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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

February 27, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS OF THE SPRAGUE COMMITTEE REPORT:

The Sprague Committee report is being circulated to the departments and agencies for consideration and any action which they deem appropriate.

The Sprague recommendation concerning the Operations Coordinating Board has been rejected by the President. This decision, however, has no bearing on other recommendations made in the report.

Each department and agency is urged to consider carefully all the recommendations except the one covering the OCB. Those parts of the report which are found to be useful can be acted upon, if appropriate, by an individual department or agency.

McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

NSC review(s) completed.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON
INFORMATION ACTIVITIES ABROAD

December 1960

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THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON
INFORMATION ACTIVITIES ABROAD

MANSFIELD D. SPRAGUE, Chairman

GEORGE V. ALLEN
Director, U. S. Information
Agency

JOHN N. IRWIN II
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

C. D. JACKSON

GORDON GRAY
Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security
Affairs

LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT
Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs

KARL G. HARR, JR.
Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent

PHILIP D. REED

Alternates

JOHN A. BROSS
Central Intelligence Agency

ABBOTT WASHBURN
Deputy Director, U. S. Informa-
tion Agency


RAYMOND A. HARE
Deputy Under Secretary of State

F. HAYDN WILLIAMS
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for National Security
Council Affairs and Plans

STAFF

Executive Director
WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN

Administrative Officer
ROBERT J. PHILLIPS

ALFRED V. BOERNER
(U. S. Information Agency)

(Central Intelligence Agency)

EDMUND A. GULLION
(Department of State)

ABRAHAM M. SIRKIN
(U. S. Information Agency)

COLONEL J. I. COFFEY
(The White House Office)

COLONEL JOHN F. TWOMBLY III
(Department of Defense)

MRS. RUTH L. SIVARD

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Chairman Sprague's letter to the President, dated December 23, 1960, transmitting the Committee's Conclusions and Recommendations

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

January 9, 1961

Dear Mr. Sprague:

I have read with deep interest the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on Information Activities Abroad which were submitted to me with your letter of December twenty-third.

I am impressed by the comprehensive nature of the study conducted by your committee and the breadth and vision which characterize it. As you know, I am asking that study be started on it at once by the departments and agencies involved in the matters it covers. Also, I am having it placed in the permanent records of the Government readily available for future use. With much of the report, and a great many of its conclusions and recommendations, I am in full and instant accord. Certain other conclusions and recommendations will of course require, and receive, further consideration. Altogether, I think it is a document of exceptional value to an informed understanding of this subject, and for this reason have determined to put as much of it as possible into the public domain. Your committee was not asked to make an unclassified report and indeed you have dealt with many things which must remain classified in the interest of national security. Even with these omitted, however, it deserves—and I hope will receive—wide attention.

There are certain of your conclusions and recommendations which merit particular notice. The first of these has to do with the emphasis on the total U. S. information effort, particularly in Africa and Latin America. I share the committee's view that there should be continued expansion of these activities, carried out in an orderly way so as to permit the preparation of sound plans and the recruitment and training of qualified personnel.

Also worthy of serious attention is the stress laid by the committee upon the training process so that those members of the Government who engage in operations may fully understand the broad policy considerations which underlie our programs and be fully equipped to act in the total interest of the United States.

There would be, I hope, general acceptance of the view that in the long run the soundest program of all might well be the one to give assistance to educational development. Such a program should of course be well defined in scope and timing before extensive commitments are made.

We have long recognized the values in the programs of exchange of persons, and serious attention should be given to your committee's recommendation that they be expanded, particularly with African countries. Also, I fully agree that improvement in planning and making arrangements for exchange personnel while they are in this country is a most desirable goal.

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In our foreign programs, there will be wide agreement as to the importance of giving careful attention to the impact of program actions on foreign opinion both in the formulation of policy and in the execution of programs. It is my hope that all agencies and departments will continue to take appropriate organizational and training measures to this end. As your committee properly points out, appropriate emphasis also must be given to public opinion in the field which we have traditionally looked upon as formal diplomacy.

There is little question in my mind that the creation of the Operations Coordinating Board was a major step forward. I think it has well justified its existence and I would hope that it will be continued as an important element in the national policy machinery. In any event, I share the judgment of your committee that regardless of any changes that may be made in this machinery, the functions now performed by the Operations Coordinating Board must continue to be provided for.

Finally, I express my personal thanks to you, and through you to the members of your committee and to the committee staff, for the long and arduous work devoted to the preparation of this study. I know of the tremendous amount of time you and your colleagues have devoted to this constructive effort. The country is indeed indebted to you all.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Honorable
Mansfield Sprague,
90 Ponus Street,
New Canaan, Connecticut

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**THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON INFORMATION ACTIVITIES ABROAD**

**Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D.C.**

December 23, 1960

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to submit herewith the Conclusions and Recommendations of your Committee on Information Activities Abroad. During the past several months, in accordance with your letter of December 2, 1959, we have carried out a comprehensive survey of what we have called "The United States Information System". We have also considered the psychological aspects of United States diplomatic, economic, military and scientific programs which have impact abroad. Likewise, we have reported on several of the activities of private groups and institutions bearing upon foreign attitudes toward this country.

This Committee effort is the second special study initiated by you to help shape the evolution of policies and programs in a new and increasingly important aspect of United States foreign policy. Like the President's Committee on International Informational Activities, chaired by Mr. William H. Jackson, we have tried to be completely objective and non-partisan. We have approached our task not as special pleaders for informational and related programs but have attempted to relate them to the total responsibilities of government in the international field.

We have consulted numerous persons in government, both within the departments and agencies represented on the Committee and elsewhere. We have also attempted to give weight to the views of knowledgeable persons outside government.

We have taken the view that an ad hoc effort of this kind should avoid intensive investigation of particular operating problems, but should concentrate on overall policies and programs. We have tried to provide guidance and a coherent foundation of criteria and concepts which will have continuing value to operating officials in dealing with concrete problems.

The timing of this study is highly appropriate. Developments on the international scene in the course of our work have continuously re-emphasized, even dramatized, the relevance and significance of the problems you assigned to us for study.

The Committee has brought a rich background of cumulative governmental and private experience to its work. Out of such experience, plus the deep and occasionally differing personal convictions of its mem-

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bers, a survey has been produced which we trust will have validity and utility in the trying years ahead.

As you will see from our recommendations, the Committee has formed three general conclusions:

a. On the whole, the United States informational system and efforts to integrate psychological factors into policy have become increasingly effective.

b. The evolution of world affairs, the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus, and the growing role of public opinion internationally confront us with the necessity of continuing improvement in this aspect of government, on an orderly but urgent basis.

c. This will involve the allocation of substantially greater resources over the next decade, better training of personnel, further clarification of the role of information activities, increasing the understanding and competence of government officials to deal with informational and psychological matters, and improvement in the mechanisms for coordination.

While recommending greater efforts and expenditures, the Committee is mindful of the importance of balanced budgets. Informational programs must be looked upon as part of the total National Security effort. If this requires greater sacrifices by the American people, we believe that they should be enjoined to make them.

During the course of our deliberations a number of salutary actions have been taken within government in areas under discussion by the Committee which otherwise might have resulted in specific recommendations. Even with respect to some of the recommendations made by the Committee, we understand that action is already being initiated. The Committee has been encouraged in its efforts by such concrete examples of initiative and forward thinking.

The Committee has received the full cooperation of various government agencies. We have been greatly impressed by the contributions of many able people in government who on their own time and without extra compensation prepared special materials for us.

The Staff of the Committee, whose names are listed elsewhere, have rendered outstanding service. Without their able and conscientious help this study would not have been possible. Especially we should like to commend Mr. Waldemar A. Nielsen, Executive Director, who was loaned to us by the Ford Foundation. His assistance was of the very highest order of competence and dedication.

I should like to note that in addition to the valuable contributions of the individual members of the Committee, the alternates for the representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and for the Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Information Agency have been extremely helpful throughout. They are, respectively, Raymond A. Hare, Haydn Williams, John A. Bross and Abbott Washburn.

The Committee will place in the custody of your Assistant for National Security Affairs an organized collection of staff papers which contain information and analyses which should be of reference value to the operating officials concerned with informational and psychological

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matters. These working papers should be treated as such and not as having been officially approved by the Committee.

Joining with me in forwarding the following chapters are the other members of the Committee: George V. Allen, Allen W. Dulles, Gordon Gray, Karl G. Harr, Jr., John N. Irwin II, C. D. Jackson, Livingston T. Merchant and Philip D. Reed.

Respectfully,
MANSFIELD D. SPRAGUE
Chairman

The President
The White House

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Chapter I

**THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR IN FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN
ADEQUATE INFORMATION SYSTEM****The Elements of the Problem**

The 1950s have seen profound changes in the world, including the consolidation of Communist control over the mainland of China, the birth of the hydrogen bomb, and the launching of Sputnik. The 1960s will see even more; this period may prove to be one of the most convulsive and revolutionary decades in several centuries.

Scientific progress has set some of the underlying forces in motion, such as the world-wide population explosion which has resulted from medical and other technological advances. Precisely where new breakthroughs will occur is unforeseeable, but that they will occur, and at an increasing rate, is certain. Some ninety per cent of all the scientists who have ever lived are alive today and the resources which will be devoted to research in the next ten years will equal the total for all past years since the beginning of history.

If progress is driving one wheel of the world transformation now underway, the consequences of backwardness are driving the other. Half of the people on earth still live under conditions of hunger, disease and ignorance; but they have become conscious of the possibility of improvement and are now in active, often violent, struggle to improve their condition. In this vast awakening are infinite possibilities for constructive change and equally great potentialities of danger.

Even if world cooperation could be counted upon and world peace assured, modernizing the societies in which the impoverished portion of this world lives would be a complex and difficult task requiring vigorous and sustained effort. But peace is uncertain and over-all cooperation under present circumstances is out of the question. The Soviet Union, having acquired great industrial and military strength, is pressing hard its drive for expansion and ultimate world domination. In doing so it is exerting all its power to counter our endeavors to help build a free and a more stable world.

As of now, the Soviet Union probably prefers to achieve its objectives through means short of all-out war. Therefore the prospect is for a period of protracted nonmilitary conflict between the Free World and the Communist system. This conflict will reach into every portion of the globe. Its background will consist of the presence within the Communist Bloc of massive conventional military forces and the availability of great nuclear striking power. Its foreground will be characterized by the continuous employment of economic, diplomatic and informational instruments as well as of subversive and conspiratorial action.

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The Free World's program is directed toward solving the political and economic ills of the underdeveloped world through a democratic and pluralistic type of state organization. To counter this, the Communists maintain an effective world-wide apparatus—Communist parties, front organizations of labor, youth and the like—which seeks to prevent the establishment of democratic institutions in the new states, and elsewhere to undermine already established and functioning free governmental institutions.

We cannot rely solely on informational media, in the narrow sense of the term, to do the job of countering such Communist activities. The Soviets have forced themselves on the consciousness of people world-wide, not primarily by their propaganda, but through the exercise of power, through instilling fear rather than through persuasion, by the tender of aid and services, and by exploiting nationalism and aspirations for social reform.

Today we are facing a revolt of the have-nots, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. We have to deal with the Lumumbas, the Castros and the Sukarnos. They are largely immune to persuasion; they basically prefer a governmental system based on the dictatorship of the proletariat with themselves as dictators, rather than any democratic, representative type of free government.

We face situations in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America where anything resembling free government has broken down. In some cases such as Cuba, Guinea and Indonesia, the leaders are inclined in varying degree to a Communist type of government. Other countries which are, as yet, opposed to a Communist form of government, have resorted to various types of military or civil dictatorship, despairing of the practicability of achieving their political and economic aims through reliance upon democratic procedures.

If these military or personal dictatorships collapse, the people, left without strong leadership, are highly vulnerable to the appeals both economic and political of Moscow and Peiping. They can be persuaded, based on the Moscow/Peiping experience, that they can achieve a strong central government and, through a Communist type of industrial organization, more rapidly secure the benefits of industrial growth. They are pushed in this direction by the closely-knit and effective subversive apparatus of Communist parties and Communist front organizations.

Too many people have been deluded by the theory that in the relatively underdeveloped countries the people value liberty more highly than physical security and their daily bread. Such is not always the case. They in fact tend readily to tolerate a governmental structure that provides the latter even if it limits their liberties.

If the United States had an opportunity over the near future to influence the form of government to be established in the Congo, in Indonesia, or Cuba, for example, which would preserve personal liberties and yet serve as a base for economic and industrial advance, what form of government would we advocate? Initially, it would probably not be one based exactly on our own Constitution, universal suffrage and the like.

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One of our basic problems, therefore, is how to meet in these areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America the pressing need for effective government that will provide security and promote economic well-being and yet is not Communist controlled. Certainly one of the objectives of our policy and of our actions must be to help in the development of forms of government which will meet these basic requirements, will promote stability, discipline and economic advancement without undue infringement of individual liberties, and which will not be incompatible with the progressive development of free institutions.

It will be extremely difficult to accomplish this unless we can find more effective means to deal with the world-wide Communist apparatus which is dedicated to the destruction of free government. Communism is a grave menace today in Cuba, in many countries of Latin America, Central Africa, the Middle East and in parts of the Far East, particularly Indonesia and Laos. Even in certain NATO countries, such as Italy and France, there are powerful Communist parties.

The eventual outcome of the struggle, assuming that general war can be avoided and that Communist subversion can be countered, will depend in considerable degree on the extent we are able to influence the attitudes of people.

Such is the context within which the present Committee has approached its task.

We begin with an obvious fact: the steadily mounting force of public opinion in world affairs. Democratic countries are by definition controlled in their policies by the opinion of their citizens. In the Sino-Soviet Bloc, where public opinion in the democratic sense is ineffective, it nevertheless cannot be wholly ignored by the regimes. If nothing else, it determines how far the screw of oppression can be turned without the outburst of revolt. In many of the less-developed and emergent states the role of public opinion and the channels for its expression are not yet clearly established. But it would be an error to assume that, because of general backwardness or illiteracy, public opinion is unimportant. It may be inoperative on certain issues and may be manifested only spasmodically, sometimes violently. But in these regions public expectations, popular unrest and mass opinion are currently providing the impulsion and setting the general directions for political as well as economic and social change.

In part, the rise of this force can be explained by the growth of literacy and education, and the introduction of new and wider channels of communication. The radio and the motion picture, publications, and now increasingly television, have brought tens of millions of people to political consciousness. An underlying element has been the spread of the concept of democracy, which although sometimes distorted or perverted in form, has now reached the most remote corners of the earth. In this century even the Communists pay lip service to the principle of government by popular consent.

The trend is perhaps most vividly symbolized by the United Nations, a diplomatic arena in which the economic and military power of the participants plays an important part in the outcome of issues, but in which world opinion is almost equally influential. The changing

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styles of diplomacy also reflect growing concern with the views of groups beyond official circles. From the formalized government-to-government communications of the classical past, we have now witnessed the advent of epistolary diplomacy, electronic diplomacy, summit diplomacy, un-official diplomacy, even undiplomatic diplomacy.

These innovations or aberrations are consistent with the increasing tendency of governments, in addition to their official dealings, to establish relations with various groups and individuals in foreign societies, including trade unions, intellectuals and opposition leaders. This trend in turn derives from recognition of a simple, practical fact: unless governments effectively communicate their policies and actions to all politically influential elements of foreign populations, their programs can be impeded and their security placed in jeopardy.

In the case of the United States, we are concerned with our general prestige in the world and our image as a dynamic and progressive society not out of national vanity but because of their relationship to the effectiveness of our leadership on crucial issues. We are concerned that foreign leaders understand the principles and values of a free society not simply out of evangelistic impulse but because their understanding will influence political and social developments within their countries and ultimately their international orientation.

In more specific ways, too, intangible attitudes translate into hard, measurable assets—or liabilities. The durability and workability of our treaties are directly affected by leadership and mass attitudes abroad. The usefulness of our economic assistance in accelerating growth in underdeveloped countries is deeply influenced by the degree of understanding and cooperation in the recipient country. In the case of our strategic bases abroad, public opinion in the various localities will affect and in some cases can even determine how long and under what conditions those bases will be available to us.

Thus, in considering public opinion in the present world situation, we are talking about something as practical as economics, as powerful as hardware.

The fundamental question to which the Committee has addressed itself is: how can U.S. performance be improved in reaching and influencing opinion abroad, including that of officials, leadership groups and the general public?

The question must be dealt with in two distinct but related parts: first, the adequacy of governmental activities specifically and primarily designed to influence opinion abroad—the overt and covert mass media, cultural and educational programs, which this Committee will henceforth refer to as *informational*; and second, the adequacy of our efforts, in shaping our foreign policies and programs, to build understanding and support and to minimize resentment, confusion or opposition—efforts which the Committee will refer to as *psychological*.

The Informational System

Since Benjamin Franklin went to Paris after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the United States has been engaged in efforts to communicate its policies and objectives abroad. But today,

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because of the growing importance of public opinion, rapid technological developments, explosive political evolution, and the omnipresence of the massive Soviet propaganda apparatus, the problem of communication is both more urgent and more complex than ever before. The U. S. Government in times past, as in periods of war, has temporarily created specialized agencies to deal with information matters. But the existence of a large-scale, continuing set of programs and agencies to disseminate information about the United States and its policies, educate key leadership elements abroad, and counter hostile propaganda, dates only from the Second World War.

During this period the principal information agency has been renamed six times, reorganized four times, and until recently has been subjected to great year-to-year variations in its appropriations, much to the disadvantage of long-term programs, effective planning and needed personnel development. The information programs of the Government have been subjected in the course of their brief existence both to rapidly growing demands and to considerable abuse from the Congress and the press. Comparatively little attention has been given to this field by serious writers and scholars of international affairs.

A mere listing of some of the principal characteristics of the information system will indicate how heavy and difficult some of its problems are. It embraces a wide variety of mass media, cultural, educational and exchange programs. The scale of activity must be large enough to meet urgent requirements in every major region of the globe; no politically significant area can be ignored. Operating responsibilities must necessarily be distributed among several agencies, whose efforts in turn must be coordinated. The system must have offensive and defensive capabilities—sound and vigorous programs in all media for the presentation of U.S. policies and programs, and facilities to counter the moves and expose the purposes of the Soviet apparatus. It must have strategic as well as tactical capabilities—the ability to build enduring relationships with foreign leaders and institutions and at the same time handle daily issues effectively. Yet it cannot be muscle-bound. It must accurately reflect the content of foreign policy, yet preserve the qualities of humanness, quickness, subtlety and lightness of touch.

In succeeding chapters the Committee will indicate steps which it feels will help the U. S. information system to meet more fully this extremely difficult set of requirements and to fill presently existing gaps.

Let it be noted, however, that very great progress already has been made. The organizational and budgetary instability of the early years seems to have been largely overcome. Despite great obstacles, staffs have been considerably professionalized, and large and effective media organizations have been built. Arrangements for the coordination of day-to-day media output with policy have been vastly improved since the time of the Jackson Committee report, and now on the whole work effectively. Satisfactory arrangements also have been created to provide policy guidance for covert operations, and for coordinating covert activities with the overt programs of the government. Basic facilities for dealing with the problems posed by the Communist propaganda

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apparatus have been built, and continuing programs established in the field of exchange of persons.

Most important, these functions and services are developing on a sound conceptual basis. Despite the seeming success on occasion of flamboyant Soviet propaganda, the temptation to imitate it has been resisted. Rather we have constantly sought to find solutions to the problems of foreign communication and persuasion in terms consistent with the principles and responsibilities of the United States. The view has been that official foreign information programs for our kind of government must reflect the true nature of our society and should be integrated with foreign policy.

The progress which has been made provides an excellent base from which to expand and improve our informational efforts to meet the new requirements.

The Psychological Factor in Policy

The second general aspect of the problem of improving U.S. performance in dealing with the psychological dimension of its foreign policies relates not to the information programs themselves, but to the substance of our action programs which influence world opinion. "Actions speak louder than words" is a maxim which applies abroad as well as at home, although it is erroneous to speak of actions and words as if they were independent and alternative instruments for influencing attitudes. They both speak, in fact, and we must find the means to make them speak together, to the same objectives, and with combined power.

We must, therefore, weigh psychological considerations not only in the presentation but also in the formulation of policies and programs having impact abroad.

It may be well to elaborate on what this basic proposition implies, and what it does not imply.

1. It does not imply that foreign opinion and public reactions should determine or control U.S. policies and objectives. Those are and must be set strictly by U.S. interests and principles. But it does imply that both in terms of the workability and results of our programs, and in terms of our responsibility as the leading nation of the Free World, we must show a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" in what we do.

2. It does not imply that psychological considerations should be made dominant in the formulation of U.S. foreign policies and programs. But because of the powerful and direct influence of foreign reactions upon the results of our actions and efforts, we are forced in plain common sense to take them into account before final decisions are made, on the same basis and with the same care and competence with which we take other relevant considerations—economic, military or diplomatic—into account.

3. It does not imply the ornamentation of policy and actions with psychological gimmicks. But it does involve a serious attempt to identify and understand the prejudices, hopes, fears, misconceptions and customs of people abroad which may impede the achievement of our goals.

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4. It does not imply that the only way to take psychological considerations into account is to pander to foreign opinion, recede in the face of foreign criticism, and solicit constant foreign approval. Nor does it imply that the only way to be persuasive in our actions is to offer inducements, incentives and accommodation. On the contrary, since our objectives must be not popularity but long-term and durable relationships of friendship, understanding and respect, we must stand firmly on principle regardless of temporary storms of disapproval. Moreover, the advancement of national policies will on occasion involve sternness, the use of sanctions, and, in the defense of vital national interests, the employment of military measures including the use of force. When such action is necessary, the only psychological requirement is that it be done in such a way as to be comprehensible to our friends and clear in its implications to our enemies. In the long run, a nation like an individual achieves stature and exercises leadership not by avoiding criticism or seeking to please but by its character, strength and goodness of heart.

The concept of integrating psychological factors in the substance of our programs is by now well established. Seven years ago the Jackson Committee in clear language stated the essence of it, emphasizing that the psychological aspects of policy are not separable from policy itself, but are inherent in and an ingredient of every diplomatic, economic or military action.

Since then, this view has pervaded our statements of basic national policy. Throughout the policy papers of the National Security Council, for instance, the relevance of the psychological dimension of foreign policy is recognized and numerous references are made to psychological objectives to be fulfilled—to influence foreign opinion generally, to change attitudes of specific leadership groups, to reinforce understanding of specific policies and actions, etc.

Likewise the machinery for the implementation of policy includes provision for the psychological dimension: The Operations Coordinating Board shall advise and consult with the various departments and agencies regarding "the execution of each security action or project so that it shall make its full contribution to the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world."

Thus, the concept is imbedded in both policy and structure. The improvement now needed is to convert the concept more fully into reality.

Hardly anyone now denies the relevance and importance of psychological factors to effective foreign policies and programs. But doubts and attitudes of resistance remain, especially at the middle echelons of the Government, which find expression in various ways. One approach concedes their relevance, but holds that the best way to deal with them is to ignore them since they are presumed to flow automatically from sound policies and programs. A variation is that they do not require special attention because it is contended that any good governmental official naturally takes these things into account in making his decisions.

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Frequently reservations are expressed about the *extent to which* psychological factors should be taken into account. It is believed by some that while such factors are important, when a choice must be made, they should in all circumstances give way to considerations of a diplomatic, economic, military or budgetary nature.

Even among those who agree that psychological considerations should be dealt with, there continue to prevail at least three markedly different views on the *time at which* such considerations should be taken into account:

1. The minimal view is they should be considered only in handling the publicity about actions already decided upon. According to this concept professional public relations personnel should sit in or be informed whenever major decisions are being made but only in order to be better equipped to write news releases and answer press inquiries.

At present even this minimal view is sometimes ignored in practice. Occasionally, the public affairs elements of departments carrying on foreign programs and the staff of USIA learn of major decisions after they are made and must therefore scramble to catch up with the background needed to deal with the news media.

2. The intermediate view is that psychological factors should be considered in planning the timing and manner of carrying out a policy already decided upon.

3. The third view is that psychological factors should be fully considered when substantive decisions themselves are being made, as well as in planning the timing and manner of carrying them out. It is this position which is endorsed by the Committee.

This is a view which is authoritatively stated in basic governmental documents but which in practice needs to be accepted and applied more vigorously and consistently.

In our view, efforts to assign rigid theoretical order of importance to the various ingredients of policy is sterile and dangerous. There are cases in which psychological considerations are secondary or inconsequential and when they should give way to other overriding factors; there are other cases in which they are of great moment. The necessity is, therefore, that they be considered along with and on the same footing as other factors in the formulation and the execution of foreign policies and programs.

This is in no sense an argument for the primacy of psychological factors. It is an argument against neglect of, or prejudice against, timely and serious consideration of them. Inadequacy in dealing with the intangible elements in our foreign policies, under present and prospective world conditions, can be just as fatal to their outcome as inadequacy in dealing with the more traditional and tangible aspects.

Breaking down remaining barriers of resistance to, and misunderstanding of, psychological factors on the part of noninformation officers of government is not subject to quick solution, nor to resolution merely by changes in machinery. This is a task of education and motivation which can be completed only over the long run. At the highest levels an awareness of these factors normally exists. However, below the top

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echelon in our diplomatic, economic, scientific and military agencies psychological factors are often overlooked. Specialists in these agencies can become so involved with their particular programs that they begin to see them as ends in themselves, as activities unrelated to over-all foreign policy objectives, not as means for the achievement of these objectives. To overcome this tendency, strong articulate leadership from the top is required.

In this connection, it is instructive to examine the Communist approach. The Soviet system and Communist ideology give an important place to agitation and propaganda. Within all elements of the Soviet Government political and psychological factors are authoritatively injected through the presence of the parallel structure of the Party and its commissars in every agency. Communist governments go to great lengths to advance their objectives by psychological and informational means. They do not, of course, hesitate to flaunt world opinion and incur disapproval when they feel it necessary to protect their vital interests. But even here psychological considerations are not ignored, for Communists frequently use intimidation to create fear as well as blandishments to win popularity.

In contrast to the Soviet Union, the United States is an open society without formalized dogma. Our administrative agencies are not linked together and controlled by an ideological and propaganda organization like the Communist Party. The United States cannot copy Soviet models in solving its problem of international political communications. Nevertheless, consistent with its own character and principles, the United States must seek to achieve greater effectiveness in this field. In the short term, organizational adjustments will be helpful. In the longer term, we must develop fuller understanding on the part of our officials of the broader psychological and political requirements of their work. In both the short and long term, we must by word, deed and directive at the top echelons of Government bring home to all affected branches, to the Congress and to the general public the vital importance of our informational and psychological activities.

Even those who grasp the importance of psychological factors sometimes feel a vague sense of impropriety about systematic efforts to deal with them. This confusion of thinking we owe in large part to the totalitarian states, which have corrupted and misused words and the communication of ideas, just as they have corrupted diplomacy, economic policy, and military power. However, the immorality is not in recognizing the importance of world opinion nor in using instruments to influence it; it is in the motivation and purposes of the user.

Achievement of full consideration of psychological factors, however, will not magically simplify our foreign policy problems, for psychological factors are just as complex, just as contradictory and just as confusing as any other. Whether the problem is Algeria, or the off-shore islands in the China Sea, or the unity of the Atlantic alliance, differing estimates of foreign opinion and contradictory recommendations for dealing with it are inevitable. Despite their complexity, however, psychological factors must be given proper consideration because

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they are now more important than ever before to the success of our foreign policies, the protection of our security and the effectiveness of our leadership in the world.

The unified and dynamic effort in our foreign actions and relations which the times call for requires that psychological factors in policies and programs be identified, planned for and dealt with at all levels of government by able people conscious of their importance in the achievement of U.S. world objectives.

In the following pages the Committee outlines some of the steps which might be taken to strengthen our information agencies and programs, and to assure the more effective translation into action of the psychological objectives set forth in basic policy papers.

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Due to the importance of education and exchanges and the unusual opportunities which they present, the Committee discusses certain aspects of this category of information activity separately in Chapter III.

Informational Needs and Opportunities Abroad

The Committee has studied the psychological and informational problems confronting the United States in the several major regions of the world and has reviewed the total effect of U. S. informational activities in those regions. On the basis of these studies, we have attempted to determine whether any important needs are being neglected. The task of dealing with many of these will necessarily fall to the Government; but to the extent that private activity in educational and cultural fields can be extended, this would on several grounds be highly desirable. The following is a summary, by major geographical regions, of the principal problems and opportunities with which the U. S. information system must deal, as seen by the Committee:

In *Western Europe*, the scale of U. S. information activity has been substantially reduced in recent years and the growing need for additional facilities and operations in the emerging nations—if total resources for information remain at present levels—will have to be financed in some part by further cutbacks in Europe. Except for exchanges, this process of reduction has gone as far as it prudently should. European solidarity with the United States has been dramatically demonstrated in recent tests. But the successful outcome of these crises should not lead to the complacent conclusion that Europe is now a “safe precinct”. There are in fact serious weaknesses and vulnerabilities, including questioning of U. S. intentions and capabilities, considerable neutralism, a continuing internal Communist threat, and the possibility of damaging intraregional frictions. Because Europe is the cornerstone of U. S. security arrangements, it is of the utmost importance that the people of this area understand American objectives, have confidence in our leadership, and cooperate actively in mutual undertakings. Given the close historical ties of the Atlantic nations, the level of European political sophistication and the full development of independent mass media in Europe, American policies and actions far more than official information programs will influence attitudes. But informational and cultural activity will continue to play a valuable supporting role.

The *Soviet Bloc*, core of the threat to Free World security and to peace, is growing rapidly in power and influence. Within the Soviet Union, despite the apparent success of the Khrushchev formula for combining the carrot and the stick, there are growing pressures for more individual freedom and more contact with the non-Communist world. In some of the East European satellites, the more flagrant and overt forms of Communist oppression and control have been moderated. There may now be somewhat more resignation to the situation, but the basic anti-Communist, anti-Soviet attitudes of the populations have not changed. Partly in response to these pressures the regimes have allowed new channels of communication with the West to open. Notwithstanding some retightening of communications controls in recent

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months, the Committee feels that the long-term movement toward wider contact probably will not be suppressed. From a security point of view, just as it is necessary for us to take every possible step to maintain attitudes of confidence and cooperation in the NATO area, it is equally important that we take every opportunity to penetrate the Bloc countries with influence, information and ideas in hope of lessening to some degree the hostility and aggressiveness of the governments and to increase frictions among them. Adequate appropriations should be made in order to exploit fully opportunities in the Soviet area for exhibits, cultural presentations, publication programs and other types of informational activity.

Communist China, despite staggering problems, is emerging as a world power. From the standpoint of American policy, the China question involves not only our relations with the mainland but our entire system of security arrangements in Asia. As China progresses with its program of forced industrialization, further develops its already extensive propaganda-cultural-economic-diplomatic offensive in other parts of the world, and particularly after it detonates its first nuclear weapon, which could happen in the next few years, the dangers to peace will grow significantly worse. For informational activity, the problem is as baffling as it is threatening. The difficulties are all too evident: The regime is in its most militant and virulent phase; contact with the outside world is virtually cut off; the circulation internally of unauthorized information is severely limited by controls and harsh sanctions. The 600 million people of the area are being subjected to the most extensive (and seemingly successful) "Hate America" campaign in all history. Realizing the unique difficulties of the situation, the Committee urges sustained government-wide action in preparing long-range plans, in developing resources, and in seeking new approaches to influence more effectively the people of Communist China.

Throughout the *less-developed areas*, despite important regional and country-by-country differences, the United States faces certain common information tasks. We must, in the face of the sweeping social, economic and political revolution now underway (1) explain U. S. policies, objectives and way of life; (2) wherever possible, identify ourselves with the forces of progress toward stable and democratic institutions and disengage ourselves from the outmoded and resented aspects of the status quo and the colonial past; (3) determine who are the individuals leading this vast upheaval and rebirth and establish effective communication with them; (4) expose and counter insofar as possible the multifaceted Sino-Soviet offensive against orderly development of these areas; and (5) provide effective close support through informational means to U. S. development programs. Our informational programs and facilities must be strengthened if they are to meet these demands.

In *Africa*, the pace of political developments has outstripped our informational preparations. We lack basic knowledge of the processes by which information and ideas are communicated within these primitive societies; we lack sufficient information specialists trained in the languages and cultures; we lack sufficient physical facilities; and we lack adequate covert mechanisms and contacts. In the judgment of

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the Committee, Africa presents the United States with a challenging opportunity to build friendly ties and to throw back Communist efforts at penetration and take-over. While recognizing that an important inhibiting factor in the development of U. S. information activities in Africa may be the attitude of the metropolises toward any such expansion, the Committee recommends a drastic and prompt upward revision of all plans, estimates and preparations for information activities appropriate to the area. A unique and major opportunity in this region is to participate in and help shape the development of the mass media, which to date are rudimentary.

In *Asia*, our primary informational and psychological tasks will be to help accelerate development and to bolster resistance to the growing power and influence of Communist China. Our economic assistance programs must be reinforced with large-scale efforts to disseminate knowledge of new techniques of production, distribution and management. For example, India because of its sheer size will be looked to as an indication of the success or failure of the alternatives to the Communist system. Within India, extensive educational and cultural activity, much of which has recently been planned for, will be necessary to help insure that development takes place along democratic lines. In India and throughout the rest of Asia, measures must be taken to offset propaganda disparaging Indian accomplishments and magnifying Soviet and Chinese undertakings, so that whatever progress India does achieve is made known.

In *Latin America*, the immediate outlook is more ominous than promising. Governments in the area are not keeping abreast of the demands put upon them by expanding populations and rising popular expectations. New groups are growing in power which are highly vulnerable to seizure by alliances of Communists and nationalists. The principal weapons of the Communists are their various national Communist parties and their subservient affiliates. In addition the fervor of the Castro revolution now exerts wide influence on the underprivileged classes throughout the hemisphere and serves as an important vehicle for the advancement of Communist objectives. American economic policy with respect to the hemisphere has undergone recent modification and strengthening, but informational activities have not been equally reinforced. Fortunately, the U. S. information agencies, overt and covert, have extensive experience in the region and a nucleus of relationships and effective instrumentalities, such as the binational centers. But greater efforts are needed to counter Communist penetration of political parties, trade unions, the mass media, intellectual elements and educational influence while at the same time strengthening U. S. influence with these same groups. The Committee recommends that a study be made to determine more effective means of combating the influence of Communism, Marxism and extreme radicalism in the educational institutions and teachers' unions of many Latin American countries.

The Financial Aspects of the Informational System

This Committee has not attempted to make a detailed analysis of budgets of the departments and agencies concerned with the informa-

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tional system. However, we have reviewed the requirements for informational activities abroad based upon our appraisal of the current world situation and estimates of probable developments over the next decade. In comparing these requirements with present informational programs, we have concluded that there is a growing need for greater efforts generally, both overt and covert, and an urgent need for substantially increased efforts in the critical areas of Latin America and Africa. These increases are over and above those required to meet the rising costs of current programs and to provide adequate representation in the newly independent countries of the world. In the various chapters we indicate the fields in which we believe increased expenditures should be made.

The extent to which information budgets should be further increased in future years can best be determined in light of changing circumstances. However, it is likely that the scale of the total U. S. information effort will have to be progressively expanded for some time to come. The Committee urges that, if and when such expansion is contemplated, the Executive Branch seek Congressional approval for planned and orderly growth of these activities. Useful programs in this field cannot be produced overnight. They require many months, and sometimes years, of lead-time to conduct the necessary operational surveys, to prepare sound plans, to recruit and train qualified personnel.

Speed and flexibility of operations are an essential component of many informational programs and often can enhance substantially the psychological impact of noninformational programs. If we are to compete successfully with the regimented Communist system, we must be able, when necessary, to match its inherent maneuverability. This does not mean that the great bulk of informational programs cannot be planned and budgeted through the normal processes. But the Executive Branch must have the authority and the funds to meet sudden opportunities and unforeseen developments. It is true, unfortunately, that swift action in the early days of a crisis is often of greater psychological significance than later programs, no matter how intrinsically sound. The Committee, therefore, recommends that adequate contingency funds be appropriated for the Government's informational and psychological operations, or, as a minimum, that adequate flexibility to transfer between accounts be provided.

American efforts to develop contact with influential elements abroad should not be diminished by niggardly allowances for official hospitality. Because the development of close personal relationships with influential individuals and groups is of very great importance, the Committee recommends that renewed efforts be made to obtain Congressional approval for adequate representation funds.

In making recommendations for budget increases, the Committee has sought to find areas in which it might properly recommend reductions or eliminations of programs. We have concluded, however, that with one exception there is no realistic possibility of providing for additional needs by cutting back present programs; nor is it feasible for the

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United States to stretch present resources by deliberately neglecting urgent needs in any major region. However, we offer three suggestions:

1. The U.S. Government should encourage the other advanced Free World nations, particularly those in the NATO area, to help bear the load of expanded informational programs which are needed in the underdeveloped areas. Their help would be especially useful in the fields of foreign educational development and exchange of persons.

2. Government-sponsored educational exchange with Western Europe might be somewhat reduced in view of the higher priority need for such exchanges with less-developed parts of the world. Mitigating the effects of such a cutback is the fact that a large number of exchanges with Western Europe now take place under private auspices.

3. Periodic evaluations should be made of the effectiveness of specific U. S. information activities, both world-wide and in individual countries. Tough-mindedness in redirecting or eliminating operations which prove to be ineffective or of marginal value for the purpose intended is mandatory.

Organizational Arrangements

At times in the past the activities now carried on by the U. S. Information Agency have been a part of the Department of State. In 1953 the overt information activities of the Government, except for the educational exchange programs, were placed under a separate U. S. Information Agency, which has continued to receive its day-to-day policy guidance from the Department of State. The exchange of persons programs remained in the Department, but with overseas operations conducted by USIA field personnel.

Because it is outside the scope of the Committee's terms of reference, the structural relationship between the Department of State and USIA has not been examined. However, the Committee believes that the present allocation of responsibilities has functioned reasonably well and that practical means have been worked out to insure necessary coordination.*

Special Recommendations

The Committee has not attempted to review in detail each of the numerous programs and projects now being conducted. Purely in terms of time and available staff such an examination would have been infeasible. More important, the Committee believes that the role of an ad hoc body is not to audit or second-guess the daily operations and decisions of information agencies and officers. Rather, we have concentrated on clarifying basic concepts where necessary and analyzing those few major problems of administration and program which the normal processes of government for one reason or another have

* Mr. Reed wishes to have it noted that, as a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, he is on record as favoring a single separate agency to operate the exchange and information programs of our Government now lodged in the Department of State and USIA.

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not been able to deal with successfully. The Committee urges that attention be given to the following needs:

A. Strengthening covert facilities

Openness has been and should remain the ideal and eventual objective of U.S. information efforts. But the rough reality is that under present circumstances the world is too full of skepticism about governmental propaganda and too full of Communist efforts to poison the flow of international communications, to allow the U.S. Government to lay aside the weapon of unattributed or covert information activity. Indeed, the probability is that in coming years the necessity and usefulness of this approach will grow, not decline.

The Committee, therefore, firmly endorses the importance and propriety of unattributed information activity. Both USIA and CIA have an important role to play in this activity.

One technique in particular deserves to be used more extensively by CIA, viz., the creation and use of "proprietary" (organizations controlled and financed by the United States). These have impressively demonstrated their power and effectiveness in carrying out certain informational tasks. The Committee therefore recommends:

1. To the extent that an existing proprietary can effectively and appropriately carry additional responsibilities, encouraging it and enabling it to expand to new geographical areas and types of activity. By the same token there should be no hesitancy in eliminating any proprietaries which have outlived their usefulness.



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3. Periodic review, by outside specialists where appropriate and feasible, of the covert operations of the CIA in the mass media field, which are now reaching considerable proportions.

B. Measures to deal with the world-wide Communist Party organization

Closely related to the need for strengthening covert facilities and for creating a more receptive climate for our other informational activities is the problem of exposing, harassing and, wherever possible, undermining the Communist parties and their various subsidiary and front organizations which are operating in the Free World.

In many countries of the Free World these organizations are given a measure of respectability. In at least some of these countries the Communist Party is legally recognized or permitted to carry on its subversive activities under the same protection afforded democratic political institutions. This is largely true in Italy and to some extent in France and Greece. The party is becoming more and more dominant in Indonesia and is controlling in Cuba. It is a grave danger in many more countries. It has a world-wide apparatus and there is a hard core of Communist "faithful" in practically every country of the world.

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The recent Italian elections are only a fresh reminder of the continuing success of the Communist Party in a free and relatively affluent society. There the Communists polled over 24 per cent of the vote and with their left-wing Socialist allies control just under 40 per cent of the total vote. This is well past the danger point. It is a good example of the fallacy of the much repeated theory that raising living standards alone is the death knell of Communism. In France the Communists manage to get over a quarter of the popular vote. Due to the de Gaulle-inspired electoral laws, which have rejected the dangerous proportional system, Communist parliamentary representation has been greatly reduced. Today in France the Communists have an organization that is strong enough to threaten with a popular front government, if de Gaulle should fail and be temporarily succeeded by an authoritarian military regime.

All of these situations call for an even more vigorous effort on our part to supplement present activities and to develop further programs of action, overt and covert, to counter the international Communist threat. Such programs should include unmasking the leadership of local Communist parties, disclosing the directives and support which these leaders receive from Moscow and Peiping, exposing the nature of the Communist conspiratorial and subversive programs, and demonstrating how the Communists abuse the freedom allowed in democracies in order to destroy democracy itself.

In many countries of the Free World we can further develop our efforts to secure cooperative action. We should be able to find additional ways, without interfering in the domestic affairs of others, to lend more effective aid to those who are directly threatened by Communist subversion and are engaged in a drive to meet it. Where such a drive does not exist, we should help to get it going in order to deprive local Communist parties of the assets and of the respectability which have made them so dangerous.

For obvious reasons the full scope of such programs cannot be developed within the confines of this document. We believe, however, that the general policies and actions recommended should be developed promptly, to supplement the very considerable contribution we are already making. To this end further country-by-country or area-by-area studies should be made of the particular form the Communist threat is taking and of the assets and potentialities available, or which could be developed locally, to help to meet the threat.

C. Expansion of training programs

To achieve the objectives urged by the Committee, a fundamental requirement is the expansion of training opportunities and programs along two fronts: broad training in the psychological and informational fields for officials in those governmental agencies whose programs strongly affect foreign opinion; and specialist training of staffs directly engaged in information programs.

Broad Training. We must seek steadily to deepen and broaden the understanding of the various components, including the psycho-

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logical, of "total diplomacy", among our diplomatic, economic, information and military officers.

Within the Government, even in American society in general, there is a tendency toward specialization, and perhaps toward overspecialization. Our economists, political officers and military officers are without peer in their own fields. But the growing size of governmental machinery and the growing complexity of technical questions are leading them to greater and greater concentration on narrower and narrower matters. This in turn has sometimes led to a segmental approach to problems, a feeling on the part of specialists that their particular fields of action are or can be divorced from political or psychological considerations.

The Committee therefore urges that long-range efforts be made to qualify more top officers engaged in economic, military, diplomatic and scientific work in the psychological aspects of policy, and to develop more information officers with adequate background in noninformation fields of foreign policy. By this approach, a basic improvement in the psychological aspect of our operations can be obtained. For example, the Committee believes that an economist sensitive to psychological considerations and an information specialist trained in economics might succeed in working out aid procedures which would combine economic effectiveness with a high degree of public acceptance and cooperation in a way which specialists pursuing their own "pure" lines could not match.

We therefore recommend greater stress upon psychological and informational matters in the various in-service training institutions and programs of the Government. It is important that these matters should be dealt with adequately in the war colleges and the Foreign Service Institute. Training in these fields can also be improved through graduate study in universities for governmental officers and through seminars and discussion groups which periodically bring together governmental and academic persons and informational specialists.

Another means of providing broader training is through the method of cross-assignment between information and noninformation agencies. In the future, when officers reach high responsibility in the diplomatic, economic or military fields, they should have had in the course of their career development substantial experience in or exposure to the psychological and informational aspects of policies and programs. Cross-assignment might also create a greater awareness on the part of noninformation officers of the complexities of governmental public relations and appreciation of the expertness in this field which can be acquired only by practical and sometimes painful experience on the front lines of contact with public opinion.

Knowledge of a country's language is an important factor in successful representational efforts and in sensitive reporting on the climate of opinion by our Foreign Service officers. Pending such time as language instruction in our schools and universities can take up the slack, the language-training efforts of the Foreign Service and the other services should receive greater Congressional support. Prior to departure

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for new posts executive personnel should be required, whenever possible, to undergo an adequate course of language training.

It seems to the Committee, however, that there is still a further requirement, namely, some provision for bringing together more people in the top echelons of the agencies dealing in the international area in a high-level institution for training in the interrelated economic, political, informational and military aspects of the present world struggle. The Committee therefore recommends consideration of the establishment of a National Security Institute under the National Security Council.

Similar proposals have been generated in the recent past in the Executive Branch, in Congress and from private sources. There are several good arguments for such an institution but this Committee will mention only two. One is the beneficial results which are likely to flow from the association in a course of study of several months of able people from State, Defense, CIA, USIA and ICA, as well as representatives of other departments and agencies as appropriate. The cross-fertilization of experience and knowledge would be almost as valuable as the study program itself. Another argument is the need for concentrated exposure to and study of Communist philosophy, techniques and world-wide operations, as well as of our total governmental cold war resources and how best to orchestrate and use them. The course of study should not be limited to these subjects but they should receive great stress.

The Committee does not feel prepared to recommend the form such an institution should take. However, if it is judged infeasible to create a separate National Security Institute, consideration should be given to broadening the character of the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Foreign Service Institute and other agency training programs to meet these needs.

Specialized Training of Information Officers. The foreign information services are now staffed with an impressive number of competent officers whose operational experience and knowledge in this specialized field is unmatched outside the Government. If the scale of activities is increased as suggested, additional staffs will have to be recruited and trained. Moreover, many of the most highly qualified officers now handling these programs feel the need for further training on subjects pertinent to their tasks.

The requirements of the work are formidable: a knowledge of the subtle and complex problems of gauging foreign attitudes, of various media and the processes of communication, of American life and culture, of the structure of foreign societies, of international relations and the various aspects of governmental policy, and not least, of the methods of managing large staffs and substantial operating programs. American private life offers no counterpart to these combined responsibilities, and fully qualified persons do not therefore come already trained to the recruiting offices of the Government.

The Committee recommends that more attention be given to training of informational specialists in media techniques and in the relevant

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behavioral sciences. In considering personnel ceilings of information agencies account should be taken of requirements for adequate training.

For a variety of reasons, information work in the Government has not always been able to attract and hold enough of the talented people required. Limitations and uncertainties of career opportunities have been important factors. The Committee therefore endorses the need for legislation which would establish a career service for USIA personnel. Such a service, in addition to raising and stabilizing the status of information specialists, should be flexible enough to insure acquisition and cultivation of creative and original talents.

D. Increasing knowledge about potential leaders, key audiences, media effectiveness and opinion trends abroad

On the basis of their own experience as well as a limited amount of research, the officers operating our foreign information activities have built up a body of practical knowledge and techniques which is constantly being improved and refined. However, many of these officers are keenly aware of the deficiencies in their knowledge about some of the major factors which can determine the success or failure of their efforts.

More information is needed about the opinions, attitudes and aspirations of influential elements and potential leaders in each country, the credibility and relative influence of its communications media, and the effectiveness of U. S. information activities. In the emergent societies particularly, more light is needed on the way information and ideas travel and how attitudes are formed or can be changed.

The darkest continent of all is the relationship between public attitudes and the actual political behavior of populations and of governments. In what countries and on what kind of issues is popular opinion a factor of importance in the determination of governmental action? When can it be taken as a valid indicator of national conduct when choices must be made or crises faced?

We should know more about the effects of both our actions and our words on foreign opinion; about how to detect, measure and analyze opinion trends; about the extent to which they can be influenced by our actions or information output; in brief, about what we might say or do to strengthen our foreign relations, assert effectively our leadership, and advance our objectives.

Not all of these questions can be answered by research. But some of the information needed to answer them can be ascertained fairly easily by modern research techniques at a reasonable cost. The Committee recommends that the various agencies involved in foreign informational programs re-examine the adequacy of their research programs. In this re-examination, they should draw upon the best available advice from private sources.

E. The establishment of over-all themes—or armatures—for words and actions

Beyond the difficult daily problem of the intelligent administration of specific information projects and programs there lies the need to give the total image of the United States definition, proportion and com-

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prehensibility. Without an over-all pattern, deliberately and effectively imposed, our official statements and actions lose impact.

There is at present no central agency or mechanism which regularly plans selected themes to be embodied in actions and coordinated information programs throughout the Government. The several information programs set and follow themes for their own activities; and noninformation programs follow their predetermined policies and plans. But no element sets the larger framework, the general keynote to be stressed, symbolized, and dramatized by all elements, informational and non-informational.

The general purpose of establishing such themes would be to orchestrate the major influences and instrumentalities of the Government so as to impress on world opinion selected principles and policies essential to the advancement of U. S. objectives. More specifically, they would make possible the following benefits:

Coordination. By giving emphasis and priority to a given theme, a dynamic coordination of effort can be achieved, not through the static process of threshing out differences of view among the various agencies on relatively timeless issues of policy, but rather through the enlistment of positive action and collaboration in support of a concrete, immediate program.

Timing. A theme selected for a definite period can serve to affect the climate of world opinion in advance of an important negotiation or to lay the psychological foundation for some intended major policy development requiring the support of world opinion. Other themes may be chosen for emphasis for a period without relation to a current or impending event. Control of timing is an important ingredient in the strategy of "seizing the initiative".

Concentration. Through the employment of total themes all government programs, by giving priority attention to the same ideas at the same time, can thereby achieve the valuable effects of concentration of effort, of mutual support by positive collaboration.

Repetition. Planning a series of actions and statements to dramatize and clarify a few selected themes makes it possible to repeat the central thoughts without monotony.

The following operational guidelines are suggested in carrying out this general recommendation:

1. The number of over-all themes employed at any given time should be severely limited, not more than three or four at most. Selectivity and limitation are essential. If the concept of over-all themes is adopted, one or two might be employed initially as pilot projects.

2. Any given theme would be kept in effect for a period which might vary from one month to one or two years, depending on the particular case.

3. If such themes are to clarify rather than further confuse the present outflow of U. S. official influences upon world opinion, they must be accorded clear dominance and government-wide priority. Thus, they must be based on the direct decision of the President and command the

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full cooperation of members of the Cabinet and all top officials whose responsibilities have significant bearing on foreign attitudes.

4. Wherever possible, the program in support of a theme should be initiated and sustained by actions which give it substance and which symbolize and dramatize it. Such actions might be those that would have been taken at that time in normal pursuance of policy or they might be measures that would have been taken earlier or later under normal circumstances. However, it is not suggested that any actions be taken which have no inherent value. There is an almost unlimited number of imaginative things to be done in every foreign policy area which are useful and constructive in themselves and which have psychological value as well.

These are the operational and organizational considerations. There remains the conceptual and creative task of determining the content of the themes, the armature-ideas themselves. The necessary generalities can be briefly stated: Such themes must relate to the fundamental wants, needs and values of other nations. This means that they will relate to the universal desires for security, for freedom and independence, and for progress. The United States must demonstrate by words and actions that we are militarily invincible yet supremely devoted to peace; that we are zealous in our support of the aspirations of other nations and respectful of their sovereignty; and that we are a progressive society actively in support of progressive change, greater material well-being and social justice everywhere.

However, such generalities are not sufficient. They must be translated on the basis of study and imagination at the highest level of the Government into concrete, dramatic and timely form. This labor of identifying and giving active support to the ideas which will reach the hearts and minds of people around the earth comes close to identifying an important part of another much used and abused term, "leadership of the Free World".

The Committee is under no illusion that this prescription can ever fully be filled. Generating great and moving ideas, advance planning, clear fixing of priorities, and effective coordination of government-wide operations—these constitute the very tasks which any vast bureaucratic machine finds most difficult. And in the American system there is no realistic possibility of neatness, perfect order, and a command-and-obedience relationship among the parts of the Government.

But we must and can achieve some approximation of unified effort in reaching world opinion. To be comprehensible, the influences we project must have proportion, pattern and clarity. Over-all themes can serve as a focusing lens to give these qualities to our various activities.

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Chapter III

**THE NEW IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL
AND EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES**

The Committee has concluded that in certain areas a great and as yet insufficiently exploited opportunity lies in the direction of educational, cultural and exchange programs. Changing world conditions are generating a particularly rapid expansion of needs in these fields.

In the Soviet sphere, radio broadcasting until recently has been the principal available means for penetrating the curtain by which the dictatorships isolate their subjects from outside influences. Such broadcasting, both official and unattributed, remains an important instrument, but new possibilities of cultural, scientific and scholarly contact have now appeared. In the future as in the past, the official Soviet gatekeepers repeatedly will alter the width of the openings, but it is essential that at any given moment we make full use of the access allowed. Not to do so is to fail in some degree to assist long-term tendencies toward lessened hostility and greater understanding through increased contact with the Free World.

With Western Europe the problem is different, but the indicated line of action is the same. Here, we have a fortunate asset in that the mass media are highly developed, communication with the United States is extensive and unrestricted, and relationships are intimate and fundamentally friendly. Hence, continuing private and governmental programs of intellectual and cultural interchange provide an effective approach for U.S. efforts to reinforce cohesion of the alliance.

In the less-developed areas, still other factors emphasize the desirability of concentration on building durable relationships with present and potential leaders. The people of these nations, largely illiterate and technically unskilled, are hungry for education and are on the threshold of a monumental effort to expand and reshape their schools and universities. The direction which that effort takes and the outlook of the persons leading it can profoundly influence the political future of the world. While it is useful to attempt to inform the leaders in these areas about the daily flow of international events, it is even more important to influence their values and to increase their understanding of fundamental economic, social and political concepts. This by its nature is a long-term task of education and of concentration of effort on selected groups and individuals.

The Committee believes that in the present world struggle we have not adequately capitalized on our cultural and intellectual resources, our educational traditions and institutions, and even our language itself. There is need for new emphasis and for substantial increase in levels of effort in those fields.

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By building on these assets we will serve effectively the several aims of our foreign policy. More adequate response by the United States to the opportunities offered through educational, exchange and cultural programs will strengthen over the long run our political ties, reinforce our economic assistance programs, advance social development and stability, and add to our chances for peace and security.

At the same time action along these lines will help correct a widespread distortion of the American image. We will place into perspective alongside our military, political, economic and technical programs our enduring concern for the individual, for learning, and for the relationship between education, democracy and social progress.

Fortunately, the activities which can contribute to these ends are what much of the world wants us to provide. Our techniques are respected and sought. Increasing numbers of foreign students are attending our universities. English is increasingly recognized as the pre-eminent language of this era and people seek by the tens of thousands to learn it. The world admires, wants and needs what we can offer scientifically and educationally.

Imaginative expansion of educational, cultural and exchange programs should evoke support by important elements of American society. For our many citizens with a strong sense of humanitarianism, with deep feelings about the right of individuals to educational opportunity, and with a conviction that the American approach to world affairs should be constructive, idealistic and democratic, the suggested emphasis should have great meaning. When in the past we have been able to combine high spiritual aims and down-to-earth practical values in a single program, support has been forthcoming from the American people.

Foreign Educational Development*

A new approach in assisting foreign educational development holds great promise. The Committee believes that certain measures in this field, if taken boldly, will have a significant impact on the way the world thinks of the United States and will strongly affect the attitudes of emerging countries toward their own modernization and political development.

The psychological gains to be realized from educational assistance are in part general and symbolic. They are also concrete and specific. Such assistance will build a basis for future communication on all matters with these new countries. The mere dissemination of information about current world affairs and American policies will not suffice as a foundation for political relationships with areas where the leaders have no real grasp of the concepts of law and order, political freedom and social justice, and the fundamentals of economies. Unless and until understanding of these values and concepts can be created, feelings of race hatred, anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism will make effective communication impossible. For that task, only the steady, slow processes of education will make much difference.

* Mr. Gray has certain reservations on this section with which Mr. Merchant wishes to be associated. Mr. Gray's comments appear at the end of the chapter.

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In the long run the development of the human resources of the less-developed areas through education and training may be the most remunerative form of economic assistance which can be given.

Educational development will contribute also to the larger goal of building viable, competent societies and governments. History amply demonstrates that literacy and education do not lead necessarily or immediately to political stability. (The reverse may well be true in some situations for longer or shorter periods.) But without the development of a "cultural infrastructure", without larger numbers of people who can read and write, without more schools and leaders trained to perform at least the basic functions required of a twentieth century society, it is hard to imagine that many of the newly-emergent countries can long exist as free and independent entities.

Through various programs and agencies, the United States Government is already providing considerable help to education and training abroad, particularly to persons from the less-developed countries. These programs, though valuable, are diffuse and frequently not readily identifiable with the United States. They are subordinate elements of agencies and activities directed principally to other things. They have no single voice or general leadership. They are not based on a coherent and avowed over-all policy or legislative enactment. They therefore fail in large part to realize their great symbolic and psychological potential.

To realize fully the opportunity presented, there must be a general determination to move with conviction in giving new accent to our assistance to foreign education.

This should be made concrete in the form of a new declaration of policy in support of long-term assistance to foreign educational development by the President and the Congress. In declaring our readiness to work with the less-developed nations in a generous and disinterested spirit for the development of their educational systems, we must scrupulously avoid any tone of cultural imperialism. Education is a particularly sensitive aspect of national sovereignty and this must be taken fully into account in our work in this field.

The proposed program might include the continuation or initiation of such projects as the following:

1. Assistance in building and equipping schools, laboratories and libraries as visible symbols of American help.
2. The creation, under UN, multilateral or bilateral arrangements, of new regional institutions and training centers in such fields as public administration, agricultural technology, and the management of enterprises.
3. The development of large, mobile training centers to provide basic technical skills in health, agriculture and mechanical trades to thousands of trainees at a time.
4. The mounting of experiments in the use of television to spread literacy and teach basic skills on a large scale.
5. The contribution of funds for "opportunity scholarships" in various countries which would enable talented young people from all

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social classes on the basis of open competition to acquire an education in their own country.

6. A major program for the training of teachers from less-developed countries and the establishment of teacher training institutes in these countries. This program might be launched with an offer of fellowships to such countries for advanced training for selected faculty members from their colleges and universities.

7. A program of training and orientation for young Americans who would spend several years abroad performing basic tasks such as teaching in elementary schools, working in civil services, and acting as staff assistants in village development programs.

Organizational steps to insure an effective program of international educational development could take any one of several forms. The essential requirement is that the organizational approach adopted should give the program visibility and leadership and thereby serve to identify the United States in the eyes of the world with one of the great universal ideals—education. It would also be most desirable if the organizational pattern adopted lessened the apprehension of foreign countries in accepting outside assistance for the development of their educational systems.

One possibility which would help fulfill these requirements would be the creation of a new quasi-independent Foundation for International Educational Development. Such a body might accomplish the following:

1. It could provide voice and over-all leadership to American efforts in support of foreign educational development.
2. It could help link Government, university and private foundation efforts.
3. Since it would not be a direct arm of the diplomatic, economic, informational or military agencies of the Government, it might be able to work more effectively with foreign countries on educational problems without offending their sensibilities.

The foundation might be directed by a board made up of representatives of foundations with foreign educational programs, of private citizens eminent in the field of education, and such others as appropriate. The Government's interest in the foundation could be maintained through some mechanism for liaison with the board. The head of such a foundation should be a person of outstanding qualifications.

If such a foundation were created it should mount programs of its own, using foreign currencies and dollar funds appropriated directly to it. In a certain sense it would resemble the National Science Foundation which has enabled the Federal Government to operate effectively without transgressing the traditional inhibitions upon the Federal Government in dealing with matters of science and education.

The Committee draws attention to the fact that a program of assistance to foreign educational development adequate to achieve major psychological impact and symbolize effectively American identification with educational opportunity will require substantial funds over and above those currently available for such purposes. To some extent the pro-

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posed program for foreign educational development could be financed by a shift of emphasis in present economic assistance. The recommended expansion should be financed wherever possible by foreign local currencies now available or to become available in the years ahead. In addition, however, fresh dollar funds would be required of a substantially greater magnitude than have been provided for foreign educational projects up to the present time.

If it were possible to have the proposed foundation grow out of private rather than governmental initiative and if some of the initial financing could be provided from private sources, the result would be to launch the enterprise under particularly auspicious circumstances.

The United States as a World Cultural Center

The United States is the political fulcrum of the Free World, and Washington is the recognized hub of leadership. The United States is the economic giant of the world, and our markets and exchanges regulate the daily pulse of trade and capital movements. The United States is also the center of enormous cultural, scientific and intellectual activity, but in these areas there is a huge disparity between the reality and the appearance.

A contributing cause to this is the fact that most of the international gatherings of thinkers and scholars take place elsewhere. Very few of the major international festivals in the fine arts take place here, and even fewer of the major world prizes for intellectual and creative achievement are American. In the eyes of many of its large population of foreign representatives, our national capital itself is regarded, from a cultural standpoint, as a provincial town.

Our activities and achievements in the arts and in scholarship deserve better than this. Our international position requires that we do better than we have. There are practical steps which can be taken.

It is recommended that efforts be made through a combination of governmental and private actions to generate:

1. The establishment of a continuing series of international festivals and exhibitions of the arts in the United States, including if necessary governmental subsidy of transportation and facilities.
2. The development in Washington of a cultural center to include operatic and ballet presentations, symphony concerts, and special competitions in the arts. Initiatives in this direction are already under way and, with well-planned and vigorous Presidential leadership, much of the necessary financing can probably be found from private sources.
3. A permanent increase in the number of major international meetings held in the United States in the humanities, social sciences, philosophy, the exact sciences and the fine arts. In some instances, this may require selective relaxation of visa requirements and governmental and private assistance in lessening the economic obstacles involved.
4. The establishment of a series of major American awards for outstanding achievements by men and women of all nations in science, art, government, education, and human welfare.

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These activities will add lustre to the prestige of the United States throughout the world. Equally important, by bringing outstanding individuals from many fields to the United States, we will enrich our own institutions and individuals working in these same fields. Not least, we will gratify the pride of other countries by showing interest in learning about their creative and intellectual achievements.

English Language Teaching

In all parts of the world there now exists a vast, spontaneous demand for learning English. Applicants by the thousands are being turned away from the doors of binational centers and English language institutes, and waiting lists for admission are long. English is becoming the language of the century. The desire to learn it springs from general recognition of its economic, cultural and prestige values.

The Committee believes that it would be both feasible and advantageous to U.S. foreign policy objectives to intensify the efforts now being made to teach English to foreigners and to expand the use of English as a universal language. In so doing we will facilitate the transmission of technical information and skills useful to economic development. We will widen our channels of communication with foreign leadership elements. We will expose increasing numbers of people to the social and political ideals of Western civilization. We will as a consequence of these benefits reinforce our ties and enhance our influence throughout the world.

The Committee recommends that the present English-teaching programs of the Government be strengthened by:

1. The establishment of a clear and explicit policy within the Government to promote the acceptance and use of English as a universal language.

2. The encouragement through diplomatic efforts of the adoption of English as the official second language in certain countries, with due regard for the sensibilities of all the countries concerned. Efforts should also be made to prevent regression in countries where English already has official status.

3. The promotion through governmental and private efforts of the teaching of English in national school systems. This can be done through such measures as providing teaching materials, the training of English teachers, and through other forms of technical assistance.

4. Exploration of the possibilities of more massive short-term efforts—parallel with long-term programs—to achieve a rapid increase in the number of foreign students and adults able to use English as a working tool. These might involve the use of new techniques of teaching by television, and the development of a large and dramatic program using gifted American college students and teachers of English to conduct summer language camps each year in selected foreign areas.

5. Encouraging greater efforts on the part of the British Council and other organizations sponsoring English teaching abroad. We should also coordinate our efforts more closely with those of other English speaking people. For example, it might be less expensive to train English

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teachers from certain areas in the United Kingdom or Australia than to bring them to the United States.

Exchange of Persons Programs

The U.S. Government is extensively engaged in exchange of persons and the training of foreign specialists and leaders in this country. These activities, which are important to our long-run foreign policy objectives, are in need of reappraisal. They are insufficiently coordinated, lack a clear framework of policy and require better arrangements for the handling of exchangees after they arrive here. These programs involve large total outlays and extremely heavy unit cost. They represent great concentration of effort and expenditure upon a single individual to increase his competence or affect his general understanding and orientation. The potential benefits of this individualized approach are realized, however, only to the extent that arrangements for training, for counseling and for continuing contact with exchangees after their return home are effective. Both governmental and private exchange programs provide fully for transportation and basic administrative costs. But there is a tendency to scrimp in outlays for other necessary aspects, with the result that a portion of the potential benefits is lost.

The Committee recommends:

1. That official exchange of persons programs be progressively expanded (except with Western Europe); that priority be assigned to expansion of existing U. S. programs for aid to African education and training, including exchange of students, specialists and leaders; and, that the United States press for speedy implementation within the United Nations framework of the proposals made by the President to the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1960.
2. That a policy be formulated by the Executive Branch clarifying and relating the objectives of the several exchange and training programs now in being. Such a statement should emphasize that all exchanges, technical or otherwise, should in addition to their narrower purposes serve to the greatest feasible extent in advancing the foreign policy objectives of the United States. This will provide a basis for adjustments needed in varying degree in the policies for selection, training, administration, and follow-up now governing existing programs.
3. That a more concentrated effort be made to identify potential leaders and activists in the emerging countries as prospects for exchange grants. There should be a pooling of current information about such individuals from all normal embassy contacts and intelligence sources. Special inquiries and research projects for this purpose should be undertaken where necessary and feasible.
4. That there be an adjustment in the division of funds between transportation costs and the other aspects of exchange programs, including selection, training, administration and follow-up. The goal should be to give every exchangee careful, continuous, individual attention, and an experience in the United States suited to his interests, to the needs of the country from which he comes, and to his special psychological requirements. The implications of this goal are considerable.

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If total funds for exchanges are held at present levels, then the number of exchangees should be reduced in order to provide resources for their better handling and training while in this country. If the present number of exchangees is maintained or increased, then additional funds would have to be made available for administrative costs. The Committee recommends the provision of additional funds rather than a general reduction in the level of present exchange programs.

To make possible a more effective handling of exchangees, funds will be required for such needs as:

- a. The expansion and financial strengthening of our specialized agencies handling foreign students and leaders.
- b. The creation of an adequate nation-wide system, based on the voluntary help of local citizens and groups, for hospitality and intelligent exchange of views with important foreign visitors.
- c. The provision of special courses and guidance to meet the needs and situations (often very different from those of the American student) of the foreign exchangees being trained under government sponsorship.

So far as possible the handling of foreign students and leaders on a routine basis must be avoided. This necessity only grows more imperative as exchange programs are increasingly focused on nations whose history, culture and stage of economic and political development are greatly different from our own.

5. That the U. S. Government, with respect to the university students it brings to this country, consider providing a supplementary grant to the school itself to help defray the special costs of facilities and training provided by the university for such students.

6. Exchanges with the Soviet Bloc countries and programs of reciprocal exchanges as provided under the U. S.-USSR Exchange Agreement should be continued with such expansion and governmental financing as may be appropriate. We should continue our efforts to provide maximum opportunities of exposure of Soviet visitors to new ideas and to politically sophisticated Americans able to hold their own in ideological discussion.

Comment by Mr. Gray (with which Mr. Merchant wishes to be associated) : I am in agreement with the other members of the Committee as to the importance of the activities discussed in this section. It is conceivable that an emphasis on foreign educational development as discussed in this chapter could become a matter of major importance to the interests of the United States. I agree that a new declaration of policy in support of foreign educational development by the President and the Congress would be of powerful assistance. My difficulties with the program suggestions are that they are imprecise, largely open-ended, and need further definition as to scope and timing.

I also have some difficulty with the new quasi-independent Foundation for International Educational Development. I am not convinced that it is a practical suggestion and feel that it needs further consideration. For the programs the U.S. administers directly, it seems important that all types of aid be closely coordinated on a country basis rather than fragmented into specialized functional agencies such as education, health, agri-

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culture, industry, etc. Furthermore, it is very probable that the U.S. may want to continue to provide some assistance for educational programs through the United Nations, especially to the new countries in Africa.

The idea of saving money by using foreign currencies is in many cases an illusion, especially in the new African countries where the U.S. does not possess any local currencies. It may be better to seek regularly appropriated funds and thus have the flexibility to provide training in this country, assist in orientation expenses, etc., as recommended in the rest of Chapter III.

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Chapter IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND INFORMATIONAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC AID, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND MILITARY PROGRAMS

U. S. economic assistance agencies, scientific research and development agencies, and the military establishment exert enormous influence upon foreign opinion as a result of their activities. The Committee has considered various measures which might be utilized by these agencies to assure adequate integration of psychological factors in the formulation as well as in the execution and public presentation of their policies and programs, as called for in Basic National Security Policy.

Foreign Economic Assistance

In the decade of the 1960s, the demand upon the United States for economic assistance will undoubtedly increase. The need will be concentrated in the less-developed areas, not in the industrially advanced countries as in the immediate postwar years. Aid will be concerned with modernizing total societies, not with the relatively simple labor of economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. Aid programs will pursue their objectives in a seething atmosphere of tension, turmoil and misunderstanding.

In many of the countries in which our aid programs will operate, we find practically none of the elements required for the development of the conditions we seek to promote. These countries in many cases are characterized by emotionally charged nationalism, visions of overnight industrialization, vast impatience with the slow processes of economic growth, and lack of skills in dealing with the technical and managerial functions of a twentieth century state. Within these societies, governmental instability and corruption are to be found along with powerful and entrenched groups resistant to change. Omnipresent and alert to every possibility of disrupting constructive effort is the Sino-Soviet Bloc with its growing programs for subversion, economic warfare, propaganda and intimidation.

Clearly, the problem of inducing and assisting foreign economic development has many dimensions. In part it is a matter of providing machinery, materials, technical advice and the transference of skills of production and distribution. But it necessarily involves parallel attention to broader and even more complex tasks of building or renovating social and economic institutions. Apart from unacceptable forms of forcible intervention these changes can be brought about only to the extent that attitudes and deeply imbedded cultural patterns can be modified.

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The importance of changing basic institutions and attitudes derives not only from the necessities for economic growth, but from the overriding political objectives toward which all our foreign programs, economic and other, must be directed. To some degree there has been a lack of understanding and acceptance by the Congress, our aid officials and the general public of the principle that economic aid programs are a means to achieve national and political objectives, not ends in themselves.

A reflection of confusion between means and ends is the issue of "impact" projects, discussion of which sometimes takes on a moralistic flavor, i.e., the value of "sound" economic projects versus "wasteful" projects intended to affect a local climate of opinion. This kind of distinction overlooks some of the broader and deeper purposes of economic aid. In the view of the Committee, any project which has economic merit and in addition constructively affects attitudes of people in the recipient country has a special quality of "soundness" in terms of the long-run national interest. In the present power struggle between Communism and freedom a major element, and one which in the long run may be controlling, consists of the attitudes, attachments and convictions of the hundreds of millions of people in the less-developed areas.

It is therefore not only relevant but indispensable to give the most careful attention to psychological and informational matters in the formulation and execution of aid programs. However, the purpose of such attention should be to facilitate the achievement of the goals of economic development and of U. S. foreign policy, not to arouse extraneous sentimental manifestations. Psychological and informational targets must be set in accord with functional requirements, not out of sentiment or belief in publicity for its own sake. The attitudinal obstacles to the adoption of better methods of production and distribution must be identified. Procedures and policies which unnecessarily generate friction or misunderstanding must be modified. The key groups which can block or advance progress must be identified and made priority targets for informational and educational efforts.

In the long run, we can hope by giving aid to hold the friendship of recipient countries and to strengthen ties of mutual respect and cooperation. But it is naive to think that our aid programs—affecting as they do basic social and economic institutions in the recipient countries—will be or can be universally understood and applauded. Our long-range goal in giving aid is not to subsidize and perpetuate out-moded structures and relationships but to help them to evolve. The process inevitably will be accompanied by a background rumble of complaint by those elements who feel their interests have been adversely affected or inadequately favored.

In brief, we must see clearly the role of our aid program in the larger context of the over-all objectives of U. S. foreign policy. But we must see equally clearly those psychological objectives which are really worth pursuing in advancing development and political relationships, and those which are merely gratifying to our self-pride.

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As a result of the establishment in the Department of State of the Office of the Coordinator of the Mutual Security Program, greater attention is now being given to political and psychological aspects in the formulation of assistance programs. Within individual aid agencies, however, administrators must give greater attention to these factors in the presentation and execution of their programs.

The informational problem with respect to foreign economic assistance has an important domestic as well as foreign aspect. Flexible, creative and effective economic aid programs are very difficult to achieve when public support at home lags, when Congress interferes with detailed operating problems, when domestic political pressures intrude into basic decisions about the form and character of assistance, and when the administrators of these programs are constantly harassed and badgered in the political forum and in the public press.

The Committee makes these recommendations:

1. The most vigorous Presidential and other high-level effort is needed on a continuing basis to strengthen the domestic base of understanding and support for our economic assistance programs as a vital instrument for the advancement of the national interest.

2. The increased domestic information effort in behalf of these programs already undertaken by the Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State should be supported and accelerated.

3. The steps being taken to coordinate our many and diverse foreign economic programs and to establish closer relationship between them and our foreign policy objectives, including the attribution to the Under Secretary of State of special responsibilities in this regard, are proving psychologically valuable and should be continued. The multiplicity of agencies concerned with foreign assistance makes excessively difficult the task of linking U.S. aid to a common set of political and psychological goals.

4. The psychological potentialities of foreign aid programs should be fully considered both in their formulation and in their execution.

This is not to say that the criterion of psychological impact should be controlling in the selection of aid projects or the determination of aid procedures. On the contrary, it will normally be of secondary importance. But in every project and policy decision, the psychological aspect deserves to be taken into consideration along with other relevant factors, economic, military and political.

In addition to the application of psychological criteria in the selection of specific aid projects and procedures, special attention should be given to: (a) means of increasing the broader value to U. S. objectives of the training given in this country to foreign technicians; and (b) making greater use of U. S. aid personnel as "communicators" with the tens of thousands of key foreigners with whom they are in daily contact.

5. Information efforts overseas in support of economic aid programs have been strengthened recently. These efforts should be continued but they will require increased Congressional support for personnel needs.

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The transfer of responsibility for foreign publicity about U. S. aid programs to USIA in 1953 resulted in a gain of coherence and coordination of over-all U. S. foreign information activity. But the cost has been a loss of focus and vigor in informational support of aid programs. The principal step required is for USIA to intensify markedly its efforts in this direction and to give particular attention to the recruitment and in-service training of personnel dealing with economic information.

An object of such an intensified informational effort overseas should be to clarify understanding of basic economic issues, including the nature of the U. S. socio-economic system, the difference between the Western and the Sino-Soviet "models" of development and the objectives of U. S. assistance. In addition, it should aim to create attitudes of understanding and cooperation—or to reduce redoubts of antagonism and resistance—among groups essential to the success of assistance programs.

Scientific and Technological Programs

A startling new development in the period since the Jackson Committee report has been the increasing impact of scientific and technological achievement upon world opinion. Without question the launching of the first Sputnik gave the Soviet Union a psychological triumph which has profoundly affected its image as a technically advanced nation and as a great military power. Its feat in one branch of technology has been systematically exploited—and with considerable success—as evidence of the dynamism of the entire Soviet system.

The United States has had, and continues to have, over-all superiority in science and technology. Nevertheless, since the launching of Sputnik I there has been considerable evidence that the average man in most countries believes that Soviet capability continues to grow relative to that of the United States, and that the Soviet Union leads in certain important aspects of space technology. Short of some now unforeseeable and revolutionary scientific breakthrough, it will be extremely difficult to re-establish the degree of American technological prestige and pre-eminence relative to that of the USSR which existed prior to October 1957.

The Committee feels that, since throughout the world the status of the nation's science is increasingly taken as a measure of its power and dynamism, two things are indispensable psychologically: (1) that the U. S. maintain a continuing stream of scientific and technological achievements; and (2) that these achievements be more effectively communicated to the world than has been the case in the past.

The Committee feels that, despite the improvements which have been made, there is still an inadequate awareness of the psychological importance of our scientific activities in the administration of these programs and that arrangements for publicizing and dramatizing to the world our achievements are inadequate.

The Committee therefore makes the following recommendations:

1. The scale and effectiveness of our overseas information efforts to communicate the facts of U. S. scientific achievements should be

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increased. This will require particular attention to the recruitment and training of qualified information specialists who are at the same time competent in technical subject matter, plus additional appropriations for special projects such as exhibits.

In stressing the need for more vigorous informational support of scientific programs, it is important also to caution that premature publicity and "leaks" that appear to promise more or quicker technical progress than can practically be realized can prove most injurious to U. S. prestige.

2. These increased efforts should be designed to improve our communications both with scientific elites and with the general public. Many governmental agencies have extensive and varied programs to communicate with foreign scientists. But only USIA and ICA (through its technical assistance programs) are making large-scale efforts to convey information about our science and technology to those outside the scientific community.

3. There needs to be increased coordination between the announcement of American scientific and technological achievements and other governmental activities. Interdepartmental efforts to provide a systematic means for considering the timing and method of announcement of scientific actions in relation to diplomatic, military and other programs should be continued.

4. Recent organizational measures to give new prominence to the role of science in our government have indirectly been of value to psychological and informational activities abroad. The Committee would like to cite particularly the establishment of the offices of President's Assistant for Science and Technology and of Science Adviser to the Secretary of State, and the appointment of science attachés at our principal embassies abroad. Further exploitation of these activities can help improve understanding abroad of our progress in science and technology.

5. USIA, in consultation with the appropriate agencies, should identify programs with unusual interest and psychological impact and recommend special actions or support that may be indicated. In the field of applied technology two types of projects appear to have special psychological value:

First, spectacular feats with dramatic possibilities representing solid scientific achievement but not requiring new fundamental research.

Second, the accelerated development of new low-cost products, machines and techniques which could directly affect the daily lives of people abroad. Such possibilities might especially be sought in fields like applied chemistry (e.g., plastics, fibers and antibiotics) and public health technology, where American leadership is outstanding. Government support may be required to develop some devices for which there are not adequate commercial possibilities.

6. Where particular needs are identified, agencies of the government participating in technical assistance should be asked to expand and intensify certain programs for teaching and transmitting American technical knowledge. This is already being done on a large scale in

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the field of agricultural technology. Other possibilities would appear to exist in the field of medicine—especially in physiotherapy where American leadership is marked—and in new teaching techniques such as educational television.

The dramatic and highly useful curriculum developments in the various fields of science education should be exported in a planned, coordinated program involving the several agencies concerned with foreign information, education and exchange of scientific knowledge. Fuller exploitation of developments in science education would have the two-fold value of providing genuinely useful materials to countries that need them and at the same time demonstrating American advances in technical and scientific fields.

7. Joint scientific and technological programs with other advanced countries of the Free World should be encouraged and the psychological benefits therefrom fully exploited.

The Committee has also given study to a problem of greater complexity, namely, whether the pattern of governmental support for basic research should be directly influenced by psychological considerations. Obviously if the United States were able to score "firsts" in such areas as the significant prolongation of life or controlled thermonuclear reaction, the value to national prestige would be enormous. There is the practical question, however, whether basic scientific discoveries—which are by their nature unpredictable—can be accelerated by focusing research funds in general fields of psychological importance.

The best assurance of a continued flow of major scientific discovery which will serve the broad spectrum of human needs and thereby the nation's prestige abroad is ample unprogrammed financial support for basic research. However, it is also desirable that some basic research should be concentrated in those fields which hold the most promise for scientific discoveries that will enhance our prestige abroad. Therefore, the Committee recommends that the President bring to the attention of the Government's scientific administrators and those responsible for budgetary allocations to scientific research, the relevance, propriety and importance of taking psychological considerations into account in determining the relative amounts of support to be given to the various areas of basic research.

Military Programs and Policies

The American military establishment is a huge and powerful system to protect the nation in the event of war. In the course of protracted conflict short of war—which is the prospect for the indefinite future—it will also exert enormous influence in every part of the world in behalf of the objectives of U. S. foreign policy. It will exert such influence primarily by the reality of its military power, its forces and weapons, but also through many and important "collateral effects": the presence of hundreds of thousands of service men and their families on foreign soil, its broadcasting activities, its relations with foreign leaders and military personnel and its expenditures abroad, to catalog only a few of the more obvious examples.

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The Department of Defense and the armed services have made important progress in recognizing the economic, social, political and psychological importance of these side-effects of military activity, and they have taken steps to capitalize upon them. The plans and policies which have been developed and the structure of special committees and working groups which has been created represent a movement which is still in its early stages but which is of great significance.

The Committee therefore makes the following recommendations:

1. The excellent steps taken within the Department of Defense to organize consideration of the collateral effects of military activities have focused attention on the armed forces' mission of supporting our national political, economic, psychological, technological and cultural objectives without diluting their primary military mission. These measures should be continued and intensified, particularly among the lower echelons of command.

However, if we are to maximize the potential political and other nonmilitary benefits which can be obtained as a by-product of military activities, military personnel at all levels will require greater understanding of the role which the armed forces should play in this undertaking. The Committee believes that additional measures should be taken to create a greater awareness of the nonmilitary implications of military activities, a better understanding of the importance of these implications and an increased knowledge of what can be done by the armed forces to enhance the positive and reduce the negative side-effects of their essential activities. Within the framework of the present Defense budget, greater resources may have to be devoted to this end.

2. Increasing emphasis should be given the political, economic and social side-effects of training foreign military personnel. In many parts of the world military forces and military elements have a growing importance politically and are significant and constructive elements for economic and social change. Identifying the potential military leadership in underdeveloped countries, providing training and orientation which will deepen understanding of democratic institutions and American objectives, and, importantly, maintaining the established relationships after the training period is finished, can create assets which will be valuable in all countries and could be decisive in some.

3. The Committee feels that if its recommendations for vigorous action by the armed forces to implement their collateral missions in the psychological and informational fields abroad are accepted, two conditions must be fulfilled:

First, the Department of Defense and the individual services must continue to maintain close supervision over military activities bearing on political or other nonmilitary objectives.

Second, there must be the closest coordination and cooperation by the Department of Defense with the Department of State and with other agencies of the Government responsible for psychological and informational activities abroad.

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4. For reasons lying deep in national psychologies and historical experience, foreign troops in a country in time of peace often offend conceptions of national sovereignty and independence. While in most cases these objections are offset by the security which our forces provide and by actions on the part of our armed forces overseas to minimize the negative effects of their presence, there are exceptions. In certain countries, particularly those not geographically contiguous with Communist areas, significant segments of the population tend to view U.S. bases located in their countries as attracting rather than deterring possible Communist nuclear attack and see no need for these bases in terms of their own local security. There is also a feeling on the part of many in these countries that the presence of U.S. bases commits them to our side and prevents their taking a neutral position internationally. In some areas the situation is exacerbated by extreme nationalism which views the presence of foreign troops as a form of colonialism and incompatible with independence. Such attitudes have already forced us to agree to the evacuation of our Moroccan bases and during the next decade could cause the loss of others.

While there is no assurance that any psychological and informational measures can prevent this, the Committee nevertheless recommends that the United States make full and integrated use of psychological and informational assets to help retain these bases for as long as they are strategically needed. Individual country plans and programs could spell out the considerable contributions which can be made by our armed forces.

5. The armed forces have two primary roles that involve psychological and informational considerations: They must deter aggression and hold the respect and confidence of our friends and allies. While the achievement of these objectives rests fundamentally on the reality of our military power, it cannot be assumed that they will automatically be realized on the basis of purely military considerations since deterrence and reassurance are not accomplished through the application of military force but through the image of our military power held by foreign peoples and their leaders.

During the process of reaching decisions on the size, composition, equipment, armament, training, deployment and strategy of our forces, we must consider the probable reaction of foreign peoples in terms of deterrence and reassurance. The Committee believes that those responsible for our military force posture and strategy must continue to be fully aware of the importance of psychological and informational considerations and give these factors due weight in their decisions.

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Chapter V

NEW DIMENSIONS OF DIPLOMACY

In some historic periods deep shifts in the mission and style of diplomacy occur. We seem now to be in such a period. The changes taking place reflect the growing importance of psychological factors.

In the past century, diplomacy has been adjusting to technological changes and to the foreshortening of the diplomats' world by accelerated transport and telecommunications. As one consequence, the relative responsibility of the foreign office at home for the formulation of policy has grown and in recent years ambassadors have been required increasingly to share responsibility with a visiting foreign minister or chief of state. The spread of popular education, of more widespread participation in government, and of mass media communications have forced diplomacy to pay vastly more attention to sensing and influencing public opinion abroad and to keeping abreast of it at home.

Today our diplomacy is confronted by still newer challenges in a radically changing world framework. Of overwhelming importance is the persistence of the ideological, economic and strategic struggle with the Communist world. Its terms are not static and its shifts constantly call for new skills and new awareness in our diplomacy. In the Soviet scheme of things, psychological warfare is an integral element of diplomacy. The whole Soviet system from the beginning has placed great stress on propaganda, both at home and abroad. Whether U.S. diplomacy is adequately armed for this struggle with the Soviet leadership, whether it is directed from the top and provided at every level with sufficient sensitivity and skill in dealing with psychological factors, are key questions in our inquiry.

In the next ten years, the conduct of our foreign relations and the organization of our diplomacy will have to be modified further to cope with new forms of this struggle, particularly in its transference to new arenas in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Since 1946, beginning with Jordan and the Philippines, no less than 37 new states with a total population of over 800,000,000 have come into being. In 1960 alone 17 new countries have been admitted into the United Nations. The political institutions of many of these new states are often inchoate, their leaders inexperienced and sometimes incompetent, and their regimes transitory.

A number of older countries are faced with similar problems. In Latin America and South Asia, governments of tenuous authority must cope with an explosive growth in population, a transformation of their preindustrial economies and popular impatience fed by the rising expectations of their peoples. Since 1953, governments of no less than 30 countries have changed hands by other than constitutional means. The successor governments in most cases have represented not only a

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change but a rupture with the ideas, individuals and groups predominant in their predecessors.

In both the new countries and the older ones going through the crises of modernization, formal and traditional diplomacy of the predominantly government-to-government type often plays a limited role because of the lack of a durable sovereignty with which to treat and the absence of common antecedents of history, ancestry or diplomatic usage.

Moreover, the power of U.S. diplomacy to influence these countries is inhibited by still other factors. Many of these states regard us as the backers and profiteers of colonialism. Our own activities may be viewed through a prism of doubt and in some areas we may find we can operate effectively only through multilateral arrangements.

Lacking a number of familiar levers or means of contact, our influence on the "new" peoples must first be addressed to the development of a responsible opinion. In some places, our efforts cannot hope to beget stable, democratically oriented countries until they can inculcate some respect for the very idea of government itself and some notion of the social contract.

What does all this mean for the function and formation of our diplomacy?

It means that diplomacy increasingly must understand and use public opinion in all countries, open and closed, old and new. It means that there needs to be more emphasis on psychological factors in all aspects of our diplomatic behavior: our handling of conferences and negotiations, our representation abroad, particularly in the emerging countries, our selection and training of personnel and our treatment of foreign visitors.

Attention to Psychological Factors

As the principal foreign policy agency of the Government the attitude of the Department of State with respect to the integration of psychological factors in plans, policies and programs, as well as its view of the importance of informational activities in general, is of central importance.

The Committee recognizes, first, that the Department, with its responsibilities for the conduct of foreign relations, must exercise extraordinary care and fidelity in its methods and approach. It must avoid risky experimentation and have no part of frills or fads. The Committee advocates no psychological gimmickry nor does it speak for those who see in psychological warfare an independent and somehow magical branch of foreign policy.

Considerable progress has been made in the recognition and accommodation of psychological factors in the outlook and practices of the Department of State.

The Committee feels nevertheless that recognition of the importance and propriety of psychological considerations should prevail more widely in the Department and Foreign Service. On some important occasions these factors have been inadequately weighed in the formulation of policies, plans and actions and the available experts in psycho-

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logical and informational matters have been inadequately consulted in the formulation of policies and plans.

The Committee therefore recommends that, in discharging its broadening and changing responsibility, U.S. diplomacy should strongly develop its capability for sensing and influencing world opinion and it should be better equipped to bring U.S. influence to bear on public opinion, especially in the new and emerging states whose evolution will significantly determine the course of the next decade. It should be increasingly effective not only in government-to-government contacts but also with selected elements of foreign populations. It must still further develop its skills in multilateral and "conference" diplomacy which now exerts dramatic influence upon world attitudes.

General Representation Abroad

If it is to have useful influence abroad, particularly in the developing states, our diplomacy should gird for an activist phase in the years ahead. It must not only deal with transitory governments but must also penetrate and seek to condition the social strata which will produce new leaders and the "government after the next". It should know how to make use of the full armory of diplomatic weapons, including economic aid, propaganda and covert influence.

Our diplomacy must be able not only to establish close and friendly relations but at times to stand aloof, to know and use opposition, to withhold U.S. favor, and, if necessary, to be unpleasant. It must have ambassadors, career or noncareer, who are ready and able to take the initiative, to influence opinion in the society in which they are stationed, and to contribute to the formation of American policy.

The Committee believes that the adoption of the following recommendations would assist the Department and Foreign Service in carrying out these tasks:

1. *Direction and Coordination.* A decisive element in the integration of psychological factors with all other factors in our diplomacy abroad lies in the role of the chief of mission and his country team.

Presiding over the staffs of several agencies, the chief of mission must operate as a good executive in coordinating, orchestrating and giving direction to their work and influence. This he can achieve best by means of his country team, comprising the major arms of his mission. On this team the information elements should be fully and regularly represented. Special attention should be given to improving the awareness of chiefs of mission of the necessity of integrating psychological factors into the planning and execution of programs.

The seniority and paramount responsibility of the chief of mission among representatives of other agencies should be maintained. While the country team is only advisory to the chief of mission, more imaginative employment of the country team concept in all parts of the world is desirable. Where feasible and consistent with policy, the chief of mission should be encouraged to exercise latitude and discretion. The practice of periodic reviews of U.S. programs by country missions is commendable. This practice should be regularized and applied to all

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missions. The country teams should be fully consulted in policy recommendations growing out of such reviews.

Provision should be made to achieve rapid action, especially in new states and crisis areas, in installing or redeploying missions or consulates, together with such public affairs, intelligence, and other skills as may be immediately required.

The special value of the consular offices for grass roots informational activities and influence should be recognized and developed. Consular personnel, whose duties bring them into contact with the public in centers of influence outside the capital cities, have a most important role in extending the range of embassy sources of information and in projecting the image of America. The Department of State should continue and, where possible, extend its efforts to enhance the morale, stature and rewards of consular work. A tendency toward excessive centralization of informational and other functions at the capital city should be resisted.

To get the benefit of political and psychological experience on a regional basis, chief of mission conferences and regional consultations which include public affairs officers, USIA representatives and others as the Department may find appropriate should be encouraged.

2. *Reporting.* The Department of State and the Foreign Service have the over-all responsibility for reporting on foreign political developments, including attitude trends having political importance. They also have continuing responsibility for the general assessment of the significance and policy implications of such trends.

Admittedly there do not exist, either in American private life or in the Government, persons who can be considered fully "expert" in analysis and assessment of such a formidable and intangible subject as psychological developments abroad. However, there is an important body of theory and practice in the social sciences, serious journalism and current historical writings which can be applied to some degree and with profit to the reporting processes and methods of the Foreign Service.

The Committee recommends that the scope and methods of Foreign Service reporting on political and psychological developments should be studied, particularly in the light of the continuing ideological struggle and its projection in the emergent countries. Such a study should be made for the confidential guidance of the Secretary of State.

3. *Active Representational Role.* American diplomatic representatives abroad should take an increasingly active part in influencing foreign opinion through the development of close and influential contacts with all key leadership groups. Dealings with all major sources of influence in foreign societies will be of increasing importance in years to come. In this task, chiefs of mission and Foreign Service officers, along with other more specialized members of the country team, must play a direct and active role. Means should be found to make it possible for political officers to devote more time to broadening their relationships with officials in labor organizations, in mass media, in educational and intellectual circles, among military officers, etc.

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4. *High-Level Visits.* Visits to other countries by the President or the Secretary of State can have extraordinary political and psychological value. To the extent possible they should be planned and managed in ways which will increase and prolong their favorable impact on local leaders and populations. Because of the complexity of psychological considerations that may be involved, the greatest care should be exercised in deciding the timing and detailed arrangements of the visits, and decisions should be made in the light of the relevant information available from all sources. To permit the fullest advantage to be taken of the opportunities presented, there should be USIA participation in the planning of such tours from the earliest discussion stage.

5. *Behavior and Obtrusiveness.* All agency missions should continue to report periodically upon efforts to hold their numbers to minimal operational requirements. A renewed effort should be made to reduce the size of certain of our missions abroad, particularly in countries where elements attached to the embassy are disproportionately large. The corps of inspectors of the respective agencies and special manpower survey teams from Washington or regional bases should assist in this endeavor.

The number of requests for diplomatic privileges should be held down. Representational allowances should not be used for ostentatious entertaining unrelated to the mission's purpose.

Negotiations on a World Stage

Major diplomatic conferences and negotiations now require more careful planning and preparation than ever before, in part because our adversaries commonly try to convert them into propaganda jousts.

In this area, the Committee feels that more consideration must be given to psychological factors and to their effective integration in policies and plans. The Committee also believes that greater attention must be given to mobilizing public opinion in support of our proposals.

The Committee has selected two cases in which these factors are important to illustrate the approach which it believes should become characteristic of our diplomatic practice.

A. *The United Nations*

Since the inception of the United Nations, debates in that body have dramatized major international issues and given an additional dimension to diplomacy. The UN has been important not only as a means of discussing issues and, on occasion, of settling disputes, but also as a sounding board.

The most recent session of the General Assembly has demonstrated more sharply than ever the increasing problems and opportunities presented by the UN in its varied aspects.

In the underdeveloped and emerging countries, public opinion and the mass media follow UN developments with special intensity. These countries tend to equate membership in the UN with sovereign status. The delegations they send to the UN have great but confused expecta-

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tions. Many are making their first contact with the United States and their first individual judgments between East and West.

The entry of so many new countries into the United Nations this year has, on the one hand, enlarged the opportunity for the United States to deal within the UN framework with certain peoples with whom we have hitherto had only slight historical associations, little political vocabulary in common, and only a few if any bilateral diplomatic dealings. Theoretically the treatment of the problems of these areas on a multilateral basis and through UN agencies ought to help avert the extension of the cold war to areas such as Africa.

On the other hand, the rapidly changing composition of the United Nations presents acute problems. Many of these countries are neutralist. Some associate the United States with their erstwhile colonial masters.

On certain issues, the United States will probably have increasing difficulty in holding substantial majorities. On some, it will be faced with a difficult choice between support of its allies and sympathy with the aspirations of newly independent peoples.

The Soviet Union, playing heavily on what it conceives to be the psychology of the new states, has called for a reorganization of the Secretariat and of UN bodies in what amounts to a campaign against the executive powers of the UN Secretariat. This Communist offensive actually darkens the hope of using multilateral UN action as a means of preserving the territories of the new states from cold war rivalries.

It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union has correctly interpreted the new-state psychology, whether Khrushchev's bullying tactics were well judged, and whether his bid for increased Afro-Asian representation in UN bodies has successfully masked the Soviet effort to render the UN ineffective.

Either way it is clear that the United States must be more than a match for the Soviet Union in its understanding of psychological factors at the UN—among the old as well as the new delegations—and of the use of the UN to influence the psychology of peoples and the climate of diplomatic negotiations.

U.S. representatives must be prepared for a more spontaneous, quick-breaking kind of debate. And the facilities for aiding or influencing the new, sometimes hypersensitive and hyper-exigent delegations must be imaginative, wide-ranging, and effective.

The United States should take more active and effective interest in the psychological and informational aspects of our participation in the United Nations than heretofore. Specifically, the Committee recommends:

1. For each major meeting of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and for continuing programs, operational plans related to major objectives for psychological and information activity should be developed—under the leadership of the Department of State.
2. The United States should make the fullest use of UN meetings, including those of the specialized agencies, to launch major new plans

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and proposals, and to reiterate its position on a selected few issues of continuing importance, such as its approach to economic and social development and its support for the independence and integrity of emergent states. Such occasions will be of particular importance in reaching audiences in the less-developed countries. Through such initiative, and in other ways, the United States should seek to advance its own objectives and to counter the increasing use being made by the Soviets of the propaganda opportunities offered by UN gatherings.

3. In the makeup of delegations to the United Nations and of assignment of U.S. personnel to UN affiliated organizations, careful attention should be given to the ability of the representatives to deal effectively on the psychological and informational front. Key personnel must possess a particular flair for intangibles, a broad knowledge of world affairs, a natural articulateness, adeptness at improvisation and the quick response, and a capacity to be impressive not only in intimate conversations but also in debate before a large public. Experience in international conference work and training for it should be more widespread in our services, especially the Foreign Service.

4. Greater attention should be given to UN affairs by U.S. Government information media and to dealings with the press to explain U.S. positions.

5. Far greater attention should be given to the responsibilities and opportunities of the United States as "host" to the UN. Many countries, especially the new ones, consider the position of representative to the UN one of high prestige. They, therefore, frequently appoint leading and influential personalities. The opportunity to shape the thinking of such men and to broaden their understanding of the United States during their UN assignment should be exploited systematically. As the most recent session of the General Assembly has demonstrated, the impact on the delegates from new states of their reception, housing, and general treatment is a factor of real political importance. Far more personalized attention to these persons by members of U.S. delegations (and by unofficial groups and individuals also) needs to be provided.

B. Arms control

Arms control, or disarmament, is a subject which will be with us for a very long time. The basic fears and hopes of humanity are woven into it. Actually one of the most complex of issues, it lends itself particularly to oversimplification and to propaganda manipulation.

The disarmament effort must be conducted on two levels: the laborious, intricate process of negotiation between governments, and the continuous consultation and education of public opinion so as to gain approval and support for proposals. Obviously, negotiations are affected by psychological factors not figuring in the position papers. With only a modest continuing official informational effort the United States has been reasonably successful in gaining a measure of public support for its proposals at home and abroad. This has been largely owing, however, to certain striking executive initiatives rather than to

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a sustained information program. President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, and the "Open Skies" proposal at the 1955 Summit Conference, for example, contributed greatly to the positive image of the United States as a peace-seeking nation. Moreover, these dramatic offers, even though not intrinsically disarmament proposals, have been largely responsible for conserving and even extending support for U.S. positions on disarmament.

Today the world is on the threshold of another important new era in disarmament negotiations. It is therefore timely to reexamine the adequacy of arrangements and concepts for handling the psychological aspects of these negotiations.

Specifically, the Committee recommends:

1. That the importance of psychological factors be fully recognized and considered in the formulation of plans and policies, and in the determination of U.S. positions with respect to such matters as the controlled reduction and limitation of atomic and conventional weapons and armed forces, the regulation and limitation of nuclear testing, and the lessening of the dangers of surprise attack and war by miscalculation.

2. That in the recently reorganized governmental machinery to deal with planning, negotiation and administration of an updated disarmament policy, the resources for influencing world opinion in favor of U.S. proposals be strengthened by such steps as:

- a. Maintaining continuity in the leadership of disarmament delegations, expert staffs, departmental direction and public affairs counsel. For example, since 1946 U.S. delegations to such negotiations have been led by 14 different chiefs.

- b. Assigning to the U.S. Disarmament Administration selected persons skilled in information and who are or who will become experts in the subject matter.

- c. Continuing to insure that key personnel in foreign missions, consular offices and USIA establishments are fully and currently briefed on disarmament matters and able to present not only the U.S. position but also to discuss the weaknesses of Soviet proposals.

- d. Maintaining and expanding the procedure for briefing foreign embassies and missions in Washington, at the UN and at the site of negotiations.

3. That the U.S. Government make a stronger and more timely effort in advance of negotiations to prepare a synchronized world information program to mobilize support for its position through diplomatic channels and through appropriate media. Among the practices which should be followed in effectuating such a plan would be the following:

- a. Encouraging heads of U.S. delegations to provide full and frequent background briefings for the world press.

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b. Insuring that statements by all Government officials on disarmament, or bearing on the question, are effectively coordinated, especially during a period of negotiations.

c. Renewing and expanding consultation between those responsible for U.S. disarmament efforts and academic groups, foreign affairs councils, industry, etc.

d. Paralleling efforts to reach world opinion with measures to inform American opinion, both on the sophisticated and popular levels, about disarmament issues and the implications of agreements.

e. Bringing new major proposals or developments in disarmament to world attention through speeches by the President and the Secretary of State.

Calibre of Personnel

To perform effectively the multiple tasks of modern diplomacy, our representatives abroad and at the conference table need to be equipped with an impressive number of qualifications.

Our chiefs of mission and professional diplomats not only should be good negotiators, creditable representatives and perceptive reporters but must also be alert in recognizing and cultivating the rising elements of influence and power, especially in formative societies. They should be able to organize the preparation of operational plans and provide recommendations for action. They should be fully conversant with public opinion values and techniques, and with strategic and economic as well as political factors.

To acquire and develop such professionals for the Foreign Service, the Committee recommends that the selection, training, deployment and evaluation of the members of the Foreign Service and of other agencies operating abroad should take account of the need for awareness and competence in the informational field.

The ability to use public opinion media and techniques should be sought out and developed along with the capacity for initiative, for long-range planning and for analytical writing. To accommodate the selection process to this need, appropriate changes should be made in entrance requirements and examinations. Such changes might in turn affect university curricula designed for students planning Foreign Service careers.

Because of the particular importance of achieving deep understanding among our negotiators and representatives abroad of the psychological and political problems of emerging nations, plans should be made to insure that more officers of the various foreign services have experience in new countries and underdeveloped areas.

Visitors to the U. S.

The Committee believes that better arrangements are needed for receiving and influencing both foreign dignitaries and ordinary visitors to the United States.

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At a time when comparatively large numbers of heads of fledgling nations will be making their first state visits to the United States as well as to Sino-Soviet capitals, the question of protocol and reception of such dignitaries should be considered a matter of high political significance. It does not seem fitting for the United States to have to rely so extensively for support of this activity upon unvouchered funds. Additional funds should be appropriated for protocol and official hospitality. At the same time, ways should be found to make the burdens on the time of our top officials more tolerable. To the extent possible, efforts to provide imagination, sensitivity and some pageantry in the reception of chiefs of state and high-level dignitaries should be stimulated. The utility of consultative citizens' committees should be considered for this purpose.

Because of the importance to international understanding of the impressions of ordinary visitors to our shores—tourists, businessmen, students—measures should also be taken to improve their reception at ports of entry. Although somewhat lightened and humanized in recent years, the procedures of our various port authorities remain more rigorous than those in most other countries. This is because of health, security, fiscal and statutory reasons. We suggest, however, that the sensitivities and reactions of the foreign visitors, whose image of America is sharply affected by their arrival experiences, be given greater weight in determining the methods, manners and procedures of our receiving officials.

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Chapter VI

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF PRIVATE PERSONS
AND ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF THE MASS MEDIA

A society like that of the United States—huge, vigorous and open—pours forth upon the world a constant flood of influences affecting foreign opinion. In mass, the greater part by far results from the private and voluntary activity of individuals and organizations. Tourists, persons with friends and relatives abroad, business firms, religious groups, scientific bodies and countless others contribute to this interflow. Vast already, these relationships and activities in an era of improving transportation and communication are likely to increase in scale still further.

The free and uninhibited contact of an open society with the rest of the world contrasts sharply with that of a totalitarian system like the Soviet. There the population is sealed off from uncontrolled influences, and the trickle of permitted intercourse is planned and policed. Nor should the existence of a multitude of international cultural, professional and "friendship" groups sponsored by the Soviet Government be confused with associations of a private and voluntary character. The former are working parts of the apparatus of the Soviet Government, reflections of the total mobilization of the life of a nation for political purposes.

This situation has led some persons to feel that the U.S. Government should begin more vigorously and extensively to stimulate and coordinate private international activities as an adjunct to official policies and programs.

The Committee believes that private activities abroad, in addition to their primary and direct value in economic, cultural and personal terms, have importance in a generalized way to the world's image of America and that they contribute significantly to international understanding—and misunderstanding. We also feel that certain steps, discussed elsewhere in this document, should be taken to counter the use being made by the Soviets of their various "front" organizations.

However, it is quite possible to have too much governmental initiative in this field. If enough resources were applied to achieve the goal of making every American an amateur diplomat, as some enthusiasts advocate, the results could be damaging rather than helpful in creating an attractive image of our voluntary and pluralistic society.

The Committee therefore has this reservation with regard to any wholesale effort to "mobilize" private international activities: however voluminous they are or may become, they do not offer a substitute for sustained and systematic informational activity by the Government. A great part of private activity is marginal or at most indirect in its relevance to the issues and objectives of foreign policy. It is not focused

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on areas or individuals of political importance. Indeed, private activity tends naturally to be concentrated upon those countries and elements with which we have the closest ties and greatest familiarity. It is of fundamental value in the endless and unlimited process of the international exchange of information and ideas. But this is not to be confused with the need for steady, concentrated efforts by the Government to advance its political objectives through psychological and informational means. In stimulating private activity, therefore, a highly selective approach is necessary.

People-to-People Program

With governmental support through USIA, this program has succeeded in engaging the interest of numerous American communities, professions and groups in developing activities and contacts abroad. On a selective basis these activities can be profitably expanded. But in this as in other areas of voluntary effort the possible gains in terms of governmental objectives must be weighed carefully against the probable cost in terms of time, effort and resources. The Committee therefore recommends that the Government limit its efforts to expand or to achieve greater focus of People-to-People activities to those which affect audiences of special significance politically, or which are influential in strategic geographical areas, and which would not take place without governmental exertion.

These same criteria should apply to governmental efforts in regard to private activities generally, whether or not they are part of the formal People-to-People program. The Committee will comment on five areas of such activity: business and labor organizations, universities, private foundations, and international sporting competition.

Business Firms Abroad

The need exists for foreign private investment abroad to supplement foreign aid programs. But the climate of opinion for foreign investment is deteriorating in many areas where the need is greatest. Even in countries where official policy is to attract them, American business firms may be subject to suspicion and hostile criticism both on an official and nonofficial level.

This is due in part to Communist propaganda and to deep-running currents of Marxist thought; in part it is a heritage of earlier days when charges of political interference and exploitation had a basis in fact. In those countries where one or a few American firms dominate the economy, their visibility if nothing else has made them a favorite target of extremist leaders riding the new wave of nationalism.

The situation presents a triple task: hastening the trend now evident among some U.S. companies to adapt their policies and practices to new political and social requirements; countering pervasive misunderstanding of the U.S. economic system and skepticism about its relevance to the development problems of emergent areas; and building an atmosphere in foreign areas conducive to the inflow of private development capital.

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Accomplishment of these tasks depends on determined effort by business and government. The necessary business associations exist—such as the Business Council for International Understanding and the International Chamber of Commerce—to give leadership; they have already undertaken some activities in this field. Individual firms are commendably beginning to face their responsibilities for good corporate citizenship abroad. Such progress must continue at an accelerated rate. The organization in some countries of councils of American and local businessmen to discuss common problems is an encouraging development which might be copied elsewhere. More companies should develop community relations programs abroad as they do at home.

Governmental information efforts, especially those directed at key government, labor and intellectual leaders, can be helpful in checking the growth of adverse attitudes. There should be more vigorous governmental efforts to encourage the best practices by U.S. firms, as well as to assist them in supporting their legitimate claims. A clearer understanding of the Government's objectives and policies will make U.S. businessmen abroad more aware of their personal responsibilities as Americans and better able to mesh their own activities with the broader national interest.

A general requirement will be continued close cooperation and consultation between the U.S. Government and U.S. business officials, both in Washington and abroad. The State Department's present program to improve the selection and increase the number of commercial attaches in our embassies abroad should be continued.

Labor Organizations

Increasingly labor organizations must play a significant part in international political developments. The international Communist movement has committed major resources to capture organized labor and to use it for political purposes. In certain areas, such as Latin America, the dangers on this front are ominous. The United States should give high priority to selected operations directed at this problem.

U.S. labor organizations provide a uniquely acceptable channel of communication with their counterparts abroad. They can be far more effective than direct governmental intervention in strengthening foreign union organization and in influencing labor attitudes. In response to the need, U.S. labor has become increasingly involved in world affairs. Whether their response has been adequate to the challenge is a matter of some dispute, but in any event what the various organizations have done in countering the spread of Communism in labor organizations abroad is to be commended.

Government obviously cannot and should not become involved in supporting all the foreign activities of U.S. labor organizations. But in certain countries efforts by American unions alone will not be adequate. The Committee approves of Government support for effective international work by free trade unions in combating the Communist drive to take over the leadership of organized labor in the Free World.

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One factor which inhibits the international activity of U.S. trade unions has been the shortage of qualified personnel prepared to go abroad. The Committee recommends that the various branches of the Government involved in foreign labor matters join in a fresh effort to develop feasible plans for alleviating this problem. Training programs to increase the competence of trade unionists in international affairs are one basic requirement.

U.S. representatives abroad should give increasing attention to contacts with foreign union leadership and to the development of their competence in this important field of economic and political action. The further expansion of the system of labor attaches would be particularly valuable in this respect.

Universities

As world affairs become more important to the nation, and as our international involvements increase, the demands upon our universities for training, research and operational support for governmental programs likewise necessarily grow. Our universities since World War II have devoted steadily increasing attention to research on foreign problems and to training American students in international affairs. They have been faced with severe difficulties in trying to provide for the special needs of the 50,000 foreign students who now study in this country. Although some have done a great deal in this regard, much more attention to this problem is required.

Economic development and technical assistance programs of the Government are placing a heavy strain on universities by drawing upon their specialized experience and personnel in connection with foreign projects. A special study group, the privately-sponsored Committee on the University in World Affairs, is already at work on the general problem of university relationships with the U.S. Government as well as with universities and other institutions abroad.

This Committee feels that it would be highly desirable to clarify and strengthen the role of a single agency of the Government to deal with universities on the over-all and long-range policy questions presented by the requirements of the various governmental agencies working abroad. This office should presumably be that of the State Department's Bureau of International Cultural Relations, which has already taken commendable initiative in stimulating discussion and gathering basic information. Likewise, it would seem desirable for the universities themselves to bring into existence a permanent council to deal with fundamental problems of government-university relations.

Private Foundations

The international activities of private foundations provide an important and independent channel of American communication with influential scientific, cultural and academic leaders abroad. In some countries, the contribution of the foundations to international relations and to economic, social and educational development has been outstanding.

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However, not enough foundations have extended their work to international problems, and those which have need encouragement to go further. The Committee believes that foundations can make no more vital contribution to the national welfare than by selected activity abroad in their fields of special competence, and it urges the trustees of all foundations not barred by charter or other legal inhibitions to consider seriously such activity.

As governmental development programs touch broader fields of science and education, the possibility of overlap with foundation projects increases. For this reason, effective communication and consultation between the Government and the foundations working overseas is increasingly important. The significance of foundation activity can also be increased thereby, for an examination of the geographical and subject matter emphasis of foundation projects abroad reveals important gaps as seen from the perspective of the Government.

The independence of action of foundations is to be valued and protected. However, the Committee recommends that periodic, informal consultations be arranged between top officials in the Government and senior officers of those foundations with major overseas operations. In preparation for such gatherings, the governmental participants should have the benefit of careful and detailed analyses of the pattern of foreign projects of the foundation or foundations represented. On this basis, discussion can be centered on concrete problems, and the outcome can be a beneficial form of constructive influence without unacceptable pressure.

International Sporting Competition

The recent Olympic Games have aroused considerable public discussion about the political and psychological implications of such contests between athletes from the various Free World and Communist nations. The Soviet Union obviously attaches considerable propaganda importance to these events as a means of projecting an image of its dynamism and progress. It spends large resources and marshals hundreds of thousands of its youth to dedicate themselves at governmental expense to becoming international sporting champions. It heralds its triumphs as proof that the Soviet system represents the wave of the future.

The Committee believes that Soviet victories in international sporting competition do have propaganda value, particularly with younger people in many countries and with those not ordinarily concerned with international political issues. Free World efforts to remove factors of national prestige and ideological significance from international athletic competition are not likely to succeed in the foreseeable future.

The problem does not justify any fundamental departure from the established American practice of participating in the Olympic Games on a private and amateur basis. However, it does serve to underscore the great importance to our standing abroad of the work of the President's Committee on Youth Fitness and the role of the armed forces as a leader in the physical development of our youth. It would seem worthwhile if many of our institutions, including our schools, were to encourage development of greater skills in gymnastics and other ath-

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letic events in which the United States demonstrated weaknesses during the recent Olympics. Government assistance is desirable to facilitate transportation of outstanding American athletes to enable them to participate in sporting events abroad.

The U.S. Government has assisted many small nations in the improvement of their sporting activities through exchanges of athletes and physical training teachers. This program has had considerable impact and should be continued.

THE MASS MEDIA

The freedom and independence of U.S. mass media are rooted in basic principles of our democracy. These private commercial enterprises are, however, clothed with a public interest. Their special interest to this Committee derives obviously from their direct influence upon the international flow of information, ideas and news, and thereby upon foreign opinion and international relations.

The News Media

The international network of the news media provides the means by which the world obtains its daily account of events. Insofar as it can be assumed that policies and actions of governments are "automatically" transmitted to the world without special governmental information effort, it is due largely to the functioning of this news system. Because the parts of the system form elements of an inter-related whole, it must be analyzed on a world-wide basis.

Two main problems which it presents are:

1. The needs of the less-developed areas in building up the competence and objectivity of their media as literacy and the interest in political developments of their populations grow.
2. The obstacles which exist to the international flow of news, particularly between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World, but also within the Free World areas.

The Committee is keenly aware of the essentiality of preventing inappropriate governmental interference with the traditional rights of a free press. However, we feel that there are four kinds of actions which governmental and private elements, separately and together, can properly and usefully consider.

The Committee recommends:

1. Under the leadership of the Department of State, that all U.S. Government agencies increase their efforts to arrange assistance for foreign correspondents in this country to report more fully on developments and that correspondents be helped, through provision of travel and other facilities, to develop a fuller understanding of our institutions and principles; and that private organizations and corporations be encouraged to do likewise.
2. That the United States continue to provide to the world an example of freedom in access to and the transmission of news, and that it demonstrate vigorous interest in promoting the rights of the news

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media to freedom of travel for correspondents and freedom from censorship. It should continue to give the most vigorous support to the UN Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information.

3. That there be parallel efforts by private media, by professional journalistic bodies, by private foundations, and by the Government, to help strengthen the news media in the less-developed areas, to develop standards of journalistic objectivity, to improve the quality of personnel, and to increase contacts between editors, broadcasters and correspondents of various Free World countries.

4. That a standing interagency group be created to plan and guide a continuing effort to expose and condemn the Soviet blockade of the free flow of news, and to break down gradually the dangerous practices of censorship, jamming, and controls which are now followed. This complex problem can at best be ameliorated gradually. But by drawing attention repeatedly to flagrant examples of unequal treatment of events by Soviet and Free World media, by offers of reciprocity of radio and television programs from time to time, and by other measures, useful pressures for improvement can be generated.

Motion Pictures

American entertainment films are enormously popular throughout the world, being seen weekly by some 150,000,000 foreign viewers. Their effects upon the image of the United States are a matter of long-standing debate. The Committee is aware of the great concern of a number of responsible persons in the Government and outside about the impact abroad of some of the poor productions. However, the Committee is not prepared to recommend governmental sanctions or control. The present voluntary arrangements between the Government and the film industry appear to have worked reasonably well, at least in modifying some types of objectionable material while films are still in the production stage. The difficulties and dangers which would be involved in going beyond such arrangements do not seem justified in terms of the probable gains to be realized. Present cooperative arrangements should be strengthened where possible and the situation kept under review.

Television

The rapidly growing export of American television programs presents some of the same problems as the export of motion picture films. In addition, special needs and opportunities are presented because of the rapid spread of television broadcasting to the less-developed countries and because technological progress has now made international television broadcasting a practical possibility. A dozen emergent countries are expected to inaugurate television broadcasting in 1960-61 and some 20 more in 1961-62. Their primary interest will be in utilizing such facilities for education and for national political, economic and social purposes, not for entertainment.

The Committee recommends:

1. That there be developed a coordinated, Government-wide policy to guide and extend U.S. participation in the future overseas expansion of television.

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2. That consideration be given to the expansion of present efforts to assist underdeveloped countries in their television development, particularly by providing programing materials and technical engineering assistance.

3. That under the leadership of the State Department steps be taken now to develop policies to clarify the roles of the U.S. Government and private broadcasters in international telecasting and to plan international proposals for frequency allocation which would prevent chaos on the international airwaves once international telecasting begins.

Books and Publications

In terms of U.S. national objectives, a most pervasive, powerful and constructive influence is that exerted by U.S. books and periodicals distributed abroad. In a time of new technical marvels of communication, the fundamental importance of the printed page in the transmission of information and ideas is sometimes overlooked. Since World War II the volume of U.S. books exported abroad has increased tenfold. It would be valuable, however, to facilitate the circulation of U.S. and other useful publications in those countries and among those groups abroad where for a variety of economic and other reasons their availability is still sharply restricted.

The Government should continue to play a twofold role in this field: to stimulate and facilitate private and commercial distribution of publications; and, where commercial publication or distribution is infeasible, to carry on supplementary activities of its own. Since several agencies are now operating in this field, it is important that their activity be effectively coordinated.

The Committee recommends the continuation of the Informational Media Guarantee program and, where feasible, its extension to cover those areas where the shortage of dollar exchange continues to be a serious hindrance.

Chapter VII

ORGANIZATION, COORDINATION AND REVIEW

In the preceding chapters, the Committee has urged greater and more consistent awareness and consideration of the psychological factors involved in the international actions of our Government. It has also stressed the importance of greater coordination among the departments and agencies in the planning and execution of policies and programs having an impact abroad.

Accordingly the Committee has certain recommendations to make regarding: (1) organizational steps to be taken within governmental agencies to assure attention to psychological factors; (2) the role of the Operations Coordinating Board in psychological and informational matters; and (3) the need for periodic review of such activities.

Organizational Steps Within Departments and Agencies

Ideally all officials dealing with matters which have impact abroad should take account of psychological factors in their planning and decision making. But since what is everybody's business often turns out to be nobody's business, the Committee feels that within the appropriate departments and agencies consideration should be given to adopting those organizational measures which will insure that psychological aspects of policy are, in fact, consciously and fully considered.

The Departments of State and Defense have already moved in this direction. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and the public affairs advisers attached to the several geographical bureaus have been increasingly concerned with psychological factors in our foreign policy. Thus personnel familiar with informational techniques and foreign public opinion are increasingly involved in the decision-making process. However, there appears to be a need for further improving their regular and effective involvement in major policy problems. This cannot be accomplished by fiat; it will depend on growing confidence throughout the Department in the political judgment as well as the specialized advice of public affairs personnel.

In the Defense establishment the device of "collateral activities committees" has been developed. These have made a useful contribution, including improving the psychological side-effects of military programs. The Defense Department should be encouraged to continue its efforts to go beyond the "collateral" concept and insure adequate consideration of psychological factors in substantive decisions.

In fiscal, economic assistance, science and other departments and agencies whose activities have major impact on foreign opinion, the need exists for initial organizational steps or assignment of responsibility to assure the integration of psychological considerations in policy formulation.

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The Committee recommends that the President reaffirm to all departments and agencies the importance of adequately considering psychological factors in the formulation of policies and the execution of programs which have an impact on foreign opinion; that he request the Departments of State and Defense to continue and reinforce the efforts already made to this end; and that he ask the heads of other departments and agencies to take whatever organizational or procedural steps may be necessary in this connection, leaving to their discretion the determination of the particular methods to be used.

The Role of the OCB in Psychological and Informational Matters

The coordination of information activities in the general structure of the U.S. Government is a formidable problem. They are conducted by a number of different departments and agencies and they are both diverse in character and substantial in scale. Even more complex is the task of integrating psychological factors in the substantive programs of the Government affecting foreign opinion.

The creation of the Operations Coordinating Board in September 1953 represented a major step forward in improving the effectiveness of U.S. psychological and informational activities. Although the activities of the Board have been the subject of continuing debate, there can be no question that it has performed and continues to perform a number of vital functions in the coordination of information activities and the integration of psychological factors in substantive programs of the Government.

The weekly executive sessions of the Board provide its members with a unique and high-level mechanism in the Government for the expeditious and effective handling of a whole spectrum of interagency matters including those related to the climate of world opinion. Its working groups and committees carry on part of the continuing task of interagency coordination of information programs. Most important, the OCB is a point high in the governmental structure where security programs and policies are considered in relation to their psychological as well as other aspects.

In the judgment of the Committee it is essential that, whatever changes may be made in national policy machinery, the functions now performed by OCB continue to be provided for.

We believe that the most effective means for insuring the continuation of these functions, particularly those related to psychological and informational matters, is through the continued existence of the OCB.

If the OCB did not exist, it would have to be invented; its creation was the logical outgrowth of the increase in U.S. information activities up to 1953 as well as of the growing importance of public opinion and communications in foreign affairs.

Furthermore, we believe that the OCB should not only be continued but that its potentialities should be more fully recognized and realized. There are certain specific measures which, if taken, would enhance the effectiveness of the present organization without giving the OCB powers incompatible with the responsibilities and prerogatives of the various executive departments and offices.

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Continuing strong Presidential interest in making the OCB effective is the crux of the matter. It is especially important that the President make clear to the individual members of the Board that he expects them to see that matters agreed upon by the Board in the implementation of policy are dealt with effectively in their respective departments and agencies.

Raising the level of representation on certain of the OCB committees and working groups would also be desirable.

Since one of the OCB's most important functions is to assure the coordinated execution of governmental policies and programs in the informational fields, special attention should be given to increasing its effectiveness in this respect. To help achieve this objective, the OCB should not only continue to identify agency operational responsibilities, but should also stimulate and coordinate planning at the various levels. This requires greater attention to anticipating major opportunities and problems, identifying the requirements for trained personnel and physical facilities on the scale and at the time needed to deal with upcoming situations, and mobilizing all the informational assets of the Government in support of national objectives. The OCB should also play a primary role in formulating and establishing over-all themes around which to build sustained action and information efforts.

At the country team level, all elements—political, military, economic and informational—under the active leadership of the ambassador, should develop a detailed operating plan in support of the OCB country plan. This should be a fully integrated plan in all aspects, including the psychological, and should point up the practical contributions which each element of the team will make toward reaching stated objectives.

The Committee believes that it is important to achieve program evaluations of a more objective and critical character than has been the case in the past. There is some question whether such evaluations, given the understandable concerns and perspectives of operating agency representatives, can be most effectively accomplished through the committee approach. Nevertheless this Committee firmly believes that the responsibility rests with the Board itself, and that the Board members should give greater attention to meeting it.

The problem of dealing with the increasingly effective activities of the Communist apparatus continues to present a very important double need for constantly improved operational planning. One aspect of the problem is to expand our influence on the people and governments of the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The second aspect is to counter the world-wide efforts of the Communist system outside its own orbit. These problems are sufficiently urgent to warrant the continuous effort of our best talent.

In the areas of foreign educational development, exchange of persons, English language teaching, exhibits and trade fairs, and radio and television, there is need for increased integration and coordination of current efforts.

We believe that the OCB should address itself to the specific means by which these various requirements can best be met. One device would

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be the establishment of additional interagency mechanisms under the OCB.

Recently an OCB committee was established to assure that new scientific developments are presented abroad in such a way as to contribute to the image of U. S. achievement. The charter of this committee might be broadened to provide a means of considering how psychological factors can be integrated into governmental scientific and technological programs.

Periodic Over-all Review of Information Activities

Since World War II, two committees have been appointed by the President to examine the field of governmental information activities abroad. The predecessor to this Committee concluded its work in June 1953.

During the past seven years the Communist threat has assumed an immediacy and reality far beyond its previous dimensions. This has created a whole new range of problems in the informational field which will continue to multiply in the decade ahead. The Committee therefore believes that more frequent independent reviews of the over-all balance, interrelations and effectiveness of U.S. information activities is desirable, perhaps not less than once every three years.

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Appendix I

SUPPLEMENTARY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following supplementary recommendations have the general approval of the Committee. They have not been reviewed in as much detail as the foregoing chapters and their exact language is not specifically endorsed by each of the Committee members.

The recommendations are presented in the same order as the corresponding material in the foregoing chapters. There are no supplementary recommendations for Chapters I, V and VII.

Chapter II

WESTERN EUROPE

1. The strong desire within Western Europe for relaxation of cold war tensions has been manifested in considerable neutralist feeling and some support for the idea that Europe should be a "third force" between the U. S. and the USSR. Our main informational problem in Western Europe will be to maintain European firmness against Soviet threats and blandishments, in an environment of increasing apathy, cold war weariness, and preoccupation with material well being.

Recommendation:

Our information efforts should be directed toward reinforcing the image of Western Europe as a part of a closely knit Atlantic Community and undercutting the idea of Europe as a possibly neutral center of world power.

2. Due to the sensitivities of European NATO powers concerning informational programs, NATO information programs have not made as significant a contribution as might have been anticipated in building European public support for NATO nor in overcoming misunderstanding or suspicion of NATO in non-NATO Free World countries.

Recommendation:

Our allies should be encouraged to strengthen their national information programs supporting NATO. We should also encourage fuller coverage of NATO by European media, and urge that NATO members accept an expanded NATO information program.

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SOVIET BLOC (Excluding Communist China)

3. We have not sufficiently exploited the potential offered by exhibits within the Soviet Bloc. Exhibits have a unique importance in this area. Often this is the only means of direct approach to the general public which the Communist governments have shown a willingness to open to us. The person-to-person approach afforded by the use of American guides and the display of real objects, which exhibits permit, have the further advantage of enhancing credibility where this has been deliberately undermined by Communist propaganda.

Recommendations:

a. Adequate funds should be provided for the three exhibits in the USSR which are currently being negotiated, for the use of these exhibits in Poland, for three exhibits in Rumania, also being negotiated, and for participation in the Plovdiv, Bulgaria, Fair in 1962.

b. The U. S. Government should take the initiative in proposing further exhibit exchanges with the Soviet Bloc.

4. There are additional opportunities for contact with Bloc peoples which we should exploit.

Recommendations:

a. Special radio and TV programs should be prepared for exchange with the USSR and possibly some of the satellites.

b. Mailing operations and person-to-person publication programs should be expanded.

c. Additional contacts should be developed with Bloc visitors to Western Europe and other areas.

d. Our resources for obtaining the maximum value from Bloc visits to the United States and from American visits to the Bloc should be improved. This will involve recruiting and training of Americans to deal with Soviet Bloc visitors as well as to brief and debrief American visitors to the Bloc.

e. Language teachers and language experts should be selected, trained and sent to the USSR, as required by a provision in the exchanges agreement advanced by the U. S. and accepted by the USSR.

f. Under the President's Special International Program, at least one major cultural attraction and several other attractions should be provided for Eastern Europe each year.

5. The development of the East-West contacts program has been a significant step forward toward greater contacts with people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It is understood that the current judgment of the responsible Government officials is that the United States derives a net advantage from this program. It is important that the programs be conducted in such a manner as to maintain this advantage.

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Recommendation:

The East-West contacts program should be reviewed periodically to determine whether or not the United States continues to derive a net advantage.

6. Since one of our objectives should be to maximize free contacts and communication between all peoples, avoiding the cumbersome and undesirable formalities of governmental agreements, we should resort to governmental exchange agreements only when essential for such purposes as breaking through the Soviet curtain.

Recommendations:

a. In reciprocal exchange agreements provision should continue to be made for additional exchanges and contacts beyond those specified in the agreements.

b. When feasible, we should shift from agreements to normal free communications between peoples and make this ultimate objective clearly known to all.

c. Our insistence on reciprocity should be limited to exchanges involving technical intelligence and cases where reciprocity will force more openness by the Communists.

7. Many of the Soviet educational leaders and university students are eager for more contact with the outside world and resent restrictions on foreign travel. Extending Government invitations to students in the Bloc for study in the United States, even if these offers are rejected or whittled down, would contribute to the ferment which may lead to more evolutionary changes in the Bloc.

Recommendation:

At an appropriate time, perhaps in connection with a concentrated psychological effort on the "openness" theme, the Government should extend invitations for an expanded number of Soviet leaders and students to study in the United States.

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Recommendation:

The Government should reconsider the question of the proper means of supporting deserving exiles from the Soviet Bloc who cannot be integrated into the economies of the United States or Western Europe in a normal way.

COMMUNIST CHINA

9. There are two measures which might put the United States in a better position to increase its informational and psychological impact upon the people of Red China.

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Recommendations:

a. More language-area specialists in Chinese affairs and Sino-Soviet relations should be trained.

b. The Radio Broadcast Policy Committee should study the effectiveness of current U. S. and allied radio broadcasts, including content, audience potential and impact, availability of receivers, signal strength, coverage and jamming, with a view to strengthening our radio broadcasts to this area.

UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

10. In many of the less-developed countries there is a need for trained specialists in such fields as administration, education including English language teaching, public health and other technical areas. This is particularly true in Africa where the departure of European specialists will create many vacancies. It would be advantageous to the United States if a significant proportion of these positions were filled by Americans or American-trained personnel. There would appear to be a considerable reservoir of the required skills among American retired teachers, military personnel and civil servants who might fill this need either as U. S. Government employees, as employees of foreign governments or of private enterprise.

Recommendations:

a. Appropriate agencies of the Government should compile information on the needs for technical personnel in the various underdeveloped countries. The information obtained should be made available both to Government agencies and private organizations.

b. A survey should be made to determine the number of retired American personnel qualified and available to fill these needs. If the potential is sufficiently large, programs should be established to channel the talent into useful overseas activities, and action should be initiated to remove administrative and legislative obstacles to their employment.

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AFRICA

12. We do not want to encourage an arms race in Africa. But we know that these countries will insist on having some sort of security forces and may turn to the Communists if the Western nations do not help them. Furthermore it is highly probable that the military in these nations will become a major political power element.

Recommendation:

We should seek to influence the development of African internal security forces along lines that will contribute to political stability, economic viability and social improvement and which will create sympathy with Western objectives and policies.

13. In many areas of Africa local communications media are in a rudimentary state of development and thus offer us an excellent opportunity to assist and influence their growth along democratic lines.

Recommendation:

should consider a coordinated, long-range program to assist and influence the development of effective African communications media, such as TV, radio and the press. The program should include, where appropriate, assistance in obtaining communications equipment, training communications personnel, cultivating broadcasters and journalists and encouraging Africans to join non-Communist organizations of journalists, broadcasters, etc.

ASIA

14. We have a continuing problem in countering the massive influence of Communist China on the bordering countries in Asia. This problem is largely the result of the growing strength of Red China and the USSR, Asian belief that some accommodation with the Communist system is inevitable, and effective action by local Communists in manipulating the neutralism and political-social revolutions in Asia.

Recommendations:

- a. American studies programs in Asian universities should be expanded.
- b. The educational, training, cultural and research activities of SEATO should be exploited.
- c. There should be an increase in programs to communicate our scientific and technical knowledge and achievements to Asians, particularly to the Japanese and Indian scientific elites. This should include exploitation of opportunities such as those offered by the Pacific Science Congress scheduled for the summer of 1961 in Hawaii.

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d. The geographical and cultural position of Hawaii should be utilized more fully in fostering Asian-U. S. relations. We note with satisfaction the creation of the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West in Hawaii and recommend the continuation of efforts to develop this into a first-rate institution.

LATIN AMERICA

15. Although there remains a reservoir of good will towards the United States in Latin America growing anti-American sentiment in the area demands our increased attention. The partially successful efforts of the Communists to encourage this sentiment have received a powerful boost through the collaboration of the Castro apparatus. Both of these forces are making major increases in their propaganda activities throughout this area.

Recommendations:

a. There should be an increase in existing programs designed to neutralize Communist penetration of the press, radio, and television in Latin America, and to expose the Castro-Communist conspiracy to revolutionize the area and deliver it to international Communism.

b. We should seek to convince the traditional vested interests of Latin America that their very survival depends on prompt political, social, and economic reforms to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people, many of whom feel that they have no stake in present regimes.

c. There should be further exploitation of the opportunities afforded by our military missions in the areas to develop the military of these countries as positive factors for political stability, social improvement and economic viability.

d. We should make greater use of the Puerto Rican example in our informational programs and consider the creation of a North-South cultural center there along the lines of that being developed in Hawaii.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF INFORMATION PROGRAMS

16. The tying of appropriations to specific years often creates obstacles to the effective execution of information programs. The difficulties imposed by this practice have already been recognized in the budgeting of funds for the President's Special International Program, which is funded through no-year appropriations. However, annual budgeting continues to reduce the effectiveness of our exchange of persons activities in that it forces administrators to fill annual quotas with second-choice candidates in numerous instances in which the high-priority nominees changed their plans late in the fiscal year.

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Recommendation:

Congress should be requested to provide no-year appropriations for exchange of persons programs so that quotas could be filled by the best candidates.

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RESEARCH


21. Research in the separate agencies concerned with psychological and informational programs tends to be carried out with insufficient consideration of what other agencies are doing. There is no broad plan covering the needs of management in these agencies for research to aid in the planning and evaluation of their programs. A coordinated plan for research might avoid duplication and provide the basis for a division of research effort among these agencies; the lack of such a plan has contributed to large gaps in the knowledge required by the program planners and operators. The clearing house for Government research recently established by the NSC should help to correct these deficiencies.

Recommendations:

a. Coordination of the planning of Government research in the psychological and informational fields should be improved.

b. There should be better pooling and coordination of research findings among Government agencies in order to improve the use of present knowledge, avoid duplication, and locate gaps in coverage.

c. Planning and execution of Government studies involving interviews with foreign nationals should be coordinated. (For



sary on a reimbursable basis.

d. The experience of the NSC research clearing house should be reviewed at an early date to see whether its responsibilities should be expanded.

THEMES

22. To win the contest for men's minds, our national statements and actions must appeal to at least five fundamental needs of most nations and individuals: *peace, security, dignity, independence and progress.*

Recommendation:

The following concepts should be considered as possible themes around which Government action and information programs could be built or as general principles under which specific themes could be developed:

(1) *Strength.* Our national military, scientific, economic and social strength must be beyond doubt. Otherwise the Bloc will exert a magnetic attraction on those nations and individuals who might shift their support merely out of fear or in anticipation of privilege or favor.

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(2) *Striving for Peace.* The issue of human survival increasingly dominates the thoughts of people everywhere. We are being carefully judged all over the world in terms of the understanding people have of our policies and actions relating to peace, including our military activities, dispositions and pronouncements, our disarmament policies and our behavior in the UN.

(3) *Openness.* We have barely begun to capitalize on one of our greatest strengths, our open society. We should convince the world of the danger to peace inherent in systems dependent on concealment and the basic weakness of nations which fear the free movement, thought and voice of their own peoples. Actions supporting the openness idea may be the single best way to influence developments in our favor within the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(4) *International Pluralism.* Our concept of a pluralistic society is not just domestic, it is also international. We do not have a blueprint which we seek to impose on other societies. We must make this clear to emerging peoples, who find it hard to dissociate us from the past behavior of some of our allies, from the motivations of the Bloc, and perhaps from some of our own past actions. Our sympathy and support for the independence and self-determination of the developing nations cannot be assumed but must be demonstrated in imaginative actions as well as words.

(5) *Rule of Law.* By our actions and stated goals we must show the world the practical possibility of an alternative to the precarious balance of terror, or to world-wide monolithic tyranny. We must lead in strengthening the international institutions which can increasingly take on the burden of keeping the peace.

(6) *Freedom.* We can do much to extend the powerful influence on the minds of men in many lands of our revolutionary traditions of national independence and individual freedom. We should make it clear, with the help of our Free World partners and even the more advanced of the emerging nations, that no country need go backward politically in order to go forward socially and economically and that totalitarianism is not essential to industrialization and social welfare.

(7) *Progress and Change.* We must demonstrate to those in the newly developing countries eager for progress our sympathies with their aspirations. Throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America we must demonstrate that our revolutionary principles have not been forgotten, that we do not cling to the status quo, that we are eager to help nations toward political, economic and social advancement, and that the principles on which our free society is based are far more forward-looking than the outdated dogmas which the leaders of the Sino-Soviet

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Bloc want to foist upon the world. We should make every effort to reach the younger and freer spirits behind the Iron Curtain with fresh ideas which affect the arts and sciences and the thought and action of those who live in open societies. These ideas can exert a tremendous pull on those who may one day hold key positions in the Bloc countries.

(8) *Truth.* As a corollary to openness, we must demonstrate our devotion to truth. Our dedication to truth is proved by our openness, under which ideas can be debated in freedom. We must show that in natural and social sciences, in history, philosophy and the arts, we believe, unlike the Communist world, that the test is truth and not dogma. Through VOA we can help establish ourselves as a source of truth on current affairs and all other spheres of knowledge. By helping to speed up the education of foreign peoples in that vast body of knowledge which is the heritage of our civilization, we can show that our type of education does not seek to suppress alternative ideas by force but seeks to determine truth.

(9) *Service to Humanity.* Our economic, medical and educational aid programs may serve sometimes as useful themes for sustained efforts combining action and information. We can focus attention both on our own bilateral activities, and on UN operations to which we contribute and which are perhaps more acceptable to some peoples. By demonstrating through our actions genuine concern for the welfare of individuals, we can gain greater understanding from those who judge nations by spiritual and humanitarian criteria.

RADIO

23. The allocation of functions among official and unofficial stations is logical: The Voice of America deals primarily with the American scene; Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Radio in the American Sector of Berlin concern themselves mainly with European and Bloc developments and give more emphasis to a European point of view.

Recommendation:

The missions of official and unofficial Government radio stations should be periodically re-examined in the light of political and technical developments.

24. VOA should be the official radio presenting the policies of our Government to foreign audiences clearly and persuasively. Its broadcasts should present a balanced and comprehensive picture of American society, thought and institutions. VOA should build its credibility through consistently reliable, accurate, objective presentation of the news. It is recognized that editorial leeway in reporting discussion will, from time to time, be useful for supporting foreign policy objectives of the Government.

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Recommendation:

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[redacted] the relevant interdepartmental mechanisms should keep under review the possibility of stepping up these broadcasts, [redacted] should be free to expand them if necessary after appropriate policy decision. 25X1
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OVERSEAS EXHIBITS AND TRADE FAIRS

32. During the past few years exhibit and trade fair activities have become increasingly important throughout the world as an instrument of foreign relations. Where the international fair was once considered primarily a device to promote international trade, it is now a useful forum for exchange and competition of ideas and techniques, especially in the Bloc and in the newly developing countries. Sino-Soviet Bloc exploitation of the exhibit medium was greater in 1959 than ever before. Although the Bloc participated in a number of Western European fairs, it was most active in the less developed and newly independent countries. The increasing number of its exhibits would seem to indicate the Bloc's conviction that such exhibits have major impact. The lack of sufficient funds to meet the growing demand for U. S. exhibits and participation in international fairs has prevented us from meeting this challenge and exploiting new opportunities. These activities, which often depend on foreign invitations, require contingency funds to permit effective participation in cases where the timing of the invitation precludes use of the normal or even supplemental budgetary processes.

Recommendations:

- a. The Government should prepare a comprehensive policy statement on overseas exhibits, emphasizing their psychological and informational objectives.
- b. Increased appropriations should be provided for exhibits and U. S. participation in trade fairs, including contingency funds for these activities.

33. There should be a systematic evaluation of our overseas exhibit program, including measuring our total efforts against Soviet Bloc activities in this field. The appraisal must include all U. S. efforts and should, therefore, be developed at the interagency level.

Recommendation:

The Operations Coordinating Board should evaluate systematically overseas exhibits programs, with particular emphasis on our ability to meet the challenge of Soviet Bloc activities.

34. Exhibits, even small ones, are a focus around which general information campaigns can be built and which generate automatically a great volume of local attention, publicity and discussions. Major exhibits provide a vast audience for appearances and addresses by top level U.S. officials.

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Recommendation:

In the planning of large exhibits consideration should be given to their possible value as a stage setting for visits by high officials or for the announcement of new programs.

35. As the over-all USIA budget in the last few years has been spread more thinly to cover new posts and new activities, funds for its own exhibits program have been sharply reduced. Other agencies have attempted to offset this cutback by developing their own facilities. The Committee questions whether this trend has been to net advantage; responsibility has been diffuse and scarce professional staff used less economically. There is an evident need to insure operational unity—as well as satisfactory economy and quality—by tying the various producing units more closely together. It would seem as illogical for the Government to have ten agencies in the business of producing foreign exhibits as it would be to have a like number making documentary films for the general public overseas. This diffusion of effort may well have contributed to the fact that when in direct competition with other nations, our exhibits have sometimes failed to achieve the distinction which this country's reputation demands. An integrated activity, making best use of professional staff, should help to raise quality standards.

Recommendation:

Consideration should be given to the greatest possible integration in USIA of the planning and production of all Government exhibits for mass audiences. USIA should be consulted in connection with technical exhibits for special audiences prepared by other agencies.

Chapter III

ENGLISH TEACHING

36. Too often our teaching methods are aimed only at a superficial knowledge of English and quick improvement of language skills for special purposes. This does not foster a broad understanding of democratic institutions and ideas or develop a command of English that would enable students to gain their own knowledge of democracy.

Recommendations:

- a. More foreign students should be given sufficient instruction to enable them to read and converse in English.
- b. Greater use should be made by other Government agencies of English language teaching materials now being developed by USIA.
- c. All USIA media services should participate more vigorously in English teaching activities by such means as radio and TV programs, visual aids and daily columns on English instruction for newspapers.

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37. It is important that this new emphasis on English teaching programs be accompanied by periodic evaluations of the programs in various countries both as to instructional proficiency and as to psychological benefits derived.

Recommendation:

There should be more thorough evaluation of the results of English language teaching projects, and systematic follow-up of language-training graduates of the binational centers.

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

38. In our exchange programs we must outdo the Sino-Soviet Bloc in selection of leaders and students with leadership potential, quality of programs offered, and treatment accorded visitors. In addition, we should handle our exchange programs, both general and academic, in ways that achieve net political gains.

Recommendations:

a. Selections for exchanges should concentrate on individuals and professions most likely to be important in shaping the society and policy of foreign countries. In some countries where our Fulbright and Smith-Mundt exchange programs overly concentrate on academic personnel, we should put more emphasis on selecting leaders, but take into account the needs and wishes of those people, institutions and governments cooperating with us and recognize that the programs have long-range as well as more immediate objectives.

b. There should be greater emphasis on the selection of students and teachers desiring to study social sciences and less on those specializing in cultural and esoteric subjects.

c. The Government should examine the practicability of easing some of the bothersome limitations and restrictions on earnings by foreign students and leaders during their stay in the United States.

39. In many countries persons with leftist sympathies and affiliations have great leadership potential and at the same time little understanding of the United States. Through selective visits here we should try to influence some of these people. Existing legislation makes it difficult to offer them grants without administrative complications (the "exceptions" procedures are cumbersome to invoke) or possibilities of serious embarrassment.

Recommendation:

In order to facilitate visits here by selected leftist leaders, the Government should revise cumbersome visa clearance procedures by issuance of administrative instructions which would allow wider use of the permissive provisions in existing legislation.

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40. Some foreign leaders whom it would be desirable to invite to the United States find it impossible or awkward to accept exchange grants from foreign governments in general or our Government in particular.

Recommendation:

The Government should encourage the arrangement of more visits by such leaders under private auspices.

Chapter IV

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

41. The Soviets readily employ economic aid and promises of such aid, like other instruments of state policy, in the pursuit of their goals. They have derived some important benefits from their efforts so far. They have secured a new sort of legitimacy for their policies by changing their image from a menacing scowl to a more benevolent though still inscrutable smile. Simultaneously, they have laid a base for subversion in many areas, and greatly broadened the once very narrow base of political communication between Soviet leaders and the developing countries, whose emergence is now regarded by Soviet ideology as being of decisive significance to the future course of world history. The substantial psychological and political success of the Soviet economic offensive has altered fundamentally the nature of the East-West confrontation in the less-developed areas and placed new requirements on Western policy and aid programs.

Recommendation:

There should be an increased effort by our information programs abroad to reveal the manipulative and colonial character of Soviet aid tactics. For example, Soviet failure to meet agreements, delivery of poor quality goods, and political maneuvers on trade must be exposed. Efforts along these lines will require careful handling and must be subject to definitive guidance.

42. Although we have long recognized that the psychological impact of our economic aid programs could be increased by a better understanding of the objectives of foreign aid and by better procedures and techniques, we have not given this matter adequate attention. Improvement could be made in such areas as recruitment and training of personnel, the form and terms of bilateral aid agreements, methods of offering and announcing assistance, the terms and conditions of loans and grants, the balance between project and commodity aid, privileges for aid personnel abroad, use of lines of credit, and a reduction in the complexity of procedures and paper work.

Recommendations:

- a. A comprehensive study should be made of our economic aid policies and practices in terms of their psychological impact.
- b. The Coordinator of the Mutual Security Program and ICA should consider the suggestions for improving the impact of tech-

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nical aid contained in a staff study titled "Agricultural Technical Assistance and the American Image", made by Michigan State University.

43. A confused image of American aid has frequently resulted from the habit of labeling aid with the alphabetical tags of the various lending and granting agencies.

Recommendation:

Official releases and other materials issued by agencies concerned should clearly emphasize the "American" nature of help rather than using exclusively the title of the specific agency involved. Measures to this end have already been introduced in certain areas including India.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

44. There are a number of measures which deserve consideration as means to improve the flow of information concerning our scientific and technological achievements. Communication with the scientific elite can be greatly improved by further dissemination of professional books and journals, encouraging the establishment of science information centers and science institutes abroad. Communication with non-scientific elites could be improved by: preparing written materials and audio-visual programs on U. S. science specially designed for laymen; establishing binational or regional science institutes abroad to study local problems; and, increasing contacts between U. S. scientists and foreign leaders. Aside from the slow process of education, effective communication with the masses depends primarily on motion pictures, television, radio, the press, and other mass media. Science exhibits appear particularly promising.

Recommendation:

The OCB should study ways and means of improving communication between scientists and non-scientific elites and mass audiences.

45. The USSR has carefully and successfully exploited its real attainments in science and technology. Sometimes it has also made inaccurate and misleading statements, exaggerated or patently false claims, and has tended to slight the contributions of Western science and technology. There are real obstacles and administrative difficulties inhibiting our efforts to counter Soviet propaganda.

Recommendation:

To the extent possible, we should improve our capabilities to counter Soviet scientific propaganda by:

- (1) Subtly and indirectly refuting Soviet claims, or placing them in perspective.
- (2) Informing the press as to the nature of various Soviet scientific propaganda gambits.

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(3) Getting high Government officials to make appropriate public comments.

(4) Better orienting U.S. personnel abroad as to the real status of Soviet scientific achievements so as to enable them to present the situation in proper perspective.

46. Because most American scientific activity takes place outside Government, and much of the activity sponsored by Government is actually handled by non-Government groups, Government cannot control all of the factors which contribute to the image abroad of our science and technology.

Recommendation:

Efforts should be made to increase the awareness by private individuals and organizations, including mass media, of their roles and responsibilities in shaping the image abroad of U.S. science and technology.

MILITARY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

47. There is no adequate substitute for real military power for the security of the United States. However, informational and psychological measures are necessary to enhance the image of U.S. strength abroad, since the effectiveness of deterrence and reassurance is determined, in large part, by the opinion of others concerning our military strength.

Recommendation:

Additional research should be undertaken on informational and psychological measures needed to enhance the image abroad of U.S. military strength.

48. It is important that the activities of the various military components overseas be tied in with the over-all country team effort in the various countries, in order to obtain maximum collateral benefits from military activities. While the importance of such cooperation is not limited to military assistance activities, this portion of military activities overseas offers major potential for possible collateral benefits.

Recommendation:

The Department of Defense should take steps to insure that all U.S. military elements in any foreign country are effectively tied in with the country team in accordance with the Presidential memorandum to the heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, of November 8, 1960, dealing with the functions of chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions.

49. There should be more conscious effort by all U.S. personnel engaged in training foreign military personnel to see that their military projects produce the optimum collateral effects consistent with military objectives. However the military should not engage in any activities which might be interpreted as "propagandizing" foreign military personnel.

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The Rand Corporation has made a study of the "Political Side-Effects of the Military Assistance Training Program", which is available as one of the staff papers of this Committee.

Recommendations:

- a. More officers experienced in psychological operations should be assigned to Military Assistance Advisory Groups and missions.
- b. Training of U.S. personnel assigned to MAAG's and missions, such as that conducted by the Military Assistance Institute, should include, where practicable, indoctrination in psychological techniques.
- c. The contacts of MAAG and mission personnel with local military leaders should be utilized to obtain information essential to our political objectives.
- d. Personnel working in the Military Assistance Program should be apprised, through prior orientation and through instructions and guidance to the field, of the potential collateral impact of military assistance programs.

50. Military activities abroad suffer from a lack of sufficient competent linguists. Voluntary off-duty language study is desirable but cannot produce the fluency required in official contacts with foreigners. Improved college-level language instruction for candidates for service commissions might help to correct these language deficiencies.

Recommendation:

The Department of Defense should conduct a comprehensive study of ways of improving its language capabilities and its utilization of language-trained personnel.

51. Troop and dependent orientation for overseas duty could be improved by fuller utilization of the wealth of orientation material available to military commanders and by more Defense guidance to the field.

Recommendation:

More Defense guidance for troop and dependent orientation programs should be provided to the field in order to meet minimum orientation requirements for overseas duty.

52. It is important that relations between U.S. armed forces and those of our allies be permeated by an atmosphere of mutuality. In particular, efforts should be made to create a feeling of mutuality of interest and an awareness of collective interdependence.

Recommendation:

Defense should take measures to increase mutuality in relations between our armed forces and those of our allies. Specifically we should consider ways and means of sending more U.S. officers to foreign armed service schools, using foreign military instructors in language and area courses in U.S. service schools, requiring

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U.S. officers assigned to bilingual allied headquarters to speak the foreign language concerned, and requesting foreign military students who attend U.S. service schools to lecture on their countries and military experiences.

Chapter VI

BUSINESS FIRMS ABROAD

53. The most important role which American companies can play abroad is to demonstrate the best practices of American companies at home, i.e., efficiency and responsible corporate citizenship.

Recommendation:

The State Department and other agencies in their contacts with private business organizations operating abroad should encourage the following business practices:

(1) Exercise of the highest standards of ethical behavior in the foreign operations of American business firms.

(2) Cooperation in a substantially increased trade fair program designed to contribute to understanding of the United States.

(3) Pooling of the public relations knowledge of the more experienced companies and making it available to other United States companies planning to work abroad.

(4) The employment of significant numbers of local nationals in responsible positions in their operations.

(5) Efforts to obtain a substantial percentage of local capital participation.

(6) Fuller participation in local civic activities by employees of American business firms abroad.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

54. The role of American labor organizations in international affairs in the next decade will continue to be exceptionally significant and influential. They must provide affirmative leadership in strengthening free institutions and in thwarting Communist operations in the labor field, and yet they must avoid appearance of domination within the world of free labor movements. Local free trade unions, particularly those in the less-developed areas, can help to develop responsible leadership and serve as an educational force to strengthen democratic institutions. More American trade unionists should participate directly in training abroad to provide non-Communist unions with the organizational and administrative skills necessary to meet the needs of their members and to resist Communist penetration. In less-developed

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countries, local training centers are needed. Preferably these should be established by the international trade secretariats or the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, with the aid and active participation of American labor organizations. While action by American labor organizations is the key to an effective approach to foreign labor, the Government must take into account the limitations of labor's resources, particularly personnel, and should strengthen its own programs to inform and encourage free trade unions abroad.

Recommendations:

a. The government should plan its overseas operating programs with increased awareness of the vital political and economic importance of worker organizations, particularly in the developing countries.

b. Government exchange programs should place more emphasis on participants from foreign labor unions and ministries of labor. By exposing these people to academic instruction and to conditions of work and labor organization here, we can help offset the shortage of American unionists able to go abroad.

c. USIA should expand its efforts to influence labor audiences abroad by promoting understanding, respect, and confidence in free trade unionism and the American economic system.

UNIVERSITIES

55. Present American university capabilities in world affairs clearly require considerable expansion. The universities must be made aware of the needs, and urged to move more energetically to cope with them.

Recommendations:

a. Universities should be encouraged to act more energetically to insure:

(1) Greater emphasis on courses on international affairs, languages and area studies.

(2) Development by more universities (especially the major ones) of plans for study abroad, designed as serious educational efforts to attract not only language specialists but the best students in political science, history and economics.

(3) Improvement and adaptation of courses of study in American universities to the training needs of foreign students.

b. Those responsible for overseas development programs which require university participation should carefully select universities which have the necessary resources and specialization for the particular problems involved. These universities should be included early enough in the planning process so that they can work with the foreign governments in such long-term programs as teacher training, exchanges, and development of technical and vocational institutes and school systems.

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AMERICAN VOLUNTARY AID

56. There should be a close working relationship between voluntary and public agencies, particularly in technical assistance. Government representatives in the newly developing countries can profit from the experience and wide personal contacts of the field staffs of the voluntary agencies. Guidance from the specialists and technicians in the public programs is often useful in voluntary health, educational and technical cooperation programs. The American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service and the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid help coordinate official and private activities.

Recommendations:

a. The Government should continue selected assistance to the foreign activities of American voluntary agencies and, if possible, encourage their expansion, particularly in Africa.

b. There should be greater sharing of experience and planning in the field among personnel from governmental and private agencies engaged in this type of work.

TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES

57. Travel is particularly helpful to international understanding; it helps rectify false impressions, and builds a new identification on the part of the traveller based on firsthand knowledge. Generally speaking, visitors leave the United States more favorably impressed than they were on their arrival, and, equally important, disseminate their views widely after their return.

Recommendations:

a. The Government should expand its efforts to promote travel to the United States because of the importance of such travel in supporting the psychological as well as other objectives of foreign policy.

b. Measures now underway in the Department of Commerce to stimulate tourist travel to the United States should be supported.

c. The close working relationship between Commerce and USIA should be continued so that psychological factors will always be considered along with economic factors in developing policy and machinery for a new program of tourism.

d. The Government should develop an educational campaign for the American public to insure that America will be a good host to foreign visitors.

e. Research should be conducted to evaluate tourism's effectiveness in meeting our psychological objectives, and to identify favorable and unfavorable aspects of the image of America which visitors carry away with them.

f. Consideration should be given to the feasibility and desirability of establishing information services at ports of entry to the United States to assist foreign travelers arriving in this country.

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THE NEWS MEDIA

58. In a majority of cases the newspapers that maintain foreign correspondents in the U.S. cannot afford to pay present communications rates. The U.S. has done less than certain other Free World countries to assist foreign correspondents to overcome this problem. Even though the problem is complex, it should at least be examined.

Recommendation:

The possibilities of encouraging communications companies to provide lower press cable rates from the United States should be considered.

59. The Government should help improve the competitive position of U.S. news agencies operating abroad vis-a-vis Reuters, Agence France Presse and particularly Tass, New China News Agency and Prensa Latina, taking care to avoid giving the impression of Government control of U.S. news agencies.

Recommendation:

The Government should consider means by which the competitive position of U.S. news agencies operating abroad might be improved.

60. Journalists of foreign countries, particularly those of the underdeveloped areas, often need assistance in raising journalistic standards of objectivity and in achieving a greater understanding of America. There are measures which can be undertaken both by the Government and by private organizations which will assist in these efforts.

Recommendations:

a. The Government should encourage duplication by other organizations and expansion of such activities as the Nieman Fellowship at Harvard for American and foreign journalists, the special program for foreign journalists at the Columbia School of Journalism, Inter-American Press Association scholarships, and seminars conducted by the American Press, International Press and Governmental Affairs Institutes.

b. The fullest use should be made of the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt Acts, and other official exchanges and assistance programs, to train U.S. and foreign journalists in American and foreign affairs.

c. Special consideration should be given under the State Department leaders program to media editors from the underdeveloped areas.

d. American wire services and our other media should be encouraged to give more experience in America to their "local hire" employees in foreign countries.

61. The open nature of our society and the closed system in the Soviet Bloc create disadvantages for the United States and the Free World in the international flow of news. There is need to counter distortions

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spread around the world by the Communist controlled media. The asset of our openness can be used to challenge the Soviet addiction to secrecy and manipulation of fact.

Recommendation:

We should correct significant misstatements in Bloc media about the U.S. and other Free World countries and should press the Soviets to publish our corrections. Other Free World countries and international organizations of editors and journalists (such as the International Press Institute in Geneva) should be encouraged to do the same.

MOTION PICTURES

62. Although motion pictures are particularly important for the people of the emerging nations, who often lack other means of entertainment, there is a shortage of movie theaters in many of these areas, particularly West Africa.

Recommendations:

a. USIA should make greater use of mobile field units in these areas.

b. American firms should be encouraged to assist in the construction of commercially owned theaters in West Africa. A study should be made of what role, if any, the Government might play in this endeavor.

TELEVISION

63. Private and governmental efforts to assist in the application of television for instructional purposes should be expanded. This is a field of clear American technological superiority at present and offers a promising possibility of simultaneously helping emerging countries and of gaining prestige for the U.S.

Recommendations:

a. The adequacy of U.S. facilities for training foreign people in television programming and technical matters should be reviewed.

b. The help of the television industry should be enlisted in improving the content of TV exports from the point of view of national interest.

c. A study should be made of the role the Government might play in providing foreign television audiences with an undistorted picture of the United States and its people.

BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS

64. There are additional measures which the Government can take to facilitate distribution of books and publications abroad.

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Recommendations:

a. The Government should seek to reduce tariff and postal rates and other barriers inhibiting the international flow of publications, including Congressional enactment of legislation implementing the Florence Convention approved by the Senate on February 23, 1960.

b. There should be increased use of subsidies and inducements, on a selective basis, to make the cost of American publications competitive in certain areas abroad and to permit the publication of low-cost translations of certain American books and the printing and circulation of useful books by foreign authors. An integrated Government translation program should be developed for each of the major languages of the emerging countries. There is immediate need for such a program to provide books in French and Arabic for many countries of Africa and Asia, and in Spanish for Latin America.

c. There should be encouragement or direct commissioning of books to be written to fill special overseas needs not met by books published under commercial auspices.

d. In technical assistance and exchange programs more attention should be given to the development of competent and vigorous local publication and distribution industries.

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Appendix II

COMMITTEE STAFF PAPERS

Africa
Agricultural Technical Assistance and the American Image
American Business Abroad
American Labor in International Affairs
Asia
Communist China
Disarmament and the Factor of Public Opinion
The English-Teaching Program
The Exchange of Persons Programs of the U. S. Government
The Impact of Achievements in Science and Technology Upon the Image
Abroad of the United States
Information Efforts in Support of Mutual Security
The International Communist Propaganda Machine
International Flow of News
International Radio and Television Activities of the U. S. Government
International Travel
Latin America
The Middle East
People-to-People Activities
Political Side-Effects of the Military Assistance Training Program
Private Foundations
The Problem of U. S. Public Understanding of International Affairs
A Program for International Education Development
The Psychological Impact of American Voluntary Foreign Aid
Psychological and Informational Aspects of Foreign Economic Aid
Research Programs and the Allocation of Limited Informational Resources
The Role of the American University in International Relations
The Role of the Armed Forces in Psychological and Informational Activities Abroad
The Roles of Attributed and Unattributed Information and the Division of Responsibility Between USIA and CIA
The Soviet Bloc
Soviet Use of Education as a Weapon in the Cold War
Themes
The United Nations as a Public Opinion Forum
Western Europe

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Appendix III

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

December 2, 1959

Dear Mannie:

I have decided to establish a committee to be known as the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad. In general, the purpose of the Committee will be to review the findings and recommendations of the Committee on International Information Activities in its report dated June 30, 1953, and consider changes in the international situation which affect the validity of the findings and recommendations in that report. In a sense I view the undertaking as one of bringing the earlier report up to date. The review will not concern itself with those organizational matters dealt with in Chapter 7 of the June 30, 1953, report.

I should like to ask you to serve as Chairman of the new Committee. Those participating will be high-ranking representatives of the State Department, Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Information Agency, as well as the President's Special Assistants for National Security Affairs, and Security Operations Coordination. In addition, there will be a limited number of non-Government members.

I attach considerable importance to this undertaking and feel it would be well managed under your chairmanship.

Of course all executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government will be authorized and directed as a matter of common concern to cooperate with the Committee in its work. Such cooperation will include the provision of the staff assistance which you and your committee will require.

I very much hope that you can accept this appointment. If so, in my absence from the country, I would appreciate your working with Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, in the constitution of the Committee and in making plans for staffing and other related matters.

Sincerely yours,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Mr. Mansfield D. Sprague
American Machine & Foundry Co.
261 Madison Avenue
New York 16, New York

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