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**Africa Review**



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**28 December 1984**

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**Brief**

South Africa: Extending the UN Arms Embargo [Redacted]

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.  
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,  
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Articles

**Zimbabwe:  
Increasing Political Violence** [Redacted]

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Leaders of both the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) have intensified their rhetoric and—either directly or indirectly—incited violence against opponents in preparation for national elections scheduled for early 1985. Prime Minister Mugabe's commitment to a one-party state and his efforts to achieve a resounding electoral victory for ZANU have contributed to a new wave of political violence aimed at intimidating opposition parties. In our view, this violence will intensify as the election approaches and as the government continues to crack down on its opponents. The government may implement new security measures in Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces to discourage voting for opposition candidates. [Redacted]

heavyhanded treatment of ZAPU. Since the killing, Mugabe has dismissed two ZAPU cabinet ministers, publicly declared ZAPU the enemy, and announced that the "time has come for us to show this evil party our teeth can bite and shall." [Redacted] Mugabe and Deputy Prime Minister Muzenda are considering the arrest of virtually the entire ZAPU leadership except Nkomo as a means of keeping ZAPU off balance before the elections.

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The violence is part of a cycle that began in February 1982 when Mugabe expelled ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo from the cabinet. The most recent round of violence was touched off by the murder on 9 November of Moven Ndlovu, a member of the ZANU central committee and the Zimbabwean Senate. [Redacted]

At the funeral of Ndlovu, ZANU central committee member Ernest Kadungure vowed that for every party official killed by dissidents three ZAPU members must die, [Redacted] Minister of State Security Mnangagwa said [Redacted] that the elections would not be free and fair because ZANU proposes to win them and will take the necessary measures to do so, [Redacted]

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**Hardening Positions**

Prior to Ndlovu's murder, Mugabe appeared genuinely interested in holding free and fair elections. He declared that those responsible for the violence must be punished regardless of their party affiliation. Mugabe tried to restrain ZANU zealots who were advocating a harder line against Nkomo and his party, according to US Embassy reporting. [Redacted]

Mnangagwa evidently believes the time has come to teach ZAPU a lesson. He said last month that the government would counter any threat to public security by ordering the ZANU youth league to retaliate against ZAPU-inspired violence. During the summer, ZANU youth gangs destroyed ZAPU offices and injured scores of opposition supporters in Midlands Province following allegations of ZAPU assistance to dissidents operating in the region. Virtually the entire ZANU leadership condones the youth wing's actions, [Redacted]

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The killing of Ndlovu and the subsequent upheaval apparently moved Mugabe and other ZANU moderates closer to those who are pushing for

[Redacted] These party leaders merely want the youth brigades not to appear as an organized arm of the party when engaging in acts of violence. [Redacted]

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### Incidents of Interparty Violence



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**Who Killed Senator Ndlovu?**

Senator Ndlovu was shot by unknown assailants at his home in the southern city of Beitbridge on 9 November. The ensuing violence between ZANU and ZAPU supporters left one person dead and 184 injured. To date, no one has been charged with the killing. [redacted]

Several theories have emerged as to the motive behind the assassination. Press reports initially blamed "dissidents" for the murder, and this is the official government version. According to this theory, Ndlovu's death was part of a continuing campaign by ZAPU-supported dissidents to kill ZANU officials in Matabeleland and Midlands. Twelve ZANU officials have been killed by dissidents this year. [redacted]

The US Embassy reports that, while there is no hard evidence as to who the culprits involved are, rumors are circulating that the death was part of an internal ZANU political struggle. ZANU's Deputy Chairman for Matabeleland South—often characterized as ruthless—was reported to have had a falling out with Ndlovu. The Deputy Chairman was apparently angry over what he viewed as Ndlovu's inability to wage a credible challenge to ZAPU in the Beitbridge district council elections. According to the rumors, the Deputy Chairman publicly declared that the senator must be removed. [redacted]

Another version sees the death as a product of ZANU-ZAPU tensions over district elections in which ZANU won some seats that ZAPU feels it should have taken, according to Embassy reporting. ZANU apparently used "heavyhanded" tactics, and there was considerable ill will between the parties. Given these circumstances, it is possible that ZAPU zealots took matters into their own hands and killed Ndlovu. Some senior ZAPU leaders, including former cabinet member Cephass Msipa, have been implicated, but most observers—including the Embassy—discount these charges as nothing more than wild accusations. [redacted]

**Cowing the Opposition**

Some Embassy sources report that more than 90 percent of the violence is instigated by local ZANU officials. [redacted]

Deputy Prime Minister Muzenda believes the interparty violence around Gweru in October was instigated primarily by ZANU's provincial governor for Midlands. The governor of Matabeleland South, also a ZANU official, has been accused of inciting party militants into violent confrontations with ZAPU members. [redacted]

The police appear unable or unwilling to contain the violence and are attempting to steer clear of interparty clashes. The head of the police, Minister of Home Affairs Mubako claims he cannot act because his hands are tied, according to Embassy reporting. [redacted]

The Embassy expects Harare to make use of emergency powers<sup>1</sup> to detain minority party members who are troublesome, in the government's eyes. On 26 November ZAPU's treasurer, Kenneth Mano, was arrested, presumably for telling party supporters to retaliate if ZANU attacks them. One well-placed Embassy source reports Mugabe personally ordered the arrest of Mano after a heated cabinet debate on the subject. A large number of ZAPU officials and supporters are still detained in Beitbridge. In Masvingo, up to 50 supporters of Sithole's breakaway ZANU faction are being held following clashes with progovernment ZANU youth, according to Embassy reporting. [redacted]

Government officials harassed minority party candidates—especially from ZAPU—during local elections in Matabeleland. The Embassy reports that "election by sight"<sup>2</sup> and the presence of security

<sup>1</sup> The emergency power regulations that Zimbabwe inherited from the former Rhodesian regime and has renewed every six months since independence confer extensive authority on the Home Affairs Minister and police, allowing them to override several constitutional guarantees to maintain security. [redacted]

<sup>2</sup> Election by sight is a process where voters physically line up behind the candidate of their choice rather than submit a secret ballot. [redacted]

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forces at polling places have been used to intimidate ZAPU in its traditional areas of support. ZANU officials in Matabeleland have voided election results favorable to ZAPU rather than accept defeat at the polls, according to Embassy reporting. There also have been accounts of assaults on ZAPU candidates, detention of opposition members by police, and the use of legal technicalities to prevent ZAPU members from running for office. [redacted]

In late October, Minister of Information Shamuyarira announced the government soon would begin a mopup operation against dissidents in Matabeleland. Embassy sources in Bulawayo believe a curfew will soon be imposed, or at the very least the number of troops in the area will increase markedly before the elections. Widespread hoarding of maize meal already has begun in anticipation of a curfew, according to these same sources. Mugabe recently accused ZAPU of promoting anarchy through the use of the dissidents, claimed minority parties are importing guns into the country to assassinate ZANU leaders, and warned that a curfew might be imposed again in Matabeleland. In addition, the military may be readying itself for some type of action before the [redacted]

[redacted] draft of the Prime Minister's New Year's message to the defense forces includes a reference to "vigilance and preparedness, especially during the runup to the general elections as disruptive elements are even now at work." [redacted]

New public pronouncements linking the ZAPU leadership to the dissidents clearly represent an attempt to discredit ZAPU. Even former ZANU party moderates are beginning to see the dissidents as an organized political tool of ZAPU operating under the direction of Nkomo, according to Embassy reporting. Differing sharply from the official government view, [redacted]

[redacted] believes that the dissidents now operating in Matabeleland are younger and more militant members of ZAPU, but they are not necessarily operating under Nkomo's direction. [redacted]

**The Opposition Threat**

[redacted]

[redacted] we believe many ZANU officials are concerned over the vocal anti-ZANU opposition and fear the minority parties may not be as disorganized and fragmented as senior party officials once thought. In October, Mugabe described as an "unholy alliance" the united front of opposition parties advocated by Nkomo, and said the effort was doomed to failure. [redacted]

Following the ZAPU party congress in October, Nkomo's party appears to be reenergized, and meetings in its strongholds appear to be well attended, despite the presence of security forces and ZANU youth brigades. The US Embassy reports the ruling party is increasingly frustrated and defensive in the face of this opposition. In addition to ZAPU, both the United African National Council of former Prime Minister Bishop Muzorewa and the Sithole faction have been trying to mobilize their supporters. Muzorewa's party has held numerous enthusiastic rallies and large-scale fundraisers in Bulawayo and Harare, despite ZANU attempts to disrupt these meetings, [redacted]

Muzorewa recently blamed Mugabe for the heightened tensions and said, "if ZANU wins, the rule of intimidation, unfairness, and violence will have carried the day." [redacted]

Sithole's faction, [redacted]

[redacted] has expanded its activities somewhat in the past few months in the eastern part of the country, although its meetings appear to be sparsely attended. Sithole recently told US officials that his supporters are prepared to strike back if [redacted]

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intimidated by ZANU. Sithole, who is in self-imposed exile in London, has attempted to run the party from abroad but has been unsuccessful in mustering any substantial degree of popular support. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

If the political violence escalates, we believe Mugabe may find himself under growing pressure to arrest Nkomo and ban ZAPU from participating in the elections. Mugabe would like to arrest Nkomo,

[redacted] but party moderates have counseled against doing so. They cite the potential for domestic unrest that such an action might bring, as well as the adverse international publicity the move would generate. [redacted]

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[redacted] Muzenda said in mid-November that there are no plans to outlaw ZAPU—at least until after the elections. [redacted]

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In our judgment, interparty violence will intensify. The death of another senior ZANU official probably would trigger a more intense government crackdown against ZAPU and other opposition parties. Mugabe probably would be forced by party militants to retaliate by ordering Nkomo's arrest. [redacted]

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We believe the government gradually has been building a case for the imposition of some type of curfew or antidissident campaign in Matabeleland or Midlands prior to the elections. Harare probably will claim additional security measures are necessary to prevent dissidents from disrupting the voting, and the Army undoubtedly will be used to intimidate the populace from supporting opposition candidates. [redacted]

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While the opposition parties are unlikely to threaten ZANU's hold on power, ZAPU victories in Matabeleland and Midlands, coupled with other opposition party victories, would be politically embarrassing to the government. We believe Mugabe and his party desire a sweeping electoral victory that ZANU can interpret as a popular mandate for establishing a one-party state. Anything less could be seen as a setback for ZANU. [redacted]

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[redacted]

**Zaire: Relations With  
France and Belgium** [redacted]

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President Mobutu has managed to stay in power for 19 years at least partly through effective use of his relationship with powerful foreign backers—France, Belgium, the United States, and to a lesser extent Israel.<sup>1</sup> According to diplomatic and open sources, he has convinced Zaire's major backers that his demise would leave a dangerous political vacuum that radicals or Communists would be eager to exploit. In addition, he has skillfully cultivated the impression at home and abroad that his foreign backers have become in part responsible for solving or at least helping to keep the lid on Zaire's major problems.

[redacted]

Zaire's major backers share certain broad interests in the country: political stability, economic growth, and a pro-Western government in Kinshasa. Brussels and Paris have stronger cultural and historical ties to Zaire than do Tel Aviv or Washington, however, and strong commercial and mining interests remain the driving force in their relationship with Mobutu, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa.

[redacted]

**France: *Plus ca Change* . . .**

Relations between Paris and Kinshasa are generally very good, according to diplomatic and open sources, although Mobutu does not have the intimate personal and business relationship with French President Mitterrand that he had with his predecessor, Giscard d'Estaing. Mobutu's initial fears that a socialist government in France would abandon him vanished shortly after Mitterrand came to power. Mobutu's frequent visits to Paris after the French President's election in 1981 and Mitterrand's early commitment to maintain aid and military assistance levels to Zaire helped get the new relationship off to a solid start.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Successful cooperation with Mitterrand on the Franco-African summit in Kinshasa in 1982 was especially timely for Mobutu, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa. It diverted attention away from domestic problems and helped to reverse Mobutu's growing international isolation resulting from Zaire's reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel several months earlier.

[redacted]

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In our view, Paris wishes to continue its special relationship with Kinshasa primarily to maintain its ties to financial and business interests in Zaire. Cultural interests also play a role. Zaire is the largest French-speaking country in Sub-Saharan Africa, and there are approximately 5,000 French citizens in Zaire.

[redacted]

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Maintenance of French support to and cooperation with Zaire has been a central theme of Mitterrand's African policy. French aid to Zaire is second only to that provided by Belgium, and it continues to grow. Paris recently agreed to a modest increase.

[redacted]

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Over the years, Paris has been Mobutu's primary military and political backer. Mobutu himself recognizes this and on occasion has used this as leverage against Belgium and the United States. Mobutu has not forgotten the rapidity of the French response to the uprisings in Shaba spurred by Angolan-based Zairian dissidents in 1977 and 1978, and he would doubtless look again to the French to save his regime in the event of another rebel incursion. At bottom, the French support Mobutu because they believe he is the only individual capable of ruling Zaire, according to public statements by French leaders.

[redacted]

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French military advisers command the 31st Paratroop Brigade and Zaire's only armored unit, which is stationed a short distance from Kinshasa. The 31st is responsible for the defense of the capital and would play a key role in the event of an internal uprising. One battalion of the 31st was sent to Chad as part of the peacekeeping force, although the unit was not accompanied by its French officers. A battalion of the 31st was also used to retake a small town in eastern Shaba last month following a small-scale rebel attack. France has approximately 125 military advisers in Zaire. [redacted]

Franco-Zairian ties have been free from the difficulties that have periodically plagued Mobutu's relations with Brussels. Paris has occasionally taken steps to muzzle anti-Mobutu dissidents in France, who are in any event much less vocal and probably fewer in number than their counterparts in Belgium. Earlier this year, the French removed several dissidents from Paris who they believed were planning to disrupt Mobutu's visit. [redacted]

Although Paris did approach Mobutu in regard to the treatment of the Zairian legislators who were imprisoned for attempting to form a second political party, the French generally have been reluctant to press Mobutu for reform. They have been content to let Washington and, to a lesser extent, Brussels take the lead—and the backlash—from Mobutu. In the past, Paris's apparent reluctance to coordinate positions on foreign assistance with Zaire's other major aid donors has allowed Mobutu to exploit the divisions among his backers to get around their demands for reform, in our view. [redacted]

There have been some relatively minor irritants in Franco-Zairian dealings. Mobutu occasionally complained that France was not providing enough support for the Zairian peacekeeping force that he sent to Chad and that Paris has not kept him adequately informed about French activities there. This issue took on new significance when the French-Libyan troop withdrawal was announced. Mobutu was incensed because he had not been notified in advance, and Paris had to make a special effort to smooth relations. Moreover, during Mitterrand's recent visit to Zaire, Mobutu expressed concern about French acquiescence in Libya's continuing presence in

Chad. There have also been occasional problems regarding the accountability of French military advisers in Zaire, French dissatisfaction with Zaire's handling of training on Mirage aircraft, and corruption in the Zairian armed forces that hampers the French military aid mission. Although a French official told an officer of the US Embassy in Paris last year that France intended to make its military mission in Zaire secondary to its developmental and cultural programs, Paris does not seem to have made any real effort to deemphasize it. [redacted]

Relations will probably remain close so long as the French perceive that there is no suitable replacement for Mobutu. For his part, Mobutu will look to Paris as his first line of defense should he require foreign intervention. [redacted]

**Belgium: *Plus C'est la Meme Chose***

The Belgians, like the French, have a special relationship with Zaire, but it is more volatile, unpredictable, unstable, and largely subject to Mobutu's moods and whims, according to the US Embassy in Brussels. Belgium suffers in part from the reputation it earned as the colonial power in Zaire. Zaire's ties with Belgium are also adversely affected by longstanding economic and commercial problems and by the activities in Belgium of a large and vocal anti-Mobutu community consisting of both Zairians and Europeans. [redacted]

According to diplomatic and open sources, some of the issues that have adversely affected relations between Kinshasa and Brussels in recent years include:

- The publication in 1980 of the Blumenthal Report, a well-documented study of financial corruption in Zaire that implicated both Zairians and Belgian officials in illegal financial and commercial dealings.
- Publications and speeches by former Zairian Foreign Minister Nguza that accuse Mobutu personally of corruption. Nguza's allegations embarrassed both governments and angered Mobutu.

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- Occasional criticism of the Mobutu regime by senior Belgian officials. One episode resulted in Mobutu's canceling an official visit last year.
- Threats by the Zairian-owned mining conglomerate Gecamines to terminate its processing and marketing arrangement with a major Belgian firm.
- Disputes over Zaire's longstanding debts to Belgium's post and telecommunications office and to Sabena Airlines.
- A protracted feud over the performance of Belgian cooperants who have been working to implement reforms in Zaire's customs office. [redacted]

In Mobutu's eyes, the most serious problem between the two countries continues to be the criticism leveled at him by Zairian dissidents who reside in Belgium, according to the US Embassy in Kinshasa. There are apparently over 50 anti-Mobutu groups in the country, although most of them are small and ineffective with no following inside Zaire. Although members of these groups have been somewhat successful in focusing negative attention on Kinshasa, in our view, Mobutu's highly vocal reactions to dissident activities have greatly exacerbated the problem and only brought more negative attention to his rule. [redacted]

Mobutu was particularly angered when a dissident leader in Brussels claimed credit for a bombing incident in Kinshasa last March; the bombings of the Air Zaire office and the Zairian Embassy in Brussels last summer further strained relations. Kinshasa quietly expelled a Belgian consular official recently for alleged contacts with dissidents, and it also accused Belgium-based dissidents of instigating the recent rebel attack in eastern Shaba. [redacted]

Although Brussels generally has played an activist role in Zaire, intervening on Mobutu's behalf with paratroops during Shaba I and II and chairing several international conferences to assist Zaire economically, Belgium's efforts seldom satisfy Mobutu completely. He criticized the Belgian military interventions in 1977 and 1978 for being slow while simultaneously praising the rapidity of the French response.

Similarly, he has criticized Belgium's approach toward Zairian dissidents while praising France's methods. [redacted]

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Belgium's military aid is nevertheless important to Mobutu. Brussels has over 100 military advisers in Zaire, some of whom are stationed with key units responsible for defending Shaba. The Belgians also run three of Zaire's six major army schools and training centers. Although the Belgian military presence is important, Belgium—unlike France—provides no military hardware to the Zairian armed forces. [redacted]

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Many Belgians—and especially the socialists—are opposed to their country's close ties with Zaire, particularly the military support that Belgium provides. Their spokesmen, both in and out of the government, frequently attack Mobutu on human rights issues. [redacted]

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In an effort to defuse some of the domestic criticism surrounding its involvement in Zaire, the Belgian Government devised a new African policy last year. Generally attributed to Foreign Minister Tindemans, the policy aimed to reduce the special significance accorded to Belgium's former colonies and to place them on an equal footing with other African countries. It also promised to cut Belgian military assistance in Africa. [redacted]

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Mobutu correctly interpreted the proposal as a plan specifically designed to deemphasize Zaire's preeminent role in Belgian foreign policy, according to the US Embassy in Brussels. One of the principal reasons for Mobutu's trip to France and Portugal last spring was to demonstrate his displeasure with the new Belgian policy toward Zaire, according to diplomatic reporting. [redacted]

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According to the US Embassy in Brussels, the change in policy has had no real effect on Belgian relations with Zaire. Belgian financial and commercial interests in Zaire and fear of being undercut by French encroachment are probably the major factors

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that prevent Brussels from significantly altering the relationship. Belgium plans to increase its aid to Zaire over the next few years. [redacted]

We believe that Brussels will remain basically committed to Mobutu, although Zairian-Belgian relations will probably blow hot and cold. Belgium would probably intervene to maintain stability in Zaire, but the strength and rapidity of such a move would depend on whether the threat stemmed from an internal uprising or from abroad and on whether white lives were in danger. [redacted]

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The invisible web of relationships that binds industries and senior officials in both countries is too important for Brussels to risk a real breach in its ties with Mobutu, in our view. Furthermore, the approximately 16,000 Belgians resident in Zaire are hostage to Mobutu's good will. Many thousands of jobs in Belgium are also directly tied to Zairian minerals. [redacted]

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Over the past year, Zairian-Belgian relations began to improve somewhat, although most of the basic problems remain unresolved. Senior Belgian officials have visited Zaire and attempted to smooth over the issues dividing the two countries. Brussels has attempted to mollify Mobutu by expelling dissident Francois Lumumba, the son of the radical Congolese leader of the early 1960s, Patrice Lumumba. The Belgians also made an effort to ease tensions when they rounded up and relegated to the countryside several other Zairian dissidents who threatened to disrupt Mobutu's visit last summer. More recently, Brussels has responded positively to Kinshasa's demands that security be tightened at Zairian installations in Belgium, [redacted]

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Mobutu's official visits to Belgium this year, the first in five years, reflect his desire to improve bilateral ties. Mobutu met Tindemans, Prime Minister Martens, and King Badouin in July and the Foreign Minister at the United Nations in September. [redacted]

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Belgian Prime Minister Martens praised Mobutu's efforts at economic reform, announced modest increases in Belgium's aid to Zaire, and pledged his country's support for Zaire's debt rescheduling during his visits to Kinshasa last summer and fall. According to the US Embassy in Brussels, Martens's promises of increased aid are, in effect, a renunciation of Tindemans' policy. Mobutu has, therefore, been reassured that Zaire retains a special place in Belgian foreign policy. Tensions over dissidents and debts apparently have also been papered over, at least for the time being. [redacted]

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**West Africa:  
ECOWAS Struggles To Survive**

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The seventh heads of state summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), held in Lome, Togo, in late November, was unusually well attended but produced few concrete results. The US Embassy suggests that the high turnout—11 heads of state attended—reflects a growing recognition of the organization's weaknesses and of the region's serious economic problems. Delegates criticized the West for not providing enough economic aid to Africa and for the continued high value of the dollar and high interest rates, which increase the costs of African imports and foreign borrowing. The only substantive development was an agreement to establish an ECOWAS bank to facilitate trade between member states, although its funding remains doubtful.

The summit failed to tackle key problems such as migration and currency convertibility, according to the US Embassy, and it was marked by thinly veiled criticism of Nigeria's border policy. Nigeria closed its borders last April in an attempt to combat smuggling, but the move has hurt trade for neighboring countries. Nigerian Head of State Buhari has given no indication when the borders would be reopened.

According to press reports, Guinean President Konte warned that ECOWAS faces disintegration if member states fail to meet their obligations. These obligations include not only the previously agreed upon open borders policy, but also financial commitments. Press reports indicate that member states have not been paying their dues on schedule.

ECOWAS groups together 16 West African states, having an estimated population of 160 million, with many different languages and currencies. According to academic studies and press reports, its founding members hoped to establish a common market and a common tariff policy by 1989. They also hoped to harmonize agricultural, industrial, and monetary policies, and to promote specialization to serve each other's needs more efficiently. Member states believed

**Regional Membership**

	ECOWAS <sup>a</sup>	CEAO <sup>b</sup>
Benin	+	+
Burkina	+	+
Cape Verde	+	
The Gambia	+	
Ghana	+	
Guinea-Bissau	+	
Guinea	+	
Ivory Coast	+	+
Liberia	+	
Mali	+	+
Mauritania	+	+
Niger	+	+
Nigeria	+	
Togo	+	
Senegal	+	+
Sierra Leone	+	

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<sup>a</sup> ECOWAS, or Economic Community of West African States, was founded by the Treaty of Lagos in 1975.

<sup>b</sup> CEAO, or Economic Community of West Africa, was founded by the Treaty of Abidjan in 1973.

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that, by combining resources, rapid economic growth could be promoted and new jobs would be created for their growing populations. The Treaty of Lagos, which created ECOWAS, also stressed the elimination of economic disparities between member states through various compensatory schemes.

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ECOWAS was founded in 1975, but, according to academic sources, its roots lay in Nigeria's emergent regional role in the early 1970s. Following the end of

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its civil war, Nigeria launched a diplomatic campaign to establish its preeminence in the region and to undermine the influence of the French, who supported the unsuccessful Biafran secessionists. The French-speaking states of Niger, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, and Burkina already had formed their own Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO) in 1973 with French support. Benin and Guinea, two other francophone states, declined at the time to join CEAO out of fear that their close trade ties with Nigeria would be jeopardized. Nigerian diplomacy successfully allayed francophone African fears, however, so that, when ECOWAS was formed, members of the smaller French-speaking community also joined. The first four years of ECOWAS were devoted largely to institution building and staffing. More recent efforts have focused on trying to institutionalize the principle of the free movement of people, which has been hampered by Nigeria's foot-dragging. [redacted]

#### The Challenge of Migration

Guinean President Konte's criticism of Nigerian policy reflects the increasing irritation of states which view Nigeria as an outlet for their surplus workers and goods. At the 1979 heads of state summit, members approved a protocol that called for implementing, over a span of 15 years, procedures to allow free entry without a visa for 90 days; the right of residence for any length without a visa; and the right of community citizens to open a business in a member country. [redacted]

ECOWAS has yet to reconcile this liberalization of migration policy with national interests. The protocol was based on the assumption that new jobs would be created as economic integration advanced. ECOWAS recognizes the right of member states to enforce migration laws, yet the protocol, unless revised, suggests there must be completely free movement of community citizens by the early 1990s. We do not believe Nigeria will allow open borders, and, as a result, the migration issue may pose a serious threat to ECOWAS's survival. [redacted]

At the time of the protocol's establishment, Nigeria's oil boom facilitated migration from surrounding states. Since then, however, the world recession and the fall in international oil prices have caused an

unprecedented economic crisis in Nigeria and anger against illegal aliens. According to press reports, Nigeria's expulsion of up to 2 million foreign Africans in 1983 outraged other African states, although they recognized Lagos had the right to enforce its immigration laws. [redacted]

Demographers estimate Nigeria's population will grow from 88 million to at least 150 million by the year 2000. As a result, the country's ability to absorb surplus labor from ECOWAS countries will be sharply curtailed, worsening already chronic underemployment and unemployment in the region. Migration currently serves as a safety valve for overpopulation and political discontent. At least 20 percent of Guinea's population already work outside their country, for example, as do about 20 percent of all Burkinans, according to press reports. [redacted]

#### Economic Integration

In 1980, ECOWAS agreed on deadlines for the removal of trade barriers, with least developed members given the longest time to protect their goods. As originally envisioned, members planned to establish free trade and a common customs tariff against external goods by 1989. We do not believe ECOWAS will attain these goals, and the deadlines most likely will be extended. [redacted]

Even if ECOWAS manages to promote freer trade, we doubt that the organization will be able to provide financial compensation to members that suffer losses resulting from trade liberalization as called for in the 1975 Treaty of Lagos. We believe the bleak economic outlook for West Africa over the next decade, together with poor and often inaccurate data available on member states, will frustrate compensation schemes. [redacted]

Moreover, French-speaking members harbor new doubts about ECOWAS's viability. For example, Benin decided to join CEAO in 1984, and, at their 1983 summit, CEAO heads of state reasserted concern for "preserving their francophone speciality." Press reports also indicate CEAO members rejected an ECOWAS call for the harmonization of regional

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customs tariffs. The rejection probably reflects the fact that CEAO's trade liberalization and freedom of movement policies have advanced at a more rapid pace than have those of ECOWAS. [redacted]

exports and lack an industrial base to absorb mineral production. Moreover, varying political and economic ideologies of member states also are likely to hamper integration efforts. The harmonization of economic policies still is at the planning level, and smaller states fear Nigeria's comparatively advanced industrialization will ensure its permanent domination of the community. [redacted]

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**Defense Cooperation**

ECOWAS's attempts to promote defense cooperation have proceeded even more slowly than its efforts at economic integration and lag still nascent CEAO defense arrangements. At the 1980 ECOWAS summit, Nigeria's Defense Minister presented a case for a community defense force, recalling the 1977 mercenary attack on Benin and the potential threat of external aggression. Conservative francophone members also supported the idea, and privately noted their concern over Libyan regional threats. According to press reports, although left-leaning Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Cape Verde, and Benin expressed reservations about the plan, ECOWAS members approved a defense protocol at the 1981 summit. Under this agreement, member states are pledged not to attack each other and to regard borders as inviolable. ECOWAS, however, did not become involved in trying to resolve recent border disputes such as the one between Nigeria and Cameroon in 1981 or the brief conflict between Nigeria and Chad in 1983 over the ownership of disputed islands in Lake Chad. [redacted]

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We believe any successful mobilization would depend on Nigeria's taking the lead, since it has the region's largest standing army. In all likelihood, in our view, different military backgrounds, command structures, and logistic problems would make the mobilization and deployment of a community force difficult even if ECOWAS members agree to do so. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

ECOWAS is in abeyance, and, despite the numerous treaties and protocols, members have not yet agreed to what degree national sovereignty should be subjugated to regional interests. Stagnation and paralysis marked the latest ECOWAS meeting, and, in our view, the goal of economic integration is at best a distant dream. Primary products, markets, and transportation still are geared to trade with Europe, and, as a result, the industrialized West continues as West Africa's primary trading partner. Uncomplementary economies hamper economic integration—many produce the same agricultural



**Mozambique:  
Turning West, South, and East** [redacted]

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Mozambique recently has completed several major steps to try to broaden its international economic ties. Earlier this month, Maputo signed the Lome Convention, a trade and aid pact between the European Economic Community and 65 less developed nations in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Maputo had refused earlier offers of membership for fear of alienating its Soviet Bloc allies. [redacted]

Moscow's willingness to finance sales to Mozambique despite Maputo's foreign currency crunch probably reflects an effort to regain some of the ground the Soviets lost when Mozambique signed the Nkomati nonaggression pact. [redacted]

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Mozambique and South Africa have signed an agreement that provides financial assistance to the Mozambican fishing industry and allows South Africans to fish in Mozambican waters, according to the US Embassy. The agreement calls for the creation of joint programs on marine resources and an exchange of scientific and technical information. Mozambique will earn much-needed foreign currency from license fees and taxes levied on the South African catch. The fishing agreement is the latest bilateral accord since the Nkomati nonaggression pact of last March. [redacted]

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Maputo's expanding economic ties with the West and South Africa has not led its old allies to abandon it. According to press reports, the Soviet Union will provide Mozambique with about 4,600 barrels per day of refined oil products in 1985, enough to meet 60 percent of Mozambique's oil needs. We believe that Mozambique's inability to obtain a secure source of oil because of its foreign currency shortage induced it to accept the Soviet offer. Although Moscow generally has demanded payment in hard currency in its commercial deals with African countries, the agreement reportedly includes three years of credit.

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**Tanzania:  
Nyerere's Image Fading** [ ]

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President Nyerere has suffered setbacks in recent international forums that have tarnished his political image and weakened his credibility as a leading spokesman for African concerns. His election in November as OAU chairman was a recognition of his stature as a respected elder statesman, but the organization's lack of unity on key African issues has spoiled Nyerere's leadership image. [ ]

[ ] Nyerere later admitted [ ] that he expected his tenure as chairman to be characterized by dissension and that little real progress would be made toward Namibian independence. [ ]

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**The Debtor Club**

Nyerere's next setback came as a result of a new initiative he proposed in the struggle against Western creditors. Nyerere held a press conference soon after the OAU summit to call on fellow Africans to default as a group on debt payments. He claimed this would force the capitalist nations to deal with Africans on their own terms and to pay more attention to the particular difficulties that Africans face. The initiative, however, elicited no reaction. African debtor nations, probably realizing that they would jeopardize further aid if they defaulted on current payments, ignored the call. [ ]

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The controversy over the seating of Western Sahara sharply divided the OAU at its summit last month. The Tanzanian delegation had committed itself to leaving the summit if Western Sahara was not seated. The delegation from Western Sahara eventually was seated, but founding member state Morocco walked out of the meeting in protest and Zairian representatives soon followed. Eleven more countries threatened to join the walkout, but later decided to stay. [ ]

**The Frontline States Summit**

The Tanzanian President also stirred controversy at a meeting of the Frontline States held in Arusha, Tanzania, in December. Prior to the meeting, Nyerere—in his capacity as leader of the Frontline States—condemned the principle of linking the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola to Namibian independence. His outspoken stance probably embarrassed Angolan President dos Santos, who had indicated a willingness to negotiate the removal of Cuban troops in return for the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia. [ ]

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The remaining members pressed ahead with the conference, turning to Africa's immense economic problems. In an effort to project an image of self-help, the member states agreed to start a fund for drought relief. They acknowledged that their ability to donate substantial sums of money was limited, but hoped the effort would encourage outside donors to contribute to the cause. [ ]

Members also agreed that the problems of southern Africa deserved greater attention. They passed a special resolution calling for more assistance to liberation movements in southern Africa, but did not create a mechanism for carrying out this resolution. [ ]

Nyerere criticized Mozambican President Machel for his dealings with South Africa and Zambian President Kaunda for his active support of Angola's regional negotiations. On Nyerere's side was President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who vehemently opposed negotiations of any sort with South Africa. [ ]

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Nyerere claimed a major victory in focusing the continent's attention on economic issues and a unified effort in dealing with the problems in southern Africa, but the hope for unity was destroyed with Morocco's announcement that it does not plan to return to the OAU next year. [ ]

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The difference between the two camps came to a head during the Frontline summit. In the end, Kaunda walked out and the summit broke up, ending without a joint communique. Although members pledged not to make press statements about the summit itself, their representatives' statements later at the United Nations clearly denote a split.

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**Outlook**

Nyerere's long-held position as an international spokesman and elder statesman for Africa continues to dwindle as it has for the past year or so. Kaunda's involvement in the South Africa-Angola negotiations has undermined Nyerere's position as the Frontline States' leader. Nyerere, however, seldom has backed down from a confrontation and is therefore likely to wage a fierce battle for acceptance of his ideas. Tensions within the Frontline States are likely to increase as a result of Nyerere's hardline stance and probably will further damage the organization's influence in the region. Similarly, although Nyerere's tenure as OAU chairman offers him a chance to regain his image as Africa's leader, the poor prospects for effective action by the OAU make it unlikely that Nyerere will recapture his former luster.

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**Africa  
Brief**

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South Africa

Extending the UN Arms Embargo

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The UN Security Council on 13 December unanimously requested UN member nations not to buy military equipment produced in South Africa. The nonbinding resolution follows the 1977 mandatory UN embargo against weapon sales to Pretoria. This embargo stimulated domestic arms production, with the result that South Africa has become self-sufficient in most weapon categories except high-performance aircraft, helicopters, submarines, and large naval warships. Pretoria seeks to keep product lines open and skilled workers on the job by producing weapons for foreign markets as well as its own forces. Export sales eventually could earn significant revenues and reduce the unit costs of equipment produced for the South African military.

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Supporters of the extended embargo are concerned that exports would further strengthen South Africa's arms industries and forces. Pretoria offers a broad selection of modern and mostly combat-proven equipment, including long-range 155-mm guns, rugged and reliable armored vehicles, compact night rifle sights, and jam-resistant radios. It successfully advertised its wares at a major arms show in Chile last March and probably would arrange attractive financing.

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The UN resolution by itself probably will not be a major impediment to sales of South African arms, which are finding few buyers anyway. The resolution reinforces the country's pariah status—undoubtedly deterring some potential customers—but Pretoria promises confidentiality, and at least ammunition and small items of equipment could be purchased without public exposure. A more important constraint, we believe, is uncompetitive prices caused by South Africa's relatively small scale of production.

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