

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Proposed FBI Report on HR 4681

FROM

C/SECOM

EXTENSION

NO.

SECOM-D-200

DATE

28 August 1984

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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FORM 1-79

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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SECOM-D-200

27 August 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Liaison CIA
Attn:
FROM: Chairman, SECOM
SUBJECT: Proposed FBI Report on HR 4681
REFERENCE: OLL-84-2750/1, dtd 22 Aug 1984

1. Regarding the proposed FBI response to Rep. Wolf's inquiry on the Brooks Bill, the following observations are offered:

a. The statement that the polygraph can be abused is negative and should be omitted. The concept that sanctions are not imposed based solely on polygraph results or a refusal to participate needs to be further developed if it is used at all. If it is used, the concept of resolving unexplained reactions through conventional investigative techniques should be discussed. Emphasis should be placed upon existing controls to ensure against abuse and on the use of the polygraph as an adjunct to investigation, not the sole means.

b. The theme that the FBI and other agencies share in sensitive intelligence collected by CIA and NSA is extremely useful. It is important that members of Congress realize that tighter security in CIA and NSA is not a panacea. They must understand that people in other agencies often have access to the same highly sensitive intelligence as CIA and NSA employees. There have been proposals to apply significantly lesser standards of security to accessed people in other agencies, apparently in the mistaken notion that they do not receive truly sensitive intelligence.

c. The implication that CIA might inhibit the flow of intelligence to agencies without polygraph programs has two flaws: first, it is highly unlikely to occur, second, it portrays CIA in a less than favorable light. A better approach would be to emphasize that depriving other agencies of the option of using the polygraph would adversely affect their capability to provide appropriate security to the sensitive intelligence they receive. This would detract from the protection of the nation's most vital secrets affecting intelligence sources and methods.

d. The positive aspect of prepublication review as a service to the writer needs to be portrayed. Employees who do not wish to damage the national interest need guidance on what disclosures can be harmful. Through prepublication review, the government provides a way to avoid illegal and damaging disclosures which are potentially harmful to the individual and the nation.

2. The proposed letter is essentially a good response, but it has a negative tone in the key areas identified in reference. Reworking the letter to accentuate the benefits to the national interest of a more even approach throughout the government to the security of sensitive intelligence would be helpful.

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