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Afghanistan Situation Report

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12 February 1985

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AFGHANISTAN SIT	UATION REPORT		
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IN BRIEF		1	
PERSPECTIVES			
AFGHANISTAN IN JANUARY		3	
Soviet and Afghan forces launched	multibattalion	J	
operations and initiated small-uni	t actions in the		
Herat, Qandahar, and Bagram areas Afghan-Pakistani border in one of	the most active		0EV
Januaries in recent years.	M ACCUANTSTAN	7	25 X ′
MARSHAL PETROV'S PROMOTION AND THE WAR I		,	
Marshal Vasiliy Petrov, promoted t Sokolov's former position as First	Deputy Minister of		
Defense, may be willing to experim tactics and pay more attention to	the political side		
of the war in Afghanistan, but pro significantly deviate from the cur	rent Soviet path.		
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This document is prepared weekly by Asian Analysis and the Office of So on the issues raised in this public	the Office of Near Eastern and South oviet Analysis. Questions or comments cation should be directed 25X7
PUBLICATION NOTE	
Unless major developments warrant of Afghanistan Situation Report next warrant of February 1985.	otherwise, we will not publish the week. The next report will appear
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	alamanta including armored nerconnel carriers and	
	elementsincluding armored personnel carriers and loaded palletsof the 104th Guards Airborne Division in convoy outside their barracks at Kirovabad in the USSR. The division probably is involved in a training exercise. Elements of the 104th temporarily deployed to Afghanistan last spring for the seventh Panisher Valley	
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	loaded palletsof the 104th Guards Airborne Division in convoy outside their barracks at Kirovabad in the USSR. The division probably is involved in a training exercise. Elements of the 104th temporarily deployed to Afghanistan last spring for the seventh Panjsher Valley offensive. The Soviets are also scheduled to train 700 new Afghan police officers. We believe approximately 8,000 Afghans2,000 of them military personneltrain in the	25 25 25

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the new UNDP country program for Afghanistan includes projects only in Kabul. Soviet advisers wanted to include several	25X1
projects outside the city, but UN officials refused, probably because of poor security.	25 X 1
	25X1
contrary to widespread rumors, no grand assembly	25 X 1
will be held in Italy because of Rome's sensitivities to Arab countries which oppose the ex-King. Zahir is unlikely to be active in the months ahead in pursuing	•
his initiative to develop resistance unity.	25 X 1,

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PERSPECTIV	E			
AFGHANIST <i>A</i>	N IN JANUARY			25 X 1
				25 X 1
year laur acti Kona pres Figh may ther	es in the war in Afghanched multibattalion of ons in the Herat, Qanarha and Paktia Proving sure on regime garrisating continued in the again be planning to	anistan. The operations and Bandahar, and Bances. The insons in the ear assault insure plans to ser	d initiated small-unit agram areas and in surgents maintained ast and Qandahar. They and the Soviets rgent strongholds and two F-4 aircraft to	
	space.	and 711 gridin V	,	25X1
Mil.	itary Activ <u>ity</u>		•	
Janı oper ambı (Spe	weather failed to si wary. The Soviets co rations but also incr wishessome conducted etznaz) in support of ive in several areas.	ntinued to re eased small u by special p other troops	ly on multibattalion nit actions and	
	US Embassy sources r area in early Januar again preparing for	y, and Soviet	and Afghan forces were	
	gent attacks against posts, and a Soviet	the airport, military conv		
	nearhy villages.			25X1 25X1
	establishing a serie between Ali Khel and regimental-size Afgh late January. The i supplies of arms int	ted Soviet and so of posts on Khowst in Palan force arringents, howe the eastern atte	ktia Province. A ved near Ali Khel by wever, had moved large	25X1
		2	12 February 1985 NESA M 85-10035JX	25 X 1

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US Embassy source	s report that	the insurgent	ts attacked		•
Bagram Airbase on a snowstorm that some helicopters. to the attack and in the Shomali ar	about 16 Janu grounded Sovie The Soviets- to counter in	ary, taking at aircraft ar-most likely tense insurge	advantage of nd damaging in response ent pressure		•
which continued t			ion operation		25
The Panjsher Valley					
Soviet and Afghan for culties in maintainin Guerrilla assaults on resulted in substanti	g forces in th Soviet posts	e Panjsher Va at Golbahar a	alley. and Kohestan		
Embassy sources. insurgents repeatedly plundering arms but orillas allow the Sovithen repeat the cycle ignored bad weather a	ccupying them ets and Afghan . In mid-Janu	only briefly s to recaptur ary, the guer	the guer- re the posts rrillas		2
Khenj. evidence of heavy air	or artillery	strikesmost	t likely the	25X	1
guerrilla activity co					2
The performance of Af January.		shortly at	fter their		2
arrival in the Panjsh and a high-ranking of	er, a large nu ficer defected	mber of Afgha to the insu	n soldiers rgents.		2: 2:
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		12 Fal	bruary 1985		25
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		T	
Embassy sources reported th	at large Soviet an	d Afghan con-	
voys were moving north on t	he road from Kabul	toward the	
Panjsher in late January.			
<u>Kabu 1</u>			
The regime tightened securi	ty in Kabul during	the first	
weeks of January and were a	ble to maintain re	lative quiet	
during the celebration of t Peoples' Democratic Party o	f Afghanistan. Th	e increased	
security and bad weather pr willingness to stage many a	obably reduced the	e insurgents'	
activity increased slightly	'late in the month	, according to	
US Embassy sources, with sp city, the assassination of	Babrak Karmal's ba	icks on the irber, and the	
bombing of the Afghan milit	ary hospital.		
	· 		
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	elease 2010/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T01058R0004058	•
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and the bombingdeci	response to the increased incursions ded to deploy two F-4 aircraft and one tanker to Mashhad Air Force Base in	25. 25.
aircraft at Mashhad.	no Iranian F-4 fighter or tanker	25X1 25X1
overflew Iranian terr close to the Afghan b concerned that the gu through Iran and usin in western Afghanista in pursuit of insurge frustration with thei	e Soviet and Afghan aircraft probably itory in the context of operations order. The Soviets and Afghans are errillas are receiving arms via routes g Iran as a sanctuary after operations n. The incursions—which may have been nt forces—also underscore Soviet r inability to suppress the insurgents	25X1
<pre>in the Herat area mor Outlook</pre>	e than temporarily.	25)
We expect the level of gents who left Afghan are likely to return Soviets probably will insurgents and supplifumber of operations of renewed arms flows appear to be preparing and ambushes, using S	f combat to increase in spring. Insuristan last fall for camps in Pakistan when travel becomes easier. The continue their efforts to interdict es from Pakistan and may increase the in the eastern provinces in expectation from Pakistan. The Soviets also g for increased small-unit operations petznaz forces garrisoned at Jalalabad, Bagram. Multibattalion operations in will also continue.	· 25)
against insurgents in however, probably will problems in the interprise attack. Because in the valley, they motorized rifle troop offensive while relyifle bombing and artillery lieve the Soviets—lespring—will also con	ry may slow a new Soviet assault the Panjsher Valley. The Soviets, l be willing to put up with logistic est of what they hope will be a sur- e they already garrison several areas ay decide to send a smaller number of s to the area than in the spring 1984 ng more heavily on medium- to low-level to suppress the insurgents. We be- arning from small successes last duct a large number of heliborne finding Massach	255
assaults in hopes of	finding Masood.	25)
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ERSPECTIVE					
MARSHAL PETROV'S PROMOTION	AND THE WAR IN A	FGHANISTAN			25
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Marshal Vasiliy Petro Soviet Ground Forces, old job as First Depu some of his responsib Afghanistan. Petrov more results-oriented side of the conflict.	, has assumed Def uty Minister of D pilities for the seems more a tro d, and more sensi	ense Minist efense and oversight (op leader t	ter Sokolov's may assume of the war in than Sokolov,		2
Petrov and Afghanista		1			۷.
Petrov has been invo	 ···	stan since	he became		
Ground Forces chief					2: 2:
				T	
Petrov has visited Afat least some impact			and has had		2
					2
operations to small-u June 1981 also came u USSR. Petrov's secon have prompted the lea approach to the confireturned to Afghanis	not long after Pe nd trip to Afghan adership to revie lict. Two months tan and the Sovie	hat was app trov's reto istan in App w Moscow's later Mars ts began se	oroved in urn to the oril 1983 may tactical shal Sokolov etting in		2
train some of the imp					2
Counterinsurgency Ba	ckground				
Petrov directed the somali invaders of Erepeated lengthy vision Ethiopian countereritrean guerrillas. rugged as in Afghanis	thiopia during 19 its to Ethiopia t rinsurgency opera The terrain in	77-78 and o oversee tions again Eritrea is	has made preparations nst the almost as		
<u> </u>	7	• NESA 1	bruary 1985 M 85-10035JX M 85-10030JX	** ***	2

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face are similaralbeit on a smalle the Soviets face in Afghanistan.	r scaleto the problems	25 X
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Outlook		
It is too soon to tell whether Petro	w will be allowed to	
have the same kind of impact on the	war as his predeces-	
sor. In any event, Petrov is unlike cantly from the current Soviet path	in Afghanistan which he	
may have helped establish. His back and Ethiopia, however suggest that h	ground in Afghanistan	
experiment with military tactics and	pay more attention to	051/
the political side of the conflict.		25X ⁻
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