

CIA FDD TRANS NO 924

SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL

JOURNAL VOYENNAYA MYSL', NO 11, 1964

30 JUNE 1965

FDD TRANS NO 924

1 OF 2



FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLATION

Number 924

30 June 1965

SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL,
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SOVIET MILITARY THEORETICAL JOURNAL
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Notes on Source

Voyennaya Mysl' (Military Thought) is a monthly organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministry's Military Publishing House, Moscow. This translation is from Issue No 11, November 1964, which was signed for the press 23 October 1964. Articles marked "not translated" above are not considered of sufficient interest to warrant dissemination.

CPYRGHT

by Maj Gen Kh. DZHELAKHOV

The term strategic reserves is commonly understood to refer to operational ob'yedineniya of various branches of armed forces, soyedineniya and chast' of arms, reserves of nuclear weapons and rockets, and various types of equipment, conventional armament, shells, and other materiel and technical means which do not have a definite operational function and are at the disposal of the supreme command of the armed forces of a country.

Along with the main forces and means mobilized at the beginning of a war, strategic reserves are located on the territory of a given country or neighboring countries and also immediately in the theater of military operations. In the latter case these reserves will usually consist of combined-arms and tank ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya, chast' and soyedineniya of other branches and arms (aviation, artillery, engineer, motor transport, etc.) and can be designated for use, as a rule, in a given theater of military operations. These reserves may have stockpiles of nuclear weapons, rocket means, conventional armament, and other materiel.

Past world wars clearly demonstrated the importance of reserves in general, and in particular the importance of strategic reserves in a theater of military operations. For example, the German attack on Paris in 1914 failed because the German Supreme Command on the Western (French) Front did not have strong strategic reserves for reinforcing and developing the attack to the Marne River and parrying the strikes of the Sixth French Army north of Paris. In 1942 the German fascist command's lack of large reserves on the Don and in the North Caucasus during the battle on the Volga prevented them from quickly beginning an operation to liberate encircled groupings with strikes from without and from creating a solid defensive front to prevent the further exploitation of the success of Soviet troops in southwestern and western directions.

At the same time, past wars have shown that large operational and strategic reserves have had a decisive effect on the outcome of an operation or campaign. For example, in Picardy in 1918 the defending Allied troops had 32 divisions in the first and second lines of defense and 18 soyedineniya in the reserve of the armies and front. During the operation the Allies were reinforced by 43 divisions, enabling them to halt the German offensive.

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Large strategic reserves were formed and deployed in the vicinity of Moscow in 1941, defeated the German fascist tank assault groups threatening the flanks of the Western Front and then supported a general counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow. There was a similar situation during the battle on the Volga. In the summer of 1942 our Southwestern and Voronezh fronts, having suffered heavy losses, could not withstand the enemy offensive. Owing to timely measures taken by the Stavka of the Supreme Command, the Stalingrad and Don fronts were re-formed and the Southwestern Front was restored through the use of strategic reserves. The presence of large strategic reserves in the vicinity of the Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943 made it possible for the Soviet Army to repel strong thrusts of attacking groupings of German Fascist troops north of Belgorod and in the vicinity of Ponyra and, after a brief operational pause, launch a counteroffensive and victoriously conclude the summer campaign of 1943.

In certain operations of past world wars the relative strength of strategic reserves was extremely high. For example, in the aforementioned operation in Picardy they comprised 86 percent of the total strength of the divisions originally at the front. Their relative strength was particularly great in several operations of the Great Patriotic War. In the battles on distant approaches to Moscow on 1 October 1941, there were approximately the same number of divisions in the six armies of the Reserve Front as there were in the armies operating on the Western Front. During the first six months of the war the air forces of the Western Front received from the reserve of the Supreme Command reinforcements amounting to more than twice their original number of aviation regiments.

Thus the experience of past wars and especially World War II shows that inflicting losses on troops operating on a front does not necessarily achieve victory since the presence of large strategic reserves in general and in the theater of military operations in particular promotes the swift restoration of a strategic front of battle and usually brings about a certain equality in forces.

The presence of large reserves during offensive operations facilitates the intensification of efforts, swift and deep penetration into a defensive formation, the defeat of its groupings, and the achievement of the objectives of the operation.

Even without going into detailed research on the ratio of forces and means operating in a certain area of a given theater of military operations to the reserves brought into that area from the depths of a country, it is easy to see the completely logical tendency to increase the role of strategic reserves in armed conflict in the last war.

... in modern warfare? Isn't the aforementioned tendency to increase their role in armed conflict obsolete and unsuitable in our time?

In modern conditions, in various parts of the world and particularly in those near the socialist camp, the aggressive circles of imperialism have created military blocks with armed forces numbering in the millions, constructed numerous military bases on their own and foreign territory, and are maintaining in full combat readiness strategic nuclear rocket weapons, atomic submarines armed with Polaris missiles, strategic and tactical aviation, aircraft carriers and submarine strike forces, ground troops, and other means for armed conflict so that they can unleash a war against the countries of socialism and other peace-loving nations at any time, without deploying large additional forces and means.

Moreover, in the military doctrines of aggressive countries it is recognized that existing forces will be inadequate and that with the beginning of a war large reserves will be necessary for intensifying efforts, replacing losses, and carrying out various missions during the initial period of the war. These reserves will be created by mobilizing the forces and means in the depth of the continental part of a given theater of military operations (TMO) or by bringing them across the ocean from other continents. They may be used for reinforcing the first strategic echelon, for creating reserves in the theater of military operations, or for establishing a second strategic echelon to carry out subsequent strategic missions in a given TMO. Therefore, in examining the problems of combating strategic reserves we have in mind all large forces and means of the various branches and arms which will arrive in a given TMO with the outbreak of a war, regardless of their operational-strategic designation.

Socialist countries, carrying on a constant struggle against the threat of war and for the peaceful settlement of all disputes between nations, must reckon with the presence of aggressive, armed-to-the-teeth circles of imperialism. Therefore, the countries of socialism and especially the Soviet Union, in order to defend themselves and restrain an aggressor, must maintain in peacetime adequate and fully combat ready forces designated for repelling a surprise nuclear-rocket attack by the probable enemy and delivering an immediate retaliatory strike. Also, Soviet military science considers that final victory over an enemy, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing a war, requires numerous strategic reserves having various designations.

The necessity for these reserves can be found in the very nature of nuclear war. The extensive destruction and heavy losses resulting from the use of nuclear weapons will disrupt the system of operational organization of troops in several theaters of military operations or strategic sectors. To prevent the enemy from exploiting this and destroying friendly groupings piecemeal it is necessary to quickly bring in reserves. At the same time the fast-moving nature of the development of offensive operations causes sharp changes in the situation, which in turn make it necessary to bring large strategic, as well as operational, reserves into the battle.

Intensifying strategic efforts by employing strategic reserves or the second strategic echelon is almost important factor in waging a successful struggle to achieve strategic objectives under modern conditions. As previously noted, strategic reserves in a TMO may be comprised of ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya of the various branches and arms (ground, airborne, aviation, artillery, engineer, and others). They can be used in the following missions: launching a counteroffensive or exploiting success on the main axis; relieving operational ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya which have suffered heavy losses; reinforcing rocket-artillery, tank, and aviation groupings; repelling thrusts and destroying large operational forces of the enemy; threatening flanks of attacking strategic groupings, reinforcing large airborne forces operating deep in the enemy rear area; operations on new strategic axes; and the achievement of other objectives.

To carry out these missions during armed conflict in a theater of military operations the belligerents use strategic reserves along with the wide employment of nuclear weapons. They try to maintain a superiority over the enemy or at least create a favorable correlation of forces by destroying reserves with nuclear strikes and isolating the enemy's strategic groupings in the TMO from the rear area and preventing the arrival of fresh reserves.

The problems of combating strategic reserves is not new. This can be seen in the experience of World War II. For example, one of the most important problems of the US and British air forces in preparing for the Normandy operation in 1944 was the disorganization of communications in the rear area of German fascist troops with the objective of disrupting the normal supply of materiel and reserves to German groupings located on the Northern Coast of France. The plan for Operation Overlord included strikes against railroad systems of France and Belgium within a radius of approximately 300 kilometers of the landing area and the destruction of railroad

and motor vehicle bridges over the Seine and Loire rivers. This would disrupt the normal transfer of reserves to the German fascist troops in Normandy. As a result of the air raids by the Allied forces 24 bridges were destroyed on the Seine alone. During the landing and the following period of battle on the beachhead Allied aviation isolated the main areas of combat action from German reserves in the inner regions of France, from the East, and from the coast of the Straits of Dover.

However, there was still no organized and systematic combat with strategic reserves in World War II. The aforementioned missions were frequently accomplished in passing, with the achievement of air superiority and during operations designed to undermine the economic potential of the enemy.

The fact that combat with strategic reserves did not have a wide scope in World War II even though its role was recognized is explained, on one hand, by the lack of powerful strategic reserves by both sides in the theaters of operations in all phases of the war, and on the other hand, by the small numbers and relative weakness of strategic aviation among the warring nations and the presence of targets more important than the reserves. The main reason was the lack of means for delivering deep operational-strategic strikes.

It must be said that combat action against strategic reserves in theaters of military operations during World War II was of a sporadic nature.

Under modern conditions the boundaries of continental theaters of military operations have expanded greatly. As is well known, all continents are bordered by wide expanses of ocean and sea: for example, Europe is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea; the Near East and the Middle East, by the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean; and Southeast Asia, by the Indian and Pacific oceans. Fresh forces will be brought in from remote areas of a given TMO and from without by air and sea transportation. It is therefore completely logical that combat with enemy reserves will take place not only within the formal boundaries of a given TMO, but also far beyond its borders, on the ocean and in the air.

The destructive nature of nuclear war, the huge losses of personnel and materiel, and the wide scope of operations in the theaters of military operations increase the role of strategic reserves and makes them an important factor in restoring forces or intensifying efforts in general. Moreover, modern means objectively create suitable conditions for independent operations against strategic reserves. The existence of nuclear-rocket

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tion with high speeds and altitudes and increased carrying capacity, rocket-carrying naval forces, especially atomic submarines, modern radar and radioelectronics equipment for guidance, target designation, and accurate bombing has opened real opportunities for effective battle against strategic reserves at great depth both in the theater of military operations and during their approach from remote areas or other continents.

In what direction can the battle against strategic reserves be conducted in continental theaters of military operations? What is most important, and, in general, is it a problem requiring special examination and solution, or can these missions be performed in the course of strategic operations in a TMO?

The most important elements of strategic reserves, which are subject to decisive action, are, in our opinion, first, combined-arms and tank ob'yedineniya and soyedineniya, rocket nuclear weapons, and chasty and soyedineniya of other arms located in mobilization areas, concentrated in the depth of a given TMO, or arriving from another; secondly, reserve groupings during their movement to an area of military operations or their entrance into battle; and thirdly, stores of nuclear weapons, conventional armament, materiel and technical supplies. In addition, there will be a complex of all types of transports from road junctions, airfields, and ports having great importance for shipping reserves to a given TMO.

Naturally, an effective struggle against reserves and the destruction of materiel and railroad objectives can be accomplished only when action has been taken against all objectives mentioned above, or at least against the decisive elements of strategic reserves which become very important at a given moment and the destruction of which will have the desired strategic result.

In a modern war the most important objectives within reserves are, of course, nuclear rocket means which have not yet been brought into action, nuclear weapons depots, tank and artillery soyedineniya and chasty, and large bases and depots of fuel, armaments and ammunition. Under all conditions it is extremely important, along with the destruction of nuclear-rocket means, to destroy fuel depots, thereby paralyzing not only the movement of reserves, but also the groupings of branches of the armed forces operating on the front.

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Among the strategic reserves it is necessary to take into account their distance from the main area of armed conflict. It is one thing when these objectives are still located in the depth of the theater at a distance of 600-1000 kilometers or more (requiring three or four days to move them and bring them into the battle), and another matter when they are already in the zone of military operations and can be brought into battle within 24 hours. The closer reserves approach from the depth of the theater, the more intense will be the action against them. It is also necessary to keep in mind the geographic factor, system of communications, the presence of suitable means of combating these reserves, and the duration and objectives of strategic operations to be conducted in the TMO at a given moment. All these factors are closely interrelated and must be taken into account when making decisions on delivering nuclear strikes against enemy reserves.

Let us clarify these statements. High mountain ranges with a limited network of roads, large water barriers with few bridges, territories divided by seas within the theater -- all these retain their significance as natural barriers even in modern conditions, with highly mobile combat equipment, and limit the maneuvers of troops and materiel from the depth of the theater. Reserves formed on the opposite side of natural barriers still have to overcome them before they can arrive in the area of military operations.

Under these conditions the proper selection of the objectives of strikes -- in other words, the waging of an effective battle against reserves with the smallest expenditure of forces and means -- will be of great importance. If the main strategic mission in a theater can be carried out in several days, then, obviously, delaying the approach of the enemy reserves for that period of time will ensure the completion of the operation. Consequently, the objective of action against reserves can be achieved by destroying sections of roads on passes through mountain ranges, bridges across large rivers, or ports for unloading reserves brought in by sea.

The availability of forces and means for combating reserves has an important influence on the selection of the objectives of strikes. If they are limited, it is possible to neutralize the reserves in succession, beginning with the nearest, and, in certain cases to destroy only important road junctions and transportation objectives or to create zones of radioactive contamination on communications routes.

theaters of military operations where the network of roads and railroads is poorly developed and where movement involves overcoming considerable natural barriers, troops operating in the TMO can be isolated from fresh reserves simply by destroying certain transportation objectives. Sometimes, especially in sparsely populated and uninhabited theaters, the main means of transferring reserves from the depth is transport aviation. In these cases it is most important to destroy airfields, aviation fuel depots, equipment, flight control systems, and aircraft.

But combating reserves in continental TMOs is only a part of the overall battle against strategic reserves, since reserves can be brought in by sea and air transports. Thus, battle on ocean and air communications routes is a no less important part of combating strategic reserves.

The essence of combating strategic reserves in a theater of military operations will be, on one hand, the destruction of combat forces and means (ob'yedineniya, soyedineniya, special units, and reserve nuclear and rocket means) and the destruction of various materiel reserves (armement, ammunition, and particularly fuel) and, on the other hand, the destruction of the complex of transport facilities and the disruption of main communications routes over which reserves are carried.

Action against strategic reserves on a wide scale became possible only with the appearance of a deep strike weapon, which at that time was bomber aviation. During World War II and especially during the Great Patriotic War, heavy bomber and front aviation periodically delivered strikes against deep enemy reserves in strategic areas or in TMOs in general. Such operations, however, were not systematic since the main objectives of air strikes remained troop groupings, the tactical and operational reserves of the enemy.

Modern rocket-carrying and bomber aviation with its high tactical and technical characteristics is a powerful and reliable means of combating reserves in a theater of military operations. Its importance is especially great in action against reserves during their regrouping and in delivering strikes against small targets -- nuclear weapons depots, fuel depots, headquarters, and others. Rocket-carrying aviation has a very important advantage in combating reserves in that it is able to destroy targets at a distance of several hundred kilometers, beyond the range of the active means of enemy PVO.

Operational and strategic rocket weapons have moved into first place as the most important means of combating enemy reserves in a TMO under the most varied conditions. Nuclear-rocket weapons, which are unaffected by weather conditions and practically invulnerable to antirocket means, which have great speed and accuracy in destroying area targets and which can be employed in mass, are among the most reliable and important means in independent action against reserves in a TMO. In comparison with aviation, rocket weapons have a number of advantages and are unquestionably the decisive means in this action.

No matter how effective each type of action against reserves may be, during a war there will usually be a combined use of aviation strikes, rockets of various designations, and assault forces and detachments of various sizes. In land-sea theaters of military operations, naval aviation and submarines using conventional and nuclear weapons will also be effective in destroying strategic reserves, especially those arriving from other TMOs by sea. Special missions in combating reserves can be carried out by air and naval landings, operations of separate detachments, and other means.

What is the objective of such action against strategic reserves and what results must be sought during its organization? No matter how systematic and powerful the strikes, it is difficult to count on complete annihilation of the reserves. Obviously, the objective will be achieved if the action seriously weakens the strategic reserves, preventing them from being used effectively and from having any noticeable effect on the entire course of armed conflict in a given theater. Another objective of action against reserves may be to deprive the enemy of superiority in forces in a certain strategic area or TMO.

The experience of World War II does not give a complete answer to the question of how to annihilate or weaken strategic reserves. A consideration of the potential of modern weapons leads one to the conclusion that the annihilation of reserves can be accomplished by strategic rocket strikes and independent air and sea operations.

The deep and dispersed disposition of strategic reserves in mobilization areas and their considerable strength make it necessary to deliver a series of simultaneous or successive nuclear strikes. Strikes by rocket troops may be especially effective against large groupings of reserves in the depth of a TMO, when they are being unloaded from ocean or large sea transports or

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transport aircraft, or when concentrating in areas of impending of nuclear-rocket weapons is the conducting of continuous reconnaissance and observation of the movements and concentrations of strategic reserves.

It is sometimes expedient to conduct air operations, with strategic aviation in close coordination with tactical aviation, for the destruction of strategic reserves in TMOs. The best results can be achieved by delivering strikes against troop columns moving toward the front line under their own power or on railroad or sea transports and by destroying stations and ports used for loading and unloading. Strikes against airfields on which troops and cargoes are being landed by transport aviation are also effective.

In a number of cases aviation may be the only active means of combating strategic reserves, especially when the number of nuclear-rocket weapons is limited or when their use would be impractical. Thus, in continental TMOs air force operations to destroy reserves will be a logical and integral part of the armed conflict.

From the experience of World War II it is known that operations on the enemy's sea lines of communication included action against strategic reserves, since, in addition to the sinking of transport ships carrying cargoes of a general character raw materials, petroleum products, supplies, etc), ships carrying troops and combat equipment were also sunk. For example, in only five months (January-May) of 1943 259 ships having a total tonnage of nearly 1,550,000 tons were sunk by German submarines in Atlantic and Arctic waters. Some of these ships were carrying troops.

Independent operations of naval forces or joint operations of the naval forces and strategic aviation to destroy ocean and sea lines of communications will also have a very important place in the system of combating strategic reserves under modern conditions. Action against ocean lines of communication is important for many reasons. Of interest in a given situation is the destruction of convoys of ships carrying troops and armament near a given theater of military operations or unloading troops at ports on its territory.

Since many countries located on continental theaters of military operations have ties with overseas territories and are to a large extent dependent on shipments of both materiel and scye-dineniya and chasti of armed forces, action against these shipments, particularly on approaches to principal ports of a given TMO, is extremely important.

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Rocket troops, strategic and tactical airborne troops, and, in theaters bordered by seas, naval forces and means may take part in joint operations to destroy strategic reserves. These operations can be conducted when the forces of front ob'yedineniya and fleets are not occupied with the execution of independent and more important missions and, obviously, are not in the main theaters of military operations. Under these conditions, especially in remote and isolated TMOs, joint operations may be the natural and most typical means of combating strategic reserves.

Also of importance may be special operations in adjacent TMOs or strategic areas to divert the enemy's strategic reserves from the main TMO or strategic area. The joint operation of troops of the Southwestern Front and part of the forces of the Voronezh Front in the second half of December 1942 to destroy the Eighth Italian Army in the central course of the Don River is an example. The thrust of the main forces of the Southwestern Front was made in a southwesterly direction, toward Morozovsk, to meet the worsening situation and destroy German reserves which could have been used to liberate the encircled grouping on the Volga. During this operation the German command threw four tank divisions and four infantry divisions against the attacking troops of the Southwestern Front, divisions which were intended to be used in the liberation of encircled troops. The successful execution of this operation finally deprived the German command of the opportunity to render aid to Paulus's encircled grouping with a thrust from the west, weakened German pressure on troops of the Stalingrad Front from the Kotel'nikov side, and also created favorable conditions for further offensive operations by Soviet troops in the Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk) and Voronezh areas (The Second World War, 1939-1945, Military Publishing House, 1958, 395 pp).

In the same way the thrust of the Seventh and Sixth guards tank armies of the Second Ukrainian Front in January 1945 drew a number of German divisions from the Gron River along the banks of the Danube to Komarno. These divisions were to have developed an attack on Budapest in an attempt to liberate an encircled grouping there. Troops of the Third Ukrainian Front supported the thrust of the tank armies.

In a modern nuclear war the possibility of encircling large operational groupings and slowly liquidating them is considered unlikely but it can not be completely excluded. Other no less complicated situations which might require the aid of armed forces operating in adjacent TMOs or strategic areas are probable. Such operations against strategic reserves must therefore be considered possible under modern conditions.

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Together with active reserves of rocket troops, reserves there may be used less active means such as hampering maneuvers by destroying crossings and road junctions, creating zones of fire in forested areas having a limited network of roads, creating wide zones of radioactive contamination, diverting part of the reserve forces, and dispersing their forces to combat various assault forces, detachments, etc.

It must be remembered that in modern conditions the main commands of the warring sides will always try to have strong reserves and regularly rebuild them in theaters of military operations. Consequently, action against them will be of a constant nature and will require systematic strikes or a series of operations for their destruction.

From the ways of combating strategic reserves examined above, it follows that they can take the form of various operations and strikes of rocket troops and will be conducted, first, in the system of strategic operations in a given TMO (including ocean theaters), as an integral part, in the form of separate strikes with nuclear-rocket weapons or special operations of air and naval forces, etc.; secondly, in the system of armed conflict in several TMOs in the form of strategic rocket strikes or separate individual or joint operations conducted upon the order of and under the direction of the supreme command, using strategic aviation, naval forces and means, and sometimes strategic rocket troops. The direction of such joint operations may in certain cases be delegated by the commander in chief to the branch which will have the decisive forces and means in a given operation.

Modern means of warfare have raised the role of strategic leadership still higher, not only as the main organizer of armed struggle in general, but as the principal organizer of separate operations for the destruction of enemy strategic reserves in TMOs. The military high command has a decisive role in preparing, planning and conducting operations to destroy these reserves. For this purpose it will use primarily strategic aviation, but also ground and naval forces and rocket means operating in a given theater and strategic rockets. When this action is entrusted to the command of front ob'yedineniya, forces at the front will be reinforced by the means of reserves of the strategic leadership, neighboring fronts, and, sometimes, of naval fleets.

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The organization of action against strategic reserves in modern conditions is an important problem of Soviet military art. Modern weapons and delivery systems have broadened the scope of military operations, made them extremely mobile and flexible, created new means and forms of combat, and required the high military command to give greater attention to the development of armed struggle in theaters of military operations. As a result, the role of large strategic reserves, which greatly influence the entire course of armed struggle in general and in TMOs in particular, has increased. Therefore combating strategic reserves in a theater of military operations is an indispensable element of a modern war.

The comprehensive theoretical development of this problem will considerably enrich military art.

by Rear Admiral V. ANDREYEV

Developing the principles for defining the concepts of subdivision and classification of theaters of military operations is not only of theoretical interest but of great practical importance. In peacetime the probable theaters of war are carefully studied in order to be able to use in one's own interests the military-political, military-economic, military-geographic, and directly operational-strategic elements characteristic of this or that theater. The timely preparation of theaters of military operations is of tremendous importance for success in war. It includes carrying out a wide range of measures to create the possibility of conducting operations by combinations of types of armed forces in accordance with their needs and special characteristics. The subdivision of theaters of military operations involves the establishment of a definite legal regime under which in time of war the military command is granted rights and broad authority in relation not only to those in the military service, but also to the civilian population which lives in the theater area.

The "theater of military operations" as a concept has long been known. But in various periods its meaning has been far from the same. It has changed with changes in the conditions affecting it, with the appearance of new factors requiring a completely different approach to the solution of this problem.

The last definitions of the theater of military operations were given in the post-war years. Particularly, in the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1956) the theater of military operations (TMO) is said to be that land or sea area predesignated for the conduct of military operations. There are land, sea, and mixed TMO's. A war usually encompasses several TMO's; during its course certain of them may play a major, others a secondary, role. In local wars the TMO's will often coincide with the theater of war. Within the bounds of the TMO is included not only one's own territory, but that of the enemy as well; its boundaries may change in the course of the war.

In other published materials, the theater of military operations is defined as the land or sea area within the limits of which armed forces during war execute a single strategic mission. The boundaries of probable theaters of war, along the front and in depth, are established in consideration of their political-economic and military-geographic conditions, and also the possibilities of deploying the forces and materiel of one or more fronts (fleets).

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"The theater of war" from the point of view of international law is regarded as that land, sea or air space in which is conducted or will be conducted military operations between the armed forces of the warring states. It includes: the territories of the warring states (including colonies); their territorial and inland waters; the surface and depths of the open sea (ocean); and the air space over the land and the sea. It may not include the territories or the inland or territorial waters of neutral states, nor territories neutralized by international agreements. There are special rules for the open sea as a part of a theater of war, to the effect that combat operations must not violate the freedom of neutral shipping.

From a strategic point of view the theater of war is regarded as the totality of the areas in which the armed forces of the warring states (coalitions) uninterruptedly and simultaneously execute major political and strategic missions which determine the outcome of the war or complete one of its stages (campaigns). It usually includes several TMO's and only in a few cases is limited to one of them.

In the armed forces of the US the theater of war and the theater of military operations are defined differently. According to their views, the theater of war includes those regions of the land, sea and air space which are directly encompassed by the war. The theater of military operations is the part of the theater of war which is necessary for the development of the combat operations of troops and their material and technical supply in accordance with the assigned mission. One or more theaters of military operations constitute the theater of war.

A theater is usually divided into a zone of combat operations and a zone of communications. The latter is sometimes called the administrative zone. The zone of combat operations includes the regions of land, sea and air space which are necessary for the conduct of combat operations of troops and their materiel and technical supply. The zone of communications includes the land, sea and air areas necessary for the rear supply of the troops. Through this zone run lines of communication, on which are located services of supply and evacuation and other agencies necessary for the direct support and supply of the field troops operating in this theater.

There exists also the so-called "zone of the interior", which includes the national territory of the US, excluding the regions making up the theater of military operations.

The theater of war includes the "zone of the interior" (continental US), the "theater of military operations" on land, and the so-called "strategic zones" on the oceans.

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The direction of the military operations may be carried out by a joint allied command, set up on the basis of a coalition agreement, or by a joint US command. In each theater of military operations there is set up its high command, combining the military operations of all the armed forces deployed in the theater.

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The strategic supreme command of NATO in Europe embraces the territory of four theaters of military operations: North European, Central European, South European, and Mediterranean. The strategic high command of the North Atlantic Bloc on the Atlantic Ocean includes the zones of the eastern part of the Atlantic, the western part of the Atlantic, and the Iberian zone of the Atlantic. Specially set apart is the zone of the English Channel including the coastal waters of Great Britain.

The ocean zones essentially are the same as theaters of military operations on land, although at present they are not called theaters.

Analyzing the above and many other definitions of theaters of military operations, and also the conditions in which these definitions were given, we come to the conclusion that the most important factor constituting the basis for the break-down of theaters of military operations or, in other words, their classification, is the necessity and possibility of accomplishing strategic missions in certain regions of the earth. And this in turn is determined by the existence in these regions of military-political blocs and alliances, of military-economic targets of strategic importance, of strategic groupings of armed forces, and also by geographic conditions.

The importance of military-political blocs for the determination of strategic missions, and consequently, for the subdivision and classification of TMO's consists in the fact that they form the basic hot beds of war and to a certain degree predetermine the probable theaters of military operations. Thus, the aggressive, imperialist bloc of Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, put together on the eve of World War II, provided the basis for considering Europe and the Far East as the main hot beds of war. And the war which began completely confirmed this assumption. With the present disposition of military-political forces in the international arena, and grouping of imperialist blocs, such hot beds are: Europe, the Atlantic, and North America, where are deployed the states which are members of the aggressive NATO bloc; South Asia (the Near and Middle East), within whose boundaries are the countries making up the CENTO bloc; Southeast Asia and Australia, where the SEATO bloc has been set up; and the Far East, within whose borders has been put together a new bloc -- NEATO.

The role of military-economic objectives is determined by the importance of economics in modern war, and accordingly, by the missions for the seizing, destruction, or making ineffective the basic elements of the military-economic potential of the enemy. Military-industrial plants, arsenals, bases, and weapons and fuel depots are now the most important

targets for destruction. And the blows against these targets will be the more powerful, the more important the place they occupy in providing the armed forces with modern instruments of war. From this point of view, the various theaters of military operations play by no means identical roles. And consequently there will be essential differences in the strategic missions, the forces, and the materiel brought into action in the various theaters, and in the ways in which they are used.

CPYRGHT

The nature of strategic missions, and with it the subdivision of the theaters of military operations, is affected decisively by the composition and the situation of the groupings of armed forces of the probable enemy. These groupings may consist of all kinds of armed forces or only some of them; they may be in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the opposing coalition, or at a great distance from them. To defeat them requires various kinds of forces and ordnance, various methods of operation.

The geographic factor plays a great part in determining the concept and the classification of theaters of military operations. The natural conditions of land and water areas (whether they are unified or broken up; their relief, hydrography, soil, vegetation) substantially affect what kind of armed forces are to be used, and the scope and methods of their operations. Different natural conditions also bring in special features in the preparation of armed forces for operations in certain regions, and in materiel and technical supply. All this, of course, must be taken into account in subdividing a TMO.

Military operations in the sea and ocean areas obviously will assume great importance. This is because of the possibilities for fleets to use nuclear weapons for the destruction of targets in the ocean and on land, and also because of the increased importance for the imperialist states of ocean communications for the supply of all the necessary strategic groupings. Military operations on the oceans will undoubtedly be of strategic importance. But strategic operations on the ocean inherently have their own specific features, as compared with operations on land, and consequently the ocean areas will be independent theaters of military operations.

A modern world war may encompass simultaneously several continents and the oceans between them. From this follows naturally the concept of an intercontinental theater of military operations.

The theater of a world nuclear-missile war would practically be the whole earth. However, the nature of the military operations would be different in various regions of the world. Military operations would not assume strategic importance everywhere, and consequently, also, the regions in which they were carried out would not always be considered of a strategic nature -- "theaters of military operations."

theater of military operations are:

-- The necessity of accomplishing strategic missions in certain regions.

-- A certain integrated character of these regions, from a politico-economic and geographic point of view.

-- The possibility of using within the borders of these regions large strategic forces and weapons and equipment.

-- A certain independence of operations of armed forces in this theater.

From the above, we think it appropriate to give the following definition of a "theater of military operations": it is an extensive land area with its adjoining sea and air space, or an ocean area with its adjacent shores, islands (archipelagoes) and air space, which in its operational scope permits the concentration and deployment of strategic groupings of forces and the carrying out by them of military operations in the accomplishment of strategic missions for the attainment of the political goals of the war.

In the past, when land forces played the decisive role in war, theaters of military operations were usually subdivided into strategic axes. We remember that by this term was meant a wide strip of terrain within a certain theater of military operations leading up to the most important administrative-political and industrial-economic centers of the enemy, the struggle for which might be the basis of a strategic operation. The geographical conditions of a strategic axis were usually such as to permit the coordinated operations of several operational combinations of various kinds of armed forces.

Under present-day conditions, with the decisive role of the Strategic Rocket Troops, it is more correct, in our opinion, to regard theaters of military operations as the totality of strategic regions and strategic axes.

A "strategic region" is one in which there are objectives the defeat, destruction, or capture of which may be the goal of a strategic mission. Such objectives are groupings of the armed forces of the enemy, including strategic nuclear armament, and formations of land, air, and air defense troops in continental TMO's, and naval forces in ocean theaters, and also military-economic and administrative-political regions and centers.

Usually there are objectives of various kinds and importance in one theater of military operations are characterized by the presence of groupings of armed forces, important industrial regions, and centers of land and air communications and transport. Typical for ocean theaters of military operations are groupings of naval forces, sea communications, naval bases, and ports and other coastal objectives.

Theaters of military operations are unequal in their importance to the course and outcome of a war: in some may be carried out basic, most important strategic missions; in others - less important. Depending on concrete conditions, that theater may become of primary importance in which are concentrated the main forces of the opposing sides.

We should note the difference between theaters of military operations in a world war and in local wars. In local wars, as a rule, the theater of military operations will coincide with the theater of war. Sometimes the military operations will encompass only a part of the theater. In this case "theater of military operations" may mean the same thing as "strategic region". Hence, obviously, a special subdivision of theaters of military operations is inappropriate in local wars.

With the increase in range of effectiveness of the means of armed conflict, there naturally follows an increase in the size of theaters of military operations. An area which formerly was a theater, now, in many cases, might be classified as a strategic region, a part of a TMO.

Also, the division into land and sea theaters no longer fits modern conditions, since theaters encompass continents or parts of continents, including inland seas and coastal waters, and also oceans with their islands and shores. It is more correct to classify theaters as continental and oceanic.

These are some of my thoughts on the substance of this question.

CPYRGHT

by Maj Gen Tank Trps I. DEMCHUK

The content, forms, and methods of educational work in the Armed Forces have many important distinguishing features. However, regardless of the specific type of educational work in the Army and Navy, it achieves its purpose only if it is based on the Marxist-Leninist doctrine concerning the education of the new man, the builder of a Communist society, the man with a new world outlook and moral sense.

The Communist views of life, society, and work, high ideological convictions, patriotism, modesty, honesty, self-discipline, respect for elders, -- all these are characteristic features of Soviet people, including Soviet soldiers. The young men in our army are always educated in the spirit of personal responsibility to the people for the performance of tasks concerned with the defense of our country, based on the noble traditions of combat glory of the Armed Forces.

Military education in higher military schools, where the students spend most of their time directly on study, should always be given special attention. During the period of study at an academy, officers not only acquire comprehensive knowledge in their military profession. They are also educated to develop all the moral and fighting qualities which are essential to a modern commander, political worker, or military engineer. The common aim of training and education is achieved mainly by coordinated and correlated actions of the entire teaching staff. The forms and methods of educational work may vary. They depend on the composition and qualifications of the teaching staff, the composition of students, the level of their previous education, their former position in the army, their age, character traits, subject and specialty, amount of study subjects, the time devoted to study in general and to particular subjects, the teaching facilities, and many other factors. An instructor must know and consider all these factors so that he may teach and educate correctly.

Of course, it is very important that all students should study excellently. However, it is necessary to carry out systematic educational measures so that the students may develop the high moral and fighting qualities necessary for skillful commanders, educators, and excellent organizers. It is essential that officers be equipped with a thorough knowledge of military affairs and combat equipment, the ability to analyze a complex situation of modern combat, to make well-founded decisions, to train and educate their subordinates systematically and correctly, to organize party-political work, etc.

The inseparable combination of training and education is a complex but extremely necessary matter. In this respect, we have had some success as well as shortcomings. Unfortunately, some instructors still fail to give proper consideration to educational work with students; the instructors have an indifferent attitude, saying that in the process of training everyone will inevitably be educated and that this is completely sufficient.

However, such opinions are incorrect. They are attempts to brush aside an important and necessary matter. The organization of educational work must be given special attention, and it is necessary to exchange experiences in educational work conducted at higher educational institutions.

In order to form the qualities required by officers in a successful and purposeful manner, it is necessary to be thoroughly acquainted with each student. Naturally, the best and surest way to know people is to have direct contact with them during the process of working and studying. Everyday activities and training situations, service duties, contacts with students, and observations of their actions provide valuable material for the study of people, a thoughtful analysis of facts, and the drawing of practical conclusions.

At the beginning of training, it is very important that the instructor should have at least a general idea of the composition of students, and during a prolonged period of working with them he should study each individual, have a beneficial, educational influence on him, and share his own service experiences with him. This requires a great deal of painstaking work and skill, but one cannot do without it in a good organization of training and, especially, in correct educational work with officers.

In our opinion it should become a practice for professors and instructors to study the personal files of students and the character reports on them which are available after their temporary duty in line units and their practical work in production, repair, and other enterprises, as well as after the period of camp training. In addition, it is very useful for an instructor to obtain a detailed character sketch of each student from the chief of a course.

At the beginning of a study year, it is also expedient to hold special meetings of chairs, during which the chiefs of faculties or chiefs of courses may present reports containing a character description of students. This will enable the instructors to obtain more complete information about the students. It is a fact that when students go through their camp training or practical training in plants, troops, repair shops, or other facilities, they may reveal many new qualities which were not immediately evident during the attendance of classes in the academy. The above mentioned practice is

also useful because usually very few instructors are present during the training. Therefore, most of the instructors may not be aware of many important facts, which should be taken into account in the educational work.

Problems of practical training are given much attention in an academy. Training in line units and in industrial enterprises is considered a very important part of the students' practical training. When training with the troops or in plants, i.e., under actual working conditions, the capabilities and potentials of our students are tested. Wide possibilities of educational activity are open to the instructors who usually supervise practical training. Close contact is established between the students and such instructors. The instructor becomes a true commander, educator, teacher, and adviser of the students. After all, it is necessary to know each student very well in order to carry out successfully the many duties of a supervisor of practical training as well as a commander and educator.

Instructors who supervise training in line units derive much benefit from close contacts with officers in podrazdeleniya where the students are being trained. In this way they have a chance to discuss the abilities of each student in detail and to plan suitable, individual measures, both in training and education. One student may be entrusted with studies of a technical nature, another one with a tactical subject; some should be authorized to conduct political study groups or give political talks, and others may carry out political education measures. In other words, an individual plan of practical training is prepared for each student, which enables the development or perfection of certain qualities of officers. By taking a deep interest in the work of students and by observing them in practical work, an instructor may revise or supplement the individual plans. It is important that the students be aware of the instructor's interest in them. Similar measures should be carried out for students who are taking practical training in industrial enterprises, repair shops, or elsewhere. Before the students leave for temporary duty in line units or other practical training, the training supervisors or instructors should consult with chiefs of courses, party organizations, and instructors of other disciplines, on all these problems.

To carry out educational work it is expedient to make extensive use of the periods during which students work on their course projects or diploma dissertations. According to experience, the academic supervisors of projects and diploma dissertations have more opportunity than under other training conditions to establish close contacts with the students in their care. This can be achieved by meeting regularly with the students to discuss the work they are doing. A skillful educator will immediately be able to dispose any student in his favor. That alone is half of the success. Knowing a student, one can have a beneficial influence on the development of his talents for scientific research and for bold,

constructive decisions in the field of engineering, and his striving for innovations, and one can help him to develop accuracy, persistence, independence, self-discipline, and an honest attitude toward his tasks.

PYRGHT

Much attention is given to the participation of students in scientific research work. Military science societies of students operate in the academies. Scientific-technical and military science conferences are held annually. Many students study in scientific groups of a chair where they choose their own study subjects. We believe that many educational measures could be successfully carried out in this connection.

Students' reports are discussed at scientific-technical conferences of the academy and in different sections. Hundreds of students take part in these discussions; some of their works are published in collected works of academies. This has a very instructive and educational effect on the students.

Academic supervisors of groups in military science societies educate the students to show a lively interest in the solution of complex technical problems and to display a high sense of responsibility for their tasks. By sharing their rich experience, the supervisors impart to the students technical efficiency, a sense of curiosity, and persistence in their work. Naturally, everything is not achieved easily and immediately. In their creative research activities, the group members sometimes experience disappointments. However, persistent work brings the instructors and students closer together and has a good effect on the training and education of the latter.

To make educational work successful, it is not enough to have an instructor meet his students only during classes and examinations. It is very important for an instructor to be in contact with his students outside the regular hours, and there is ample opportunity for such contacts. We believe it would be useful to visit the formitory and hotel of the students. However, it is important that each such visit by an instructor should have a definite purpose. Collective attendances of theaters, museums, recreational programs, and lectures by students and instructors would be of great educational benefit. Such contacts, however, should not be formal and be turned into burdensome supervision. They must be sincere and friendly.

We believe it would be useful if instructors would take an interest in the system of educational work in the case of students transferred to senior courses who are to be instructed by them, i.e., to study the methods previously used with such students, the positive results achieved, any shortcomings which have remained, and steps to be taken for a successful continuation of military education. It would be very good if

educational measures were carried out while taking into account the previous positive achievements of a given group of students. Close contacts with party and Komsomol organizations of training departments would help the instructors in their work.

In our opinion, training departments should become the true centers of educational work. Here it is easier for people to establish contacts, and their sense of unity, mutual assistance, and friendly interest become more evident. In a small group it is easier to watch the degree of success, the ideological development, and the self-discipline of each student, and to give prompt assistance to anyone who is lagging behind the others.

The chiefs of courses should maintain close contacts with all the instructors teaching the students under their supervision, and should carry out both training and educational work in close coordination with such instructors. They all supplement one another; if one person is unable to solve a problem, another one might be able to do so, and much can be done by joint efforts.

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Party and Komsomol organizations, which study each party member, give assistance to instructors and chiefs of courses. It is very useful to demonstrate to the students, as future commanders and educators, the forms and methods of educational work being used by instructors and chiefs of courses. It would be a mistake to make some kind of a secret out of courses. It would be a mistake to make some kind of a secret out of these methods. On the contrary, it would be useful to exchange opinions with the students on this subject. The students would express many interesting and useful thoughts in this matter.

It is quite logical to demand that at the end of a semester or study year each instructor should not only determine how the students have assimilated certain subjects of a course, but should also evaluate the results of educational measures used in the process of training and note any shortcomings. In grading the students, it would be correct to take into account the opinions of the whole teaching staff. At meetings of chairs, it would be proper to discuss not only methods of conducting classes, but also educational aims and methods of achieving them.

CPYRCHT

We believe that as a result of such work the officers and military engineers graduating from academies, who are assigned to the troops, will be better prepared and will be equipped with all necessary qualities. Unfortunately, this does not always happen in practice. Some students acquire the required amount of knowledge during the period of training at an academy; however, they do not become skillful chiefs, organizers, and educators. That means not everything was done for these officers during their training period in the academy. Apparently we are satisfied that the officers have successfully assimilated the training program, but we sometimes overlook certain important aspects of education and permit some deviations from the principle of unity of training and education. Education is an extremely delicate matter. It requires the sensibility of a psychologist, training expert, educator, and exemplary officer, endowed with the necessary command qualities. That is what every instructor should be.

It is known that the moral code for builders of Communism is a collection of important moral principles, expressing the nobility, humaneness, and sense of justice inherent in the society being created by Soviet people. The teaching staff of an academy, during the process of training, carries out a great amount of work aimed at educating such qualities as devotion to the fatherland, high ideological convictions, love for the military profession, self-discipline, truthfulness, and honesty. As shown by experience, every kind of study at an academy is able to draw the students' attention to many important questions which may in some way further their education. The forms and methods of educational work may be developed by each instructor. One sometimes hears the opinion that all educational measures should be carried out only through the chairs of social sciences, party and Komsomol organizations, clubs, or agitators' groups (organization of various programs, lectures, talks, meetings of students with veterans of the revolution and of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars, attendance of museums, and many other events). Undoubtedly, such measures are necessary and have great educational significance. However, this cannot and should not relieve the instructors from carrying out educational work on a regular, individual basis during the process of training students.

In educational work, it is extremely important that all generals and officers be very exacting and that the actions of all persons participating in the solution of educational problems be coordinated. Officers and generals must be equally demanding toward themselves and toward their subordinates, especially in matters of discipline, regardless of their position and military or academic ranks.

In addition to being excellent teachers, many instructors are successful in having their students fulfill the requirements of military regulations strictly and accurately. These instructors are experts in methods of education, they know their subjects, and they skillfully combine the qualities of a commander, teacher, and educator. The students love and respect them.

The well-organized and precise work of all sections, chairs, libraries, and other numerous services, also serve as an educational example for the students. In such an environment they develop accuracy and precision, i.e., qualities which are essential for an excellent performance of duties with the troops.

Under conditions including the use of rockets and nuclear weapons, commanders and chiefs will be required to make independent and bold decisions, at extremely short notice, since indecision, delayed reactions, or inability to make a prompt evaluation of the entire operational and tactical situation and to make the right decision may result in the fact that the enemy will forestall us and the troops will be placed in an extremely difficult situation. Consequently, academy students must constantly develop their will power, independence, the ability to act promptly, and many other qualities. People may say that this is the job of tacticians, since the training classes conducted by them requires a tactical situation, in which the students learn to make decisions, give orders and instructions for troop operations, etc. All that is correct. During this type of training the above-mentioned qualities are constantly being developed by the students.

However, how should one proceed during classes on mathematics, physics, chemistry, electrical engineering, foreign languages, and many other subjects taught at an academy? One cannot create any kind of a tactical situation in such classes. Does that mean that the chairs of such disciplines should restrict themselves to the instruction of their subjects, without taking part in the education of students? The principal task of the chairs of physics, chemistry, and other general educational disciplines is to give the students excellent instruction in their particular subjects. However, in addition to this, all instructors, regardless of which chair they belong to, can and should always strive to develop certain officers' qualities in their students, especially the ability to think quickly, to make calculations independently and promptly, to solve problems by the shortest and most expedient way, and to formulate laws, theorems, and theses clearly and precisely. For example, in the instruction of a foreign language one should strive not only for a correct, grammatical translation, but also for speed of translation, ability to compose sentences, give concise answers, formulate rules clearly, etc. In any subject one may require the students to give brief, comprehensive, and clear answers. It is the task of all instructors to insist that the students should express their thoughts clearly and concisely, as would be appropriate for a commander in the performance of his duties. Many training subjects make it possible for the students to develop a "command language."

Mar Su. R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY, minister of Defense USSR, repeatedly referred in his orders to the low level of officers' "graphic training" and their inability to prepare a map of combat operations. During

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classes, instructors should require students to prepare diagrams, charts, maps, tables, and other records accurately and clearly, as this will help the students to acquire a staff officer's efficiency in this type of work.

PYRGHT
Special emphasis should be placed on the effect of personal contact between instructors and students. It is no secret that there are favorite teachers in almost all schools. These persons do not curry favor with their students; they are just and exacting. They are admired for the very reason that they are a model of humanity. Students usually come to such instructors with any urgent questions and speak their mind frankly. The contact between instructors and students on a healthy ideological foundation is always useful from an educational standpoint. Unfortunately, there are some instructors who are dry "formalists" and who talk to their students of nothing but the subject they are teaching. Students ordinarily do not approach such instructors and do not share their own thoughts and difficulties with them.

To a certain extent each person chooses his own way to acquire complete mastery of a subject. Some find it easy to study, others have more difficulty; one person is able to demonstrate his knowledge clearly and distinctly, while another one may be less successful in this respect. The existing forms of checking students enable instructors to obtain a definite impression of each one, although it will obviously not be a deep knowledge of an individual. It is no secret that an instructor is sometimes very much surprised by a poor answer from an excellent student, and that he does not always believe in the fact that a poor student could give an excellent answer or be successful in a standard test. This happens whenever a teacher has not studied his students sufficiently and has not devoted enough time to their education. As a result, he is unable to notice certain positive changes in his students as soon as they occur, as well as any negative traits or habits which an otherwise excellent student may acquire. Only a person who is thoroughly familiar with each student has the moral right to give proper encouragement and assistance to some and to rebuke others at the right time.

In some cases, outstanding students have been treated too indulgently; the title "outstanding student" sometimes becomes a shield which is not always used correctly either by the instructor or by the student. It is known that it is sometimes very hard for a student to be considered "outstanding" if he has previously been included in a category of less successful students. By the same token, an instructor is rather unwilling to give a poor grade to a student considered "outstanding," even though he may deserve it. This is psychologically a delicate problem, which should be given some thought.

Not only students are in need of educational measures. The chairs are also conducting serious educational work with instructors. We would like to make a few comments on educational work connected with lectures, seminars, laboratory training, and other forms of study.

Lecture courses in an academy are the principal forms of the training and educational process and are given great importance.

Every lecture, regardless of its subject, should first of all give students thorough knowledge, and also educate them to acquire ideological convictions, party spirit, pride in the great achievements and progress in all spheres of life of our homeland. For example, lectures on the use of the latest, improved automatic systems in combat equipment include references to our party policy in matters of technical progress, the growth of our industry, and the enormous achievements in the development of technology as a result of economic competition with the capitalist system. This gives the students a feeling of pride in the achievements of our homeland, army, and of all Soviet people, and inspires them with a sense of patriotism and love for their profession. In delivering a lecture on the subject "Repair of tank parts by the method of galvanizing, welding, and soldering", the same aim is pursued in giving a convincing description of the achievements of leading enterprises and illustrating the technical and economic analysis of the work of enterprises.

One should also make use of lectures to give the officers a good cultural education. In the course of a lecture, an instructor may have the opportunity to quote works of art, recommend the reading of books, the holding of discussions, or attendance of museums and exhibitions. A lecturer inspires his students by a lively presentation of his subject, teaches them to think logically, and explains the methods and tasks of science. Therefore, naturally enough, the chairs are interested both in the cognitive and in the educational aspects of a lecture.

Seminars are very conducive to the education of students. If the instructor conducts them in the form of a creative discussion, stimulates the audience to feel interested, and inspires it to a deep and serious discussion of the most urgent and complex problems of the subject under consideration, he will not only achieve a thorough study of training matters, but will at the same time educate the students to demonstrate adherence to principles, and ability to defend correct opinions, to understand a subject, and to interpret events in the proper way. Unfortunately, some instructors miss these opportunities; they conduct seminars in an uninteresting manner, as a result of which the material contained in a lecture is merely repeated in a formal way. How can one expect any activity, creative boldness, or wide exchange of opinions in such classes! Here everything is strictly subordinated to the study plan

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and no one is concerned about educational measures. "It is important to cover all subjects of the plan. However, this form of study should teach students to think dialectically, to give a logical presentation of their knowledge, and to be able to defend their views.

PYRGHT Or, let us consider laboratory studies which constitute a large part of the training according to study plans. These too are an extremely suitable form of work for the purpose of achieving many educational goals. However, not always and not everywhere are they conducted as they should be. Many laboratory classes are organized in accordance with training manuals, which give a precise description of the order, sequence, technical equipment, and many other conditions for each work session. In carrying out laboratory work the students are obliged to adhere strictly to these conditions and have no right to deviate even slightly from the recommendations given by the chairs. Such precision is necessary in many cases. However, it is not always justified. Sometimes it only hinders initiative and the striving for independent and creative work. The students are often deprived of a possibility to do some exhaustive experimenting and to reach some interesting conclusions, since they are not allowed to go beyond the limits of a training textbook.

It is also important that laboratory studies should be conducted with equipment which is perfect and faultless from the standpoint of operating efficiency and cleanness. Everything in a laboratory must be attractive and well equipped. A high level of technical culture at any place of work has a beneficial influence on the students and develops their aesthetic feeling.

We would like to call attention to consultations, both general and individual, as a very important form of training and educational work. We are sorry to say that this form of study is not sufficiently popular. However, in the course of such meetings between instructors and students many educational problems could be solved very successfully. Unfortunately, these possibilities have not been sufficiently exploited.

Just a few comments on the practical training of students. Students will encounter this form of training on the very first day they are assigned to the troops, where they are to function not in the role of students, but in that of commanders.

Each practical training job of students is a true school for the perfection of methods and organization. No compromises or simplifications can or should be permitted during training. Students must be taught whatever will be required in a modern war. Above all, it is important to help students acquire the qualities of a commander, political worker, and military engineer, which are essential in modern combat. Problems of organizing technical support of combat operations are the most important

and most complex ones for military engineers. However, it is not enough for students to know the organization and technology of field repairs or the theory of operation and evacuation of equipment under combat conditions. It is important for students to develop the ability to restore damaged equipment and put it back into operation in different combat situations and in a minimum amount of time, to find the most efficient methods of evacuating equipment, and to carry out promptly any measures ensuring the reliable operation of equipment. Students develop such abilities not only as a result of excellent training on the part of instructors, but also as a result of systematic education in carrying out all types of training.

In this type of training, as in many others, students are always educated to acquire a feeling for whatever is new and are trained in the skill to apply theoretical knowledge constructively in solving practical problems.

In this connection, it is very instructive for students who receive training in maintenance work to assist a plant in matters of mechanization and automation of the technological process in repairing combat equipment. It is also very useful to conduct practical training in the field, since it helps to develop accuracy and coordination of personnel in carrying out various command and engineering or technical duties during nighttime, under the "effect" of weapons of mass destruction. Such training helps the students to develop initiative and independent thinking.

We believe it is expedient to establish definite educational goals, in addition to training goals, whenever preparing for a training session. An experienced instructor has a clear idea of the qualities and skills which may be taught or improved during a training session with students, how to accomplish this, and what kind of individual work is to be carried out. All this is given careful, preliminary consideration by the instructor.

In conducting a course for party-political work, one should arrange meetings between students and political workers, as well as leaders of party and Komsomol organizations from the troops. Such meetings will greatly benefit the students, especially if they are held before the students are assigned to practical training in line units.

The study programs for courses on party-political work in command and engineering academies specify only lectures and seminars. In our opinion, these programs should be revised to include the independent conduct by students of any measures which would develop their skill in party-political work (talks, preparation of notes for lectures and reports, public speaking to personnel of the training unit of the

academy, public speaking to students of junior courses and to personnel of troop units). Sometimes the chairs of Marxism-Leninism of academies prepare assignments for students who are leaving for training in line units. In some cases, it would be useful to prepare individual assignments. During their training in line units, the students keep a diary and prepare reports on the work performed by them. The material of these reports is very interesting, lively, and has a fresh approach. It contains observations, opinions, and suggestions of students; however, all this has not yet been sufficiently used in working with them.

A very useful educational measure is the conduct of a reviewing seminar or conference with students returning from training in line units, for the purpose of discussing the accumulated experience in party-political work.

However, all of the training and educational work with students must be aimed at the military education of personnels. Successful military education is one of the decisive conditions for the further increase of combat power of the USSR Armed Forces.

According to Mar SU R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY, "the education of leaders and of educators is the principal element of educational work and a guarantee of its success." It is important to have a firm hold of this element in order to improve all the remaining sectors of educational work in our academies.

by Army Gen Leontin SALAJAN,
Minister of Armed Forces of
the Rumanian People's Republic

CPYRGHT

This year the Rumanian people, closely united around their tested leader -- the Rumanian Workers Party -- triumphantly celebrated the 20th anniversary of their country's liberation from the fascist yoke.

The workers' class, the collectivized peasants, the intelligentsia, and all Rumanian people marked this anniversary with a sense of justified, patriotic pride in the grandiose transformations which have taken place during this period in the political, economic, and social structure of the country.

Among the notable achievements and the far-reaching changes of this period, the development of the Rumanian Armed Forces occupies an important position.

I.

The Rumanian people, who took their fate into their own hands and who have a tested, steadfast, and far-sighted leader in the Rumanian Workers Party, a loyal adherent of Marxist-Leninist teachings, radically changed the appearance of the country and the workers' living conditions during the two decades which have elapsed since the liberation of Rumania.

In his speech at the formal session of the Grand National Assembly devoted to the 20th anniversary of the liberation, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej stated: "The greatest achievement of workers is the complete victory of socialism in cities and rural areas. The exploiting classes have been liquidated, and the exploitation and oppression of man have been abolished forever."

The free, independent, socialist Rumania is now a country which advances steadfastly along the path of progress; it has a complex economy and a thriving culture, completely devoted to satisfying the growing material and cultural needs of workers.

The economic activity of our country is noted for the high speed of industrial development, as industry has become the leading branch of national economy during the years of the people's government. During the period 1950-1963, the average yearly rate of growth of gross

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industrial production in 1963 this rate increased even more, reaching 15 percent. This was more than the average yearly rate provided by the 6-Year Plan. As a result, the present volume of industrial production is 8 times greater than in 1938.

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Free from capitalist bondage, the Rumanian people, who are now the masters of their country's resources, have selflessly and wholeheartedly carried out the sound policies of socialist industrialization pursued by the Rumanian Workers Party; they have created new, rapidly developing branches of industry, and modern industrial combines, plants, and factories equipped with the most modern machinery, and have built large electric power stations, new mines, and oil wells.

During the past 20 years, far-reaching social-economic changes have also taken place in agriculture. As a result of the policy of intensive and diversified development of agriculture, which has been carried out consistently by our party, the completely collectivized agriculture of our country supplies food for the population, agricultural raw materials for industry, and at the same time produces a surplus for export.

As a result of the development of national economy and the continuous growth of the national income, the living standard of the people improved, which is the basic aim of our party's policies. The real wages are now twice as high as in 1950. By implementing a number of measures planned by the June 1964 decision of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers Party and the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic, the income of workers and employees will increase by 6.8 billion lei per year. Because of the constant concern of the party and government for the improvement of workers' housing conditions, more than 160,000 apartments were built during 1960-1963 with state funds. Education, art, and science are constantly developing and the people's government has created the best possible conditions for such a development.

Our heroic working class, which is the decisive, public force effecting all great changes in the life of a people, together with the industrious, collectivized peasants, the intelligentsia, and the workers of all nationalities who have joined together in the struggle for the development of our country, -- they all march shoulder to shoulder, under the tested leadership of the party, toward the completion of building a socialist society and the gradual changeover to the building of Communism.

The success achieved by our country in all spheres of socialist building is the result of creative activity, efforts, and selfless labor of the Rumanian people, as well as the utilization of all internal

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potentials of the country by strengthening of its own forces and the best possible utilization of its natural resources. These results are inseparable from the consistent implementation of the Rumanian Workers Party policy of socialist industrialization, which is the only way to guarantee a harmonious, planned, progressive, and speedy development of the whole national economy, a further increase in general labor productivity, an intensive and complex development of agriculture, and a systematic improvement of the living standard. At the same time, the cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries is of great importance for the development of the Rumanian People's Republic. The Rumanian Workers Party and the government of the Rumanian People's Republic highly value this cooperation. Within the system of COMECON and the friendly economic cooperation among all socialist countries, and on the basis of the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality of rights, mutual benefit, friendly mutual assistance, noninterference in internal affairs, respect of territorial integrity, and socialist internationalism, these relations are an important contribution to the achievements of socialist countries.

In carrying out the grandiose task of completing the building of socialism in our country, the Rumanian people have contributed by their achievements to the strengthening of the world socialist system and have affirmed the superiority of socialism over capitalism.

Inspired by the progress of the past 20 years and by the realization that the new system in our country is a historical achievement of the Rumanian people and a fruit of their creative labor, the personnel of the Rumanian Armed Forces has spared no efforts in striving for a continuous strengthening of defense capabilities of our socialist country.

Continuing the heroic traditions of the Rumanian people, which have developed during centuries of struggle for national and social liberation, the Army of Rumanian People's Republic keeps watch over the revolutionary achievements of the people and protects their independence, sovereignty, security, and peace.

The Rumanian Workers Party is steadfastly guided by the Marxist-Leninist teaching concerning the defense of our socialist country and has studied the practical experience of the CPSU which forged the first socialist army in the world. In learning from this experience to benefit its own activities and taking into account the specific conditions of our country, the Rumanian Workers Party has created a new army during the years of people's government. This army has close ties with the people whose interests it serves.

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The principal distinctive character of the Rumanian Armed Forces is their socialist, deeply popular character. The soldiers and officers of the Rumanian People's Army are sons of workers in cities and rural areas. They have no other interests than those of the people. This strengthens the unity of the army ranks and its close ties with the working people. Servicemen enjoy all political and civil rights. They may vote and may be elected to leading organs of the state, and they take an active part in the political life of the country, and in public and cultural-educational undertakings. The monolithic unity of all people around the party and the government, and the selfless devotion shown by workers in cities and rural areas in implementing the policies of the party and government, are clearly reflected in the singleminded determination of the whole personnel of the Armed Forces and in their enthusiastic, resolute performance of tasks assigned to the Army by the party and government for the purpose of improving its combat capacity.

The personnel of our Armed Forces is educated in the spirit of ardent devotion to their socialist fatherland and the cause of the working people, and of boundless loyalty to the Rumanian Workers Party, which is the tested leader of the people, as well as the State Council and the government of the Rumanian People's Republic.

Selfless devotion to the party and the national democratic system, close ties between the army and the people, high political consciousness of servicemen, and their firm discipline and responsibility for strengthening the defense capability of the socialist fatherland, -- all this is a guarantee of the fact that our Armed Forces are honorably performing the noble mission entrusted to them.

The personnel of the Rumanian People's Army is educated in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, friendship, and solidarity with fraternal peoples of socialist countries, and with workers of the whole world. Based on the unity of countries of the world socialist system, which is rooted in an equal state system, in the common interests of defense and development of revolutionary achievements of our peoples, in a singleness of purpose inherent in the building of socialism and communism, and in a common ideology of Marxism-Leninism, Rumanian soldiers and officers have feelings of warm friendship for the military personnel of other fraternal socialist armies.

Our People's Army is surrounded by the love of the party, the government, and all the people, who have created the necessary conditions for constantly improving the training of cadres and the combat capability of troops, and who have provided for the equipment of the army in accordance with requirements of modern military science and technology.

Workers Party and the Union of Working Youth play an important role in the military training of soyedineniya and chasti, in improving their combat capability, strengthening one-man command, military order and discipline, and increasing the political consciousness of military personnel. The main purpose of the work of party and youth organizations in the army is to see that the personnel understands and carries out the policies of the Rumanian Workers Party. These organizations concentrate their attention on developing the socialist consciousness of personnel and on the formation of high moral and fighting qualities.

At present more than 76 percent of officers of our army are party members and candidates, and more than 90 percent of the whole personnel of the army are members of the party or the Union of Working Youth. This shows itself in the high degree of socialist consciousness of soldiers and officers of our Armed Forces; they perform the tasks assigned to the army by the party and government selflessly and enthusiastically.

Party organs and organizations are becoming increasingly competent in solving the tasks assigned to them and in mobilizing the personnel of the Armed Forces to carry out the plan for combat and political training in all details and on an increasingly higher level.

On the basis of experience accumulated by our party in the organization and conduct of political work, party organs and organizations of the army have improved their methods and forms of work from year to year, mainly by inviting the participation of large groups in the preparation and implementation of various measures.

Based on recent experience, and by decision of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, the Combine-Arms Academy and the officer training schools have organized party committees instead of political sections since 1959. By a consistent use of the collective principle and a simultaneous reduction in the party apparatus, party committees have achieved much better results in their work, thereby proving the correctness of such measures in practice.

The collective leadership principle has become the basic principle in the work of all party organs in the army as a result of the organization of the Main Political Council of Armed Forces, political councils of armies, and commands of arms and soyedineniya, and appointed party organs, i.e. regimental party committees. These organs, while strictly observing and strengthening one-man command, bear a collective responsibility for the subject matter and effectiveness of all political work, and they promote a constant increase in the role of the party as the political leader in all types of activities of the army.

CPYRGHT A fact of extreme importance in the formation of the Rumanian People's Army was the participation of the Rumanian Army on 23 August 1944 in an armed uprising, which was initiated, organized, and led by the Communist Party of Rumania, and also the army's participation in the just war against Hitler Germany. During this war the army fought valiantly, together with the Soviet Army, for the liberation of Rumania from German fascist occupation; it later fought battles on the territories of Hungary and Czechoslovakia until such time as fascist Germany was defeated.

Since the date of its foundation, the Communist Party of Rumania consistently strove to win over large numbers of soldiers and officers to the side of the revolutionary forces, in the interests of the defense of independence and national sovereignty of the country.

During the years of military fascist dictatorship, when the most reactionary circles of the bourgeoisie and the landowners plunged the country into war on the side of Hitler Germany, the Communist Party of Rumania was the only political force advocating the protection of national interests, the withdrawal of Rumania from this war and its entry into the antifascist coalition, in which the Soviet Union was the decisive force.

After a thorough analysis of the internal and international, political and military situations, the principal cadres of the Communist Party of Rumania, under the leadership of Gheorge Gheorghiu-Dej, began to develop a plan in the summer of 1943 for the overthrow of the military fascist dictatorship and for the national liberation of Rumania.

To implement this plan measures were taken to strengthen the party, and to achieve a unity of action of the working class by creating a single workers' front, which was the backbone supporting all the political forces willing to fight for the liberation of the country.

The Communist Party of Rumania, a fearless fighter for the vital interests of the people, who demanded the unification of all anti-Hitler forces for the purpose of deposing the military fascist dictatorship, gave proof of its ability to cope with complex conditions in the crisis of the fascist regime. Our party was skillful and extremely flexible in making use of all the opportunities presented by this crisis, including various splits between ruling classes, conflicts between Antonescu and the "historical" parties, and between the regime of fascist dictatorship and the monarchy.

... consists in the fact that it united, around a common platform, all political groups and circles, which for some reason or other advocated the withdrawal of Rumania from the anti-Soviet war and the turning of weapons against Hitler Germany.

One of the most important measures of the party in preparing the revolt was the increased activity of armed groups and the increase of personnel in patriotic combat detachments. The latter consisted mainly of workers who were experienced in class and antifascist struggle. Of particular importance was the work done by the party in the army in connection with preparations to overthrow the fascist regime and to fight against Nazi forces; this included the winning over of patriotically minded generals and senior officers to the side of the anti-Hitler forces.

Our party made skillful use of favorable conditions created by military successes of the anti-Hitler coalition, mainly by the brilliant victories of the Soviet Army.

In accordance with a plan prepared by the Communist Party, the fascist leaders were arrested on 23 August 1944. A new government was formed the same night, and a proclamation was broadcast at 2200 hours, announcing the liquidation of the military fascist dictatorship, the withdrawal of the country from the war on Hitler's side, and the changeover to an armed struggle on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition for the purpose of driving out the fascist occupation forces.

In Bucharest, patriotic combat detachments and Rumanian military units had surrounded German military installations by midnight of 23 August, and had begun to dismantle them and to disarm Nazi soldiers and officers. At 2300 hours of August 1944, the General Staff sent an operational directive to the troops and command officers of the Rumanian Army on Rumanian soil, ordering them to begin military operations against German units and to regroup our troops for the operation in Transylvania. (Archives of the Ministry of Armed Forces, General Staff, Document No 738/1, Chapter 2, pages 60-63.)

Almost simultaneously with the beginning of the fight in Bucharest, operations aimed at wiping out the German fascist troops started in all parts of the country. By the end of August 1944, patriotic combat detachments and Rumanian military units cleared the city of Bucharest and its surroundings of Nazi units, and defeated the German troops in central, southern, southeastern, and southwestern regions of Rumania, i.e., in Dobruja, Muntenia, Oltenia, Banat, and the southern part of Transylvania.

ian military units captured 56,000 German soldiers and officers and 14 generals, including generals Hansen (chief of the German Mission in Rumania for Ground Troops) and Gerstenberg (chief of the German Mission in Rumania for Air Force). About 5,000 Germans were killed in battle. Thus, more than six German divisions with a large quantity of arms and combat equipment were withdrawn from combat or captured by the insurgent forces.

The victorious armed revolt in August 1944, the withdrawal of Rumania from the war against the Soviet Union, and its joining of the anti-Hitler coalition dealt a heavy blow against Nazi Germany. These events contributed to the collapse of the German front in the Balkans and facilitated the rapid advance of the Soviet Army at great depth to the borders between Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, and the approach of the Soviet Army to the border between Rumania and Hungary. The latter had been protected by Rumanian troops since the first days of the uprising, thus preventing the penetration of German troops. The Rumanian people participated with all their human and economic resources in the war against fascist Germany until it was completely defeated.

At the time of the successful armed revolt, the Soviet troops continued the Jassy-Kishinev offensive which had begun on 20 August; they defeated and wiped out the principal forces of the German group of forces "Southern Ukraine," which were surrounded by the end of 24 August, and pursued the German troops retreating in disorder. According to a directive of the Soviet Supreme Command setting forth the tasks for troops of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian fronts in the given operation, i.e. to develop the offensive against Izmil, Reni, Galati, and Focsani, the Soviet troops entered the cities of Focsani and Galati on 27 August.

The Soviet soyedineniya of the Second Ukrainian Front, which were to meet with German troops fighting against the Rumanian Army in central Transylvania and on the western border, passed through Bucharest, where they were met by large crowds with flowers, banners, and endless shouts of rejoicing. Huge columns of Bucharest residents met the heroic fighters of the Soviet Army like friends and brothers, as the latter had borne the whole weight of the war on their shoulders, fighting to defeat fascism and to liberate mankind from the threat of Nazi slavery.

Continuing the fight against the German occupation forces, the Rumanian Army together with the glorious Soviet Army fought bravely for the liberation of the whole country. During this period, 27 Rumanian divisions numbering about 270,000 men took part in military operations.

On 7 September 1944, the division named Tudor Vladimirescu, which had been formed in the Soviet Union from the ranks of former Rumanian prisoners of war who wished to fight against Hitler Germany, entered into combat at Sfintu Gheorghe. This division continued to fight together with other Rumanian army units and distinguished itself in the battle for Debrecen and on the Gron River. The coordinated action of Rumanian and Soviet forces took place as part of the operations of the Second Ukrainian Front, to which the Rumanian troops belong.

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When the German occupation forces were driven out of the cities of Carei and Satu-Mare on 25 October 1944, the whole territory of the country was liberated. This marked the end of the Vienna Dictate, according to which Nazi Germany and fascist Italy deprived Rumania of part of its national territory.

In giving due credit to the combat past of our army, its fight for freedom and independence of the country, particularly for the liberation of the country from the fascist yoke, and its contribution to the defeat of Hitler Germany, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers Party and the government of the Rumanian People's Republic declared 25 October as the Rumanian Armed Forces Day.

In close military cooperation with the valiant Soviet soldiers, Rumanian soldiers continued to fight on the territory of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, contributing to the operations of Debrecen and of Budapest, and also took part in military action connected with the Vienna and Prague operations, until the complete defeat of fascist Germany.

The participation of the Rumanian Army in the war of liberation against Hitler Germany, shoulder to shoulder with the army of the first socialist country in the world, had a powerful effect on the minds of large numbers of Rumanian soldiers and officers and enabled the personnel of our army to master the principles and methods of socialist military art, under conditions of close Rumanian-Soviet military cooperation at the front.

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dea made in a speech at the official session of the Grand National Assembly devoted to the 20th anniversary of Rumania's liberation from the fascist yoke: "The Rumanian people will forever honor the memory of the valiant Soviet soldiers, who gave their lives for the freedom of our country; the blood which was shed by Rumanian and Soviet soldiers strengthened the friendship and unity between the two nations in fighting for the great cause of liberty of all peoples, peace, and socialism!"

front until the capitulation of Hitler Germany, more than 360,000 Rumanian soldiers and officers participated in combat.

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The Rumanian troops which fought against Hitler Germany understood the justness of the cause for which they were fighting; they displayed a high degree of heroism and self-sacrifice, and their numerous combat exploits contributed to the history of heroic combat traditions in the struggle of our peoples for national and social liberty. The Rumanian Army had about 170,000 casualties in the war against Hitler Germany.

The successful execution of operational tasks by Rumanian troops, and their valor and self-sacrifice in combat were noted in many orders issued by the Soviet Supreme Command, in 21 reports of the military command, as well as in orders of the commander of the Second Ukrainian Front. Mar Su R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY, Minister of Defense USSR, stated: "As a commander of the Second Ukrainian Front, I recall with great satisfaction the glorious combat feats of Rumanian soldiers, who fought without sparing their strength and even their lives and defeated their mortal enemy by their courage and daring. By their courageous feats they helped to accomplish the great victory."

Fighting for the just cause of defeating Hitler Germany, the Rumanian people gave all their strength and resources to this cause, mobilizing the whole economic potential of the country for the needs of the front. They responded with enthusiasm to the appeal of the Communist Party: "All for the front, all for victory!" Our people multiplied their efforts, supplying the troops at the front with everything they needed for combat operations. Displaying great patriotic enthusiasm, which will always remain engraved upon history, the workers restored railroad junctions, promptly repaired railroad workshops, bridges, and tunnels which had been destroyed by the fascists, and supplied the front with ammunition, food, and fuel.

After the Rumanian Army joined the side of the patriotic forces and took part in the antifascist armed revolt and in the war against Hitler Germany, very important changes took place in the social function of the army. Instead of being a tool serving the interests of the exploiting classes and the monarchy, as in the past, the army became more and more a support for the people's struggle. In the war against Germany and under the influence of revolutionary changes in the country and of the work done by Communist Party members, profound changes occurred in the consciousness of large numbers of soldiers and of most officers, making them receptive to the aspirations of the working class and increasing their interest in political problems of the country and in the fate of their people.

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The political apparatus, which was introduced in the whole army after the establishment of the people's democratic system on 6 March 1945, began extensive activities in educating the personnel in the spirit of loyalty to their country, to the working people, and to the people's democratic system; in the spirit of brotherhood with the Soviet people and friendship with all peoples on whose territory the Rumanian soldiers had fought; and in the spirit of solidarity with all peoples fighting against fascism, for freedom and national independence, and for delivering civilization from Nazi barbarity. The political apparatus cultivated new relations between officers and soldiers, between commanders and subordinates, and educated officers and NCOs to respect the dignity of soldiers and to take care of their needs.

The glorious combat traditions which have their origin in the war against Germany, have been recorded in golden letters in the history of our country. The Rumanian people will for ever remember the heroic fighters -- Rumanian soldiers and officers, courageous fighters of patriotic combat detachments, and all of their fearless sons, who took part in the antifascist struggle and gave their lives in fighting for the sacred cause of their country's freedom.

The Rumanian people and the personnel of their Armed Forces are full of admiration and respect for those who took up arms 20 years ago to fight for the freedom and independence of their country. Together with other working people, veterans of the war against Hitler Germany are making their contribution to the implementation of party policies, giving all their strength to the work of building socialism; they take an active part in the education of the younger generation in the spirit of socialist patriotism, and they support the foreign policy for the defense of peace, which is carried out consistently by the Rumanian people's Republic.

The glorious combat traditions of the Rumanian Army, dating back to the war against Hitler Germany, are an inspiration to the personnel of our Armed Forces, encouraging them to perform the tasks of combat and political training in a precise and excellent manner, and to continue increasing the combat capability of our People's Army, so that it may be ready at any moment to defend the sacred soil of our socialist fatherland, the Rumanian People's Republic.

III.

After the war, our party continued to give due attention to questions of military structure, leading the Rumanian people in the development of a people's democracy.

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The process of forming the people's revolution and had the same general features and stages of development.

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By making constructive use of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the defense of socialist countries in solving problems of military building in our country, and by taking into account the complex conditions under which the people's revolution took place, the party gradually created a new military organization. The process of forming military cadres from the ranks of the working masses was begun, and measures were taken to improve living conditions, training, and education of personnel and to establish new relationships among members of the Armed Forces, reflecting the changes in the social and economic system of the country. Those elements, which did not meet the requirements presented by the people to the army, were eliminated.

Considering the changes taking place in the correlation of social and political forces in favor of the revolutionary interests of workers, the party carried out the overthrow of the monarchy on 30 December 1947 and proclaimed the establishment of the Rumanian People's Republic, a country realizing the political government of workers. This event marked the beginning of implementing the tasks of socialist revolution.

Under the new conditions, the development of our Armed Forces continued to be coordinated harmoniously with the entire revolutionary process in the country, being an integral part of it. The specific measures for completing the process of formation of our socialist army were based on the tasks formulated by the First Congress of the Rumanian Workers Party. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej stated in a political speech at the congress: "There are no sacrifices which we would spare for our army and for its needs. We want it to be well fed, well equipped, well clothed, and excellently trained... To keep watch over the interests of the people and the Rumanian People's Republic, and to be a school for the people -- such is, in our opinion, the role of the army of the Rumanian People's Republic." (G. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articles and Speeches, Volume 1, State Publishing House, 1956, pages 132-133)

In carrying out the tasks assigned by the congress, the party began to rebuild the political apparatus and party organizations in the army; in this connection the formation of the Main Political Administration of the Army was of particular importance.

In accordance with the workers' tasks of socialist building, and the mission of the army under these new historical conditions, the party became very active in forming new officer personnel. For this purpose the party devoted much attention to the training of new graduates in

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officer schools and in the Military Academy. The doors of the schools were opened wide to admit young men who came from the ranks of the working class, the peasantry, and the people's intelligentsia; they came from the midst of the people who were vitally interested in the socialist development of the country, and in the defense of its independence and sovereignty. During a short period of only a few years, numerous officer cadres were formed. They fully justified the trust of the party and the government, both as commanders of podrazdeleniy and chasti and in the political apparatus. At the same time the party continued to reeducate in a socialist sense those cadres of the old army which had proved their loyalty to the people's democratic system.

With the development of the national economy and the growth of the country's economic power, it became possible to equip our People's Army with everything necessary to carry out the mission entrusted to it by the party and the people. The supply of the army with arms and combat equipment was closely coordinated with the creation of improved living and training conditions for officers, NCOs, and regular enlisted personnel.

Together with the technical equipment of the army, important changes took place in its organizational structure. Those arms which did not meet modern requirements were abolished; mechanized soyedineniya were formed; and chasti and soyedineniya of new arms were organized, which had not existed in the old army.

The Rumanian Workers Party gives particular attention to the strict observance and strengthening of one-man command, considering this one of the basic principles for building an army of the new type. The army maintains firm discipline, based on the conscious recognition of all servicemen of the need to fulfill their duties and on their sense of personal responsibility for the defense of their country.

The Rumanian People's Army, which is a socialist army deeply devoted to the interests of the workers, was created by consistently carrying out the program of measures prepared by the party.

The deep transformations, which have taken place in the 20 years since the liberation of the country in the structure of productive forces and production relations, had a direct influence on the increase of Rumania's defense capability and created the necessary conditions so that the organizational structure and the combat and political training of the army would meet the requirements arising from the rapid development of new weapons of modern warfare and from structural changes in military science and military art.

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The scientifically founded policy of a complex and comprehensive development of the country, initiated by the Rumanian Workers Party, and its tireless activities aimed at the further development of the material and technical base of socialism, have led to a systematic increase in the country's economic power and, on this basis, to the strengthening of its defense capabilities.

As a result of the efforts of the Rumanian Workers Party and the government of the Rumanian People's Republic, military chasty and soyedineriya have the use of modern arms and combat equipment, and the army has been completely mechanized. We now have tank troops, rocket-launching artillery, supersonic jet airplanes, modern combat ships, radiotechnical and rocket troops.

With the completion of collectivization of agriculture, the unity between the working class and the peasantry has been raised to a higher level, and the moral and political unity of all the people has become even stronger. This is clearly evident from their boundless loyalty to the party and to our socialist state and from their enthusiastic work to complete the building of socialism and to further the prosperity of their country. The solidarity of workers with the party, and their determination to continue carrying out its tried and tested policies, is also of extreme importance for strengthening the defense capabilities of our country.

In the process of the cultural revolution which took place under the leadership of the Rumanian Workers Party, the cultural level of the people has improved considerably and highly qualified cadres of specialists have been trained, who are fully capable of using the latest achievements of science and technology.

All this has greatly influenced and continues to influence the strengthening of our Armed Forces. The fact that the general educational level of our young recruits has improved from year to year and that many of them have a complete secondary education, enables them to acquire military skills quickly and to master modern combat equipment and complex devices at the army's disposal.

The number of command and technical cadres with higher military education has increase considerably; this is of great importance for the mastering and skillful use of combat equipment and for increasing the combat capability of chasty and soyedineniya.

The officer personnel is constantly improving its technical and political training, keeping in step with the development of combat technology and all that is new in socialist military science and art.

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The officers strive to improve the combat training of personnel and to perfect the art of commanding chasti and podrazdeleniya on the training field, on firing ranges, tank parks, and during tactical command-staff and troop exercises.

Joint exercises, conducted both in the USSR and in adjacent socialist countries, play an important role in improving the theory and methods of training command personnel and in stimulating the commanders' operational and tactical thinking process.

With the improvement in the theory and methods of training, our officers became more and more experienced in organizing and supervising soyedineniya, chasti, and podrazdeleniya. This is evident from the good and excellent results achieved in all types of training. The number of soyedineniya, which received the rating "good" during field inspections, has doubled; the number of podrazdeleniya and chasti achieving good and excellent results in tactical exercises has increased.

In the process of troop training for the perfection of combat skill, the method of socialist competition has been applied successfully. Soldiers and officers have made extensive use of socialist competition for reducing norms established for the operation of arms and combat equipment, and for increasing the number of rated specialists, outstanding servicemen and leading podrazdeleniya. More than 3,000 podrazdeleniya received the title "leading podrazdeleniye", in the competition preceding the 20th anniversary of Rumania's liberation, by striving for further improvements in the results of combat and political training and by displaying deep patriotism. It is also indicative that the number of leading podrazdeleniya, which retained their title for a number of years, has increased 3.5 times as compared with last year. In carrying out commanders' orders and assigned tasks, soldiers and officers have shown high moral and fighting qualities, courage and daring, persistence and determination, firmness and initiative.

Commanders, staffs, and party, technical, and rear service organs have concentrated their attention on the continuous increase of combat readiness of the Armed Forces; on the ability to deploy in a short period and conduct decisive combat actions with the use of rockets and nuclear weapons, or without them; in training all servicemen to apply the necessary skills for prolonged combat actions, both in summer and winter, in any weather and any terrain, and to maintain their weapons and combat equipment in constant readiness.

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An important role in the development of political consciousness is assigned to the ideological and political training of officers and the political training of regular servicemen, based on the study of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and a thorough comprehension of the scientifically founded policy of the Rumanian Workers Party. This training inspires the command personnel and its subordinates to strive persistently for implementing our party policy and helps them to gain a correct understanding of all tasks facing them as a result of the constantly changing situation.

* * *

At present, mankind is experiencing a profound process of renewal. The transition from capitalism to socialism marks the keynote of our epoch. As a result of the great achievements of the Soviet people in the building of Communism and the remarkable success achieved by all socialist countries in all spheres of life, the world socialist system has become a decisive factor in historical development, strengthening the forces of peace, democracy, and social progress.

Although the reactionary and aggressive nature of imperialism has remained unchanged, the correlation of forces has changed significantly in favor of peace. The forces of peace today are more powerful than the forces of war and they are able to foil the attempts of imperialists to start a new world war; the further growth of these forces provides practical conditions for eliminating a world war from the life of society even before the victory of socialism throughout the world.

A firm foundation of the foreign policy conducted by the Rumanian People's Republic is the fraternal friendship and unity with other socialist countries. The Rumanian Workers Party and the government of the Rumanian People's Republic have consistently carried out the policy of strengthening the unity and brotherhood of socialist countries, and unifying the international communist and workers' movement under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, as a guarantee of victory in the struggle for the cause of socialism and peace. Being convinced of the fact that all countries can and must cooperate and contribute to the regulation of international relations, the Rumanian People's Republic, together with other socialist states and other peace-loving countries, has consistently advocated the defense and strengthening of peace in all the world, and has expanded its contacts with countries of a different social and political system on the basis of principles of peaceful coexistence.

At the same time, recognizing the existence of imperialist circles which are interested in the armament race and preparation for war, the Rumanian People's Republic, as well as other socialist countries, remain vigilant and have taken all measures to defend their independence, sovereignty, and freedom. The Rumanian people have dependable allies in the Soviet people, with whom they are connected by a strong friendship cemented by the blood of both peoples which was shed in the fight against Hitler Germany, and they are also allied with the peoples of all socialist countries. United by a singleness of purpose, the countries of the world socialist system with their enormous economic and military potential are able to repulse any encroachment upon their security and upon peace in the world. In strengthening its defense capability and the combat strength of its army, our country helps the Warsaw Treaty Organization, whose member it is, to fulfill its mission, i.e. to protect the peaceful labor and security of the Warsaw Treaty countries against possible aggression. At the same time, our country contributes to the strengthening of the whole world system of socialism and of the powerful forces offering resistance to the policy of aggressive imperialist circles.

The workers of our country and the personnel of our Armed Forces rejoice in the achievements of the Soviet people in building the material and technical basis of Communism, and in the development of science and technology for the purpose of raising the living standard of Soviet people. Fruitful relations of fraternal cooperation in all spheres of activity have been established and continue to grow between our countries; this cooperation serves the vital interests of socialist peoples in their struggle for the victory of socialism and peace.

The Rumanian People's Army is a reliable shield for the independence and sovereignty of our country; it protects the revolutionary achievements of the Rumanian people and, in close unity with the Soviet Army and the armies of other socialist countries, it keeps a steadfast watch over the cause of socialism and world peace.

Soviet military thought before World War II had already come to the conclusion that for the successful carrying out of an offensive operation in great depth there must be available such an organization of the army and instruments of war as would make it possible to overcome the resistance of the enemy and to defeat him both in the beginning and during the course of the operation. For this it is necessary not only quickly to break through the tactical defense of the enemy, but also with furious speed to exploit the success in operational depth all the way to the completion of the operation. Here rapid exploitation of the break-through is considered the most important action of the army and the front offensive operation.

Pre-war Soviet military art envisaged the following ways toward solving the problem of exploitation of a break-through: creation of powerful striking forces in the direction of the main blow; inclusion in the operational organization of fronts and armies of special echelons for exploitation of a break-through, consisting of mobile sovedineniya (mechanized and cavalry corps) and airborne troops; and creation of powerful reserves and second echelons. However, our pre-war theory of the solution of the problem of exploiting a success in an operation, although fundamentally correct, found no practical support in our military build-up.

As a result of the influence of the cult of personality and incorrect evaluation of the experience in the war in Spain, serious errors were permitted in the organization of our armed forces. The mechanized corps, which were the chief means of exploiting a success, were broken up shortly before the beginning of World War II, and in the training of troops before the war, main attention was paid to problems of breaching long-term defenses of the enemy (Mechanized corps were re-established only on the eve of World War II, and it was not possible to train them completely by its beginning.). As a matter of fact, the problem of exploiting a success by the combat use of tanks and other instruments of battle was studied very little, and our command personnel had had little experience with this, which, undoubtedly, led to unfavorable consequences.

World War II was a most important stage in the development of military theory and the use of the most suitable methods of operations of troops. Methods of operational exploitation of a breakthrough were constantly being perfected, depending on changes in the quantity and quality of means of armed conflict, the nature of the preparation for, and subsequent stages of, an operation, and the increase in the organizational abilities of Soviet military commanders. In the first period

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of the war and in beginning of the second, exploitation of a breakthrough for this used separate tank brigades and cavalry corps, which were later attached to these armies for strengthening the tank and mechanized corps. Tank armies of mixed composition were more adapted to exploitation of a breakthrough, but only by a part of their forces -- the tank and cavalry corps (Mixed tank armies were composed of tank corps and also infantry divisions. Also, cavalry corps were sometimes added to these tank armies.). Their other part, the infantry divisions, were used also, like the divisions of a combined-arms army, primarily for a breach of the enemy's defense. Thus, of heterogeneous composition, they with their own forces both broke through the enemy's defense and advanced in operational depth, which in fact split them into two parts, and undoubtedly had an adverse effect on the speed with which they carried out missions in operations.

In the summer and autumn campaign of 1943 the function of operational exploitation of a breakthrough was transferred, in the main, to the front. In the composition of the latter appeared such new (for that time) powerful mobile operational ob'yedineniya as tank armies of homogeneous composition. At the same time they continued to strengthen also the combined-arms armies with means (mobile troops) for exploiting a breakthrough.

Problems of the mission and use of tank armies in offensive operations of World War II have already been elucidated to some extent in the military press. In this article we will try to carry on the discussion on a somewhat different plane: from the experience of offensive operations of the Soviet Army, 1943-1945, we will examine the operations of tank armies in operational depth, emphasizing generalization of this experience and determining what we can learn from it for present-day conditions.

It should be emphasized that such characteristics of modern combat operations as decisiveness, great maneuverability, speed of movement, their development on a wide front, in great depth, and a rapid tempos, the increased importance of the march, and rapid and abrupt changes in the situation are not absolutely new. They existed to a certain degree in the operations of mobile troops and especially of tank armies in offensive operations of the last war. Now such operations are typical not only for tank troops but also for motorized-infantry troops. Of course, radical changes have taken place in the conduct of a battle or an operation, brought forth by the use of nuclear weapons, rockets, and other new means of warfare. Therefore the general character of combat operations unquestionably cannot at all be compared with the past. We are concerned only with these operations of tank armies which undoubtedly can still be instructive for tank and motorized infantry troops.

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With the appearance of tank armies of homogeneous composition, quantitatively and qualitatively, of the front echelons for exploitation of a success. As a result, the number of tanks taking part in operations, and the depth of the operational disposition of the front, greatly increased, which made it possible not only correspondingly to intensify the attack, but also to exploit a breakthrough at high tempos with decisive overcoming of the resistance of the enemy and defeat of reserves he brings up, unit by unit, from the march (Having mechanized corps, in addition to tank corps, in tank armies made it necessary to have in their composition a certain number of motorized infantry.). The use, in offensive operations for exploitation of a success in operational depth, of tank armies in addition to tank and mechanized corps greatly influenced the change in the nature not only of front offensive operations, but also of the operations of groups of fronts. (In the Belgorodskiy-Khar'kov, Bug-Dnestr, L'vov-Sandomir, Wistula-Oder, Berlin and other operations two or three tank armies were used, with strong air support.) The decisiveness and scope of operations was increased; their duration was decreased; combat operations of troops became much more dynamic and fastmoving.

The experience in the use of homogeneous tank armies in operations deserves attention even under present-day conditions. With the sharp increase in the depth of operations, their fast-moving and rapidly-changing character, and the use in them of nuclear and other new weapons, some concrete situation or other, it seems to me, may make it necessary to use not only mixed, but also homogeneous operational and tactical groups of forces. In this connection, naturally, there may be required also corresponding homogeneous tactical and operational elements -- tank and motorized infantry, for example.

In the last war, tank armies, cavalry-and-mechanized groups, and separate tank and mechanized corps, out of which were constituted echelons for the exploitation of a success, caused the appearance of new methods (new for that time) of operations of troops in operational depth. These mobile operational groups developed the attack and carried on the pursuit, as a rule, on separate axes, independently from the main forces of the fronts and armies, forced water barriers from the march, seized and expanded operational bridgeheads, and over-ran enemy lines of defense in depth, from the march, and with preparation in limited periods. Under such conditions, the combined-arms armies, too, were able to advance quickly behind the tank armies, which led to a completion of their missions in shorter periods. The experience from such operations, in our opinions, still has not lost its validity.

All these and other characteristics of the offensive operation did not arise all at once. In the second period of the war, from lack of the necessary experience in the use of tank armies, and also in

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armies of mixed composition), their operations still did not provide the desired results. Only as the production of tanks increased, organization was perfected, and experience was gained in the use and operations of tank armies did they begin more successfully to carry out the missions of exploitation of a breakthrough, and from the summer of 1943 they occupied a leading place in the operational organization of fronts.

Being of homogeneous composition (mainly tank and mechanized corps), the tank armies represented a real force, the correct use of which opened the way for still more rapid development of an offensive at high tempos, and for carrying on a number of subsequent operations in great depth, with the infliction of a complete defeat on the enemy operating on the axes concerned. To be sure, the exploitation of a tactical success in operational depth and a further continuous offensive in great depth were not carried out only by tank armies, cavalry-and-mechanized groups, and mobile forces of combined-arms armies. Front and army second echelons and reserves also were used for this purpose. However, lacking sufficient mobility, they could not have the same effect on the character of the operation as did the tank armies. For example, when there were still no tank armies in the fronts, the depth of offensive operations usually varied from 100 to 150 kilometers. In the second and third periods of the war, the depth of operations of fronts which included tank armies was from 300 to 500 kilometers a day, in the latter, 40-50 kilometers a day, and in certain operations amounted to 70-80 kilometers a day.

What is to be learned from the experience of the operations of tank armies, it seems to us, is that now, too, separate tank groups can be established and can function independently during operations, to a great extent separate from the main attacking forces. Also, certain missions which tank armies carried out, and ways in which they operated, can take place now, too, with changes appropriate to new conditions of conducting operations.

In operations at operational depth tank armies carried out the following basic missions: the defeat of the operational reserves of the enemy, and primarily his tank and mechanized forces; the swift development of an attack at high tempos with maneuver for encirclement of enemy groups and the creation of an external, less commonly an internal, front of encirclement, in cooperation with other forces; pursuit of a retreating enemy, with forcing of water barriers and breaking through lines of defense; the disruption of the command and disorganization of the rear of the enemy; the seizure of important operational zones and objectives in the enemy's depth; and others.

One could scarcely deny that similar missions could be performed by tank groups under present-day conditions.

Or let us take the methods of operations used by the tank armies. Among the most typical of them was the delivering of a powerful attack with the development of an offensive on axes in depth, or toward the flank with the aim of bypassing a large group [gruppirovka] of the enemy, and then encircling and destroying him in cooperation with mobile forces and combined-arms armies of other fronts (the 6th Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 5th Guards Tank Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Kossun'-Shevchenkovskiy operation; the 5th Guards Tank Army and other mobile forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front together with the 1st Guards Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front in the encirclement of groups of the enemy east of Minsk; etc.)

The delivering of powerful attacks by tank groups, including attacks on converging axes may be typical under modern conditions. Here, we must assume, their operations following nuclear attacks will be still more swift.

Tank armies carried on an offensive in converging directions also within the limits of one front, but much less often, and only in those cases when the front was launching two attacks, as happened in the L'vov-Sandomir operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front (It is noteworthy that of the most important offensive operations of World War II with encirclement of the forces of the enemy, 22 were carried out by the forces of groups of fronts, and only 8 by a single front.)

Tank armies also delivered powerful frontal attacks in great depth, with the aim of splitting up the enemy forces and defeating them piecemeal. Such operations provide for a furious attack by mobile groups of one or more fronts on various axes. The operations of tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy operation, of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Uman'-Botosani operation, and of the 1st and 2nd Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Eastern Pomeranian operation may serve as examples.

Such attacks, delivered by the tank armies of several fronts, resulted in the splitting and fragmentation of the defense of the enemy. Especially instructive in this respect were the operations of the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front and the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Lodz and Czestochowa sectors in the Vistula-Oder operation. As a result of the furious attack of our troops, the forces of the group of armies A of the enemy were split up into three isolated groups: those of Warsaw, Kelce-Radom, and Krakow.

The delivoying by tank groups of deep and intering attacks has become an even more characteristic phenomenon in modern operations, with the depth of these attacks, like the depth of the operations, having now sharply increased, which favors the massed use of nuclear weapons, air forces, and air-borne attacks.

Just as in the past, various methods of operations of tank groups may be combined or used in turn. An example of combination is the L'vov-Sandomir operation. In it, the 1st Ukrainian Front launched two attacks: in the Rava-Russkaya and the L'vov sectors. After exploitation of the success after the breach of the enemy's defense, two strong tank groups were formed in the front: into the composition of one went the 1st Guards Tank Army, into that of the other, the 3rd Guards and the 4th Tank Armies (In the composition of tank groups of the front there were, in addition to tank armies, also cavalry-and-mechanized groups and separate tank and mechanized corps). These armies launched deep salient thrusts, in the course of which they surrounded with a part of their forces the Brody group of the enemy.

The use in turn of various methods of operations of tank armies took place in the Belorussian operation, where after surrounding the enemy east of Minsk, the 5th Guards Tank Army launched a deep salient thrust against Vilnius and Kaunas. The 6th Tank Army operated in a similar way in the Jassy-Kishinev operation. During the Proskurov-Chernovtsy operation, three tank armies first launched a salient thrust, and then a group of the enemy was surrounded in the Kamenets-Podolsk region.

In the operations of World War II, front echelons for the exploitation of a success achieved the best results with the massed use of tank soyedineniya and ob'yedineniya on the principal axes, with their echelonment in depth. Committing to action in the cosen sector first the mobile groups of combined-arms armies, and then the front echelons for the exploitation of a success -- tank armies, cavalry-and-mechanized groups, and tank and mechanized corps -- provided for a steady increase in the force of the attacks during the operations.

In most operations of World War II tank armies of front echelons were used for the exploitation of a success and operated on one general axis, and only in individual cases, on different axes (when the front was launching two attacks, or when in the course of a tank army operation, due to changed circumstances, it became necessary to continue an attack on divergent axes).

With the aim of creating large tank groupings, there was also the practice of joint use of tank armies on the contiguous flanks of two fronts. This was characteristic of the operations of the second period of the war, with there being, as a rule, one tank army in each front (the 3rd Guards Tank Army of the Bryansk Front and the 4th Tank Army of

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Таблица 1*

Наступательные операции	Фронты	Танковые армии	Состав танковых армий	Наличие в составе фронтов других подвижных войск*	Некоторые показатели при действиях танковых армий:		
					средние темпы наступления (км/сутки)	максимальные темпы (км/сутки)	максимальный отрыв от ОА
Контрнаступление в битве на Волге (ноябрь 1942 г.)	Юго-Западный	5 ТА	1 и 26 тк, 8 мк, шесть сб, одна тбр	4 тк	32	40-45	до 40
Острогожско-Россошанская (январь 1943 г.)	Воронежский	3 ТА	12 и 15 тк, 7 км, три сб, одна сбр	4 тк	28	40-50	15-25
Орловская (июль-август 1943 г.)	Западный	4 ТА	11 и 30 тк, 6 гв. мк	1, 5 и 25 тк	4-5	до 18	10
	Брянский	3 гв. ТА	12 и 15 тк, 2 мк	1 гв. и 20 тк	5-6	до 20	20
Белгородско-Харьковская (август 1943 г.)	Воронежский	1 ТА	6 и 31 тк, 3 мк	5 гв. и 2 гв. тк	30	35	до 40
	Степной	5 гв. ТА	18 и 29 тк, 5 гв. мк	1 мк, 4 гв. тк, 3, 5 гв. и 7 км	20	28	30
Киевская (октябрь-декабрь 1943 г.)	1-й Украинский	3 гв. ТА	6 и 7 гв. тк, 9 мк	1 гв. км, 5 гв. тк	15	40	20
	2-й Украинский	6 ТА	5 гв. тк, 5 мк				
Хорсунь-Шевченковская (январь-февраль 1944 г.)					Наступление совместно с общевойсковыми армиями		Почти не было (переломных тбр)
	2-й Украинский	5 гв. ТА	18, 20, 29 тк	5 гв. км	20	40	
Прокурово-Черновицкая (март-апрель 1944 г.)	1-й Украинский	1 ТА	11 гв. тк, 8 гв. мк, 61 отбр	4 гв. тк	18-20	до 30	10-15
		3 гв. ТА	6 и 7 гв. тк, 9 мк		15-20	30	10-15
		4 ТА	10 гв. тк, 6 гв. мк		до 20	25	до 15
Уманьско-Ботошанская (март-апрель 1944 г.)	2-й Украинский	2 ТА	3, 16 тк, 11 гв. тбр		23-27	50-60	15-17
		5 гв. ТА	18, 20, 29 тк		20-25	30-40	15-20
		6 ТА	5 гв. тк, 5 мк		до 20	30-35	15-20
Белорусская (июнь-август 1944 г.)	3-й Белорусский	5 гв. ТА	3 гв. тк, 29 тк	2 гв. тк, кмс (3 гв. мк, 3 гв. км)	25-40	до 55	Более 40
		1-й Белорусский	2 ТА		3, 16 тк, 8 гв. тк	до 40	60

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Львовско - Сандомирская (июль-август 1944 г.)	1-й Украинский	1 ТА	11 гв. тк, 8 гв. МК	Две кмг (25 и 31 тк, 1 гв. и 6 гв. кк), 4 гв. тк	25-30	до 55	30-40
		3 гв. ТА	6 и 7 гв. тк, 9 МК		25	50-60	до 60
		4 ТА	10 гв. тк, 6 гв. МК		20-25	40-50	до 55
Яско-Кишиневская (август-сентябрь 1944 г.)	2-й Украинский	6 ТА	5 гв. тк и 5 МК, затем 18 ТК	КМГ (23 тк и 5 гв. кк), 18 ТК	40-50	до 70	60-70
		1 гв. ТА	11 гв. тк, 8 гв. МК		3 и 11 тк, 2 гв. и 7 гв. кк	30-35	70-80
Висло-Одерская (январь-февраль 1945 г.)	1-й Украинский	2 гв. ТА	9 гв. и 12 гв. тк, 1 МК	4 гв., 25, 31 тк, 7 гв. МК, 1 гв. кк		40	до 90
		3 гв. ТА	6 и 7 гв. тк, 9 МК		25-35	до 50	40-60
		4 ТА	10 гв. тк, 6 гв. МК		25-35	40-50	50 и более
Восточно-Прусская (январь-апрель 1945 г.)	2-й Украинский	5 гв. ТА	10 гв. и 29 ТК	1 и 8 гв. тк, 8 МК, 3 гв. кк	18-20	Более 40	10-30
Венская (март-апрель 1945 г.)	3-й Украинский	6 гв. ТА	5 гв. тк, 9 гв. МК	23, 18 тк, 1 гв. МК	9-17	25	Почти не было
Берлинская (апрель-май 1945 г.)	1-й Украинский	1 гв. ТА	11 гв. тк, 8 гв. МК, 64 гв. тбр	9 и 11 тк, 2 гв. и 7 гв. кк	8-10	20	Почти не было
		2 гв. ТА	9 гв. и 12 гв. тк, 1 МК		до 10	20-25	То же
	1-й Украинский	3 гв. ТА	6 и 7 гв. тк, 9 МК	1, 25, 4 гв. тк, 7 гв. МК, 1 гв. кк	30-35	до 50	40-45
		4 гв. ТА	10 гв. тк, 5 гв. и 6 гв. МК		30	40-50	45
Пражская (май 1945 г.)	1-й Украинский	3 гв. ТА	6 и 7 гв. тк, 9 МК	25 тк, 4 гв. тк, 1 гв. кк	до 60	80-90	80-100
		4 гв. ТА	10 гв. тк, 5 гв. и 6 гв. МК		до 60	80-90	80-100
	2-й Украинский	6 гв. ТА	5 гв. тк, 2 гв. и 9 гв. МК, 83 мсбр	1 гв. кмг (4, 6 гв. кк, 7 МК)	70-90	120	до 100
Маньчжурская (август-сентябрь 1945 г.)	Забайкальский	6 гв. ТА	5 гв. тк, 7 МК, 9 гв. МК, 36 и 57 мсд, шесть мбр, одна мсбр, пять тбр	КМГ (25 мбр, 43 тбр, четыре кд, один тп)	Около 100	130-160	70-90

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Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090005-1

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the Western Front in the Orel operation, etc.) Yes, and in a number of operations of the third period of the war the efforts of several tank armies of one or two fronts were combined for carrying out major missions. Thus it was in the Korsun'-Shevchenkivskiy operation, in which three tank armies of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts were concentrated on the outer front of encirclement to repulse the counter-attacks of the enemy. At the conclusion of the L'vov-Sandomir operation the efforts of all three tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front were directed toward the seizure, expansion, and holding of the Sandomir bridgehead.

Some data on the composition of tank groupings of fronts and information on their operations are provided in Table 1.

From the table it is evident that the greatest success in operations was achieved with the existence in the composition of fronts of large tank groups which operated on the principal axes.

In a number of cases, to increase the force of attacks in the course of an operation, one front or another would be reinforced with a tank army from the reserve of the stavka of the Supreme High Command (the Bryansk Front, with the 3rd Guards Tank Army, in the Orel operation; the 1st Ukrainian Front, with the 2nd Tank Army, during the Korsun'-Shevchenkivskiy operation), or by transferring a tank army from another front (the 1st Tank Army to the 2nd Belorussian Front in the Eastern Pomeranian operation, etc.).

Thus the concentration of the efforts of several tank armies in most cases was completely justified, inasmuch as under these conditions the striking power of the mobile forces was sharply increased, as was their operational independence, which enabled them to make deeper thrusts, maneuver extensively, attack at high tempos, and attain the final goals of operations in short periods. Besides, this provided for uninterrupted participation of tank armies in subsequent operations carried out within the frameworks of strategic operations of groups of fronts, without long operational pauses.

The creation and use of large tank groups may be expedient now, too, considering the added factor of the increased depth of offensive operations. In addition, the mass use of nuclear weapons creates exceptionally favorable conditions for swift, vehement operations. At the same time these groups may suffer great losses from the nuclear weapons of the enemy, and it will be necessary to strengthen them, but not just by committing to action fresh infantry forces, as used to be the case, but first of all by delivering nuclear attacks, by subordinating to them nuclear-weapons units held by higher commands, by transferring motorized infantry troops by air, and by launching airborne attacks. In many cases, especially in large-scale offensive operations, several large tank groups may, just as formerly, be used and operate simultaneously or in succession.

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The experience in sending tank armies into action in the course of an operation is instructive. For example, with several tank armies in the striking group of a front, depending on the plan of operation and the circumstances, they were sent into action simultaneously or one after the other in one sector, or if the front were launching two attacks, in two sectors (the 1st Belorussian and the 1st Ukrainian Fronts in the Berlin operation). In the L'vov-Sandomir operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front, two tank armies (the 3rd Guards and the 4th) operated in one of the main sectors; they were sent into action one after the other. This made it possible to increase the effort from depth for the exploitation of a success, but on a narrow front, while simultaneous use of tank armies on several axes provided for the development of a decisive offensive on a wider front.

The exploitation of a success by tank armies usually began after a break-through by combined-arms armies of the main zone or the whole tactical zone of defense of the enemy, and was carried on in great depth. But often the tank army corps from the beginning attacked together with the units of the combined-arms armies, "completely breaking through" the enemy's defense, and thereafter they operated gradually more and more separately, exploiting the success in operational cooperation with the combined-arms soyedineniya, with air support.

Now, differing from this, large tank armies probably will immediately exploit the results of massed nuclear attacks and will swiftly develop an offensive from the very beginning of the operation. In many cases, just as formerly, tank groups may operate for some time jointly with motorized infantry, gradually out-distancing them and attacking independently, at a considerable distance from them. Along with the tank groups, some motorized infantry soyedineniya may also be separated.

The vehement operations of tank armies to a considerable degree made possible the successful carrying out of operations of encirclement and destruction of large operational groups of the enemy. This operation was fairly complicated and required the participation of sizeable forces, usually of several fronts. In the Soviet Army during World War II encirclement became the basic, leading form of offensive operations. They attained the greatest success primarily due to the rapid arrival of mobile forces in the rear of the surrounded enemy group and as a result of repelling enemy attempts to free his encircled forces.

Tank armies accomplished the encirclement maneuver immediately after the breach of the tactical zone of defense of the enemy, with the development of the attack in operational depth of during pursuit, when the enemy was beginning to withdraw his forces. In all these cases the tank armies, independently or in conjunction with mobile groups of combined-arms armies, took part in the establishment of an external or, less

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commonly, an internal front of principal arrival on the internal front of encirclement of infantry troops, the mobile units, as a rule, were freed for action on the external front.

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The operations of tank armies on the external front of encirclement is instructive. Sometimes they, with the troops of other arms, went on the defensive, forming a fixed external front. But more often these armies continued the offensive and, swiftly developing it, comparatively quickly increased the distance between the external and internal fronts. A sizeable increase in the distance between these two fronts made it possible to prevent the maneuver of operational reserves of the enemy and to destroy them piece-meal as they approached from depth; at the same time it gave freedom of action to the combined-arms armies for the defeat of the encircled groups and resulted in a more rapid liquidation of them.

Thus, in the Jassy-Kishinev operation, by decision of Marshal Malinovsky, commander of the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 6th Tank Army, in cooperation with a cavalry-and-mechanized group, continued a furious offensive and as a result drove back the enemy from 80 to 100 kilometers from his encircled groups, which deprived him of the possibility of helping the encircled forces and made possible their rapid defeat.

In an offensive at operational depth the tank armies carried out combat actions with great maneuvering; skillfully, with all or a part of their forces, executed flanking movements or envelopements; launched attacks on the flank or rear of enemy groups; and frequently accomplished maneuvers from some axes to others, traversing great distances in their movement. Unquestionably, the experience of these operations is useful for present-day operations of troops, still more dynamic and involving still more maneuvering.

Especially important now are the marches of troops for great distances, and their rapid deployment and entry into combat from the march.

We should like to call attention to the lessons to be learned from the maneuvers of the 3rd Guards Tank Army during the Vistula-Oder operation. Having advanced to a great depth and continuing to develop the attack, by decision of Marshal I. S. Konev it made a sharp turn to the southwest and launched an attack on Oppeln and then on Nikolai, as a result of which the Silesian group of the enemy was enveloped from the north and northwest, and we succeeded in almost completely cutting off his communications. This played a decisive role in the conquest of Silesia. This same army, together with the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, after completion of the Berlin offensive, was abruptly turned to launch an attack on Prague, which accelerated the defeat of the Prague enemy groups.

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These and many other offensive operations of the past war there was clearly demonstrated the great maneuverability and striking power of the tank armies, which was of first importance in assuring success of operations.

Modern tank forces have progressed far in their development, and in their combat and maneuver capabilities can by no means be compared with the tank forces of World War II. Having modern instruments of attack, higher quality materiel and armament, and using new methods of operations appropriate to the conditions and nature of nuclear warfare, they are capable of carrying out any missions assigned to them. But it is useful for them to consider the experience of the vehement operations of tank armies and to a certain extent utilize this experience. This relates especially to the operations of tank armies in the pursuit of the enemy in operational depth (this began, as a rule, in from two to five days of the operation). It was precisely in this pursuit that the tank armies achieved the greatest results in the exploitation of a success, demonstrating to a maximum their maneuverability and mobility.

Thus, while the average daily speed of advance in most operations amounted to 20-40 kilometers, in pursuit it reached 40-70 kilometers, and in a number of operations, even 100 kilometers. Such speed of pursuit was provided by the uninterrupted nature of the operations of tank armies. They advanced during the day with their main forces, and at night, mainly with advance detachments. During that time the main forces of the armies accomplished their marches and made ready for further action. In operations of the third period of the war, the speed of pursuit was so high that it exceeded the speed of retreat of the enemy. In these circumstances, as is evident from Table 1, tank armies most often operated mainly independently, to a great degree detached from the infantry units of the combined-arms armies.

The speed of advance of troops, especially of tank groups, will be still higher under modern conditions. In this connection, there arises especially sharply the problem of the uninterrupted action of troops, day and night, despite their having to pass through zones of destruction and areas of radioactive contamination. It must be expected that the highest speeds of advance will be in sectors where the enemy is being subjected to nuclear blows, including some from the very beginning of the operation.

It is noteworthy that tank armies, depending on circumstances, more often carried out parallel -- less often, frontal -- pursuit, or both in combination. In many cases the pursuit was carried out by combined-arms armies from the front, and by mobile forces by routes parallel to the retreat of the enemy. Parallel pursuit was the most decisive and advantageous. In this the tank armies made a headlong rush, prevented

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the enemy from moving into prepared zones of depth, in-
tercepted communication lines, struck blows on his flank and the rear,
defeated his operational reserves piecemeal (as they moved up from depth),
and from the march broke through operational defense zones and forced
water barriers.

Especially instructive, it seems to us, is the fact that in most cases the tank armies pursued the enemy in dispersed formations and even in columns of the march, deploying in combat formations only on meeting the enemy. The strong advance detachments played a great role in this; they were selected from the tank and mechanized corps. In many cases they had a greater complement than usual, and were assigned missions of operational importance (In the composition of such an advance detachment most often there operated a tank brigade, reinforced by a self-propelled artillery regiment, one or two battalions of artillery and up to [one] engineers battalion, and sometimes infantry podrazdeleniya). These detachments, operating ahead of the main forces at a distance of up to 40 kilometers and more, did not become involved in protracted battles with the enemy, but bypassed his centers of resistance and hastened on to objectives subject to capture. First among such objectives were still-undestroyed bridges, especially across large rivers, fords, and bridgeheads. There is no doubt that the role and importance of the advance detachments now will not only persist, but become still greater, with their being called on to execute missions taking advantage of the results of nuclear strikes, in cooperation with air-borne troops, making possible the swift advance of their own forces.

It should be noted that in the last war great haste was always made to seize river crossings and bridgeheads, because crossing a river in force was for a tank army a difficult task, and accomplishing it was of great importance for attaining high speeds of advance. The fact is that tank armies did not have available enough of their own river-crossing equipment; what was assigned to them very often lagged behind, as it was comparatively not very mobile. So one of the basic missions of the advance detachments was the seizure of river-crossings, which made possible more rapid crossing of the river by the main forces of the tank armies.

Modern tank forces have incomparably greater possibilities of crossing rivers, both with the aid of various mechanized river-crossing equipment, and by themselves -- under the water. All this makes possible a still more rapid overcoming by them of water barriers, as a rule, from the march, without decreasing the general speeds of advance and even without seizing bridgeheads, which they used to have to do.

One of the main missions of tank armies in operations in operational depth deserves attention -- that of defeating the operational reserves of the enemy. No offensive operation could do without the repulse of

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counter-attacks or counter-offensives of large groups of the enemy, amply supplied with a great number of tanks and motorized-and-mechanized forces, and with strong air support. It was the tank armies, operating ahead of the main forces of the front, upon which first fell the flows of these groups. We must assume that in present-day operations the large tank groups, operating separately from the rest of the attacking forces, will be the first to suffer the powerful and active effects of the enemy's action, and not only of his infantry, but primarily of the delivery of massed nuclear blows by his air force and rockets.

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In many cases the tank groups will have to repulse powerful counter-attacks and counter-offensives of the defending forces. In the past, successful accomplishment of these missions was an important condition for rapid exploitation of a success in depth and the attainment of the goals of the operation; it was often necessary to engage large groups of tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy. Some data on the strength and composition of these groups is provided in Table 2.

Table 2 (Table compiled from data of military-historical works published by Voenizdat.)

Операции	Начало контрудара	Состав группировки противника	Количество танков
Прокурново-Черновикский	13 марта 1944 г.	Тл-2 Пл-3	до 250
Керсушь-Шенченковский	4 февраля 1944 г.	Тл-8 Пл-4	490
При наступлении в Прибалтике	16 августа 1944 г.	Тл-7 Пл-5	750
Львовско-Сандмирская	11 августа 1944 г.	Тл-7 Пл-6	Более 800
В районе озера Балатон	6 марта 1945 г.	Тл-7 Пл-5	1630

As is learned from operational documents captured from the enemy, as a rule the mission of his tank groups included the breaking up of our offensive operations. The tank armies accomplished the defeat of these groups of the enemy independently in cooperation with the air force or jointly with combined-arms armies by carrying on meeting engagements or active defense operations..

As a rule, tank armies carried out meeting engagements, which now are still more typical than in the past, with the development of an offensive in operational depth and in the culminating stage, and only sometimes at the beginning of an operation. Such engagements were distinguished by decisiveness, dynamic quality, and variety of methods of

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combat operations were purely tank operations.
The attainment of success in them was mainly made possible by the timely discovery of the advancing enemy groups, forestalling them in deployment, and inflicting attacks by the main forces of the tank corps and armies from the march on the flank of the enemy, with air and artillery support.

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With regard to defensive operations of tank armies in operational depth, these were more often carried out with the completion of front offensive operations, in those cases when there had not been success in defeating the advancing reserves of the enemy in a meeting engagement, or when, according to reconnaissance data, superior forces of the enemy were coming up to the battlefield, and further offensive had become temporarily inadvisable. Going over to the defensive was carried out under difficult and strained circumstances, under heavy pressure from the air and land forces of the enemy, on ground which has not been organized by the engineers, and in a limited period of time. Simultaneously the tank armies carried out a regrouping with the aim of creating a powerful group for the defeat of the enemy. Thus it was in the conduct of defensive operations of 5th Guards and 6th Tank Armies on the external front of encirclement of the enemy in the Korsun'-Shevchenkobskiy operation; of the 1st and 3rd Guards and the 4th Tank Armies in the Sandomir bridgehead; and other cases. In the course of such defense, tank armies carried on active, including offensive, operations with a part of the forces. For example, in the Sandomir bridgehead, while repulsing counterattacks of the enemy, the tank armies undertook decisive offensive actions, and even surrounded and destroyed parts of the enemy's counter-attacking groups.

Under present conditions carrying out defensive actions has become extremely complicated, primarily because of the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy, creating an extensive zone of destruction and radioactive contamination of the terrain. It will be necessary to eliminate the consequences of the nuclear strikes of the enemy and to replace those units which have been greatly weakened, or reinforce them. Under these conditions, previous experience in carrying out defensive actions by tank armies, both independently and jointly with units of combined-arms armies, has, in our opinion, only relative value.

Experience has shown that an important condition for successful operations of tank armies in operational depth is their organized entry into battle. And it was not just chance that in many operations a good deal of time was spent in preparation for this entry into battle -- at least several days (Tank and Mechanized Forces in the Offensive Operations of the Red Army, A Collection of Articles, Voenizdat, 1945, p 72.) We always strove to break through the defense just with infantry divisions of combined-arms armies, with artillery and air support, and to commit the tank armies to battle after the whole tactical zone had been overcome.

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Unquestionably, this way of commitment to battle was the more expedient to the extent that the tank armies were able immediately to move out into operational space and quickly develop a headlong offensive in great depth.

At the same time, most frequently tank armies were committed to battle with the participation of their forces in the completion of the breakthrough of the tactical zone or even the main zone of defense of the enemy. This, undoubtedly, was a less desirable version, but we cannot, in our opinion, only evaluate it negatively. This version of committing tank armies to action was often completely appropriate to the circumstances which had arisen, when the infantry divisions, because of lack of close-infantry-support tanks and the existence of a strongly fortified, echeloned-in-depth defense of the enemy, were unable to break through it in a short period. And if the break-through was delayed, this inevitably used up time which the enemy took advantage of to increase his efforts in his threatened sectors. This why the effort to commit tank armies to battle only after the breach of the tactical zone of defense by the infantry, in certain circumstances often led to a delay in commitment of the tank armies and to undesirable consequences. Thus it was, for example, with the 4th Tank Army in the Orel operation: delay in bringing in the tank forces for completion of the breakthrough enabled the enemy to get organized after the first attacks of our forces and again to set up a strong defense. Naturally there could be no thought of any success of the operations of a tank army in those circumstances, since it was unable not only to exploit a success, but even to complete a breakthrough of the defense; actually, it had to start all over again.

In noting the necessity and expediency in many cases of having a part of the forces of the tank armies participate in the completion of a breakthrough, we do not have in mind the premature commitment of all their forces, as happened, for example, in the Berlin operation, in which the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies could not be separated from the combined-arms armies and had to operate jointly with them during the whole operation. To be sure, the strongly fortified defense of the enemy in the Berlin sector had a great effect on the operations of our forces in that operation. But just the same, in our opinion it was not necessary to commit all the forces of both tank armies within the limits of the main zone.

One of the most interesting and instructive examples was the commitment to combat of the 3rd Guards and the 4th Tank Armies in the L'vov-Sandomir operation. By the time of their entry into the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front there had been created a difficult situation, as follows: it had been possible to accomplish a breakthrough of the enemy's defense at the beginning of the operation only in the zone of the 60th Army, with the front of the enemy breached in only a narrow

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front. By this time the enemy, continually intensifying his resistance, had begun to bring up his immediate operational reserves. As a result there arose a threat of the disruption of the offensive operation of the front. In these circumstances the commander of the forces of the front made, in our opinion, a bold and correct decision: to move into the gap not only the 3rd Guards Army, which had been pre-designated for this, but also the 4th Tank Army (the latter it had been intended to send into action to the left, in the zone of the 38th Army's offensive). In addition, the front air forces (2nd Air Army) were skillfully utilized to assure the development of the operation; they struck massed blows at the Koltuvskaya and Plugskaya groups of the enemy.

The results were soon apparent: the enemy did not expect this and was stunned. By decisive actions, both tank armies, and the cavalry-and-mechanized group which had been brought in here, with a part of its forces, jointly with the infantry corps of the 60th Army, finally broke the resistance of the enemy, swiftly completed a breakthrough of all his tactical defense and rushed on to operational depth. The development of the success was so swift that in just two days the immediate operational reserves of the enemy were defeated and a large group of his forces were surrounded in the Brody region.

The infantry divisions, with air support, were given responsible missions for providing for the entry of the tank armies into action. They were to hold this famous "Koltuva corridor", while being fired on from both sides by the enemy, repulse his counter-attack, and then utilize the success of the tank armies for exploitation of the success, and take part together with them in the encirclement and destruction of strong groups of the enemy.

Anti-aircraft defense (PVO) was of great importance for the operations of tank armies in operational depth. Obviously, now, too, PVO will to a large extent determine the success of an offensive of tank armies in the course of the operation. This relates especially to fighter aircraft.

Successful operations of tank armies in operational depth was to a great extent determined by the organization of coordination. The high rates of advance of tank armies, their maneuvering, and the rapid change in the situation exercise a decisive influence on coordination. This was the reason for the use of the most varied forms of their coordination with combined-arms armies, air forces, neighboring tank armies or cavalry-and-mechanized groups, and of coordination between elements of the operational formation of the tank armies themselves.

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to battle and in the period of defeat of the first operational echelon of the enemy's defense, the tank armies usually operated jointly with combined-arms armies and the tank and mechanized corps assigned to them. During this time tactical coordination was maintained between them. However, on the fifth or sixth day of the operation they were, as a rule, separated from the main forces of the combined-arms armies by 40 to 50 kilometers, and by the end of the operation, by 70 to 100 kilometers. At this stage of the operation there was between them operational coordination.

There is not doubt that under present-day conditions coordination between tank groups, and also with motorized infantry in the course of an operation, may be tactical and operational. Therefore the value of the experience of organizing and maintaining the coordination of tank armies is unquestionable. At the same time, now tank groups would have to coordinate not only with air forces and neighboring units, but also with rocket forces. The complicated conditions of combat would require more often than formerly the establishment of coordination, which the enemy would very often be able to break up.

In the experience of the use of tank armies, there became evident the necessity of dependable artillery support of their operations in operational depth. This arose from the fact that having in their composition self-propelled artillery and tank destroyer regiments was clearly inadequate. Temporary assignment for this purpose in a number of cases of artillery units of combined-arms armies (for the period of artillery support of the tank armies in immediate operational depth) did not fulfill the mission (In the L'vov-Sandomir operation 122 mm and 152 mm gun artillery battalions were assigned for this purpose; in the Vistula-Oder operation there were created special groups of artillery support according to the number of corps of tank armies.). Besides, this artillery remained subordinate to the combined-arms armies, since because of its poor mobility it could not follow along with the tanks. The artillery of the RVGK [Reserve of the Supreme High Command], although by the end of 1943 it was converted to mechanical traction, likewise could not completely meet the needs of the tank armies, since it had considerably less mobility than the tanks. For achieving dependable artillery support of the operations of tank armies in operational depth there was required the creation of a sufficient quantity of fast-moving artillery and the inclusion of it in the composition of the tank armies. But to the very end of the war this was not done.

The air forces played the main role in securing the operations of tank armies in operational depth. It was the main means of their support in the exploitation of a success. The air forces participated in protecting entry of the tank armies into combat, covered them from the air, and delivered attacks on the advancing reserves of the enemy in the zones

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of operations of the tank armies. In a number of operations of World War II, with the exception and support of the troops, part of the forces of the air armies of the fronts were attached to the commanders of tank armies -- usually one ground support and one fighter corps to each. In addition, in the interests of carrying out the missions of tank armies, by decision of the commanders of troops of the fronts, bombing planes were also used, including night bombers.

Under modern conditions a decisive means of defeating the enemy in an operation is nuclear weapons and rocket troops, which first of all would be used to strike blows which are also in the interests of tank groups. At the same time, air power also must be considered one of the effective means of protecting these groups, especially when they are operating at great distances away. Here there must be considered and creatively used the experience of the organization of cooperation of tank armies with air forces and the coordination of their operations according to missions, time, and space. At the command posts of the commanders of tank armies there were, as a rule, operational groups of the headquarters of air corps (divisions), or their commanders themselves, with the means necessary for the control of the air units and communication with their base air fields. This permitted tank army commanders to summon air support directly, omitting extra channels, which facilitated more operational use of them in accordance with the situation. And now, too, there can be no doubt that tank groups, especially large ones, will be supported by air forces.

Besides, under modern conditions it is necessary to organize and maintain on a fairly large scale coordination of tank and motorized infantry groups with air-borne forces, which, in our opinion, will be used very extensively in battles and operations.

The development during World War II of means of combat, and particularly of tanks, inevitably led to the need to create new means and use new methods of supply of materiel and technical equipment to the troops. The participation of large masses of tanks in operations, the increase in the volume and weight of supply loads, and the rapid increase in the hauling distances, together with the slow restoration of the railroads in comparison with the advances of the troops, made especially difficult the rear supply of the tank armies during their exploitation of a success. According to World War II experience, the average daily fuel and ammunition requirement of a tank army of medium strength was 600-700 tons. To satisfy this requirement it was necessary to provide, for a distance of 200-300 kilometers, 270-300 trucks with loads.

The difficulty in supplying tank armies during their operations in operational depth due to the greatly extended lines of supply adversely affected the tempos, and consequently, the results of the operation.

Therefore transport aircraft were used in many operations for the supply of fuel. In case of an shortage of transport aircraft at that time, this could not successfully solve the problem. Motor transport continued to play the basic and decisive role in the supply of tank armies. And yet the experience of using air transport is of very great importance. Primarily this relates to supplying tank groups with fuel and ammunition. In addition, transport aircraft for the strengthening of tank armies can transfer troops, equipment, weapons, etc.

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It must be said that the direction of tank armies operating in operational depth became the more difficult the more separated they were. When the distances were very great, even the radios available at that time did not make possible dependable direction, and they had to limit themselves to mobile means, mainly communications planes (PO-2). In these circumstances, frequently advance command posts of the fronts were established in addition to the main command posts. Control of mobile forces became still more difficult when in the composition of the front there were several tank armies, operating not as one common group, but as several, and in addition, cavalry-and-mechanized groups and separate tank and mechanized corps. Control within tank armies was carried out from army command points by radio and by mobile means of communication.

With regard to separate tank and mechanized corps, although in most cases they operated successfully, in my opinion their use outside the composition of the tank armies was not always expedient. For example, when these corps (I have in mind corps subordinated to the front) operated in the same sectors as the tank armies, it would have been better to have included them in the composition of the latter, as was done in the Jessy-Kishinev operation. Originally the mobile forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in this operation operated as three independent groups: the 6th Tank Army, a cavalry-and-mechanized group, and the 18th Tank Corps, which had the mission of advancing on the flank of the tank army. Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy, commander of the Front, it seems to us, was entirely correct in deciding to subordinate this corps to the 6th Tank Army, which undoubtedly facilitated the direction of the mobile forces. If this corps had continued to operate outside the composition of the tank army, this would have dissipated the efforts of the mobile forces of the front, weakened their striking power and operational independence, and complicated the command. Inclusion of the separate tank and mechanized corps subordinate to the front in the tank armies created more powerful tank groups, all the more because some tank armies had in their own composition a total of two corps each.

Also it was not always expedient to attach the tank and mechanized corps to the combined-arms armies, especially on the main sectors of the front where one, or even two, tank armies were operating. We are

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not in the least inclined to minimize the role and importance of the mobile groups of the armies, which are the army echelons for exploitation of a success. Their existence was fully justified in those cases when there were no tank armies in the front or they were being used on other axes. On these axes the tank and mechanized corps of combined-arms armies operated, as a rule, jointly with the tank armies, essentially in the immediate interests of the front operations (and their missions were assigned them most often by the commander of the front). At the same time, when these corps were greatly separated from the infantry soyedineniya, control and support of them by the commanders of the combined-arms armies became practically impossible, inasmuch as in the armies there were not the appropriate means.

It seems to us that in many cases it would have been expedient to transfer these tank and mechanized corps, too, under the tank armies. There was also the possibility of creating from these corps several additional tank armies, which undoubtedly would still further have increased the combat capabilities of the front ob'yed ineniya and the decisiveness and speed of their offensive operations.

Creatively studying the rich and comprehensive experience of the combat operations of armored forces in World War II, it is necessary to consider that "in a nuclear-rocket war, if the aggressors manage to start one, the role and importance of the tank forces not only will not diminish, but on the contrary will become even more important. This is primarily because the combat capabilities of the tank, as a powerful instrument of warfare, have increased and enable the tank forces most effectively to take advantage of results of nuclear strikes." (R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY. "The 20th Anniversary of the Jassy-Kishinev Operation and the Liberation by the Soviet Army of the Peoples of Southeast Europe from the Yoke of Fascist Occupation." Voyennay Mysl, No 7, 1964, p 15.)

World War II experience has shown that tank armies, correctly used as echelons in the composition of the front for the exploitation of a success, were one of the most important means of successfully solving the problem of carrying out offensive operations at high speeds in comparatively short periods. The use of tank armies in operations of World War II made it possible to accumulate rich and varied experience of their operations in the conduct of operations in depth. Mastery of this experience has enabled Soviet military thought to arrive at important conclusions regarding the use of armored and mechanized forces.

It has been recognized that armored and mechanized forces, organized into tank armies, corps, brigades and regiments, were the means which, in cooperation with other arms, made it possible to successfully overcome the resistance of the enemy at the beginning and in the course of an operation, quickly increase the effort in the region of a breakthrough, and develop a success at rapid tempos. The enemy, on the defensive, was

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in no position to bring up in time his operational and strategic reserves to the area of the breakthrough. The tank armies committed to action and the mobile groups of the combined-arms armies, operating in operational depth, inflicted defeat on these reserves, as a rule, from the march, and destroyed them piecemeal. The use of tank armies on the axes of the main blows greatly increased the scope of the offensive operations of fronts and made more decisive, with high maneuverability and vehemence.

All these important changes in the nature of operations of World War II, brought about by the massed use of armored forces, were taken into account in the later theoretical generalization of their experience. It is true that qualitative changes in ground troops, as in the armed forces as a whole, have required the working out of new forms and methods of the organization and conduct of an operation, as well as refining those established during the last war. In the development of military theory, the experience of the war has been used almost completely for the solution of practical problems in the field of training the armed forces.

Thus, the operational echelons for the development of a success have remained as before, although their functions have been transferred to second operational echelons, which it has become possible to make completely mobile.

The operations of tank forces in operational depth, just as during the war, have been foreseen as being separate from the infantry *soyedineniya*, at rapid tempos, and with extensive maneuvering of forces, equipment and fire in the course of the offensive. Even the basic missions carried out by troops of the tank armies and their methods of operations in operational depth have continued to remain acceptable.

We emphasize again that the combat experience of the tank forces, acquired in the operations of the past war, is also of definite interest under present-day conditions, despite the radical changes which have taken place in the armament and technical equipment of the various branches of the armed forces, and also in the conditions and methods of carrying on war and operations. It should not be a matter, of course, of mechanically copying the forms and methods of operations of tank forces and, in particular, of tank armies, but of those principles which, applied to conditions of modern warfare (nuclear and non-nuclear) require appropriate changes, but which in principle may be retained or be further developed.

Now all ground troops are completely motorized and mechanized, and amply supplied with a great quantity of tanks; therefore, there may be no need specially to have mobile echelons for the development of a success, as there was in the past. But, as we have been saying, in modern

operations, one or more large tank groups may be also used to operate. In addition, apart from the methods of operations of these groups and tank forces in the past, there will undoubtedly be some similarity. Moreover, the individual elements of combat experience may prove to be useful also for modern conditions. This has to do with both the first and the second echelons, called upon following nuclear strikes, and taking advantage of their results, to swiftly exploit the success to the whole depth of the operation. In many cases, undoubtedly, the second echelons and the reserves will prove to be the main means of exploiting a success in operations, and their operations will have still more in common with the operations of echelons for the development of a success which were used during the last war.

In the new conditions of armed combat there will be further development of such methods of operations of tank forces as the advance on separate axes, in separation from the rest of the forces. Especially important may be the separation of the advancing groups (not only tank, but also motorized infantry) on the axis of our nuclear strikes. Utilizing the results of these effectively, the advancing forces on these axes can swiftly exploit the success at very high tempos.

The experience of extensive maneuvering by tank forces during an operation, of their rapid penetration to a great depth into the positions of the enemy, taking advantage of breaks and gaps in his operational formation -- this experience, too, we believe, has not lost its importance. Under modern conditions, the importance of maneuver and of its combination with the strikes of troops will still further increase. This is because of the unprecedented power of nuclear weapons, the great increase in the number of tanks in the composition of ground troops, and the sharp qualitative change in their combat characteristics, and also the new structure of forces.

Some elements of the combat experience of tank forces in principle retain their importance in modern meeting engagements and battles, in the pursuit of a retreating enemy, forcing water barriers from the march, and also operations for the disruption of the enemy's lines of communication, and disorganization of his command and the work of his rear.

It should also be noted that it was the mobile forces, primarily the sovedineniya of the tank armies and tank and mechanized corps, in the operations of the last war which initiated such actions as the advance of troops in approach march and march formations, without dismounting by the motorized infantry, firing directly from the combat vehicles on the march.

As we have said before, the experience of air support of tank armies is of great importance for modern operations. Of course now, support of tank groups and of advancing forces as a whole will be looked

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at in a completely different way, due to the use of nuclear weapons, impossible to do without the operations of the air forces using conventional (non-nuclear) ammunition, both in a nuclear as well as in a non-nuclear war.

In our opinion, much that is useful can be found in the experience of control of tank army troops in an offensive in operational depth. It is true that now the means and methods of the control of troops cannot at all be compared with the past. We have in mind the availability of high quality means of communication, the use of mobile command posts, the ever greater introduction into the process of control of means of mechanization and automatization, etc. Therefore, we must take into account, finally, that the control of troops now has become quite different.

It has not been our aim to examine completely all the possibilities of utilizing the experience of the combat use and operations of tank armies in the last war. Unquestionably, each case calls for new decisions as compared with the past, decisions that correspond to new means of combat, and the new character and methods of carrying out modern operations. But it is also evident that there is much from the past experience that is also useful for present-day conditions.

SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

by Maj Gen N. NOVOKHATKO, Col P. GALOCHKIN
and Col I. TIMOSHCHENKO

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The Soviet Armed Forces have a glorious combat history. They now represent a first-class, modern army, which is a threat to all enemies of peace, democracy, and Communism, and a reliable shield protecting the freedom-loving peoples against attacks by aggressors. This is the force which will inevitably defeat the aggressors if they should commit an act of insanity and start a new war.

The leadership of the Communist Party is the decisive source of strength and invincibility of our army and the principal foundation of the Soviet military establishment. This leadership is evident from the fact that all Soviet military development is based on our party policy and ideology and on the basic instructions of the party.

Commanders, political organs, and party organizations directly implement party policy in the army. The role of the party and its organizations has increased considerably, since the national and international military tasks have grown and become more complex, the role of troop morale in relation to the course and result of armed struggle has increased in importance, and the requirements for combat readiness of troops have become more complex. Therefore, the CPSU Program includes a requirement for the further strengthening of the party's leading role in the army and of the organizing and guiding influence of party organizations.

It is natural, therefore, that each new publication on party leadership of the army and on the development of military party organizations attracts the attention of officers and of all Soviet readers. Among the books devoted to the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, readers will undoubtedly note the monograph by Col. Yu. P. PETROV, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, entitled Partiynoye stroitel'stvo v Sovetskoy Armii i Flote. Deyatel'nost' KPSS po sozdaniyu i ukrepleniyu politorganov, partiynykh i komsomol'skikh organizatsiy v Vooruzhennykh Silakh, 1918-1961 gg. (Party Structure in the Soviet Army and Navy. CPSU Activities in Forming and Strengthening Political Organs and Party and Komsomol Organizations in the Armed Forces, 1918-1961); Voenizdat, Moscow, 1964, 512 pages.

The author has undertaken to describe the activities of the Communist Party in forming and strengthening political organs and party and Komsomol organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy (page 8).

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The book under review will undoubtedly occupy an important place in the literature on party history. It represents the first attempt to examine, in detail, the vast practical experience of the CPSU in building party organizations during almost the entire historical period of the Soviet Armed Forces (1918-1961).

The book consists of a brief introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion. The book discusses, in proper sequence, the principal activities of the party in the formation of political organs and party organizations during the years of foreign military intervention and the Civil War; the development of political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations during the period of peaceful socialist building; the strengthening of political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations in the years of the Great Patriotic War; and political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations during the final period of the building of socialism.

In addition to generally known sources, the author has made extensive use of archival documents which characterize the manifold activities of the party in establishing and strengthening the Soviet Army. The book cites some decisions and instructions of the Central Committee of the party and directives of the Main Political Administration concerning tasks of party development in the Soviet Army and Navy, which had not been included previously in historical literature.

The entire work is permeated by the idea of the leading and organizing role of the Communist Party in the building and strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is shown on the basis of extensive factual material how the party and its Central Committee, in accordance with the international and internal situation and in line with combat and service conditions of the Soviet Armed Forces, developed the structure of party organizations and political organs and perfected the forms and methods of their organizational and educational work.

The facts cited in the book indicate what exceptional importance V. I. Lenin attributed to party-political work in the Red Army. He participated in the elaboration of important problems of party leadership in the army and he corresponded regularly with many members of revolutionary military councils of the fronts and armies, and with political workers of divisions. In his reports and speeches, Lenin brought out and substantiated the principles of party leadership of the armed forces of a socialist state. The whole content of these principles is permeated by the idea that the Communist Party is the principal source of strength of the Red Army and Navy and that it represents their organizer, leader, and educator. At the same time

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V. I. Lenin fought against those who deviated from the line of the Central Committee in matters of military organization. Lenin severely criticized and exposed the "military opposition," whose views and actions were based on the position of "leftist Communists," opposing the conclusion of the Brest peace treaty and dogmatically advocating the conduct of a revolutionary partisan war.

As the readers will see, the Central Committee and V. I. Lenin fought just as resolutely against the adventurous line of Trotsky, who tried to weaken party influence in the army and, finally, to isolate the Soviet Armed Forces from the Communist Party.

It is probably the first time that such a detailed discussion has been presented in our literature concerning the struggle of army Communists against the erroneous views of the so-called "inner army opposition" (the Belorussian and Tolmachev group), which opposed the party line concerning one-man command in 1927-1928 and which essentially represented the views of the "military opposition" denounced at the 8th Party Congress. The book cites documents expressing the firm support by army Communists of the Leninist line in the struggle against various factional groups which tried to distort, shake, or weaken the Leninist principles of party leadership in the Soviet Armed Forces. Army Communists, together with the whole party, waged the struggle against Trotskyism as a revision of Leninism, and exposed the anti-Marxist, petty bourgeois character of Trotskyism. This struggle strengthened the party organizations of the Army and Navy and joined the ranks of the Red Army masses around these organizations.

The book under review includes a more complete discussion than any previously published historical literature of military problems covered by decisions of party congresses, especially the 8th and 10th congresses. The author correctly emphasizes that the decisions of the 10th Party Congress on military matters "have become the program of reorganization of the Red Army and Navy in the postwar period" (page 124).

The book presents a great deal of interesting material describing the manifold activities of the Central Committee, which has constantly guided the work of military councils, political organs, and party organizations. During each stage of Soviet military development, the Central Committee elaborated and specified concrete tasks for party organizations of the Army and Navy. During the period from the 13th to the 14th Party Congress the Central Committee, at the request and suggestion of the Political Administration of the Red Army, examined more than 90 important problems related to the strengthening of the Armed Forces and the improvement of party-political work in them (page 206).

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Based on the idea that the combat capability of the army depends to a great extent on political consciousness and moral fortitude, and on the degree of influence of Communists and Komsomol members in the army, the party and its Central Committee repeatedly carried out important organizational measures aimed at strengthening party influence on all aspects of army life. "Party mobilizations were one of these important measures. The book contains a great deal of factual material concerning the dispatch of Communists to the army.

The author has shown how the Communists arriving in the army established closer unity within *chasti* and *podrazdeleniya* and inspired the Soviet soldiers by their personal example and their ardent words to perform military exploits in times of war and to carry out their peacetime duties of combat and political training in an exemplary manner.

The Central Committee has always shown concern for the ideological and organizational strengthening of all levels of the party-political apparatus and has selected the best cadres for supervisory party work in the Army and Navy. At various times, the Central Committee has assigned noted men from the party and Soviet government to party-political work in the army. The book should definitely be commended for the fact that it informs its readers of the activities of many of these men, who were steeled in revolutionary battles under the leadership of V. I. Lenin and who endured the difficulties involved in establishing and strengthening our Army and Navy. During the period of the Stalin personality cult, these names were undeservedly erased from the history of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In close connection with other measures aimed at strengthening the influence of the party in the Armed Forces, much importance is given in this work to matters pertaining to party growth and the continuous increase of party membership among Soviet Armed Forces personnel. The author presents a great deal of factual material to show how the constant increase of party membership continued to strengthen army party organizations. Even during the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, when the Communists suffered great losses at the front, the membership in party organizations did not decrease but, on the contrary, increased. Full-fledged party organizations existed in most of the *podrazdeleniya*.

In view of the fact that the qualitative improvement of party membership has a decisive effect on the strength of the party, the author has shown, with the help of Central Committee documents and Main Political Administration materials, how party education in the Army and Navy was developed and improved at various stages, and how practical experience was accumulated in this field.

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The pages describe the strengthening of one-man command in the Soviet Army and Navy are of considerable interest. The author cites a number of documents in support of the fact that the party and Central Committee repeatedly pointed out that one-man command increases the social-political authority of command personnel and requires "a maximum intensification of political work and general strengthening of party influence in the chast. The role of political organs, as party institutions in the army, will increase particularly in this connection." According to a statement of the Central Committee in October 1921, "a real commander must be a completely trained political leader of the Red Army masses." (KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza, sbornik dokumentov 1917-1958, The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, Collection of Documents, 1917-1958; Gospolitizdat, 1958, pages 281 and 213).

These are the merits of the book by PETROV, which may be considered an important work on the history of party structure in the Soviet Armed Forces. However, the book is not free of shortcomings.

In reading the book, one notices that problems of party structure and the activities of political organs and party organizations are sometimes discussed by the author without tying them in with the actual development of the Armed Forces.

In matters of organizational development, as in all of its activities, the Communist Party maintains the positions of creative Marxism. It rejects organizational methods and work forms which would be applicable to all times. This means that party development in the army does not have a self-contained character. It is connected with the development of the Armed Forces, and with the specific historical tasks which the Armed Forces had to perform.

Only by using this approach to problems of party development can one understand the need for changes in the organizational structure of political organs and party organizations which were carried out in the army by the Central Committee. Unfortunately, the author of the book does not always adhere to the given and, in our opinion, only correct methodology. For example, in the last chapter, which is devoted to party organization in postwar years, almost nothing is said about the new stage in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, or about the essence of the revolutionary changes which occurred in the Armed Forces. However, it was during this period that the army received rockets and nuclear weapons and that a tremendous leap forward took place in the development of other types of armament. Literally all branches of the Armed Forces and all arms were changed. The technical changes in the army led to an increase in the role of party-political work and provided the latter with new and more complex tasks. Only from these positions can one deeply understand the true meaning of

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decisions of the October 1957 Plenum of the Central Committee and the subsequent measures of the Central Committee CPSU for improving party-political work among the troops. Unfortunately, the author has said almost nothing about the development of the Armed Forces themselves during the postwar period, or about the revolution in military affairs. Therefore, the discussion of problems of party organization during this period has the appearance of being sufficient in itself. Even a decision of the October Plenum of the Central Committee is related by the author only to the incorrect line of the former Minister of Defense, Marshal ZHUKOV.

The basic changes which occurred in military affairs objectively demanded a new upswing of party-political work in the army, whereas Marshal ZHUKOV followed the line of curtailing the activities of political organs and party organizations, thereby reducing the influence and policies of the party in the army.

Readers are interested not only in facts, but in a scientific approach to their interpretation. Otherwise it is difficult to understand the complex processes connected with the organization of our army, since it was necessary in a relatively short period of history to establish one-man command and the institution of military commissars, and to organize primary party organizations in regiments, then in battalions, and then again in regiments.

The ideological and theoretical level of the book would have been much higher, and its practical value would have increased, if the author had not limited his discussion to the period ending in 1961 (by the way, it is not quite clear why the year 1961 was chosen). The chronological limits of the book did not permit the author to include a full discussion of problems of party organization as mentioned in the new Party Program and in the decisions of the 22d Party Congress. The readers are entitled to expect a discussion of these problems, since the book was released to the press in February 1964. It has been stressed repeatedly in party decisions that the principal content and the main task of ideological work is propaganda of the CPSU Program and of decisions of the 22d Party Congress. In this respect not only the author, but also the Military Publishing House permitted a serious error.

It is known that Yu. P. PETROV has already published two books on this subject, one of which discussed party organization in the years 1918-1920, and the other during the period 1921-1940. Of course, the author did not mechanically combine the first two books into one new book. He introduced the proper corrections and additions, and eliminated all traces of the personality cult from his writings. The new book was supplemented with two new chapters, covering the past 25 years

of the development of our Armed Forces. So it is even less comprehensible how it could be a monograph in 1964, without using any of the materials of the 22d Party Congress.

A book of this type, published after the 22d Party Congress, should have included not only questions of party organization during the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar years (until 1961), but also an analysis of the 22d Party Congress decisions concerning matters of party organization in the army and the strengthening of its combat power.

The author should also have pointed out his own errors and shortcomings, which occurred in his works published in 1952 and 1954. In his introduction, he stated that he was able to present a more precise discussion of a number of problems of Soviet military organization (page 8); however, he did not specify which problems he was referring to, even though his books were used to propagandize problems of party organization in our army among officers.

It should also be mentioned that the author has arbitrarily defined the period of development which our country is now experiencing. As it is known, it was stated at the 21st Party Congress that the USSR has entered upon a period of large-scale building of Communism. The author named his last chapter: "Political organs, and party and Kom-somol organizations during the period of completion of the building of socialism." Chronologically, this chapter discusses events from 1946 to 1961, which belong to different periods, i.e., the restoration and development of national economy (1946-1953), the period of the upswing of national economy, and the period of large-scale building of Communism.

A very important question in the problem under discussion is the relationship between the one-man commander and the party organization. A correct understanding of this question has a decisive effect on the activities of a commander, as well as of a party organization. In our opinion, the author has on the whole solved this problem correctly, but he sometimes permits deviations from the generally accepted views concerning the relationship between a one-man commander and a party organization. He stated in several places that during the 1930's "a real one-man commander was not only the political leader of a podrazdeleniye, chast', or soyedineniye, but also the party leader... A real one-man commander (as well as his assistant for political affairs) was the representative of a higher party organ in the corresponding chast' and soyedineniya; this was one of the special features of party structure" (pages 200-201).

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The author expressed the same opinion in explaining the question as to why the Instructions to Party Organizations, approved in April 1957, discuss matters pertaining to party transgressions by commanders of separate chasti, not in the primary party organization, but in the party commission attached to the higher political organ by decision of the latter's chief. The author explained this by the peculiarities of party structure, according to which "a commander (party member) and his deputy for political affairs were endowed with the rights of party leaders, in addition to their administrative functions" (page 474). Speaking of the establishment of one-man command in 1942, the author emphasized that "a commander, who was a party member, supervised not only the political but also the entire party work" (page 375).

Is this formulation correct? We do not think so. It is not mentioned anywhere in the decisions of the Central Committee concerning one-man command that commanders are representatives of a higher party organ, nor that they are leaders of a party organization.

Naturally, a commander carries out the policy of the party, but does this mean that he is the representative of a higher party organ? Does this not erase the differences between a commander, on one side, and for example, a commissar or chief of political section, on the other side? Even though party organizations in the army operate under specific conditions, they do remain parts of our party. All of their activities, as those of a voluntary organization, are based on Leninist organizational principles and Leninist norms of party life. The leading principle of the organizational structure of party organizations is the principle of democratic centralism. However, if we endow a one-man commander with the rights of party organization leader, we would violate this basic principle of the organizational structure of the party and would immediately place the commander above a party organization.

The work of party organizations in the army is supervised by an elected party organ, i.e., the Central Committee, through the Main Political Administration, operating with the right of a section of the Central Committee. The political organ of a soyedineniye exercises direct supervision over the work of party organizations in the soyedineniye. This principle has always been stressed in all directives of the Central Committee concerning the work of army party organizations, which were cited by the author in his book. It was stated in the 1919 instructions that "the general supervision over the activities of all Russian Communist Party cells, and the organization of political education work in chasti of divisions, is entrusted to political sections of the divisions" (page 105).

The Statutes, adopted at the 14th Party Congress, include the following statement: "The general supervision of party work in the Red Army and Red Navy is carried out by the Political Administration of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, functioning as a military section of the Central Committee. The Political Administration carries out its supervisory work through political sections appointed by the Administration (political sections of fronts, districts, fleets, armies, divisions, and military commissariats), and through party commissions elected at the proper army conferences" (KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK, The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee, Part II, Gospolitizdat, 1954, page 254).

It is stated in the Instruction of CPSU organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, approved by the Central Committee CPSU on 27 April 1957, that party organizations of chasty and ships are supervised by the appropriate political organs, and that commanders seek the support of a party organization and guide the latter's activities for the purpose of a successful performance of combat tasks (Paragraph 2).

The system of supervising party organizations has been established by the CPSU Statutes, adopted at the 22d Congress, as well as by the Regulation Concerning Political Organs.

The Instructions approved by the Central Committee CPSU on 17 January 1963 indicate that party organizations in the Army and Navy are supervised by the appropriate political organs and party committees. The Instructions clearly state the relationship between a commander and a party organization. A commander, who is a CPSU member, seeks the support of the party organization in his work and guides its activities toward the fulfillment of combat tasks. A commander, who is a non-party member, only seeks the support of the party organization in the performance of such tasks. (Paragraph 2).

The problem concerning the relationship between a commander and a party organization should have been deeply analyzed by the author with the help of party directives. A deviation from the established views in this matter may lead to the practical result that individual commanders, who are politically not sufficiently trained, would not always be able to establish a correct relationship with a party organization; they might assume "bureaucratic attitudes" or try to give orders to the party organization.

The author's interpretation of forms of one-man command should also be made more precise. Speaking of the establishment of one-man command in October 1942, the author stated that "after establishing complete one-man command in podrazdeleniya, chasty, and soyedineniya,

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the Central Committee of the party at the same time retained the joint form of leadership on an operational level, i.e., military councils of fronts, armies, and districts" (page 376). A similar idea is repeated on page 507.

Essentially, PETROV maintains the same point of view as that expressed by S. NAYDA: "... by the end of the Civil War the practice of troop leadership clearly confirmed that the basic principle of control over a podrazdeleniye, chast', or soyedineniye, must be one-man command, while larger army units should be under collective control in the form of military councils of armies and fronts... The Great Patriotic War confirmed that this combination form of troop control is the only correct one under modern conditions" (S. F. NAYDA, O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii grazhdanskoj vojny v SSSR, Some Question of History of the Civil War in the USSR, Voenizdat, 1958, page 22).

We cannot agree with this statement. The party decisions do not make any mention of a "combined" form of troop leadership. One-man command presupposes consideration of other persons' opinions and of the experience gained by subordinates, party organizations, and political organs.

Soviet one-man command does not contradict the principle of collectivity; it successfully combines the authority of a commander with the will of the collective.

The CPSU Program states that one-man command is the most important principle in the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. The existence of military councils on an operational and strategic level is one of the manifestations of that party principle according to which one-man command is carried out on these levels of our army's organizational structure.

One must also draw attention to the unevenness of the Scientific level in individual chapters. While the chapters relating to the years 1918-1941 were written on the basis of thorough research, the chapters concerning the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period are largely of a descriptive character. The book gives a superficial discussion of the present stage in the building of the Soviet Armed Forces and in the work of political organs and party organizations. The author restricts himself to repeating the most important decisions of the Central Committee CPSU, which pertain to a given problem, and he often fails to introduce new ideas in a scientific manner. The descriptiveness of the last two chapters did not enable him to explain the deep internal processes, which took place in the work of army party organizations, although many new and interesting facets of the work of army

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party organizations had appeared after the October 1957 Plenum of the
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considerably. At present about 50 to 60 percent of members of party organizations in many chastis are soldiers and sergeants. The structure of party organizations has also changed. Public principles in party work are developing rapidly; intraparty democracy is continuing to develop; and the role and influence of party organizations have increased. The party organizations of troops have accumulated a great deal of practical experience in fulfilling the requirements of the Instructions, i.e., in taking a deep interest in and having an active influence on all aspects of the life and activities of podrazdeleniya and chastis. These and other aspects of the work of party organizations are treated by the author in a cursory manner, which is disappointing to the readers.

We would also like to draw the author's attention to some specific shortcomings. It is difficult for the reader to remember, from the text of the book, the many reorganizations which took place in the party-political apparatus during a period of more than 40 years. The book should have included the structure of political organs in the form of definite diagrams. Certain questions require additional explanation. We would like to refer, for example, to the so-called political secretariats (page 105), which existed in 1919 and were later abolished (page 138). It is not clear to the reader how the Stalin personality cult manifested itself at the time when the Political Administrations (sections) were transformed into administrations of political propaganda (page 358). One also has to ponder over the question as to how Zhukov restricted the rights of party organizations in the army (page 463). Here, by the way, it would have been a good idea to comment on Zhukov's order issued in May 1956, which "introduced bureaucratic administration into the supervision of party organizations, placed commanders in opposition to political workers, and caused unhealthy relationships and dissension between them" (page 463).

It is not at all clear to the reader why socialist competition in the Army and Navy was abolished (page 336). The author also fails to provide an answer to the question whether the practical relationship between the Political Administration and the Main Administration of Political Education was correct in the 1920's, at which time the supervision of political education work in the Army and Navy was entrusted to the Main Administration of Political Education, while the chief of the Main Political Administration was also a member of the Main Administration of Political Education with the rights of deputy chairman.

The author made use of many archival documents, which is a positive aspect of the book. However, it is not clear why the author, in substantiating certain basic principles, refers not to archival

documents but to articles by NAYDA and MIPOVKTIN (pages 173). In explaining the reasons for the formation of a conciliation commission at the 8th Party Congress, for the purpose of arriving at a single resolution on a military matter, the author does not refer to the stenographic record of the congress, but to an article by KUZ'MIN (page 74). Such references are made quite frequently. For a serious scientific work this approach is too superficial. By the way, works of a monographic character should invariably be accompanied by lists of bibliographic and other references.

We would like to point out some careless formulations and unclear statements by the author on several questions.

It is stated on page 85: "The Second Komsomol Congress decided not to form Komsomol cells in the army." The author does not explain this decision.

It is stated on page 142 that in 1922 the control functions of a commissar over the activities of commanders "acquired secondary importance"; however, the excerpt from the Regulation on Commissars does not confirm this statement.

It is stated in the introduction that the party "considers its supervision over army and navy party organizations as a most important part of general party work and as one of the basic principles of the Soviet military establishment" (page 6). The CPSU Program does not speak of the supervision of party organizations in the army, but of party leadership of the Armed Forces, and of increasing the role and influence of party organizations on all aspects of the life and activities of the Army and Navy.

In conclusion, we offer a number of suggestions to the author and the Military Publishing House.

In our opinion, books on this subject should contain a more complete analysis and deductions from the history of party structure in the Soviet Army and Navy. Officers of our army, and especially those of other socialist countries' armies, should know when we acted correctly, and when we permitted mistakes. After all, we were treading on new ground. Therefore, works on this subject should present a careful analysis to show what has been selected, retained, or rejected from our practical experience of almost 50 years. Moreover, our experience includes not only matters of national importance, but also some that are international and generally applicable, which will definitely be repeated, in certain forms, in all armies of socialist countries. Under present conditions, when advocates of "national communism" try to reject the international character of Soviet experience, the emphasis on these principles is extremely important.

In summing up, our 1955 CIA Report 00875R000300090005-1
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Communists and non-party members, will read this necessary and useful
book with great interest. Our comments were made with the desire to
help the author in his further work on this important problem.

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