for internal order.

However, this is only the beginning. Further development and tempering of resolute qualities occurs in practical work carried on throughout military service. Resolute qualities are worked out by overcoming difficulties, in assiduous and persistent labor, and by strict self-discipline imposed in peacetime. In combat these qualities are perfected, hardened, and developed to a still higher level.

Military discipline is a cohesive factor in the development of a resolute will and a firm character in an officer. It lies at the basis of all successes which an officer may achieve in combat or training. To fulfill the requirements of military regulations and orders, an officer must above all be disciplined and capable of controlling his activity and conduct, subordinate them to the requirements of service.

In one way or another resolute qualities are developed when an officer unquestioningly obeys his superior commanders. However in our opinion, an especially important role is played here by operational and tactical training, theoretical and practical activity, and self-training conducted by an officer when training and educating his subordinates. In the course of properly delivered tactical training, not only is there a growth of military skill and organizational capabilities among commanders, but they also formulate and temper necessary resolute qualities.

There is still another aspect pertinent to instilling resolute qualities among our officers and generals.

Certain commanders, desiring to aid their subordinates and sometimes fearing that young officers will make mistakes, do not put sufficient faith in them, deliberately make conditions easy for them, watch over them, and from time to time do their work for them. None of this facilitates creative thought processes among officers in complex conditions, nor does it develop independent thinking which is necessary to show initiative. However on the other hand, it does train them in passivity.

To develop creative thought processes among young officers, conditions must be developed so that they are presented with several possible decisions, so that they must make a choice between decisions to answer complex conditions most completely to achieve success.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Tactical training of troops conducted in the field presents the greatest possibilities for instilling the highest combat and moral qualities among young officers and tempering them comprehensively. The widest possibilities for the development of active initiative, decisiveness, persistence, and other command qualities which are necessary to a young officer in war are found in the field, during day and night training exercises, and in situations which closely approach the conditions of actual combat.

At times during field training two officers may be observed who, although they have identical training, execute identical assigned tasks in different ways. One manifests his will and character by acting boldly, independently, and creatively while the other acts without initiative, will, and spirit and often glances at his senior commander. One of the basic reasons for the conduct of the second officer is that he cannot manifest his resolute qualities because he has insufficient knowledge, fears making a mistake, or simply does not have enough will power.

The widely known truth must also be remembered that one of the basic conditions for instilling resolute command qualities is the steadfast and constant observance in tactical training of the following guiding principle: Train troops to meet that which they will actually be faced with in modern combat. A serious error is committed by those supervisors who allow various simplifications and conditionalities in training exercises. This can do irreparable harm to the development of resolute qualities in officers by not allowing them to act creatively. Training is useless when supervisors and umpires bind their subordinates to their will and decisions instead of compelling them to think and act creatively.

Every officer must be given the widest possible scope to show independence, decisiveness, activity, the ability to orient himself in any conditions, and other resolute qualities in combat activity. It is completely inadmissible to adjust their activity and decisions to planned variations which were considered beforehand regardless of the actual composition of the conditions of a battle or operation.

When the decisions of a commander do not coincide with the suggestions of the supervisor, but are sufficiently expedient and well based, they should be accepted and proper corrections should be made in the plan. When a trainee is carrying out operations without proper basis, the supervisor must direct him to the proper path conforming to the complexity of the situation.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Modern combat training, high cost, and complex weapons reflect the peculiarities of modern combat causes command trainees to experience the enemy's presence constantly and to put their decisions into practice persistently to respond simultaneously to enemy measures with counter-measures, execute timely and daring maneuvers in opposition to his actions, employ powerful fire, and dictate their will on the enemy. The more complex the situation and the stronger, more resourceful, and crafty the enemy, the greater are the requirements on officers to show moral and physical strength, creative initiative, independence, and decisiveness in operations. Modern combat weapons and complex equipment present such requirements very effectively.

Senior commanders must organize tactical training exercises in such a way that they are conducted with the best organization and at the highest training level to develop among officers, especially among young and inexperienced officers, the habits of operating skillfully, decisively, and with initiative on the battlefield.

From the point of view of modern combat, the critique is an important moment in training and an integral part of every exercise. The great value of the critique is that it helps trainees to comprehend the essence of what has occurred in combat exercises and training, become accustomed to critically analyzing their actions, and clarify the reasons for mistakes which were committed. The critique allows the systematizing and enriching of experiences for further perfection of the combat training of troops and the combat mastery of officers and generals, develops their operational and tactical thought processes, and forms firm and resolute qualities.

In preparing a critique, a commander systematically and comprehensively analyzes the actions of the trainees. This causes him to consider his subordinates carefully and individually, delve deeply into their actions, notice both the positive and the negative, and point out vivid examples of what may lead to a commander being indecisive, passive, or excessively cautious in combat.

At the same time it is necessary to notice and publicize the experiences of those commanders who act bravely, decisively, and with initiative. When a senior commander only points out mistakes to his subordinates and does not indicate achievements, this weakens the faith of the trainees in their own capabilities. Thus, he must always be maximally exacting, but at the same time just. Incorrect evaluations almost always give rise to either hidden resentment or conceit among individual officers.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

By indicating the correct actions of some and mistakes committed by others, explaining reasons and causes, and discussing what actions are necessary in similar circumstances, the supervisor develops among the trainees a feeling of responsibility for their actions, a belief in their own capabilities, and a desire to execute all tasks entrusted to them. It has been known for a long time that a correct evaluation of an officer's actions by a supervisor both educates him and enriches his experience.

Among the factors which have a noticeable influence on the formation of resolute qualities in officers, an important role belongs to physical training and sports. Officers and generals who constantly take part in sports acquire skills in calmly overcoming the difficulties involved in camp and combat, and develop quickness in their reactions, a sense of orientation, and strength, i.e., those qualities which form a man's strong will. The physical tempering of a commander supplies an example of cheerfulness and a well developed capability for work, persistence, and activity to subordinates.

Of course, the development of high moral and combat qualities among officers is not limited to combat training. Purposeful party-political work devoted to the comprehensive strengthening of the authority of the one-man commander and all officers has a primary role. Party organs and party organizations conduct important work in developing resolute qualities among commanders and all Soviet soldiers. They conduct this work by using the conclusions and suggestions of the sciences of psychology and pedagogy. Thus, reports, lectures, conferences etc. are organized. The use of all these methods allows senior commanders and political workers to raise the level of training and direct it toward the formation of moral and combat qualities.

We have dwelt on certain aspects of the complex and many-sided task of implanting resolute qualities among our officers and generals without pretending to exhaust or systematically illuminate this theme. The forms and methods of this work cannot be expressed once and forgotten. Changes in the character of modern war and combat and in the means of waging battle constantly propose newer and more advanced requirements for command cadres who must make firm and knowledgeable decisions on matters entrusted to them by the party, people, and Soviet government.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

The development of firm resolute qualities among officers is a unified and purposeful process in combat and political training and party-political work. It is important to know how to coordinate all forms and methods of working with soldiers to train officers and generals thoughtfully and attentively as masters of military affairs who are both exemplarily responsible to the socialist motherland and always ready to deliver a crushing blow to an aggressor if he dares to attack our native land or any other country of the socialist fraternity.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
generals, trained in the immortal ideals of Marxism-Leninism, ever more persistently develop among themselves the qualities of true leadership and educators who are ideally tempered and unquestioningly devoted to the party and the people and ready to battle for communism courageously and persistently.

CPYRGHT

by Maj Gen B. GOLOVCHINER

World War II, especially the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, is exceptionally rich in examples of the encirclement and annihilation of large groupings of defending enemy troops.

During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union more than ten large encirclement operations were conducted, resulting in the annihilation (or capture) of approximately 200 divisions. In the battle of the Volga alone a grouping of more than 300,000 men (22 divisions) was encircled and annihilated (or captured), and in the Yassy-Kishinev Operation -- a grouping of more than 250,000 men (21 divisions).

That was in the past. But now completely new means of armed struggle have appeared; the mobility, firepower and striking force of troops have increased; combat action has taken on a more decisive and maneuvering character and a large spatial scope. Military art has naturally been confronted with the question of whether it is possible and expedient to encircle groups of defending troops under these conditions.

It would seem to be inexpedient inasmuch as defending groupings can be annihilated with nuclear weapons, without encirclement, and since encirclement is connected with the risk of tying up considerable forces and equipment of the operational ob'yedineniya and depriving them of opportunities to swiftly develop the attack in depth. Also, an encircling maneuver may be difficult to execute since the defending force, using nuclear weapons, can offer determined resistance to such a maneuver. In the grouping troops will be dispersed over large areas and will have high mobility.

However, upon closer analysis another conclusion is suggested: encirclement of large groupings of defending troops is possible and expedient in a nuclear-rocket war.

We base our conclusions on the fact that the use of nuclear weapons in offensive operations of ground troops can not be unlimited, otherwise these operations would be inconceivable. However, assuming the possibility of such operations, it would be incorrect to exclude such methods of conducting them as the encirclement of defending groupings. This method would certainly accompany an attack. It could be used following the employment of nuclear weapons and the swift movements of attacking troops along axes, even when such an objective has not been planned in advance.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

as the most expedient under existing conditions. For example, the West German command considers a battle for encirclement especially advantageous since the encirclement of groupings is one of the most convenient objectives for the most successful employment of nuclear weapons. (E. Middel'dorf.) Tactics Manual. Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1960). In connection with this it has been recommended that during an attack there be selected penetration areas, located on the main operational axes, through which an attack will promote the encirclement and annihilation of enemy troops in these areas (Wehrkunde, March 1959).

All this is proposed for situations in which the attacking force has a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to carry out the main missions of the operation. If the attacking force has a limited number of nuclear weapons or if their employment would be inexpedient, encirclement would be used even more widely.

Thus, encirclement of defending groupings in modern offensive operations can take place when the attacking troops have a sufficient number of nuclear weapons as well as when there are limited opportunities for their use.

The encirclement of defending troops is possible in various situations: when the main forces and means of a defense are distributed over a relatively small area and the attacking ob'yedineniya have an enveloping position in regard to a certain grouping, or when there are difficult terrain areas (a sea, a system of lakes, large rivers, marshy wooded areas, impassable mountains) in the rear area or on one of the flanks of the defending troops and there is a chance to "pin" the troops to this barrier.

Encirclement may also occur in situations in which defending troops will try at any cost to hold an area having operational or strategic importance or during their withdrawal if the defending forces can not offer determined resistance to the swift pursuit of attacking troops. Encirclement is also possible when routing operational or strategic reserves.

What is most characteristic of the encirclement and annihilation of defending troops under modern conditions?

First of all the very concept of "encirclement and annihilation" has changed. Today we look on these actions as a means of defeating separate groupings of defending troops in the course of carrying out the main and special missions of operational ob'yedineniya, whereas in the past they frequently were the means of defeating the main force of a defense and achieving the objectives of an operation. The maximum

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT

force and means of one or several operational ob'yedineniya were employed in these actions. The encirclement and annihilation of large operational groupings and sometimes even strategic groupings took place during these operations. At the same time combat actions were always connected with the encirclement and annihilation of the enemy at a tactical level.

The possibility of such operations in modern times is not excluded; however they occur infrequently, specifically when large groupings of defending troops are forced to conduct combat operations in relatively small areas of operational or strategic importance or during an attack in the direction of a coast line. In view of the difficulty of their organization and execution, such operations will, of course, be planned in advance.

Judging from the experience of war and keeping in mind the new conditions of armed struggle, it may be said that a decision on an operation should include consideration of such fundamental questions as the procedure for the employment of nuclear weapons, the methods of encircling and annihilating defending troops, the directions of strikes, forces and equipment, the missions of encircling troops, and support of the operation. Missions can naturally be clarified during the operation and, if there are drastic changes in the situation, reassigned.

In the majority of cases the encirclement and annihilation of defending troops under modern conditions will be intermediate missions on the way to achieving the objectives of an operation; consequently, a large part of the forces and means of the attacking troops can not be designated for carrying them out.

In the encirclement of troops in operations of the last war, interior and exterior fronts of encirclement were established. The interior front, as a rule, was continuous. On the exterior front attacking ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya either developed the attack to the operational depth or repelled counterthrusts.

In modern operations there is no need to establish a continuous interior front of encirclement to prevent defending troops from breaking out of the encirclement since this can be accomplished by intercepting their probable withdrawal routes or by creating zones of contamination on them, bearing in mind that the possibilities of troop movements other than on roads will be extremely limited. Nor is there a need for an exterior front of encirclement since approaching reserves can be successfully destroyed by nuclear weapons and the swift advance of attacking troops.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

of encircling troops as in the past when there was the consecutive execution of missions such as the penetration of the defense, the exploitation of the breakthrough with mobile troops to create conditions for encirclement, the creation of interior and exterior fronts of encirclement, and the annihilation of encircled troops. Considerable time was needed to carry out these missions. In the L'vov-Sandomir Operation, for example, the breakthrough, exploitation of the attack, and the encirclement of the Brody grouping of German fascist troops required seven days and their annihilation took five days; in the Korsun'-Shevchenkivskiy Operation the execution of these missions required 11 and 14 days respectively. In certain other operations the encirclement and annihilation of groupings took even longer. In the Battle of the Volga, for instance, it took more than 70 days.

Today there can be no talk of such periods of time for the encirclement and annihilation of defending troops. An encircled grouping is capable of quickly organizing a strong defense, preparing various types of obstacles on the operational axes of attacking troops, and creating strong reserves for resisting encirclement. Possessing nuclear weapons and high maneuverability, the defending side can in a short time reinforce an encircled grouping, employ decisive actions against the flanks of attacking sovedineniya, and withdraw the main forces from the endangered area before encirclement is completed.

This does not mean that under modern conditions such enemy groupings can not be encircled and destroyed. It only requires attacking troops to take measures to prevent the enemy from employing nuclear weapons and putting up organized resistance.

The necessity for rapid encirclement and annihilation of groupings of defending troops will be dictated by the fact that to achieve the objectives of an operation it is important that the attacking force does not tie up considerable forces and means of the ob'yedineniya (or sovedineniya) and deprive them of opportunities to swiftly develop the advance in depth. Therefore, the encirclement and annihilation of troops will be accomplished in a limited period of time. To do this the attacking force must obviously have the required forces and means.

The basis of actions for the encirclement and annihilation of defending groupings is the use of nuclear weapons and a swift attack from several directions. These actions will be organized in a way that will deprive the enemy of opportunities to use nuclear weapons, that will not give it time to prepare organized resistance, and that will not slow down the execution of the main missions of the offensive operation.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

COPYRIGHT

The most important mission of the encircling troops is the destruction of nuclear weapons; its execution will determine the success of the encirclement and annihilation of defending troops. This battle must be directed not only against the nuclear means of the grouping being encircled, but to an even greater degree against means located on the edges of the encircled area, since the main forces of aviation and operational-tactical rocket troops, capable of rendering the most determined resistance to troops executing an encirclement maneuver, may be situated there. Rocket troops, aviation, artillery, airborne troops, and various detachments of tank and motorized rifle troops can be used in this battle. The swift actions of encircling troops must also be considered an effective means of combat.

A very characteristic feature is the simultaneity of the encirclement and the annihilation of defending troops. Strikes for breaking up and annihilating the grouping being encircled will take place during encirclement maneuvers, without waiting until the encirclement has been completed, i.e., until all withdrawal routes have been cut off.

However, to prevent the grouping being encircled from breaking out of the encirclement, the attacking force will try to deliver salient thrusts in the directions of the probable withdrawal routes of the defending soyedineniya. Nuclear weapons may also be used against these routes and against units withdrawing on them to create zones of radioactive contamination and destruction. Attacking troops will either by-pass these zones or, if the level of radioactivity has decreased to a safe level, negotiate them.

Airborne troops may be used to capture important road junctions, river crossing, and passes in the directions of the withdrawal of the grouping being encircled and for combat with approaching reserves or support of rapidly advancing troops in the rear area of the grouping.

Under modern conditions, when the attacking force possesses the required number of nuclear weapons, the encirclement and annihilation of defending troops can be accomplished with fewer ground troops soyedineniya than there are in the grouping being encircled. For example, in the opinion of the West German Command, the over-all superiority in forces and means needed for encirclement can be achieved with a superiority only in nuclear weapons and with equal (or even fewer forces in the ground troops. A shortage of ground troops soyedineniya can be offset by wide maneuvers of armored forces and artillery and rocket fire supporting decisive actions of troops during envelopments with the objective of encircling the enemy (E. Middel'dorf. Tactics Manual).

If the attacking troops do not have a superiority in nuclear weapons, they naturally must use more forces and conventional means or at least forces equal to those of the defending grouping.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

In addition to having a superiority in nuclear weapons, it is important that troops have the ability to quickly locate the main enemy objectives and forestall the enemy in delivering accurate strikes with nuclear and conventional weapons. This will contribute to the accomplishment of the operation's objectives.

When the attacking force has little nuclear ammunition, the grouping being encircled can be broken up only in certain directions by an attack by part of the forces from the front with the simultaneous envelopment of the entire grouping. If the attacking force has the necessary amount of nuclear ammunition, the grouping does not have to be broken up by thrusts of ground troops. Annihilation will be accomplished solely by nuclear and conventional weapons.

The efforts of ground troops soyedineniya during encirclement of defending groupings will most often be directed more toward the deep envelopment of the grouping than toward its immediate annihilation.

The number and directions of thrusts during the encirclement and breaking-up of a grouping will depend on the objectives of the operation, the missions, forces and means of the attacking units, the capabilities and nature of the defense, and terrain conditions. Envelopment groupings capable of delivering two or more thrusts in the appropriate directions may be created to break up and annihilate the troops being encircled. These thrusts will usually be, in essence, a continuation of the development of a swift attack to accomplish the main missions of an operation.

In the opinion of West German military theoreticians, the number and composition of strike groupings will be determined primarily by the amount of nuclear ammunition which the operational command has at its disposal. Considerably fewer forces and means of ground troops will be needed when there is a concentrated employment of nuclear weapons than when missions are carried out with conventional means (Wehrkunde, March 1959).

Conditions for the encirclement of defending troops may arise simultaneously in several directions. In this case the attacking operational ob'yedineniya, if it has sufficient forces and means, will accomplish the destruction of the groupings simultaneously in all directions. If the forces and means are not sufficient for this, the main efforts of the attacking troops will first be directed against the main grouping and then against other groupings with the objective of completing their destruction.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

...am, etc., on one of the flanks of the soyedineniya being encircled, a thrust may be delivered and developed in the direction of the natural barrier. In this type of action there will naturally be a deeper distribution of forces and means, providing the possibility of gradually increasing the strength of the thrust in depth.

During the encirclement and annihilation of a grouping of defending troops on a coast line, a naval blockade may be organized. The blockade is usually formed by aviation and submarine forces, and sometimes surface ships and coastal rocket and artillery units. Their efforts are directed toward annihilating rocket-armed and aviation forces, putting naval bases and ports out of operation, and preventing the evacuation of encircled troops by sea. In certain cases mines will be laid in the ports and bases located on the coast line being blockaded, on the approaches to them, and on the routes of transport means and combat ships of the defense.

During combat actions to encircle and annihilate defending groupings, the defense is capable of delivering strong counterthrusts against the flanks of the soyedineniya making the encirclement maneuver. To break up these counterthrusts systematic nuclear strikes can be delivered against the defending force's means of nuclear attack and his groupings of ground troops in their initial assembly areas and shifts. Strikes can also be delivered against the home bases of troop transport aircraft. Conventional means of destruction, especially aircraft, are also used for these missions.

Counterthrusts can also be thwarted by swift attacks. If the attacking forces are unable to break up a counterthrust while it is being prepared, they can disrupt it in a head-on encounter or repel it with part of the forces while the main forces are simultaneously carrying out missions connected with the encirclement and annihilation of groupings of defending troops.

In certain cases defending troops may employ weapons of mass destruction and deliver a counterthrust against troops developing the attack in an attempt to break out of the blockade. The clash between the attacking forces and troops attempting to break out of the blockade may develop into large tank battles. In this case the combat actions of both sides will become extremely intense.

Obviously, the greatest success in defeating groupings which are attempting to break out of a blockade is achieved only if the attacking forces forestall the defending forces in the employment of nuclear weapons and if they are able to use the results of these strikes for a swift advance into the depths of the enemy territory. This characteristic of these groupings, but also the swift annihilation of the encircled troops.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
will have a special place in modern actions for the encirclement and annihilation of troops.

by Cols I. ZHELTIKOV and V. IGOLKIN

CPYRGHT

The use of military aircraft placed the air on the level of the earth and sea in the arena of intense combat operations in war. Aircraft, dirigibles, and balloons were sent into the air for reconnaissance and to be used against enemy troops in World War I. As the aircraft fleet grew quantitatively and qualitatively and the combat capabilities of aircraft were increased, the problem of organizing a defense against aerial attack and the problem of antiaircraft defense became more complicated. The first attempts by the belligerent states to use firearms and artillery weapons for this purpose did not produce positive results. Urgent measures were undertaken to develop special combat means: antiaircraft artillery and machine guns, barrage balloons, and fighter aircraft as well as special equipment for systems of aerial observation, warning, and communications.

An unprecedented competition between the means of aerial attack and antiaircraft defense occurred in the period between the two world wars. In a comparatively short time, systems for defending against enemy aerial attack in many countries acquired a structural organization which included means of combating an aerial enemy, expansive nets of observation posts for detecting aerial targets, and fully reliable means of communications. The later development of radar greatly increased the range at which aerial targets could be detected, allowed control to be exercised over the interception and destruction of aerial targets, and led to a much more effective use of active air defense means, antiaircraft artillery, and fighter aviation.

With the development of a nuclear bomb as a weapon of aviation, the capabilities of bombers grew enormously and the destruction of aircraft carrying these weapons became the paramount task of air defense. The search for new and more effective means of combating an aerial enemy became a problem of state importance. The use of rocket weapons or, more precisely, surface-to-air-guided rockets as one means of combatting an aerial enemy was widely recognized by the military specialists of many countries. Achievements in the development of radioelectronic equipment prior to this time permitted the development of systems for guiding and controlling surface-to-air rockets which caused them to be highly effective.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

With the wide use of rocket equipment took on the aspects of crash programs in many countries of the world in the postwar period. Many different types of surface-to-air rocket systems intended for antiaircraft defense appeared in the most developed countries. Especially great attention was paid to this problem in the US, England, France, and the other countries of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc. As they prepare for a third world war, the ruling circles of these countries are attempting to equip their armed forces with the most modern means of combatting aerial targets. Series production of the Nike-Ajax surface-to-air guided rocket, designed to hit piloted aircraft and cruise missiles, was begun in the US in 1953. The maximum speed of this rocket is twice the speed of sound, its effective altitude is 18 kilometers, and its range is approximately 40 kilometers.

As the result of modifications and further perfections of the Nike-Ajax rocket, the Nike-Hercules surface-to-air guided rocket became operational in 1957. This rocket had half agains as much speed as the Nike-Ajax, its effective altitude was increased by more than 60 percent, and its slant range was increased by a factor of 4. One advantage of the second rocket is that the system of ground fire control was supplemented by homing apparatus on board the rocket which greatly increased its capabilities for hitting targets and maneuvering. The Nike-Hercules surface-to-air rocket can be armed with a nuclear warhead.

At the beginning of 1959 the Bomark surface-to-air rocket was added to the surface-to-air guided rocket arsenal of the US. The Bomark-B, a subsequent modification, has an altitude capability of 24 kilometers and a range of over 600 kilometers. The Nike-Ajax, Nike-Hercules, and Bomark surface-to-air guided rockets became basic weapons for the anti-aircraft defense of large regions containing important installations and of troops and their rear areas. After these rockets were operationally deployed among air defense forces, some foreign military specialists began to assert that the problem of destroying aircraft in flight had been fully solved. However, it was soon discovered that the new rocket weapons of the air defense were not able to combat against low flying targets. Great efforts had to be applied in the US to the development of the Hawk surface-to-air guided rocket to solve this problem. In the last few years, this surface-to-air rocket has been widely accepted in the armed forces of many countries in the North Atlantic bloc: West Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Greece.

Strenuous efforts were undertaken to construct surface-to-air rockets in the armed forces of England and France. In England the Bloodhound and Thunderbird surface-to-air rockets were developed and made operational. The Parca, Masurca, and Matra surface-to-air rockets of different types of surface-to-air guided rockets were either operational or in stages

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85-100875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT

of development by 1960 in the US, Finland, France, and other capitalist countries. Later however some of these projects were canceled when it became necessary to find solutions to problems connected with the development of an antirocket defense and the reduction of the role of piloted means of attack. Thus, surface-to-air guided rockets designed to destroy aircraft and other targets at long and short ranges and also surface-to-air guided rockets for combatting aerial targets at low altitudes are in the arsenal of the air defense of many countries.

The acceptance of surface-to-air guided rockets in air defense troops signified the great qualitative jump in the development of anti-aircraft defense. In comparison with antiaircraft artillery, the new weapon has greatly improved qualitative characteristics. Speed is chief among them. A surface-to-air guided rocket is launched into space 3-4 times as fast as an antiaircraft artillery shell. An antiaircraft artillery shell is fired at the target by leading the target with calculation of its speed and altitude as well as weather conditions, which unavoidably leads to large errors, since a multitude of factors are not taken into consideration. Also if the target maneuvers slightly or there are small mistakes in sighting, it is not possible to correct the trajectory of the shell after it is fired. The use of ground control systems and guidance systems on board surface-to-air rockets has corrected this basic shortcoming and has made it possible to achieve very high accuracy for hitting targets.

The great power of the warhead which may be carried by a surface-to-air guided rocket also is a very important factor in the effectiveness of this new weapon of antiaircraft defense.

With the availability of surface-to-air rocket weapons and the perfection of the means for detection, control, and guidance, anti-aircraft defense became more effective, reliable, and difficult to overcome while aviation, which is still preserved as a means of attack, had to search for new methods of surmounting modern air defense. Therefore flight at lower altitudes where the capabilities of air defense weapons are greatly decreased were practiced abroad, radio interference means were established to interfere with the operation of ground and air-borne radar and guidance systems, and the use of air-to-surface rockets which can be launched from outside of the effective zone of surface-to-air rocket weapon was begun.

Piloted fighter-interceptors are presently the second most important means of combatting aerial targets. Significant increases in the speed and rate of climb of fighter aircraft, the replacement of cannon and machine guns with air-to-air guided rockets, and the installation of radiotelemetry means for control have imparted new qualities to air defense fighter aircraft and transformed them, so to speak, into flying rocket launching batteries. The missions of air defense fighter

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85-100875R000300090003-3

CIA FDD TRANS NO 904

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090009-3

SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL

JOURNAL VOYENNAYA MYSL-, NO 8, 1964

23 APRIL 1965

FDD TRANS NO 904

2 OF 2

aviation have also been changed. It is now used chiefly for combating rocket-armed bombers on distant approaches to defended territories, for protecting areas which do not contain surface-to-air rocket positions, and for reinforcing the air defense of areas during large aircraft attacks against installations or groups of installations. The production of an ever larger quantity of surface-to-air rockets, their constant perfection, and the equipping of air defense chastí and soyedineniya with this weapon as well as the increased capabilities of fighter aviation have greatly increased the effectiveness of antiaircraft defense and have caused an evolution of new conditions for waging armed battle in the air.

However, the effective use of surface-to-air rocket weapons and fighter aircraft is unthinkable without the timely detection of aerial targets. Therefore intensive research in the development of perfected systems for detecting aerial targets and controlling the forces and means of air defense have been carried on for many years. Radar equipment has been greatly developed in the post war years. The range for detecting aerial targets has been increased approximately 100 percent, the precision with which coordinates can be determined has been made much more exact, and, due to the employment of automated systems, the speed of transmitting and processing data, evaluating situations, and controlling the forces and means of air defense has been greatly accelerated.

In many highly developed countries complex automated systems of antiaircraft defense using rocket equipment and radio electronics have been developed which permit the timely detection of aerial targets and the transmission of data to control points, rocket firing complexes, and fighter aviation chastí. Electronic computers and other means of automation are widely used in systems for controlling forces and weapons.

As the means of antiaircraft defense were perfected it became derious to unify the air defense systems of several countries. For example, in 1958 the US and Canada developed a combined air defense system for the North American continent called Norad which allowed them to centralize the control and coordinate the combat operations of the air defense weapons of both countries and to maneuver these weapons widely to concentrate main forces on threatened areas and distant approaches to their territory.

Then the US initiated the development of a combined air defense system for the European countries of NATO. This system is closely coordinated with the combined air defense system of the North American continent. These measures allowed the US to advance its boundaries for detection and interception a great distance from its own territory and to provide earlier warning to prepare its strategic forces and air defense systems for operation.

control over the air defense forces and means of the North American continent is exercised by means of the Sage semiautomated system and the Missile Master and Birdy systems for the fire control of surface-to-air rocket batteries. In the Sage system information on the aerial situation is processed and data is worked out for making decisions and guiding fighter-interceptors and Bomark surface-to-air rockets automatically by means of electronic computers. The Missile Master and Birdy systems coordinate the fire of several Hawk batteries using the same principles of processing data and transmitting them to podrazdeleniya as are employed in the Sage system.

The development of a combined air defense system for the European countries of NATO was begun in January 1956 when a single coordinated system was introduced in the NATO countries. According to a statement by General Norstad, the former supreme commander in chief of the combined forces of NATO in Europe, the European line for long-range detection was developed in 1958 because the earlier long-range detection system had many windows through which attacking aircraft could penetrate without difficulty.

The final decision on the organization of a combined air defense system for the European countries of NATO was made in December 1960 at a regular meeting of the NATO council. Presently this system which is operationally subordinate to the supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces of NATO consists of the air defense forces and means of all the European countries of NATO with the exception of Portugal and part of France.

It must be noted that along with the organizational development of a combined air defense system in the aggressive NATO bloc, France and other countries of Western Europe have their own systems equipped with modern means of detection, surface-to-air guided rockets, and modern fighter-interceptors. US firms which specialize in the production of various types of weapons have supplied these countries with different equipment and even whole systems for complex use. For example, a single automated system for controlling the air defense forces and tactical aviation was developed with the aid of the US. With the establishment of a unified system, limited complexes for automated control were introduced in individual air defense zones and regions to centralize all air defense forces and shorten the time needed for deriving and processing data, making decisions for combat operations, and controlling all air defense forces in a given area. Thus, the installation and testing of a US automated system for controlling air defense is being completed in West Germany and a radioelectronic complex for the automation of target interceptions has been developed in England. Similar complexes are being developed and produced in other European countries.

CPYRGHT

As they conduct comprehensive analysis of the combat effectiveness of various active air defensive means, the military and political leaders of the Western countries are devoting much attention to the development of surface-to-air guided rockets, but they are not forgetting about fighter aviation although certain theoreticians attribute a much less important role to it.

The development of active air defense means has caused opinions to be changed concerning the deployment of air defense systems. Presently the military leaders of the leading countries of the capitalist world are not satisfied with the deployment of rocket complexes around large individual installations and the use of these weapons to protect important strategic areas on the basis of theaters of military operations. Surface-to-air rocket complexes are being deployed for the protection of whole military and industrial areas and individual states.

The development of ballistic rockets imparted a qualitative jump to the development of the means of waging armed warfare. At first the destruction of this formidable weapon was possible only when it was on the ground prior to being launched. Thus, before the problem of combating aircraft had been fully solved, air defense was faced with the new and still more serious problem of defending against ballistic rockets.

This problem became especially acute in the postwar period which was marked by the rapid development of various types of rocket weapons for various purposes. The flight range of ballistic rockets and their capability to deliver ever more powerful nuclear charges were constantly increased.

The problem of antirocket defense and primarily of combating strategic rockets which threaten the interior areas of states and the vitality of large installations, communications, and the civilian population have acquired paramount strategic importance. The solution of this problem is an exceedingly complex technical task which is complicated by the special tactical and technical characteristics of strategic ballistic rockets. These include primarily the great speed of their flight which is more than ten times greater than the speed of modern fighter aircraft, the huge altitude of their flight trajectory, the probability of a simultaneous attack by a large number of rockets, their small size and very durable warheads, and the possibility of the use of decoy targets and radar interference to complicate the execution of the assignments of antirocket defense.

All the achievements of science and technology have been mobilized, huge amounts of money spent, and newer projects begun to solve the problem of antirocket defense abroad.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Of all the countries of the capitalist world, the most expensive program for the investigation of problems connected with the development of an antirocket defense system is being carried out in the US. This program has received the designation of Defender. It includes more than 50 different projects. In this program investigations are planned of the phenomena connected with the peculiarities of the flight of inter-continental ballistic rockets over their whole trajectory. The results of these investigations may be used to develop methods for intercepting these rockets on any portion of their trajectory and to solve problems connected with the detection and identification of rockets and the guidance of antirocket rockets.

The Defender program is planned for a long period of time, from 15-20 years. 128 million dollars were assigned to this program in the 1964 budget. In the opinion of US specialists it will aid in the rapid development of a new antirocket system, the Nike-X, which is supposed to replace the Nike-Zeus system which is presently being tested. At the same time that scientific research work is being conducted in the Defender program, the military and political leaders of the US are speeding up the completion of individual projects. In the development of an antirocket defense much attention is presently being concentrated on two areas considered extremely important by the US: the development of antirocket rockets and the development and implementation of a system to provide early warning of rocket attack by using radar and satellites for long-range detection.

In the opinion of US specialists an early warning system must permit the air defense command to be notified of a rocket attack in time to enable them to prepare the antirocket defense system for operation which includes the preparation of the antirocket rockets themselves for launching, the processing of necessary data and calculations, and the launch and guidance of antirocket rockets to destroy ballistic rockets.

The problem of providing early warning of rocket attack is being coped with in the US by deploying powerful radar sites and systems to provide long-range detection of ballistic rockets.

One such system called the BMEWS has already been developed. According to US specialists this system provides the US command with a 15-minute warning of rocket attack if the attack is from the north. This system is composed of three radar posts situated in Clear, Alaska; Tule, Greenland; and Filingdales Moor in England. BMEWS posts carry out air and space surveillance at ranges greater than 5,000 kilometers. Besides radars they have electronic computers to determine the parameters of rocket trajectories, including the launch and impact points, and means of communication. The US has similar radar complexes with shorter effective ranges in the Aleutian Islands, Turkey, Canada, Puerto Rico, and the US.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

The continuous development of rocket weapons has made it necessary to further improve systems for detecting and tracking rockets. For example, when powerful global rockets appeared US scientists worked out and built radar stations to detect rocket attacks from different directions. The experimental Teepee is one such station. It uses repeated signal reflections from the ionosphere and the earth's surface. This station allegedly allows rockets to be detected immediately after they are launched, which increases the warning time from 15 to 25-30 minutes.

The experimental Madre station is similar to the Teepee, but has a longer range. To increase the effectiveness of the BNEWS system, suggestions have been made to supplement the operation of this system with superlong-range detection satellites launched by rockets and with special patrol aircraft. A special system called Caesar is being developed in the US to detect rocket-armed submarines. It uses packets containing sonar equipment which are submerged in the ocean along the shoreline and connected by cables to posts on shore. It is assumed that the rockets which are launched from submarines will be detected by means of the latest radar stations on the mainland.

A unified system for the control and surveillance of air and space called Spadats has been developed and made operational for the Norad command in the last few years. The BNEWS system and all military systems for control and surveillance of space are included in the Spadats system. Data on the space situation is supplied from the elements of this system and all posts and systems of civilian departments and organizations to the Spadats system center where they are processed, portrayed on a special tableau, and transmitted to the Norad command post.

When a target is detected it must be confirmed that it is a rocket warhead and not a decoy target or another space object of no military importance. Only then can it be intercepted by means of an antirocket rocket. Until now this has been the concept of the antirocket defense system of US military specialists.

As an example we shall discuss the US development of the Nike-Zeus system which is presently a basis for subsequent modification of anti-rocket defense. This is an intricate firing complex composed of anti-rocket rockets and radar stations for detecting, tracking, and identifying targets, and also intercept-computing apparatus which prepares data for launching antirocket rockets and operating launchers and guidance equipment. After the plans which were begun in 1956 were worked out, extensive design and test work was done, and an experimental model was developed. In 1962 the US began composite testing of the Nike-Zeus system.

It must be noted that there is much disagreement between representatives of the military and political leadership and US specialists on questions concerning the development of an antirocket defense. The fate of the Nike-Zeus program has been repeatedly discussed in higher US departments, in particular at meetings of various Congressional committees and in the Pentagon. The costs connected with the implementation of this program have caused much uneasiness in the USA. According to preliminary calculations it would cost 13-15 billion dollars to deploy an antirocket defense based on the Nike-Zeus system. Many specialists and influential people in the US have spoken against the production of this system believing it to be questionable, unreliable and ineffective. The absence of actual possibilities for the successful solution of the problem of developing an antirocket defense has irritated the US Army command responsible for the completion of the project. Leaders of the US Department of Defense have declared many times that they are planning to stop work on the Nike-Zeus system. However, since no other antirocket rocket is practical at this time in the US, means for continuing its testing were again given in 1964.

According to data from the US press, 10 successful interceptions of Atlas and Titan ballistic rocket warheads were executed during tests of the Nike-Zeus system. The rockets were launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base on the US mainland across Kwajalein Island in the Pacific Ocean where experimental antirocket defense installations were located. However, it must be remembered that these results were achieved in test conditions when the scientific and technical personnel who were operating the experimental antirocket equipment had prior knowledge of the Atlas ballistic rocket launch point and the parameters and direction of the rocket trajectory and the time of the launch were known.

In regard to these tests, US Minister of Defense McNamara declared in Congress, "these tests have shown that the Nike-Zeus antirocket system can detect and destroy approaching ballistic rocket warheads, but they have not shown and cannot show that the Nike-Zeus system in its present form can effectively protect our cities from mass attacks." (New York Times, 10 November 1963). Therefore, in spite of the results achieved in testing, the US Department of Defense decided not to begin series production of the Nike-Zeus antirocket defense system.

As the specialists of western countries have noted, there are many reasons for the lack of success in the development of an effective antirocket defense system capable of destroying intercontinental ballistic rockets at great distances from defended installations, for which purpose the Nike-Zeus complex was intended. Primary among these reasons are the difficulties associated with discriminating between real and decoy targets, the unwieldiness and imperfection of systems for detecting, tracking, and guiding antirocket rockets to targets, the

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
imposed large costs. Convinced of their failure to develop the Nike-Zeus antirocket defense system, the military and political leadership of the US advanced new concepts for solving this problem. The essence of these new trends is found in the desire to develop a mixed firing complex such as the Nike-X to successfully combat intercontinental rockets with the Nike-Zeus antirocket rocket and a new antirocket rocket, the Sprint. Plans call for the Sprint antirocket rocket to hit targets at altitudes of 30-50 kilometers and the Nike-Zeus at altitudes of 100-160 kilometers.

The development of powerful boosters is planned for the Sprint antirocket rocket to give it great speed and permit it to meet a target in 4-5 seconds. The development of a single multitarget radar is also planned. This radar is to have a high resolution capability and thus is supposed to fulfill the following requirements: target detection, target tracking, and guidance of the antirocket rocket to the target.

Since the altitude where the Sprint antirocket meets its target is very low, the rocket is acknowledged to be useful only in the defense of protected installation such as rocket bases, control points, and certain military industrial installations. Thus, a tendency can be determined in the US to first protect individual important installations and then to develop an antirocket defense system to protect areas or all the territory of the nation when the level of science and technology and the budget make it possible. As work on the development of an antirocket rocket goes on, the problem of selecting effective warheads for it are widely discussed in the western press. It is noted that the most promising method of defending against intercontinental ballistic rockets is the formation of a prohibitive barrier such as the shock, heat, or neutron waves from nuclear charges exploded in front of the rocket.

To speed up the development of an antirocket defense system, the military and political leadership of the imperialist states are enlisting huge scientific effort and financial means, drawing many military and civilian organizations into the development of projects, and distributing responsibilities among departments. For example, in the US responsibility for working out the problems associated with the development of an antirocket defense system is apportioned to many organizations. The Department of the Army conducts tests of the Nike-Zeus system and is developing the Nike-X system and also antiaircraft and antirocket defense means for field armies. The Department of the Air Force is responsible for the development and construction of systems to provide early warning of the launch of intercontinental ballistic

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

The Department of the Navy conducts re- search for means of naval antirocket defense and is working to broaden its capabilities in submarine warfare as it searches for methods to prohibit an enemy from employing his submarine-launched ballistic rockets. Responsibility for working out possible means of combating ballistic rockets and satellites is entrusted to the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Also, many civilian scientific research organiza- tions and private firms are involved in solving antirocket defense problems.

The search for means and methods of antirocket defense are re- ceiving much attention in the countries of Western Europe which are taking part in the North Atlantic bloc. Various aspects of the prob- lem are considered in the press. For example, the English press has devoted space to the seriousness of their situation in connection with the development of strategic rockets. One specialist on rocket tech- nology U. T. Hanston wrote that "Great Britian is exceptionally vul- nerable if these weapons are employed because of our geographic position" (which to tell the truth is sufficiently well known) and because of the large population density of our island and its strategic importance. Actually we are the only people who have endured the prolonged effects of this weapon and we endured only because nuclear weapons had not ap- peared at that time." (Brassey's Annual the Armed Forces Year-Book, 1957).

England's lack of a practical means of antirocket defense have caused much apprehension there over the consequences of a nuclear rocket war.

Having an insufficiently developed scientific, technical, and experi- mental base, English scientists and specialists are carrying out certain work for the development of an antirocket defense system jointly with the US. Evidently to emphasize the fruitfulness of the alliance and to boost public opinion, a scientific observer of the English newspaper Daily Express wrote in 1960 that English and US scientists had achieved remarkable progress by developing a new electronic defense against rockets which carry hydrogen bombs. It operates on a principle which causes the rocket to deviate from its fourse by influencing its electronic brain immediately after launch. Then a new plan for an antirocket de- fense system appeared in England, evidently developed jointly with the US. The same Daily Express wrote that the US "had achieved great success in the development of missiles which would bring about a revolution in antirocket defense equipment." As indicated, these new missiles would operate according to a signal from a large radar screen in a system for the long-range interception of ballistic rockets. It has been proposed that a base for antirocket defense will be situated in England, in East Yorkshire. The antirocket missiles would be launched in large salvos to an altitude of 20-25 miles to meet rockets in flight. Each missile would

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
be able to discharge a hurricane of self-homing arrows containing infrared-homing warheads. It was pointed out in the article that England had taken part in the development of these weapons.

A more realistic evaluation of the development of an antirocket defense system was given by the English newspaper Liverpool Daily Post. It pointed out that the process of intercepting an intercontinental ballistic missile had not yet been studied completely, but that it was clear at that time that the antirocket rocket had to be considered the only means for hitting a ballistic rocket. An intercontinental ballistic rocket is invulnerable because of its high speed which reaches 15,000 miles per hour.

In the opinion of many foreign specialists who have soberly evaluated the level of development of various projects, an effective means of combating ballistic rockets has not yet been developed in the capitalist world. To intercept the warheads of strategic ballistic rockets is a very difficult problem. That which has been accomplished toward the solution of this problem in such countries of the capitalist world as the US answers only the questions of yesterday. The Nike-Zeus system was developed to combat ordinary intercontinental ballistic rockets without calculation of subsequent developments of rocket technology. Although the US has proposed the development of passive and active interference, the application of special coverings for warheads to absorb radar signals, the ejection of decoy targets by rockets, and the use of special interference transmitters for jamming; they have not been able to solve the problem of repelling a large-scale rocket attack with the Nike-Zeus system. The developers of this antirocket defense system did not consider the possibility of the development of powerful global rockets and special space ships.

Lately it has openly been acknowledged in the US press that neither the US nor its allies in the aggressive bloc have yet developed an antirocket defense. Specialists of the US and western Europe claim that more or less effective antirocket defense systems may be developed in the future, but will require no less than 5 years. These opinions have caused consternation and skepticism even among the highest members of the defense department. For example, Secretary of Defense McNamara once declared that the Pentagon did not have even reasonable prospects for the development of an effective antirocket defense (New York Herald Tribune, 12 March 1962).

Soberly evaluating the international situation and the possibilities of attempts by the aggressive circles of the imperialist countries to unleash a nuclear and rocket war, the Communist Party and Soviet Government are paying exceedingly great attention to strengthening the defensive capabilities of our socialist motherland, including the development of effective means of combating aircraft and rockets.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
and testing work has been widely carried out to develop means to permit
the detection and destruction of an enemy in the air and near-space.
This work has permitted the solution to very important problems con-
cerning the reliable defense of our native land not only from aircraft,
but from various types of rockets.

CPYRGHT

by Col M. KIR'YAN

CPYRGHT

At present no one doubts that military-scientific work has become an important factor, which makes it possible to determine correctly the course of development of the Armed Forces, their branches, and combat arms, and to find the most expedient methods of their combat use in battle and operation, depending on the character of a future war.

Experience has shown that among the many forms of military-scientific work, military science (scientific-technical) conferences rightfully occupy a leading position. In recent years such conferences have been conducted widely at all levels of the Armed Forces, their branches, and combat arms, and have covered the most diverse topics of a strategic, operational, and military technical nature. In contrast to former years, when military-scientific organs had the principal organizational role in preparing and conducting military science conferences, this work is now done with the participation of many generals and officers of the troops and staffs.

The wide scope of military science conferences, and the mass participation of generals and officers who have extensive experience in working with troops and are well versed in military-scientific work, made it necessary to find new methods of organizing and conducting these conferences. The search for new methods of conducting conferences also became necessary because they involve the discussion of scientific problems concerned not only with operational-tactical, but also with military-technical matters. (For this reason the participants in the conferences represent a variety of specialties.) Therefore, it is necessary to use such forms of organizing and conducting conferences which would benefit all participants, and would enable them to make their contribution to a solution of the general problem discussed at a conference.

In this article we would like to express some ideas about military science conferences in general and about methods of organizing and conducting them.

First of all, we would like to say that our Armed Forces began to conduct military science conferences immediately after the Civil War. This was a worthwhile undertaking, which furthered the development of the new Soviet military art. Although conferences were conducted rather infrequently during the first few years, and the methods of organizing and conducting them were far from perfect, they nevertheless served a useful purpose. The most urgent problems of structuring the new Soviet

CPYRGHT

~~Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3~~
operational art, tactics, and other problems, were discussed at those conferences. The characteristic features of the first conferences were wide representation and free exchange of opinions.

During the period of the Stalin personality cult, the number of military science conferences was reduced, representation was more restricted, and freedom of creative discussion was practically nonexistent. A bold discussion of innovations gradually became unknown. It was replaced more and more by eulogies of Stalin's statements, and at best, by timid attempts to elucidate them. Gradually the conferences lost their meaning as a forum for the constructive development of problems of military theory.

All this had to be overcome by military (and not only military) thought during the long prewar and postwar periods. It is true, after the Great Patriotic War attempts were made in a number of military districts to conduct military science conferences; however, they were not distinguished by a constructive approach or by truly scientific results. Only after the 20th Party Congress, when the personality cult had been discredited and a mass movement for the elimination of its effects had begun, the former best traditions of military-scientific work, and particularly conferences, i.e., traditions of free, creative discussion, were gradually restored.

Particular attention to military-scientific work, and especially to military science conferences, was given as soon as nuclear weapons and other types of modern combat equipment were developed. This was entirely logical, since an unprecedented, revolutionary "jump" had been made in all spheres of military affairs, resulting in radical changes in combat equipment; organization of Armed Forces, their branches, and combat arms; and in forms and methods of conducting a battle, an operation, or a war in general.

It is noteworthy that rockets and nuclear weapons were awarded the decisive role in the general system of armaments immediately, and not gradually as had happened in the past, for example, in the case of firearms. This was because of their enormous destructive properties, their long range, and quick effects.

For the first time in the history of military art, it was necessary during such a short period (i.e. the past 10 years) to subject many problems of troop organization and nearly all important problems of strategy, operational art, and tactics, to a radical revision. These objective conditions created the need for a most extensive and intensive development of military-scientific work in the Armed Forces. According to practical experience, military science conferences represent one of

~~Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

the military science conferences require the cooperation of a wide circle of generals and officers, especially from the troops, in scientific research concerning important problems of military art, since they are directly interested in the solution of such problems. Preliminary opinions, which are sometimes subjective, always require critical, comprehensive checking, serious discussion, and exchange of opinions, and this can best be done at conferences attended by experienced military leaders, military specialists, and numerous (other) representatives of the troops.

Such a composition of conference participants makes it possible to penetrate deeply into the problems under investigation, to understand them more fully, to find the most correct and feasible methods of solving problematic questions, and to establish the necessary accord of opinions. In addition, one should keep in mind that since, as a rule, the most urgent and vital problems are placed on the agenda of conferences, the theoretical recommendations elaborated at the conferences may be applied as quickly as possible to the practice of operational and combat training. For that reason, military science conferences are a very effective form of military-scientific work.

One should also take into consideration that the great majority of conferences (except those held in off-duty hours by voluntary military science societies) are planned undertakings. Therefore, their preparation and conduct should be regarded as an integral part of the official activities of commanders, as well as of scientists' cadres. In the activities of troops, the conferences are very closely connected with the practice of operational and combat training, thus helping to improve it by analyzing the accumulated training experience and preparing recommendations on all new questions.

That is why the interest in military science conferences has noticeably increased, as compared with the past, and the range of participants has been widened considerably. Originally, such conferences were conducted mostly in military educational institutions (mainly in academies) and scientific research establishments. However, now a practical need for conferences is felt in operational staffs of branches of the Armed Forces, of combat arms, of operational-level ob'yedineniya, and even of tactical elements. The number of conferences has also greatly increased. It may be mentioned that during 1963 the Ground Forces alone conducted (in various units) more than 600 conferences.

The numerous levels, at which conferences are conducted, as well as the variety of their topics and aims, require the use of proper methods of organization and conduct suited to each occasion. This is all the more important since under any conditions the preparation and conduct of conferences is a complicated process, requiring intensive work of fairly long

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

military science conferences, including the selection of topics, the determination of aims, the periods of preparation, the composition of participants, and the time of the conference. It should be noted that during the initial period conferences were planned, in most cases, in a spontaneous or arbitrary manner, and this prevented the work from being purposeful and well organized. As a rule, many supervisors considered military science conferences, and military-scientific work in general, as a purely voluntary matter.

Later, there was a sharp turn in the other direction: since there had been many statements to the effect that military-scientific work should be regarded as part of the official activities of military cadres, it became customary for higher-ranking authorities to determine the topics and time for the conferences, and even to designate the individuals who were to prepare the key reports, according to a centralized procedure. Very often all this was done without any coordination with authorities at lower levels. At the same time, despite strict centralization, the selection of topics was often arbitrary and not coordinated with plans for operational and combat training.

We believe that it is most expedient to combine the independent planning of conferences by the individuals who are locally in charge of them with the approved plans for military-scientific work, and to coordinate the topics of conferences, as well as other scientific undertakings, with higher levels. Such an approach has already been used, and the first results have shown that this procedure is fully justified. Centralized planning of military science conferences on a scale of the Armed Forces or of their branches, including combat arms, military academics, scientific research establishments, and operational staffs (according to the principle "from top to bottom"), must be accompanied by a well-timed and careful coordination of all questions with the persons in charge, taking into consideration the tasks facing them in a regular training year in the sphere of operational and combat training and in military-scientific work. At the same time, the persons directly concerned must be given the opportunity to make the necessary corrections concerning conference aims, depending on local conditions.

This kind of planning is most appropriate, since it enables the conference organizers to display creative initiative and to conduct conferences in an organized, purposeful manner, thereby assuring the most effective and meaningful development of military theory as a whole. Such planning also eliminates duplication and lack of coordination in the scientific work of numerous participants.

A correct selection of topics is extremely important in the planning of military science conferences. According to experience, military science conferences devoted to strategic and operational-tactical subjects

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

are usually given fairly comprehensive and frequently complex themes which require a scientific solution of many questions pertaining to one or more related problems of military art. Such themes would include, for example, problems of preparation for and conduct of war and operations involving the use of weapons of mass destruction by the combatants, prospects for the development of branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms, operational ob'yedineniya, and so forth.

We do not deny the expediency of holding conferences devoted to such general, theoretical subjects; however, we believe that the comprehensive nature of such themes does not make it possible to examine, with sufficient thoroughness, the entire complex of questions at a single conference. The relatively short duration of a conference (a maximum of 2-3 days) also makes it impossible to study a large number of questions of a complex theme as thoroughly as would be required.

At present, a certain order has been established, which we believe to be quite appropriate, for determining more limited and specific topics of conferences, not only in the sphere of tactics and operational art, but also in that of strategy. A similar situation exists with regard to topics for conferences pertaining to training methods and military technology. This makes it possible to examine a definite range of questions more thoroughly and specifically, to concentrate attention on these questions, and to make appropriate practical recommendations. In some cases, we believe it would even be advisable to limit the discussion at a conference to one single question, which may not be extensive but which is new and important at a given time (it may be a controversial or unsolved question).

Speaking of topics for military science conferences, it must be admitted that the chosen topics are not always of sufficiently current interest. It often happens that the same subject is chosen year after year, and it is not taken into consideration whether that subject is important enough to be discussed at a particular time.

It must be said that until now two trends are observed in the determination of topics and aims of conferences, i.e., they are either extremely theoretical, or they are purely practical. In military academies and operational staffs, preference is usually given to theoretical research on thematical questions. On the other hand, in ob'yedineniya and especially in tactical units, there is a tendency to discuss mostly questions of a practical nature at the conferences.

We believe that the selection of topics should be approached in a slightly different manner. Even though, under certain conditions, a theoretical or practical trend in the handling of each topic may be acceptable, it would be more correct in principle to prevent a conference

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

that it provides for an analysis of the experience of training exercises and of methods for the use of new military equipment by the troops. One should always remember that, in the final analysis, the principal aim of theory is to prepare the way for practice.

As we have learned from experience, conferences with a practical purpose should not be entirely eliminated. Such conferences usually discuss problems and matters directly related to the daily practical activities of troops. Obviously, we learn primarily from the practical training of troops when certain principles, rules, norms, or methods of conducting combat operations become outdated and cease to meet modern requirements, and when it becomes necessary to make appropriate changes or recommendations. All of these questions become the subject of discussion at conferences. In this manner, not only a few individuals but most of the conference participants may be convinced of the necessity for replacing the old rules with new ones, based on their experience with troops and staffs, i.e., during troop and command-post exercises.

However, it is unfortunate that in a number of cases such conferences restrict themselves to a discussion of deficiencies, which have become evident at that particular time in the process of operational and combat training, or even during individual exercises, and that they merely issue general requirements for eliminating such shortcomings, without sufficient theoretical interpretation. At such conferences, the theory of a particular question is not sufficiently taken into consideration, practical experience is not properly analyzed, and the conclusions and suggestions are made hurriedly, without scientific basis, and are not coordinated with theoretical research. As a result, there is a certain lack of contact between theory and practice. In such cases, the conferences are not sufficiently constructive, their scientific value diminishes, and they become merely official meetings, or restrict themselves to a practical critique of exercises.

In our opinion, regardless of the character of conferences, they must combine careful scientific research with a critical analysis of practice. Conferences which have a practical purpose, and are held mainly to review and analyse accumulated experience, should be based widely on scientific principles.

Sometimes, as it is done in some staffs of military districts, it is expedient to assign the same topic to several persons, when planning military science conferences. Experience has shown that this provides for a more comprehensive and detailed handling of the subject, taking into consideration different physico-geographical and other conditions, as well as specific features of troop operations. After holding such conferences,

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

it is possible to compare different opinions (which are bound to exist) and to work out the most acceptable recommendations, which are specifically suited for each individual case.

Another method being used requires the simultaneous participation in the preparation of a topic for a conference by representatives of different administrative echelons. This is also a useful measure. The joint handling of a theme, for example by a military academy and one or two staffs of military districts, also deserves attention. We quite agree that such an approach enables the best possible coordination between theory and practice.

For a long time, the elaboration of a theme was limited to writing the principal report, which was read at the conference during a period of one hour, or not more than two hours. Depending on the nature of the theme, two or three so-called supplementary reports were frequently prepared.

We do not deny the expediency of such a method, particularly if the reports are of a high quality; however, we believe that this method alone is no longer sufficient. It was and still is acceptable in those cases where a theme is handled for the first time and where the aims of the conference are not outside the scope of the general formulation of questions which require further theoretical research and practical testing.

A more thorough and specific study of a complex theme obviously requires timely preparation, not in the form of short, general reports, but in the form of extensive materials for study by the participants of a conference. In such cases, a consecutive or simultaneous, comprehensive study of each question becomes necessary. (The number of questions may vary greatly, depending on the nature of the theme.) It should be noted, however, that these preliminary materials cannot replace the principal report and supplementary reports. The latter must be prepared, even when this method of working out a theme is used. However, they are composed on the basis of materials prepared in advance and they include only the principal conclusions and recommendations, i.e., the new results of research.

This method was first used by the Academy imeni M. V. Frunze and was found to be completely justified. Each of the questions pertaining to the principal theme (including both general and special questions) was first worked out in detail by the persons to whom this task was assigned, and then brought to the attention of the conference participants. This made it possible to gain a better understanding of the importance of a particular question and to select more appropriate methods for solving the problems presented at the conference.

CPYRIGHT

There is no need to prove that this method of preparation helps to improve the academic level, the singleness of purpose, and the end results of the whole conference. The question may be asked whether such a method might not lead to a situation where the conference participants merely have to listen to the research results and accept them. We believe this is not the case. Experience has shown that a comprehensive study and elaboration of a theme provides greater opportunities for serious thought. It has become possible to present and examine original questions, which have been subjected to comprehensive study and have found new, specific solutions, with the help of scientific evidence confirmed by practical experience. Such methods of preparing for a conference, if accompanied by the necessary preliminary work with its participants, will undoubtedly provoke the most extensive, constructive discussion and will produce good results.

In elaborating on a theme it is very important to raise problematic questions and to find a solution for them, not only as applied to the present but also with regard to the future, and by analyzing tendencies in the development of means of combat, to conceive the nature of possible changes in a particular sphere of military art. In other words, in working out a theme one should always envision the future, at least in general outline. Even though such long-range solutions and revealed tendencies may be only in the form of working hypotheses, rough drafts, or individual suppositions, they will certainly be useful if they are scientifically substantiated.

The study of a large number of materials discussed at conferences has shown that many of the materials, including principal and supplementary reports, unfortunately contain too many general propositions, repetitions of solved questions, and insufficiently substantiated categorical statements. At the same time, they lack an original presentation and constructive solution of new, complex questions and fail to offer a deep analysis, expert conclusions, and scientifically substantiated recommendations. As a result, the reports often do not go beyond the scope of ordinary lectures; they are read and heard without interest and, naturally, do not stimulate active, creative discussion.

Any report, or supplementary report, must be filled with new material; it must be deeply scientific, creative, and innovational, and should not contain any generally known axioms. A report must compromise a limited range of the most important questions pertaining to the main theme, and must throw light only on what is new and characteristic as compared with formerly accepted principles. Obviously, some of the new questions may be discussed only in the order that they are brought up. These requirements apply also to speeches made at the conference.

CPYRGHT

I would also like to express some new opinions concerning the preparation of materials for the future participation of conference participants.

At present it is customary to begin this preparation only after the conference participants have received the theses of the principal and supplementary reports. As a rule, these are received only very shortly before the conference. Therefore, the conference participants have very little time to examine the substance of the questions. Furthermore this is rather difficult to do in the case of short theses.

Conference participants must be familiar with the theme and the principal questions to be discussed, as early and as much in detail as possible. This is a well known requirement; however, unfortunately it is often disregarded and this produces undesirable results. In that case, the officers and generals cannot become familiar early enough with the existing (and previously published) materials pertaining to the theme, study them, and work out their opinions and recommendations with a view to a practical solution of these questions. We believe that upon receipt of the materials prepared for the conference, its participants should already be, as they say, firmly rooted in the theme and when appearing at the conference, they should be completely sure of the changes and amendments that may be required on some questions. This would also increase their constructive activity and they would not be obliged to prepare for speeches in a hurry, i.e., at the conference itself, as it often happens.

The prepared materials should be sent to conference participants as early as possible, at least the full reports, but not their theses. In that case, the generals and officers will be able to study the theme more deeply and comprehensively, penetrate the substance of the questions and proposed solutions, and form their own opinions. There is nothing wrong with having to listen to a report on questions which have been studied in advance. This will only confirm their opinions on given matters or will stimulate them to further thought.

Unfortunately, it often happens that the theses of reports are distributed with great delay, and are sometimes not even brought to the attention of participants. This obviously makes it much more difficult to obtain active participation.

In sending the prepared materials to conference participants, we believe it would be useful to list the questions on which their opinions and reactions may be desirable.

To avoid duplication of speeches, or on the other hand, failure to throw light on some important question, it is suggested that some of the questions may be distributed in advance among generals and officers, depending on their specialty.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

It should be noted that in a number of cases the preparations for the date of the conference. Obviously, in such a case one cannot hope for high quality in working out the theme and in achieving the aims set by the conference; it either becomes a matter of form, or it becomes necessary to postpone the date it is to be held.

CPYRGHT

As we have learned from experience, the high academic level of a conference and the achievement of valuable theoretical and practical results are in direct relation to the quality of preparation. The latter should begin at least several months in advance and should be carried out according to a carefully determined plan.

It has sometimes been customary to plan a conference at an early stage in the study of a theme, so as to gain a better understanding of the basic questions which require more detailed theoretical examination and immediate practical testing, and also to give the further work a definite trend and the necessary singleness of purpose. We believe that under certain conditions this method may be quite expedient. However, it is not always practically possible, since it may sometimes become necessary to call a second conference in order to conclude the solution of a theme. It would be difficult to hold two conferences on the same theme, as this would cause an excessive work load for staffs, generals, and officers, and it would often be difficult to find the necessary time. We believe, therefore, that at an early stage of the work it would be better to hold a short military science discussion to determine the trend of research for certain urgent themes; in the case of academies, it would be advisable to organize a scientific informative meeting, as it is often done. Such meetings are especially useful for operational staffs and troop elements, if the theme of the conference coincides, at least in part, with the theme of a forthcoming exercise, or if the content of the conference theme corresponds to the basic problems involved in the exercise. The preliminary theoretical research and recommendations will be approved in practice during the exercise and supplemented with new data, thus improving the results of the work as a whole. In addition, practical experience will tell which questions require further theoretical interpretation and what the direction of further research should be.

We would like to emphasize the need for regularly scheduled conferences. This is explained by the fact that there has been rapid development in military affairs in recent times in accordance with the intensive scientific and technical progress. It is necessary to introduce changes regularly in all spheres of military theory and practice, and sometimes these changes are of a cardinal nature. One should bear in mind, moreover, that many questions for which an expedient solution had apparently been found before, must after a certain period of time be

re-examined in order to find a new solution. This requires a revision of rules, which would be better suited to meet the requirements for high combat readiness of troops and ability to conduct operations or battles with them, in strict accordance with objective conditions of a future war.

PYRGHT

Judging from experience, it is most expedient to conduct conferences and other operational and military science projects in large operational staffs once a year. This makes it possible to coordinate military theories with the interests and practical activities of troops; it helps to carry out missions of operational and combat training, and it does not exceed the practical possibilities of scientific and command cadres for conducting research and preparing analytical conclusions.

Whenever a conference is conducted on a scale involving the Armed Forces as a whole, it is customary to discuss important and complex themes of a strategic or operational-strategic nature, which require lengthy preparation. The dates of conferences are scheduled accordingly. We have learned from experience that conferences may be held a little more often (than customary) in main staffs of branches of the Armed Forces, such as once every 2 or 3 years; in operational staffs, military academies, and soyedineniya they should be held once a year, and if necessary, twice a year.

Speaking of the time for holding a conference, it should be noted that during the past few years a peculiar routine has become established, especially in operational staffs, i.e., most of the conferences were conducted at the very end of the year. On the one hand, this is convenient and advantageous for the persons concerned, since it gives them a maximum amount of time for preparation, i.e., almost the whole year. On the other hand, there are usually fewer other operational activities at the end of the year, and it is possible to give these questions more attention. Finally, such a conference serves to sum up the theoretical work done during the past year, and it is the most suitable opportunity for announcing the regular assignments in military-scientific work.

However, in our opinion, one should not be guided merely by these departmental considerations and interests. One should also take into consideration that the holding of several conferences at the same time every year causes certain inconveniences. In particular, the planned character and quality of the work of higher organs and authorities is impaired, since it becomes difficult to carry out supervision and give assistance to the local organizers of conferences. It becomes less feasible for interested representatives from scientific research institutions, military academies, and adjacent operational staffs to attend the conferences. It is also more difficult for the higher staffs to

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

summarize the results of a number of conferences. In addition, the reports are prepared daily on the basis of written reports, and these are not sent out immediately, but some time after the conferences. Finally, the reports of conference proceedings, as a rule, omit many important questions, including those pertaining to organization and methods. All this reduces the possibilities of becoming familiar at an early date with the work results of a conference, so that they may be considered when setting up the tasks of military-scientific work for the following year, not to mention the difficulties of promptly carrying out the suggestions and recommendations made at a conference.

The trend to conduct conferences at the end of a year is not always justified by their aims. For example, there have been cases when science conferences were held in the interests of discussing drafts of manuals and theoretical works. Obviously, such conferences could be held without any trouble at the beginning or in the middle of a year, in which case generals and officers would have to be given the necessary time for a careful study of the drafts and for preparation of well substantiated speeches.

We have learned from experience that the quality of conducting conferences depends on the individuals presenting the principal and supplementary reports. Unfortunately, it must be said that in cases where a high-ranking official is the principal speaker, the freedom of criticism is sometimes greatly restricted, and most of the following speakers support the propositions made by the principal speaker, or at best, may try to elaborate them to some extent. Hardly anyone ever offers his own suggestions, especially if they might conflict with the statements of the principal speaker. It is also bad that in some cases the same speakers are appointed year after year. This does not promote the participation of a wide circle of generals and officers in constructive work, and it further reduces the active spirit and quality of conferences. All this, undoubtedly, represents a holdover from the influence of the personality cult, and it should be opposed.

There is one more serious shortcoming. The preparation of a report is usually entrusted to persons who are subordinated to the principal speaker, and the latter frequently joins in the work directly before the conference. In that case, it is naturally difficult for him to become deeply absorbed in the theme and to examine all its details, not to mention his inability to make proposals and present scientific arguments containing anything really new and original.

We believe that the principal speaker should not necessarily be a leading official. It is also not advisable to follow the rule that only leading specialists should present supplementary reports at a conference. This has been the case recently at almost every conference.

In our opinion, it would be more correct for the principal speaker to prepare his own report (especially if previously prepared, extensive materials are available). Subsequently, the whole report or parts of it should be discussed by a group of comrades contributing to this report, so that the conclusions and suggestions to be discussed by the conference participants may be carefully analyzed, summarized, and well reasoned.

This, of course, does not preclude the possibility that the principal report may be made by a leading official. However, in that case he should personally supervise the preparation of the report. And yet it happens, as we said before, that the speaker will look over the prepared report just before the conference, and will then give instructions for revising it. This will result in hasty work and nervousness, and there will be no time to think about a high theoretical level and constructive content of the report.

Conferences may be conducted by various methods. For example, in the form of a general plenary meeting. The advantage of this method is the fact that all participants of the conference are well informed of its work and able to join in the discussion of any question. This is the simplest method, but not the only one.

Another method, also widely used, is the sectional method of conducting conferences. In that case, the principal report is presented at a plenary meeting, and the discussion of questions is handled in sections. An operational (tactical) section may be formed, as well as a number of sections for branches of the Armed Forces (or combat arms), for services, and for party-political work. With this method, the final meeting is also a plenary meeting, at which the results of the work of sections and of the conference as a whole are summarized. The advantages of this method are in the fact that the total number of questions to be discussed increases in proportion to the number of sections, and the theme as a whole is studied more deeply and comprehensively. Moreover, it promotes more active participation at the conference and increases the number of speakers.

Experience has shown that the number of speakers at conferences conducted by the sectional method is 3-4 times as great as in the case of conferences held in the form of plenary meetings. It is true, one must take into consideration that the sectional method requires much more time

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
COPYRIGHT

only on a limited number of special questions (to be considered and discussed by a given section). This may be partly compensated by the fact that the decisions of a section are brought to the attention of all participants at the concluding plenary meeting.

In the case of a complex theme one may use a combination method of conducting a conference; this requires holding a plenary meeting first for the purpose of discussing the most general and important questions, then continuing the work in sections, and holding another plenary meeting at the end.

Usually a conference begins by hearing and discussing the principal report; then the work continues either at a plenary meeting, or in sections; and after that the concluding plenary meeting is held. However, a different order may be possible: the sections do their work first, then their decisions are heard at a plenary meeting, where they are discussed together with the propositions of the principal report.

There is another method which should not be ignored, according to which the complete materials of principal and supplementary reports prepared for the conference are distributed in advance among the participants. In that case, the plenary meeting begins directly with a discussion of the questions involved. It would be better, of course, if the participants could send in advance copies of their speeches. In our opinion, such a method would promote a more active participation of generals and officers in the work and would make it possible to use a maximum amount of time for speeches by the participants.

Thus we see that there are various methods of conducting conferences and the best method should be selected by a constructive approach, i.e. by considering the topic and aim of the conference, the quality and quantity of participants, the amount of available time, and other factors.

In some operational staffs and sovedineniya it might be useful to conduct conferences on the theme of a forthcoming or past exercise concerned with experiment or research. This would greatly benefit the coordination of theory and practical operations in troops and staffs.

The value of any conference is determined, in the final analysis, by its results, i.e., the development of practical recommendations on the basis of what has been achieved in the course of the work by unanimous agreement. The recommendations (or conference decision) should be adopted directly at the conference, at the conclusion of its work; when summarizing the work results of the conference, these recommendations may be further elaborated, substantiated in detail, and

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
then approved to the extent of the participants in written form and presented to the higher authority in the form of a report. In our opinion, decisions should always be adopted at a conference so that it may be determined what results were achieved in the discussion of a given theme. However, experience has shown that such decisions have been issued very rarely (we explain this mainly by the fact that organizational questions have been given insufficient thought). At best, the leader of the conference makes a final speech, which cannot always be regarded as an indication of the results achieved through the work of the conference.

Naturally, not every conference decision may be considered as the only correct one, and not every question may be fully exhausted. We believe that the time has come to devote more serious attention to the elaboration of decisions at conferences, so that truly acceptable recommendations (theoretical and practical) would be introduced more boldly into the practice of operational and combat training, and that special (experimental) exercises may be conducted in some cases.

In conclusion, I would like to stress once more that military science conferences at all levels are one of the most important and most effective forms of mass activities in military-scientific work, which has enormous significance for the development of military theory and the perfection of practice in operational and combat training. This, in turn, increases the combat readiness and combat capability of the Armed Forces. Therefore, conferences should be held regularly and the most expedient methods of their organization should be chosen, based on the specific conditions attending each conference.

CPYRGHT

by Col Gen D. DZHUROV
Minister of National Defense of Bulgaria

CPYRGHT

The Bulgarian People's Army is marking the 20th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria and its own military holiday on 23 September, devoted to the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) standing firmly behind its Central Committee headed by Comrade T. ZHIVKOV, and ready to protect our socialist fatherland and the socialist commonwealth against possible imperialists aggression, together with fraternal armies of Warsaw Treaty Forces, whenever called upon to do so by the party and the people's government.

Our country marks this great anniversary in an atmosphere of great political and industrial upswing in socialist building. The past two decades were years of far-reaching, revolutionary changes in all spheres of our life. During this short period of history, Bulgaria was transformed from an extremely backward, predominantly agricultural country into an industrial-agrarian socialist state. As compared with 1939, industrial production in 1963 had increased about 17 times; electric power production -- 27 times; chemical industry -- 55 times; and machine building and metalworking -- 139 times. Our people also performed great feats in the socialist reorganization of agriculture. In place of the former 1,100,000 small private farms, there are now 85 large, mechanized, state agricultural farms and 980 enlarged cooperative-labor agricultural farms. We have also achieved great success in the sphere of culture and science.

Together with the development of Bulgaria on the road to socialism, our people's army was strengthened and became the faithful guard of our people's socialist achievements.

Under the supervision of the party, the Bulgarian People's Army has gone through a glorious development. It has incorporated all the revolutionary and combat traditions of the Bulgarian Communist Party and of our freedom-loving people.

For several decades, the party of Bulgarian Communists worked selflessly and consistently with the aim to disintegrate the bourgeois army and create a revolutionary, people's army of the proletariat and workers. The turning point came during the years following the victory of the Great Socialist October Revolution. In 1919, at the 22d regular congress (First Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party), the party of "close" socialists was renamed the Bulgarian Communist Party. In the Program Declaration adopted by the congress, the task of creating a Red Army to defend the revolution against counterrevolutionary plots

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
was first formulated. Later, under the supervision of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of the BCP, the newspaper Narodna Armiya (People's Army) was published. In the spring of 1921, an illegal military organization was formed, which had the purpose of improving the military training of Communists and Komsomol members, providing guards for clubs and public demonstrations, and supplying arms.

Under the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the first anti-fascist uprising in the world took place in September 1923 and spread over a large part of the country. A workers' and peasants' government was established in 440 villages and eight cities. During the uprising, the party organized an insurgent people's army, numbering tens of thousands of soldiers. It was the first armed force of the party, the working class, and the toiling peasants in the struggle against fascism and capitalism. The "druzhiny" (druzhina was an organizational combat unit of the insurgent army, equivalent to the force of a battalion) and detachments created in battles against the enemy were the prototype of the Bulgarian People's Army organized after 9 September 1944. Their combat experiences are an inexhaustible source for the patriotic education of our people and of army soldiers. Therefore, the day of 23 September was established as a military holiday of the Bulgarian People's Army by decision of the party and the government.

After the defeat of the uprising, and despite the "white terror", the Bulgarian Communist Party did not cease to work for the creation of its army. At the same time, it developed extensive anti-imperialist activities among the people and the bourgeois army, campaigning against Bulgaria's entry into the war on the side of fascist Germany.

The Bulgarian Communist Party conducted widespread military-revolutionary activities during World War II, especially after the attack of Nazi troops against the Soviet Union. As early as 22 June 1941, the Central Committee of BCP addressed an appeal to the Bulgarian people, which described the war of Soviet peoples as a just, progressive war against the barbarous invasion of Hitler's hordes. Two days later, the Politbureau of the Central Committee of BCP adopted a course to prepare for an armed uprising. The first partisan "chety" (a cheta was a combat unit within a detachment, numbering 20-60 men and having its own commander and commissar), sabotage and combat groups were organized in the country.

With the victories of the Soviet Army over Nazi troops, the partisan movement became more widespread in our country. The chety grew into detachments, which did not give the enemy a moment's peace. In the spring of 1943, the Politbureau of the Central Committee of BCP formed the main staff of the National Liberation Insurgent Army and divided the country into 12 military operation zones. The army included one division, 11 brigades, 37 detachments, and more than 200 chety, with a total number

CPYRGHT

"yataki" (yataki were legal, clandestine comrades -- either party, Komsomol, or non-party members -- who supplied the partisans with food, weapons, shelter, conducted enemy reconnaissance, and performed other functions) and party supporters. The partisan movement drew strength from the support and admiration of all the people.

In the battles against fascism the National Liberation Insurgent Army recorded events of great heroism in the war annals of the working class and of all working people. According to its nature and purpose, its aims, and tasks, this was a real people's army. Therefore, the workers of villages and cities loved it, provided it with food, helped it, and were full of admiration for its heroism. Although not large in numbers, the army diverted the attention of large fascist forces and prevented the fascist government from sending a single Bulgarian soldier to the Eastern front against the Soviet Union. From each battle against the enemy, the National Liberation Army emerged stronger and better prepared for new exploits in the name of freedom of our enslaved country.

The uprising of 9 September 1944, which had the decisive support of the Soviet Army, was successful. Under the leadership of the BCP, the workers of our country established a people's government of the patriotic front. The uprising prepared the way for building socialism in Bulgaria.

In view of the exiting internal and international situation, our party did not dissolve the old army, but carried out measures to transform it into a new-type army.

As a result of many years of BCP activity in the army, large numbers of soldiers, most of whom were the sons of workers and peasants, joined the patriotic front under the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

Soldiers' committees, organized on the initiative of the party in each combat chact', played an important role in the revolutionary reorganization of the army. During the uprising, these committees were actually the leaders of the soldiers' masses.

Under the leadership of the party and with the help of soldiers' committees, all fascist officers who had been guilty of crimes were turned over to the people's court. In a short period, attempts at partial resistance in some garrisons of the country were suppressed.

An institute of assistant commanders was established to carry out the policy of the party in the army. This institute was extremely active in rallying the troops and raising their morale and fighting spirit for participating in the war against fascist Germany. The assistant commanders could rightfully be called emissaries of the party. They were the party's right hand in the army: they organized the soldiers' masses and the entire political work among the personnel.

CPYRGH formed the basis of the new army. They were its nucleus and backbone. At the same time, another new current joined the army -- volunteer soldiers and those mobilized from the reserve. Many partisan commanders and fighters received army ranks and were assigned to command positions in the army. Reserve officers, many of whom had participated directly in the 9 September uprising, were also called up. As a result of these measures, the make-up of the army was radically changed and it became truly a people's army in its character, purpose, and composition. To conduct the forthcoming combat operations against Nazi troops the army needed military specialists. Therefore, officers of the old army, who had not performed any crimes against the people, remained in the service. The party openly informed them that their future service in the army would depend on their conduct and work.

As a result of the wise policy of the Central Committee of BCP, the Bulgarian People's Army developed in a short period as the army of workers and peasants, the army of the socialist revolution devoted to the cause of 9 September. The new and not yet firmly established Bulgarian People's Army conducted its victorious battles in the Patriotic War against Nazi troops, shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army. In the first period of the war, three armies consisting of 445,000 men participated in the liberation of the Balkans from German invaders. In the second period of the war, when combat operations were transferred to Hungarian territory, one army numbering 120,000 men took part in them. Therefore, our army cooperated directly in the liberation of the peoples of Macedonia, Southern Serbia, and Southern Hungary from fascist occupation. The battles of Strazhin, Stratsin, and Kumanovo, of the Drava and Mur rivers, and of Yastrebits, represent a number of illustrious pages in the history of the Bulgarian People's Army, which lost over 30,000 men in battle. Three-gun salutes in the capital of the Soviet Union in honor of the victories of our heroic army were the highest reward for the army, the Bulgarian people, and for the heroic Bulgarian Communist Party.

After the Patriotic War, the Central Committee of BCP and Georgi Dimitrov personally entrusted the Bulgarian People's Army with the task of learning from the experience, strategy, and military art of the invincible Soviet Army, in order to become a modern, excellently armed and trained army and a true defender of socialist achievements. A number of military educational institutions was opened for the purpose of training highly qualified military cadres. Many officers and generals graduated from courses and academies in our country and in the Soviet Union.

The period of the personality cult had a negative effect on the development of our country, including that of the army. Personal command of the army by V. CHERVENKOV, and the reprisals against a number of military cadres which had been tested in battle, hindered the further growth of the army.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
BCP were historically significant in the life and development of our country and army.

CPYRGHT

The plenum drew conclusions, necessary for the activity of our party, from the decisions of the 20th Congress of CPSU; condemned the incorrect methods of the personality cult period; and adopted an extensive program for restoring the norms of party life and the principles of party leadership. An invaluable role in the building of our army was performed by the decisions of the October 1958 Plenum of the Central Committee of BCP, at which the Central Committee clearly determined the tasks of further increasing the leading role of the Central Committee of BCP in the army, strengthening one-man command on a party basis, and increasing the role of political organs, party, and Komsomol organizations in the whole life of the army.

The plenum stressed that the supreme Leninist principle in building an army of the new type is its leadership by the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

The restoration of Leninist norms and principles of party life and of the Leninist principle of one-man command in the army based on the party, and the reinstatement of criticism and self-criticism, played a decisive role in strengthening the army. After the plenum, commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations developed constructive initiative and activity. Socialist competition and various projects designed to achieve high combat efficiency were instituted on a wide scale.

The decisions of the 8th Congress BCP, which took place in November 1962, greatly benefited the development of the Bulgarian People's Army. In evaluating the current international situation, the congress established the task of further strengthening the defense capability of our country. The congress stated in its resolution: "It is necessary to increase the vigilance of the people and strengthen the defense capability of our fatherland, and to improve the combat skill of the people's army, so that it will be able to defeat relentlessly any attempts of the imperialists and their servitors to encroach upon the peaceful labor of our people, and upon the independence and territorial integrity of the Bulgarian People's Republic."

We are well aware of the importance of the position occupied by our country in southeast Europe; we realize that the US imperialists are trying to carry out insane, aggressive plans in this part of the world; and we are deeply aware of our great responsibility to the party and the people for the defense of our socialist fatherland. In view of these considerations, our army personnel has vigilantly watched the preparations of our enemies for a surprise opening of hostilities and has shown great concern for maintaining the armed forces of the country in a state of constant, high combat readiness.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

In view of the character of modern war and of the international situation, a comprehensive reorganization and rearmament of all branches of the Armed Forces took place during the past few years at the instruction of the Central Committee of BCP. As a result of the fatherly concern of the party and the selfless assistance of the brotherly Soviet Union, our army has the most modern combat equipment and arms, which represents the basis of its combat strength. Within the Ground Forces, well coordinated, highly mobile and maneuverable *chasti* and *soyedineniya* were organized, which are trained for conducting combat operations under difficult conditions of modern warfare. The large-scale supply of these *chasti* and *soyedineniya* with automatic weapons, tanks, and other combat equipment, has greatly increased fire power and striking power.

The total volley of our modern division is five times stronger, and the mobility of the division is 6-7 times greater than that of a division in World War II.

The PVO troops and Air Forces have undergone a special development in the past few years and have been equipped with the most perfected combat equipment, i.e. guided surface-to-air rockets, supersonic fighters, and modern radar. Our Navy is also constantly being rearmed and its organizational structure is being improved.

The revolutionary changes in military affairs have increased demands in the training of personnel, especially of command cadres. The development of military art requires that officers be capable of exercising continuous, firm, and flexible control of the troops. During the past few years, our officer cadres have accumulated considerable experience in organization and training methods. They are successfully supervising the daily troop activities; using modern methods in the training process of their subordinated *soyedineniya*, *chasti*, and *podrazdeleniya*; and conducting complex operational and tactical command-staff exercises and troop exercises. Considerable success has been achieved in the theoretical formulation and practical application of new methods of troop control, taking into consideration the specific conditions of our army. At present our commanders and staffs are capable of solving, in a short period, the whole involved complex of problems concerning the organization of an operation or battle, and of carrying out the operational direction of troops during combat action.

As a result of the constant concern of our Central Committee, the Bulgarian People's Army has been staffed with highly qualified command cadres, loyal to the party and the people. Many of them were active fighters against fascism and capitalism and participants of the Patriotic War. More than 83 percent of the officers are members of the BCP. One out of every 6 or 7 officers has higher military education.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Commanders and political organs are honorably discharging the duties assigned to them by the party. They are continuously improving their Marxist-Leninist and operationa-tactical training and studying the character of combat operations in modern war, particularly during the initial period. Their organizational work is also constantly improving. The number of commanders who have trained outstanding podrazdeleniya has increased.

CPYRGHT

The principal attention of commanders, staffs, and troops of the Bulgarian People's Army is now directed toward a complete mastery of new combat equipment and toward their training for joint combat operations, mainly in the initial period of a war. The Seventh All-Army Party Conference suggested that the mastery of equipment be considered a priority field of endeavor for party organizations, commanders, and all military personnel, and adopted detailed decisions to that effect.

During the past few years, combat training of our army troops has been raised to a new, higher level. Chasti and podrazdeleniya of the Ground Forces are being trained to conduct bold, resourceful, and highly maneuverable combat operations by day and night, under any weather conditions, and on different types of terrain. They are constantly improving their field training, physical endurance, and combat skill, and are being trained to perform long marches at high speed, to force river barriers from the march, and to conduct meeting engagements and battles in difficult, mountainous terrain.

PVO Troops and Air Forces are trained in rapid, accurate firing and bombing, involving complex maneuvers under any weather conditions. They are able to detect an air enemy on distant approaches and are ready to destroy any enemy airplane attempting to violate our air space. The Navy, although not numerous, is well trained and preparing to provide reliable protection and defense of our maritime borders.

Socialist competition is an important factor in achieving success and improving combat training. Every year there is an increased number of commanders who take a more active part in competitions, and conduct them in a more specific and efficient manner, making use of their great effect in achieving high, lasting results. During the 1963 training year alone, over 25 percent of soldiers and commanders earned the title "Outstanding in Combat and Political Training," and there are more than 3,200 outstanding podrazdeleniya. The movement for Communist labor has found widespread support. During the past year, 1,325 otdeleniya, crews, teams, and groups were awarded the title "Collective of Communist Labor."

In honor of the 20th anniversary of the victory of the socialist revolution and in answer to the Appeal of the Central Committee of BCP, the army has now developed large-scale organizational activities to prepare for a worthy celebration of Victory Day.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Conscious military discipline and strict military regulations are some of the most important conditions ensuring constant, high combat readiness of the army. The socialist military science regards discipline as a deeply political manifestation, which focuses the moral and fighting qualities of soldiers. High ideological convictions, selfless devotion to the fatherland and the Communist Party, and correct understanding by all soldiers and commanders of the patriotic duty and the international tasks of our army, constitute the solid foundation of an iron military discipline.

Party-political work plays a great role in strengthening the combat capability and combat readiness of the Bulgarian People's Army.

The May 1964 Plenum of the Central Committee BCP has been invaluable for the development of party-political work in the army, having discussed measures for the further strengthening of the leading role of the BCP in striving to carry out the decisions of the 8th Congress. These decisions have enormous significance for our whole party-political and command activities. Political organs have concentrated their attention on strengthening the working efficiency of army party organizations and on ensuring a leading role in combat and political training and discipline for all party members. All ideological work in the army is founded on the decisions of the 8th Congress of the BCP. The main emphasis in this work is placed on the Communist education of personnel and the ideological aspect of combat training and discipline.

The Bulgarian people and the peoples of the Soviet Union are permanently united by an indestructible, brotherly friendship, which was tempered in the fire of the common struggle. As Comrade N. S. Khrushchev emphasized at the workers meeting in Sofia on 19 May 1962, "The friendship of our peoples has a tradition of many centuries. They have repeatedly fought shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy. Russian troops and Bulgarian national guardsmen acted together for the liberation of Bulgaria from the yoke of the Ottoman Empire. The best sons and daughters of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria fought together against fascist invaders. However, our friendship reached its high point only after 9 September 1944, when the Bulgarian workers chose the path of socialist development. The Soviet-Bulgarian friendship became truly nation-wide, and there is now no force that could shatter it."

The brotherly friendship and cooperation between our peoples and Armed Forces continue to develop and grow stronger. In March 1948, the USSR and Bulgaria signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Our country is a member of the Warsaw Treaty. The BCP is educating soldiers, sergeants, and officers of the People's Army in the spirit of eternal love for the Soviet Union and indestructible military friendship with the USSR Armed Forces. Bulgarian soldiers are honorably fulfilling the historical precept of Georgi DIMITROV: "Our army must be like the Soviet Army. We

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

must have the same tasks, the same organization, the same arms, and the same military science. We must have complete understanding and one common language on all questions."

CPYRGHT

The development and strengthening of military solidarity between our armies was furthered by joint exercises, organized by the Command of the Warsaw Treaty Forces, the exchange visits of military delegations, and other measures.

A new stage in the development and strengthening of Bulgarian-Soviet friendship was marked by the visit of our party and government delegation, headed by Comrade T. ZHIVKOV, to Moscow in February of this year and the signing of a joint Bulgarian-Soviet declaration. Our relations with the Soviet Union are characterized by a further intensification and general strengthening of economic, political, and cultural cooperation. Our military cooperation is being strengthened and expanded on this basis.

The principal source of strength and power of our army is the fact that its organizer, leader, and educator is the Bulgarian Communist Party.

The BCP and its Central Committee headed by Comrade T. ZHIVKOV are constantly guiding the People's Army and are concerned with its training and education, the strengthening of discipline and the increase of its combat power.

The instructions of Comrade Todor ZHIVKOV and the decisions of the Politbureau of the Central Committee BCP, concerning the increased role of sergeants in the training and education of soldiers, the complete mastery of new weapons and combat equipment, the more direct and active supervision of commanders and staffs of troops, and the general improvement of party-political work, have served as the principal guide for the activities of army Communists, i. e., commanders and political workers.

The close ties between the army and the people are a life-giving source of strength and power for the army.

Our people's Army is based on the socialist system and its rapidly developing economy. The army is truly a part of the people in its spirit, composition, and tasks. It has no other interests but those of the people. The working people, on their party, surround the army with sincere love and warm concern. The moral and political unity of military personnel is an exhaustible source of inner strength and solidarity of the army.

One of the most important sources of strength and invincibility of our army is its inviolable friendship and military solidarity with the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Treaty Forces headed by the great Soviet Army, and the education of military personnel in the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The BCP has rejected as harmful and dangerous for the world Communist movement the statements and concepts of Chinese dogmatists and saboteurs

YRGHT "concerning reliance on one's own strength" in socialist building, and also concerning an independent military defense.

In our country, absolutely every sound-thinking individual is convinced that, without the fraternal and unselfish aid of the Soviet Union and the cooperation with other socialist countries, we would have been unable to achieve such great success in our socialist building within such a short period. With the exception of the Soviet Union, not a single country of the world socialist system could singlehandedly defend its socialist achievements and would lose its national independence in the event of imperialist aggression.

Our party sees an important condition of the strength and invincibility of the great cause of Communism in the unity of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. In his speech at Vratsa on 2 June, the day honoring the men who were killed fighting against Turkish slavery, capitalism, and fascism, Comrade Todor ZHIVKOV stressed that "in the friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union the Bulgarian people see the principal guarantee of preserving their freedom and national independence." Being convinced of this, the Bulgarian soldiers and all our people reject the malicious abuse and slander of the Chinese leaders against the Soviet Union and the leadership of the Central Committee of CPSU under Comrade N. S. Khrushchev.

For 20 years, the Bulgarian People's Army has stood firm, guarding the great victories of the party and following its militant course, and for 20 years the Bulgarian soldiers have guarded the borders of our beloved fatherland. Our soldiers are selflessly and ardently devoted to their socialist country, the People's Republic of Bulgaria; they are proud and happy to serve it. For the soldiers and commanders of the People's Army there is no duty more sacred than to be constantly linked by indissoluble bonds with the party and the people and to serve communist ideals selflessly. This is the source of the soldiers' enthusiasm, which was kindled by the wise words of the Central Committee of the party in its proclamation honoring the 20th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria: "Improve your combat and moral-political training, and achieve complete mastery of modern military science and technology! Be vigilant, promptly expose and ruthlessly suppress any attempt to disturb the peace and labor of the people, who are advancing confidently on the bright road of socialism and communism."

Devoted to their patriotic and international duty, the soldiers and commanders of our Armed Forces, together with their brothers -- soldiers of the Warsaw Treaty Forces -- headed by the Soviet Union, are prepared to retaliate with a shattering blow against imperialism, if the latter should dare to disturb the peace of our peoples.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

(Review of Journal Voyenny Vestnik)
by Lt Col L. SALTYKOV

CPYRGHT

Voyenny Vestnik is the oldest Soviet military journal. For 43 years it has carried on extensive work in the training and education of our officer cadres. The journal has been a true friend and assistant for officers. It has made definite contributions to the development of the theory of combined-arms combat and progressive methods of training and education and in the generalization of the experience of past wars.

The present-day role of the journal is especially important. As the result of the great growth of science and technology and changes in the economic and technical principles of war, a genuine revolution has taken place in military affairs. It encompasses the means of armed struggle, troop organization, methods of warfare, and methods of training and educating personnel.

Drastic changes in the character and methods of warfare demand a new approach to many problems of military affairs and the further development of military theory and practice. Under these conditions military journals have an exceptionally responsible role. As stressed by the Minister of Defense Mar SU R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY, they "can and must do much for the deep interpretation of the essence of the revolution in military affairs and the resulting concrete requirements for the training and education of personnel of the various arms and branches of the Armed Forces."

It is from this position that the work of the journal Voyenny Vestnik in recent times should be examined.

In 1960 Voyenny Vestnik underwent an important reorganization on the basis of which the periodic publications of the arms and special troops were combined. It became the common journal of the Ground Troops. Not only the purpose of the journal, but the structure, character, and volume of tasks to be performed changed as a result of the reorganization.

The tasks of the journal are many and varied. Unfortunately, the editors did not clearly and accurately set forth these tasks in the journal and did not reveal its program, even though there was a real need for an editorial statement following the reorganization. During a similar reorganization in 1927 the journal published an article entitled "From the Editors," which briefly but clearly defined the purpose and main tasks of the journal and set forth its initial aims.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
podrazdeleniye commanders of all arms and special troops of our ground troops in their everyday practical work. But this general task is many-sided. It includes the ideological education of officers and the improvement of their professional mastery, which in turn includes the thorough study of the theory of modern combined-arms combat, general military-technical training, special training, the mastery of progressive methods training and education, a detailed familiarity with foreign armies, etc.

How are these tasks being solved on the pages of the journal? In evaluating its work in general, it must be noted that recently the quality of materials being published has improved considerably.

First of all, it is to its credit that Voyenny Vestnik has not confined itself to narrow professional limits. It gives serious attention to general political questions. It actively propagandizes the decisions of the 22d Party Congress and the plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU and discusses important events in the life of the Soviet people. And this is completely justified. The professional training of an officer can not be separated from his ideological education.

While it is true that all materials on these questions published in the journal are not of equal value, the best are very beneficial and are well received by readers. In a number of cases the editors have found effective forms of presenting materials. For example, in the No 11 issue for 1961, under the heading "Delegates of the Congress Speak," there were published speeches of the delegates of the 22d Party Congress, including famous military chiefs, outstanding officers, scientists, and shock workers of communist labor.

The editors are giving much attention to propaganda of the decisions of the June 1963 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on questions of ideological work. But in this respect the journal should more frequently show what effect the decisions have had on improving combat training, strengthening military discipline, and further developing military theory. In this review it is impossible for us to examine the materials on military education published in the journal, but this matter is important and merits special analysis.

Considerable space in the journal is devoted to questions concerning the military-technical training of officers. It is well known that now, when revolutionary changes are taking place in military affairs in connection with the appearance of new equipment and new types of weapons, the importance of military-technical training has increased immeasurably, and this in turn requires a thorough knowledge of the principles of nuclear physics, mathematics, chemistry, and electronics. This fully

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Justifies the section of the journal entitled "In the World of Science and Technology." Thus, while in 1960 and 1961 a total of five articles were published in this section, there were four articles published in 1963. Their themes have become more timely and the content has acquired depth in a scientific respect.

In particular, such articles as "Lasers and Their Use" by M. KASENKOV (No 2, 1963), and "Destructive Factors of Nuclear Explosions and Protection Against Them" by V. LOGACHEV (No 2, 1964), attracted the attention of readers. We would like to see on the pages of the journal, in the near future, articles that are equal in scientific interest and equally well written, which would tell us about the use of the latest achievements of chemistry in relation to arms and combat equipment, and in relation to the development of military affairs as a whole.

Present-day officers must be familiar with the organization, armament, and tactics of the principal armies of capitalist countries. In this respect, Voyenny Vestnik has done a great deal. It regularly publishes materials on foreign armies, presents timely reports on all changes in the organization of troops and their operational tactics in different types of combat, and regularly provides information on new types of military equipment and arms.

One might only suggest that the materials on foreign armies devote more attention to methods and means of combat training of probable enemies.

At present the Soviet Army has loyal friends -- the armies of fraternal socialist countries. The exchange of experience with these armies is extremely significant. Therefore, Voyenny Vestnik deserves praise for its initiative in organizing a special section under the heading "Reports From Our Friends." It would not hurt other journals to follow this example.

Voyenny Vestnik has permanent sections pertaining to the arms and special troops. A considerable amount of useful material has been published on questions concerning fire and weapons. Rocketeer officers, artillery men, engineer-technicians, signal men, officers of PVO troops, and other specialists will find material of interest to them on the pages of the journal.

However, the most important questions, of course, are those concerning tactics and training of personnel.

General problems of modern combined-arms combat, tactics of tank and motorized rifle podrazdeleniya; and questions of reconnaissance and protection against weapons of mass destruction are discussed in the section entitled "Tactics." With regard to volume and quantity of published materials, this is the leading section of the journal. It publishes from 80 to 100 articles and notes annually. In addition, materials on tactics of podrazdeleniya of the arms and special troops may be found in other sections of the journal.

As a result, the total percentage of articles on tactics is very high. They include theoretical articles, reports from tactical field exercises, articles analyzing specific examples of actions by podrazdeleniya and their commanders during exercises, recollections of participants in the Great Patriotic War, individual combat episodes, etc.

However, regardless of the various forms of these articles, they all have the same purpose, which is mainly practical, i.e. to assist commanders of podrazdeleniya how best to organize and direct operations during exercises, and in the final analysis, in battle.

This practical trend of the materials on tactics also reveals itself in the subject specialization of individual issues of the journal. For example, one issue may be devoted mainly to combat actions in winter, another to marches and meeting engagements, and a third to attacks from the march.

As an example, let us look at the No 3 issue of the journal for 1964. It is devoted to problems of marches and meeting engagements. Accordingly, the Section "Tactics" includes the following articles: "Marches and Meeting Engagements of a Motorized Rifle Battalion," "Reconnaissance Group on the March," "Technical Support of the March of a Tank Battalion," and the tactical problem "A Tank Battalion in the Advance Guard." The section includes only one article not related to the specialized subject and one commentary on a previously published article.

Other sections also include articles on marches and meeting engagements, and the issue has a total of 10 articles on this subject.

The subject specialization of this journal has been practiced since 1961. This has, undoubtedly, been of some positive value. It is now easier and handier for officers to use the materials of the journal in preparing for a study course on a certain subject. It is no longer necessary to dig in numerous issues in search for a required article.

With this order of publication, better possibilities are provided for studying problems of the organization and conduct of different combat operations, both in detail and as a complex.

COPYRIGHT

These are the positive aspects of subject specialization for individual issues of the journal. However, if this were to be the only accepted principle, one has to admit that it has some serious shortcomings. In our opinion, it would hardly be expedient to make all issues of the journal into collections of articles on one particular subject. Such a strict division of combat into its individual types results in the fact that the common characteristics of combined-arms combat, as an aggregate of its various types, are lost from sight. However, in the case of modern warfare, the variety and continuous, rapid alternation of different types of combat are a characteristic phenomenon. A podrazdeleniye may complete a march, then it will have to conduct a meeting engagement or attack the defending enemy from the march; in case of success, the podrazdeleniye will pursue the enemy, cross zones of radioactive or chemical contamination, force water barriers, then conduct another meeting engagement or break through the defense. In case of necessity, the podrazdeleniye may have to turn to the defensive temporarily to repulse strong counterattacks. In the past war, such alternation of various types of combat operations was usually done gradually, during a relatively long period of time; now, however, the change would be much more dynamic. It may often happen that during a 24-hour period a podrazdeleniye will have to conduct different types of combat, changing rapidly from one to the other.

In view of this character of operations performed by podrazdeleniya, tactical exercises and training are conducted as a complex, with quick alternation of different operations.

Therefore, the commander of a podrazdeleniye, who is preparing for exercises, now requires not only material discussing one particular type of combat, such as for example, attack from the march, or defense, but other materials which would discuss the whole complex of problems connected with the forthcoming operations. Unfortunately, such materials are almost never published on the pages of the journal. One of the reasons for this is, apparently, the subject specialization of each issue.

It is not surprising that some important subjects have been overlooked by the editors. For example, during a long period there were no articles discussing the organization and conduct by podrazdeleniya of such a widely known type of offensive action as the pursuit of a withdrawing enemy.

It is quite justified that the journal has given its main attention to the offensive. This corresponds to the spirit of our military doctrine and the combat capabilities of the troops. However, it would be a great mistake to ignore questions of defense in tactics, particularly in the tactics of podrazdeleniya, where it has retained an important role.

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
be avoided under modern conditions. In the course of combat operations, including the development of attack, troops will often find it more to their advantage to repulse strong counterattacks of the enemy by defense, and then to continue the offensive. Defense may also have to be employed in the event of the unsuccessful outcome of a meeting engagement.

Therefore, one should not underestimate defense. However, apparently the editors of Voyenny Vestnik have followed this road. While several special issues of the journal were devoted to problems of defense in 1961 and 1962, there was no such special issue in 1963, and none has been planned for the current year.

Only two articles on problems of defense were published in 1963, i.e., "Defense of a Tank Battalion" by A. KISLYAKOV (No 12) and "Defense in the Mountains" by A. DOROFYEV (No 11). However, the practical experience of troop exercises has shown that most of the problems not clearly understood by officers concerned matters of defensive combat. Two articles a year concerning defensive combat is, undoubtedly, not enough for a journal like Voyenny Vestnik. We believe that one of the causes of this abnormal situation, in addition to other reasons, is the extremely rigid uniformity of subject matter in individual issues.

This situation has resulted in the fact that, for example, on the subject of marches and meeting engagements the journal publishes the same kind of articles year after year, which duplicate each other in many respects. Apparently, things are done according to the principle: "Once you have started something, you can't stop." Once the special subject of an issue has been designated, you have to supply suitable material, whether you want to or not.

Obviously, it would be most expedient to have only a few issues a year with a specialized subject matter and to select actually important and necessary materials for this purpose. Also, one should not repeat the same subject specialization of journal issues, year after year. In the remaining (non-specialized) issues it is advisable to publish materials on various subjects, but always deeply informative.

What is the quality of articles on tactics published in the journal?

If we evaluate them from the point of view of practical application, we must admit that most of them answer their purpose both in content and in form. Their positive aspects are the practical value and specific nature of the material, and the wide utilization of experience gained in recent troop exercises. The materials on tactics contain a large amount of practical advice and recommendations, which are very helpful to commanders of podrazdeleniya. For example, such recommendations are

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGHI

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

contained in the following articles: "A Man is a Combat Document" (No 8, 1963), "Coordination in a Tank Company" (No 10, 1963), "Defense of a Tank Battalion" (No 12, 1963), "March and Meeting Engagement of a Motorized Rifle Battalion" (No 3, 1964), and others.

However, at the same time it should be noted that there is a certain stereotyped pattern in using the experiences gained in exercises. Most of the material is based on the description and analysis of one specific example.

Let us look at the articles published in No 10, 1963. The first article in the "Tactics" section is entitled "Skill and Determination Will Win." The article carefully analyzes an airborne landing made during one of the exercises of a rifle company under the command of Capt MASLOVSKIY.

The second article, "An Amphibious Landing," describes the actions of a rifle company under the command of Capt MARTIM'YANOV during an amphibious landing, and the next article, "Coordination in a Tank Company," analyzes in equal detail the actions during an exercise of a tank company under the command of Capt RASTORGUYEV.

Three articles in one issue are built on the same plan. Isn't that too monotonous? One should not forget that the journal must be not only informative, but also interesting. However, this same pattern is characteristic for many other issues.

Aside from monotony, which palls on the readers, the result of this uniformity in planning articles is that they become an analysis of specific, but individual examples. It is not surprising that the authors of such articles usually limit themselves to an evaluation of whether the actions of podrazdeleniya and their commanders conform to certain recommendations contained in military regulations. However, the purpose of the journal is much more comprehensive than merely to acquaint its readers with military regulations. The journal must, above all, explain the reason why such recommendations have been made in the regulations, so that each officer may correctly understand and constructively apply them in different situations.

Unfortunately, the editors have given little attention to this aspect in recent issues.

The positive quality of articles on tactics of motorized rifle and tank podrazdeleniya is their discussion of specific actions; however, the materials on tactics of podrazdeleniya of the arms and special troops are merely a restatement of general regulations or a description of actions without an attempt at thorough analysis. As an example, we might point out the article "Engineer Reconnaissance in the Area of a Nuclear Explosion" (No 7, 1963).

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
The most characteristic feature of modern warfare is the fact that podrazdeleniya of all arms and special troops are closely tied together into one indivisible whole. In this manner they should be analyzed in the articles on tactics. The fact that journals of the arms and special troops have been merged in Voyenny Vestnik particularly favors this type of approach. However, all possibilities have not been fully utilized. There is a certain lack of connection between sections of the journal. Therefore, the materials on tactics of podrazdeleniya of the arms and special troops are often insufficiently coordinated with the character of actions of motorized rifle and tank podrazdeleniya.

Actually, the first attempt to correct this lack of coordination was made in the article "March and Meeting Engagement of a Motorized Rifle Battalion" (No 3, 1964), which makes a comprehensive analysis of actions in the advance guard of a motorized rifle battalion, a tank company, an artillery battalion, and a combat engineer podrazdeleniye.

In our opinion, such comprehensive articles should occupy a leading position among materials of an applied nature.

The article "A Company on the March and in a Meeting Engagement" (No 5, 1954) once again gives a description of one particular example in the actions of a company. Having shown a successful initiative, the editors should follow up on it. Naturally, this form should not become a stereotyped pattern either.

In summing up the above, it may be said that Voyenny Vestnik has on the whole been successful in the solution of problems designed to assist commanders of podrazdeleniya in their daily tactical training, although even here there is room for improvement.

However, it would be wrong to restrict the journal to such problems alone. In 1927, the editors emphasized quite correctly in the article referred to above that the main purpose of the journal was to assist commanders of podrazdeleniya in their daily work, but that this did not mean that "the journal would fail to state general problems of military structure." If this was correct at that time, it would be even more so now, when radical changes are taking place in military theory as a result of the revolution in military affairs.

It is characteristic that in answer to a question from a group of editors of military newspapers and journals Mar SU R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY, Minister of Defense USSR, placed the emphasis on problems of military theory, involving propaganda and interpretation. He particularly stressed the fact that "one must act more boldly in breaking down and discarding everything which hinders the creative development of

CPYRGHT

progressive military thought and the formation of correct, innovational and useful to publish constructive, animated discussions of current problems of military theory and practice, to be followed by detailed, expert conclusions and generalizations. It is important that these discussions include the participation of as many as possible military men, who are concerned with theory and practice, i.e., those connected with scientific establishments and military educational institutions, as well as those serving with troops."

Of course, a journal such as Voyenny Vestnik should not be permitted to become a purely military-theoretical journal. However, it should also not be reduced to a narrow practical purpose.

Officers, especially the younger ones, need not only practical advice, but also a deep understanding of the nature and character of modern combined-arms combat, a good knowledge of the principles of modern tactics, and a correct understanding of its laws of development.

The present commanders of battalions, companies, and platoons will in the future become commanders of *chasti* and *soyedineniya*, and some of them may even become important military leaders. It is very important to instill in them, at this early stage, an interest in military theory and a desire to gain a deep understanding of it. Our command cadres are not just mastering a trade, but a military art.

It is characteristic that the readers themselves have shown the greatest interest in such articles. This has been confirmed, in particular, by the wide response to the article by Col I. SEMENOV, "Tactics of *Podrazdeleniya* in Modern Combat" (No 2, 1963). This article was quoted as an example at many readers' conferences.

A positive evaluation should be given, on the whole, to such articles as "Foresight in Battle" by R. SIMONYAN (No 4, 1964), and "Combat Capabilities of a Company and Its Role in Modern Combat" by M. DESHKO and I. SEMENOV (No 5, 1964).

A serious shortcoming of the journal is the fact that such articles appear very seldom (usually in the form of discussions). It may suffice to say that, during the past few years, out of 80-100 articles on tactics published each year in the journal only 8-10 articles were concerned with theory, and these too were mostly devoted to individual problems and not to general problems of tactics.

In some measure, the situation is improved by the fact that the journal regularly publishes discussions of some problems of tactics. For example, in 1961 and 1962 discussions of the following articles were organized: "Defense of Rifle *Podrazdeleniya*" (published in No 10,

1961) and "Offensive of Rifle Podrazdeleniya" (published in No 11, 1963) and "Tactics of Podrazdeleniya in Modern Combat" was discussed.

CPYRGT The promotion of such discussions contributes to the correct solution of complex problems of modern tactics. It also instills in the officers desire for critical analysis and independent evaluation of some aspects of military affairs. This is a higher form of perfecting the tactical skill of officers then, for example, a simple reading of articles and the use of recommendations made in them.

There is no doubt that the effectiveness of a discussion depends on the quality of its organization, on the importance of the problems presented in the article to be discussed, and the editors' ability to sort out the frequently contradictory responses from readers and to draw the correct conclusions in summarizing a discussion.

In this respect, we believe that the discussion of the article "Tactics of Podrazdeleniya in Modern Combat" was a definite success of the journal. The article raised several urgent problems, which had received a contradictory interpretation in our military literature, including the following topics: the expediency of refraining from dividing marches into normal and forced marches; the order of organizing reconnaissance and security on a march; thoughts on the character of operations of podrazdeleniya in meeting engagements, during an offensive against a defending enemy and on the defensive; and others.

In publishing the article, the editors gave the readers enough time to study it and express their opinions. In three issues of the journal (Nos 7, 8, and 9 of 1963), the editors published 10 comments from readers, and No 10 of the journal contained a review of the remaining comments. In the first issue of the journal for 1964, the editors summarized the results of the discussion in a detailed, well-reasoned article.

Undoubtedly, such a discussion not only aroused the interest of readers, but also helped considerably to broaden their tactical outlook, which is very important under present conditions. We hope that the journal will continue to publish such discussions in the future. In addition to special discussions, it would be desirable for authors of the remaining articles to express their opinions with regard to statements of other authors and conduct arguments with one another, supplying well-founded reasons for their conclusions.

The revolution in military affairs does not signify by any means that the experience of the last war has become obsolete and that the assimilation of this experience can add nothing to the development of modern tactics. In his own time, V. I. Lenin emphasized: "We cannot learn to solve problems with new methods today, if we have not learned

from yesterday's experience to recognize the mistakes of the old methods." Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
(words, vol 55, page 70) This study applies to the present situation in military affairs.

CPYRGHT
We must also take into consideration that many methods of operations, which were characteristic for the last war, will find their application in modern warfare. However, they must be used in conformity with the new conditions and with the changes in the character of combat and the means of conducting it.

A constructive assimilation of experience gained in the last war is also very important because of the fact that many officers, who are now in command of podrazdeleniya, have no combat experience. Their number will gradually increase. It is very important for them to become familiar with the military past.

Voyenny Vestnik has done much to promote the assimilation and utilization of experience gained in the Great Patriotic War. The journal regularly publishes recollections of our outstanding military leaders, generals and officers who took part in the war. The journal published interesting collections of articles in honor of the 20th anniversaries of battles of the Volga, of Kursk, and of the Dnepr, of the victories of Leningrad and of the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy operation. There have been many descriptions of instructive combat episodes, and the authors of tactical articles frequently refer to examples from past war experience. In this respect, therefore, the journal is to be commended.

However, there is one aspect in assimilating the experience of the Great Patriotic War which has been largely neglected. Any example, even the most instructive one, is nothing but an illustration. A single example is not yet a basis for research and scientifically founded deductions. Therefore, without in any way belittling the importance of using examples to illustrate certain situations, it is hoped that the journal and its authors will devote themselves to a more thorough analysis of the development of tactics and its individual elements during the past war and that they will determine methods of operations which could be used constructively at the present time, not on the basis of isolated facts, but as a result of careful analysis of all aspects.

The development of military theory and the perfection of the officers' professional skill are, of course, not the ultimate aim. The solution of these tasks must further the fulfillment of the major aim of our army, i.e., to achieve, in every possible way, an improvement in the combat readiness of troops. One of the most important elements of combat readiness is combat training. Therefore, the requirements and conclusions of modern military-scientific thought must be applied persistently to the practical training and education of personnel. Theory and practice must be combined into a single whole.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

CPYRGH

In analyzing the contents of the journal, one must conclude that the combat training and education of personnel are in the center of its attention. This is the leading theme of the journal, both in regard to the quantity of articles and their singleness of purpose. It should also be noted that most of the materials on tactics in other sections of the journal are closely connected with the main theme.

In the present survey, we are unable to discuss all aspects of solving this many-sided problem in the journal, and we shall mention only a few of them, mainly those concerned with improving the quality of training.

Every year, the first issue of the journal opens with an editorial which sums up the results in the work of soldiers of the Ground Forces during the past year and announces the tasks for the new training year.

Such an editorial, entitled "Toward New Achievements," appeared in the first issue of the journal for the current year. It emphasizes the inseparable connection between ideological and organizational work and draws particular attention to the role of combat readiness under present conditions.

The first editorial, as it were, sets the tone for all following articles. High quality of combat training and, consequently, the combat readiness of troops are impossible without a thorough study of regulations and their strict execution by the personnel. It is quite justified, therefore, that the lead editorial in the same issue of the journal is followed by another editorial entitled "The Requirements of Regulations Must Form the Basis of Training and Education." The article explains the role of regulations in training and education of personnel and draws attention to some aspects of the requirements established by regulations. However, unfortunately, in many respects this article, which is not bad on the whole, repeats some of the principles expressed in the first editorial published in that issue. For example, it discusses the need to refrain from stereotypes, the importance of mastering combat equipment and weapons, the significance of improving gunnery training, the importance of good drill, etc. Undoubtedly, repetition is essential to learning, but in this case it would be better to avoid it. Otherwise one gets the impression that both articles were insufficiently coordinated.

There are many factors determining the quality of training. However, the principal factor at this time is undoubtedly concerned with training methods.

The revolution in means and methods of combat operations must naturally result in radical changes in the methods of training and education of troops.

CPYRGHT

The new combat equipment and arms are a great deal more complex than the ones existing only a few years ago. Consequently, it is more difficult to master them. This fully applies to the mastery of new methods of warfare. A mechanical increase of the time for training will not do any good. Figuratively speaking, it is now very important to increase the efficiency of combat training, i.e., to achieve higher results with minimum expenditures. This is impossible without using new means and methods of training.

Therefore, the new, leading methods are the main factor in improving the quality of combat training. The lead article "Toward New Achievements" correctly stresses that "the training and education of soldiers is a complex task, requiring from the officers great knowledge, high culture, and a mastery of methods."

Let us see how the journal itself takes part in the elaboration of new training methods and how it helps officers to improve their mastery of methods.

In this respect, the principal task of our entire military press, including the journal Voyenny Vestnik, consists in the generalization analysis, and publication of progressive methods in the training and education of personnel.

From an analysis of the journal's contents one must conclude that serious attention has been given to the propaganda of progressive methods. In 1962, a special issue, No 12, was entirely devoted to this subject. However, such a concentration of generalization in one issue proved to be wrong. What this generalization amounted to was one single "campaign"; it was mostly a summing up of results, without showing the development of new, progressive methods of training and education. Many articles of the issue suffer from excessive eulogizing. It is true, however, that even progressive methods must be evaluated critically, without hesitating to point out the difficulties and mistakes which had to be overcome by commanders, as well as party and Komsomol organizations, on the way to the achievement of high end results.

It would also be better to generalize and publicize progressive methods not just once a year, but from day to day.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1963 the editors used a different approach. Beginning with the first issue and in almost every following issue, the journal published a selection of articles concerning outstanding podrazdeleniya of different arms and special troops. This made it possible to discuss progressive methods in the course of one year in a more systematic manner. Another good feature was that many selections of articles were preceded by introductory articles by noted

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
CPYRGHT military leaders. This emphasized once again how much importance is given in our army to the publicizing of progressive methods and helped commanders and party-political workers to concentrate on the most important aspects of these methods. The publication of selections of material made it possible to show the different aspects of the work of commanders, and party and Komsomol organizations of leading podrazdeleniya. Outstanding officers had the opportunity to give an account of their work. and journalists also wrote reports about the officers' methods.

The most satisfactory selections of material concerned leading motorized rifle and tank battalions (No 11), an engineer-technical company (No 7), and a leading landing force company (No 8).

Some of the best articles on progressive methods are filled with facts and vivid examples. One can say many words about the need to use different forms for developing creative, intelligent initiative in subordinate officers, without stirring the readers' imagination. The article by M. YEPISHKIN, "The Strength Lies in the Collective" (No 11, 1963), cites an example showing how Maj P. MITIN, commander of a motorized rifle battalion, taught Capt V. SYROYEGIN, company commander, a lesson on the correct choice of a line of defense; this example is more impressive than wordy explanations. However, the same article describes the role of a party organization in general, conventional phrases: "The party organizations decide all complex questions placed before them with expert understanding." This is followed by a list of names of party organization leaders and of soldiers admitted to the party. The author of the article was unable to explain, however, what actually constituted the practical help given by the party organization to the commander in forming and educating a united collective.

We had a reason for citing this example from a fairly good article which was included in one of the best selections. General statements and "phrases for the sake of phrases" are particularly out of place in articles on progressive methods. The editors should be very exacting in regard to such articles.

Unfortunately, articles on progressive methods also have other shortcomings. Even though they are written about different podrazdeleniya, they often repeat one another. Frequently, the praise given to leading servicemen detracts from the essence of the progressive methods used; it prevents the author from fully explaining the training methods in general and in regard to particular training subjects.

Moreover, during the past year the same strict demarcation existed between progressive methods used by different podrazdeleniya of the arms and special troops, as had been the case in the previous year. Only in that year the materials on all outstanding podrazdeleniya had been collected in one issue and this time they were distributed over several

issues. As a result, some problems which applied equally to all podrazdeleniya were repeated several times, while the specific problems often were of no interest to officers of other arms.

During the current year, the journal has once more changed the form of presenting materials on progressive methods. It now publishes the generalized experience of several outstanding podrazdeleniya on one particular subject of training. For example, issue No 2 contained articles on progressive methods of training paratroopers, while issue No 3 contained a similar article on rifle training of a rifle company.

It is noted that the articles have become more purposeful and that their description of methods has improved considerably. As an example, we may refer to the articles "A Solid Foundation," and "In a Paratrooper Garrison" (No 2); "Makes Use of All Possibilities" and "Devotion to Work, Search, and Innovations" (No 3).

This form of propaganda of progressive methods is therefore quite justified. However, in our opinion, it should not become a routine matter. In addition to such selections of articles on a special subject, one should publish from time to time comprehensive selections concerning one outstanding podrazdeleniye, similar to those published in 1963. Or, one may select a form such as the regular publication of reports from the same podrazdeleniye during the period of one year. This would make it possible to report and analyze progressive methods without any delay. Or, for example, one might publish the diary notes of an outstanding officer.

In general, the forms of presenting material may vary greatly, and the editors should continue to select the best ones, without making it a matter of routine.

The generalization and propaganda of progressive methods in a journal is not restricted to material in special issues. There are some elements of it in the remaining articles, particularly in those concerning detailed discussions of methods.

However, the journal has another serious shortcoming of the same order, as mentioned before in our discussion of articles on tactics. While the editors have published numerous and often quite successful articles devoted to the generalization and propaganda of individual new methods, too little attention has been given so far to the study and assimilation of all accumulated experience in the use of methods. The theoretical principles of modern methods of training and education are very rarely discussed in articles. However, the time has come to shift the emphasis from individual cases to generalizations. After all, this is the only journal which is in a position to do so.

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3

Another serious shortcoming in the work of the journal is the fact that until now it has merely been publicizing progressive methods, but has not been active enough in trying to introduce such methods in practical training. The party teaches us that the most important thing is to introduce progressive methods into practice. A journal should not merely make recommendations. It should report on its pages how these progressive methods, which have been discussed, are applied to practice by the troops. Also, in the event such methods are not being introduced in some podrazdeleniya, it would do no harm to publish some critical comments. However, in either case, one should not merely cite examples, but present a thorough analysis of the actual situation and help officers to introduce progressive methods into the daily practice of their work.

One of the main indices of the quality of combat training is the state of field training. It is quite correct that the journal has given this subject constant attention. In 1963, it published several articles which deserved the readers' attention, such as "Skill is Forged in the Field" (No 7) and "The State of Field Training of Officer Candidates" (No 9).

Now, as never before, training and education are closely related. The journal has published many articles on educational themes. Unfortunately, their quality is by no means uniform. For example, No 1 of 1963 published an article by V. KONONENKO entitled "Authority and Position," and No 12 of the same year contained an article by V. SOSHNEV, entitled "To Be a Friend and an Exacting Commander." The subjects and contents of both articles overlap to a considerable extent, and both of them expound correct principles. But what a difference between them! The first article attracts attention because of its tone of sincerity; it is like a talk with an older, more experienced friend. The second article will hardly inspire any emotion whatsoever in the reader. It is a collection of correct, but well known truths, moderately seasoned with quotations or simply references to high authorities.

Articles on education must be written with heartfelt sincerity and must express trust in the readers and their ability to figure things out by themselves. One should be a friend of the reader, and not a dry mentor. Things of the soul [i.e. human relationships] must be discussed in a warm, sincere manner. Of course, instructions are also necessary, but not in such a delicate matter.

Some articles discuss questions of training and education apart from one another. However, the main purpose of Voyenny Vestnik should be to illustrate education in the process of training. The June 1963 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee also drew attention to this need for close connection between education and training. Here we call attention to an interesting selection of articles under the heading "Training and Education" in issue No 1 for 1964. We would like to see such selections more

CPYRGHT

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090003-3
frequently on the pages of the journal. This form is used by commanders of podrazdeleniya, similar to the one entitled "Where There is a Will, There Is Success," by Lt Col V. VOYEVODIN, commander of a tank battalion.

From time to time the journal publishes articles on important questions, such as the strengthening of one-man command, the maintenance of high discipline, and others. These questions deserve constant attention.

To further the improvement in the training and education of soldiers, the editors should not hesitate to publish sharply critical articles, followed by reports on the measures taken to correct the situation. This will only help to increase the authority of the journal with the troops.

In concluding this review, I would like to make a few more comments and suggestions. For some reason, the journal has neglected a form of publication which includes answers to interesting questions by readers, i.e. the publication of articles in the form of consultations or answers to questions sent to the editors.

There has recently been a considerable improvement in the literary style and language of most of the articles. However, in this respect there are still many shortcomings. The principal shortcoming is probably the fact that all articles in the journal are written in the same manner. The authors are different, but the language is the same. Some kind of an average standard has been established. However, even military articles require not only a literate style, but a vivid, graphic language. One should not hesitate to use apt proverbs or vivid comparisons.

The journal has also established a certain standard with regard to the volume of published material. Of course, one should not criticize the desire to enable the largest possible number of authors to publish their articles, but one should not forget the difference between a simple informative report from the training fields and a theoretical article.

A campaign must be waged against wordiness, but not so that it would detract from the arguments presented by the authors in support of their opinions.

On the whole, the journal Voyenny Vestnik has done a great deal. However, there is still much that remains to be done, since it must meet the requirements of modern military theory and practice.

* * *