




**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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CCPAS/CIG



CY# 28.1



# National Intelligence Daily

*Monday  
4 April 1983*

DIA review  
completed.

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CPAS NID 83-079JX

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
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



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**VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Border Fighting Continues**

*Vietnamese forces have overwhelmed Democratic Kampuchean guerrillas at Phnom Chat and reportedly have launched a strong attack against Prince Sihanouk's resistance headquarters at Sihanoukberi.* [Redacted]

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[Redacted] the Vietnamese now control all important Democratic Kampuchean strongholds in the Phnom Chat area along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Although the Communist guerrillas abandoned most of their positions in the region by Friday, Vietnamese and Thai artillery units continued to exchange fire across the border throughout the weekend. [Redacted]

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The Vietnamese also launched heavy artillery and ground attacks on Saturday against the non-Communist guerrilla base at Sihanoukberi, according to unconfirmed press reports. The lightly defended base had a population of approximately 30,000 Kampuchean refugees. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** The Vietnamese are likely to destroy most of the facilities at the Phnom Chat camp—and perhaps plant booby traps—to prevent the Communist guerrillas from resuming operations there. A major Vietnamese assault against Sihanoukberi risks an increase in fighting with Thai forces, who earlier promised resistance leaders there artillery support if they came under Vietnamese attack. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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
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**USSR-UN-CHAD: Soviets Block Compromise**

The UN Security Council may vote early this week on Chad's resolution referring its complaint of Libyan occupation of the Aozou Strip to the OAU.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] The USSR thus far has blocked all attempts by Nonaligned members of the Council to achieve a compromise.

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**Comment:** Nonaligned unity may crack under intense Libyan pressure. A majority of Nonaligned votes for Chad would force the USSR reluctantly to consider using its veto, despite overwhelming support in the UN for action by the Council.

[Redacted]

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**MOROCCO: Shakeup of Military Officers**

King Hassan has begun a shakeup among key command and staff officers who were close associates of General Dlimi, his chief adviser, who died early this year in a car crash. The US defense attache reports the operations officer of the armed forces has been moved to a less sensitive position, and a major troop commander and several other officers in Western Sahara recently were arrested. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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**Comment:** Dlimi had a strong following in the officer corps and intelligence services, and his associates appear to have been badly shaken by his death. As a result, Hassan may have to deal with serious morale problems and perhaps a security threat. In the past, however, the King has successfully handled such problems and is likely to do so once again. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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**SENEGAL: New Government**

President Diouf yesterday announced a new cabinet and proposed abolishing the office of prime minister. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Half of the cabinet is new, and press reports indicate many party stalwarts have been replaced by younger technocrats. [Redacted]

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**Comment:** In the wake of his election in late February, Diouf is moving to assert presidential power, counter the opposition, and check the old guard in his party. These moves probably are a prelude to the imposition of more IMF-mandated austerity measures that could prove unpopular. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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## **Special Analysis**


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### **USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Uncertain Military Prospects**

*The Soviets face tough fighting this spring in Afghanistan. Despite Moscow's efforts to engage the insurgents in local cease-fires, the insurgents were more aggressive during the past winter than in any previous winter season since the invasion in 1979. As a result of their attacks on urban targets and airfields, the guerrillas have expanded the scope of the war and increased pressure on the Soviets and the regime in Kabul. Insurgent attacks in the spring and summer will force Moscow to continue to pay a high but not prohibitive price.*




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**The Afghan Army's poor performance continues to undermine Soviet counterinsurgency efforts.**



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**Conscription efforts apparently have failed to make up for losses in manpower, and most units still have only around 40 percent of their required personnel.**



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**Shortages of food and fuel in January also curtailed Afghan Army operations throughout the country.**



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### **Insurgents Widen the War**

**Resistance groups increased their attacks on bases and facilities near cities during the winter, while continuing to raid garrisons and convoys.**



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


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**Soviet Gains**

Moscow, however, can point to some small progress in the last few months.



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Over the long term, Moscow probably hopes economic reorientation, demographic shifts, and the indoctrination of a new generation of Afghans will strengthen its position in Afghanistan. The Soviets, partly to gain time for these processes, have pursued extensive negotiations with the guerrillas.



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
The insurgents have a number of reasons for accepting temporary cease-fires. They almost certainly welcome a reduction of Soviet and Afghan attacks against the Panjsher Valley and other insurgent-controlled areas, where civilian morale has declined.



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
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


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**Short-Term Outlook**

The Soviets probably will continue to try to negotiate truces with prominent insurgent leaders in order to divide the resistance movement and prevent coordinated insurgent military activity. They are likely to take advantage of truces in some areas to redeploy and concentrate their forces for counterinsurgency operations in other regions. 


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The USSR evidently believes its best prospect for consolidating its hold on Afghanistan lies in a combination of apparent diplomatic flexibility, local negotiations, and continued military pressure. Although insurgent leaders probably believe cease-fires and negotiations could secure tactical advantages for them, the Soviets would be likely to benefit the most. They will launch multibattalion operations this spring in some areas to keep military pressure on the insurgents and disrupt resistance activities. 


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Any Soviet gains, however, probably will be marginal or temporary. Cease-fires will likely break down when insurgents rearm and launch new attacks this spring. 

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Increased insurgent attacks on convoys, garrisons, and urban targets in the next few months seem likely. Such actions will further unsettle the security of major cities and probably will cause an increase in Soviet equipment losses and casualties. 

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This may cause the Soviets to consider modifications in their tactics, new diplomatic moves, or troop increases. Although the current situation rules out an early achievement of the USSR's long-term efforts to consolidate a pro-Soviet Marxist regime, Moscow seems determined to pursue this objective. 

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