


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

*Communist China: Foreign Trade  
1967 and Prospects for 1968*

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**FOREWORD**

The data for 1967 in this memorandum are preliminary estimates and subject to modification as additional information becomes available. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown in the cables and tabulations. Ton- nages are in metric tons.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 Directorate of Intelligence  
 May 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM


Communist China: Foreign Trade  
1967 and Prospects for 1968

Summary

The steady recovery of Communist China's foreign trade, which began in 1963, came to an abrupt halt in 1967. Preliminary estimates place total turnover for 1967 at \$4.2 billion, 3 per cent below the total of \$4.3 billion in 1966. Imports increased slightly as a result of larger

**COMMUNIST CHINA: FOREIGN TRADE**  
**1959 AND 1963-67**

Million US Dollars



58959 5-68

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purchases from Western Europe, but exports went down moderately because of the disturbances of the Cultural Revolution and strained relations with Hong Kong and the USSR. Given the self-imposed problems confronting China in 1967, the trade performance was a remarkably successful one. Foreign trade in 1968 probably will show a more pronounced decline.

China's trade with Communist countries dropped 8 percent, resulting in a further increase in the Free World share of Chinese trade, to 75 percent. Trade with the USSR continued its decline, reflecting political differences; trade with other Communist areas fell off by small amounts. With respect to the Free World, the higher turnover with Western Europe and Australia almost offset reductions in trade with the less developed countries, Hong Kong, Japan, and Canada. Sino-Japanese trade declined for the first time since 1959 because of Chinese export problems and a shift of some Chinese import business to Western Europe.

Grain imports fell 20 percent in 1967 because China's requirements were lower in the second half of the year as a result of an excellent harvest. Machinery and equipment purchases moved down moderately following a decline in contracts for whole plants, but took over from foodstuffs as the leading commodity group imported. Steel and fertilizer imports increased considerably. Imports of machinery and equipment most closely related to the defense effort appear to have continued on a priority basis. China's exports declined generally, but textiles and foodstuffs were particularly hard hit.

Preliminary calculations lead to an estimate that China's balance of payments with the Free World showed a deficit of \$55 million in 1967 compared with a surplus of \$155 million in 1966. Nevertheless, Chinese reserves of gold and foreign exchange at the end of 1967 were at least \$600 million, a level considered adequate for emergency requirements.

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Trade in 1967Level of Trade

1. The steady recovery in Communist China's foreign trade, which began in 1963, came to an abrupt halt in 1967. Preliminary estimates place total turnover in 1967 at roughly \$4.2 billion, 3 percent below the total of \$4.3 billion in 1966. Imports are believed to have increased 1 percent to about \$2.1 billion, and exports declined 6 percent (see Tables 1, 2, and 3). The following tabulation gives trade turnover in the past five years as well as for 1959, the peak year prior to the collapse of the Leap Forward:

	Million US \$					
	<u>1959</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Turnover	4,265	2,770	3,220	3,850	4,295	4,180
Imports	2,065	1,200	1,470	1,855	2,045	2,075
Exports	2,205	1,575	1,750	1,995	2,245	2,110

Imports

2. China's imports edged up by about \$30 million in 1967 because of a rapid rise in purchases from Western Europe, as shown in the following tabulation:

	Million US \$	
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
<i>Total imports</i>	2,045	2,075
Western Europe	510	695
Canada, Australia, and Argentina	405	320
Japan	331	302
USSR	175	130
Other	624	628

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3. Imports from Western Europe increased 36 percent, or \$185 million. Larger imports of steel and fertilizer highlighted this rise. Purchases from Western Europe would have risen even further but for the closure of the Suez Canal, which created a backlog of several months in fertilizer shipments and caused a two-week break in the delivery of China's other imports. Shipping delays were aggravated by congestion in Chinese ports and by harassment of crews of foreign ships during intense periods of the Cultural Revolution.

4. Lower purchases from other major areas offset most of the rise in imports from Western Europe. Grain imports from Canada, Australia, and Argentina fell by about \$85 million in 1967. This reduction reflected the excellent Chinese harvest of 1967. Japan's exports to China declined by \$29 million because a Western European cartel gave China substantial price concessions on fertilizer and because China insists that trade with Japan remain balanced. Finally, Sino-Soviet trade suffered further from heightened political hostilities; Chinese imports from the Soviet Union declined by about \$45 million. China's imports from other areas were a mixture of small increases and decreases.

Exports

5. After four years of uninterrupted recovery, Chinese exports declined by an estimated \$135 million in 1967. The only bright spot was exports to Malaysia and Singapore, as shown in the following tabulation:

	<u>Million US \$</u>	
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
<i>Total exports</i>	2,245	2,110
Western Europe	365	335
Japan	291	256
Hong Kong <u>a</u> /	377	320
Malaysia and Singapore	142	185
USSR	145	130
Other	925	884

*a. Net of entrepot trade with third countries.*



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6. Export performance during the year was strongly influenced by both internal and foreign developments. By 1967 much of the domestic industrial capacity idled by the Leap Forward was back in operation and the traditional markets had been recovered. But overall exports were hurt when the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution curtailed the production of some export goods and hampered the internal transportation of others. Also, China's exports to Japan and Western Europe, which had expanded rapidly from 1963 until 1966, declined by \$65 million in 1967 primarily because of reduced foreign demand. Finally, the direct political confrontation with Hong Kong and the USSR, which arose out of the Cultural Revolution, caused a combined loss of \$72 million in exports to these two areas.

7. Despite these problems, China was able to keep the decline in exports well controlled. During the final quarter of the year the Cultural Revolution moderated, exports to Hong Kong revived, and the Canton Trade Fair was completed successfully following a month's delay. Moreover, export losses were partially offset by export gains in some less developed countries, notably Malaysia and Singapore.\*

Direction of Trade

8. Preliminary estimates of Communist China's trade in 1967 indicate a decline of about 1 percent with the Free World and roughly 8 percent with the Communist countries. The Free World share of China's trade rose slightly, to 75 percent, as follows:

\* Because presently available information on China's trade with the less developed countries in 1967 is so fragmentary, it is possible that later information will show a larger than estimated increase in exports to these countries.

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	1966		1967	
	Million US \$	Percent	Million US \$	Percent
<i>Total trade</i>	4,295	100	4,180	100
Free World	3,160	74	3,140	75
Developed countries	1,845	43	1,975	47
Less developed countries	910	21	825	20
Hong Kong and Macao <u>a/</u>	400	9	340	8
Communist	1,135	26	1,040	25
USSR	320	7	255	6
Other	815	19	785	19

a. *Net of entrepot trade with third countries.*

9. The slight drop of \$20 million in China's trade with the Free World in 1967 was the net result of increases with the developed countries and reductions with the less developed countries and Hong Kong. The more marked decline of \$95 million with the Communist countries resulted from a sharp drop in trade with the USSR and small reductions with other Communist areas. Thus trade with the developed countries in 1967 was the only major source of growth in China's trade, which became still more oriented toward these countries.

10. Trade developments in 1967 changed the ranking of China's ten major trading partners, as follows:

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	1966		1967	
	Million US \$	Percent of Total World	Million US \$	Percent of Total World
<i>Total ten major countries</i>	2,600	61	<i>Total ten major countries</i>	2,519 60
Japan	622	14	Japan	558 13
Hong Kong <u>a</u> /	380	9	Hong Kong <u>a</u> /	321 8
USSR	320	7	West Germany	292 7
West Germany	217	5	USSR	255 6
Canada	214	5	Australia	231 6
Malaysia and Singapore	190	4	Malaysia and Singapore	228 5
United Kingdom	177	4	United Kingdom	201 5
Cuba	170	4	France	146 3
France	160	4	Cuba	144 3
North Korea	150	3	Italy	143 3

a. *Net of entrepot trade with third countries.*

Free World

11. Japan remained China's leading trading partner in 1967 despite a 10-percent drop in their trade. China's imports of Japanese fertilizer and steel declined in the face of increased competition from Western Europe, and Chinese exports of rice fell by almost one-half because of a bumper harvest in Japan. Exports of fish also showed a considerable decline, probably because of Cultural Revolution disturbances. Many other exports, however, showed moderate increases.

12. Western Europe, led by West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, registered substantial growth in trade with China. Marked increases in Chinese purchases of steel and fertilizer were highlights. Imports from West Germany increased 64 percent overall, with steel purchases nearly five times the 1966 level. China's exports to West Germany and most other major countries in the area declined, primarily because of the slowdown in Western Europe's growth rate. Both imports and exports increased

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in trade with Italy, however, raising this turnover by 27 percent despite some shipments of spoiled Chinese pork and a few delays in unloading caused by Chinese infractions of Italian port regulations.

13. China's trade with the United Kingdom was buffeted during the last quarter of 1967 by the Hong Kong disturbances and the sacking of the British Embassy in Peking. Both imports and exports were hurt in Chinese trade with the United Kingdom. Imports, however, had been growing earlier in the year, and China's trade with the United Kingdom increased by 14 percent for the year as a whole. Sino-French trade fell off 9 percent, principally because the large sales of French trucks in 1966 were not repeated in 1967.

14. Canada and Australia swapped places in 1967 as China's primary and secondary grain suppliers. Chinese imports from Canada slumped 45 percent and purchases from Australia soared 114 percent. Exports to these countries have been pushed by the Chinese as a small counterbalance to huge grain purchases, and in 1967 exports rose by 39 percent, to \$25 million, with Canada and by 8 percent, to \$26 million, with Australia.

15. China's trade with the less developed countries of the Free World declined by about \$85 million in 1967 because Argentina did not maintain the large grain sales of 1964-66: Sino-Argentine trade plummeted by \$107 million, or 94 percent. On the other hand, Chinese exports to Malaysia and Singapore evinced only minor effects of the Cultural Revolution and advanced by 30 percent for the year. Trade with Pakistan rose to an estimated \$100 million, an increase of 54 percent. Finally, trade with the United Arab Republic and Syria declined substantially as a result of the June war and the closure of the Suez Canal. Trade with other less developed countries probably showed only minor changes. These estimates of trade with the less developed countries of the Free World are based on fragmentary data.

16. Political confrontation and Cultural Revolution disturbances had a serious impact on China's exports to Hong Kong in 1967. Despite the

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importance of Hong Kong to China as a source of hard currency earnings, the Chinese regime permitted disruptions which cut exports by about 20 percent during the second quarter and by about 60 percent during the third quarter of the year. Exports revived in the fourth quarter, but trade for the year fell an estimated \$59 million.

Communist Countries

17. Sino-Soviet trade also felt the effects of China's political belligerence and internal turmoil in 1967. Chinese vituperation and intransigence delayed until July the signing of a trade agreement with the USSR, thus reportedly reducing the quantity of timber the Soviets could deliver and reducing the value of the trade agreement by 16 percent from the level of 1966. Following the signing of the agreement a number of problems, such as the incident with the Soviet ship, *Sversk*, at Dairen in August 1967, hampered the fulfillment of trade contracts. Thus Sino-Soviet trade in 1967 declined by roughly 20 percent, to \$255 million.

18. Most trade agreements with Eastern European Communist countries called for an increase in trade, but China's exports to these countries suffered the same problems encountered by exports to Western Europe, and two-way trade probably fell slightly. Trade with North Korea and Mongolia probably declined because of differences with China over the Cultural Revolution and because of further polarization in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Estimated trade with North Vietnam increased in 1967 because of Chinese aid deliveries in support of the war. Trade with Albania probably increased slightly -- also because of Chinese aid. Finally, Sino-Cuban trade fell off an estimated 15 percent, reflecting the continued cool relations between the two countries.

Commodity Composition

19. The composition of Communist China's trade in 1967 changed markedly as a result of the Cultural Revolution, the improved agricultural picture, and probably some change in import priorities, as shown in the following tabulation:

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	Million US \$			
	Imports		Exports	
	1966	1967	1966	1967
<i>Total trade</i>	2,045	2,075	2,245	2,110
Foodstuffs	510	410	630	590
Of which:				
Grain	400	315	155	125
Crude materials	350	385	485	465
Chemicals	250	300	90	85
Of which:				
Fertilizer	150	180	0	0
Manufactures	905	950	925	870
Of which:				
Textiles	35	40	480	440
Iron and steel	225	275	90	80
Machinery and equipment	455	435	N.A.	N.A.
Unspecified	25	30	115	100

20. China's commodity imports in 1967 featured reduced imports of grain and machinery and equipment and increased purchases of steel and fertilizer. Grain imports were maintained in the first half of the year, but the Chinese failed to contract for Canadian deliveries in the second half, possibly in anticipation of an excellent domestic harvest. Australia was the only major supplier in the second half of 1967. Thus grain imports fell sharply from 5.8 million tons (\$400 million) in 1966 to 4.5 million tons (\$315 million) in 1967.

21. Imports of machinery and equipment from Japan and Western Europe fell off moderately in 1967 after a rapid rise each year from 1963 to 1966.

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This reduction may reflect confusion and disruption in Chinese long-range planning as a result of the Cultural Revolution. China has not ordered any major industrial plants from the Free World since early 1966; its purchases of machine tools, however, were a notable exception to the general decline in machinery imports in 1967. Imports of machine tools from Japan and Western Europe tripled in the first six months of 1967. These imports are playing an important role in China's modern weapons program and the development of its general military-industrial base.

22. Chinese purchases of steel and fertilizer accelerated in 1967. Imports of steel from Japan and Western Europe increased 49 percent in the first half of 1967. Purchases from the USSR, however, may have declined in 1967 as in 1966. Fertilizer imports in 1967 were about 60 percent higher in terms of quantity than in 1966. Primarily as a result of hard bargaining, which whipsawed Western European and Japanese producers, China paid only about 20 percent more than the \$150 million expended for fertilizer in 1966.

23. Among Chinese commodity exports, textiles and foodstuffs probably declined substantially, and other categories may have showed some small reductions. Textile exports to Hong Kong fell abruptly in 1967, and exports to other countries in Asia and Africa may have declined. Food exports to Japan and Hong Kong fell by 25 percent in 1967.

### Balance of Payments

#### Free World

24. Communist China's balance of payments with the Free World deteriorated during 1967 because of a reversal in the commodity trade balance and a reduction in credit receipts. These developments ended the balance-of-payments surplus China had maintained since 1964 and probably caused a deficit of about \$55 million, as follows:

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	<u>Million US \$</u>	
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Balance of payments with the Free World	155	-55
Commodity trade balance	105	-80
Overseas remittances	70	70
Net credits from the Free World	45	25
Foreign aid to Free World countries	-50	-55
Other transactions	-15	-15

25. The estimated commodity trade balance of China changed radically from a surplus of \$105 million in 1966 to a deficit of \$80 million in 1967 because of the curtailment of exports and the slight rise in imports described above. Overseas remittances leveled off at \$70 million in 1967, after a \$20 million decline in 1966.

26. Credit receipts from the Free World declined by about \$20 million in 1967 because China elected to pay cash for some Australian grain and because drawings on credits for whole plants have probably tapered off. Although China's credit drawings exceeded repayments by an estimated \$25 million in 1967, this increment to its indebtedness was offset by the devaluation of the pound. China netted a \$30 million windfall at the time of the devaluation because the majority of its debts in the Free World were denominated in pounds sterling with no value guarantee. Thus China's estimated indebtedness to the Free World actually showed a small decline, from \$310 million in 1966 to \$305 million in 1967.

27. Chinese aid in the form of cash and commodities to less developed countries of the Free World increased by about 10 percent in 1967 to an estimated \$55 million. The two major recipients were the United Arab Republic, which was granted \$11 million in wheat (150,000 tons) and \$10 million in hard currency following the June war, and Pakistan, which drew about \$12 million on commodity credits.



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Communist Countries\*

28. In 1967 as in 1966, China's balance of payments with the Communist countries probably showed moderate changes. Chinese exports to Communist countries probably fell short of planned levels in 1967 for the same reasons that exports to the Free World declined, and China probably drew on clearing credits to finance the trade deficits. The export surplus in China's trade with North Vietnam and Albania probably increased moderately along with larger aid deliveries.

Reserve Position

29. Despite an unfavorable balance of payments with the Free World, China's reserves remained adequate through 1967 and included sufficient Western currency for China to purchase about \$50 million worth of gold following the British devaluation in November 1967. Moreover, as a partial offset to the balance of payments deficit, China produced roughly \$25 million in gold during 1967. Thus the country's total reserves of gold and foreign exchange probably declined by only about \$30 million to an estimated \$600 million, as shown in the following tabulation:

\* China's trade and payments relations with Communist countries are bilateral. Since any trade imbalances that occur are usually matched by credits or settled through trade the following year, these accounts have little effect on Chinese reserves of gold and foreign exchange.

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	Million US \$					
	1966			1967		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Gold</u>	<u>Foreign Exchange</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Gold</u>	<u>Foreign Exchange</u>
Beginning reserves	450	308	142	630	370	260
Changes:						
Balance of payments with the Free World	155	0	155	-55	0	-55
Gold purchases	0	37	-37	0	50	-50
Gold production	25	25	0	25	25	0
Year-end reserves	630	370	260	600	445	155

Prospects for 1968

30. Communist China's foreign trade probably will show a more pronounced decline in 1968 than in 1967. Imports should fall off because of reduced export earnings and because investment planning was seriously disrupted during 1967. Exports probably will decline because of continuing disruptions in industry, transportation, and economic administration. Many of the economic dislocations of 1967 will have their major impact on trade in 1968. The decline in trade should not exceed 10 percent unless the Cultural Revolution intensifies. Domestic disturbances have continued through the first four months of 1968, and major ports are still experiencing cargo-handling problems. On the positive side, transportation has gradually improved since 1967, and China's external trade relations are not now suffering from intense political influences such as the confrontation with Hong Kong in 1967.

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31. Import contracts for 1968 are running later and are generally smaller than in 1967. Unsettled domestic conditions, confused planning, and the devaluation of the British pound have delayed many of China's annual import contracts -- some by three months and longer. The 1967 Fall Canton Trade Fair was held one month late because of violence in Canton, and some import contracts were held up longer because the pound devalued just after the fair got under way. The Sino-Japanese trade agreement was not signed until March 1968, more than three months later than usual. (China has signed a semi-official trade agreement with Japan each year since 1962. Transactions under this agreement accounted for about one-third of Sino-Japanese trade in 1967.) Commodity contracts under the agreement were held up another month by fears of a second pound devaluation. In late April, contracting began after the French franc was chosen as a new settlement currency.

32. Negotiations for fertilizer imports from Nitrex, a Western European cartel, have been delayed more than four months because of a dispute over payment of extra shipping costs on the 1967 contract. Last year Nitrex sold China \$100 million worth of fertilizer.

33. Grain imports scheduled thus far are \$60 million short of the \$315 million delivered in 1967. The 1968 grain harvest in China probably will be less than last year's excellent harvest. It is unlikely that weather conditions will be as favorable as in 1967, and the regime is having problems supplying such agricultural inputs as chemical fertilizer and agricultural tools to rural areas. Thus China may make additional contracts for grain in the second half of the year, which could push grain imports to the 1966 level of \$400 million.

34. Machinery and equipment orders in 1967 were much lower than in previous years, and no major whole plants have been contracted since early 1966. As a result, China's purchases of machinery and equipment will probably show a substantial decline in 1968. Steel contracts indicate imports of this commodity will probably continue to increase at least through the first half of 1968.

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35. China's exports appear to be in short supply for 1968. At the 1967 Fall Canton Fair, purchasers from Japan and Western Europe were unable to obtain some traditional commodities, and the Chinese offered unusually long delivery dates on many others. Total exports contracted under the Sino-Japanese trade agreement in March were substantially lower because China could not offer any coal and Japan would not take more than 100,000 tons of rice. More recently, early reports from the Spring Canton Fair (scheduled for 15 April to 15 May 1968) complain that Chinese exports are generally higher priced and of poorer quality.

36. Reduced trade and delayed contracting are showing up in early trade statistics reported by a few major trading partners, as shown in the following tabulation:

	M:llion US \$					
	January-February 1967			January-February 1968		
	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
<i>Total</i>	219.8	67.5	152.3	173.5	62.6	110.9
Japan	66.9	24.3	42.6	57.8	27.4	30.4
Hong Kong <i>a/</i>	85.8	Negl.	85.7	60.6	Negl.	60.5
West Germany	38.1	30.3	7.8	32.4	25.1	7.3
United Kingdom	29.0	12.5	16.2	22.7	10.0	12.7

*a. Including Chinese exports reexported to third countries.*

37. Sino-Japanese trade should fall again in 1968 because of China's declining export capability and because of another drop in Japanese demand for Chinese rice. Japanese steel sales have recovered after losing ground to Western Europe in 1967, but prospects for machinery and equipment sales appear less bright.

38. Trade with Western Europe probably will decline in 1968 because of higher freight costs and because China is no longer able to finance its

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large trade deficit with this area out of current export earnings. Imports will include grain from France worth \$40 million, but these purchases may be more than offset by a decline in purchases of fertilizer, machinery, and equipment. Chinese exports to Western Europe are likely to fall more rapidly than in 1967 as a result of faltering supply.

39. China's trade with the less developed countries will probably show little change over 1967, unless a grain contract is signed with Argentina for the second half of 1968. Trade with Malaysia and Singapore should continue to increase, but at a slower rate since the Hong Kong confrontation added unusual stimulus to this trade in 1967.

40. Exports to Hong Kong in the first two months of 1968 were down considerably from the same period in 1967, but a small improvement in 1968 over 1967 may occur unless Chinese supplies become extremely tight or political constraints recur. Trade with Hong Kong is still feeling some of the adverse effects of the confrontation in 1967.

41. Trade with the Communist countries is unlikely to increase and may decline further in 1968. Trade relations with the USSR are still marred by incidents such as the recent detention of a Soviet captain at the port of Whampoa. Of three trade agreements signed thus far with Eastern European countries, only one calls for increased trade.

Table 1  
 Communist China: Trade with the Developed Countries  
 of the Free World a/  
 1966-67

	Million US \$					
	1966			1967		
	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Total world	4,295	2,045	2,245	4,180	2,075	2,110
Total Free World	3,160	1,525	1,630	3,140	1,610	1,530
Of which:						
Developed countries	1,845	1,140	705	1,975	1,325	650
East Asia and the Pacific	755	435	320	810	520	290
Of which:						
Japan	622	331	291	558	302	256
Australia	120	96	24	231	205	26
Western Europe	875	510	365	1,030	695	335
Of which:						
West Germany	217	135	81	292	222	70
United Kingdom	177	96	82	201	131	70

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Table 1  
 Communist China: Trade with the Developed Countries  
 of the Free World a/  
 1966-67  
 (Continued)

	Million US \$					
	1966			1967		
	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Western Europe (Continued)						
Of which:						
France	160	111	48	146	101	45
Italy	113	61	52	143	88	55
Netherlands	44	16	28	43	16	27
North America	215	195	20	135	110	25
Of which:						
Canada	214	195	18	133	108	25

a. Area data are rounded to the nearest \$5 million.

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Table 2  
 Communist China: Trade with Less Developed Countries  
 of the Free World and with Hong Kong and Macao a/  
 1966-67

	Million US \$					
	1966			1967		
	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Total world	4,295	2,045	2,245	4,180	2,075	2,110
Total Free World	3,160	1,525	1,630	3,140	1,610	1,530
Of which:						
Less developed countries	910	385	525	825	285	540
Southeast Asia	325	80	245	345	85	260
Of which:						
Malaysia and Singapore	190	47	142	228	43	185
Indonesia	59	9	50	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Near East and South Asia	325	135	185	335	150	185
Of which:						
Ceylon	80	35	45	83	38	45



Table 2  
 Communist China: Trade with Less Developed Countries  
 of the Free World and with Hong Kong and Macao a/  
 1966-67  
 (Continued)

	Million US \$					
	1966			1967		
	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Near East and South Asia (Continued)						
Of which:						
United Arab Republic	76	37	39	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Pakistan	65	38	27	100	60	40
Latin America	120	120	<u>b/</u>	10	10	<u>b/</u>
Of which:						
Argentina	114	114	<u>c/</u>	7	7	<u>c/</u>
Africa	140	50	90	135	40	95
Hong Kong and Macao	400	5	400	340	<u>b/</u>	340
Of which:						
Hong Kong <u>d/</u>	380	3	377	321	1	320

a. Area data are rounded to the nearest \$5 million.

b. Less than \$2.5 million.

c. Less than \$500,000.

d. Net of entrepot trade with third countries.

Table 3  
Communist China: Trade with Communist Countries a/  
1966-67

	Million US \$					
	1966			1967		
	Turnover	Imports	Exports	Turnover	Imports	Exports
Total world	4,295	2,045	2,245	4,180	2,075	2,110
Total Communist countries	1,135	520	610	1,040	465	580
USSR	370	175	145	255	130	130
Far East	270	95	170	260	90	170
Of which:						
North Korea	150	75	75	140	70	70
North Vietnam	115	20	95	120	20	100
Eastern Europe	270	140	130	255	145	110
Of which:						
East Germany	68	36	32	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Rumania	66	34	32	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Poland	52	30	23	45	30	15
Czechoslovakia	46	22	24	33	18	15
Hungary	32	16	16	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

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Table 3  
 Communist China: Trade with Communist Countries a/  
 1966-67  
 (Continued)

	Million US \$					
	1966			1967		
	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Turnover</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Total Communist countries (Continued)						
Other	280	110	170	270	100	170
Of which:						
Cuba	170	85	85	144	72	72
Albania	105	25	80	110	25	85

a. Data are based on the official statistics of the Communist countries, where available. Data for the individual countries of Eastern Europe are rounded to the nearest \$1 million; all other data are rounded to the nearest \$5 million.

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