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DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT

In July, the Secretary asked a distinguished group of Americans to form a nonpartisan Advisory Panel on Overseas Security to study and make recommendations concerning the security of our diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad. This Panel will be chaired by Admiral Bobby Inman, retired, who is currently President of MCC Corporation in Austin, Texas. Other members include:

- Senator Warren Rudman, Republican from New Hampshire;
- Congressman Daniel Mica, Democrat from Florida;
- Lawrence Eagleburger, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and former Ambassador to Yugoslavia;
- Lt. General D'Wayne Gray, Chief of Staff of the United States Marine Corps;
- Ann Armstrong, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom;
- Robert McGuire, currently Chairman of the Board of Pinkerton's, Incorporated and former Police Commissioner of the City of New York; and
- Victor Dikeos, a retired Foreign Service Officer, who will be the Panel's Executive Secretary.

The members of the Panel will examine a number of security-related questions, such as:

- What is the nature of the threat that our overseas personnel and facilities face over the next ten to fifteen years, and how can we best protect against it?
- How can the U.S. fulfill its obligations to protect foreign missions and their personnel in this country?
- And, what are the resource implications of these answers?

The members of the Panel first met on July 27, and they intend to issue their report on or shortly after January 1, 1985. It is anticipated that the Panel will at that time present a series of recommendations concerning our overseas security activities and related topics.

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Possible Qs and As:

- Q. Who is the State Department's Point of Contact for the Panel?
- A. Under Secretary for Management Ronald Spiers, who is responsible for the Department's security and counterterrorism policies and programs, through his Assistant Secretary for Administration, Robert Lamb.
- Q. Where will the staff for the Panel come from?
- A. In addition to State Department employees who will be detailed to the Panel's working staff, we expect that the other foreign affairs agencies will also contribute personnel.
- Q. What other agencies will be involved?
- A. All of the U.S. Government agencies with a major overseas presence will be assisting the Panel in its work.
- Q. Will this Panel pre-empt the existing decision-making process?
- A. No. The Panel will not deal with military aspects of the question, and will not become involved in managing current security programs or day-to-day operations.
- Q. Will the Panel members travel overseas to study the issue?
- A. There may be the need for a trip by 1 or more members, but at the moment we don't anticipate any.
- Q. Will the Panel members be paid?
- A. They of course will be reimbursed for their travel and expenses in the process of carrying out their duties on the Panel, but that is all that is anticipated.

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Q. Will the report be made public?

A. There will be parts of this report that will be highly classified and of course they won't be released, but all unclassified information will be put in the public domain.

Q. Another Panel to study the issue of security is all well and good, but what has the Department actually done recently about this problem, especially in light of the bombings in Beirut and Kuwait?

A. In this fiscal year, the Department will spend over \$120 million directly on security-related programs and activities to protect our personnel, facilities and national security information overseas. In addition to the ongoing regular security programs, the Department is also over one-half way through the Security Enhancement Program, which will spend more than \$130 million over a five-year period to enhance security significantly at over 65 of our most threatened posts. We have also added a great deal of additional security protection to our posts in Western Europe, in light of the recent assassination attempts there, through a special supplemental approved by the Congress in 1982. In response to the vehicle bombings in the Middle East last year, all posts have received their physical barriers and host-government protection, and remedial measures have been taken where needed.

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Cleared: A: JPShumate  
PA/PRESS: BCarlson

## The Panel's Charter

I. THE PANEL SHOULD EVALUATE THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROTECT U.S. FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL ABROAD AND DETERMINE HOW BEST THEY CAN BE FULFILLED.

We cannot protect every post against every threat. The costs--human as well as material--are too great. Our policy has been to protect our facilities and people against specific, identifiable threats. As a consequence when a new type of threat arises, our employees are subject to risk until we have had time to institute proper measures. We often appear reactive.

The number and size of our diplomatic and consular posts and foreign affairs agencies abroad have grown dramatically since the Second World War. The Department has sought to accommodate the full range of U.S. Government activities that seek to locate under the umbrella of our embassies.

Given the intensified security threat the panel should examine the size, composition, location and degree of control we can exercise over the 257 Foreign Service posts to determine the proper balance between reasoned security measures, operational effectiveness and our obligations to protect our people.

In acknowledging our responsibilities to protect employees, we have differentiated between terrorist acts directed against our buildings and personnel and criminal activities which affect an entire populace. To the person whose life or family is threatened at a remote and dangerous post, this distinction is likely to be academic.

Criminal activity and common crime are, to some extent, a part of the landscape in the United States; terrorist activity is not. Our present policy takes into account the fact that many actions necessary to protect personnel from common crime overseas would be the responsibility of the employee in the U.S.

The Panel should re-examine our responsibilities to protect employees against common crime.

Our security measures have been concentrated on chanceries because they are generally subject to the greatest threat. We have done less for residences. Government-owned housing is often treated differently from privately-leased housing. Schools and community centers represent an even more mixed pattern.

IV. THE ADEQUACY OF PRESENT PROGRAMS TO PROTECT FOREIGN MISSIONS AND THEIR PERSONNEL SITUATED IN THIS COUNTRY NEED COMPREHENSIVE RETHINKING. THE UNITED STATES MAKES HEAVY DEMANDS ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT ITS MISSIONS. WHEN THEY SEEK RECIPROCITY, OUR RESPONSE HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN SATISFACTORY TO THEM.

Protection of foreigners in the United States is a quilt work of responsibilities. The Secret Service protects visiting Chiefs of State and Heads of Government. State's Office of Security generally protects their wives, husbands and other accompanying adult family members. State Security has responsibility for protecting all other foreign visitors including cabinet members.

In Washington, the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service protects foreign missions. Elsewhere, responsibility falls on local jurisdictions.

For New York, the Department is acquiring from Treasury the authority to reimburse local jurisdictions for extraordinary expenses in connection with protection of foreign missions to be U.N. We have legislative authority to establish a similar program for consular facilities and people but as yet no money to fund the program.

Our effectiveness in meeting these responsibilities has a direct bearing on the willingness of foreign governments to protect our personnel. There are a number of Federal agencies involved in providing this protection. State alone cannot rationalize this situation. The Panel should make recommendations to the Secretary for rationalizing this situation, recognizing that some may require follow-up with other agencies.

V. WHAT ARE THE RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES?

This Panel is being asked to come forward with a program which could lay the foundations of the Department's security philosophy and practices for the next generation. For a program of this scope resources cannot be the deciding factor. But the Department's means are modest and funding must be taken into account. The Panel should identify, in general terms, the costs of their recommendations to the Secretary.

The Panel should assess the actions necessary to ensure a secure environment for our employees once potential threats are identified or projected.

In today's world our foreign national employees in some countries risk their lives and well being by working for us. We need outside thinking on U.S. Government responsibility for these loyal men and women.

The Panel should examine our obligations to national employees and our ability to satisfy reasonably these expectations.

II. IN ADDITION TO CONSIDERING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT TO ITS EMPLOYEES, THE PANEL SHOULD ALSO REVIEW THE CONDITIONS OF AN EMPLOYEE'S SERVICE AT A DANGEROUS OR THREATENED POST.

Traditionally the Foreign Service and other foreign affairs agencies have taken pride in their discipline and willingness to serve at difficult and hazardous posts. Never before have the dangers been so grave and direct.

The Panel should examine whether these new and more hazardous conditions have meaningfully altered our psychological contract with our employees, and their implications for our recruitment, assignment policy, and the total psychic and financial compensation package? What new training may be needed?

III. THE PANEL SHOULD REVIEW OUR OBLIGATION TO PROTECT AMERICAN BUSINESSES AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS OPERATING ABROAD AGAINST THREATS TO THEM AS AMERICANS OR SYMBOLS OF THE UNITED STATES.

Today the Office of Security offers informal advice to private industry in the United States and responds to inquiries on threats. This service is provided unevenly. SY is developing a program to strengthen and institutionalize these arrangements. Our security support of American business will continue to be limited to unclassified, advisory activities unless we change present policy.

Abroad this sort of assistance is provided to those firms knowledgeable enough to seek us out or when conditions in a particular country lead the post to reach out to members of the private American community. The Panel could help us achieve a clear concensus on our responsibilities for American citizens, businesses and other institutions abroad.

SCHEDULE FOR THE JULY 27, 1984 MEETING  
OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON OVERSEAS SECURITY

8:45-9:00 a.m. Commission members assemble in the  
Operations Center Conference Room

9:00-9:30 a.m. Meeting with Secretary Shultz

9:40 a.m.-  
1:10 p.m. Briefing for Commission Members

9:40-9:50 a.m. Robert E. Lamb, Assistant Secretary for  
Administration: 'Introduction'

9:55-10:15 a.m. David Fields, Deputy Assistant Secretary for  
Security: 'The Nature of the Threat'

10:20-10:40 a.m. Harvey Buffalo, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Foreign Buildings: 'Physical Security  
and our Overseas Facilities'

10:45-11:00 a.m. Ambassador Donald Petterson, Acting Director  
of Management Operations: 'The Nature of  
Our Overseas Presence'

11:05-11:20 a.m. Ambassador Robert Sayre, Director of the  
Office for Counter-terrorism and Emergency  
Planning: 'International Terrorism'

11:25-11:40 a.m. Robert Ribera, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Communications: 'Communications  
Security and the Paperless Embassy'

11:45 a.m.-  
12:00 p.m. James Nolan, Director of the Office of  
Foreign Missions: 'Reciprocity and the  
Security Context'

12:05-12:15 p.m. Marcia Curran, Director of the Family  
Liaison Office: 'Family Liaison Office  
Perspective on Security'

12:20-12:30 p.m. Dennis Hays, President of the American  
Foreign Service Association: 'AFSA  
Perspective on Security'

12:35-12:50 p.m. Roger Feldman, Comptroller: 'Budgetary  
Implications of Security'

12:55-1:10 p.m. Mr. Lamb: 'Non-Monetary Costs of Security'

1:15-2:20 p.m. Lunch, Henry Clay Room, eighth floor

2:30-4:30 p.m. Commission members convene for discussion,  
Room 6316



In testimony before the Congress, I said we would convene a high-level advisory panel to look at the ramifications of embassy security worldwide. I briefly described to the Committee--just as I did in the letter you received from me--the nature of the problem we face in conducting our nation's business around the world. I told them that I would be seeking your judgment on the appropriate balance between the risks and benefits of our presence abroad. What I hope to see is a map that will guide us into the future.

You are all very busy and I am pleased that you have agreed to participate in this work. I can think of no more distinguished and appropriate panel than this one, and I want to express my thanks that you have carved out a day to devote to this topic.

In my opinion, there are few issues which impact more seriously on how we may carry out our foreign policies. Business is best conducted in a stable work environment. And yet, we cannot give up and come home every time stability is threatened.

I do not have to tell you that our Foreign Service is not a timid or frightened group. For two hundred years, they have served in every corner of the world under the most adverse conditions. In recent times, however, conditions have changed to a remarkable extent. The number of names on the plaques in the Diplomatic Lobby of those killed while serving this country is graphic testimony to that change. We have seen our ability to conduct business tested too often and in too many places.

We have taken steps to cope with the increasing and shifting threats. We have pioneered new security systems, products, devices, and tactics. We have been successful with our security programs. But perhaps in some instances we have not acted quickly enough. We think our record can be improved.

We have gone to Congress again and again with requests for monies for new programs. The resources available to fund and manage our overseas security program have been inadequate to meet the mounting threat and the growing requests for additional security measures. We have been spreading our resources too thinly--which is but one of two interrelated problems. The second is that we have lacked a recognized conceptual framework for defining, consistently and realistically, what we mean by security overseas.

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Unfortunately, there is no way to provide "security" for all or even most of the staff and dependents at embassies and consulates everywhere in the world. We recognize that we start from a discouraging premise:

- any embassy can be overrun, especially when we do not have the support of the host government;
- any American official or family member can be kidnapped or killed if the opposition is willing to take the necessary risks and invest the necessary resources in the operation;
- no residence can be made entirely secure, here or overseas; and
- no total security guarantee can be given by the U.S. government to its employees, career or noncareer, overseas.

There are, however, four areas where we have taken concerted, systematic action to improve our security posture overseas. These are:

- (1) The security enhancement program to strengthen our embassy buildings to avoid infiltration and capture,
- (2) Public access control,
- (3) Protection of our officials, and
- (4) Counter-terrorism.

In a fifth area--residential security--we have been much less systematic, because of the immensity of the problem.

In mounting these programs, we have faced the fact that the specific security requirements of each individual post may vary greatly, depending on the size of the American community; the number, size, age, condition, and, especially, location of our buildings and facilities; the local social, political, and economic conditions; the responsiveness of the host government to security requirements; the status of existing security arrangements; and a number of other factors. Thus, the specific security improvements at each post must be measured and implemented on a case-by-case basis. No two are the same.

In approaching these problems, we have been guided by a number of assumptions and objectives:

-- U.S. missions must continue to do business abroad. U.S. personnel will continue to live and work at overseas locations with normal social, recreational, and educational needs in all but the highest temporary threat situations. Host country nationals will continue to meet with our people and to enter our facilities on business. Host government protection will continue to be the cornerstone of our security overseas as specified by the Vienna Convention.

-- Our facilities can and will be made resistant to mob action, entry of vehicle-borne bombs, attack by small groups of terrorists, and surreptitious entry. They cannot be made immune to sustained siege or military action conducted or condoned by host governments, to very powerful explosions outside our premises, to aerial or artillery bombardment, or to hostile action initiated or supported by some of our own employees.

-- Most of our systematic efforts to date have been devoted to posts in the highest threat areas. Our objective, however, is to address the security of all locations worldwide.

-- Armoring of vehicles can and will be used to provide protection to our ranking personnel in foreign locations.

-- Intelligence analysis, local and long-distance secure communication, and provision of temporary assistance at overseas locations in response to specific threats or incidents are essential elements in lessening the incidence and impact of terrorism.

-- The homes of our overseas personnel can and will be provided with measures to make kidnapping less likely to succeed and to reduce the incidence of crime. Residential structures, however, can be secured to a lesser degree than our official buildings.

We also have important questions of our obligations to our foreign national employees and to private Americans who are exposed to threat simply because they are Americans. And finally, we have the question of whether we are providing adequate protection to foreign missions and their people in our country.

We cannot accept tragic losses that might have been prevented by taking defensive steps.

I recognize that there are no sure solutions to all these problems. There are questions that demand the most careful scrutiny and analysis and the best answers possible. I can pledge to you that my personal support and the resources of this Department and our sister foreign affairs agencies will be made available to you. While I recognize the magnitude of this undertaking and the limitations on your time, I hope you can agree to have your report to me by the first of next year.

For the remainder of the morning, we will present to you a series of short briefings on a technical level designed to cover an array of factual, as opposed to subjective, considerations that enter into the various problems I have outlined.

Bob Lamb will describe the agenda, and I will look forward to meeting with you again when it may be helpful.

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ADVISORY PANEL ON OVER-  
SEAS SECURITY HAS BEEN FORMED

KEYWORDS: S H U L L T Z O V E R S E A S  
S E C U R I T Y P A N E L I N M A N

COMMENTS: FINAL REPORT TO BE ISSUED ON OR ABOUT  
JANUARY 1985

Action to OS and sec.com per exdir of  
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ACTION: (OFF/TYP/COMP DATE) OS / /

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