

25

Approved For

SECRET

CIA/ONE/STAFF MEM/13-65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

0400
30 April 1965

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 13-65

SUBJECT: Are West European Communists Really Changing?
True False

SUMMARY

Recently the Soviets have been encouraging the Communist parties of Western Europe to adopt more flexible, nationally oriented tactics in order to improve their domestic political positions. Some of the parties (e.g., Sweden) have made progress in projecting a new independent image; others (e.g., Finland) have been slower to respond to Soviet encouragement. Despite this new tactical approach, none of the West European parties has yet changed in those fundamental respects which differentiate Communist parties from other political parties. However, much change has occurred in the past few years in the theory and practice of international Communism, serious disputes have emerged within the movement, and various Communist parties have become more assertive and independent in their conduct toward Moscow. In time fundamental changes may evolve in some of the West European Communist parties. Meanwhile, in assessing Communist behavior and party ties with Moscow -- both of which are often more complicated than they seem on the surface -- care should be taken to avoid drawing premature conclusions concerning either the view that all changes are dictated from Moscow or the view that the Communist parties have become genuinely independent and "respectable."

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

Introductory Observations

1. Communism, worldwide, has undergone considerable change since the death of Stalin. It has lost the semblance of a monolithic entity with all authority flowing from a single, supreme source. Differences concerning ideology and policy among Communist parties and within them, traditionally submerged or treated as heresy, are now openly discussed. In many instances, the more discussion, the wider the differences seem to become. Even the content of communism has changed. The fully educated communist ideologist can no longer end his studies with Marxism-Leninism; there are also Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Marxism-Leninism-Khrushchevism, and Marxism-Leninism-Castroism. Many free enterprise concepts are creeping into economic thinking and planning in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. Changes are also apparent in the tactics of Communists, in both national and international affairs. Of course, the extent of change and the kinds of change vary greatly from party to party.

2. While the view that all this change is a "minuet," a carefully planned and executed maneuver and a vast hoax, still

- 2 -

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

has a few adherents, in our judgment it retains very little credibility. On the other hand, the view that communism has entered an evolutionary phase which will inevitably transform it into something uncommunist, or tame it, or shear off its threat to Western democracy, may be gaining wider currency than either evidence or prudence will support. This much is clear: the practice, and in some respects the theory, of communism in 1965 differs in significant ways from the practice and theory of communism in 1950. What is not clear is how much of the change is substantive, organic, and permanent, and how much is tactical, superficial, and transitory.

3. Another point needs be made. One's views of international communism are almost certain to be shaped to a significant extent by one's professional responsibilities. For example, those who concentrate on collecting and operating against the KGB or against the hard core apparat of the various communist parties, tend to see in the attitudes, convictions, tactics, operations and discipline of that very small group of professional agents the real truth as it pertains to international communism. They concentrate on the techniques of the apparat -- party processes,

- 3 -

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

[REDACTED]

propaganda, pressure, intimidation, bribery, even murder -- designed to maneuver and to control parties and governments. There is, among this group, a tendency to judge developments in the various parties on the basis of brief glimpses into the inner workings of the professional machinery. In this context they view the problems faced by international communism as having increased over the years but as offset by important factors such as continuing close professional relationships among the hard core apparats.

4. On the other hand, those responsible for studying and interpreting international communism as a phenomenon of national and international politics approach the problem from the other end. They concentrate primarily on the political behavior and effectiveness of the various parties and the movement as a whole; they attempt to weigh trends in the movement and the various parties in the context of national and world political, sociological, and economic developments. This group of officers tends to view the many indications of serious disagreement about fundamental matters among and within communist parties as telling the most important story about international

- 4 -

[REDACTED]

S-E-C-R-E-T

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

communism. They would attach less significance to evidence of operational ties between individual party members and the KGB than to evidence of strife between various factions of a Communist party, and between some Communist parties and the CPSU.

5. It is, of course, wrong to conceive of all opinion falling into one or the other of the two groups described here for purposes of making a point. Most opinion within the intelligence community, and, so far as we can ascertain, most of the evidence, falls somewhere in between. But where?

6. What follows will not answer the question posed by this paper; indeed, it will almost certainly activate as many disagreements as it will defuse, and it may cast shadows where light now seems to shine. It is as unfortunate as it is true that discussions of communism in the context of change often lose their point in a morass of semantic difficulties or are blunted by the exception which can be found to any general observation. Nevertheless, this memorandum may help some of those who find themselves somewhere in between the minuet school and the evolutionist school to better evaluate the ground under their feet.

- 5 -

[REDACTED] 25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

[REDACTED] 25X1

General Observations

7. After twenty years of effort since World War II, the Communist parties of Western Europe have not perceptibly improved their positions in their respective countries. In general, they have not been making much progress with their old policies, appeals, and programs. Most of them have declined in membership and are having trouble in attracting and holding youth. Apart from Italy, France and Finland they have remained only minor forces in domestic politics. The parties have also been profoundly affected by developments within the Communist movement since the death of Stalin. The Twentieth Soviet Party Congress and Khrushchev's denigration of Stalin deeply shocked many Communists who had revered the old Soviet leader and stimulated intense disputes within many parties over whether and how to adjust to the new Soviet line. Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolution in 1965 caused profound disillusionment among West European Communists, resulting in many defections from the parties and leading to the disaffection of many non-Communist leftists who previously had sympathized with the Soviet line. Togliatti's theory of polycentrism caused party loyalty to

- 6 -

25X1
25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

[REDACTED]

Moscow to be brought further in question. Two most important developments affecting the Communist parties of Western Europe have been Western Europe's economic revival and prosperity and the Sino-Soviet conflict.

8. The economic prosperity and high levels of employment achieved in recent years have tended to blur traditional distinctions between workers and bourgeois. Many workers, particularly the more affluent industrial workers in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, and even Italy, are tending to merge into the growing middle class and to feel less alienated from their national societies. They are losing their inclination to seek association with an international class or party. With prosperity, employment, and state welfare programs the old class warfare slogans are losing their appeal and old communist dogmas their point.

9. Especially since the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress, the Communist parties of Western Europe have reacted to the new economic and sociological trends in different ways. Where the party has been dominated by conservative, doctrinaire

- 7 -

25X1

[REDACTED]

S-E-C-R-E-T

[REDACTED]

25X1

leaders, there has been very little adjustment to new conditions. Where the party leadership has been more independent minded, the Communist parties have sought to project a nationalist image and to adjust their tactics to national circumstances. In order to compensate for a dwindling working class base they have again begun to court support from bourgeois elements; they have sought to reduce antagonism with the Catholic Church; and they have sought, without much success as yet, to find new ways and means of appealing to youth. Progress in changing tactics has varied greatly from country to country. The Italian party has gone farther in adjusting its policies to national circumstances than any other party in Western Europe. This was due in large measure to Togliatti, who established a tradition of considerable party autonomy. Recently there has been some movement in this direction in Sweden. Adjustment of policies and tactics to meet national conditions has been less in Finland, France, Holland, and Belgium, where the leadership has tended to cling to Stalinist concepts.

10. The Sino-Soviet conflict caused further confusion, stimulating differences of view within and among the Communist

- 8 -

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

parties as to the proper degrees of national autonomy, party assertiveness, and militancy to exercise. Groupings have emerged in various parties favoring differing degrees and kinds of flexibility in policy and doctrine, and strenuous and divisive debates on the subject have increased factionalism and intensified personal rivalries. In some cases, leftist factions have split off from the Communist parties to form pro-Peiping splinter groups.

11. From Moscow's point of view, perhaps the most important change with respect to Western Europe's Communist parties has been the diminution of Moscow's direct control, particularly since the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress. In earlier days, party leaders in Western Europe responded quickly to hints from Moscow that policies should be changed. If they did not, Stalin usually was able to engineer the replacement of a recalcitrant party leaders. But now the Soviets do not always find the local party leaders responsive to suggested changes in policy or to Soviet requests for support in their dispute with Peiping. Some of the Communist party leaders have taken advantage of the Sino-Soviet dispute and other manifestations of the weakening in central control over the Communist movement to

- 9 -

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

achieve a greater measure of independence for their parties. Rumania is the most dramatic case in point, being a Communist-ruled state in the East European "bloc" but demonstrating a remarkable degree of nationalist independence. The Italian party has also taken advantage of the situation to assert its independence of judgment and action.

12. These general developments in the behavior of communist parties in Western Europe are visible to the naked eye. They point to confusion in the Communist movement, to uncertainty in the various party councils, to a significant weakening of Moscow's controls, and to some gravitation toward the center in party policies, programs, and appeals. Are there some specific observations which would place these changes in a different perspective, which would suggest that they are merely tactical and that Moscow's control of the Western European parties is in fact as effective and absolute as ever?

Specific Considerations

13. The Italian Case: Palmiro Togliatti led the Italian Communist Party for nearly 30 years, until his death in mid-1964.

- 10 -

25X1

SECRET

25X1

The party has weathered many storms since it was founded in 1920 and is today the second largest force in Italian politics and by far the largest Communist party in Western Europe. During the past decade, membership in the Italian party has dropped about 25 percent and membership in its youth organization (FGCI) has dropped about 60 percent. Nevertheless, Communist strength at the polls has continued to increase; nearly 26 percent of Italian voters now vote Communist. The size and the following of the Italian Communist Party appears to be due to widespread dissatisfaction with Italian governmental leadership and administration, a strong popular desire for reform, the superior discipline and organizational skill of the Communists, and the success of the party in adjusting its policies and appeals to take advantage of local and national circumstances.

14. During most of his professional life, Togliatti was closely allied with the Communist leadership in Moscow. While he dominated the Italian party, policy formulation was essentially a one-man operation. Togliatti made the decisions and made them stick. Apparently, he was close to Stalin, and Stalin gave him

- 11 -

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

considerable latitude in running the Italian show. From an early period, Togliatti seems to have favored adjustment in classic Marxist doctrine to permit the tailoring of strategies to fit circumstances in Italy. At the same time, Togliatti, as an old Comintern hand, wanted to look to the Soviet Union for inspiration and example. Consequently he was the more critical when developments in the USSR did not measure up to his expectations.

15. With the passing of Stalin, and especially after the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress and de-Stalinization, Togliatti became increasingly critical of developments in the Soviet Union, and he ran the Italian party and developed its tactics in an increasingly independent manner. He was very anxious to avoid isolation of his party in Italian politics, and he sought to develop and maintain a party reputation for political autonomy and respectability. He postulated the theory of polycentrism, under which control over the Communist parties would be decentralized and would depend to a large extent upon willing cooperation by individual national parties.

- 12 -

25X1
25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

16. Khrushchev clashed several times with Togliatti over this theory, almost certainly because it obstructed Khrushchev's attempts to reassert control over pro-Soviet parties. Since his death, Togliatti's views have continued to have important influence, both on the Italian party and on other parties.* Despite Soviet dissatisfaction the Italians considered that the 1-5 March 1965 Conference of 19 Communist Parties in Moscow virtually adopted the position of the Italian Communist Party -- that there should be no world conference of Communist parties at this time, and that no new centralized world Communist organization should be established.

17. Since Togliatti's death, the Italian party has continued, occasionally, to clash openly with Moscow over Communist policy. There have also been some indications of lessening of unity

* The most dramatic manifestation of this influence was the famous "Togliatti Memorandum," written just before his death, but published posthumously by his successors. This memorandum criticized Soviet tactics toward China and the international movement and stressed the right of each party to determine its own policies, based on local and regional circumstances. It also strongly criticized developments within the Soviet Union itself.

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

25X1

within the Italian party. Judging from the party journals
, an increasing number of party cadres
 and of rank and file members are protesting the lack of intra-
 party democracy and demanding meaningful participation in party
 decisions. Three groups, vaguely defined to be sure, appear to
 have emerged, each holding somewhat different ideas as to
 proper stance and policy to assume with respect to such
 fundamental questions as the Sino-Soviet dispute, relations
 with Moscow, political strategy and tactics, and national
 autonomy.

18. How do the main lines of this sketch jibe with the
 thesis that the Italian party enjoys autonomy because Moscow
 told it to or, at least, wants it to? It appears true that
 Moscow has not opposed the desires of Western European Communist
 parties to alter their domestic tactics according to changing
 political conditions. On the other hand, Moscow has expected
 the various parties to adhere to its general line on national
 and international issues -- especially such fundamental issues
 as those at stake in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Continued

- 14 -

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

obstruction by the Italian party can hardly serve Moscow's interests in this regard.

19. There is considerable evidence that the Italian party's hard core apparatus is in touch with the KGB and is used by the latter in operational matters. Moscow appears to provide financial support to the Italian party. We can thus assume that the relationship to the Soviet party is more complicated than it appears to be on the surface, and the extent of real Soviet control is unclear. As against this, however, we would draw attention to the strong differences which are apparent among the Italian Communist leaders, and to the fact that the top five or six leaders of the Italian party differ as to how much, and even whether, to respond to clearly conveyed Moscow desires on matters of importance to the Communist movement.

20. Moscow appears to have accepted, in some degree and in some situations, the principle of polycentrism, and it now espouses the Togliatti line as to tailoring tactics to local conditions. There have been instances in which Soviet party functionaries have even cited the experience of the Italian party

- 15 -

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

to other parties as an example of good national tactics and of the kind of independent relationship they desire to achieve among Communist parties. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the Italian party's adjustment of its tactics to changing conditions in Italy, Western Europe, or the international Communist movement is not the product of Soviet manipulation. It seems more likely that the Soviets have been forced, and with considerable reluctance, to accept this course in order to avoid the indignity of being defied by another major Communist party and to avoid further chaos in the movement.

21. On the other hand, we think it important to stress that despite its tactical flexibility, the Italian Communist Party continues to be organized along traditional "democratic centralist" lines, and remains fundamentally different from non-Communist political parties in its structure, goals, and its ties with the Soviet Union. It continues to support most aspects of Soviet policy, and is fundamentally hostile to the US. Though it has achieved much respectability in Italian eyes, this should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, for US policy

- 16 -

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1



purposes, the Italian party remains a hostile force with close links to Moscow.

22. The Finnish Case: The top leaders of the Finnish Communist Party have long been rigid and unimaginative in doctrine and tactics. This habit of subservience to Moscow has hurt the party's domestic political position. This became apparent last October, when in the election it was not the Communist front SKDL but the Social Democrats who made gains as a result of urban and youthful dissatisfaction with the Finnish government. This setback, together with party leader Ville Pessi's abject support of the Soviet line on the removal of Khrushchev, sparked criticism in the party daily to the effect that the old guard leaders' conservatism and subservience to Moscow had cost the party dearly in popular support. Nevertheless, after a short period of ferment in the party, old guard leaders Pessi and Aimo Aaltonen were able during December and January to stifle further criticism.

23. In early February, the Finnish party was visited by Aleksey Belyakov, a high ranking functionary in the International



[Redacted]

Section of the Soviet Central Committee. Belyakov addressed various party leadership bodies, including the Politburo.

[Redacted] he advised that violent tactics were a thing of the past in Western and Northern Europe, and that the correct Communist tactics now were to cooperate in a genuine way with Social Democratic parties in order to improve popular support; the parties should try to impress on the populace, by word and deed, that the Communist parties were independent of Moscow. He pointed to the Italian party as an example of proper party tactics.

24.

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

On 20-21 March, the Finnish Politburo admitted three new individuals, including Anna-Liisa Hyvonen, to membership.

[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

Aaltonen continues to control the party apparatus, but recent evidence points to rising ferment in the party, with growing support within party ranks for the anti-Aaltonen faction, supported by the CPSU, and intense maneuvering for advantage between the two factions.

25. This evidence supports the judgment that Moscow now is actively pushing at least some West European parties away from the appearance of adherence to Moscow in order to improve their political appeal and avoid party isolation and stagnation in nations undergoing political, economic and social change. It also indicates that, far from being able to control events in the Finnish party through the "inner apparat," the Soviets have found it extremely difficult to make old guard leaders Pessi and Aaltonen change their ways, even though the party is faced with the prospect of further setbacks at the polls and perhaps an open split in its ranks. Sending high level Soviet officials to Helsinki and summoning the Finnish old guard to Moscow for lectures by the Soviet leaders has thus far been unavailing. Pessi and Aaltonen merely nod their heads vigorously, then go home and take measures to stifle change or even discussion within the party.

- 19 -

[Redacted]

26. In fact, the Finnish case is directly contradictory to the Swedish one since the Soviets now are supporting liberal elements in the party against the inner apparatus controlled by Aaltonen. Rather than an example of Soviet control over a Communist party, the Finnish case, [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] is an example of the extent to which Soviet control over the Communist parties has deteriorated since the time of Stalin. On the other hand, there has been no essential change in the organization or goals of the Finnish party. Indeed, it has not been able as yet even to change its tactics successfully.

25X1

27. The Swedish Case: In the past year or so the Swedish Communist Party has experienced some important changes. The old-time "Stalinist" Hilding Hagberg, along with some of his more crustacean associates, was replaced as party chairman by a younger man, Carl Henrik Hermansson. Since the party's Twentieth Congress in January 1964, when this occurred, Hermansson has publicly pushed the party forward as a new type of independent, national and democratic political party which aims at achieving power by peaceful, parliamentary means. His efforts, and especially his appearances on Swedish television, were successful to the extent

[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

that in the general election of September 1964 the party increased its share of the popular vote from 4.5 percent to 5.2 percent and its seats in parliament from five to eight. Although this is a small gain it is potentially an important change because the Swedish party had long been stagnant.

28. From Moscow's point of view, Hermansson has been entirely too independent. He consistently opposed Soviet proposals for a world conference of Communist parties and refused to take the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Moreover, some of his public statements, including his criticism of the Berlin Wall and his advocacy of a plebiscite for the three Baltic countries regarding their inclusion in the USSR, have been quite harmful to the Soviet position. Hermansson has encouraged cooperation not only with Communist parties, but with other leftist groups in Europe such as Aksel Larsen's heretical party in Denmark. Domestically, his main effort is directed toward cooperation with the left wing of the Social Democratic Party. Recently, Hermansson's efforts have been hindered somewhat by attacks from the small, Peiping-sponsored faction of the Swedish party, led by Nils Hemberg, but Hermansson still apparently commands the support of a large majority of the party.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

29. Against this public image of the party, [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] far from being independent, the Swedish party continues to be controlled by Moscow, through an "inner apparat" of trusted functionaries. Indeed, [redacted] in 1963, when Hermansson, as editor of the party daily, stimulated criticism in its columns of party policies, the leader of this "inner apparat," Erik Karlsson, secured Moscow's approval to engineer Hagberg's replacement by Hermansson. Since that time Karlsson [redacted] has continued to control the party from behind the scenes and to support Hermansson's leadership and the new image. The latter's public actions, especially his open criticism of the CPSU have caused Moscow to be distrustful of Hermansson. But in December 1964, Karlsson [redacted] convinced Moscow that the apparat would be able to continue to control Hermansson, and the Soviets [redacted] gave their reluctant consent.

25X1

25X1

25X1

30. We feel that this story of hidden Soviet manipulation of the Swedish party is quite convincing. The method of manipulation through inner hard core party functionaries is a time tested technique. We find the proposition reasonable that,

[redacted]

25X1

SECRET

[redacted]

25X1

in order to help the party's position and stave off worse divisions within the party, the Soviets agreed to let Karlsson put Hermansson in power, and continued to control events, for the most part, through the apparat.

31. However, it would appear that the Soviets continue to find the situation in the Swedish party far from satisfactory. Their distrust of Hermansson may be accompanied by fear that at some point he might be able to wrest control from the "inner apparat." Thus, even in Sweden, where the Soviets hold most of the cards, Soviet control is insecure.

- 23 -

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

General Conclusions

32. Behind the public image and overt activities of the Communist parties of Western Europe, the Soviet party maintains close ties with certain individual leaders and with some members of the inner apparat of the parties. Members of the inner group are not always the same people who hold the leading positions in the party. Sometimes the apparat seeks to hide its hand not only from the non-Communist forces of the country, but also from the rank and file membership of the party and, at times, even from the main party leaders. Soviet control of the inner apparat may not necessarily mean or assure control of the party, although that, of course, is its purpose. In sum, the situation and relationships with respect to the Soviet party, the various Communist parties, the apparat, and the party leaders varies greatly from country to country.

33. In the case of the Italian party, for example, the Soviets apparently maintain close ties with individuals of the hard core of the party, but this seems less important than the fact that the Italian party pursues, and has pursued for some

- 24 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

years, an independent road of its own. Moreover, the leaders in power since Togliatti's death appear to be very much concerned not to lose the independence the party has gained, and they sometimes obstruct Moscow's designs in the international movement as did Togliatti. It appears that Togliatti maintained a kind of Stalinist attitude toward decision making and discipline within the Italian party, while advocating and practicing a very un-Stalinist course with respect to party relations within the international movement. It may be, with the towering figure of Togliatti removed from the scene, that Moscow, working through the Italian apparatus, may attempt to curb the Italian party, at least to some extent. It is possible that the Moscow party leaders could encourage the Finnish party to "be more like the Italian party," and, at the same time attempt to curb the independent attitude of the Italian party.

34. The new "popular front" or "national Communist" tactical approach of the West European Communist parties, supported by Moscow, has not yet resulted in fundamental changes in the nature, goals, or organization of any of the West European

- 25 -

25X1
25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

[REDACTED]

parties. Indeed, changes of such fundamental significance are not likely to occur -- if they occur at all -- before many years have passed. Nevertheless, the importance of change should not be underrated either. It is possible that some of the tactical changes may prove to be more than transitory. For example, some individuals who, like Hermansson, lead in transforming the public image of their parties, may eventually feel strong enough to wrest their parties from Moscow's control. Or some of the parties, having practiced the new tactical approach for a number of years, may eventually find, especially if they have become prosperous in the meantime, that it is very difficult to shift from being agreeable and bourgeois in order to become disagreeable, militant and proletarian once again.

35. And in the meantime, Moscow will find, as it has already found, that despite the fact that it retains important ties with many of the parties, control over the Communist parties is becoming increasingly difficult. Already, it has had to resort to traditional political tactics -- persuasion, pressure, cajolery -- to obtain the results it used to achieve

- 26 -

[REDACTED]

S-E-C-R-E-T

[REDACTED]

25X1
25X1

by direct orders or intimidation. Assertiveness by individual party leaders is likely to become more, not less, pronounced as time goes on. For example the leader of the Dutch party, de Groot, continues to feel free to oppose the policies of the present Soviet leaders, just as he did those of Khrushchev. This assertiveness will not be significant, as far as we are concerned, in those parties which are small and unimportant locally, or are still heavily dependent on financial and other support from Moscow. It is already significant, however, in the Italian party. It may soon become significant in the Swedish party; and at some point in the future it may become significant in the French party.

36. Even allowing for considerable control over Communist parties, policies, and activities by a hard core apparatus of dedicated, disciplined professionals loyal to Moscow's orders, it is an open question as to whether the effectiveness of that control is increasing or decreasing. The future of that kind of control also seems uncertain in the face of the political, economic, and social trends now visible in Western Europe.

- 27 -

25X1

S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/07/18 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210038-2

Moscow may, for sinister and tactical purposes, instruct parties to adopt un-Communist-like policies, to be independent, and even to attack Moscow. But if Communist parties prosper by being national, by attacking Moscow, and by compromising basic Communist tenets, what conclusions are the rank and file, the cadres, and party leaders to draw? And how receptive are they likely to be when Moscow decides that, for sinister or tactical purposes, it wants those parties to revert? And will the hard core apparat be able to jerk the party back into line? The yo-yo theory has limitations. Moscow may find when it jerks the string that the yo-yo keeps spinning off into the distance and nothing comes back on the end of the string but a hard core apparat consisting of 2 to 5 percent of the party.



25X1



25X1



Page Deleted