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Preliminary Views on the Intelligence Implications
of the Defense Department Blue Ribbon Panel Report

1. It is obviously impossible to evaluate the implications of this report on intelligence activities without reference to the recommendations of the report relating to the organization of the Defense Department as a whole. To put it differently, if the organizational recommendations of the report are adopted, some rearrangement of intelligence relationships will be necessary irrespective of the specific conclusions of the report relating to intelligence.

2. The main thrust of the report is to recommend the establishment of three Deputies--one for resources; one for evaluation and one for operations.


3. The Deputy for Operations would be the senior as amongst the three Deputies and would be in charge of all operational, intelligence and related matters (including, as I remember it, communications). All military command authority would be consolidated in (again as I remember it) three major commands which would report to the Deputy for Operations through a senior deputy or commander. The present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs might be this senior deputy or commander who would report to the Deputy for Operations--a civilian.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments and services seem to vanish away, retaining little more than their uniforms. What happens to them is not entirely clear to me but is presumably spelled out in some of the back-up material to the report. What is clear in the summary is that all operational authority, all intelligence activities and (as I remember it) responsibility for personnel assignments is removed from the service departments.

5. Against this background the chapter of the report dealing with intelligence recommends the establishment of an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence who would function under the Deputy for Operations. This man would also serve as the Defense Director of Intelligence in which capacity he would:

- a. serve on USIB;
- b. direct and control all intelligence activities other than those inherent to a major command;

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- c. review programs;
- d. review requirements;
- e. review requirements for R&D;
- f. be responsible for the protection of intelligence methods and sources.

6. A Defense Security Command would be established under the Assistant Secretary responsible for all collection activities (other than tactical). The commander of this organization would command all collection and associated processing and reporting activities. He would "serve as the Director, NSA" and insure dissemination of intelligence information.

7. A Defense Production Agency would be responsible for all Defense intelligence production. It would provide current intelligence, threat assessments and finished intelligence required by the Defense Department. It would also be responsible for Defense inputs to National Intelligence Estimates and manage intelligence production information systems.

8. The report finally recommends expansion of responsibilities of NSA to include processing, data base maintenance and reporting of all intelligence information.

9. There is a curious redundancy in the report which calls for the establishment of a command to supervise all collection activities and states that the director of this command will also be the Director of NSA. What the writers of the report appear to be gunning for is the NRO which they don't like. NRO is not specifically referred to in the report but is obviously included under the heading of a discussion of certain special arrangements designed to take care of new systems. They seem to feel that the NRO is out of reach of the normal review mechanisms and its activities not properly related to the other intelligence activities of the Defense Department. I suspect that they don't know very much about the NRO and the wording of their report suggests that they were given somewhat of a run-around. Quite obviously one of their objectives is to see that the NRO is safely subordinated to the new review and control mechanism.

10. From their general introductory discussion, one gathers the following:

- a. They recognize the authority of the DCI over the community as a whole and his responsibility as an over-all coordinator; they also recognize the function of USIB of

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which they think the new Assistant Secretary should be a member.

b. They seem to feel that the interests of the policy-makers and consumers are not generally represented in the requirements process. I don't know what the source of this impression is as the problem has always seemed to us to be that the interests of every conceivable consumer, from those interested in wheat production in the Ukraine to those interested in the number of rivets in a Soviet weapons carrier are thoroughly reflected in the requirements. The problem has always been to translate these requirements for information about missiles or tanks into the kind of data (ELINT, photographs, espionage reports) that are likely to respond to the question.

c. They have accepted the conventional criticism that Estimates are pretty well compromised and watered down as a result of the coordinating process.

d. They criticize the CIRIS on the grounds that it shows the resources allocated against targets but contains no information about the nature of requirements for information on the targets and no assessment of the value of intelligence collected. (Obviously it is not intended to do either of these things--it is simply intended as an inventory from which value judgments can be developed.)

6. The report makes a number of other comments--for example, on what it considers the excessive compartmentation of information and the need to consolidate all mapping and charting activity in a new agency.

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