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87 APR 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIFE Staff

SUBJECT: Annual Spring Review of Government Programs

REFERENCES: a) Letter dated 14 April 1964 from Permit (ord) to John A. McCone
b) NSCID No. 1, paragraphs 2a (2) and (3) and 3c

1. With respect to the letter from Mr. Gordon, it appears to me that only paragraph 2 alone (not the numbered paragraphs that follow) relates to the Director's Community responsibilities, and asks for three things:

a. The "budgetary implications" of the various special studies being conducted by the NIFE Staff and its task forces.

b. Any comments the DCI may wish to make with respect to the CCP and NRP.

c. Particularly the DCI's "views" as to the magnitude of the overall intelligence effort that will be required between now and FY 1969, and any changes he may anticipate in the basic "mix" of collection techniques.

2. As far as the "special studies" are concerned I assume that each of them will contain, as will the Middle East study, such material and comments on costs and related "budgetary implications" as we have been able to develop on this piece-meal basis; the net result will be some straws in the wind indications on the future emphasis and direction of the Community's overall intelligence program.

3. On the CCP and the NRP, I believe that the DCI should reserve any comment on them until he is in a position to view them against the totality of the Community's programmed intelligence effort.

4. Unless he waits until the totality of the Community's programmed efforts for FY 1968 and projections through FY 1969 are

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available for study, he can only provide a philosophical guessimate as to the magnitude and "mix" of the collection effort over the next five years. Incidentally, here is another example of looking at only one side of the coin - I believe that any consideration as to change in the future "mix" of collection techniques should also consider what compensative changes may be required in the "mix" of production techniques - otherwise we may find ourselves driving our 1969 collection machine with 1890 buggy whips.

5. The letter from Mr. Gordon to the Director, the President's letter outlining his responsibilities, the Congressional committee reviewing the CIA budget, and the NSCID's, all stress the DCI's responsibility to consider the totality of the U. S. intelligence effort. We are still in the very early stages of developing a true picture of this totality; all we can do now is add up a variety of program data that has been developed unilaterally by the various member agencies of the Community without reference to what other members are doing or what their combined efforts add up to in amounts of men and money, or, more importantly, emphasis, direction, balance, etc.

6. NSCID No. 1 contains provisions pertinent to this problem as in this directive (I assume it is still in full force and effect, however, lacking its implementation may be) the National Security Council has authorized and directed that:

"The USIB shall also: (1) Establish policies and develop programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned; (3) Review and report to the NSC on the national foreign intelligence effort as a whole; (4) Make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters to appropriate U. S. officials..... Paragraphs 2a (1), (3) and (4)

"The DCI, or representatives designated by him, shall make such surveys of departmental intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary..... Paragraph 3:

7. Unless on a de facto basis the NSCID's have become mere scraps of paper, the USIB and the DCI as its Chairman has a clear responsibility with respect to the Community's intelligence program: on a unilateral basis the DCI has the "duty" to advise the NSC and coordinate the intelligence effort of the U. S. as a whole, and the right to look into departmental intelligence activities to the extent he may deem necessary in order to carry out these duties. The distinction between the duties and responsibilities of the USIB and

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the DCI as its chairman on the one hand, and of the DCI as the unilateral coordinator and advisor to the NSC is not crystal clear with respect to intelligence programs. However, unless the USIB is to ignore the responsibilities in this area that were given to it in NSCID No. 4, provision for their participation in any system for both guidance to and review of intelligence programs must be provided, they should have an opportunity to discuss with the Director the Community implications of Mr. Gordon's letter to him, before he answers it; he does not have to agree with nor is he bound by their individual views or their consensus of view, but he should know what those views are.

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