



General Services Administration
Information Security Oversight Office

Washington, DC 20405

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Date : 26 SEP 1979
Reply to :
Attn of : Director, Information Security Oversight Office (AT)
Subject: Systematic Review Guidelines


To : Senior Officials
Executive Branch Agencies with Original Classification

Section 3-404 of Executive Order 12065 provides that foreign government information, as defined in the Order, shall be systematically reviewed for declassification thirty years from its date of origin. This review is to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-3 of the Order and with guidelines for systematic review developed by agency heads in consultation with the Archivist of the United States and, where appropriate, with the foreign government or international organization concerned.

To achieve consistency in the declassification of foreign government information, it is the opinion of this Office and other major recipients of foreign government information, that a uniform systematic review guideline applicable to all executive branch agencies should be promulgated. To achieve this, representatives of the National Security Council Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Archives and Records Service, this Office, and the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, Treasury and Justice have, since early August, 1979, been involved in the development of such a guideline.

Enclosed is the final draft of the guideline developed by the above-named representatives. This draft is being sent to all agencies of the executive branch that possess original classification authority for concurrence and/or comment. I would like to receive any comments that you agency has by November 5, 1979. Upon receipt of all comments, a final product will be prepared and promulgated by this Office for the use of all executive branch agencies.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.


MICHAEL T. BLOUIN
Director

Enclosure

GUIDELINES FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
THIRTY YEARS OLD OR OLDER

A. PURPOSE.

These Guidelines have been developed in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-404 of Executive Order 12065, "National Security Information," and Section III,C of Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1. All foreign government information constituting permanently valuable records of the Government and for which a prior declassification date has not been established shall be systematically reviewed for declassification as it becomes thirty years old. Foreign government information found to be within one of the specific categories of information listed in Item F, below shall be reviewed item-by-item by especially authorized personnel of the agency or agencies concerned to determine whether continued protection beyond thirty years is needed. All foreign government information not identified in these Guidelines as requiring item-by-item review and for which a prior declassification date has not been established shall be declassified at the end of thirty years from the date of original classification subject, when appropriate, to consultation with the foreign governments or international organizations of governments concerned.

B. IDENTIFICATION.

"Foreign government information" as used in these Guidelines consists of:

1. Documents or material provided by a foreign government or governments, international organization of governments, or any element thereof in the expectation, expressed or implied, that the document, material, and/or the information contained therein is to be kept in confidence;

2. Documents of United States origin which contain classified information so provided, orally or in writing, to the U.S. Government or its agents by foreign governments, international organizations of governments, or element thereof with an expressed or implied expectation of confidentiality;

3. Classified information or material produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a written joint arrangement with a foreign government or organization of governments requiring that the information or the arrangement, or both, be kept in confidence. Such a written joint arrangement may be evidenced by an exchange of letters, memorandum of understanding, or other written record.

C. SCOPE.

1. These Guidelines apply to 30-year-old foreign government information which had been received or classified by the United States Government or its agents.

2. Atomic energy information which is defined and identified as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data pursuant to Sections 11y and 142d, respectively, of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is not subject to systematic review and may not be automatically downgraded or declassified. Such information should have been clearly marked after 1947. If such information was generated or received prior to 1947, it was not marked differently from other classified information. (N.B, Atomic energy information received from the U.K. or Canada is marked "Atomic," and that from NATO is marked "Atomal.") Documents containing information falling within the definitions of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data which have not been marked appropriately and are encountered during a systematic review will be referred to specialists of the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Classification for review and appropriate marking.

3. Foreign government information in documents attributable to or concerning the Central Intelligence Agency, or which mention that Agency or any representative, personnel, agent or activity thereof, shall be reviewed for declassification by designated CIA personnel.

4. Information appearing in FBI originated documents, which has been furnished by a foreign government, an agency of a foreign government or by an employee of a foreign government or which reports the activities of individuals or organizations in a foreign country without identifying the source of the information shall be reviewed by designated FBI personnel.

5. Foreign government information constituting or concerning cryptology, including such information on the development and/or use of any method, means, system, technique, procedure, activity, installation, device, material or equipment used for the acquisition, production, or transmission of signals intelligence or for the protection of classified communications or data shall be reviewed by designated National Security Agency (NSA) personnel.

6. Foreign government information appearing in White House originated documents, which is either identifiable as having been furnished or appears to have been furnished by a foreign government, an agency of a foreign government, or by an employee of a foreign government shall be reviewed by designated White House personnel.

D. USE.

1. Unless previously marked with declassification instructions specifying declassification within 30 years from the date of receipt or original classification, classified foreign government information 30 years old that is not covered by one of the categories in Part F of these Guidelines shall be declassified in accordance with Part A, above.

2. Foreign government information transferred to the General Services Administration for accession into the National Archives of the United States shall be declassified or downgraded by the Archivist of the United States in accordance with E.O. 12065, the directives of the Information Security Oversight Office, these Guidelines, any applicable terms of accession, and any additional guidelines provided by the responsible agencies.

3. Foreign government information constituting permanently valuable records of the Government (as defined in 44 U.S.C. 2103) that is thirty years old and undergoing systematic review for declassification while in the custody of an agency shall, except as otherwise provided in Part C, above, be declassified or downgraded by that agency in accordance with Executive Order 12065, the directives of the Information Security Oversight Office, these Guidelines, and any additional guidelines developed by the responsible agencies.

E. PUBLICATION.

1. Foreign government information is declassified if already published or cleared by the U.S. Government and/or the foreign government involved as appropriate for publication in Foreign Relations of the United States or other U.S. official publications, or if published by the foreign government or international organization of governments which furnished the information unless the fact of the U.S. Government's possession of the information requires continued protection.

2. Publication of identical or substantially similar information in unofficial but authoritative media may render the information itself no longer classifiable although the sources thereof and/or the means whereby it was acquired by the U.S. Government, if identifiable as requiring continued protection, could preclude declassification of documents containing such information. Regardless of such sources or means of acquisition, however, information which in or of itself concerns intelligence sources or methods shall not be considered declassified as a result of any unofficial publication.

Final determination on the declassification of unofficially published information will be made by the agency or agencies holding classification jurisdiction over such information.

F. CATEGORIES.

1. Information exempted from declassification under any written joint arrangement between the United States and the foreign government or international organization of governments which furnished the information. Questions concerning the existence or applicability of such arrangements shall be referred to the agency or agencies responsible for or holding classification jurisdiction over the records under review. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall, be informed concerning such arrangements and shall, as appropriate, instruct other agencies engaged in systematic review as to the applicability thereof.

2. Information related to the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities, foreign and domestic, including but not necessarily limited to vulnerabilities and vulnerability assessments of nuclear facilities and Special Nuclear Material.

3. Nuclear arms control information (see also #12, below).

4. Information regarding foreign nuclear programs (other than Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data), such as:

- a. Nuclear weapons testing.
- b. Nuclear weapons storage and stockpile.
- c. Nuclear weapons effects, hardness, and vulnerability.
- d. Nuclear weapons safety.
- e. Cooperation in nuclear programs including, but not limited to, peaceful and military applications of nuclear energy.

f. Production and import of uranium and thorium from foreign countries.

5. Information concerning intelligence or counterintelligence sources, methods or activities including intelligence, counterintelligence and covert action programs, plans, policies, operations, or assessments; or which would reveal or identify:

a. Any present, past or prospective undercover personnel, installation, unit, or clandestine human agent.

b. Any present, past or prospective method, procedure, mode, technique or requirement used or being developed to acquire, transmit, analyze, correlate, assess, evaluate or process intelligence or counterintelligence, or to support an intelligence or counterintelligence source, operation, or activity.

c. The present, past or proposed existence of any joint United States and foreign government intelligence, counterintelligence, or covert action activity or facility, or the nature thereof.

6. Information that could result in or lead to actions which would place an individual in physical, political, social or other jeopardy directly attributable to disclosure of the information, including but not limited to:

a. Information identifying any individual or organization as a confidential source of intelligence or counterintelligence.

b. Information revealing the identity of an intelligence, counterintelligence or covert action agent or agents.

c. Information identifying an individual as a sexual deviant, criminal, saboteur, traitor, "quisling," "guerrilla," terrorist, member of a "resistance" or "liberation" group, organization, etc.

7. Information which would reveal the identity of any individual prisoner-of-war who was forcibly repatriated.

8. Information about foreign individuals or organizations which, if disclosed, could be expected to:

a. Adversely affect a foreign country's relations with the United States.

b. Adversely affect present and/or future confidential exchanges between the United States and any foreign government or international organization of governments.

9. Information related to plans (whether executed or not, whether presented in whole or in part), programs, operations, negotiations, and intelligence assessments shared by one or several foreign governments with the United States, including but not limited to those involving the territory, political regime or government of another country, and which if disclosed could be expected to affect adversely the conduct of U.S. foreign policy or the conduct of another country's foreign policy with respect to a third country or countries. This item would include contingency plans, plans for covert political, military, paramilitary or intelligence activities or operations by a foreign government acting alone or jointly with the United States Government, and positions or actions taken by a foreign government alone or jointly with the United States concerning border disputes or other territorial issues.

10. Information on foreign policy aspects of cryptologic activities and operations, including but not limited to that concerning arrangements for sharing such information with one or several other countries and/or for the establishment or operation of "listening posts" or related installations and facilities, or support provided thereto.

11. Scientific information such as that concerning space, climatology, communications, maritime, undersea, and polar projects, if its disclosure could be expected to affect adversely current and/or future exchanges of such

information between the United States and any foreign governments or international organizations of governments.

12. Information on foreign policy aspects of nuclear matters, the disclosure of which could be expected to adversely affect cooperation between one or more foreign governments and the United States Government.

13. Nuclear propulsion information.

14. Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of nuclear detection systems.

15. Information concerning or revealing escape, evasion, cover or deception plans, procedures, and techniques whether executed or not.

16. Information which could adversely affect the current or future usefulness of policies, programs, weapon systems, operations, or plans.

17. Information concerning research, development, testing and evaluation of chemical and biological weapons and defense systems; specific identification of chemical and biological agents and munitions; and chemical and biological warfare plans.

18. Technical information concerning weapons systems and military equipment which reveal the capabilities, limitations, or vulnerabilities of such systems or equipment and which could be exploited to destroy, counter, render ineffective or neutralize such weapons or equipment.

19. Cryptologic information, including cryptologic sources and methods, currently in use. This includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, operations, and scope of signal intelligence comprising communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence, and the cryptosecurity and emission security components of communi-

cations security, including the communications portion of cover and deception plans.

20. Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry intelligence and electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures, electronic counter-countermeasures) or related activities, including but not necessarily limited to:

a. Information concerning or revealing nomenclature, functions, technical characteristics or descriptions of communications and electronic equipment, its employment/development, and its association with weapon systems or military operations.

b. Information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, operations or scope of activities involved in the acquisition, analysis and evaluation of such information, and the degree of success achieved by the above processes, techniques, operations or activities.

21. Present, past or proposed protective intelligence information relating to the sources, plans, techniques and methods in carrying out assigned duties of protecting United States Government officials or other protectees abroad and foreign officials while in the United States or United States possessions. This would include information on the identification of witnesses, informants and persons suspected of being dangerous to persons under protection.

22. Information on deposits of foreign official institutions in United States banks and on foreign official institutions' holdings, purchases and sales of long-term marketable securities in the United States.

23. Information concerning economic and policy studies and sensitive assessments or analyses of economic conditions of foreign countries received through the Multilateral Development Banks which are: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank), International

Development Bank (IDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AFDB), the African Development Fund (AFDF). Also similar information received through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

24. Information pertaining to the unlawful activities of foreign governments and/or their officials.

25. Information described in these Guidelines that is contained in correspondence, transcripts or memoranda of conversation, or minutes of meetings between the President of the United States and a current or former foreign government official.

26. Information described in these Guidelines that is contained in documents originated by or sent to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or to his Deputy, for the President or Vice President.

27. Federal agency originated documents bearing NSC or White House comments relating to categories of information described in these Guidelines that is contained therein.

28. Information as described in these Guidelines that is contained in correspondence to or from the President, including background briefing memoranda and talking points for meetings between the President and foreign government officials and discussions of the timing and purposes of such meetings.

29. Information as described in these Guidelines that is contained in agency message traffic originated by White House Staff members on overseas visits, directed to the White House Staff in Washington but sent through agency communication networks.

G. FURTHER REVIEW.

1. Foreign government information undergoing systematic review which is exempted from declassification after applying these guidelines shall be further reviewed by especially designated officials from the agencies having classification jurisdiction over it. If the identity of that agency is not apparent, or the reviewing official does not possess the requisite expertise, the information may be referred to an agency competent to make the decision required, as follows:

- Categories 2 - 4, Department of Energy
- 5 - 6, Central Intelligence Agency
- 7 - 12, Department of State
- 13 - 20, Department of Defense
- 21 - 23, Department of the Treasury
- 24 Department of Justice or Treasury (as approved)
- 25 - 29 National Security Council

2. If the cognizant agency determines on its own authority, or after consultation with the foreign government or international organization of governments which furnished the information, that the information no longer requires protection, that information must then be declassified. Such action may involve the release of an entire document, or only portions of a document. If the agency declassification authority determines that classification should be extended beyond 30 years, the provisions of Section III,C,2(b) of Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1 apply.

H. AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING.

1. Foreign government information originally classified at the Top Secret level and exempted from declassification under these Guidelines, and which is not declassified following further review under Part G above, shall be downgraded to the level of Secret subject, where appropriate, to the consent of the foreign government or international organization of governments which furnished the information.

2. Any categories of documents and/or information, or individual documents or items of information, required by the originating foreign government or international organization of governments to remain classified at the Top Secret level shall not be downgraded until such downgrading is consented to in accordance with Part H,1 above.

more up a file
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date 9/27/79

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. C/RMD 5B 2828 Hqs.	E.	10/1
2.		
3. C/CRD 211 Key		
4. [Redacted]		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

For joint review -- suggestions, additions, deletions, etc.

1-4 [Redacted] told me today 10/2 that CRD has a copy & will comment. I said RMD had reviewed & had nothing to contribute. Do we want to file this or destroy? @

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
[Redacted]	7D 24 Hqs

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