# OMB
Staff Report

Intelligence Production And
Customer Satisfaction:

Results of a Survey

State, JCS, DIA reviews completed. On file OMB release instructions apply.

May 1978

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JCS review(s) completed.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION AND CUSTOMER SATISFACTION:

Results of a Survey

May, 1978

CLASSIFIED BY ~~David Litvin~~
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

● In recent years, there has been increasing criticism of the product of the Intelligence Community - the end result of the Community's major expenditures on collection, processing, and production activities. Much of this criticism has focused on the alleged inability of the Community to meet real customer needs. To more systematically ascertain customers' opinions of the Community, OMB undertook a survey of about 90 political and military intelligence customers on the National Security Council Staff, in the Departments of State and Defense and in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This survey was conducted during the last half of 1977.

● The survey revealed an extremely wide range of opinions on the Community's performance, ranging from perfect satisfaction to profound disappointment. A number of causative factors influenced satisfaction, including subject area and level of detail needed, and the extent of a customer's direct contacts with various intelligence agencies. In the eyes of customers, the Community performed best in the areas of Soviet strategic forces and current political reporting and analyses on many areas of the world. The Community did less well in providing intelligence on conventional military forces and on some other political topics. In the eyes of the customers, State's INR and DOD's DIA had some of the more effective arrangements for serving customers, although the primary beneficiaries were only a small fraction of all customers. CIA and NSA had less effective arrangements for serving customers and relatively few were served well by these organizations. A major factor influencing customer satisfaction was the degree of close, personal, working relationships between customers and intelligence analysts throughout the Community. Where these relationships existed, the customer was much better served. Overall there were significant problems and limitations impeding effective dissemination of intelligence and customer communications with Community analysts. In addition, available and relevant information would often not be absorbed or would not be an obvious factor in decisionmaking.

● Directions for improvement seem to lay in significant Community improvements in dissemination and communication with customers, in improved identification of ways in which intelligence affects other government programs, and in selective Community improvements in substantive areas specified as needing improvement - conventional military forces and political reporting and analyses. Recommendations are made to address these areas.

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I.   Background

The fundamental function of the Intelligence Community is to provide information to those government customers who can usefully apply it. This function today is carried out by almost all the agencies of the Community; collectively, they provide their customers with a wide range of finished and unfinished products including direct personnel support and contact, briefings, cables, field reports, individual "think pieces," and coordinated, multi-agency reports, all of which can be produced at several different levels of classification and disseminated for the use of one or many customers.

The "production" component of the Community is the element most directly involved in providing information to customers. According to IC Staff data, these elements, in 1978, have about [   ]personnel, down about 4 percent from the 1973 level, and now accounting for 11 percent of total Intelligence Community personnel. By agency, these personnel are distributed as follows:

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	1973	1975	1978
Total Production Personnel (percentage of total Community)			
	(8%)	(10%)	(11%)
CIA*			
State-INR	220	220	220
Energy	--	--	10
DIA	1,770	1,610	1,640
Army	780	710	830
Navy	1,520	1,420	1,380
Air Force	2,850	2,610	1,830

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Notable trends are the decline in DoD (especially Air Force) production personnel offset to a degree by the increase in CIA* production personnel. In addition to these personnel, there are over 1,000 people in NSA, CIA (DDO), and the State Department who are directly involved in substantive analysis, production, and communication of intelligence to customers.

The substantive focus and output of the Community as a whole has always been centered heavily upon the principal potential military adversaries of the U.S. (the Soviet Union, East Europe, China, North Korea, and North Vietnam). Information on the foreign policy, national security objectives, and military capabilities of these countries is directly useful in

*   Now the National Foreign Assessment Center

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developing, sizing, and operating U.S. military forces and in composing overall foreign policy. Important secondary foci have been selected non-communist world political and economic subjects (e.g., the Middle East, energy, Southern Africa, nuclear proliferation) many of which have been somewhat transitory (e.g., Southeast Asia, Portugal, Chile). The Community's method of allocating its total production effort among all of these subjects begins with priority setting. The DCI's priorities are set forth in direct-ive DCID 1/2, and the JCS's priorities are set forth in the Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning issued to DIA and the Services. Although a few topics (e.g., human rights, nuclear proliferation) now receive more emphasis than in the past, current DCID priorities are, in the aggregate, reasonably typical of those of the past few years, and a few country/subject priorities are summarized below:

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
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This general guidance is supposed to "provide basic guidance to all intelligence activities including .... production." A profound limitation with priorities such as these, however, is that they provide, at the most, very broad guidance; particularly significant difficulties are that they are rather broad, unbounded categories, and no distinctions are made between collection, processing, and production or between the importance of differ- ent quantities of information in the same general subject area. Thus, re-, gardless of how much information is already available on Soviet ICBM's, SLBM's, and strategic bombers, additional collection and production on these subjects is still priority 1; conversely, no matter how little information is available on Tanzanian military aid, deployments, and warning of hostil- ities, collection and production on these subjects is still priority 6. Thus, in order to address the needs of customers interested in other than the highest priority concern, Community production managers must interpret and supplement these overall priorities, and the dynamics of the formal and informal processes by which this is accomplished in the various agencies are not clearly discernible.* Despite these subjective interpretations, however, the general thrust of the overall DCID priorities is achieved; over 50 percent of the Community's production resources are allocated to Communist World military sbujects, seven percent to other Communist World subjects, less than five percent of the production resources cover the rest of the world, while a substantial share (almost 40 percent) cannot be targetted against any specific geographic region or subject.

This allocation of production resources, as well as the ambiguous processes by which the allocation is made, may explain some of the criti- cisms that the Community has failed to anticipate significant developments in the non-Communist World (e.g., Third World nuclear weapon programs). Other criticisms (which cover a wide range of subjects and time) include significant failures in indications and warning (e.g, the 1973 Mideast War), in anticipating numerous developments during the Vietnam War, and in correctly anticipating Soviet strategic weapons programs. More recently, criticisms have been directed toward the "quality of analysis." The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in its report on the 1978 budget, sum- marized these concerns as follows:

o   "Lack of high quality analysis of complex or multi-disciplinary analytical issues.

o   Poor organizational procedures to identify, recruit, train, and motivate high quality analytical personnel.

o   Insufficient use of organizational techniques and managerial guidance to insure adequate presentation of alternative views.

o   Insufficient use of outside experts in dealing with analytical problems."

* The Key Intelligence Question/Defense Key Intelligence Question approach was one Community innovation, but the effects of stating these questions upon production resource allocation or Community output was never clear, and both efforts have subsequently been terminated.

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Over the years, the Community has attempted to respond to outside criticisms in a variety of ways (e.g., through the establishment of National Intelligence Officers (NIO's) and Defense Intelligence Officers (DIO's) to facilitate high-level customer support, by the conduct of "experiments" in NIE production designed to introduce a wider range of views into intelligence products, and by modifications to many of the products of at least DIA and CIA to make them more useful to outside customers). These changes have not been sufficient to still the criticism, however. Recognizing the continuing criticism and the continued questions of the Community product, OMB interviewed a sample of mid-senior level intelligence customers in order to gain their views about the extent to which the Community was performing a useful service and the ways in which it should be improved.

II.   Methodology and Scope

The methodology was to personally interview mid to senior level intelligence customers. Each interview, while designed to be short (about 1 hour) covered these topics:

- What kind of intelligence support, in general, do you "need?"

- What kind of intelligence support do you receive?

- What agencies and offices provide this support?

- What, if any, are the problems associated with this support?

- What suggestions, if any, do you have for improving the intelligence support provided to you?

Interviews were conducted during August-December of 1977. A "conversation guide" (see Appendix A) was provided to each customer ahead to time so as to indicate topics to be covered, and each interview was conducted by 1-2 people from OMB. Approximately one-third of the interviews were arranged by DIA, and on these occasions a DIA representative was also involved. The interviews themselves evolved along lines of interest to the individual customers and, thus, were to a degree unstructured, even though covering the five areas listed above. Follow-up discussions were held with some customers to clarify points made during the interviews and a sample of customers from all the major offices contacted provided comments on an early draft of this report.

Customers interviewed were from those offices mentioned most frequently by intelligence agency personnel as major consumers of intelligence support. Ninety-six separate customers contributed their views. These customers were all located in the Washington, D.C., area, and their offices are listed in Table I. The median grade levels were colonel-brigadier general for military customers and GS-16 or FS-02 for other customers.

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TABLE I
Intelligence Customer Offices Contacted

9 NSC Staff (Program Analysis, North/South relations, Soviet Union, Global
Affairs, Mid-East, Office of the National Security Advisor)

61 DOD

(OSD) 7 ISA (Europe/NATO, Near East, Africa, South Asia, East Asia &
Pacific Affairs; Policy and NSC Affairs)

7 DDR&E (Strategic & Space Systems, Strategic Offensive Systems,
Land Warfare, Tactical Air Warfare, Naval Warfare, Net
Technical Assessment)

11 PA&E (Strategic Planning and Arms Limitation, Strategic Forces,
Special Weapons and Support Systems, Regional Programs,
Europe, Land Forces, Naval Forces, Tactical Air Forces)

3 Net Assessment

(Joint Staff)

2 Director, Joint Staff

6 J3 (Operations), (Director, Strategic and General Operations,
WWMCCS and Telecommunications, Current Operations,
Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare)

8 J5 (Plans & Policy), (Director, International Negotiations,
SALT, Political/Military Affairs)

5 SAGA (Strategic Forces, Special Studies, Political/Military,
Scientific Advisor)

(Military Service Headquarters)

12 Force Analysis Groups (Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Navy
Systems Analysis Division, Air Force Assistant Chief of
Staff Studies and Analysis)

7 ACDA (Director's Intelligence Staff, Weapons Evaluation and
Control, International Security Programs)

19 State Department (Latin America, Africa, Europe, Central America, East
Coast (of South America), Korea, Japan, Republic of
China, Southeast Asia, PRC, USSR, Egypt, Iran, Israel,
Jordan, Office of the UN Ambassador)

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Although certainly not representative of all intelligence customers, this sample represents an important subset, especially of those customers associated with overall foreign policy and national security affairs.* Indeed, because of the responsibilities of these offices, the relative seniority and experience of many of these customers, and simple physical proximity to intelligence producers, it is to be expected that they would receive close to, if not the very best, support the Community could provide. In addition, almost all of the customers possessed at least SI/TK/GAMMA clearances and thus were better equipped than the majority of intelligence customers to acquire information from the Community.

Two limitations on the results are obvious--direct conclusions are limited to those offices contacted; no recording of the intelligence support needs and opinions of other types of customers (e.g., military operational commanders, hardware engineers, ambassadors, and noncodeword cleared personnel) was accomplished. In addition, results are qualitative and are sensitive to what these customers perceived and chose to express in the limited time available. Despite these limitations, however, the interviews were sufficiently comprehensive and demanding to capture salient opinions in the target population sampled.

* There was no attempt to systematically sample economic intelligence customers.

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III. Analysis of Responses

The customer responses covered a wide range of topics and could usefully be studied from many points of view; for this purpose major points made by customers are summarized in Appendix B. For present purposes, attention will be focussed on four topics:

-- Overall customer assessments of Community performance - How well does the Community satisfy its customers and what are the principal factors affecting this satisfaction?

-- Value of this support - To what extent was it apparent how intelligence information availability affects other government operations?

-- Customer-Community interactions - How effective are existing mechanisms for information transfer and guidance between the Community and its customers?

-- Directions for improvement - In what ways can the Community and its customers improve its performance and its value to the government?

A. Overall Customer Assessments.

● It is clear that the Community is viewed as performing a valuable function, notwithstanding criticisms by some elements of the public, congressional leaders, and executive branch officials, including some of the customers sampled by this survey. Virtually all customers interviewed credited the Community with providing some basic but quite valuable intelligence - most notably technical characteristics of major Soviet weapons and weapons technologies, approximate nuclear and conventional force sizes for major potential opponents of the U.S. and insights into current political developments in many areas of the world. The value of this output was said to be easily overlooked because it was so basic that it was part of the background environment within which day-day and month-month political and military decisions were made; it was nonetheless thought quite valuable. In addition, customers in all offices could cite specific valued intelligence products and contributions (many of these are listed in Appendix B).

● There were some significant complementary (outside the Community) sources of information and analysis for many customers and these greatly affected many customers' assessments of the Community for if these other sources did not exist, demands upon the Community would be altered and increased. The most significant of these sources were:

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-- Extensive State Department political reporting from most
   areas of the world.

-- Study contractors and consultants for military equipment
   and force analyses, net assessments, and policy analysis.

-- Customers' in-house experience, expertise, personal
   contacts, and access to many "open" sources.

The continued availability of these sources was presumed by most customers in their assessments of Community performance and directions for improvement.

Although almost all customers credited the Community with being able to provide some extremely valuable information, there was still a wide range of expressed opinions, ranging from almost perfect satisfaction to profound frustration; the bulk of the customers sampled (80-85%) fell between these extremes. As a generalization, the more satisfied customers appeared to need basically the type of intelligence which the Community was widely recognized as being able to provide (general weapon technologies, military force sizes, current political reporting) while the less satisfied customers need deeper or broader coverage or both. The specific factors which appeared most significant in explaining these differences in satisfaction were:

-- Customer country/subject focus - some topics simply receive
   much more Community attention than others and customers
   needing information on relatively neglected topics felt
   relatively less well satisfied.

-- Customer responsibilities - customers actively engaged in
   planning or designing political or military responses to
   foreign developments needed more precision and specificity
   than those who needed the same information for more general
   background purposes. Similarly, customers engaged in long
   term studies generally needed more comprehensive detail than
   customers involved in more short-term, ad-hoc actions. In
   both cases, customers needing the more comprehensive and
   detailed information were relatively less well satisfied.

-- Customer interest in current vs future - customers needing
   information and projections into the future tended to be
   less satisfied than those interested in current developments.

-- Customer personal contacts - customers with more or more
   widely distributed personal contacts within the Community
   tended to be more satisfied than those with fewer or more
   narrowly distributed contacts.

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-- Customer personal standards and circumstances - customers
   with experience in particular substantive areas and/or
   with relatively good information on U.S. systems, programs
   or policies expected more of the Community than those less
   favorably situated; they also tended to be less well
   satisfied.

-- Availability of alternative sources - customers were not
   equally supplied with alternative (non-Community) sources
   of information and analysis and those less well situated
   were more dependent upon the Community and tended to be
   less well satisfied.

These factors differed significantly among customers and combined in various
ways, sometimes compounding and sometimes offsetting each other, to produce
the very wide range of opinions encountered.

● Of the 90+ customers interviewed, about 20 were principally inter-
ested in foreign strategic nuclear forces, about 35 with foreign conventional
military forces, and about 30 with foreign political developments with the
remainder being interested in multiple topics. Summaries of the views of
these customer aggregations are:

-- Strategic nuclear force customers on the Joint Staff, OSD
   (PA&E and DDR&E), in Service headquarters (Air Force and
   Navy), on the NSC staff and in ACDA indicated that their
   needs were predominately for general trends and directions
   in Soviet nuclear weapons programs and related defensive
   systems. As one customer put it, what was really important

   were "trends in a few key variables" (numbers of launch
   platforms, ranges, weapon yields, accuracies, etc.) from
   today to about 5-10 years out. The general availability
   of codeword clearances and products to this type of
   customer and the Community's output in terms of products
   (e.g., S&T publications and briefings, interagency esti-
   mates and memoranda, SALT reports) and its participation
   in forums such as the SALT working group seemed to address
   these customer concerns well and these customers were
   generally very satisfied. (Nine of the DCI's top twelve
   priorities address this topic area).

-- Conventional force customers on the Joint Staff, in OSD
   (PA&E, DDR&E, Net Assessment, ISA), in all the Service head-
   quarters, in ACDA and on the NSC staff indicated that their
   needs were collectively more diverse, covering both equipment
   quantities and characteristics for ground, air and naval forces

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but also considerable detail on how foreign forces would likely operate under combat conditions. Interest centered primarily on forces in the period 5-8 years in the future, and those of today. General trends between these two periods also were of interest. The restricted availability of code-word clearances and products to this type of customer and the Community's output on these subjects (although collectively quite voluminous) did not address many of these customers' concerns (e.g., Allied military capabilities, Warsaw Pact logistics and sustainability) and these customers were only partially satisfied. (The DCI's priorities for these topics range from first to sixth).

-- Political customers in the State Department, on the NSC staff, in OSD (ISA), on the Joint Staff and in ACDA indicated that their needs were predominantly for a steady stream of informed current reporting supplemented by a few, occasional interpretive analyses and projections covering the next few months. The Community's output (together with State Department cables) satisfied many customers but some areas (e.g., Southern Africa and Southeast Asia) were poorly covered by existing sources and longer-term analyses were said to be infrequent, poor, and/or irrelevant. Thus, these customers were only partially satisfied. (The DCI's priorities for these topics range from second to seventh).

● Organization - specific arrangements for intelligence support also influenced the degree of customer satisfaction because they affected the ease with which useful intelligence could be obtained. The range of organizational opinions (in decreasing order of satisfaction) were:

-- Joint Staff - very satisfied with the direct support responsiveness of DIA.

-- State Department - mostly satisfied with the volume of State Department and CIA cable traffic (and a few other intelligence sources) and with the efficiency of INR in performing a liaison function.

-- ACDA - mostly satisfied with the generally good access provided to all intelligence agencies.

-- Military Service headquarters - mostly satisfied by intelligence available from their parent Services and from DIA.

-- NSC staff - partially satisfied with primarily CIA/NIO support but many subject areas (especially political) were said to need improvement.

-- OSD staff - partially satisfied by the limited responsiveness of all Community agencies.

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Of all the agencies involved in substantive production, CIA and NSA (and the DCI's interagency committees) appeared to have less extensive and effective mechanisms for providing intelligence to customers. Only a handful of the customers sampled knew how to utilize them but valued some of their products highly. INR appeared to have an effective mechanism for serving State Department customers, centering principally on daily, personal, discussions at the all-source level. DIA had the most extensive mechanisms for serving customers in all the organizations contacted but implementation was reportedly very uneven, with only the Joint Staff being uniformly well supported. (Extensive personal contact was an important factor here, also).

- The extremes of views expressed were:

  -- Some customers (just over 10% of those sampled) were highly critical of aspects of the Community's performance some going so far as to characterize the Community as "a disaster area." The principal reasons for this high degree of dissatisfaction appeared to be the inadequate quality of analysis in many subject areas (attributed by customers to poor Community personnel policies for substantive analysts) and the lack of responsiveness by the Community to repeated requests and guidance for different types of analyses, and for coverage of "neglected" subject areas. These problems are quite similar to those cited by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and were said to be ultimately caused by the lack of attention of senior Community managers to problems of substantive analysis and production.

  -- Other customers (just over 5%) highly commended the Community stating that in view of the inherent difficulties of accurately discerning or anticipating what is happening in either open or closed societies, the Community performs surprisingly well.

- Although not directly interviewed, types of intelligence customers not sampled would probably be less well served by the Community for, as a rule, they possess fewer of the factors influencing good support; e.g., they are likely to be physically further from the Washington area, to have less participation in working groups with intelligence representatives, to have fewer personal contacts in the various agencies and less storage space and fewer clearances for codeword products. (Most of the "most valuable" products mentioned by the customers sampled were codeword products). This speculation is supported by a few of the customers surveyed, who had experience in other types of positions and who indicated that intelligence support elsewhere was usually worse. Thus, Community services to the customers contained within this sample can be considered as an approximate upper bound in performance.

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B.   Value of Intelligence Support.

●   Although expressions of customer satisfaction may indicate that
the Community overall is performing some useful service, they provide little
guidance for allocating resources to the intelligence function or between
intelligence systems or programs. For these latter purposes it is necessary
to know how useful various aspects of intelligence support are or could be
and why, with the ultimate focus of interest being on decision-making. These
topics were pursued on a selective basis (partially due to time limitations)
during the customer interviews with quite limited results. Specifically,
customers queried on this subject could easily describe some of the theoretical
effects of having or not having particular types of information and a few
customers could identify specific uses that had actually been made, for
instance:

    --   Using HUMINT information to foil assassination plots against
          some foreign leaders.

    --   Using imagery to support political initiatives to insure
          Soviet compliance with the SALT treaty.

    --   Using ELINT and all-source analysis information to route
          peripheral reconnaissance aircraft.

    --   Using all-source analysis of Soviet air defenses to determine
          the scope of the U.S. strategic bomber program.

    --   Using COMINT information to modify the positions of foreign
          diplomatic representatives.

For the bulk of the customers queried on this point, however, the principal
use of intelligence was simply "to know" the situation in some foreign subject
area, or to feed the information into issue papers, studies, and background
material for other decision makers. Subsequent actual experiences were quite
mixed with customers indicating that a number of decisions were made which
apparently ignored important intelligence evidence and other decisions were
made without any intelligence inputs at all; in many cases, customers simply
had no way of knowing whether intelligence had affected some decisions.
A few indicated that some uses occurred only after considerable periods of
time (years). Thus the use and ultimate value of many intelligence
products appeared to be quite diffused, unaudited, and uncertain.

    ●   Very surprising in view of the public criticisms which have been
made was the lack of perceptible customer concern with some of the more recent
reputed "failures" of intelligence, for instance:

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-- Failure to anticipate the Indian and South African nuclear programs.

-- Failure to anticipate the 1973 Middle East war.

-- Failure to anticipate some Soviet weapons programs.

Very few customers sampled were seriously concerned with these types of errors because (they said) the lack of this type of information had not affected U.S. decisions to any serious degree. In short, the real value of improvements in these areas is uncertain.

   • Other factors tending to cast doubt on the value of much of the intelligence product were:

-- Many customers indicating that many products which they received were highly discretionary for their purposes.

-- Some customers appearing to have a somewhat casual attitude towards many products, as evidenced by their not absorbing available material during busier periods.

-- Some customers indicating that they were constrained to use only official or "validated" intelligence, regardless of what other information might be available.

-- Some customers indicating that they "probably haven't done all I could" to get some subjects of high personal interest studied by the Community.

-- Many customers appearing to have few hard standards for what information was required, especially on future needs. (The type and level of information available on U.S. subjects often served as an informal upper bound on what it was reasonable to ask for, even though significantly different means are used to observe foreign and domestic developments and there are reasons for believing that information on some foreign topics could be better than that routinely available on comparable U.S. topics).

   • Ideally, before decisions on major changes to the Intelligence Community budget are made, it should be possible to identify the substantive effects of the changes and the effects of these substantive changes upon other government operations, for only in this way can it be determined whether expansions or reductions in intelligence or in other government programs are the most efficient way of improving overall government performance. This type of systematic review is impeded by customers' inability to identify specific actual uses that have been made of available intelligence and that really would be made with improved intelligence. In short, although expanded and improved intelligence would probably produce more satisfaction, the ultimate significance of significant additions or reductions in the quantity or quality of available intelligence is not clear.

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C. Interactions Between the Community and its Customers.

● Most customers appeared to have very little knowledge of overall Intelligence Community collection, processing or production capabilities, of overall budget levels, systems capabilities, or even of current production efforts or available products. Most customers' knowledge pertained to a small element of one or two production agencies with which the customer dealt regularly. This lack of knowledge appeared to result from security restrictions and the lack of good sources of information on these subjects. As a result, many customers simply didn't know what it was reasonable to ask of the Community. Consequently, there was often a lack of informed customer requests for products, customer guidance to the Community and customer assessments of the Community's performance. Customers generally under-estimated the quantity of raw data available or potentially available to the Community. This lack of knowledge may partially explain some of the attitudes described elsewhere in this paper.

● Many customers indicated that in their experience, Intelligence Community personnel had an inadequate appreciation of customers' particular responsibilities and functions with the effect that available intelligence products were often not directly relevant to their problems. This was reflected to a degree in a limited customer reliance on the products of the Community.

● The volume of general products available in some subject areas (including some reports put out by customer organizations) was excessive. Much of the material was duplicative (but partially inconsistent) descriptions and unfocused analyses. The quantity was sufficient to overwhelm customers and to obscure the unique information contained in the various products. This problem was mentioned by a number of customers and in follow-up discussions it was suggested that there should be fewer separate products sent out but that the separate views and analyses of different analysts and agencies should be included in a more limited set of products.

● The highest degree of satisfaction was produced when customers had close personal relationships with community analysts (e.g., the Joint Staff, the SALT working group). This type of arrangement was widely acclaimed by customers, many of whom desired to establish a wider range of personal contacts within Community agencies. Direct personal contacts were valuable because they:

-- Permitted an efficient two-way flow of information on customer concerns and relevant intelligence.

-- Served as an indirect guide to ongoing intelligence analysis and available products.

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• A surprising and critical problem was that customers often would not be using or even be completely aware of available, relevant information. The extent of this problem was surprising because many of the customers went to some trouble to try and locate information and some were even served by intelligence support offices. From the interview responses and follow-up questions, however, it appears that no customer and probably no member of the Intelligence Community knows what products are available in given subject areas. This lack of knowledge is caused by:

-- Little Community effort to market its products (DIA is apparently the only agency with a significant effort in this area).

-- Lack of good indices to the products of the various agencies (the only indices which are available to customers are very incomplete and most are quite dated).

-- Limited personal relationships between analysts in the various agencies and customers (e.g., DIA and INR are the only agencies where customers can locate substantive offices in readily available telephone directories).

-- Inadequate dissemination of information between intelligence agencies (e.g., restricted dissemination from NSA and the Navy to CIA and DIA, between DIA and CIA, and between INR/State and DIA).

-- Inadequate dissemination of information to customers (e.g., NIO denial of a report on Soviet SALT perspectives to customers involved in the negotiations).

-- An apparent reluctance by at least some Community representatives to disclose the existence of many codeword or specially-produced reports to many customers.

-- Restricted availability of codeword clearances among some customers, greatly restricting access to products and preventing candid discussions with intelligence analysts.

Product dissemination was so irregular that it was possible for OMB staff, on the basis of a quite limited knowledge of available products, to make some customers in all organizations aware of products which they subsequently found to be of significant usefulness. Most of these addressed topics which customers said needed improvement (Soviet politics, African politics, Soviet advanced weapon developments, Warsaw Pact plans for employment of military forces, ☐, indications and warning prospects in Europe). A significant and indicative peculiarity of all of these products was that almost all of them were codeword products of CIA, NSA, the Scientific

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and Technical Intelligence Committee*, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee*, the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee*, the Strategic Warning Staff*, and the National Intelligence Officer structure*. They appeared in no index available to the affected customers. Word of mouth was the only means of discovering the existence of the specific products.

- Customer guidance to the Community on what substantive products were desired was extremely limited. Many customers indicated that they responded to periodic questionnaires (especially from DIA) but that there was essentially no feedback from the Community and that few if any apparent changes made on the basis of their responses. A few customers provided inputs to JCS and DCI priority setting exercises but indicated that the relevance of these priorities was unknown. Requests for specific products or support were significant but Community reactions had been mixed and most of these requests affected only the short-run (a year or less); in any case, the bulk of the intelligence which was available was in the form of multiple-customer reports and briefings. Most customers wanted to put their faith in informal guidance - developing rapport with Community analysis or managers so that the latter could anticipate what customers would find of use.

- There were two areas in which disagreements between customers could be affecting Community perceptions of the types of products which are desired:

    -- Net assessments and estimates of performance - virtually all
       military intelligence customers wanted more than simple
       physical descriptions of military forces and equipment; in
       particular, estimates of performance, weapons effectiveness,
       and force capabilities were, in the abstract, desired.
       Analyses such as these usually require a countervailing
       force against which foreign forces are supposed to fight,
       however, and this often involves U.S. forces. Some customers
       would like the Community to perform such analyses, taking
       into account U.S. force capabilities; other customers,
       however, object to such analyses, pointing out that good
       information on U.S. forces and plans is not generally avail-
       able in the Community. In addition, there are few intelligence
       analysts trained to perform or review such analyses, such
       analyses are performed (to a degree) by and for customer
       organizations, and additional analyses would inevitably use
       different models, assumptions, and data and would merely
       confuse decisionmakers. One suggestion was to perform
       intelligence net assessments using foreign perceptions of
       the U.S. threat rather than the "real" U.S. threat. In
       addition, inter-nation comparisons not involving the U.S.
       were said to be useful.

* Many of the customers sampled were not familiar with any of the products
  of these Community elements (other than the Soviet Nuclear NIE) and some
  had never heard of them.

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-- Anticipatory political analyses - some political intelligence customers desire more reflective and speculative political forecasts or projections, but some other customers indicate that such forecasts are mostly futile. Other customers believe that whatever is possible is best performed by outside academic experts, whereas still others believe that such analyses must also include consideration of U.S. actions, in which case it should be performed by policy planners who would have better information and expertise on U.S. options.

D.   Directions for Improvement.

    Some of the more basic improvements that could be made obviously lie in expanded and more reliable intelligence dissemination and communications between the Community and its customers. This type of improvement could increase the relevance of intelligence reporting and analysis as well as improve the possibility that "available" intelligence would really influence government decisions. If relevant information already on-hand within the Community is not readily identifiable and disseminatable to interested customers who could use it, it is not clear if that information has any value. Also, if customers are not receiving available information, it is not clear how much direct relevance customers' opinions should have on major production resource allocation decisions (not to mention collection and processing) since the "needed" information may already be "available" in one form or another. Actions that would appear to contribute significantly to improving dissemination and communications include:

-- Regular and widespread issuance of a Community-wide guide and telephone directory to facilitate direct contact by customers.

-- Regular issuance of timely and authoritative Community-wide product indices and production schedules.

-- More extensive Community participation in customer working/ study groups (and vice versa).

-- Reduced artificial barriers to dissemination, such as restrictions on codeword clearances, contractor access, and controlled dissemination.

-- Better mechanisms for soliciting customer opinions and significantly improved mechanisms for providing feedback to them.

-- More complete sharing of information and products between intelligence agencies so that customers primarily reliant upon a single agency are not needlessly cut off from relevant information within other agencies.

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Other means which have also been suggested include more extensive substantive conferences involving customers, improved liaison offices and all-source libraries, more complete cross referencing of intelligence reports and listing of authors' names and phone numbers and more aggressive customer guidance to and acquisition of information from the Community.

● Because allocations of resources to and among various intelligence activities are ultimately made for the purpose of improving the information available to the rest of the government, it should become more clear how and to what extent disseminated intelligence affects or can affect these other programs. Both the Community and its customers could improve their ability to demonstrate the value of specific types of intelligence. Such demonstrations could include:

-- Identification of policy, program and/or budget decisions made in which specific types of intelligence have played a key role, including programs and policies not being carried out by the government primarily because of the significance of intelligence information.

-- In-depth case studies of how and to what extent particular types of intelligence have influenced types of U.S. decisions.

-- Identification in customer studies and analyses of specific key intelligence inputs whose variation causes significant changes in study results and in decision recommendations affecting non-intelligence programs.

● Although the real value of major changes in the Community's budget may not be clear, the Community could significantly improve the quantity and quality of its product line at least in the eyes of the customers surveyed here, with only small changes in the overall intelligence budget (less than 1%). More specific suggestions are contained in Appendix B but overall improvement actions could include:

-- Pruning and streamlining the product lines of the various agencies to reduce redundant, or irrelevant description and analysis while enhancing the presentation of different and relevant viewpoints and analyses in a less voluminous product.

-- Expanded reporting and analyses of topic areas noted as deficient by a number of customers - Warsaw Pact conventional forces, Allied conventional forces, political reporting and analyses, and selected other areas as summarized in Table 2. The bulk of these topics were said to primarily require improved analysis, including better and more thorough exploitation of available HUMINT and COMINT, and expanded

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HUMINT reporting (including State Department) in some areas of the world.

-- Improving Community personnel policies to enhance the development and retention of senior substantive expertise.

-- Reallocating more of the Community's effort to focus upon the future implications of past developments rather than the past developments themselves.

-- Expanded use of contractual analyses to address topics requiring special skills and expertise.

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IV. Conclusions

●   It is clear that the Community, together with certain external sources, performs a valuable service in supplying numerous customers with critical information. This information appears to be sufficient in both quantity and quality to almost completely satisfy many customers, notably those concerned with Soviet strategic nuclear forces and with current political developments in many countries of the world.

●   Other customers exist who are currently less well served·by the Community and by other sources and there is room for considerable improvement both in dissemination and in coverage of some subject areas of high relevance to these customers. Most of these areas require relatively low cost, if any, collection, the primary improvements lying in analysis, production, and dissemination.

●   Although some intelligence is obviously valuable to some government activities, there is room for some doubt as to how sensitive many other government programs and activities may be to selected changes in available intelligence.

V.   Recommendations.

●   The DCI and other elements of the Intelligence Community should substantially improve dissemination and communications with customers by:

-- Regularly issuing a Community-wide guide and telephone listing of substantive analytic offices, making it available to customers throughout at least the offices sampled.

-- Regularly issuing a timely, Community-wide, all-source index of completed and forthcoming products.

-- Significantly reducing artificial barriers to needed dissemination.*

●   The DCI and other elements of the Intelligence Community should substantially improve the quality and quantity of available intelligence products by:

-- Selectively expanding and improving the Community's output in the areas of Warsaw Pact conventional forces, Allied military capabilities, political reporting and analyses, and the other areas of interest to the customers surveyed.

-- Streamlining the intelligence available in some subject areas by reducing product proliferation while expanding the representation of different views in the remainder.

* The Executive Secretariat of the Department of State should also take action on this item.

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-- Improving the relevance and quality of analysis through increased emphasis on the future, through significantly altered personnel policies for intelligence analysts and through the expanded use of contractual expertise.

● Customers should improve their intelligence support by:

-- More aggressively seeking out information throughout Community agencies.

-- Providing more specific and more frequent guidance to the Community on what information and products will be needed in the future.

-- Improving their ability to demonstrate that changes in intelligence products and support significantly affect the operation of their programs.

● The Community should review the detailed problems and suggestions mentioned by customers (see Appendix B) to discern what additional means for improving intelligence support to government operations may be possible.

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APPENDIX A

CONVERSATION GUIDE - FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CUSTOMERS

(These questions were furnished to customers several days prior to their interview to indicate areas of interest.)

1. General Background

   - In general, what are your responsibilities and those of your office, and how can good intelligence help you do a better job?

      o What are your general needs for intelligence (e.g., country, subject, level of detail)?

      o What agencies and offices within the intelligence community provide the bulk of your intelligence support, and what form does this support take (examples)?

      o Where has the intelligence community provided the most useful support to meet your needs?

      o Where has the intelligence community not met your needs?

2. Getting the Product

   - What offices in DIA, CIA, NSA, the Services, and elsewhere in the intelligence community do you contact regularly and directly? Do you interact directly with National Intelligence Officers, Defense Intelligence Officers, National Foreign Intelligence Board and DCI Committees, or other liaison personnel?

   - How do you communicate your immediate and long term needs to the intelligence community?

   - Has your office ever had any problems or difficulties in locating and/or obtaining information from the various organizations in the intelligence community? If so, what were the circumstances? Are there any significant current difficulties?

   - Do you make any significant use of the foreign military capability information found in unclassified, publicly available publications? If so, why? Is it due to any particular difficulties with available intelligence products?

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- How significantly do the following reduce the utility of available intelligence?

  o Time delays

  o Codeword document control procedures (clearances, document storage, etc.)

  o Other security related problems

- What has been your experience in requesting intelligence which required special analytic effort? Have you ever been told that your concerns could not be addressed because of inadequate production resources or because additional collection was required?

- The following are items which either exist or which could exist and which might be useful in locating and obtaining intelligence information. Could you please comment on how important each of these means is or could be to you.

  o An intelligence community consumers guide

  o A (monthly?) index to intelligence reports (DIA, CIA, NSA, etc.)

  o An interagency phone directory of analytic personnel/offices

  o An improved system of reading/lending libraries, perhaps with better information display methods

  o Improved quick-response reproduction

  o An expanded secure phone network

  o A system of computer terminals in users' hands with access to finished intelligence data bases

  o Other (specify)

- Are there any noticeable trends in the quality and quantity of intelligence support available to you? What changes have occurred as a result of community concern over the last 2-3 years?

- What would be your preferred mode of interaction with intelligence producers?

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3. Using the Product

   - Have you noticed any particular problems with the form of intelligence products (e.g., verbiage, abstract technical data)? Have you noticed any particularly valuable presentation means or features (e.g., use of color, analyst names and phone numbers)?

   - Contrast the usefulness of the products of various agencies and offices to you in your job.

   - How much confidence do you place in the information provided by the intelligence community? Which are the stronger and weaker areas? Do you perform or are you aware of post hoc assessments of accuracy?

   - What effort does your office make to expand or adapt the available intelligence product for your use? Are there any perceived biases which you try to correct?

4. Value Assessment

   - What intelligence information now available to you is so critical to your responsibilities that you would allocate more resources to obtain it? Can you give an example of how the intelligence provided in these areas affects significant decisions made in your agency?

   - Would you be willing to pay to get some information faster, more accurately, more frequently updated, etc.? If so, what information? How would this improvement affect decisions made in your agency?

   - If the intelligence support your office now receives (visits, phone calls, briefings, messages, publications) had to be reduced, what would be the items/subject areas which you would prefer to give up first, and how would these affect decisions made in your agency?

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APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW RESULTS

Sections 1-4 contain summaries of the ranges of views expressed by customers within each organization. Common views expressed by a large number of customers in all organizations are found in Section 5, while some highly critical views held by a few customers in most organizations are found in Section 6. Section 7 summarizes the views of those customers who were extremely supportive of the Intelligence Community. Although the comments summarized here were usually not carefully qualified by customers, obviously the comments relate principally to a customer's own particular responsibilities, interests, and experiences.

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1. National Security Council Staff

    ● NSC staff customers expressed opinions ranging from unsatisfied
to full satisfaction with their intelligence support. Their needs were for
timely reporting of current political developments in and between selected
foreign countries, foreign perceptions of U.S. policies and programs, the
status of developments in such areas as human rights and nuclear weapons
proliferation, as well as significant developments in and occasional pro-
jections of foreign military forces, particularly those of the USSR, East
Europe, and NATO. Information provided was used as inputs to Presidential
Review Memorandums and to inform senior NSC officials and the President.
The time frame of principal interest was today, although general long-run
trends were of signficant interest.

    ● The principal source of intelligence was CIA, either directly
or via the NIO (National Intelligence Officer) structure. CIA provided
briefings, some special as well as regular reports, representation to working
groups, cables and FBIS reports, and considerable personal contract; one
(military intelligence) customer mentioned receiving phone calls on any
significant new development. The operational element (DDO) of CIA was also
contacted regularly by some NSC staff customers. The NIO structure was
heavily utilized, primarily as a conduit to CIA but also as a source of
information from the rest of the Community.

    ● Other sources of intelligence support and information were the
State Department, DIA, NSA, and USIA. The State Department provided an ex-
tensive supply of cable traffic to most NSC staff elements as well as the
Morning Summary and some special reports. DIA provided selected publications,
some cables, and there was some limited personal contact and weekly-biweekly
briefings, primarily on military-oriented scientific and technical subjects.
NSA provided a daily-weekly general report and on a few narrow topics would
provide some additional, useful material (to two customers). Foreign opinion
surveys done by USIA were also identified as useful.

    ● NSC staff customers thought that the Community was often responsive
and that it performed well in the areas of military and scientific/technical
intelligence, especially on the USSR. DIA's steadfastness during the B-1
bomber reexamination was praised as was INR's Morning Summary which was said to
be quite relevant and timely for their uses. Also praised was the National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet strategic forces, Special National
Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) in general, a DIA nuclear Proliferation Watch
report, INR/CIA weekly human rights roundups, CIA support for the SALT working
group, and selected special reports, such as those done by CIA on the Kenyatta
succession question.

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- NSC staff customers requested studies and reports informally via their personal contacts (often NIO's) but did no long range projections of needs. Several customers noted that it was hard to know in advance what would be needed. One customer noted receiving a number of early (if not premature) visits from the heads of CIA analytic offices inquiring as to what analyses were desired. One customer noted, however, that requests could be made endlessly on some subjects but with no response. Another customer indicated that he did not like to tell the Community what to do - he believed that the Community should be able to adequately identify topics of potential interest (e.g., South Africa's development of nuclear weapons) and allocate resources to them.

- Some problems were identified. One was the lack of responsiveness of Community elements (principally CIA) to some request, such as for more future oriented analyses and for a better integration of different types of information (e.g., the political motivations and scientific capabilities of foreign groups for nuclear weapon development). Another problem was the often unfocussed nature of much production, even on areas of high interest (e.g., Euro-communism) which was said to greatly reduce the potential utility of products. There was too much historical description and analysis and too little production directly addressing potential problems. One problem of a different sort was mentioned - that some customers seemed either to not be aware of available intelligence or to completely ignore it (e.g., prospects for warning of a European conflict); the related suggestion was that additional personnel for liaison were needed.

- Problems with specific agencies were as follows:

CIA:

-- Some studies "delayed beyond belief" for unknown reasons.

-- Costing of Soviet military programs is misleading.

-- Sometimes assigns analysts with little relevant substantive background to important areas.

-- One customer thought that the value of CIA cable traffic on some "friendly countries" did not seem to justify the political risks that appeared to be necessary during collection.

-- Some customers concerned with growing militarization and morale problems at CIA.

-- Too many "primers" and "general appraisals".

-- One customer mentioned that a more specific table of contents and an index was needed for the Weekly Review.

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<u>DIA</u>:

-- Its political analyses were of little use for most customers.

-- Withholds some information (e.g., products done for the Joint Staff) from CIA.

<u>NSA</u>:

-- Is difficult to reach and was mostly an unknown to most customers.

-- One customer who valued NSA products felt the DCI was trying to prevent NSA from being a direct producer of useful intelligence.

-- Processing/production resources appeared to be insufficient to the task.

-- Some customers were concerned that NSA may be withholding some sensitive COMINT products from CIA, and perhaps from DIA.

<u>Navy</u>:

-- Withholds some intelligence and operational information from CIA, preventing the latter from fully assessing some Soviet ASW exercises.

<u>Community Coordinated Products</u>:

-- Many products are "sterile," limited by the "lowest common denominator rule," and written so as not to be wrong.

-- Community does "a poor job in backing themselves up."

-- The <u>National Intelligence Daily</u> was said to be inferior to INR's <u>Morning Summary</u> by some customers, citing the latter's inclusion of more relevant material.

● Substantive topics identified as requiring more attention were:

-- Better and more integrated political/economic analyses (including focussed analyses of the politics and economics of foreign military establishments and of the Arab world).

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-- Global issues, especially nuclear proliferation
and economics.

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-- _____ politics (surprisingly few intelligence
reports were said to be available).

-- The support establishment, logistics and weaknesses
of Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

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In addition, one customer thought that the State Department could usefully
review and provide to customers a summary of the output of the academic
community on many topics of interest (mostly political).

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2. Department of Defense

a. OSD(ISA)

 ● OSD(ISA) customers expressed opinions ranging from partial
to full satisfaction with their intelligence support. ISA needs were
(predominantly) for political intelligence and (secondarily) military
trends relating to countries, areas, and issues of significant DoD/NSC
concern. Information provided was used to develop, review, and monitor
U.S. military assistance and military sales programs and to prepare senior
DoD officials for negotiations and interactions with foreign governments
on other matters (e.g., base and overflight rights, arms limitations, and
crisis developments). The time periods of principal interest were two--
from today to the near future (a year or less) for most political topics
to several years in the case of policy and force projections.

 ● The principal single source of intelligence support and infor-
mation for ISA customers was DIA, which provided regular and special request
reports, some raw intelligence (e.g., attache reports), as well as extensive
personal contacts between analysts and ISA staff members and, to a lesser
degree, between DIO's and more senior ISA customers. Occasionally, the
Director of DIA would be contacted, and DIA also participated with ISA as
a member of the MBFR task group.

 ● Other sources of intelligence support were CIA, NSA, the State
Department, and, to a lesser degree, NIO's, the Air Force's FTD, and study
contractors. CIA provided a considerable quantity of raw data (e.g.,
cable traffic), and some finished products to many elements of ISA. One
customer also mentioned a number of personal contacts with CIA analysts;
he could also request and receive special analytic products from CIA. NSA
provided one customer with his most valuable product--a specially produced
report for a particular area of interest; NSA also provided some inputs to
ISA via working groups on the Mideast and on chemical warfare. (The NSA
Pentagon representative had arranged some of this support.) The State
Department provided cable traffic and some INR reports to ISA customers.
NIO's were contacted regularly by one customer. ISA study contractors
also provided valuable inputs by performing longer range analytic studies
blending intelligence and U.S. policy considerations.

 ● ISA customers indicated that the Community was generally very
responsive and that they were satisfied both by this responsiveness and
because of their knowledge of what was possible. Elements of DIA support
were praised (e.g., support to the MBFR group, DIA's being relatively fast
and accurate in getting out the facts, production of the Executive Summary,
and use of quantitative confidence estimates). CIA was said to be the
source of the best political analysis and to have improved its economic

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analysis capabilities. NSA, for a few customers, was a most valuable source, particularly on _____* nuclear programs, and (in conjunction with DIA) on chemical warfare programs in _____.*

● Some ISA customers indicated they responded to KIQ forms, others responded to DIA forms, and others requested special reports from time to time. There were no explicit long range projections of requirements, however.

● A number of general problems were identified by ISA customers. One was the difficulty in simply getting good (political) analysis. In addition, there was a need for more anticipatory analyses, as much of the available material was merely descriptive and historical; one customer summed up the problem as a lack of knowledge of "what is building up." (One simple example was given of what was needed--if a country is going to become independent in 6 months, he wanted some appreciation of the conditions likely to be prevailing then.) Also, the implications of foreign develop- ments for U.S. policy needed to be better brought out. One customer believed, however, that the Community was not aware enough of U.S. policy issues to do this well. (One suggestion to improve this situation was mutual attendance at senior staff meetings--ISA and Community agencies.) Other customers thought it unrealistic to expect good predictive or estimative intelligence, while another doubted that the Community could do any better than a good outside scholar in assessing the future. One customer indicated that neither he nor the Community appears to know what the real concerns of the leadership of the Soviet Union are. Other general problems involved dissemination. Cus- tomers indicated that informal channels and contracts were preeminently im- portant in getting good intelligence, that there was no real guide to what may be of interest to customers ("I can't ask for what I don't know exists," was one comment), and that available information sometimes would only be surfaced by the Community as project priorities went up. There were also some administrative difficulties in handling codeword material in ISA which were mentioned (e.g., no use of codeword material after 5 p.m., uneven access to the National Intelligence Daily, and severely limited secure communica- tions--apparently only one secure phone in all of ISA); these problems served to reduce access to and use of codeword information. One customer thought that the availability of relevant intelligence to ISA study contractors had worsened in the past year or so, due to increased dissemination restrictions. One customer noted the occasional issuance of a product tailored to agree with the views of a customer.

● Problems with specific agencies were as follows:

CIA:

-- Produces the best political analyses but was too slow to be of much immediate use.

* Denotes information in codeword channels (SI/TK/G). The specific examples quoted are contained in Appendix C.

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-- One customer couldn't get information on Philippine base negotiating positions.

-- A few customers thought there was insufficient prior consultation on potential products, often making them less relevant to ISA concerns.

<u>DIA</u>:

-- One customer has difficulty getting DIA to do longer-range, anticipatory studies (and used study contractors instead).

-- Weak in technology transfer.

-- Weak in political analysis.

<u>NSA</u>:

-- Rarely dealt with, little contact for most customers.

-- One customer couldn't get some pertinent material available to the NSC staff.

<u>INR</u>:

-- Most customers said they saw little of value from INR itself.

<u>State Department</u>:

-- LIMDIS/NODIS/EXDIS cable traffic highly valued by many customers but were rarely available. Some customers went to considerable trouble visiting other agencies to see selected cables, but other customers did not have the time to do so. One customer summarized the problem--lack of these cables "really slows me down."

<u>Community Coordinated Products</u>:

-- Very time-consuming to produce and often of small marginal value.

● Substantive topics identified as requiring more attention were:

-- Military equipment transfers between Third World countries involving U.S. law (more complete coverage).

-- Philippine base negotiating positions.

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-- Soviet concerns and policy motivations.

-- Southeast Asian and [   ] (too   25X1
   little coverage across the board at present).

[   ]   25X1

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b. OSD(DDR&E)

● OSD(DDR&E) customers expressed opinions ranging from partial to full satisfaction, with strategic nuclear force customers being the most satisfied. DDR&E needs centered principally on the technology levels embodied in the latest foreign military equipment, with the Soviet Union being the principal country of interest. For strategic nuclear force customers, general directions and trends were of principal interest, although a few operational details (e.g., the mechanics of ICBM upper-stage and RV entry into the atmosphere) were valuable. For conventional force customers, it was also important to know how a foreign nation would use various types of combat equipment. In some areas, specific characteristics for weapon and countermeasure design were needed. Information provided was used in reviewing the effectiveness of, selecting, and pacing the development of new U.S. weapons systems and in performing net technical assessments of U.S. and foreign equipment. Considerable work in these areas was done by study contractors. The time period of interest was principally in the future - from 5 to as much as 20 years in some cases.

● The principal single source of intelligence support was DIA which provided weekly "S&T" briefings (principally), regular publications, and some personal contacts at the senior level. The DIO for SALT was used extensively by one customer. DIA also participated in the drafting of Development Concept Papers (DCP's) (by reviewing "the threat") and was said to do a fairly good job. DIA's scientific and technical intelligence reporting was characterized as small, partially dependent on the Services, but was definitely improving and was often equivalent or superior to that of CIA. (One customer pointed out that DIA tried to respond to all requirements, whereas CIA could pick and choose, thus, CIA selection may be a significant explanation of some apparent quality differences.)

● Other sources of intelligence support and information were collectively quite significant and included CIA, NSA, Military Services, contractor studies, and by foreign manufacturers' advertising. CIA provided selected technical publications to DDR&E, some of which were said to be quite useful (particularly on strategic systems) and OSR would be contacted at times. NSA would sometimes provide some useful data, and there was some limited interaction on selected topics between CIA/NSA analysts and DDR&E throughout the year. The Military Services were, however, a much more important source of intelligence information for DDR&E, especially for conventional force customers. The Services provided some direct support (e.g., monthly Navy intelligence briefings for two customers), indirect support in the form of expertise (e.g., the Air Force's Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems office was considered a center of expertise on both U.S. and Soviet RV technology) and, most significantly, studies. These studies, as well as DDR&E contractual studies, were identified as a very significant, perhaps even pre-eminent, conduit for intelligence information because for most DDR&E customers, intelligence "had to relate to a specific problem to be of interest." Advertising by foreign equipment manufacturers was an important source of information on developments of non-communist world weapons systems.

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- DDR&E customers indicated that a good deal of basic information seemed to be available, too much to read or absorb in the time available. In addition, much of it was of no direct and immediate use. Many decisions, it was noted, were not precisely tied to intelligence inputs. There were frustrations in some areas, but in many cases, Soviet security practices were considered to be the real limitation. Despite problems, DDR&E customers were satisfied that their most critical needs were addressed one way or another. Most of their time was said to be spent on U.S. systems ("We don't live for Soviet systems (alone)" was one comment), and there was little time available to search out all the information in the Community.

- Most DDR&E customers relied upon informal feedback to guide the Community, although some specific requests were made from time to time, with varying results. One office mentioned responding to requirements solicitations (primarily by DIA) and also indicated that long term requirements are stated during the preparation of RDT&E Mission Area Summaries.

- A number of general problems were identified by the various DDR&E customers; many dealt with compartmentation and dissemination restrictions. 25X1

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Several customers noted that:

-- Many of the Community's products were broad but not deep.

-- The Community does not seem to be able to say why a foreign nation (especially the USSR) is following some development path.

-- Answers to critical questions about how military equipment would be utilized (e.g., how would tanks cluster, how extensive would night combat be, what would be the principal targets for jammers?) were sometimes "quite shaky".

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-- The overlap of CIA/DIA production in a number of areas (e.g., Soviet navy).

● Problems with specific agencies were as follows:

DIA:

-- Poor career structure for analysts limits what can be expected from DIA.

-- At least occasionally - too much U.S. doctrinal thinking reflected in products.

-- For one customer - "repeatedly asked (for some specific analysis) with no response." Another customer indicated that there was no way for him to influence even the selection of topics to be addressed in the weekly briefings.

-- Many publications of limited use because their information will be 1-2 years old when finally available. (This may be a printing problem).

-- Most guides and indices (e.g., the RIP) are not timely and are incomplete.

-- Many questionnaires "just seem to disappear into DIA."

* Denotes information in codeword channels (SI/TK/G). The specific examples quoted are contained in Appendix C.

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CIA

-- A "peculiar situation; there should be a closer relationship between CIA and DDR&E, and improvement is definitely needed."

-- No way for DDR&E to know what is being studied in CIA, what products are in preparation or even what products have already been issued; in addition, there is no way to influence their selection of work.

-- Output is uneven and irregular and coverage seems very thin on most conventional military force topics (e.g., a report on Warsaw Pact air attack plans against NATO was done some years ago and contained little new usable information. The customers have seen, however, no CIA reports at all on that subject since).

-- Worst record in providing available intelligence data to DDR&E study contractors.

NSA

-- Information sometimes seems quite slow in getting out of NSA because it is held up until fully analyzed (e.g., significant characteristics of _____ * were available in NSA two years sooner than in DDR&E). Another customer indicated that useful data could be "squeezed out of NSA" if a specific request were levied and time permitted. Another customer opined that there must be much unanalyzed _____ * data at NSA. Other customers indicated very little interaction with NSA, no way to know what is or could be collected, processed, and analyzed, no NSA acceptance of contractor support, and for one customer, no method to really approach the agency. "We don't even know if they monitor (some subject), ... can't get a name, ... no management method (to get data from NSA)".

Navy

-- Over-compartmentation and clearance billets were the worst problems for two customers--seriously reducing their knowledge of Soviet ASW capabilities.

Service intelligence organizations

-- Many long range weapons forecasts were called "completely misleading" because of their inadequate comprehension of technological advances.

* Denotes information in codeword channels (SI/TK/G). The specific examples quoted are contained in Appendix C.

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● Substantive topics identified as requiring more attention were:

-- Warsaw Pact plans and capabilities to destroy and/or disrupt NATO rear area installations (air bases, communications, logistics) using its networks of agents in Western Europe (alleged by the customer to be some 16,000).

-- Soviet ASW countermeasures.

-- ECCM capabilities of Soviet anti-radiation missiles.

-- Improved estimates of the timing of significant enemy weapon upgrades (e.g. ICBM accuracy). (Precise forecasts would not be believable but knowledge of whether a new weapon system or modification is "a 1980 threat, a 1985 threat, or a 1990 threat" would be useful.)

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c. OSD(PA&E)

● OSD(PA&E) customers expressed opinions ranging from unsatisfied to full satisfaction, with strategic nuclear force customers being the most satisfied. PA&E needs were for information on the quantity and quality of the conventional and nuclear military forces of the Warsaw Pact[⬚] of the two Koreas, and selected other countries. Needs included current and projected orders of battle and equipment holdings, equipment character- istics, and operational capabilities and limitations. Considerable detail was required in the area of conventional forces. Information provided was used in formulating force planning guidance for DoD, in analytical studies, and in the preparation of issue papers for the Secretary of Defense during the annual program review cycle. The time period of principal interest was from today to 10-15 years in the future.

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● The principal overall source of intelligence, especially on conventional military forces, was DIA, which provided weekly briefings, some workshops, computer tapes containing order of battle information, numerous publications, some personal contact with analysts and DIO's, and access to a codeword library.

● Other sources were CIA and the Military Services. CIA provided Soviet strategic force intelligence via the SALT Working Group (these are often Community inputs), and other intelligence via a number of publications, and some personal contact, usually with more senior customers. PA&E was also a source of information for CIA, providing it data from a Warsaw Pact/ NATO data base. The Military Services also provided significant inputs both directly and indirectly as inputs to Service/OSD studies.

● PA&E customers indicated that information on Soviet strategic forces was adequate and complete and that there were no significant information deficiencies. DIA's integrity in projecting the air defense threat to the B-1 and to cruise missiles was also praised. Several customers dealing with conventional forces indicated that DIA's DIPP (Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning) was very important and was potentially the single most important publication for the mid-long term force planning performed by PA&E.

● PA&E customers mentioned responding to numerous questionnaires on intelligence needs but were disappointed because there was no feedback and no evidence of any responsive changes. (Some customers thought this was a serious problem.) There were also a lot of informal interactions but no other explicit requirements statements. On specific product requests, some customers indicated few problems, whereas other customers said that DIA, while it would never turn you down, may take several years to respond.

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● PA&E problems lay in several different areas. One of the most serious was a long-standing and perplexing lack of codeword billets for PA&E personnel. In the various sections of PA&E, it was indicated that from 50-95 percent of the personnel do not have and cannot get such clearances, even though many of the personnel have previously had such clearances. It was said that efforts to secure additional billets have been fruitless for years, with the result that many personnel have essentially no access to a large quantity of information (especially from COMINT) which could be extremely important to their evaluations. This was the most important problem for some PA&E customers.* In other areas, technical analyses of weapons were said to be too heavy on description, too light on effectiveness. Some customers indicated that intelligence analysts often seemed to have no idea how their information would be used and that this lack of knowledge could greatly reduce product value. (An example of a misleading AS-4 analysis was given.) (One suggestion was to provide improved feedback to intelligence analysts.) Some chronic problems with force projections were mentioned (e.g., continued misanticipation of a Soviet third generation attack submarine), but, for at least one customer, "this has not really affected any decisions." Some customers mentioned serious consistency problems between the data provided by different agencies or even by different offices in DIA. One example of the type of problem of concern was strength estimates - there appeared to be significant and unexplained inconsistencies between different products of DIA and other sources including, for Allied governments, <u>Defense Planning Questionnaire</u> responses.

● Problems pertaining to specific agencies were:

<u>DIA</u>:

-- Most recurring products were not "up to speed", were often inconsistent and frequently seemed to lack coordination between the various elements of DIA.

-- Seems to not want to find any look-down/shoot-down anti-air capability.

-- Very slow response for regular products (4-6 weeks).

<u>CIA</u>:

-- Contact is very light.

-- "Get a lot of watered down publications which are not terribly useful."

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* The causes of this unusual situation were not clear. Some customers indicated a lack of billets, others told of internal administrative restrictions, while others said that background investigations took too long or that no serious effort had been made to request and justify additional billets. Regardless of cause, however, the effects are the same -- reduced information availability.

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-- "Tasking is impossible, but sometimes they will produce something you want."

-- Coordination comments on the DIPP are very uneven and incomplete.

NSA and INR

-- Almost no contact.

● A few customers mentioned an inherent "intelligence" problem -- that reports dealing at length with only "the threat" (such as the USSR strategic forces NIE) are susceptible to misuse or misinterpretation in that a balanced and comparable evaluation of U.S. forces and capabilities is not provided.

● Substantive topics identified as requiring more attention were:

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-- Military forces, equipment, capabilities and limitations of [   ] including projections similar to those available for the Warsaw Pact in the DIPP.

-- More frequent, more detailed and better estimative analyses of the nature of Warsaw Pact conventional force operations under realistic combat conditions, including problems and limitations, and explicitly addressing logistics, maintenance, command and control, and the effects of training and attrition.

-- More timely conventional force information in the DIPP (a more regular publication rate - 1/year - was mentioned); also better information on confidence levels and more complete references were desired.

-- More specificity was needed in DIPP land force equipment projections.

-- Present and prospective Soviet production of improved conventional munitions (ICM).

-- More coordinated intelligence projections of future submarine noise levels.

-- Soviet force structure planning perspectives.

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d. OSD (Net Assessment)

● OSD (Net Assessment) customers expressed opinions ranging from not satisfied to partial satisfaction with their intelligence support. Their needs were for a broad spectrum of information relating to the rela- 25X1 tive strengths and weaknesses of the nuclear and conventional military forces of the Warsaw Pact,☐the two Koreas,☐China, and selected countries in the Mideast. Information available was used to develop "force balance" analyses for the Secretary of Defense. The time period of interest was today, some recent history, and a short period into the future.

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● The principal single source of intelligence support was DIA, which provided numerous regular publications, weekly briefings, and some personal contact with analysts, DIO's, as well as with the Director.

● Other sources were, however, cumulatively more important; these were CIA, NSA, the Military Services, NIO's, and study contractors. CIA provided selected publications and would respond to some requests, while NSA, especially the Soviet group, provided some significant material for studies. The NSA Pentagon representative had facilitated receipt of some information. The Military Services provided useful material both directly and indirectly via their studies. NIO's were called upon to provide answers to some brief questions. Contractual analyses, however, were a principal source of information on the subjects of greatest interest to Net Assessment; they, in turn, primarily used DIA, NSA, and Military Service data in their work.

● Net Assessment customers indicated that the Community did a credible job in monitoring the order of battle of the combat elements of Communist military forces and in assessing the technical characteristics of their major weapons systems. In addition, other valued services were CIA's ability to retrieve foreign press articles and a monthly CIA (OSR) review. It was thought that NSA, of all the agencies, probably did the best job of analysis on the things it attempted to do (an analysis of _____*_____ was one example given).

● Net Assessment customers, in addition to responding to standard Community requirements inquiries, had tried over a period of years to obtain analyses of high priority to them, but they noted no great changes and few improvements in the areas of their greatest need.

● A number of problems were identified, most of which centered on an inability to get the Community to seriously and systematically study subjects other than those that were thought to be the Community's forté (given above). (Topics of principal interest are given below.) A related, serious problem was the Community's resistance to providing the best intelligence to the study contractors and consultants who Net Assessment found useful in addressing these neglected subject areas. Restrictions

* Denotes information in codeword channels (SI/TK/G). The specific examples quoted are contained in Appendix C.

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or prohibitions on the release of codeword information were the principal
problem (a DIA refusal to grant access to IRONBARK papers was the most
recent occurrence). Other problems mentioned were the lack of a central
substantive library (especially one usable by contractors), the decen-
tralization of translation services among many agencies making it impossible
to find out what has or has not been translated and to focus the effort
on some subjects of interest, and a lack of customer knowledge about
research going on in the various agencies (some reports, when they come in,
are a surprise).

- Substantive topics identified as requiring more attention were:

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  -- Warsaw Pact [   ] logistics, training, doctrine,
     tactics, command and control capabilities, limitations
     and weaknesses.

  -- Warsaw Pact concepts for employing tactical nuclear
     weapons.

  -- Soviet motivations and perceptions of the U.S.

  -- The effects of foreseeable Soviet resource constraints
     (e.g., oil and manpower in the 1980s) on the Soviet economy
     and defense budget.

- Net Assessment customers made these additional suggestions:

  -- Greater use should be made of study contractors and con-
     sultants, many of which now have substantially greater
     analytic capabilities (at least in areas of interest to
     Net Assessment) than many elements of the intelligence
     community. In addition, study contractors were said to
     have greater organizational flexibility as well as experi-
     ence and access (as a result of other contracts) to some
     data on U.S. forces; thus, comparative analyses can be
     readily accomplished.

  -- Prepare the annual "Soviet Strategic Forces NIE" from a
     Soviet perspective rather than from a U.S. perspective.

  -- Do more inter-nation comparisons of similar types of forces
     to display and contrast foreign reactions to evolving
     threats. (For instance, a comparative analysis of recent

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     [   ] reorganizations was desired to show how each force
     was reacting to anticipated changes in the nature of land
     warfare.)

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-- Where lack of expertise on U.S. forces would impede a net assessment, use <u>foreign perceptions</u> of the U.S. "threat."

-- Establish a mock "Soviet Planning Board" to continually review the "foreign" threat and to make Soviet resource allocations from a Soviet viewpoint.

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e. Joint Staff

• Joint Staff customers expressed opinions ranging from almost full satisfaction to delight with their intelligence support. Collectively, their needs covered a broad range of subjects--strategic and conventional forces of Warsaw Pact, [   ] and other countries, national-security-related political subjects, and selected economic topics. Historical analyses, current events reporting, and projections were all needed by some element of the Joint Staff. Information provided was used to support SALT and other negotiations, nuclear and conventional warplan preparation and review, crisis management and for some current operational planning (e.g., SR-71 missions). The time period of principal interest was from "today" (for current operations, negotiations, and crisis management) to 5-15 years in the future.

• The principal source of intelligence support (by far) was DIA, which provided daily and weekly briefings and regular publications as well as special reports and memorandums. Frequent personal contact at all levels was mentioned (some with the Director of DIA and with Defense Intelligence Officers (DIO's); principally, however, with DIA analysts in the National Military Intelligence Center, in the JCS liaison office, and in support teams ("cells") for various parts of the Joint Staff). DIA analysts would participate in Joint Staff study projects and physical proximity of DIA offices to the Joint Staff was also important. One customer noted in summary that DIA was "just like being on the Joint Staff."

• Other sources of intelligence support were CIA and to lesser degrees, NSA, the Military Services' intelligence organizations, State Department, and interagency sources such as NIO's. CIA provided selected finished products and some raw data, and a few Joint Staff personal contacts were made with CIA representatives to interagency study groups or with friends who worked there. NSA provided a few reports and a little personal contact, the State Department provided cable traffic (including some LIMDIS/NODIS cables), and the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division was identified as providing technical intelligence to some customers. (DIA would usually be used as an intermediary if contact with other organizations was necessary, and DIA would usually decide this.)

• Joint Staff customers noted improvements in their intelligence support in the last 6-8 years and had high confidence in the product. One opinion volunteered was that there were few surprises--most of the important things to know were known. Another customer indicated that it was supremely important to avoid strategic surprises (e.g., Soviet development of a broad area submarine detection and tracking capability); he believed, however, that the Community did a good job in providing this type of coverage. The responsiveness of DIA was often praised, and some customers

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valued some new DIA publications. Various customers also valued highly the interagency SALT Monitoring Report and the responsiveness of the entire Community during the 1976 Soviet ICBM silo dismantling episode. When available, CIA and DIA competitive analyses were liked because each agency would pick up on different aspects of a problem.

● A number of customers indicated that their future requirements for intelligence production were very hard to specify but that the Community seems to know what is needed. An example given of a significant Community initiative were improvements in Warsaw Pact manpower estimates undertaken to support MBFR talks. One specific future problem was identified--verification of cruise missile force levels and performance.

● A few problems did exist, but it was said that most could be worked out. One recurring problem was the development and use of different (and somewhat inconsistent) data bases for different but related problems and countries.

● Problems with specific agencies were as follows:

CIA:

-- For a few customers, a "frustrating" lack of data.

-- Occasionally has a "mind fix" on some subjects, such as BACKFIRE bomber capabilities.

Navy (NISC):

-- One customer said he had found the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) to be useless (Air Force and Navy analysts at FTD were said to be much more responsive).

Community Coordinated Products

-- Time delays before these products are available to the working level significantly reduce their utility.

● Substantive topics identified as requiring more attention were:

-- Soviet intentions and motivations. Several customers said this was a "virtually unmined area" and that the U.S. Government as a whole has few insights into Soviet politics, personalities and policies and that although we may know what they're doing, we don't know why.

-- African problems (A general lack of resources for this area was noted).

-- The status of Soviet ASAT, high energy laser development programs and SS-16/20 deployment. (These topics were believed to be collection-limited.)

-- A Soviet economic model and data base to support recovery denial targeting analyses.

-- Soviet perceptions of who their enemies would be during a nuclear war.

-- Unexpected strategies for conventional warfare in Europe, including possibilities for an attack through Austria into Southern Germany.

-- How Warsaw Pact [   ] conventional forces would   25X1
   operate in combat - e.g., how would attrition affect
   the rate of ground force advance and aircraft sortie
   rates, at what point would reserve and/or second
   echelon ground forces be committed and how would
   logistics and maintenance problems affect combat
   capability?

●   Finally, one customer indicated that he believed it important to stabilize the structure of the Community and its agencies sometime soon for the turbulance of recent years has distracted both analysts and managers from more substantive concerns.

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f. Military Services' Headquarters

● Customers in the Military Services' headquarters force structure analysis organizations* indicated that they were mostly satisfied with their intelligence support. Their principal need was for basic information on foreign military forces, including orders of battle, equipment holdings and performance, strategic and tactical plans for employing same, and, for conventional forces, logistics, maintenance, and other factors affecting force sustainability in combat. A secondary need for some customers was political information relating to the future availability of allies, bases, overflight rights, and so forth. Countries of primary interest were those directly related to DOD planning guidance--USSR, East Europe, [   ] and the 25X1 two Koreas. Information provided was used to conduct force and equipment capabilities analyses, war games, and net assessments to support development of their parent Service program and budget proposals. Analyses were also performed for the JCS and OSD. The time period of principal interest was 5-10 years in the future.

● The principal source of intelligence support was usually their parent Service general intelligence organization which directly provided some information and support and also served as a conduit for information from other sources. For instance, the Army's Intelligence Analysis Group provided intelligence inputs to an annual report (Army Force Planning Data and Assumptions) which contained projected force characteristics and which was heavily used in studies performed by the Concepts Analysis Agency and elsewhere in the Army; Air Force Intelligence provided extensive personal contact, weekly briefings and technical reports to Studies and Analysis; and the Navy's Field Operational Intelligence Office and Intelligence Support Center were also mentioned as providing useful analyses and contact to the Systems Analysis Division.

● Other sources of intelligence support were DIA, CIA, NSA, and NIO's. DIA sometimes would serve as the conduit for reports and publications between the Military Services, would be the source of an occasional special report, and provided some personal contacts at the working level, and, to a lesser degree, DIO's would interact with more senior customers. CIA provided some selected publications, and some informal contacts were available to all organizations, although the extent of these varied widely. Customers in one organization said they particularly valued CIA contacts. NSA was occasionally contacted directly by these customers, especially by one of the Services. NIE's and other interagency products were selectively available to two of the organizations, and one senior customer would occasionally interact with an NIO.

* The Army's Concepts Analysis Agency, the Navy's Systems Analysis Division, and the Air Force's Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff (Studies and Analysis)

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● Service customers indicated that they thought intelligence support had improved significantly over the last 4-5 years, attributing much of the improvement to less restrictive security practices. There was a little less mystery now, one customer said (partially due to Congressional hearings and leaks in the press, as well as to the increased availability of satellite imagery information in non-codeword channels). Service customers had high confidence in the all source intelligence product and thought the Community did a pretty good job on equipment quantities and technical characteristics. The DIPP was used extensively for future threat projections, with the Air Force also using the NIE for strategic force projections because it contained more widely agreed upon data and was more timely for their uses. DIA's Trends and Developments report was also mentioned as useful as was the FTD "White Stork" project which allowed users to search out the appearance of particular key words in foreign literature.

● Some customers mentioned responding to Community solicitations of intelligence interests, others requested special reports from time to time, and there was considerable informal interaction. No real long-range projections of needs were made, however. Some customers thought that there was an imbalanced priority of effort between satisfying the needs of national level senior officials and those of the working level (with the former preempting most of the effort). Another customer could not understand the Community's efforts in a particular substantive area, indicating that some "critical questions are worked on by one guy, while 50 people work on silly problems." Another customer thought that the Community was often driven by Congressional pressure (e.g., Soviet Civil Defense analyses).

● A number of problems were mentioned. Some customers noted that different levels of classification sometimes present significantly different pictures (e.g., the higher level material revealing systems, modifications, plans, and capabilities that "we didn't know about"). One customer indicated that he had recently found that downgrading/sanitization procedures were not working and cited three instances in the previous three months where NSA (COMINT) material of considerable significance to his organization had not been included in products available to him via normal service and DIA channels. Other customers said that there would sometimes be problems in locating the most knowledgeable people to address some topic. Available guides, such as the DIA Users Guide and the DOD phone directory, were said to be inferior (less detailed) to formerly available material, such as a phone directory put out by DIA several years ago and a list of Naval Intelligence Command personnel published by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Several customers noted that:

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-- The Community was extremely poor in exploiting Communist military writings (foreign university professors were said to do the best job) and in debriefing defectors and emigres (e.g., only by coincidence were some important ICBM silo details obtained).

-- They doubted that the available COMINT information (on a variety of subjects) was adequately exploited.

-- The intelligence personnel drawdown following Vietnam had affected areas other than Southeast Asia.

-- The utility of many Community publications was impaired by lengthy publishing lags and old intelligence cutoff dates.

-- Considerable efforts had to be made to adapt the available intelligence to the problems at hand (e.g., making Red and Blue tank repair times comparable).

-- Opinions of military operational people could often be useful in analyzing foreign weaponry and forces, but that these opinions and experience appeared to be infrequently utilized.

Finally, one of the three organizations had experienced considerable difficulty obtaining billets and clearing personnel for codeword material (a real adminis- trative burden was said to be caused by Community clearance procedures), and two of the organizations had problems obtaining access to secure communications.

● Problems with specific agencies were as follows:

DIA

-- Some customers said that a request for a special DIA product frequently would encounter lots of resistance and that its ultimate availability was unpredictable; if available, however, the product would be finished only after several months had elapsed.

NSA

-- Seems to be impossible to speed NSA processing of material of interest to several customers.

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Community Coordinated Products

-- Customers in one organization said NIE's and other inter-
agency products were no longer received because the
Community had reduced distribution and had cut out their
organization's copy "for economy reasons."

-- Some customers believed that these products are sometimes
"political documents" and do not necessarily reflect
balanced views (e.g., they were said to over-emphasize the
strategic role of Soviet attack submarines and to be
needlessly ambiguous on the factors affecting cruise missile
defenses).

-- One customer indicated that he had tried over a period of
time to get an interagency product on peripheral nuclear
attack forces but had been unsuccessful.

• Substantive topics identified as requiring more attention were:

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-- [_____] ground, air, naval data (more complete,
detailed and accurate information on current forces and
equipment and projections of same covering the period
5-8 years out)

-- Sustainability-related topics for Warsaw Pact [_____]
conventional forces (maintenance, logistics)   25X1

-- Soviet plans and targeting doctrine for nuclear and
conventional forces

25X1

-- Warsaw Pact [_____] war reserve stockpiles of tactical
missiles, other munitions and equipment (A concern was
that we know little about the quantity or purpose of
equipment stockpiles not assigned to front line units--
e.g., what happens to Warsaw Pact tanks when they are
phased out of front line service.)

-- Warsaw Pact multi-sensor target acquisition capabilities
(for ground combat in Europe)

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-- [_____] naval capabilities

-- Readiness of Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and how much
warning time their preparations could provide us

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-- Soviet capabilities to produce and deploy (in quantity) improved conventional munitions

-- Warsaw Pact intentions with regard to communications jamming against NATO forces, along with likely allocations of available capability

-- Soviet plans and capabilities to employ their merchant marine and fishing fleets in support of combat operations

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3. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

● ACDA customers were mostly satisfied with their intelligence support. ACDA needs were for information relating to foreign compliance with treaties in force (e.g., SALT, ABM, nuclear test, non-proliferation, CW/BW). "Negative information" was of significant value (i.e., that no activities of a particular sort were going on). Interest in these areas was sharply related to the specific terms of treaties (e.g., the number of ICBM silos). Also important were information and analyses to support ongoing and potential arms negotiations (mostly with the USSR) and military equipment flows affecting the "Third World." Needs in these areas were for mainly numerical data and some key qualitative factors and net assessments. Information provided was used to assess current treaty compliance, to negotiate with foreign powers over arms levels and military equipment transfers, and to prepare arms control impact statements. The time period of principal interest was from today (for verification and arms transfer information) to 5-8 years or more in the future.

● The principal single source of intelligence was CIA which provided representation to working groups, daily and other publications, cable traffic, some special papers and briefings, and numerous other personal contacts.

● Other sources of intelligence and information were, however, cumulatively more significant; these were DIA, NSA, the State Department and INR, interagency sources, and OSD (PA&E). DIA provided numerous daily and other publications, some briefings and special reports. NSA provided separate reports directly to certain arms negotiators. The State Department provided cable traffic to ACDA, and INR's Morning Summary was also available. Interagency products such as NIE's and the SALT Monitoring Report were available, and one interagency committee (JAEIC--the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee) was also an important source. NIO's were frequent contacts, and the DCI would be contacted from time to time. OSD (PA&E) was considered a good source of comparable data on [   ] 25X1 conventional forces.

● ACDA customers thought the Community was generally very responsive (even engaging in some collection at ACDA's request). CIA's OSR was mentioned as trying to be very helpful. The product was generally pretty good, and it was not thought possible to know everything (e.g., to anticipate South Africa's nuclear programs). Improvements in the NIE on Soviet Strategic Forces have been made (e.g., ranges of estimates are now included), CIA did a good job in presenting Community-wide views in the SALT working group, and CIA papers on Soviet SALT and MBFR decision-making were mentioned as valuable, as was ACDA participation in and reports from the JAEIC. DIA's DIPP was a good source for future data, and the Trends and Developments was also liked. NSA's "V group" liaison office was identified as quite responsive.

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• Some ACDA customers took an active, if informal, role in formulating requirements, principally by personal contacts with various elements of the community, including IC Staff collection "requirements" committees (e.g., COMIREX). ACDA would also respond to Community solicitations (e.g., KIQ's and DIA questionnaires).

• Some problems were mentioned. Products from elements of the Community were sometimes apparently politicized--one customer noted the unresolved and unexplained differences between CIA and DIA on the Soviet ABM program. Some customers believed that the Community went to more trouble to support itself than to support outside customers. One customer noted, in this regard, that CIA and DIA objected to ACDA's acquisition of a DIAOLS/COINS terminal, even though ACDA was willing to pay for the terminal out of its own budget. ACDA customers indicated some problems with clearances (obtaining them was a very slow process) and also a number of customers thought that a new DCI policy of no new codeword billets for any agency would result in some intelligence just not being used. (This was a problem for ACDA because of growth in the number of ACDA personnel working on intelligence-supported projects.)

• Problems with specific agencies were as follows:

CIA

-- Sometimes there is a failure to carry through analyses to address items of obvious high customer concern--(e.g., CIA's not addressing the defense budget implications of foreseeable Soviet economic problems).

-- A report on the balance of conventional forces in Europe was severely criticized as "primitive" and not at all informative.

DIA

-- Several customers said that DIA was "paranoid about raw data" getting to customers, even information from other agencies.

-- Somewhat bureaucratic in responding to special product requests (but usually would ultimately respond).

-- One customer thought that DIA's orders of battle were useless because so many units were not contained therein. Another customer, however, thought that this was probably a compartmentation problem and that the additional details were available in codeword channels.

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-- DIA's [____] capabilities study, although addressing an important area, was said to be mostly useless (DPQ responses were thought better).

-- Emphasizes the menacing aspects of foreign developments rather than presenting an objective view of strengths and weaknesses.

Community-Coordinated Products

-- The DCI's Weapons and Space System Intelligence Committee (WSSIC) was said to be more of a potential source of information than an actual source because ACDA was not considered to be an appropriate recipient of its reports.

● Substantive problems identified as requiring more attention were:

-- Soviet concealment, camouflage, and deception practices, present and projected (an IIM was desired).

-- Improved intelligence on [_____] (DCID priorities may be misapplied in this area--production needs big improvement but not necessarily collection.)   25X1

-- [_____]   25X1

-- Better (more complete) information of Third World military equipment transfers.

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4. State Department

- State Department customers expressed general satisfaction with their intelligence support and indicated that most of their key concerns were taken care of. Their needs were predominantly for information on the internal politics and economics and foreign policies of other nations, as well as foreign perceptions of U.S. policies, foreign diplomatic instructions to missions, and selected information on military forces and on "global" issues such as terrorism, nuclear weapons development, and drug traffic. Most needed was current factual and interpretive reporting, although longer term analyses were also useful. Information provided was used to coordinate overall U.S. foreign policy, to support negotiations, and to provide foreign policy advice, including the preparation of policy papers for the Secretary of State, the President, and the Congress. The time period of principal interest was from today to about a year in the future, although general longer run trends were of interest for a few problems.

- The principal source of intelligence support and information was INR and State Department cable traffic. INR was said to act primarily as a "facilitative link" to the rest of the Intelligence Community. INR analysts provided most customers with a morning briefing or discussion covering overnight events and a pouch containing codeword material of relevance (e.g., the Morning Summary, National Intelligence Daily, cables, NSA reports). These discussions took place in customer offices. INR also prepared some short analyses on special subjects, especially for the Secretary, and (together with the Secretariat) issued the Morning Summary. The principal source of information for almost all State customers was, however, State Department current reporting, especially cables.

- Other sources of intelligence support and information were overt media and personal contacts, CIA, NIO's, DIA, the Military Services, NSA, USIA, and the FBI. For a large part of the world, the amount of overt material available was said to be enormous, with academic experts, journalists, businessmen, and one's own personal foreign contacts being considered quite useful. Particularly mentioned were monographs from the American Universities' Field Service, a newsletter put out by a local office concerned with human rights in Latin America, a New Yorker journalist, and regional experts such as Doak Barnet. CIA was said to provide a considerable quantity of valuable information--particularly station cables, personal contacts with DDO and other personnel, biographic data, and FBIS and all source analytic reports. NIO's would also provide some reports and information and served as a conduit for intelligence (mostly from CIA) for some customers. DIA and the Military Services provided both cable traffic and analytic reports to State customers, while NSA provided some ____*____ to INR for State customers, and in one case, there was some direct personal contact (via INR). Other sources of occasional value were ⌐

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⌐   USIA translations, and the FBI.

*Denotes information in codeword channels (SI/TK/G). The specific examples quoted are contained in Appendix C.

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● State customers indicated that the Community did a good job in supplying them with material, that the chief problem was selection; most customers did not believe that any more reporting or analysis was needed. INR's daily visit with codeword material was praised as "a very important operation." CIA's biographical data base, economic modeling and analysis, and the informal methods of access to personnel, especially to field stations, were valued highly. DIA's military biographic data was also liked as was the Community's performance in numerous specific subject areas (e.g., Soviet/Chinese relationships, Japanese and North Korean foreign relations, Southeast Asia drug traffic, Republic of China nuclear weapon developments, Greek base negotiations). Specifically valued were the (U.S.) Taiwan Defense Command's China Watch weekly report, some INR contractual analyses, a CIA analysis of the Kenyatta succession question and current reporting related to assassination attempts, DIA's reporting on Indonesian fighting and on military politics in Argentina, and NSA's reporting on some [   ]   *   .

25X1

● State customers indicated that they informally tasked INR and requested and suggested areas of interest to CIA (both the DDO and DDI) and that CIA was very responsive. Some suggestions would also be made to NIO's who would generally respond; requesting an interagency product, however, was much more difficult. Most requests were short term, and there were no long term projections of requirements.

● There were a few general problems identified by State customers. A perplexing problem was said to be the causative factors in internal politics--why is what's happening happening? It was said that we rarely can discern these factors. There was often a need to embed current analyses more fully into a longer-range historical context. A few customers indicated that they desired more long-term and indepth analyses from the Community, but other customers preferred other sources for this perspective--e.g., academic experts or the informal face-to-face reflections of a CIA station chief. (It was said, however, that there was occasionally some feeling "in the field" that it was improper for CIA personnel to discuss future implications of current developments.) One customer thought that estimative (political) products are a waste of money. A few customers believed that in some areas (e.g., Middle East and Southern Africa) the United States was too dependent on information provided by cooperative foreign governments who tell us what they want us to hear. A potential future problem mentioned by one customer was that most State customers who had codeword clearances had SI but not TK, and, thus, some relevant material would not be available to them, especially from the more modern collection systems. The DCI's limits on billets would exacerbate this problem.

*Denotes information in codeword channels (SI/TK/G). The specific examples quoted are contained in Appendix C.

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● Problems with specific agencies were as follows:

INR -- Some customers were concerned that INR had declined in size too much in recent years so that there was no longer any mobile pool of analysts who could be put to work on important but transitory topics. Several customers indicated that INR was rarely the originator of much substance anymore, being primarily a liaison unit and writing one to two page summaries on various subjects, usually for the Secretary.

CIA -- One customer indicated that he was disenchanted with the value of CIA reports from [   ] and was concerned that the potential political cost did not seem justified on the basis of the material he was seeing.

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DIA -- Several customers indicated that DIA political reporting and analysis were weak (attaches specifically were said to often be insensitive to political nuances).

Service Intelligence Organizations -- Several customers said that the political reporting of the 500th M.I. Group in Asia had for years been "worse than useless"--usually being wrong, out of date, duplicative and/or misleading.

NSA -- One customer indicated that NSA material on ____*____ ____*____ was denied to him on security grounds and that he could only obtain a gross impression of the subject by having it filtered through the one INR analyst who was cleared to see it. He noted that NSA, in handling such material, is much more "mechanical" in its decisions on who can read it and contrasted the situation with CIA, who was said to be more imaginative in granting access to its "sensitive" products. (The difference appeared to be that NSA would grant access to only the most senior policymakers and their immediate senior staff, whereas CIA would provide material on a selective basis to the different echelons involved.) Another customer indicated that NSA resisted direct contact with customers.

● Substantive topics identified as requiring more attention were:

-- Politics of Third World military governments (neither CIA nor DIA seems to focus on this subject).

-- Southern Africa - more complete reporting on current developments.

*Denotes information in codeword channels (SI/TK/G). The specific examples quoted are contained in Appendix C.

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-- Egypt - Military politics and morale.

-- Iran - Long range analyses of its economy.

-- North Korea - Economics problems and projections; status of hardening (periodic reports were desired).

-- Terrorist threats against U.S. citizens and property.

● State customers had two problems with the <u>uses</u> of the intelligence product--one was the public use of CIA economic projections (on the USSR), which was said to probably implant an undeserved semi-permanent slant to that subject, whereas the projection was merely a best guess at a point in time. Another problem was the reported dissemination of DIA DIN's by some U.S. military attaches to foreign military officers. This was said to cause trouble because the DIN would often be mistaken for a U.S. Government position on some subject.

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5. Common Responses

A number of additional opinions were expressed by a large number of customers in all or most of the organizations contacted; these are summarized below:

- The most highly valued type of customer-community interaction was personal contact, preferably face to face, with an analyst (or in some cases with a case officer or station chief), and measures to facilitate these direct contacts (e.g., intelligence participation in customer working groups and vice versa, briefings, signed articles, phone numbers, guides) were highly valued. Such contacts, where available, could most rapidly communicate information in ways that most directly pertained to customer problems and could serve as a two-way mechanism for communicating current customer policy and program concerns, available intelligence information, and research suggestions. Although working through them was said to be sometimes very time consuming, personal contacts also served as important indirect conduits for intelligence in that they would serve as a guide to where else within the Community a customer might find intelligence of value. Many customers indicated that there was no other effective way to find out what information was available.

- Almost all customers indicated that there was, in general, a surfeit of intelligence available to them, in excess of their time to listen, read, or absorb it. Although usually there was a considerable amount which pertained to their interests at the moment, there was also much that was not of immediate interest, and a considerable quantity would remain unread or otherwise unabsorbed. Problems included too much duplicative material (so much sometimes as to obscure that which was unique), some contradictory material (with no explanations or cross-referencing), lengthy publishing delays and old information cutoff dates (particularly for many DIA and Service products), and excessively general and/or watered down material not addressing a topic in a policy-relevant way (e.g., not written in such a way as to indicate how a policymaker might influence, counter, or respond to a described situation). One customer indicated that there was even too much production in an area which he had indicated was of high interest--upon querying him on this point, it was said that the available products were "too academic" and not sufficiently focused to be of use (one reason was that reports addressed only the past and did not concern themselves with possible future developments). Another customer (in OSD) complained that there was too little CIA consultation with customers before a product is issued; thus, potentially important and relevant points often would not be addressed.

- There was no practical distinction made by customers between "finished" and unfinished intelligence products; both were valued. Customers preferred all-source, finished analyses where available but indicated that some of their most valued products (when available) were State Department, CIA, and DIA cables, NSA intercept reports and DIA photographic briefings, none of which are usually considered "finished, all-source intelligence." These products were valued because of (at least) their timeliness and the contextual details provided (which were said to be lost in some of the more "finished" products).

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● Classification and compartmentation were problems identified by most customers, although perceptions of seriousness varied widely. Some specific problems have already been mentioned (e.g., PA&E codeword clearances and contractor access for a number of OSD customers), but a more general problem was if and how to use codeword information within the customer's organization--for there would often be inappropriately cleared personnel involved at some stage (both more senior and more junior in rank), there was quite limited and inconvenient space for storage and discussion, and handling procedures were said to be so burdensome that for some customers it was almost impossible to write a codeword memo for the use of others in their organization (at least for elements of the Joint Staff, OSD, State, and ACDA). Compartmentation also was said to restrict and confuse knowledge about what intelligence was available. ("I wouldn't know what I'm not getting," was a typical comment.) Sometimes a customer would only find out that there was intelligence on some subject by dealing with customers in other organizations who received other products--often simply more highly classified versions of basic reports which the former already received. Compartmentation also inhibited full discussion of available intelligence even among codeword cleared personnel for they would not know the degree of access each had received. Customers understood that there was a general need for security, however, and had adopted procedures to work around these limitations to the best of their ability.

● A number of customers indicated that information on U.S. policies, programs, and systems was deficient, in come cases causing more difficulty than foreign intelligence deficiencies (e.g., a JCS customer needed data on the spatial structure of the U.S. economy in order to assess the effects of alternative nuclear weapon impact patterns, Net Assessment needed better data on historical U.S. force deployments, and an ACDA customer needed assessments of the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces against a range of plausible Soviet ABM defenses). Customers did not expect the Community to provide this information. Nevertheless, the quality and quantity of information available on U.S. military forces, politics, and economics directly affected intelligence customer needs and degree of satisfaction because the U.S.-related information was a benchmark or standard for judging Community performance. In some cases U.S. information deficiencies were said to be simply the result of a lack of an organization focused on U.S. problems. In other cases, however, the deficiencies were said to be more profound in that nobody could reasonably be expected to know such things (e.g., why a U.S. policy was adopted, how effective the A-10 would be as a tank killer in Europe, what sortie rate can an F-4 sustain, what would be U.S. policy on some subject in two years, or even how many ships would the Navy have in 2-3 years). Difficulties in answering these U.S.-related questions (even when surrounded by large amounts of raw information) were said to limit what one should expect from the Intelligence Community. In addition, the lack of high confidence information on some U.S. subjects sometimes makes it unimportant to be precise about some foreign developments, for the requisite comparative analysis could not be carried out.

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⦿ Most customers associated with General Purpose Forces noted that the Community concentrated too heavily upon factual, numerical data on Warsaw Pact front-line combat equipment (quantities, dimensions, external appearances) to the exclusion of information on how forces possessing that equipment would probably be used and maintained, how effective they would be, what backup reserve and support equipment, what facilities and munitions would be available, and how forces containing this equipment could or would probably be managed and operated in wartime. Much more analytical attention was wanted on the latter subjects. ⦁

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6. Highly Critical Responses

● Slightly over 10 percent of the customers sampled predominantly expressed serious reservations about the general quality of the intelligence product. (These comments were primarily directed at CIA and DIA, since there was relatively little contact with most other agencies and these customers were primarily interested in political, conventional military or military-economic topics, as opposed to Soviet strategic weapons systems per se.) Expressed views of these customers were very pessimistic, including the feeling that the intelligence function was "a disaster area." Other expressions were that the resource planning function "was poorly served by intelligence," that there was "very little in-depth analysis," and that very little improvement seems to have occurred in recent years--despite apparent Intelligence Community concern with the consumers of intelligence. A repeated lack of Community responsiveness to requests and suggestions** was mentioned by all of these customers, and one result was that most of these customers requested only what they knew the Community could produce and not what was really needed. (One agency-specific comment was that DIA was too engrossed in publications to be able to respond to requests.) Another customer indicated that Community production managers employed an overly simplified model of information use centering principally upon immediate decisionmaking and ignoring educational and background uses. This over-simplified model was said to reduce the availability of some products not tailored to support an immediate, clear-cut decision.

● The underlying concerns of these customers were that substantive areas of considerable significance were essentially ignored by the Community (because they were difficult to analyze) over a long period and that the validity and usefulness of much that was produced was questionable. A few customers said that a great many products (in the area of general purpose forces) often did not "bear up well under close scrutiny." Two specific problems were identified by all of these customers-- intelligent speculation and writing/presentation of views. On the former, it was said that there was too little speculation by analysts,** and, in many cases, analysts (or their superiors) would refuse to speculate.** One customer indicated that a CIA representative had indicated that his job was to be solely "a purveyor of hard facts." Two types of speculation were of interest--speculation about past phenomena for which there is no direct, hard evidence and speculation on possible future developments (e.g., for the former, one customer indicated that the Community would not provide performance estimates for a piece of (general purpose) equipment until it has a system in hand (and by that time it was usually too late to be of much use), and for the latter, almost all of these customers indicated that community analysts and managers in general were "not oriented

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**These comments were also made by a number of other customers who did not, however, characterize their problems as being so serious.

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to the future").** The cause of this reluctance was generally thought to be the fear of being wrong, although for DIA an organizational problem was also mentioned--DB (Intelligence Research) would not estimate, whereas DE (Estimates) would, but DE analysts did not know all the current information on hand in DB.

• Writing/presentation was a lesser, but still significant, problem, and comments from these customers in particular were that there was little standardization of data, ways of speaking, estimating techniques or assumptions,** that writing needed to be more concrete, that there often was too much boiler-plate and too many generalities about limitations and assumptions with too little effort being made to correct them, and that it was often difficult to distinguish between facts and judgments.** On this latter point, improvement was noted by some customers, but an increasing Community tendency to obscure collection sources was said to make this more difficult. DIA's use of quantitative confidence estimates was liked,** however, and was said to partially compensate for this loss of source information. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, customers complained that different views were not well spelled out in most products--that there were usually ranges of opinions throughout Community agencies on many subjects but that most of these were not available to customers.** These customers thought that the Team A-Team B analysis was a useful initiative but noted that the Team B analyses were refused to them because the reports were said to be only an input to the NIE process and were not for the use of intelligence customers. Nevertheless, copies had become available using informal channels, and these alternative views were valued, even where not fully believed.**

• The biggest single direct cause of these deficiencies in intelligence analyses was said to be people problems--that is the attraction, retention, and encouragement of substantive experts.** It was said that some areas (e.g., political analysis) were intellectually stagnant, that there were too few "eccentrics" (e.g., unconventional and creative thinkers) and too many areas where the depth of knowledge was too shallow, that the Community was years behind the academic and think-tank community in analytical methodologies, especially for political analysis and conventional military force capability assessment. Another customer added that some DIA analysts were too passive and just received data, acting more as librarians than analysts. One customer believed that many other customers are probably not aware of how little some DIA and CIA analysts know (in some political and conventional military subject areas). Some of the factors bringing about this situation were said to be

**These comments were also made by a number of other customers who did not, however, characterize their problems as being so serious.

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DIA and CIA personnel policies**--specifically, too frequent rotation, assignment of analysts to areas where they have no prior knowledge, too little training, too little foreign travel, and infrequent direct contact with academia and with customers and their problems. There was said to be little incentive for creativity and in-depth analysis at least in part because of the intervention of middle management layers in DIA and CIA, especially as buffers between customers and analysts. One customer said that these layers often seemed to deprive analysts of the feelings of being experts, for at meetings with customers, managers would pose as experts. In addition, DIA was said to have a severe problem because of the policy that personnel at particular arbitrary grade levels (e.g., GS-12, LtCol) must be managers, not analysts.**/*

     ● The ultimate cause of these problems was said to clearly reside in senior Community managers. These customers, however, believed that there was a long-standing lack of attention by these managers to substantive analysis and production.** (Their attention was said to be focused instead on "technical gadgets" and "jurisdictional disputes.") Top management had set no meaningful standards for intelligence analysis and had not adopted or even studied newer or alternative analytic methods, especially in political analysis. In its place, customers noted, middle management had grown excessive (in both CIA and DIA), and some CIA middle and upper management was said to be much too bureaucratic. These intervening layers, it was said, often added little to the product, while delaying and obstructing product availability and customer-analyst interaction.

*DIA actually has many analysts at the GS-13 level and a few at higher
 levels; thus this problem may be overstated. DIA does have only about
 30 "supergrades," however, whereas CIA has over [____](not all involved in
 production). Some customers,moreover, who had tried to get DIA to
 appoint a particularly expert military officer to an analyst vice manager
 position quoted DIA as saying that "A LtCol is management, not analysis."

**These comments were also made by a number of other customers who did not,
 however, characterize their problems as being so serious.

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7. Lauditory Responses

- Slightly over five percent of the customers sampled expressed generally very positive views--not on the specific problems mentioned in 6 above but on the general conclusions. Citing problems and restrictions such as those imposed by resource limits, civil service regulations, the closed nature of many foreign societies, and the inherent difficulties associated with intelligence analysis (e.g., the unknowability of some things, as illustrated by the lack of good data on U.S. policies and systems), these customers believed the Community did a surprisingly good job. Their more specific views are included in Sections 1-5.