
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DIA REVIEW COMPLETED

Cease-Fire Developments

FEPAC DIV

Top Secret

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CEASE-FIRE DEVELOPMENTS

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SOUTH VIETNAM

PRG Views on Relations with South

The PRG appears frustrated over the deadlock in the Paris talks, and is casting about for some way to gain tactical leverage against the GVN.

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-- the PRG has no "solid ideas" on how to get the talks off dead center. Therefore, they were turning to their "big brothers to the

North" to provide some expertise in negotiating.

-- The PRG had "exhausted its current trump cards" without budging Saigon on the issue

of "democratic liberties."

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the PRG has not abandoned its hope for progress and claimed that it still "much prefers a political solution to a military one." It has concluded, he said, that this indeed is the most likely scenario. that Thieu's trip to the US "confirmed" the PRG's theory that he is in "trouble." The Communists are trying to put the best face forward, but appear disappointed with the success of the Nixon-Thieu talks.

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Saigon's View of the Talks

The Thieu government is apparently also searching for ways to break the deadlock in the Paris talks with the Viet Cong. A Foreign Ministry official in a conversation with US Embassy officers in Saigon noted that one of Saigon's delegates is now in South Vietnam discussing new approaches to the Paris talks with President Thieu. The official also hinted that another effort may be made soon to initiate secret talks with the Viet Cong.

Approved For Release 2004/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R000700010002-8 Thieu wants Saigon to maintain the appearance of a reasonable and flexible negotiator without abandoning its basic principles. Saigon still hopes that the Viet Cong will agree to its proposals to discuss elections first. The Thieu government will not agree to put the question of "democratic liberties" in South Vietnam at the top of the agenda, because the Viet Cong would simply use the issue for propaganda purposes and no progress would be possible.

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The Military Situation

There were sporadic Communist shellings in Quang Tri Province on 19 and 20 April, but no major ground action has been reported so far. | 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 north of the capital. In the delta, South Vietnamese forces are encountering stiff resistance to clearing operations along the Mekong River in the Hong Ngu

More POL Pipeline Construction

area.

the Communists have extended their DMZ pipeline southward to Route 9 in eastern Quang Tri Province, where they are building a petroleum storage facility. Four bladder-type storage tanks were observed near a bunker, and more than 20 steel tanks were scattered throughout the area. The pipeline ends near the inflatable tanks, suggesting they may already be in use. When all of the tanks are installed, the storage facility will have a capacity of roughly 130,000 gallons. facility's location, astride Route 9, will allow the Communists to distribute the petroleum to units throughout the province.

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CAMBODIA

The Military Situation

Government troops on 20 April withdrew a short distance from the village of Siem Reap, some 12 miles south of Phnom Penh on Route 2 following heavy Communist attacks. A preliminary report indicates 20 Cambodians were killed and 150 wounded. Some 20 miles west of the capital, the Communists have overrun a government unit on Route 26, and now control about four miles of that road. The Khmer Communists expanded their control over Route 5 following the loss of two more government positions on 19 April some 40 miles northwest of Phnom Penh.

In the southwest, Communist troops continue to put pressure on government defensive positions some eight miles east of Kampot City. The US defense attache—who visited Kampot on 19 April—reports that the city can be defended adequately as soon as more reinforcements arrive. Elements of one government brigade have already been flown into Kampot. The government commander at Kampot told the attache that US air strikes have been largely responsible for keeping the Communists away from the city.

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LAOS

The Military Situation

According to delayed reports, Communist units on 18 April shelled and assaulted a government position some 25 miles south of Pakse. The government troops held their ground. In the north, elements of the government force retreating from Tha Viang have begun arriving at Muong Decha, a major Mecrefugee center some 25 miles southwest of Tha Viang.

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INTERNATIONAL

China Joins in Protesting US Bombing

An authoritative Chinese commentary on recent American military moves in Laos and Cambodia, which appeared in People's Daily on 20 April, is relatively tepid compared to earlier Lao and Cambodian Communist protests. People's Daily is far more circumspect in treating US actions and motives, and did not address itself to the implications of US bombing on stability in Indochina and East Asia. Although the formulations have been used before, the article appears to be a milder expression of Peking's views than recent Chinese statements on the subject.

Moreover, in making its point about violations, People's Daily spells out the provisions of the cease-fire agreements regarding foreign intervention in Laos and Cambodia in a deadpan way apparently intended to leave the impression that Peking takes a dim view of intervention by any foreign country—a nuance unlikely to be lost on the North Vietnamese.

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