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National Intelligence Daily

Friday 18 February 1983

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18 February 1983

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SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA: Continuing Di	alogue
Press reports stating that South Africa reached agreement on the outline of a limited southern Angola are overdrawn, although senion two countries may meet again during the next work out such an agreement.	l disengagement in or officials of the
The two sides reportedly will conat their meeting in Cape Verde last Defire and mutual pullback of forces. discussion calls for a withdrawal of from Angola and a shift of Angolan, Conorth from the Angola-Namibia border	ecember on a cease- The proposal under South African troops uban, and SWAPO forces
Comment: The Angolans, who face UNITA insurgency and remain fearful o incursions, would be likely to welcom provided some pause in South African	f new South African e an agreement that attacks. 25X
	25X
A limited accord probably would both the hardline and moderate factio Soviets and the Cubans also might go vided that South Africa did not deman on a Cuban troop withdrawal.	ns in Luanda. The along with it, pro-
The South Africans almost certai Angolans and might back away from con Nevertheless, a disengagement agreeme to abandon militarily some of its tertrayed domestically by Pretoria as a (S NF)	cluding an agreement. nt requiring Angola ritory could be por-
Such an agreement, however, coul down. The Angolans could prove unabl from moving back into the border regi South African military response.	e to keep SWAPO forces
The South Africans, moreover, pr to provide aid to UNITA. This could nounce a disengagement pact, particul moved into the area vacated by the So	lead Luanda to re- arly if the insurgents
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CHINA-USSR-VIETNAM: Beijing's Hard Line	
The Chinese are maintaining their tough stand on Soviet involvement in Indochina and Afghanistan as they prepare to resume talks in Moscow next month.	25 X 1
A commentary last week in <i>People's Daily</i> criticized Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa for defending Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea and for endorsing Vietnamese proposals for regional talks previously rejected by ASEAN. The article also rebuked the Soviets for increasing their military presence in Indochina, particularly at Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, and Kampong Sam. In addition, the Chinese media continue to criticize the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and to highlight the activities of resistance forces there.	25X1
China also is rebuffing Hanoi's overtures to improve relations. Beijing has rejected another Vietnamese proposal for a cease-fire on the border during the lunar new year and has accused the Vietnamesefor the first time in monthsof firing into Chinese territory. Moreover, during a visit to Bangkok last month, the Chief of Staff of China's armed forces renewed his country's support for Thailand's security and hinted at retaliation if the Vietnamese increase their military activity along the Thai-Kampuchean border.	25X1
Comment: The Chinese are emphasizing that the USSR's support for Vietnam remains the main obstacle to major improvements in Sino-Soviet relations. When Secretary of State Shultz visited Beijing, the Chinese cited the similarity of views on Kampuchea and Afghanistan as one of the positive elements in Sino-US relations.	25X1 25X1
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




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	20.
ZIMBABWE: Government Confronts the Op	pposition
The government has embarked on a high-r opposition leader Joshua Nkomo and his follow	risk campaign against Ders in the Army. 25
The regime has been actively cons from Army enlisted ranks of former Zir People's Union guerrillas for alleged purge is still a matter of some debate but many former ZAPU soldiers returning portedly have been advised that they I discharged.	mbabwe African disloyalty. The e in the government, ng from leave re-
	25.
Comment: If the government foll	owe through with
the purge, many of the remaining form and soldiers probably will decide to Rather than return to their homes in	er ZAPU officers quit the Army. Matabeleland, many
would be likely to join dissident ban or flee to Botswana and Zambia.	25. 25.
The overall decision to get toug ably was made by the ZANU Central Comheads but has never fully controlled. acted as a brake on hotheads in the page of the control Central Control of the central Cen	mittee, which Mugabe Mugabe has long arty, but he usually
acts in accordance with the Central C which are reached by consensus. The remain a moderating influence, but it successful he will be.	Prime Minister will
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Juan Ponce Enrile



Defense Minister since 1972 . . . confidant of Marcos, believed architect of martial law (1972-81)

59 years old.

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Defense Minister Enrile will use meetings with US officials in Washington next week to set the stage for the review of the Military Bases Agreement that is scheduled to begin in Manila in April. Enrile's most important objective is to pave the way for eventual acceptance of a Philippine proposal to store US war reserve materiel at the bases for Philippine use. Manila links this issue to compensation for US use of the bases and to progress in modernizing the Philippine armed forces—the key items on the base review agenda.	25X
Comment: Enrile, who is close to President Marcos, will play a major role in the bases review. He believes that the talks this year give Manila an excellent chance to "correct" a security relationship he views as heavily weighted in Washington's favor. The Defense Minister's visit also offers a chance to settle the war reserve materiel proposal and other issues before the review actually begins.	25X
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aid publicly last we new long-term grain tated, however, that	the Soviet grain purchasing agency eek that Moscow is ready to negotiate trade agreement with the US. He the USSR is unwilling to increase has to buy above the current requirence.
Comment:	
Conquent.	
s the world's most s f grain. Neverthele s an unreliable supp he Soviets have dive	maintain an agreement because the US stable producer and largest exporter ess, Moscow continues to view the US plier. Since the US embargo in 1980, ersified their sources of grain into long-term agreements with other
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PERSIAN GULF: Foreign Ministers Meet

The Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council--composed of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman--will discuss the war between Iran and Iraq as well as other regional issues at their quarterly meeting tomorrow in Riyadh. Specific topics reportedly will include Saudi Arabia's efforts--unsuccessful thus far--to mediate between Syria and Iraq and the declaration of support by Syria and Libya last month for Iran.

Comment: The ministers probably will criticize
Tehran obliquely in their communique for not agreeing to
peace negotiations. Syria's reaffirmation of support for
Iran may prompt the ministers to consider—as they did
last year—the possibility of cutting off financial aid
to Damascus, but they are not likely to follow through.
The Council members, particularly Saudi Arabia, fear
retaliation by Syrian—sponsored terrorists. The Saudis
also worry that cutting off aid would make the Syrians
even less cooperative in Middle East peace efforts.

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
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