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NFIB-M-148
25 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD PRINCIPALS

FROM: Walter Elder
Executive Secretary, NFIB

SUBJECT: Minutes of the One Hundred and forty-eighth
NFIB Meeting, 18 May 1984, 1400-1430 Hours

Summary of Decisions

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), with the concurrence of

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
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Mr. Gates noted that there had been two previous periods during which the tone of Soviet propaganda had been harsh and shrill. One was in the immediate post-World War II era; the other was in the late 1950's. Both were periods where the USSR felt itself to be especially vulnerable. Because of this perception of vulnerability, the forecast for long-term U.S.-Soviet relations was probably more pessimistic.

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The DCI, Mr. William Casey, said that the estimate was an important and useful exercise in what should be a continuing evaluation of Soviet activities. He noted that the USSR was trying to influence the U.S. elections, even though their earlier attempt to influence the West German elections had backfired. In connection with the Soviet feelings of vulnerability, he suggested that recent Chinese activities seemed to reflect a Chinese perception that the Soviet Union was somewhat off-balance.

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Mr. Casey said that the estimate should include the specific points raised by Mr. Gates. When referring to Soviet military activities we should include specific instances; we should also bear in mind the potential weaknesses of the Soviet collective leadership.

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Mr. Meyer said that we had a tendency to see Soviet activities as purposeful and cunning. We should be alert to the possibility that they were not so well-organized and might do stupid and dangerous things.

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Mr. Montgomery said that the Soviet withdrawal from the Olympic games worsened an already unpleasant atmosphere and served notice that we should be prepared for more chilling Soviet actions. The Soviet Union has already succeeded in frightening some West Europeans.

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With the concurrence of the NIFB principals, the DCI approved

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Walter Elder

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Those Participating

Mr. William J. Casey, Chairman
 Mr. John N. McMahon, Vice Chairman
 Mr. Robert N. Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
 Mr. Hugh Montgomery, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

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Intelligence Agency
 Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer, U.S. Air Force, Director, National Security Agency
 Mr. Jimmie D. Hill, Acting for Under Secretary of the Air Force
 Mr. Douglas Mulholland, Special Assistant to the Secretary (National Security), Department of the Treasury
 Mr. Charles V. Boykin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, Department of Energy
 Mr. Phillip A. Parker, Acting for Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Mr. Clarke Magruder, Acting for Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
 Brigadier General James W. Shufelt, U.S. Army, Acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
 Major General James C. Pfautz, U.S. Air Force, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 Brigadier General Lloyd W. Smith, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Marine Corps

Those Attending

Miss Eloise R. Page, Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
 Mr. Herbert Meyer, Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
 Mr. Fritz Ermarth, NIO for USSR-Eastern Europe
 [Redacted] CIA/SOVA

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