

you & (2)  
Soured

Central Intelligence Agency  
25X1



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

19 July 1985

IMPACT OF CLARK AMENDMENT REPEAL

Summary

In our judgement, repeal of the Clark Amendment in a vote now scheduled for August could be a crossroads in the stalled US-brokered negotiations for a regional settlement in southern Africa. In response to preliminary House and Senate votes on repeal, Luanda suspended discussion with the United States and we believe it is unlikely to resume talks until it has assessed any changes in US policy towards UNITA. Moscow and Havana likely will use repeal of the Clark Amendment to strengthen the arguments of MPLA hardliners who oppose negotiations. We believe Savimbi will regard a repeal as a significant political victory that will reduce UNITA's diplomatic isolation and will help ensure that his interests are protected in future regional negotiations. Furthermore, it may encourage him to push aggressively for US military and financial assistance, including more sophisticated weaponry. South Africa will react favorably to repeal of the Clark Amendment, but we think Pretoria is likely to interpret it as reflecting domestic US politics, not a change in policy.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

This typescript memorandum was prepared at the request of the NSC Director of African Affairs by [Redacted] Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

ALA M 85-10078

[Redacted]

25X1

SECRET

For now, the prospect of repeal has further complicated the already stalled settlement talks. Over the longer run, the impact of a repeal on resumption of negotiations depends in large measure on whether Angola views it--and any subsequent US actions--as a turning point in US policy. Indeed, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Luanda could interpret repeal as a signal to resume talks if only to forestall further US moves.

\* \* \*

#### Status of Settlement

US efforts to negotiate a regional settlement in southern Africa appeared close to a breakthrough last year when Luanda--apparently with the grudging approval of the Soviet Union and Cuba--accepted linkage of a conditional Cuban troop withdrawal to Namibian independence. In a letter to the UN Secretary General last November, Luanda proposed to send home the 20,000 Cuban troops stationed in southern Angola over a three year period while retaining the 10,000 or so remaining Cuban troops as a residual force in the north. Luanda demanded, in return, that South Africa withdraw its forces from southern Angola, implement the UN plan for Namibia, cut off aid to UNITA, and cease attacks against Angola. [REDACTED]

25X1

There has been little movement in the negotiations since Pretoria rejected the specifics of the Angolan proposal and demanded that all of the Cubans be withdrawn simultaneously with South African troops from Namibia. In March, the US proposed a "synthesis" of the two positions that was intended as a starting point to move the process off dead-center. Luanda promised to consider the US proposals but had not responded officially. Pretoria accused the US of retreating from its previous understanding on a total Cuban withdrawal and emphasized that South Africa would not be a party to an agreement that jeopardized UNITA's position. The South African raid in Cabinda Province in May prompted Luanda to announce in late May that it had suspended bilateral talks with South Africa, pending an explanation from Pretoria. [REDACTED]

25X1

#### Reactions to the Repeal

While the key players--except for Angola--have yet to react officially to the Senate (10 June) and House (10 July) votes to repeal the Clark Amendment, past public statements and negotiating positions give us some insights into their likely views. In our judgment, formal repeal

will be seen as a positive statement of US support for UNITA and encourage suspicions that materiel or financial assistance is being or will be provided. The perception that the United States has taken sides probably will lead to repeated challenges to the US role as a neutral broker. [REDACTED]

25X1

Angola: On 5 July, in a speech for the visiting Yugoslav president, the Angolan leader said that talks with both South Africa and the United States had been suspended. In extending the suspension to the United States, dos Santos cited the UNITA-hosted gathering in Angola of anticommunist insurgents, some of which are US-backed, and the Senate vote to repeal the Clark Amendment. Luanda reacted immediately to the House vote by announcing on 12 July suspension of "contacts" with US envoys, although it did not close the door on a resumption of negotiations. Based on their track record in the negotiations, we believe Luanda probably found the Congressional action to be a convenient excuse for avoiding further talks that may have created expectations of additional Angolan concessions concerning a Cuban troop withdrawal--moves we believe Luanda is not prepared to make at this time, given the growing military threat from UNITA. [REDACTED]

25X1

We believe it likely that Soviet- and Cuban-backed hardliners in the MPLA will portray repeal of the Clark Amendment as vindicating their long held views that the principal US objective was to install a Savimbi-led regime in Luanda and that only Moscow and Havana are reliable allies. We believe that those in the MPLA leadership most closely tied to the negotiations, such as Minister of Interior Rodrigues, are likely to come under increasing criticism and their arguments supporting closer ties to the United States will come under sharp fire. [REDACTED]

25X1

South Africa: Based on its support of UNITA, Pretoria will portray repeal of the Clark Amendment as Washington's recognition of South Africa's position that UNITA is a key actor that must be included formally in the negotiating process. Privately, however, Pretoria is likely to assess the repeal as reflecting US domestic politics and not a fundamental change in US policies. [REDACTED]

25X1

UNITA: The Angolan insurgents, in our view, will see repeal as a significant political victory and a step tantamount to official recognition. Despite UNITA's growing military prowess, the insurgents have been unable to break their diplomatic isolation. Only South Africa openly supports UNITA; a few Black African, European, and Arab countries have provided behind the scenes encouragement and [REDACTED] a small amount of materiel or financial support.\* Savimbi probably is aware that this assistance is most likely a hedge in the event of an ultimate

25X1

UNITA victory, and could disappear suddenly if the donor's political interests alter or if UNITA's military fortunes are reversed. [REDACTED]

25X1

In our judgement, the repeal will no doubt be a psychological boost for Savimbi. Based on his actions and speeches to date, we believe that Savimbi is concerned that he might be sold out as part of a settlement in which he was not a formal participant. Luanda's proposal to trade a Cuban withdrawal for Namibian independence was probably viewed by Savimbi as an Angolan attempt to cut his supply lines to the south and make him vulnerable to a protracted war of attrition. Savimbi has said repeatedly that peace in Angola will only be settled by an MPLA-UNITA reconciliation at which time Cuban troops will no longer be needed and can be withdrawn. Savimbi may see repeal of the Clark Amendment as a sign that Washington is starting to come around to his views. [REDACTED]

25X1

UNITA undoubtedly would hope that repeal will lead ultimately to US materiel support. Although their battlefield performance suggests that Savimbi's insurgent army is well stocked by Pretoria, he has openly commented that the insurgents need certain sophisticated weapons--antitank and antiaircraft rockets, for example--that are not readily available from South Africa. At a minimum we believe that Savimbi will push for US assistance if only to pin down a US commitment to his cause. [REDACTED]

25X1

USSR and Cuba: We believe repeal of the Clark Amendment will be used by Moscow to further its efforts to dissuade Luanda from participating in the regional negotiations. It also will add weight to Soviet arguments that the United States was all along covertly working hand-in-hand with South Africa to install a UNITA regime in Angola. Moscow probably also hopes the repeal will strengthen the political positions of the MPLA hardliners who promote pro-Soviet policies. [REDACTED]

25X1

In addition, we believe Moscow probably will seize on the repeal in a vocal propaganda campaign to promote Black African unity against US policies throughout Africa. The Soviets may also argue that repeal implies a stepped-up US role in aiding UNITA and requires the continued Cuban troop presence in Angola, if not an even greater Cuban and Soviet involvement. [REDACTED]

25X1

\* These countries have included [REDACTED] Morocco, Senegal, and Zaire.

[redacted]

From Havana's perspective, we believe that Castro will view the repeal as an ominous confirmation that the United States is adopting a tougher foreign policy in general towards Cuba and Cuban interests. His public statements lead us to believe Castro is convinced that improved relations with the Reagan administration are not possible, a conviction that may harden his position on several issues, including Angola. Following the South African raid on Cabinda, Castro publicly reaffirmed his commitment to the MPLA and asserted his willingness to even increase the Cuban contribution until a "just" Namibian settlement is reached. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

We do not believe, however, that the repeal of the Clark Amendment itself will necessarily prompt an increase in Soviet or Cuban support for Angola. In the past, increased deliveries of Soviet weapons and additional Cuban troop arrivals have followed regime-threatening military setbacks, not diplomatic ups and downs. Even so, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Moscow or Havana could use the repeal as a convenient excuse to boost military support. [redacted]

25X1

Black African States: Based on their reactions throughout the settlement talks, we believe most Black African states will roundly condemn repeal as a statement of support for UNITA, inconsistent with the US role as mediator. They are also likely to charge the United States with collusion with Pretoria. [redacted]

25X1

States such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe that have been most critical of the linkage of a Cuban troop withdrawal to Namibian independence and US dealings with South Africa probably will see the repeal as vindication of their positions. There could be some negative fallout from more moderate states, such as Zambia, that have supported US diplomatic efforts and leaders in these countries may be more hesitant to back future US initiatives in regional forums. [redacted]

25X1

#### Outlook for the Negotiations

At a minimum, we believe that the MPLA will sustain its suspension of direct contacts with US officials over the near term and will want to assess the direction of US policy vis-a-vis Savimbi. Luanda, which has clearly been unwilling to see its Cuban protectors leave, probably would interpret any increase in UNITA's strength as circumstantial evidence of US involvement and would be even more reluctant to return to the negotiating table. Over the longer run, the impact of a repeal on resumption of negotiations depends in large measure on whether Angola

views it--and any subsequent US actions--as a turning point in US policy. Indeed, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Luanda could interpret repeal as a signal to resume talks if only to forestall further US moves. If the Angolans were to resume talks, the atmosphere would probably be one of intense suspicion of US motives and with the moderates in the MPLA discredited, prospects for compromise would be limited in the near term, in our view. [REDACTED]

25X1

Distribution:

Original -- Phillip Ringdahl, Director African Affairs, NSC  
1 -- Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President  
1 -- Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs  
1 -- Frank Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs  
1 -- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs  
1 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director INR/AA, Department of State  
1 -- Noel Koch, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense  
1 -- William Struck, Defense Intelligence Officer, Defense Intelligence Agency  
1 -- Robert Gelbard, AF/S, Department of State  
1 -- DCI  
1 -- DDCI  
1 -- Executive Director  
1 -- NIO/Africa  
1 -- NIC  
1 -- DDO/Africa  
1 -- PDB Staff  
1 -- ILS  
1 -- C/DDI/PES  
1 -- D/ALA  
1 -- ALA Research Director  
2 -- ALA/PS (one sourced copy; one clean copy)  
4 -- OCPAS/IMD/CB  
4 -- ALA/AF  
2 -- ALA/AF/S  
4 -- ALA/AF/S

25X1

ALA/AF  (19 July 1985)

25X1