


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# Intelligence Memorandum

*The OAS General Assembly*

**Secret**

3 April 1973  
No. 1639/73


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2 April 1973

THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Summary


The Third OAS General Assembly that convenes in Washington on 4 April will provide yet another forum for a number of Latin American nations to criticize both the OAS and US policies. Few concrete proposals are likely to emerge.

Although the agenda lists some 37 items, three issues are expected to provide most of the fireworks during the ten-day session. Probably the most divisive will be the Cuba sanctions policy. Although the group that opposes continuing the sanctions is unlikely to get the two-thirds majority it needs to lift them, the opponents will probably be able to mobilize much stronger support than last year. Indeed the final vote will be close, and, depending on the wording of the resolution, it could be a tie.

The other major issues to be discussed are a call by Venezuela for an examination of the "ultimate purpose and mission" of the OAS and a request by OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza for a review of the system of inter-American cooperation for development. The former will generate complaints over "excessive US influence" in the OAS, and the latter will spark criticism of US trade and aid policies.

Peru, Chile, and Panama are likely to provide most of the anti-US rhetoric; on certain issues they may be joined by Ecuador. Nevertheless, given the routine nature of past assemblies, the climate may be somewhat less hostile to the US than the recent United Nations Security Council meeting in Panama.

*Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to*



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### **Sanctions Imposed Against Cuba by the Organization of American States**

#### **The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, January, 1962**

Resolved that adherence to Marxism-Leninism by any OAS member is incompatible with the Inter-American system....

That the Government of Cuba, by officially identifying itself as Marxist-Leninist is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the Inter-American system....

That this incompatibility excludes the Government of Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system....

That the Government of Cuba be excluded from the Inter-American Defense Board....

That all OAS members will suspend trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war....

#### **The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, July, 1964**

Declared that Cuba was guilty of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of Venezuela and agreed to apply the following measures:

1. OAS members would not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with Cuba.
2. OAS members would suspend all their trade with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment.
3. OAS members would suspend all sea transportation with Cuba except when necessary for humanitarian reasons.

#### **The 12th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, September, 1967**

Condemned Cuba for its repeated acts of aggression against Venezuela and for its persistent policy of intervention in the internal affairs of Bolivia and other American States....

Requested non-member states to join the OAS in the economic sanctions previously called for; called upon OAS members to carry out a series of measures relating to control of propaganda and to restrict funds and arms destined for Cuba; called for increased control of the movement of persons to Cuba, for additional frontier controls, and for continued vigilance in respect to subversive activities; recommended the coordination of counter-measures and a tightening of OAS economic sanctions.

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The Cuban Issue

The General Assembly is expected to review the diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed against Cuba in 1964 and 1967 (Figure 1). The sanctions were imposed following charges by Venezuela that Cuba was sponsoring subversion in Venezuela. Significantly, Venezuela now appears the most likely sponsor of an initiative to repeal or at least weaken the sanctions.

Since Peru sponsored a similar initiative at a special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council last June, Latin American's have become more opposed to the maintenance of the sanctions against Cuba. Several factors have contributed to this trend:

- The decline of visible Cuban support for local revolutionary groups.
- The growing conviction of some governments, despite assurances to the contrary, that the US may embarrass them by suddenly reversing its Cuba policy.
- The desire to avoid the appearance of being last on the bandwagon.
- The intention of some leaders to build domestic support by demonstrating their independence of the US.
- A perception by some countries of Cuba as a "sister American nation."

Even in this changing atmosphere the 16 votes needed to repeal are unlikely to materialize. Recognizing this, the sponsors will probably opt for a vaguely worded resolution designed to gain at least a "moral victory" by attracting a simple majority. Peru tried this tactic last year, recommending that each member be allowed to establish the kind of relationship it desired with Cuba. The resolution failed to gain a majority, though it did attract seven votes (Figure 2). While a simple

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**Voting on Peruvian Initiative Permitting OAS Members  
To Re-establish Relations with Cuba, June 1972**

YES	ABSTAIN	NO
Chile	Argentina	Bolivia
Ecuador	Barbados	Brazil
Jamaica	Venezuela	Colombia
Mexico		Costa Rica
Panama		Dominican Republic
Peru		El Salvador
Trinidad-Tobago		Guatemala
		Haiti
		Honduras
		Nicaragua
		Paraguay
		United States
TOTAL 7	3	13

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majority vote would not legally rescind the sanctions, it would bring the OAS a step closer to doing so and would be an important psychological victory for the anti-sanctions forces. If they do get a majority, they might well seek to convoke a special session of the Permanent Council to press for the requisite two-thirds vote.

Tactically, the Venezuelans are likely to bring up the sanctions question within the general framework of the item they inscribed on the agenda to examine "the ultimate purpose and mission of the OAS." They may well take the line that no condition exists that would justify actions to violate the sovereignty or political independence of any American state. By implying that Cuban subversion is no longer a meaningful threat, this approach would seriously undermine the justification for continuing the sanctions.

The supporters of an initiative against the sanctions probably will point to reports that Panama and Argentina will soon re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. In addition, the supporters will strongly emphasize the fact that Venezuela was the original sponsor of the sanctions in both 1964 and 1967 and is now supporting their repeal. Several delegations may well waver in their position until just before the voting. It is upon these "swing votes" that the chances of Venezuela's getting a simple majority will finally rest. The final vote probably will be close and might even result in a tie (Figure 3).

There also may be a move to undermine the basis for Cuba's exclusion from the OAS. The decision to suspend Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system was made at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation in 1962. Since then, the concept of "ideological plurality" has become increasingly popular among Latin Americans because of a growing conviction that ideological differences should not interfere

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**Possible Voting on Initiative on Cuban Sanctions  
Based on Current Indications**

<b>Probable Votes Favoring Initiative</b>	<b>Probable Abstentions</b>	<b>Probable Votes Opposing Initiative</b>
Argentina	Colombia	Bolivia
Barbados	Costa Rica	Brazil
Chile	Dominican Republic	El Salvador
Ecuador		Guatemala
Jamaica		Haiti
Mexico		Honduras
Panama		Nicaragua
Peru		Paraguay
Trinidad-Tobago		Uruguay
Venezuela		United States
<b>TOTAL 10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>

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with the greater goal of Latin American unity in dealing with the US. Consequently, a resolution calling for "recognition and acceptance of the ideological plurality of the countries of the region" would stand a good chance of passage. The sponsors of such a resolution presumably will ignore the fact that Cuba's continuing refusal to have anything to do with the OAS renders their initiative meaningless in terms of practical effect.

Because of the divisive nature of the Cuban issue, there may be parliamentary moves to postpone its consideration. One possibility would be to direct the OAS Permanent Council to study the question "in light of present circumstances" to determine whether any country is a threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of any member nation.

#### Calvani and Plaza Items

Apart from its implications for Cuba, the Venezuelan proposal (the so-called Calvani item), can be expected to spark a wide-ranging debate featuring criticisms of US economic policies and the weaknesses of the Inter-American system. So can the initiative sponsored by OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza.

--The Calvani proposal (Item 9) calls for a

"Consideration of the ultimate purpose and mission of the Organization of American States and ways of achieving that purpose and carrying out that mission, under the international circumstances existing in the world today."

--The Galo Plaza initiative (Item 10) proposes a

"Review of the system of Inter-American cooperation for development with a view to improving it and bringing it up to date,

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and thereby strengthening the action of regional solidarity in that field and avoiding acts or measures that serve unilateral positions or interests, alien to the objectives of cooperation."

Most of the bombast against US international economic policies will probably occur during the debate on the Galo Plaza item. Anti-American statements have become more frequent and aggressive in recent years and reflect a growing belief among the Latin Americans that US policy makers fail to consider the impact of their decisions on the rest of the hemisphere.

Complaints will be raised against US trade policies. Believing that increased trade is a prerequisite for economic development, the Latin Americans deem it vital that the US agree to impose no further barriers to their products, to eliminate gradually existing quota and tariff barriers affecting their exports, and to enact legislation for non-reciprocal generalized tariff preferences for products of the less developed countries. If the US were to do all this, it would, the Latin Americans believe, lead to a significant increase in foreign exchange earnings, ease their economic problems and facilitate their development efforts.

The Latin American delegates will again apply the term "coercive economic measures" to those US policies and actions which they interpret as pressure tactics in bilateral relations. They object to legislated measures such as the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez Amendments. They also object to what they call the US use of its influence in multilateral lending institutions to deny loans to countries that have expropriated property of US corporations without offering fair compensation. Peru, Ecuador, and Chile are expected to be the most vociferous in depicting these and similar measures as "economic sanctions contrary to the charter of the United Nations."

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A few delegates may also raise the issue of "transfer of technology," defined by the OAS as the process by which the production system of one nation acquires the production technology of another. In the view of many Latin Americans, the US has not demonstrated a sufficient commitment to this goal. There are likely to be renewed calls for a plan of action to expedite the infusion of new technology into the Latin American economies.

In addition to these economic issues, several other Latin American complaints are likely to be aired again. These will include protests against the "increasing influence of multi-national corporations" and expressions of concern that international monetary arrangements are formulated without the participation of the developing nations.

During the discussion on the Calvani proposal, the Latin American delegates will focus on their perception of the "excessive influence of the US in the Inter-American system." The Peruvian delegation is preparing to call for a reorganization of the OAS. Lima's proposals will probably call for a restructuring of the OAS into two separate bodies, a political organization and an economic organization. Lima may also propose that OAS headquarters be moved from Washington to a Latin American country. Peru's primary aim is to reduce US influence in the Inter-American Development Bank. Peru objects to the fact that the voting power of bank members is based on their contributions and would like to nullify the resulting ability of the US to block some loans. A proposal to this effect would receive support from a number of nations, particularly those whose relations with the US are strained. It probably would not receive enough support to become OAS policy at this juncture.

The Peruvians apparently have coordinated their proposal with Panama, but most of the other delegations will arrive in Washington with no specific position on the proposal. There are indeed several

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conflicting viewpoints concerning the proper role of the OAS. One approach would limit OAS business to matters of a strictly regional nature. The defenders of this thesis argue that the organization would become more effective by concentrating its resources on a limited number of goals. Another approach would broaden the organization to reflect the growing involvement of both Latin America and the US with world-wide rather than regional problems. The latter approach might even include the admission of non-American states as full members in order to reduce the influence of the US. In addition, there may be suggestions that the provisions for joint defense against external aggression--the Rio Treaty in particular--have been made obsolete by radical changes in the international system.

#### Other Issues

In addition to these big issues, the General Assembly will have to deal with two thorny membership problems. Argentina and Venezuela, together with Guatemala and one or two others, will vote against the British request for permanent observer status. Their opposition is based on their involvement in territorial disputes over current or former British colonial possessions in the hemisphere. London's request probably will be approved.

The Assembly also will examine the question of admitting "mini-states" to OAS membership. By "mini-states" the members mean the six West Indies Associated States, the Bahamas, and the Netherlands Antilles when they achieve independence. The problem has some urgency because the Bahamas will become independent in July. Although their small size would limit their ability to participate in OAS activities, the main issue is the possible impact their votes might have on issues important to the "Latin" part of Latin America. Compounding the problem of where to draw the line on the definition of a "mini-state" is the fact that Barbados is already a full member. This question will probably be referred to a special committee for further study.

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Several nations are expected to use the Assembly to air specific grievances. Ecuador may attempt to gain an affirmation of the "right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources" which would include complete sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over the seas for a distance of 200 miles. In addition, there are indications that Panama intends to continue its canal campaign during the Assembly. Torrijos has not revealed his plans, but the most plausible approach would be an effort to gain further symbolic support for Panama's position.

#### The Probable Outcome

Although the General Assembly will provide a forum for ventilating the many problems of the Inter-American system, the assembly will be unable to come up with practical solutions for these problems. The final results will depend a great deal on the interaction among the delegations in the corridors, but the most likely outcome is a general resolution recognizing the existing problems and creating a committee to prepare specific recommendations for consideration by the next General Assembly.

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