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SUBJECT: The PLO Offices in Tunis and Amman: Possible Roles, Links and Conduct in Fatah Operations

NESA M#85-10216

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

30 October 1985	
The PLO Offices in Tunis and Amman: Possible Roles, Links and Conduct in Fatah Operations	25X1
Key Judgments	
Fatah's involvement in recent Palestinian attacks against Israel and the possibility that Fatah may attack US targets raises questions regarding the functions and activities of the PLO/Fatah offices in Tunis and Amman. Israeli	
political leaders claim that PLO facilities in Tunis and Amman have been used for the planning and directing of Fatah	25 X 1
terrorist operations.	25 X 1
We have little hard information on which to make conclusive judgments regarding any link the PLO offices in Tunis and Amman may have with recent Fatah-directed or inspired terrorist	
operations. Our best estimates are based upon what we surmise from	25 X 1
the	
October Israeli airstrike on the PLO headquarters in Tunis and the Achille Lauro terrorist	
operation.	· 25X
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This memorandum was prepared by	
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis Information as of 30 October 1985 was used in its prepa Questions and comments should be directed to Chief, Ara	ration.
Division,	25X1
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We believe that the governments of Tunisia and Jordan, while supportive of the Palestinian cause, are fully aware of the political and military implications if either host serves as a staging ground for PLO/Fatah-mounted terrorist operations, particularly against Israel. We do not believe, however, that either has adequate manpower or technical resources to fully monitor and control all PLO activity within their borders.

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PLO Headquarters, Tunis

PLO/Fatah offices in Tunis have served essentially as the PLO's "capital" since its departure from Lebanon, primarily handling routine administrative matters. There apparently have been two main complexes in Tunis; one adminstrative office located downtown and the beach hotel in the suburb of Hamman, hit in the Israeli raid, where PLO officers were resident and presumably held meetings. Palestinian fighters are located about 25X1 70 kilometers southwest of Tunis at Oued Zarqa. there are only about 100-150 fighters at the 25X1 camp and many of them are preparing for transfer to Iraq. camp morale has been low 25X1 because the fighters have little to do--there is no military training--and they are not allowed to travel into town because of problems with the local population. 25X1 We believe Palestinians in Tunis have abided by the restrictions laid down by local authorities against initiating 25X1 any terrorist activities from Tunisia. we assess that Tunis has not been a center 25X1 for the planning and directing of PLO/Fatah terrorist operations, even though the PLO's chief security official and head of the United Security Organization, Salah Khalaf, is based in Tunis. Fatah's Force 17 also had an office in Tunis, although its headquarters'is in Amman. Muhammad Abbas's faction of the Palestine Liberation Front, which has been associated with Arafat, apparently planned the recent Achille Lauro operation from Tunis. We cannot confirm, however, that Arafat had any foreknowledge of the specifics of this operation. 25X1

The PLO's need to reestablish its headquarters and recover from its physical losses following the departure from Lebanon in 1982 initially preoccupied senior PLO officials in Tunis. Even after the PLO settled in during 1983, the isolation of the PLO headquarters and Fatah offices in Tunis seems to have severely

•	SECRET		25)
complicated and slow planning operations		sionmaking, including	25)
probably known in ge	neral terms of act	PLO officials in Tunistivities planned by Farat Palestinians. We	atah
believe that Fatah s bases in other count	ecurity officials	have been careful to	use 25X
	we believe that R	Khalaf uses his securi	ity 25
activities. The For Fatah operation in W Palestinians or Syri	ce 17 facility in Test Berlin last Ja an officials there West Germa <u>ns arres</u>	for most operational Tunis may have planned anuary against pro-Symbol but the operation wasted the Palestinian second	rian was
			25)
Greece, and Cyprus.	bers appear to be	most active in Lebano	
Force 17 was respons yachtsmen in Larnaca	ible for the murde in late September	er of three Israeli	25) 25)
PLO Offices, Amman			
considerably since N to move offices out	of Damascus after with his decision	marily because Arafat alienating the Syrian n to convene the Pales	ns and

Palestinian military personnel in Jordan are divided into four distinct groups. The first three groups have maintained a presence in Jordan for many years:

transferred from Damascus to Amman were the headquarters of the

- -- The Palestine National Liberation Army forces usually called the Badr Brigade
- -- Fatah Force 17, the organization's security service
- -- Khalil Wazir's Western Sector Department

PNC and the Palestine National Fund.

The fourth group includes almost 1000 fighters stationed at a new PLO training camp in Khaw near the PNLA camp. Among these fighters are pro-Arafat forces who were forced out of Lebanon during the fighting with Palestinian rebels two years ago and

*	During	this	perio	d, Fatah	figl	hters r	epor	tedly	und	lertook	ζ	
mi	litary	traini	ing in	Algeria	and	transi	ted	Tunis	on	their	way	to
Le	banon v	ia Cyr	orus.									

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	lestinians who came to Jordan from Libya raeli/Palestinian prisoner exchange.	
acilities to Amman vanted to encourage coward peace negotia	Hussein permitted the PLO to transfer s despite his distrust of the PLO because Arafat to cooperate in an effort to move tions with Israel. Hussein also wants tons with Jordan's Palestinian majority b Arafat.	he o
	e, the PLO's increased presence in Amman s position with Israel.	has
	the Western Sector is the PLO's main s in Amman for directing terrorist activ	ities
activities in Jordan celephone taps, and Force 17 Commander, in any as 36 Western S	the Jordanians closely monitor PLO and probably through the use of surveillan informers. Jordan recently expelled Fat Mahmud al-Natur (Abu Tayyib) and possiblector officials as a precautionary measust of Israeli reprisals against Palestini	ce, ah's y as re to
estrict activities, peratives may have sraelis. They appa with West Bank Pales	believe to be stringent Jordanian effor it is probable that Western Sector been behind some recent attacks against rently have used their increased contact tinians visiting Jordan to encourage	
pperations in the te	rritories.	
Israeli hat they believe th Palestinians acting	officials also have told US Embassy off e bulk of West Bank violence is the resu on their own.	icers lt of

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srael's Views	25 X 1
Israel has been consistent in public	25 X 1
in reporting what it perceives as evidence of irect links between the PLO offices in Amman and Tunis and	23/
atah-directed acts of Palestinian terrorism against Israel. Ithough most of Israel's verbal attacks have been aimed at the	_
LO presence in Jordan, it alleges that the squad the Israelis	}
rrested last August from the vessel <u>Casselardit</u> , traveling fr yprus to Lebanon, was directed from Tunis and had a final	com 25X1
ission of attacking a bus in northern Israel.	
	25X ²
Israeli Prime	25X ²
inister Peres and Defense Minister Rabin have stated that the pproval for the raid against PLO headquarters in Tunis was ba	ir
n evidence they believed showed that Fatah Force 17 directed	the
arnaca terrorist attack from Tunis.	25X ²
	25X ²
utlook •	
Despite the risks, Fatah is likely to try to retaliate	

Despite the risks, Fatah is likely to try to retaliate against Israel—and possibly the US—in the wake of the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis and the US interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers. Arafat's security chiefs will press for more frequent and spectacular operations. We believe Arafat, who is aware of the political implications for his hosts, may urge restraint until Fatah can carry out an attack that cannot be traced to operatives in either Tunis or Amman.

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