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**Latin America
Review**



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26 October 1984

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**Latin America
Review**

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Despite the mutual benefits derived from the Cuban-Soviet relationship, several issues have caused friction in the past year and, as has happened in the past, cooperation has been temporarily strained.

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Cuba: Dealing With Regional Leftists and Communists

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

One immediate purpose of Cuba's efforts to strengthen ties with Caribbean leftists and South American Communists is to encourage both groups to unite in strong opposition to escalating US pressures in Central America and against Cuba.

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Panama-Cuba: Closer Ties

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[Redacted]

Panama is becoming an increasingly important commercial link for Cuba, and Panamanian Defense Forces Chief Noriega is steering the relationship toward a restoration of the mutually beneficial ties that existed in the late 1970s.

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Mexico: Opposition on the Right

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[Redacted]

Leaders of the ruling party, nervous over recent gains by the center-right National Action Party, have become more aggressive in efforts to undercut the growing popularity of this opposition group.

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Cuba: Pursuing Japanese Trade [Redacted] 25

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Since early this year, the Castro regime has been making a determined effort to improve trade with Japan, asking for help in developing Cuban technology, exports, and tourism. [Redacted]

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Antigua: Leftists Alter Image [Redacted] 27

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The leftist Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement is planning to soften its radical image in hopes of presenting a stronger opposition to the ruling Antigua Labor Party. [Redacted]

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Briefs

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[Redacted]

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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis [Redacted]

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Articles

**Soviet-Cuban Relations:
Discordant Notes** [Redacted]

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Soviet-Cuban differences over the past year represent a trough in a longstanding pattern of fluctuating relations. In the past, for example, serious differences over revolutionary strategy in Latin America climaxed in 1967 with Moscow using its oil leverage and Cuba arresting a "microfaction" because of its dealings with Soviet Embassy officials. More recently, there have been less significant disagreements such as the friction over the Afghanistan intervention. Nonetheless, the ups and downs always remain within certain parameters and, since the 1970s, have not threatened the overall relationship. In our opinion, disagreements over the past year are symptomatic of the patron-client relationship between Moscow and Havana, wherein both seek to maximize their gains from the bilateral ties. [Redacted]

The patron-client relationship has not undergone any significant changes during the past year. Indeed, the prevailing trend toward closer cooperation is likely to continue, as Cuba—suffering economic difficulties at home—remains dependent on the more than \$4 billion in economic aid provided annually by Moscow. Castro realizes that there is no alternative source for the massive Soviet aid that keeps his economy afloat. Moreover, the Cuban military depends almost entirely on the Soviets for its weapons, equipment, and training. [Redacted]

Despite the mutual benefits derived from the relationship, several issues have caused friction between the two countries and, as has happened in the past, have temporarily strained Soviet-Cuban rapport. Over the past year, issues ranging from the loss of Grenada and Soviet policy in the Third World, to Cuba's economic development and its role in CEMA have generated differences between Moscow and

Havana. Even the longstanding question of the Soviet commitment to Cuba has risen again in the wake of Grenada—at least in Havana's eyes. [Redacted]

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Soviet Support for Cuba

Statements by Cuban leaders over the last several months, including those of Fidel Castro, indicate that Havana is increasingly worried that if President Reagan is reelected, the United States will intervene militarily in Central America and perhaps even attack Cuba.¹ Given Cuba's perception of the present situation, Moscow's coolness toward Havana since the Grenada episode almost certainly has heightened Castro's sense of vulnerability. [Redacted]

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The Cuban leader clearly was frustrated by Moscow's weak response to the US intervention in Grenada. In his speech at the funeral of the Cubans killed in Grenada, he placed the blame squarely on pro-Soviet Grenadian Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, arguing that his actions set in motion the events which gave the United States a pretext to intervene. Conversely, the official Soviet line, elaborated in a TASS commentary, placed blame for the Grenada episode on the United States, whose "special services" were alleged to have penetrated Grenadian circles and created a pretext for the US intervention. The TASS replay of the Castro speech pointedly omitted the paragraphs in the speech that discussed Coard's culpability. So far Cuba has not adopted the Soviet line alleging US intelligence involvement in the Bishop-Coard dispute. [Redacted]

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
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Moscow's low-key approach this year to Cuba's two most important holidays—the 1 January anniversary of the Cuban revolution and the 26 July anniversary of the storming of Moncada barracks—probably increased Cuban anxieties over Soviet support and solidarity. Moscow's failure to send a delegation to the 1 January holiday is particularly noteworthy because this year was the 25th anniversary of the Cuban revolution. Soviet Minister of Culture Demichev, however, visited Havana during the first week of January to unveil a statue of Lenin. *Pravda* noted that Demichev met with Castro, but the Cuban media made no mention of such talks. [redacted]

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In his 26 July speech, Castro made little mention of the Soviets' contribution to the Cuban revolution or to the economic development of Cuba. Although a low-level Soviet delegation attended the 26 July event, neither the Soviet or Cuban media acknowledged its presence. Moreover, the Soviet congratulatory message to Havana made no mention of the US threat to Cuba, or of revolutionary developments in Central America. [redacted]

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The Soviets traditionally use these occasions to highlight bilateral ties and to make statements of solidarity with the Cuban revolution. Moscow's failure to do so is not totally out of keeping, however, with its current tack toward Central America and the Caribbean. As evidenced by their policy in Nicaragua, the Soviets are playing down their involvement in the region, presumably to avoid inflaming US sensitivities. At the same time, however, they are delivering large amounts of military assistance to give Managua and Havana the means to defend themselves. The material aid only partially eases Castro's worries, however, because this increased assistance underscores Soviet policy that Cuba would stand alone in any military confrontation with the United States in the region. [redacted]


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Soviet Third World Policies

The Cubans are frustrated with the Soviets' preoccupation with the situation in Europe, especially INF, at a time when Havana believes it is more seriously threatened. [redacted]

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Castro to acknowledge some of the human costs of his Angolan adventure to the population at home. [redacted]

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Soviet Involvement in Cuba's Economy

Havana and Moscow are also at odds over the fundamental "development strategy" assigned to Cuba and its specific role in the long-term CEMA master plan. An East European diplomat told the US Interests Section in Havana that Cuba, during the planning talks for the CEMA summit held in Moscow last June, sought to adjust its economic role to emphasize accelerated industrial development. The Cubans evidently were rebuffed because summit documents note that Cuba will continue instead to focus on agriculture, a role that is analogous to that of a primary goods producer for a "colonial" power. Castro, aware that his proposals had been rejected, probably stayed away from the heads-of-state summit—the only leader to do so—to avoid being associated with humiliating resolutions that underscored Cuba's client status. [redacted]

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[redacted] Arguing for a more forceful Soviet role, the Cubans cite Mozambique as an example of a situation where lack of Soviet support prompted the Machel regime to negotiate the Nkomati nonaggression accord with South Africa last spring. This perception of waning Soviet interest in the Third World, together with growing US pressure, may have led Castro to begin bilateral talks with Washington on the refugee problem. Moscow's view of such moves is unclear; to date the Soviet media have not acknowledged the US-Cuban talks. [redacted]

Over the next year Soviet-Cuban relations could once again become strained by developments in Africa, particularly by the issue of a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. Castro clearly was angered by the Angolan and Mozambican negotiations with South Africa earlier this year and apparently believes that Cuba's interests, as well as those of its allies in the ANC and SWAPO, have been compromised. His cool treatment of Angolan President dos Santos during the African leader's visit to Cuba last March suggests Castro may be wary in the future of a continued open-ended military commitment in Angola. [redacted]

[redacted] Havana may be preparing the way for an eventual withdrawal from Angola. [redacted]

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The Soviets would view the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a serious setback in Africa, however, and probably will resist any settlement that could undermine their influence with the dos Santos regime. For his part, Castro would ultimately accede to Moscow's wishes, but probably would resist Soviet pressure to increase Cuban involvement in the fighting in Angola. Although the data are incomplete, Cuban casualties in Angola appear to have increased over the last year and the Huambo incident—where some 80 Cubans were killed or wounded—forced

Castro's letter to Soviet leader Chernenko on the eve of the summit—ostensibly to make amends for his absence—focused largely on political-military issues and the US threat to peace. It made little mention of the CEMA meeting and failed to acknowledge Soviet economic assistance to Cuba. By expressing gratitude to the USSR and Eastern Europe for making it possible for Cuban men and women to have weapons, Castro underscored his unhappiness over the outcome of those talks. Moscow, apparently displeased by the tone and substance of Castro's letter, has yet to acknowledge it anywhere in the Soviet media. The sparring by the two countries over this issue also was inferred in a *Pravda* article on 26 June by Cuban Political Bureau member Jorge Risquet. The introduction—provided by *Pravda*—focuses exclusively on CEMA and its impact on Cuban economic development. It describes the CEMA summit as a "very important event in the history of world socialism and the international communist and workers movement." In contrast, Risquet's text fails to mention the CEMA summit even once—despite the fact that the article deals exclusively with Cuba's economic development, including its successes, tasks, and problems. [redacted]

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Castro's absence from the summit and the subsequent exchanges of pique may have prompted the Soviets to increase pressure on Havana to cooperate even more closely with CEMA. [redacted]

[redacted] a high-level Soviet economic planning delegation that visited Havana in July strongly chastised the Cubans for making hard currency purchases from the West and squandering scarce foreign exchange. A Soviet official reportedly cautioned that capitalist countries should only be turned to as a last resort and that future expenditures by Havana for Western goods should be made only after coordination with Moscow. [redacted]

[redacted] last spring [redacted] the Soviets unexpectedly canceled a shipment of sugar industry equipment, an action [redacted] in response to Cuba's earlier purchase of Australian cane cutters. [redacted]

[redacted]

Moscow also is increasingly unhappy with what it views as Cuban inefficiency and economic mismanagement. Soviet officials, [redacted]

[redacted] have told the Cubans that they are investing too heavily in the sugar industry, particularly when sugar substitutes will increasingly cut into the world sugar market. They added that Havana must increase its production of foodstuffs to eliminate its longstanding food rationing program. Moscow admonished Havana that the rationing program presents a poor image to other Latin American countries. The Soviets reportedly advised Castro of their intention to assume greater control over Moscow's investment in the Cuban economy. [redacted]

Outlook for Relations

The recent frictions stem from differing perspectives on some issues—largely the result of the USSR's broader responsibilities as a global power—several diplomatic setbacks over the past year, and Castro's heightened sense of vulnerability and need for Soviet assurances of support. Despite these policy disagreements, however, Moscow has maintained the high level of military deliveries to Cuba that have characterized the past few years. This is consistent with past Soviet behavior, even during times of bilateral friction. In 1967, for example, Soviet

military deliveries to Cuba surged when the Moscow-Havana relationship was at its lowest point. We believe Moscow will continue to deliver more and better military equipment, in part to assuage Castro and to improve Cuban defensive capabilities, despite continuing frictions that mar their otherwise close strategic relationship. [redacted]

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From the Soviet perspective, Cuba remains the most important symbol of Moscow's commitment to "socialist" change in the Third World. The Soviets still derive important political, geostrategic, and military benefits from the relationship. Cuba provides strong support for Moscow's policies in Third World forums where the USSR has limited access. Cuba also gives the Soviets access to facilities in the Western Hemisphere from which they can discreetly promote their objectives and funnel support to leftist groups operating outside of Moscow's sphere of influence. Moreover, Cuba's geographic location enables Moscow to conduct intelligence and reconnaissance activities against the United States. [redacted]

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Havana probably will continue pressing the Soviets for increased military and economic assistance, as well as for broad political statements of support that emphasize Cuba's role as an integral part of the socialist community. Concerned with the US threat and their isolation from Soviet Bloc allies, Cuban leaders probably will seek high-level visits from the Soviet Bloc—such as the Polish Foreign Minister's recent trip to Havana—as visible signs of Moscow's support. A CEMA heads-of-state meeting in Havana later this month may partly assuage Castro's desire for expressions of socialist solidarity, but it also may raise tensions again between Havana and Moscow over economic aid and development. Castro may use the occasion to ask for more assistance, but he is likely to receive more Soviet strictures on economic management. [redacted]

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**Cuba: Dealing With Regional
Leftists and Communists** [redacted]

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Havana's actions at recent regional meetings suggest it is using them as vehicles to strengthen ties with Caribbean leftists and South American Communists. One immediate purpose is to encourage both groups to unite in strong opposition to escalating US pressures in Central America and against Cuba. In addition, we believe that Havana's careful management of a meeting in June with Caribbean leftists is an effort to overcome Cuba's isolation and loss of prestige after the Grenada debacle by unifying the region's leftists. Similarly, Havana's low-key approach to an unprecedented public meeting in July of South American Communist parties probably was designed to avoid undermining its campaign to improve bilateral relations with governments in the area. At the same time, Havana saw the meeting as a way to revitalize its somewhat strained ties with the Communists and to help the parties make tactical adjustments to increasing political liberalization in several countries. [redacted]

Despite its more cautious posture, Havana continues to support insurgent groups outside of Central America, although more selectively and generally on a smaller scale than in the past. On balance, we expect that, while the fence-mending activities in the Caribbean and South America will not greatly enhance Cuba's image in the short run, Havana will persist in its current tactics so long as it remains on the defensive in the face of US pressures. [redacted]

Doctrinal Adjustments

Since 1959, Fidel Castro has consistently advocated revolution in Latin America and has supported or directed revolutionaries in numerous countries. Nonetheless, he has frequently been forced to shift tactics in his dealings with the hemisphere's Communist parties, radical leftists and insurgents, and with Moscow. In conferences on revolutionary strategy held with such groups over the past two decades, Castro has shown considerable flexibility in

adjusting to changing Latin American conditions, Cuba's own standing, and external pressures, especially from the Soviets. Doctrinal disputes most often revolved around whether "armed struggle" was the best tactic to adopt for specific countries, whether Communist parties or insurgent groups should be the "revolutionary vanguard," and over the uneven responsiveness of the region's leftists to Havana's guidance. Castro's recognition of the need for new approaches to Caribbean leftists and South American Communists was most recently demonstrated in the regional meetings in June and July 1984. [redacted]

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Cultivating Caribbean Leftists

The first Consultative Meeting of Anti-Imperialist Organizations of the Caribbean, held in Havana on 11-13 June, was a significant step forward in Cuban efforts to heal the ideological rifts within the Caribbean left caused by the Grenada debacle. Previously, Havana had been unable even to bring the two main factions of the Caribbean left together. [redacted]

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[redacted] delegations from some 30 leftist and Marxist parties from most Caribbean and several Central American countries attended the conference, which was organized by the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party. The gathering established a permanent bureau to disseminate "anti-imperialist" information and to support the activities of leftist organizations in the Caribbean. George Odum, leader of the St. Lucia Progressive Labor Party, reportedly was picked as regional coordinator of the bureau, and the Cubans agreed to fund its operations. [redacted]

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In addition to a general propaganda effort condemning US policies in Central America and the Caribbean, the Cubans tried to overcome squabbling among factions in several key countries. [redacted]

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[redacted] the America Department organized a secret session of selected leftists from the English-speaking Caribbean to encourage them to put aside disputes over Grenada and to work energetically to form a united leftist front. The Cubans reportedly promised to establish and fund two secretariats for the front, one in the offices of Odium's party and the other in Guyana, probably in Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party. Havana pledged to channel some \$380,000 through the secretariats to leftwing parties in the English-speaking Caribbean, but stipulated that the money be used exclusively to aid the parties in gaining power through elections. In return, Havana demanded continued support for Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the "liberation struggle" in Latin America. [redacted]

In the secret session, the Cubans also pushed for unification of leftist forces within individual countries. To avoid a doctrinal split, however, Havana agreed that there can be more than one formula to develop a united front in a given country, because domestic political conditions differ greatly throughout the Caribbean. Despite this concession, doctrinal disagreement persisted. More moderate parties, such as the St. Vincent Movement for National Unity, argued for a "liberation struggle" led by a "mass party" that need not be Marxist. Orthodox Communist parties, such as Cheddi Jagan's, insisted that the "vanguard" role could be played only by the Marxist-Leninists. The upshot was that several parties refused to endorse the Conference's final declaration without further study. [redacted]

[redacted] some parties complained that the final declaration failed to recognize the importance of "progressive nationalist movements" in the Caribbean. The Trinidadian National Joint Action Committee reportedly was so dissatisfied with the declaration that it insisted on making it a matter of record that it is not a Marxist-Leninist party. [redacted]

Nevertheless, Havana evidently was sufficiently encouraged by the secret session's discussion that it has persisted in pressing leftist parties in several countries to unite, in some cases threatening to withhold Cuban funding if they do not. [redacted]

Havana pushed the three main opposition parties in Dominica to form a so-called United Labor Movement, or face loss of Cuban aid. [redacted]

[redacted] Havana is disbursing funds to at least some parties in the region—for instance, to Odium's party—and that it continues in other ways to cultivate leftists from numerous regional countries. The America Department reportedly is planning to host a followup meeting in Havana and hopes to play a leading role in a meeting in December of regional leftists in Guadeloupe. [redacted]

Meeting With South American Communists

Havana took advantage of the Conference of South American Communist parties in Buenos Aires from 5 to 7 July, the first such public meeting in decades, to improve its flagging relations with several of these parties and to elicit pledges of support for Cuba's "struggle" against the United States. Senior party members from all South American countries, plus Guyana and Panama, attended, as did observers from Cuba, the Soviet Communist Party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, the Office of Communist parties in Prague, and the World Federation of Trade Unions. [redacted]

[redacted] one of the Conference's main topics was how to adjust Communist strategy to exploit the trend toward democracy in South America. The delegates reportedly agreed that in contrast to Central America—where guerrilla warfare is the appropriate route to achieve power—the preferred tactic in South America is to concentrate on nonviolent, legal political actions. In several press interviews and the Conference's final declaration, the participants welcomed the new "bourgeois democracies" in South America and emphasized a determination to foster united fronts with "all democratic forces" in order to topple the continent's remaining military regimes. They also called for greater efforts at mass mobilization in every country, with the worker class in the "vanguard role." They proposed a systematic campaign for Communist party representation in government coalitions, as is currently the case in

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Bolivia. Once these objectives are achieved, according to the final declaration, the Communist parties can guarantee the "revolutionary transformation" of all of South America. [redacted]

American Communists or to play a role in the America Department's planning for the region. [redacted]

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The second key area of discussion was the need to mobilize Latin America against "Yankee Imperialism." The participants expressed full solidarity with the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions and called for coordinated actions to defend both against predicted US military actions. [redacted]

Despite this ostensible downgrading of the Conference, Havana participated in advance planning for the meeting. The Cubans wanted to ensure that South American Communists would come out strongly in support of Cuba against the United States and to have a say in the discussion of tactical shifts by the Communists in response to the changing political conditions in South America. [redacted]

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[redacted] the delegates agreed that a "massive" Latin American front comprised of socialist and Marxist parties should be formed to help forestall US military intervention in Central America. [redacted]

[redacted]

The conferees asserted that all Latin American Communist parties must come to Cuba's defense and that their efforts should be coordinated with Communist parties worldwide. They agreed that Communist parties should press selected Latin American governments to renew or expand bilateral relations with Cuba, thereby helping to lessen its hemispheric isolation. Also, it was agreed that periodic meetings must be held between the Cuban and South American Communist parties, followed by a worldwide meeting of Communist parties focusing on the US threat. [redacted]

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Cuban Unobtrusiveness

Continuing Support for Insurgents

The Cubans assumed a very low profile at the Buenos Aires meeting, and evidently neither played a leading role in the discussions nor made statements to the local media. Even *Granma*, the Cuban Communist Party daily, gave scant coverage to the event, making no mention of a Cuban presence and noting only that the Conference called for increased solidarity with Cuba and Nicaragua in the face of the "growing US aggression" and that the participants condemned Washington's policies in Central America. Also, the head of the Cuban observer delegation to the meeting, Santiago Diaz Paz, the then director of a Cuban "think tank" that studies the United States, previously has not been known to deal with Latin

Even as it engages in a long-term rebuilding program with Caribbean leftists and attempts to revitalize its ties with the South American Communist parties, Cuba is not neglecting its traditional contacts with insurgent movements throughout the hemisphere. Outside of Central America, it generally has kept its support to such groups at relatively moderate levels. Nevertheless, [redacted] Havana has targeted several countries for increased levels of training, financial aid, and policy guidance during the past year or so. Havana apparently has varying objectives for this selectively expanded role. In Chile, Havana hopes to stimulate intensified insurgent operations against the Pinochet regime, while in

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Ecuador it wants to reassure radical groups Cuba still stands behind them in troubled times. In the Dominican Republic, Havana has encouraged leftists to try to exploit popular unrest there since last April. In Colombia, on the other hand, it has urged tactical shifts and greater caution on its allies due to the recent government-guerrilla truce. [redacted]

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Outlook

Havana will continue basically on the defensive in its tactics toward the Caribbean and South America as long as it fears a looming confrontation with the United States over Central America and even an attack against Cuba itself. We expect Cuban planners to continue efforts to improve bilateral relations in South America in order to strengthen regional flanks against the United States. We also believe that as long as prospects remain favorable for progress on the diplomatic front Cuba will be discreet in its dealings with South American Communist parties to avoid increasing the suspicion of local governments. In the Caribbean, where there is little hope of early diplomatic gains, the Cubans will continue to pursue a long-term building-block approach. Cuban planners probably calculate regional governments, which remain highly critical of Havana, will more likely tolerate cultivation of the Caribbean left than aggressive subversion techniques. In any event, Havana undoubtedly believes that relations with several key Caribbean countries will remain poor as long as their current governments are in power. [redacted]

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Panama-Cuba: Closer Ties [redacted]

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Panama is becoming an increasingly important commercial link for Cuba, and Panamanian Defense Forces Chief Noriega is steering the relationship toward a restoration of the mutually beneficial ties that existed in the 1970s. The largest increase has been in business-related activity, particularly in the shipment of goods from Cuban-owned firms in Panama to Cuba. At the same time, General Noriega has cultivated the Cubans [redacted] to enhance his domestic political power and regional influence. Although ties between the two countries probably will continue to grow in the near term, we believe expansion will be constrained by limited economic opportunities, lingering mutual suspicions, and Panama's stronger bonds to the United States. [redacted]

Surge in Trade Activity

Cuban commercial operations in Panama have been expanding, particularly during the past 12 months. [redacted] the Cuban CIMEX import-export firm in Panama has sharply increased its trade activities and related operations, especially imports to Cuba of goods embargoed by the United States. Precise figures on the value of CIMEX operations in Panama are unavailable, but [redacted] total assets for CIMEX and its several Panamanian subsidiaries rose from about \$106 million in 1982 to more than \$144 million in 1983. Moreover, [redacted] the CIMEX branch may be buying some \$2-3 million worth of goods monthly for transshipment to Cuba. [redacted]

Other CIMEX-related activities in Panama point to an upswing in commerce. [redacted] Havana has purchased a new building in a high-income district in Panama City to house CIMEX's Panamanian operations. [redacted] CIMEX officials in Cuba recently doubled the amount of funds in one of several

revolving accounts they maintain in Panama to \$1.2 million per month and opened a new \$300,000 account to cover rising operating expenses. [redacted]

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CIMEX has taken advantage of Panama's flexible commercial laws to create new Panamanian front companies to conduct business in other countries in the hemisphere, including Venezuela and Mexico. In addition, [redacted] CIMEX's headquarters in Cuba has begun sending midlevel managers to a three-month training course in Panama at a cost of \$15,000 per student as part of an effort to improve the company's efficiency. [redacted]

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The CUBANA Airlines office in Panama is one of the most important branch offices in Latin America, serving as a convenient connecting point for moving passengers and cargo between Cuba and countries not served by CUBANA. This year, for example, CUBANA reportedly has already surpassed last year's tonnage of cargo flown from Panama to Cuba, rising from some 700 tons in 1983 to more than 1,000 tons as of September. [redacted] the increased tonnage, which consists primarily of consumer goods for Cuban officials or for resale in Cuban tourist shops, has forced Havana to schedule additional CUBANA flights and to use chartered planes to accommodate the increase. [redacted]

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Government Visits

Cuban-Panamanian Government exchanges have grown in recent months, particularly since the resignations in August 1983 of anti-Communist Defense Chief Gen. Ruben Paredes and in February 1984 of conservative President De la Espriella. In July, for example, 10 Panamanian legislators reportedly accepted Havana's invitation to all

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members of the Panamanian Legislative Council to visit the Cuban National Assembly with expenses paid by the Cubans. Cuban Minister of Culture Hart visited Panama in August at the invitation of leftist President Illueca to discuss exchanges in the cultural and educational fields. Cuban Council of State Vice President Carlos Rodriguez attended President Nicolas Barletta's inauguration on 11 October. [redacted]

ventures. For example, through his brother-in-law, Noriega owns controlling interest in a Panamanian import-export firm that fronts for Cuban Embassy purchases of US-embargoed goods, handles Cuban cargo vessels passing through the Panama Canal, and services the Cuban fishing fleet at the port of Vacamonte. [redacted]

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In addition, [redacted] Mission in Panama is second in size only to that of the United States and is one of Cuba's largest in Latin America. [redacted] some 75 people are based at the Embassy itself, while [redacted] several hundred others serve in the fishing fleet and as cultural and commercial representatives in Prensa Latina and CUBANA offices in Panama. [redacted]

[redacted] the Defense Chief also is linked to Cuban operations in a variety of nefarious activities such as arms smuggling and drug trafficking, although direct ties are difficult to establish. [redacted]

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Noriega's Primary Role

General Noriega, who took command of the Panamanian Defense Forces in August 1983, has been behind Panama's closer ties to Havana. [redacted] Noriega responded—at least in part—to warnings from President Castro in September 1983 not to continue General Paredes's close alignment with the United States, and replaced Paredes supporters in the de la Espriella cabinet with left-leaning officials. [redacted]

In addition, we believe Noriega has sought to use the link with Havana to further his domestic and regional political objectives and has already enjoyed some moderate success. After offering temporary asylum to over a dozen terrorists of the Basque ETA organization earlier this year to portray himself as a regional power broker, Noriega reportedly got Castro to take half of them off his hands in May. In addition, during the Panamanian elections last May, he reportedly obtained secret Cuban campaign support to help ensure victories for relatives and progovernment candidates. Apparently in return, Noriega recently lifted a suspension on the issuance of temporary Panamanian visas for Cuban immigrants en route to the United States. This relieves Havana of the burden of an additional 400 refugees by allowing them to join some 4,000 Cubans currently in Panama awaiting resettlement in the United States. [redacted]

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[redacted] Noriega has conveyed to the Cubans, both directly and through several loyal leftist advisers, his purported desire to return Panama to the independent, nonaligned course pursued under the late strongman Omar Torrijos. In addition, Noriega himself has visited Havana at least twice this year, most recently in July, to reaffirm his intention to maintain warm relations, according to press reports. [redacted]

Constraints on Further Growth

While the warming trend in relations probably will continue over the near term, Cuban commercial operations in Panama, in our view, will be constrained by Havana's limited ability to produce the hard currency needed to fund new ventures. Moreover, opportunities for new Cuban commercial ventures in neighboring countries are hampered by the region's diminished potential for growth and hard currency returns, especially in investment areas preferred by the Cubans, such as tourism-related enterprises. [redacted]

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We believe, however, that Noriega has sought better relations with Cuba more for personal reasons than because of ideological commitments. In our view, his chief interest is to protect and enhance his numerous business dealings with the Cubans in Panama, which he has established over the years. [redacted]

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[redacted] Noriega uses friends and relatives to secure major shares in joint Panamanian-Cuban

Mutual distrust also will undercut the evolution of closer ties. Reports from US Embassy [redacted] [redacted] indicate that Noriega is wary of Cuban intentions both in Panama and the region, and that on occasion he reflects the Panamanian military's traditional anti-Communist concerns. Moreover, his good relations with Havana probably are also intended to promote Panama's Third World credentials, bolster his influence with local leftists, and discourage Havana from sponsoring domestic unrest. The Cubans, for their part, reportedly do not trust Noriega but feel they can deal with him and use him to advance their interests in several areas. [redacted] [redacted]

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As a result, Noriega can be expected to continue to cooperate with the Cubans in mutually profitable enterprises, but he will not hesitate to side with the United States on matters that are contrary to Havana's political interests. In the past, Torrijos and Noriega were careful to try to gain maximum political mileage and personal profit from their Cuban contacts, while stopping short of a relationship that would damage more important bilateral ties with Washington. [redacted]

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Mexico: Opposition on the Right

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Mexico's political environment is heating up as the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party and opposition forces prepare for important national, state, and local elections next year. Leaders of the ruling party, nervous over recent gains by the center-right National Action Party (PAN), have become more aggressive in efforts to undercut the PAN's growing popularity. They are playing on the nationalistic sentiments of Mexicans, charging that the PAN is a tool of US interests. Nonetheless, the government's control over the electoral process, as well as the PAN's organizational and factional problems, will keep the PAN from threatening the ruling party's hold on power in the near term.

Recent Developments

In the past month or two, the government-dominated Mexican press has roundly criticized the PAN for sending observers to attend this summer's Republican Convention in Dallas. In addition, a number of state governors have demanded an investigation into alleged links between the PAN and the Republican Party. Ruling party President Lugo Verduzco and labor chief Fidel Velazquez have gone further, suggesting that the PAN should be barred from competing in the elections. While President de la Madrid's government probably will not take such drastic action, the adverse publicity the PAN has received may temporarily stem its increasing popularity.

PAN officials, for their part, are sensitive to charges of foreign influence within the party, and they deny that they receive funds from abroad. At the same time, they point out with pride that the PAN is Mexico's only major political party that does not accept a government subsidy, an action they maintain could compromise the party's independence. According to the organization's leaders, the PAN derives 90 percent of its income from contributions of federal congressmen, who are asked to turn over 30



"I like to be antonomous."

El Nacional ©

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percent of their salaries to the party, and the remaining 10 percent from small personal deductions.

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The PAN Threat

Although formed in 1939, the PAN has recently demonstrated growing strength with the electorate. In September 1982, it won mayoral contests in the state capitals of Sonora and, in alliance with another conservative party, in San Luis Potosi. In July 1983, the PAN won mayoralties in Durango, the capital of the state of the same name, and in Chihuahua state,

where it captured the three largest cities, including the state's capital. [redacted]

At present, the PAN controls 51 of the 400 seats in the lower house of the federal congress, 57 seats in state legislatures, and 33 mayoralties.¹ PAN officials charge, [redacted] they would hold additional offices were it not for fraud the governing party has practiced in past elections. [redacted]

Despite having to contend with such electoral obstacles, the PAN is organized at the district, regional, and national levels. It is strongest in the northeastern states of Coahuila and Nuevo Leon, the northwestern states of Sonora and Baja California Norte, the central state of Puebla, the Federal District, and the southern state of Yucatan.

[redacted]
[redacted] Mexicans increasingly are coming to view the PAN as representing the interests of the country's northern states, while the ruling party is identified with those of Mexico City and the central states. [redacted]

Although PAN officials assert that they represent no special class or economic interests, support for the party has traditionally been strongest among the middle and upper classes, particularly within the business community. The party's support is weakest among workers and peasants. In recent years, the PAN has benefited from the protest votes of many Mexicans who, while not enamored with the PAN's policies, have sought to register their displeasure with the ruling party. [redacted]

Leadership and Policies

The current national leader of the PAN and its presidential standard bearer in the 1982 national elections is Pablo Emilio Madero. Madero, who is independently wealthy and has lived in Monterrey for many years, is a former federal congressman. He is

¹ The PAN occupies 50 of the 100 seats reserved for the opposition in the lower house of the federal congress and one of the 300 seats in the same chamber open to members of all parties. Members are elected in general elections held every three years. The 100 opposition members are selected under a regional system of proportional representation; the other 300 are chosen from single-member constituencies. [redacted]



PAN leader
Pablo Madero
Proceso ©

also a scion of Francisco Madero, the father of the Mexican Revolution. [redacted]

The PAN's political ideology favors less government involvement in the economy and is supportive of free enterprise. Madero has been critical of the ruling party's nationalization of Mexican banks in 1982, for example, but he asserts that his party is just as committed to defending Mexico's sovereignty as the ruling party. To a greater extent than the ruling party, the PAN takes prochurch positions, opposing abortion and favoring church education. [redacted]

The PAN supports a foreign policy line more sympathetic toward the United States than the ruling party. PAN leaders earlier this year refused to support a resolution in the Mexican congress denouncing Washington for its alleged mining of Nicaraguan ports. More generally, they maintain that they do not want Central America to become an arena of East-West tension but, unlike the ruling party, accept the need for US military aid to the region. [redacted]

Constraints

The PAN is unable to attract greater public support largely because it cannot match the organizational and financial resources the government extends to the ruling party. The PAN does not enjoy the backing of organized labor or peasant organizations, which are officially linked to the ruling party. [redacted]

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Moreover, the PAN has long been hobbled by internal divisions between the party's activist and traditionalist wings. The activists assert that the party needs a younger, more dynamic leadership. They dismiss as futile the party's continuing attempts to gain power through elections, at times urging civil disobedience. The traditionalists, such as Madero, counsel patience and favor continued participation by the PAN in the electoral process. Although Madero and other party leaders now seek to downplay such differences, as recently as 1976 the schism proved so divisive that the PAN was unable to nominate a candidate for president. [redacted]

The ruling party's resort to electoral fraud and voter intimidation have also hurt the PAN, as have other actions the ruling party has taken that have less directly detracted from PAN's electoral prospects. For example, PAN leaders assert that charges have been trumped up against a popular former mayor in the northern state of Sonora to prevent him from running on the PAN ticket for governor. In addition, the government recently changed its military zone commander in Sonora, as well as in Yucatan, replacing both with military officers known to be ruling party loyalists. [redacted]

Future Prospects

Although the controversy over the PAN's attendance at the Republican Convention is likely to wane soon, ruling party politicians will continue to show sensitivity toward any US actions that appear to lend support to the PAN. They know that the government's austerity measures will reduce support for the ruling party at the polls, and they want to minimize inevitable losses to the PAN. [redacted]

Nonetheless, the PAN's electoral gains probably will be quite limited. There has not been a governor who has not belonged to the ruling party in the post-revolutionary period that began in 1929, and the de la Madrid government almost certainly will take whatever measures are needed [redacted] to ensure the record continues unbroken. At the same time, so long as the PAN does not make significant new gains, the government will permit it to control some local offices and a large share of the seats in the

federal congress reserved for the opposition. To do so, particularly in races where the PAN has won overwhelming victories, enables the government to make a stronger claim that Mexico is a pluralist democracy. [redacted]

PAN leaders almost certainly will not endorse violent means to protest electoral irregularities, particularly so long as Madero and other traditionalists remain in control of the party. They are more likely to adopt nonviolent means, such as protest marches and occupation of municipal buildings, to publicize their grievances. At the same time, there remains a potential for spontaneous civil disturbances if rigged elections deprive PAN supporters of victories they believe they have won. [redacted]

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Cuba: Pursuing Japanese Trade [redacted]

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Since early this year, the Castro regime has been making a determined effort to improve trade with Japan. The campaign began with the Japan-Cuba Economic Council meeting last February. At that session, Cuba asked for help in developing Cuban technology, exports, and tourism. Havana also wanted the Japanese to resume longer term financing and export insurance and to participate in Cuba's next five-year investment plan. [redacted]

Japanese firms that have established a foothold in the Cuban market would benefit from an expanded trade relationship, as would members of the Japan-Cuba Diet Association who have received campaign contributions from these companies. However, Havana's limited capacity to import because of a depressed sugar market as well as Tokyo's sensitivity to US concerns probably will prevent any significant increase in trade between the two countries. [redacted]

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[redacted] Cuba has assigned a new commercial attache to Tokyo, and that a representative of the Cuban import enterprise arrived in July. [redacted]

[redacted]

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To show the importance it places on ties with Tokyo, Havana appointed a Vice Minister of Foreign Trade as its new ambassador in September. The ambassador will be able to benefit from his experience as the former head of the Cuban commercial office in Tokyo. [redacted]

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[redacted] Cuban Council of State Vice President Juan Almeida Bosque was to hold talks in Tokyo last month with the chairman of the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations and members of the Japan-Cuba Diet Association. [redacted]

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The Japanese response to date has been limited to the renewal of short-term export credit and export insurance. Cuba hopes to reverse the steady decline in trade between the two countries since 1980, which has been caused by lower prices for Cuban sugar, restrictions on nickel exports, and Cuba's debt rescheduling. The Japanese trade link is valuable to Havana as a source of hard currency and imports not available from the Soviet Bloc. Havana also views its trade with an important US ally as an act of defiance against the US trade embargo. [redacted]

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Antigua: Leftists Alter Image [redacted]

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[redacted] the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement is planning to soften its radical image in hopes of presenting a stronger opposition to the ruling Antigua Labor Party. The Movement's challenge to the government has been so weak that its leader, Tim Hector, was forced to boycott the general election in April, rather than risk a poor showing. The next election is not due to be held until 1989. With the other two opposition parties undergoing internal woes, however, Hector believes that his group has an opportunity to become the foremost opposition party in Antigua. [redacted]

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Tim Hector, leader of the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement. Outlet ©

The party's intended shift to a more moderate image indicates more a change in strategy than a serious altering of policy. Established by Hector as a Black Power advocacy group in the early 1970s, the Liberation Movement evolved into a leftist-nationalist party favoring fundamental change of the political structure to accommodate a socialist economic system. [redacted]

from regional leftists. In addition, despite pressure from several Caribbean radicals, Hector refused to involve the Liberation Movement in planning violent activities to mark the first anniversary of the death of Grenadian Prime Minister Bishop and of the US-led intervention in Grenada. Instead, Hector organized a peaceful cultural presentation designed to attract a wide cross section of Antiguan. [redacted]

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Deputy leader Harold Lovell claims that subscriptions to the party's popular weekly newspaper, *The Outlet*, are increasing, giving rise to hopes for more popular support. [redacted] the party plans a low-key propaganda effort among youths who will be first-time voters in the next election and intends to propose a merger with one of the moderate, established opposition parties, preferably the United People's Movement. [redacted]

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The party has enough time to build a base of voter support that could enable it to gain a foothold in parliament in the next election. A merger with one of the moderate parties would improve its electoral chances. It is unlikely, however, that the Movement will be a serious electoral threat to the Antigua Labor Party. In spite of Movement efforts to distance itself from its previous leftist stance, most Antiguan would be reluctant to vote for a formerly radical party. We believe, nonetheless, that the Liberation Movement, under Hector's leadership, will remain committed to seeking power by peaceful and constitutional means. [redacted]

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[redacted] Hector already has started to change his image. His past dealings with Libya and Cuba and close association with the radicals in the region had earned Hector the distrust of the conservative, pro-Western Antiguan populace. Recognizing this, he declined an invitation to travel to Libya with other Caribbean leftist leaders earlier this year and has apparently begun to disassociate himself [redacted]

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Haiti

Cabinet Shuffle [redacted]

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The decision early this month by President Duvalier to restructure his cabinet underscores the highly personalistic and fluid nature of Haitian politics. The Minister of Social Affairs, Theodore Achille, was the most prominent casualty. Achille was a member of the small inner cabinet, the so-called super ministers, and reportedly a close adviser of the President. He apparently lost favor with Duvalier because of his failure to keep a lid on public unrest last spring. Duvalier also created an ill-defined new post, Secretary of State for Social Affairs, raising cabinet membership to 35. In a subsequent move, the US Embassy says Duvalier sacked the Justice Minister, who is a close associate of Achille. [redacted]

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The shuffle, the sixth in the last 14 months, probably does not signal a significant shift in Haiti's domestic and international policies. Cabinet realignments, often the result of behind-the-scenes palace intrigue, allow Duvalier to help keep the country's political elite dependent on his continued good will. The departure of Achille, one of the most nationalistic members of the cabinet could, nevertheless, help improve strained relations with Washington. We agree with the US Embassy's view that, while the impact of Achille's removal on the cabinet's internal workings is as yet unclear, the stature of his chief competitors—Defense Minister Lafontant and Finance Minister Merceron—is likely to grow. [redacted]

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Mexico

Visit of Foreign Minister to China [redacted]

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Mexican Foreign Minister Sepulveda's official visit to Beijing this month reciprocates his Chinese counterpart's visit to Mexico City last August. Talks are likely to focus on selected political issues and means to revive the two countries' flagging bilateral trade. In addition, Sepulveda's visit probably is intended to pave the way for President de la Madrid's planned trip to China in 1985. [redacted]

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Sepulveda is likely to receive Beijing's strong support for the Contadora group's efforts to bring peace to Central America. China, which in the past year or two has shown greater interest in Latin America, professes to oppose "superpower intervention" in the region and supports a political solution to its problems. Officials of the two countries also probably will issue perfunctory statements denouncing the international arms buildup and endorsing global negotiations to establish a new international economic order. [redacted]

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The visit should strengthen bilateral trade and other economic ties. [redacted]
[redacted] trade between the two last year amounted to \$58 million. Largely because of Mexico's economic difficulties, it was down significantly from a total of \$143 million in 1982. Mexico's exports to China, which last year were worth \$46.3 million, included copper and zinc, chemical products, and fertilizers. China's sales to Mexico in 1983 were valued at \$11.7 million and included heavy machinery, rice, silk, textiles, and paraffin. Officials of the two countries are likely to explore modest joint investment ventures and to discuss China's plans to open a consulate in Tijuana, the Mexican city with the greatest concentration of ethnic Chinese. [redacted]

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Cuba Chronology

September 1984

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- 2 September* Defense Minister Raul Castro sends a message to Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega on the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Sandinista People's Army telling it to rise up against threats of US imperialism.
- 3 September* Minister of Interior Ramiro Valdes heads delegation to Ethiopia to attend festivities commemorating the 10th anniversary of Ethiopia's revolution.
- 4 September* In a press conference in Cuba, Bulgarian road workers discuss their activities in Cuba, including the national highway, the *Granma* publishing house, and the Jose Marti steel plant.
- Trade between East Germany and Cuba is praised at a meeting in Leipzig between Werner Jarowinsky, member of the SED Central Committee, and Cuba's Foreign Trade Minister, Ricardo Cabrizas.
- Tegucigalpa press reports that 23 Cuban and Libyan mercenaries were killed at a military training base in Santa Clara in an attack by the Nicaraguan Democratic Force on 1 September.
- 5 September* Some 990 Cuban internationalist construction workers from the Communist Party of Cuba and the Union of Young Communists are building 1,042 houses in Tobruk, Libya.
- 6 September* Juan Almeida arrives in Sofia to attend 40 anniversary celebrations of Bulgaria's revolution and to visit Cuban construction workers at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant.
- Ethiopian leader Mengistu meets with Minister of Interior Ramiro Valdes in Addis Ababa. Valdes heads the Cuban delegation to the 10th anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution.
- 7 September* Cape Verdean Foreign Minister Luz arrives in Havana and is greeted at Jose Marti International Airport by Foreign Minister Malmierca and Vice Foreign Minister Mazola.
- 8 September* In a speech in Ethiopia, Valdes says that the United States has intensified the warmongering campaign against the Cuban revolution and that this campaign includes the possibility of a direct attack.
- 9 September* UPI reports that at least four Cuban military advisers were killed in the 1 September air attack by Nicaraguan rebels on a military training camp at Santa Clara.

10 September

Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez tells US newsmen in Havana that President Reagan's reelection would not be an obstacle to bilateral relations, but neither would it improve relations between the two countries.

Division Gen. Rosales del Toro, Chief of the General Staff, heads a delegation to Czechoslovakia to observe "Shield-84" exercises.

Secretary Armando Manresa says a defense exercise caring for the wounded, firefighting, and repelling a simulated land attack and infiltration has taken place on the Isle of Youth.

11 September

Czechoslovak Premier Strougal and Central Committee member Flavio Bravo discuss bilateral relations and the international situation; condemn US policy of adventurism, and stress the need to avoid nuclear war.

Angolan President dos Santos, while visiting Paris, states that Luanda and Havana are ready to begin a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez receives the credentials of Ambassador Nanzad of Mongolia.

Castro receives Cape Verdean Foreign Minister to discuss the international situation and bilateral relations.

12 September

Burkina (formerly Upper Volta) officials announced that Cubans will work on Bobo-Dioulasso Airport to enable DC-8s, DC-10s, and Boeing 747s to land there.

Granma reports that a recent decision by the United States to further tighten restrictions on travel to Cuba proves the Reagan administration does not want Americans to discover the truth about Cuba.

Soviet delegation headed by I. V. Kapitonov, Supreme Soviet Deputy and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stops in Cuba on its way to Mexico.

Fidel Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Jesus Montane, and Isidoro Malmierca welcome Guyanese officials Forbes Burnham, Hamilton Green, and Richard van West-Charles at Jose Marti Airport.

In a New York court, Omega 7 leader Eduardo Arocena admits that in 1980 he participated in an operation to introduce dengue fever into Cuba. He also admits links to a US intelligence service.

13 September

Spanish Deputy Foreign Minister Puente arrives in Havana at the invitation of the Cuban Government.

Granma announces that Javier Ardizones Ceballos has been appointed Ambassador to Italy.

Oscar Fernandez Mell and East German Central Committee member Erhard Krack sign an agreement on East German participation in reconstruction projects in Havana.

14 September

Iraq's Deputy Minister of Trade arrives in Havana to attend the fifth session of the intergovernmental Committee on Scientific-Technical Cooperation.

Foreign Trade Minister Cabrizas meets with Edgard Camacho Omiste, coordinator of the Andean Group, in Havana. Camacho Omiste is interested in Cuba's foreign trade structure and achievements.

15 September

Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski arrives in Havana and is greeted by Foreign Minister Malmierca. Vice Foreign Minister Bolanos accompanies Olszowski on his visits to historical sites.

In a statement for Prensa Latina, Mexican President de la Madrid says that Mexican and Cuban relations are excellent and that Mexico is firmly committed to strengthening ties.

16 September

Guyanese President Burnham departs Cuba. During his visit, he and President Castro discussed bilateral relations and the international situation and visited economic and research centers.

17 September

Venezuelan Democratic Action party member Camache Mata says that improving relations with Cuba should not be seen solely as in Venezuela's interest, but in the interest of all of Latin America.

Cuba is selected by the group of Latin American nations at the United Nations to occupy one of the vice presidency seats at the UN's 39th General Assembly.

18 September

Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski and Foreign Minister Malmierca issue a communique in Havana condemning US aggression and supporting Nicaragua and the efforts of the Contadora group.

19 September

Havana press announces the signing of accords for supplying Cuban chrome and nickel to Czechoslovak enterprises.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service in Miami announces that Carlos Saavedra, a deserter from the Cuban military, paddled an inner tube from a beach near Havana to Florida.

Minister of Interior Ramiro Valdes arrives in Harare, Zimbabwe on an official visit.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez opens CEMA's third executive committee meeting in Moscow, in his capacity as president.

20 September

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Commander of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Tikhonov discuss international problems of mutual interest and bilateral relations during a meeting in Moscow.

Ethiopia's Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Rayeh Berhanu meets with Cuban labor official Enrique Gutierrez visiting Addis Ababa to discuss cooperation in labor unions, and bilateral relations.

Foreign Minister Malmierca and Kampuchean Vice Foreign Minister Kong Korm discuss the international situation, particularly Central America, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia during a meeting in Havana.

Ramiro Valdes tells the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation that Cuba and Zimbabwe would like cooperation between the two countries to include defense.

21 September

An accord for refinancing Cuba's foreign debt is signed in Madrid between the Cuban Government and Spain's Company of Credit Insurance. Both sides support increasing economic and trade relations.

The Council of State appoints Amadeo Blanco Valdes-Faully as Cuba's Ambassador to Japan.

Granma charges the United States of intensively militarizing Grenada, saying that the Grenadian Royal Police are receiving special training for incorporation into antisubversive paramilitary units.

Isidoro Malmierca and Spain's Deputy Foreign Minister Puente discuss international issues and the status of Spanish-Cuban relations during a meeting in Havana.

Ten deputy chiefs of government sign the protocol on agreements reached during the third meeting of the CEMA executive committee in Moscow. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez examines the documents.

22 September

A US Federal grand jury convicts Cuban exile Arocena of murdering a diplomat and masterminding a 10-year bombing spree as the commander in chief of the anti-Castro *Omega 7* terrorist group.

24 September

During a press conference in Harare, Ramiro Valdes expresses the firm conviction that his visit to Zimbabwe has strengthened and consolidated relations between the countries.

Joel Domenech meets with Josef Haman, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, to discuss increasing cooperation in energy, geological exploration, and others.

25 September

Trade talks are held between an Argentine trade mission from Cordoba Province and Cuba's Chamber of Commerce in Havana. Nearly 50 directors representing 38 Argentine firms are included.

President Sankara of Burkina arrives in Havana and is greeted by Fidel Castro.

26 September

Fidel Castro and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meet in Havana with former British Prime Minister Heath to discuss international problems, especially Central American and the Caribbean.

Fidel Castro awards the Order of Jose Marti to Burkinan President Sankara. Minister of Public Health Sergio del Valle accompanies Sankara on a visit to the Ernesto Guevara Central Pineers Palace.

Isidoro Malmierca receives Armino Santos Cruz who presented his credentials accrediting him as new Charge d'Affaires of Cape Verde.

Cuba and Algeria sign a protocol on bilateral cooperation agreement effective through 1985. Cooperation in economic, cultural, scientific, and technical sectors is stated.

27 September

Fidel Castro receives Javad Larijani, special envoy of Iranian President Khamenei, who delivers a letter describing Iran's position on some of the problems to be debated at the UN meeting in New York.

Isidoro Malmierca and Javad Larijani meet to discuss Iran's stance against Israel and the necessity of its expulsion from the United Nations and other international organizations.

28 September

Isidoro Malmierca arrives in New York to participate in the UN General Assembly debates.

Granma-84 defense exercises are held in Granma Province as part of a nationwide effort to prepare the people to defend the fatherland.

President Sankara and his delegation arrive at the Isle of Youth and visit the former model prison, the urbanized area of Nueva Gerona, and other places of economic, political, and social interest.

Peruvian Air Force Lt. Gen. Cesar Enrico Praeli and his delegation depart for Peru. During his visit to Cuba, Praeli was received at FAR headquarters by Raul Castro.

Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati meets with Isidoro Malmierca in New York to discuss expanding mutual relations. Velayati pledges support for the Latin American countries against US imperialism.



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