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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team FrederickTeam Frederick (153a)

Jedburgh team Frederick was the third Jedburgh team to be dispatched to France from the U.K.

Members of Team

The members of team Frederick were:

(Major A. W. Wise)/(British), code name: KINROS
 (2nd Lieutenant P. Aguirec)/(French), code name: VIRE
 M/Sgt. R. R. Kehoe (154)(U.S.), code name: PESETA

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Frederick was dispatched on the night of 9/10 June to the Guincamp area in Brittany, France.

Background of Resistance in the Area

There is no knowledge of established maquis groups in this area but the spirit of resistance is strong throughout Brittany and the support of the majority of the population could probably be relied upon. It was the task of the team to contact such forces and individuals as would be useful in establishing and protecting the SAS base known as Samwest.

The Gendarmerie throughout Brittany are generally sympathetic and a French source estimated a total of 3,000 men organized in the Brittany area. There is no specific information as to the location of camps.

A French officer, sent from England in 1943, had previously established a circuit in this area, but when he was arrested a few months later his organization scattered.

Purpose of Mission

The prime purpose of team Frederick was to assist SAS in establishing their base, which was to be used as a place where other SAS parties might withdraw and be re-supplied. In particular, the team was to arrange for the assistance of

(153a) Operations after 1 Jul 44 p.137

(154) War Diary Vol 11 p. 624 *

* NOTE: Vol 11 was not finished, page 62 does not appear in Vol 11.

Declassified

date 22 January 1979

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Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

resistance elements in establishment of the base, and to be prepared to arrange for the reception of such additional arms and stores as would be needed by the resistance gathered together.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

Team Frederick was dropped at a pre-arranged point to a reception committee organized by the SAS base party.

Equipment

The team was to take no Jedburgh containers with them. Each member of the team took one rucksack and the team took 2 W/T sets with them.

Scale of Air Support Likely

SFHQ would attempt to supply the resistance groups organized in this area. To accomplish this information regarding additional dropping ground was to be furnished SFHQ.

Communications

The team was dropped with 2 W/T sets, with instructions to establish communication with the Home Station as soon as possible. The SAS W/T operator was to have independent contact with the SAS Home Station.

Finance

Each officer of the team took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

Special Airborne Services. The team was to assist SAS in establishing their base and was to be under the command of the officer in charge of the SAS party in the field, but was to report independently to SFHQ on the state of resistance in terms of personnel, leadership, arms and potentialities.

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

Other Jedburgh Teams. If it was felt that the supply and organization of resistance demanded it, request could be made for up to three additional Jedburgh teams. In this case the team was to arrange for the reception of the additional teams at a suitable dropping point in the locality where the teams would be used.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. If overrun by Allied Forces the team was to report to the headquarters of the nearest Allied unit and ask for the intelligence officer. No details of the work were to be given, but they were simply to ask to be forwarded through this officer to the nearest SF staff. This staff would identify them and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. On arriving in the field the team was to be met by the SAS group and would immediately set about carrying out their missions of arranging such assistance from resistance groups as would be required in establishing the SAS base.

If Withdrawal Should Become Necessary. If it became necessary for the group to withdraw, SAS would handle all the arrangements.

Information Provided to the Team.

The following information was provided to the team prior to its departure for the field (155):

- a. The enemy order of battle in the area.
- b. Information regarding Gestapo and counter-espionage units.
- c. Orders restricting movement in the area.
- d. Topography of the area.

(155) Jedburgh Operation Instruction #6 Mf R-7 F-431/3

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Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)First Word from the Field

In a W/T message (156) dated 11 June Frederick reported:
 "Arrived safely with all containers and equipment. Have con-
 tacted local groups. Great possibilities Cotes du Nord area.
 Send Jed team and arms for them. Advise soonest possible
 dropping ground."

Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged

18 June From Frederick (157)

"SAS attacked Monday and dispersed. Guarding 3
 of their wounded here. Jeds okay. Have contacted
 guerilla leaders. Paris Brest underground cable cut by
 us. All railway lines in area cut. No traffic received
 as yet."

18 June From Frederick (158)

"Send arms and ammunition soonest possible for
 500 men."

19 June SFHQ to Frederick (159)

"Confirm grounds you give. Congratulations Peseta
 on promotion to 1st Sgt."

20 June From Frederick (160)

"Want Stens, carbines, grenades. Bonfires will be
 lighted."

21 June SFHQ to Frederick (161)

"Propose to send 4 aircraft 22 June. What clothes
 and money required?"

21 June From Frederick (162)

"Our position 1 km from Plumelin Quinton. Recep-
 tion Committee for dropping will consist of Maquis."

21 June SFHQ to Frederick (163)

"Confirm you are ready to receive night 22 June."

22 June From Frederick (164)

"Cannot receive night 22. Repeat dropping same
 arrangements night 23."

(156) C-4126/27 dated 11 Jun 44
 (157) C-4312/31 18 Jun 44
 (158) C-4327/20 dated 18 Jun 44
 (159) C-3276 19 Jun 44
 (160) C-4370/48 20 Jun 44

(161) C-3312 21 Jun 44
 (162) C-4384/91 21 Jun 44
 (163) C-3314 21 Jun 44
 (164) C-4416/27 22 Jun 44

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Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)23 June From Frederick (165)

"Confirm dropping arrange tonight 23."

23 June SFHQ to Frederick (166)

"Is your ground suitable for Jeds. If so can you obtain necessary contacts for them."

24 June From Frederick (167)

"Region humming with enemy activity. Successfully carried out attack on communications. Boche communications in Brittany in chaos. Will try again after ammunition dump. Our morale terrific."

24 June From Frederick (in reply to query from SFHQ on 23rd) (168)

"My ground not suitable for Jeds. Am arranging ground and contacts. Details later."

24 June SFHQ to Frederick (169)

"Do you require more arms on your ground."

25 June From Frederick (170)

"Send battle-dress and cigarettes, soap, tobacco, pipe and ration for two weeks for Jed team also batteries for receivers. All Resistance Chiefs in Brittany now contacted. Dropping on my ground great success. Thanks."

26 June SFHQ to Frederick (171)

"Will send same load tomorrow your new ground near Plesidy. Bonfires if possible. Will send requirements in package marked 'Pour Frederick'".

27 June From Frederick (172)

"Okay to go ahead with plan as arranged for today 27 on Ground Yves. If impossible for you today okay for tomorrow 28 with BBC message as given. Bonfires will be lit. Big Boche convoy near Garhaix."

28 June From Frederick (173)

"Details for Finisterre team. Ground MMn 58 P11 5 at 54mm. East of O720 and 45mm. North of 5340 between Stangerloulas and Chelledxs Trois Fontaines. Safe house and reception must be arranged and team met by chiefs Finisterre region. Require minimum 2 days warning of drop. Boche very troublesome in this area. Request team bring one million French francs for use of Frederick team."

(165) C-4438/88 23 Jun 44	(170) C-4509/73 25 Jun 44
(166) C-3370 23 Jun 44	(171) C-3436 26 Jun 44
(167) C-4448/22 24 Jun 44	(172) C-4535/3 27 Jun 44
(168) C-4453/65 24 Jun 44	(173) C-4562/92 28 Jun 44
(169) C-3401 24 Jun 44	

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Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)29 June SFHQ to Frederick (174)

"Four Halifaxes and two Hudsons will visit you tonight. Captain Leblanc on his way to contact you. Please arrange send him home with Hamilton if possible. Thanks for rendezvous Finisterre, will advise you later."

30 June From Frederick (175)

"Last night great success. Thanks again."

(174) C-3528 29 Jun 44

(175) C-4614/43 30 Jun 44

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team FrederickTEAM FREDERICK (437)Summary of W/T Messages Exchanged1 July From SFHQ to Frederick (438)

"Can we send Jedburgh to Kergoulas. Do you want repeat on Alain."

2 July From SFHQ to Frederick (439)

"Development your area now matter of utmost urgency. Arms deliveries can be made as rapidly as you can absorb. Wish you to concentrate on west of Cotes du Nord. Are preparing further Jed for east of this Department whom we wish you to receive as soon as possible. Submit maximum number grounds stating in each case maximum container capacity per op and whether fit for bodies. Wish you to be on ground when next Jed arrives. They will bring you full orders and new directives."

2 July From Frederick (440)

"Can you drop these arms on Wednesday June 5. Ground MMN 58 at O5MM east O620 and 45 north 5400 south west Runan. Arms desired 150 Sten guns, 100 rifles, 10 Bren, grenades, explosives and ten 2-inch mortars."

3 July From SFHQ to Frederick (441)

"Will send three aircraft Wednesday weather permitting on ground Runan. Air Force very pleased your reception."

3 July From Frederick (442)

"For HQ SAS can now arm 3 battalions as follows dropping grounds at Plevin, St Trepine, St. Martin. Request planes night 4/5. Training cadres are now with each battalion."

3 July From Frederick (443)

"Must postpone drop Wednesday near Runan due to enemy activity against that maquis."

4 July From SFHQ to Frederick (444)

"Sorry bad weather Alain last night. Will try tomorrow Wednesday. Postponing Pierre near Runan. Will do Yves tomorrow 5th with 4 aircraft."

4 July From Frederick (445)

"Can we have drop on ground at Runan Friday July 7. Please drop Frederick package Wednesday on Yves."

(437) See p.33 1st Qtr this Vol	(438) C-3610 1 Jul 44
(439) C-5879 2 Jul 44	(440) C-4656/25 2 Jul 44
(441) C-3641 3 Jul 44	(442) C-4570/66 3 Jul 44
(443) C-4687/33 3 Jul 44	(444) C-3662 4 Jul 44
(445) C-4703/84 4 Jul 44	

Declassified by STAT
Date 23 January 1979

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JEDBURGHES

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)4 July From SFHQ to Frederick (446)

"Please advise if LeBlanc has arrived."

5 July From Frederick (447)

"Do not drop Finisterre team tonight. Drop them Friday July 7 same message and letter. Boche were in area Monday. Okay for Yves tonight. LeBlanc contacted. Should return England next sea operation."

6 July From Frederick (448)

"Desire drop arms 300 grenades and some explosive on Ground MMn 59 Pli 5 22 MM east 0520 and 12 MPI north 5380 northeast Jugon. Also boots for 100 men. Maquis area Guingamp attacked by Boche Sunday. 70 Boche killed, 10 maquis."

7 July From SFHQ to Frederick (449)

"Must know very urgent if you can arrange for reception of a Jedburgh team for Cotes du Nord. Inform us what ground we could use from night Saturday 8th, Sunday 9th."

7 July From SFHQ to Frederick (450)

"Jedburgh Giles to Alain tonight with money. Will repeat Alain on advice from you four aircraft. Acknowledge and confirm."

7 July From Frederick (451)

"Okay for Saturday on ground Caramel near Jugon. Can you increase arms from 200 to 400 ground near Henon on Sunday."

8 July From Frederick (452)

"For information of RAF 2300 Boche in villages of Plounevez Moedec. General Hq and command post 1 km southeast of village MMN 58 Pli 48 MM east 06607 MM north of 6380 infantry and artillery. High tension line between Brest and Gouyec blown yesterday. Convoy 20 Boche lorries destroyed near Rostrenen by maquis working with us."

8 July From SFHQ to Frederick (453)

"Regret Alain postponed bad weather but will try again tonight. Will also do Caracec tonight with Jedburgh team Felix. Will also do Yves and Pierre."

(446) C-3678 4 Jul 44

(448) C-4761/97 6 Jul 44

(450) C-3739 7 Jul 44

(452) C-4833/46 8 Jul 44

(447) C-4750/2 5 Jul 44

(449) C-3737 7 Jul 44

(451) C-4813/15 7 Jul 44

(453) C-3756 8 Jul 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)9 July From Frederick (454)

"We have changed Hubase to Canihuel near St Nicholas for security. Recommend promotion Aguirec to rank of captain. In contact and working in complete agreement with chief of all resistance in Cotes du Nord. Have joint Hq with resistance and all military operations handled by us. Droppings being arranged as fast as possible. Desire Smith does not overlap our work."

9 July From Frederick (455)

"Twin drops known to have been success last night. Boche attack 5 hours before drop at Pierre. Boche captain and adjutant killed. No maquis casualties. Many cases of great bravery here. Is it possible to demand decorations for outstanding cases. Suggest good for morale of maquis. Thanks to RAF for a grand job. Drops arranged by Smith failed. Believed too hasty preparation."

10 July From Frederick (456)

"Contact made July 9 with Demagny, Delegue Etat Major Region. Complete agreement reached on points concerning command of any FFI of Cotes du Nord. Battle last night on Cadoudal. Maquis chief killed. Denounced by traitor. Moncontour region out of action for moment."

10 July From SFHQ to Frederick (457)

"Regret death Chief Cadoudal. All our sympathy. Ground Kerfot refused by Air Ministry too near balloon barrage. Can you give fresh point."

10 July From Frederick (458)

"One Jed team and material dropped on Caramel all okay. Report not in yet on Alain."

11 July From SFHQ to Frederick (459)

"Please inform Aguirec he is already promoted acting Captain and temporary Lieutenant and convey our congratulations."

20 July From Frederick (460)

"Desire drop arms for 500 men night of Thursday 20 July on ground 5847. Require most urgently 10 million francs."

(454) C-4857/4	9 Jul 44	(455) C-4879/38	9 Jul 44
(456) C-4886/52	10 Jul 44	(457) C-3821	10 Jul 44
(458) C-4905/15	10 Jul 44	(459) C-3843	11 Jul 44
(460) (Via Wash 181035)	20 Jul 44		

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Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)20 July From Wash 18115 (461)

"Frederick encircled by 600 Boche last Tuesday. Managed to break out but lost everything except arms and cipher. Do not use any terrain or message already used once by Frederick as Boche may know position. Will commence parachuting soon as radio received. Morale tops as Boche patrol searching for us 3 yards away, Mille Fois Cambronne, came in handy."

20 July From SFHQ to Frederick (462)

"Our congratulations for having succeeded in escaping from the Germans and successful attack against them. We are sending a radio this evening on Mossy. We are glad about the good relations with the AVECCHRE FFI. Give us names under which we can contact them."

21 July From SFHQ to Felix (For Frederick) (463)

"Regarding decorations, send us the name, decoration proposed, text of the citation very short. We will award them as soon as possible. Try to send us such information as the real name, rank, and date of birth."

31 July From Frederick (464)

"Request 2 drops arms for 250 each for Wednesday."

31 July From Frederick (465)

"Results Plesidy battle much better than first report. 500 Boche out of action, killed or wounded. Germans report best armed and disciplined maquis yet contacted. Maquis reformed with loss of only one Bren and casualties as in previous message. Their morale excellent."

31 July From Frederick (466)

"Our base is now about 6 kms southwest of Bourbriac. Maquis near Pleven was attacked by large number of Boche Saturday during a 15 hour fight. They held their position. Germans withdrew with large casualties. Two maquis killed."

2 August From SFHQ to Frederick (467)

"Allied advance will probably be rapid in your direction. Task is now preservation not destruction. Greatest importance attached to preservation of road Morlaix, Saint Brieuc, Lamballe. You will prevent enemy carrying out demolition of road bridges, culverts, etc on this road and on secondary roads in this area. Report if you require assistance and your prospects of success in this task."

(461) 18115 20 Jul 44

(463) C-5969 21 Jul 44

(465) C-710/79 31 Jul 44

(467) C-4486 2 Aug 44

(462) C-5967 20 Jul 44

(464) C-709/82 31 Jul 44

(466) C-741/8 31 Jul 44

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)2 August From Frederick (468)

"Have 2000 men now being concentrated on and near route Morlaix, St Brieu, Lamballe. Tasks being allotted. Can use aid parachute troops later. Have further 2000 available in department for secondary tasks. Prospects of success good. All drops ordered now of utmost importance."

3 August From Frederick (469)

"Boche reported to have evacuated Lamballe. Believe 200 remain at St Brieu, 300 at Guingamp. Reliably reported to be evacuating Cotes du Nord."

3 August From Frederick (470)

"Can receive Jed team Friday night okay. Chief of FFI Cotes du Nord with us now as always. Send our money and rations with team."

3 August From SFHQ to Frederick (471)

"Here are two orders from General Koenig to all commanders in Brittany. First, in order to avoid possibility of battles between resistance and advancing troops in confusion of battle you must prepare to send forward a small unarmed party including one officer, or NCO to make contact with Allied troops. They should be briefed to supply exact information on disposition your troops. Warn them above all in no circumstances to start running as this will inevitably draw fire."

3 August From SFHQ to Frederick (472)

"Second, until Colonel Eono's mission has had time to take charge of general situation you must order your men as soon as they are overrun by Allied troops to assemble in predetermined spots under their own officers. They should have their arms with them but must deposit them under guard in order that there may be no risk of their being taken for snipers. Urgent this instruction be strictly observed. Providing these instructions are observed the Allied armies have been requested not to take possession of these depots of weapons. Copies these instructions have been given to armies concerned."

4 August From SFHQ to Frederick (473)

"They will be enlisted on arrival and will act as guides to forward units. They should ask the first soldier they see for the nearest division G-2. On arrival at divisional headquarters they must ask for G-2 branch. Until Divisional Headquarters specifically ask for it they must not mention the password. When asked for they will give password Angouleme."

(469) C-856/81 2 Aug 44

(470) C-938/97 3 Aug 44

(472) C-140 3 Aug 44

(469) C-905/30 3 Aug 44

(471) C-139 3 Aug 44

(473) C-186 4 Aug 44

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

4 August From Frederick (474)

"Okay for drop tonight of men on ground Bonaparte. Orders from General Koenig understood and dispatched to maquis groups."

5 August From Frederick (475)

"Drop of mission last night complete success. Contacts made with FFI. Americans reported at Callac this morning."

7 August From Frederick (476)

"Odd parties of Boche still at large but maquis on all important points and can deal with same. Information on maquis passed on to Mikison and Americans consider our role almost completed."

7 August From SFHQ to Frederick (477)

"Army Command requests protection of St Brieux, Guingamp, Morlaix road after passage of motorized division and cavalry who are greatly in advance of the other elements. This protection should be given only by organized units."

9 August From Frederick (478)

"Desire confirmation of promotion of Vire."

10 August From Frederick (479)

"Boche activity in Paimpol Pluebian serious. Essential American help is given quickly. Boche committing atrocities in Pleubian. Maquis strong enough to contain enemy but not to attack at moment. We are now near Briec."

11 August From Frederick (480)

"Situation at Pleubian grave. Whole village will be burned by tonight by Boche if materials for them are not provided by populace. Boche in strength - 100 area Lezadricux with artillery and strong defense position including Paimpol. Impossible task for maquis attack. German atrocities in region appalling."

11 August From SFHQ to Frederick (481)

"Vire promoted Lieutenant first June this year."

11 August From SFHQ to Frederick (482)

"Have requested urgently air support for FFI area Paimpol."

(474) C-996/71 4 Aug 44

(476) C-1211/21 7 Aug 44

(478) C-1306/11 9 Aug 44

(480) C-1451/33 11 Aug 44

(482) C-6203 11 Aug 44

(475) C-1038/99 5 Aug 44

(477) C-475 7 Aug 44

(479) C-1373/29 10 Aug 44

(481) C-6200 11 Aug 44

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

20 August From Yalelock to Watermark (483)

"The following agents - Max alias Esguihoux, Differentiale, Ale, First escort refer Uppermost. Leave air strip T 2 to Northolt scheduled departure 1600 today. For Carleton Smith - Jed team Frederick unescorted same flight."

Report on Team Upon Return from Field - 9 June to 20 August 1944

The Mission. The Mission given to the team was to drop with a party of SAS into the Cotes du Nord and to assist them in establishing a base by providing liaison and arms and materials for the local patriots.

Briefing. It was stated that little resistance movement was known in Brittany and gave the names of the agents who might be useful to us. In actuality we found an extremely strong underground movement and the three agents were either dead or unheard of. In our opinion it would have been better to have contacted the resistance in the Cotes du Nord, say two weeks before D-day, as this area was to turn out to be one of the most important in France.

Dropping. We jumped in the middle of a stick of SAS in bright moonlight. In the air we heard a number of explosions on the ground and thought we were dropping into a battle. It turned out to be an unfortunate SAS paratrooper who had packed his detonators in with his plastic HE with fatal results.

The Reception Committee was assisted by an enormous crowd of onlookers of both sexes, most of whom were smoking, which we did not consider very wise as the Boche were in a town only seven kms away.

Action on arrival. Before leaving I had been placed under the orders of Captain Le Blond who formed the Samwest base on arrival. The base was well hidden in the Foret de

(483) C-2216/98 20 Aug 44

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

Doualt and section posts for the defence of the HQ were organized soon after arrival.

Events in Samwest base. The day after the arrival of the SAS, numbers of representatives of the various partisan groups arrived but we did not contact the real head of the Cotes De Nord and Brittany areas until much later. Two women and a man were also held as spies and after questioning one woman and the man were shot and daggered respectively.

Unfortunately, however, the SAS held these prisoners in full view of the various people who came to have a look at the base. In view of the fact that the man was beaten up every ten minutes or so the results to his face were not pretty, and in my opinion subsequent brutal treatment of SAS prisoners may have had something to do with this.

Without our knowledge some of the young patriots were armed with weapons which had been dropped the previous night to the SAS and they congregated that evening in a farm about 200 yards from the base - none of them being trained to handle a weapon like a sten gun. As chance would have it, a car containing two Boche Officers stopped at the farm to ask the way to Carhaix. One officer entered the room where these young patriots were having supper and asked quite politely for directions.

The answer he received was about five slugs in his belly. Holding his stomach in place with one hand he regained the car and a grenade was thrown at the patriots. The whole base stood to but nothing happened that night.

The following morning, however, a lorry containing about 40 Boche of the 2nd Paratroop Division armed and proceeded to burn the farm and shoot the occupants.

As the farm was within range of one or two SAS section

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

posts a first class battle started. Later in the morning, however, the Boche, who had a radio, called up re-inforcements and by the middle of the afternoon there must have been about 400 Boche at least attacking the position.

Withdrawal. Captain Le Blond gave the order to withdraw in small groups to the base named Dingson in the south and our team with Squadron Leader Smith of the SAS broke out of the forest and moved in an easterly direction, losing nearly all our kit in the process.

During the withdrawal, we had a piece of providential good luck when a motor cycle patrol which was in hot pursuit was machine gunned from the air by a Beaufighter and decided that there was no future in continuing.

After a very cold and miserable night hidden in some gorse we arrived near Tremargat and lay up in the woods. We contacted the local schoolmistress Simone Legoefflic who undoubtedly saved our lives, as we were very hungry and chilled to the bone.

She arranged guides for us to assist us to the southern base and we marched that night to Kergrist where we failed to contact the guide for the next stage. We lay up in a wood and waited for daylight.

The next day Simone came with news that there were two SAS officers and a corporal very gravely wounded in a deserted farm not far from the Foret of Doualt.

Return to Peumerit de Quintin. I decided to return with the team to this farm and see what we could do.

On arrival we found Sergeant Robert of the SAS looking after these officers who were nearly dying. We arranged for a doctor to come from Guingamp, who arrived and performed a

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

wonderful operation on Lieutenant La Serre and Lieutenant Bottella undoubtedly saving both men's lives.

These men were looked after and nursed back to health by the courage and fortitude of Madame Le Moigne and Madame Quiennec of Peumerit de Quintin and they are now back to duty. In view of the fact that the Boche frequently passed 500 yards away during the two months they were there, this is a remarkable achievement.

Work at Peumerit De Quintin. When the wounded were properly established we made contact with Marceau, chief of the FFI of the Cotes Du Nord and Francois of the FN. He stated that funds were needed badly and we supplied them with about 50,000 francs on the spot, also leaving money with the wounded.

I decided to establish a base in the region about 10 kms from the Forest of Doualt and carry on alone with the team with the original intention of arming the patriots.

We arranged two parachutings for Maquis not far away. Both succeeded without incident and we arranged for a "cadre" of FFI leaders to watch them in order to learn the procedure of a Reception Committee.

Move to Canihuel. After about 2 weeks at Peumerit de Quintin I decided that a move to another region was necessary for security reasons; the area was thick with Boche and we had had three ambushes on the road just behind our base in one week. We had organized a number of expeditions against Boche petrol installations, transformers and cables and an attack on a convoy of 20 lorries near Rostrenen, which had succeeded perfectly.

We moved to a deserted farm house in the woods above Canihuel near St Nicolas du Pelem and established radio

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Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

communications and contacts with all Maquis in our area by means of two bogus gendarmes on a motor cycle and five girl convoyses on bicycles - these being the only people who could get through Boche and Gestapo inspections without much trouble.

A lot of work was done at Canihuel as our radio worked perfectly and Marceau assisted us greatly by bringing in several contacts and by introducing us to Thiery and Domigny chief of region M.

A number of parachutings were arranged and worked successfully, including reception committee's for teams Giles (484) and Felix (485).

Attack at Canihuel. After about five days at the farm we were working a schedule with London in the morning when we had a report that Boche and Russian cavalry were looking for Maquis in the woods. We did not pay much attention except to post a sentry: this sort of story was very common. A few minutes later machine gun fire opened up very close to us and Boche approached the farm on horse back together with infantry. As we were five in number and there were eight hundred encircling the region we quit the farm just having time to collect crystals and cypher.

The German Coy commander noticed our aerial between two trees and dispatched a section to see what was in the farm. We hid up in the wood about 150 yards from the farm hoping to return later and collect some of our kit.

After a time, all seemed quiet and Captain Aguirec thought he heard French voices and went to see what was happening. He almost fell on to a German sentry who luckily did not see him and in the meanwhile a villager came to me and said the

(484) See pp 323 this Vol
(485) See pp 361 this Vol

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farm was stiff with Boche. I decided to try and break out of the the cordon which was closing in around us and get away during the night.

When Captain Aguirec returned we moved as a patrol over about three fields which did not provide much cover and as the Boche were close I decided to take cover with the team in a small patch of gorse about 30 yards square. We lay tight and about half an hour later a patrol talking in German passed three yards from our heads. It was impossible to throw a grenade at them as there was a Coy of 150 just down the path. At long last, darkness came and we moved out down to the village which the Boche had just left, had a meal and got a guide for the next move.

Cime of Kercheren. We moved to this area after the Canihuel party and lay up for two days as the Gestapo now had our details and were after us in no small way.

We ordered another radio through Captain de Moduit of the SAS and a set was dropped to Felix but unfortunately the only chute to fail was the one with our set and this put us back for a while.

We arranged several drops for our Maquis through De Moduit, however, which was good cooperation on his part considering his set was already over-worked.

We moved about 10 kms further north after five days, and later moved again to a region about 7 kms from Etang Neuf, not far from Plesidy.

Action against Maquis at Plesidy. We carried out an official inspection of the Maquis at Etang Neuf, which consisted of 3 Coys - all armed and clothed in uniform and with extremely good discipline, the best being under the command of Sous Lieutenant Robert SAS.

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

The day after our inspection the Boche attacked this Maquis in strength. All ranks were on PT except the sentry on the gate with a Bren gun who opened fire and killed 30 Boche in their lorries before he was killed at his post like a good soldier.

The Maquis stood to and the results of a series of attacks on all three Coys were 27 Maquis killed or missing, Germans 500 killed and wounded.

The Germans stated after this action that it was the best disciplined and armed Maquis they had yet contacted. The Maquis moved their position after this action and lost only one bren gun, that of the sentry on the gate.

Attack against our HQ. The afternoon of the Plesidy battle. Boche patrols approached our HQ and opened up with Machine Guns in the next field to our tent. We moved out to a region about 7 kms SW of Bourbriac. We found here our best PC well concealed in gorse on the top of a hill; we had learned enough lessons by this time to chose a good one.

Orders from London. After some parachutings had been carried out from this region we received orders to protect the road Lamballe - Guingamp - Morlaix and to stop the Boche blowing bridges and installations. This was done the same afternoon and over 2000 armed men were concentrated on the sector with the result that the American task force had a completely clear run through to Morlaix without a bridge being destroyed. The American commander and his officers paid great tribute to the Maquis for a fine job of work.

Mission Aloes. (486) I received orders about this time to prepare to receive the above mission. Arrangements were made for a farm to accommodate the personnel - two cars for the use of Colonel Eono and a HQ in the school at Kerrien.

(486) War Diary Vol 3 p

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

The drop succeeded without accident except that for some reason the Jed team dropped about 15 miles away. The next day the mission moved down to Kerrien and the resistance collected the arms dropped.

The mission HQ at Kerrien was of no small interest to the villagers as it bore a strong resemblance to a mad house. I was also a little disconcerted when on entering the school Colonel Eono asked me who I was and what I wanted. In view of the fact that our team had made the entire arrangements for his welfare and I had introduced myself to him the night before, this was a little staggering. The next day the village was attacked by German parachutists who were driven off by troops of the Maquis aided by some of the mission.

Contact with the US Army. About this time, advance units of the US Army were beginning to overrun our position and Colonel Passy gave Captain Aguirec and myself liaison duties with General Ernest of the US task force, myself with the Americans and Captain Aguirec with the French. Our normal Jed role ceased at this point as there were no more parachutings.

The Paimpol Peninsula Battles. The only effective resistance remaining in the Cotes du Nord was force of about 3000 Germans and Russians who occupied the towns of Treguier, Lezadrieux, Plunez and Paimpol. These towns were attacked and held by Americans and patriots in three days in the above order. The Maquis casualties were very slight indeed and they had previously done an excellent job in bottling up the Germans in this peninsula and preventing them from breaking out and attacking the US Supply lines.

The only point of note here is that in the attack on Paimpol the French patriot attack went in at 0630 and the

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

American on the same axis of advance at 0730 due to bad coordination on the part of the staff responsible for the French attack - the plans of the French attack for the next day only reaching General Ernest at 0230 in the morning when it was too late for him to alter his fire plan. He instructed me to report on this and it was only through pure chance and the grace of God that the patriots were not shot by American guns. It is a lesson for future combined attacks.

Liaison Work. It is felt that a Jedburgh officer can be of invaluable assistance to an Allied commander coming into the area for the first time as he has the dispositions, strengths and capabilities of the Maquis at his finger tips. Captain Aguirec did extremely good work at this juncture by organizing the Maquis Coys to bottle up the Boche.

Return. We had received orders seven days before by SF representative Lieutenant-Colonel Walsh to return to England but we waited until the Paimpol peninsula was clear before returning; it was our area and we controlled the Maquis in it.

Points arising from the Work.

1. The Jed set is first class and never let us down.
2. Home operators must never give QSA3 when they are hearing the out-station reasonably well as was sometimes done. The Out operator may have the Boche in the next field as we frequently did during a sched.
3. Home operators must send messages blind when the Out Station does not come up on the sched.
4. The aerial should consist of one fixed end and the other end on a pole which can be raised and lowered. Avoid a fixed aerial for the reasons quoted under a previous heading.

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

5. Teams going into the field should make sure they have a No 1 coil. We started without one and we found it invaluable when one was dropped to us by parachute.

SAS Co-operation. We found at first that it was very difficult to work with the SAS as they had ideas about arming the partisans and rather intruded on our job. We do not mind the maximum number of men being armed naturally, but when hasty preparations are made and the parachutings fail the effect is bad on the Maquis. SAS and Jed parachutings must not overlap.

Morale of Maquis. We found that for the most part the men we had to deal with were very brave - inclined to be far too rash - very fond of petty shootings which brought the whole weight of the Boche down on them - and very good comrades in a scrap. They show little pity for the Boche with ample reason and none at all for the Milice whom they consider 100 per cent worse than the Boche. I personally witnessed the ill treatment and execution of five Milice and none of us felt the least pity for them.

The fighting morale of the Maquis is really good. Volunteers were never lacking for the most dangerous missions and their one idea is to kill Boche.

There is excellent material for the future army of France in their ranks provided they are instructed in the right way for the greater part the younger men had never done military service. The SAS did good work as instructors and occasionally as leaders of sabotage groups.

Work done by the Team. It was estimated before leaving France, working in conjunction with Marceau, that we have armed in the region of 4200 men in our area of the Cotes du Nord, either directly by parachute or by the organized distribution

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

of captured German arms. Details of arms parachuted to various Maquis are given in the detailed list.

Operations carried out under our orders.

1. The guarding of the Morlaix - Guingamp - St Brieuc - Lamballe which allowed the US forces free passage.
 2. Blowing all rail, cable, telephone communications in the Cotes du Nord during June and July.
 3. Attacking petrol either in dumps or stores - the most important being the blowing of 60,000 gallons of petrol, at St Brieuc when the Germans had urgent need of it.
 4. Attacks on enemy convoys which occurred every week - the most important being that near Rostrenen of 20 lorries which was completely wiped out.
 5. Maquis resistance to the Boche. Every time one of our Maquis coup was attacked, the Boche lost far more men than they could afford. The best case occurred to the Maquis at Plevin which had been armed by us two days before. The Boche surrounded the Maquis for three days, suffered very high losses and then withdrew, which was a great moral and physical blow to the Boche as it was one of the first occasions the Maquis had stood their ground when attacked by the Boche in strength.
 6. Several towns were occupied before the US advance the chief being - Guingamp - St Brieuc - Lannion and Morlaix.
 7. The battle in the north in the Paimpol peninsula showed that the patriots can be used in certain cases as normal infantry. They followed the American tanks in and held the towns of Lezadrieux, Treguier, and Plunez during the nights of the battle on their own.
 8. The above are general points - the detailed actions
-

Operations, Team Frederick (Cont'd)

of each Maquis are given in elsewhere.

The FFI. We have received in all our work very fine co-operation from Thiery and Marceau and all minor officials of this organization. The Aloes mission should have full details of all heads of departments of the area.

Conclusion. We have found real pleasure in assisting the French patriots in the liberation of their country, and their splendid spirit of defiance to the Boche has repaid our work a hundredfold.

We feel that our mission has been in some way a success and the sight, when driving up to the Cherbourg peninsula along the main road which our men had guarded, of all bridges intact and all roads clear gave us no little satisfaction. We do not forget either the little team of five very courageous women and the two gendarmes who did our liaison work in the face of the Gestapo and who never failed us when we most needed them.

Financial Statement

Money issued to team -----	250,000 Frs
<u>Expenses</u>	
Major Wise -----	8,000
Captain Aguirrec -----	76,000
Sergeant Kehoe -----	17,465
	<u>101,465 Frs</u>
<u>Money returned</u>	
Major Wise -----	100,120
(including franc equivalent of 40 pound sterling)	
Captain Aguirrec -----	24,000
Sergeant Kehoe -----	32,535
	<u>156,655 Frs</u>

8,120 Francs in excess was handed in by this team. 120 Francs was excess by Major Wise and it is believed that Sergeant Kehoe handed in only 24,535 - the other 8,000 having been handed in by other teams and been placed by mistake with Kehoe's money - thus accounting for the extra 8,000.

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team George (Cont'd)

of XX Corps to operate in territory well known. When released by Division will be infiltrated to Colonel Felix."

9 August From Watermark to Underfoot (504)

"To Powell from Haskell. It is desired in general that Jedburgh teams be returned to UK as quickly as possible after their operational role is completed. In the case of Captain Cyr - if you consider it important to attach him to XX Corps approval is granted herewith."

10 August From Underfoot to Watermark (505)

"Jed team George safe. Erard and Cyr both here, returning Chateaubriant today. Through with written statement and intelligence lower units. Would not object to operations. Their contact London difficult because set in bad state. All info not sent to Watermark has been relayed to Army units with whom they are in perfect liaison."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 9 June to 23 AugustMISSION

Our mission was to drop with a party of SAS and to assist them in establishing a base west of Redon by calling to action all resistance elements who could be put to use and by providing liaison, arms and materials for the local patriots.

Team George was under the command of the OC, SAS party in the field but were to report independently to SFHQ on the state of resistance in terms of personnel, leadership, arms and potentialities.

FROM LONDON TO BALEINEAt the SAS Camp, Fairford

Jedburgh team George left London on 7 June with Major Horton, as conducting officer, and Jedburgh team Frederick (506) for the SAS camp. There we contacted Commandant Bourgoin who was to be our CO.

Our first impression was not good. There seemed to be a strained feeling between Jedburghs and SAS, the latter did not seem to recognize our value to them and rather implied that

(504) C-726/727 9 Aug 44
(506) p 33 this volume

(505) C-1419/151 10 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team GilesTEAM GILES

Jedburgh Team Giles was the seventh team to be dispatched to France from the UK.

Members of Team

The members of Team Giles were:

Captain Bernard M.W. Knox, AC (732) (US), code name: Kentucky.

(Captain Paul Lebel) (French), code name: Loire.

(Sergeant Gordon H. Tack) (W/T), code name: Tickie.

Area to Which Dispatched

Team Giles was dispatched on the night of 8/9 July to the Finistere area, France.

Background of Resistance in Area

Team Giles was being dispatched to the neighborhood of the SAS team Dingson. This SAS team was in close contact with Jedburgh George, (733) the new Delege Militaire Fonction, and F Section's agent Fernand (734).

The original SAS team, accompanied by Fernand, had been sent to the field on 5 June. They made contact with resistance and by 8 June had contacted 3,500 men. On the night of 9/10 June a reinforcing SAS party together with Jedburgh team George were dispatched to this base.

On 13 June word was received from Samwest and Frederick, (735) an SAS party and Jedburgh team in the Guingamp area, that they were unable to maintain an organization in the area and were falling back on Dingson.

Large quantities of supplies had been delivered to the Dingson base and reports showed that there were 2,300 armed men in the area. Also, all the railways were out of action with the exception of one single track.

(732) War Diary Vol 11 p 555
 (733) See pp 39 this Vol
 (734) War Diary Vol 3 p
 (735) See pp 33 this Vol

Declassified by
 date 23 January 1974

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)15 July From Giles (744)

"On no account use ground La Lune Brille sur le Dolmen. Ground searched by Boche and messages too well known."

15 July From Giles (745)

"Received 2 loads on Peche yesterday. Boche arrived just too late. Do not use Peche again until further notice."

16 July From Giles (746)

"General report. Our region Chateaulin Chateaneuf. Maquis affiliated to FTP. We are in process of arming and organizing them in companies with orders to remain quiet. So far orders obeyed completely. Men excellent. Have had contact with Department Chief of Liberation but his organization has such incredibly bad security that we do not like to touch it. In any case it does not count for much in this area."

17 July From Giles (747)

"Have with us Canadian airman shot down over Brest a month ago, Flight Lieutenant Brown. Send instructions on escape route immediately. You dropped 6 containers on Framboise. All found - ground safe. Drop some more. No drop on Gerise last night."

18 July From Giles (748)

"Frederick encircled but escaped. Radio lost. Tackles package found. Chute did not open. Send entire package quickly. Set smashed to hell."

19 July From Giles (749)

"Gerise ready but do not repeat until asked. Received 45 containers, 2 Jed teams and 3 French officers. Sending 1 Jed to Maquis Plou Rach Fromboise to work on Morlaix. Other to Maquis St Segal Pomme to work on Brest. Repeat broadcast of 17th on new groups. We destroy old ones at once. Too near Jerry to file them. Our losses 17, Boche 23."

22 July From Giles (750)

"Have been informed that Berthaud, Chief FFI Department, has complained to London of our activities. We think he complains that we have based our action on FTP in our zone. True enough because in our region resistance is mostly maquis FTP. We are in same Maquis as Department Chief FTP who is in liaison with Berthaud. This arrangement was made at an interview between us and Berthaud. Discussed situation yesterday with Ogden Smith and they agree with us. Expect this evening meeting with Berthaud to settle."

(744) C-69/9 15 Jul 44
 (746) C-115/13 16 Jul 44
 (748) No number 18 Jul 44
 (750) C-279/22 22 Jul 44

(745) C-72/10 15 Jul 44
 (747) C-157 17 Jul 44
 (749) C-232/19 19 Jul 44

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Giles (Cont'd)6 August From Giles (791)

"Carhaix - cannot promise much because of our situation. We are in middle of Boche parachutist division which has taken to the countryside. Liaison between our companies can only be maintained by heavily armed motorized groups which have frequent casualties. We have no real contact with FFI of Carhaix. They were armed by Francis. We could muster men to go to Carhaix but not all of them would get there and the result could easily be complete disaster. If you wish us at all cost to send our men there we will try but they will have to go on foot as we are almost out of petrol. Give instruction."

6 August From SFHQ to Giles (792)

"Resistance headquarters Brittany under command Mission Aloes: Mission parachuted in Cotes du Nord night 4/5 August to Frederick. They ask for contact with FFI Finistere. Send post box urgently. Jedburgh Ronald parachuted same night to Gilbert with mission to liaise with FFI to whom he will transmit Aloes orders. Ronald has contact with London and with Aloes. Confirm if you have received our message indicating action you should take when overrun."

7 August From SFHQ to Giles (793)

"Resistance are requested by army command to do everything possible to protect following roads after cavalry and motorized divisions have passed well in advance other elements. First, route Rostrenen - Carhaix - Brest; second, Pontivy - Gourin - Carhaix - Chateaulin - Brest. Protection should be carried out only by organized units."

7 August From SFHQ to Giles (794)

"We did mean repeater and not railway station. Repeater station is part of telephone system."

8 August From Giles (795)

"New Hq Chateautrev area. Do not strafe. Contact yesterday with US Forward unit at Rostrenen. Daily liaison from now on. Situation Finistere - plenty of Boche left, mostly parachutists here. Will not surrender. Yesterday had prisoners third parachutist division from Huelgoat. We need more arms for job."

9 August From Giles (796)

"Visited Aloes yesterday. Do not understand mission of Jedburgh Ronald. We have undertaken to hold open road Carhaix, Chateauneuf, Chateaulin, Daoulas. Will try to find organization at Huelgoat. Have had no contact with Berthauld since Napoleon had message except constant

(791) C-1117/76 6 Aug 44

(792) C-6149 6 Aug 44

(793) C-509 7 Aug 44

(794) C-510 7 Aug 44

(795) C-1251/78 8 Aug 44

(796) C-1291/79 9 Aug 44

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)

It was planned to bring resistance to its maximum effectiveness during the month of July. In order to accomplish this ten Jedburgh teams were being dispatched. Team Felix was to work in the Cotes du Nord area with team Frederick.

During the first part of the month no action was to be undertaken, but stress was to be placed on organizing and arming resistance groups. About the middle of July a senior French officer would take over command of all resistance in Brittany and guerrilla operations would begin. The signal for the beginning of these operations was the following BBC message:

"Le chapeau de Napoleon est-il toujours a Perros-Guirec".

Team Felix's specific task was to organize resistance in the east part of Cotes du Nord on the basis of groups of 100 men. Also the team would investigate possible landing grounds in the area both for Lysander and Dakota operations. The possibility of sea operations for supplying the area was also to be studied.

Method of Dropping and Reception Committee

The team was to be dropped to a reception committee organized by Frederick.

Equipment

Standard "A" load and standard Jedburgh packages.

Scale of Air Support Likely

To establish increasing numbers of resistance groups in the Brittany area the command was planning 620 sorties, totalling 780 tons of stores, during the month of July. However, the team was still advised to be careful about the numbers they organized. One group was to be established and armed before a new one was attempted.

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)Communications

The team was dropped with a Jedburgh W/T set with instructions to establish contact with the Home Station as soon as possible after arriving in the field.

Finance

Each of the officers took 100,000 French francs and 50 American dollars. The W/T operator took 50,000 French francs and 50 American dollars.

Relations with Other Allied Units

FFI. When Guerrilla activities began, Colonel Eono (817) would arrive to take command as chief of the FFI in Brittany. Until the arrival of this French officer, the team would be under the command of Commandant Bourgois, (818) FFI chief in this area.

Other Jedburgh Parties. The team was being dropped to a reception party organized by team Frederick.

Allied Forces, If Overrun. In case the team was overrun by Allied forces they had instructions to report to the nearest unit and ask for the intelligence officer. They would give none of the details of their work to this officer, but merely ask him to forward them to the nearest SF Staff. This staff would identify the team and pass them back to SFHQ.

Action

Upon Arrival in the Field. The team was to start organizing resistance groups immediately upon its arrival. The total number of effectives to be armed was about 1,600. The specific groups to be armed was to be decided jointly with the FFI. Caution was to be taken against organizing larger groups than could be armed.

(817) War Diary Vol 3 p
(818) War Diary Vol 3 p

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JEDBURGH

Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)

If Captured. The team went into the field with no cover story. If taken prisoner they were in the position of a combat soldier in uniform. All the laws of war should apply to them. Therefore, each member of the team would give his name, rank and serial number only.

Information Provided to Team

The following information was given to the team prior to its being dispatched:

1. Enemy order of battle in the area.
2. Location of enemy dumps and depots.
3. Sitrep on Jedburgh team Frederick, the team arranging for their reception.

First Word from Field

On 10 July Felix reported his safe arrival in the following W/T message (819):

"Have arrived safely with all containers and money for Fred. Spare receiver smashed. Have contacted local partisan chief."

Summary of Messages Exchanged

10 July From Felix (820)

"Require maps 1/50,000 St Malo, Dinan, St Meen, Mur du Bretagne. Also complete receiver. Paratroop unit moving on foot east from Lanballe east Planguenoul."

11 July From Felix (821)

"Have not yet managed to contact Bourgoin, believed in Finistere. Hope to meet Fred Friday Legoursax. Making recce. Dinan, Plancouet, Lamballe. Partisan leader reports number resistance underground Arez area approximately 7,000."

11 July From Felix (822)

"Require arms load A for 500 night 17/18."

12 July From Felix (823)

"Have contacted local leader of Dinan and Plancouet. Dinan 1,000 unarmed, being organized. Plancouet 500 organized armed. Require 500,000 francs for each. Population very friendly."

(819) No code number 10 Jul 44 (820) C-4889/6 10 Jul 44
 (821) C-4923/2 11 Jul 44 (822) C-4927/14 11 Jul 44
 (823) C-4964/8 12 Jul 44

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JEDBURGHES

Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)13 July From Felix (824)

"Bridge at Lancieux prepared for demolition. Can prevent demolition of bridge, Plancoet. Required 2 aspirants as instructors and saboteurs."

14 July From Felix (825)

"Require 2,000,000 francs Maquis Le Chat. Also three Eurekas. Suggest cash be dropped on Aspirand."

15 July From Felix (826)

"SAS dropping Jugons area. Stores cannot be received on ground Ancelot. 200 or 300 German troops in Chateau Ranlion, 3 kms S W Jugon."

19 July From Felix (827)

"Frederick attacked 4 or 5 days ago has lost all except arms, crystals, ciphers. Wants radio from me. Send radio complete ground Mossi."

20 July From Felix (828)

"Visited maquis Bois de Bougere, 96 kms SW Broons. Numbers 120 armed, 30 nucleus arms and Viviane. Three Americans there, names Diggers, King, Carestri. Crew Liberator bailed out St Meen 8 June. Also seen 1 Russian captain and 10 deserters with arms in maquis."

23 July From Felix (829)

"Frederick's radio smashed. Chute failed. Have sent on your messages. Will take 4 days to reach Fred."

28 July From Felix (830)

"Have contacted Francois. Urgent need for Jedburgh team for region between Frederick and us. Send him on ground Foulah with 2,000,000 francs. Necessary for men already in maquis."

29 July From Felix (831)

"American lightning pilot buried Floubalay 24 July. Named Swarl Wurst."

30 July From Felix (832)

"Received notes on sea operation. Have sent on to Marceau and Fred. Money handed to FFI local chief. Thanks for mail etc. Send map sheets Dinan. Lost them."

(824) C-1/41 13 Jul 44
 (826) C-71/42 15 Jul 44
 (828) C-242/79 20 Jul 44
 (830) C-573/28 28 Jul 44
 (832) C-675/40 30 Jul 44

(825) C-40/30 14 Jul 44
 (827) C-205/62 19 Jul 44
 (829) C-334/7 23 Jul 44
 (831) C-619/36 29 Jul 44

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JEDBURGHs

Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)

Jugon and Pleneuf. Contact Aloes who will return you to us. Heartiest congratulations for magnificent work."

20 August From Felix (859)

"Operations Dinan since 2 August. Captured radio, depots, munitions at St Meen. 59 Germans killed, 356 prisoners. 4 cars destroyed, 24 captured. Our losses 15, 7 wounded."

20 August From Felix (860)

"Job finished. Cannot contact Aloes. If no contrary order we leave next Tuesday with Aguirec."

20 August From SFHQ to Felix (861)

"General Koenig's congratulations messages directed at the group at Dinan too. We understand that you will return Tuesday if there is no other order. We agree with this and are warning Aloes."

Report of Team Upon Return from the Field - 8 July to 23 August 1944

Mission. Team Felix was alerted on 7 July and briefed in London on 8 July. Their mission was to organize and arm resistance in the eastern half of the Cotes du Nord, to find landing grounds, and if possible a suitable place on the coast for the landing of stores for the resistance. Contact was to be made with Frederick and Commandant Bourgoin (SAS).

Dropping. The team was dropped to a reception committee 3 kilometers northeast of Jugon on 9 July at 0045 hours. Five aircraft containing arms were also received by this reception committee which was laid on by Frederick, though he had not seen the ground.

Order of jumping: Captain Kernevel, Captain Marchant, Sergeant Colvin.

There were no casualties on landing. We found the reception committee well organized and efficient, especially in view of the fact that a main road ran along one side of the ground 300 meters away and a battalion of Germans were resting

(859) C-2199/5 20 Aug 44
(861) C-6284 20 Aug 44

(860) C-2200/86 20 Aug 44

Operations, Team Felix (Cont'd)

on civilian affairs, especially on the question of collaboration. In any case it was impossible to have the same outlook as those who had lived under German rule for four years, and who had witnessed occurrences of collaborations since 1940, of which we heard numerous stories.

Nevertheless we learned a great deal about the political and civilian reorganization. It was plain that the greater part of the resistance was formed by parties of the Left. The FTP seemed to be essentially Communist. The FN, the largest resistance party in the Cotes du Nord, was of communist origin, but its scope had widened considerably, embracing members whose political views were Right, members of the Regular Army who declined to consider political questions, and priests, etc. The parties AS and Liberation were essentially Right, but their numbers were rather small. In the Cotes du Nord the FN was the movement which most desired common union as FFI. The FTP, however, wished to preserve their individuality. For example on 21 August we received an order from a Colonel Courtois, Chef FTP Cotes du Nord, whom we had never heard of or been told about before. His orders ran parallel with those given by Lieutenant-Colonel Marceau, sole Chief FFI recognized by Frederick and us in the Department.

We were given a sure lead on the political feeling by the fact that all the dinners at which we were invited to preside during our last week, were invariably finished with "God Save the King", "The Marseillaise", and the "Internationale".

The leaders both civil and military sent by the Provisional Government were not in all cases accepted, and some of them should probably be removed from office. We give as examples Colonel Glohen, Commandant of the St Brieuf Sub Division,

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Horace (Cont'd)

passive defense remain. Heard Boche started sabotage last night. Is still not too late for us to save much of port area if you serve grounds Venus, Calipe, Orphee, Ralsin tonight."

5 August From SFHQ to Horace (1191)

"Many thanks news tankers in Brest harbor. Target passed to air force but if you have good swimmer who could place charge of plastic with magnets on hull you should try to attack yourselves."

5 August From Horace (1192)

"Boche general hq commanding Brest is 4th house on left from road leading north from Ecole Navale."

5 August From SFHQ to Horace (1193)

"Please consider as high priority task the preservation of all permanent works throughout your area from destruction. This is in addition to specific targets already given to you. Therefore all harassing activities must be carried out without blowing up major works. Specific target for preservation is repeater station at Landerneau."

6 August From SFHQ to Horace (1194)

"Confirm we shall serve Venus tonight. BBC message passed 1730 and 1915 transmissions. Will also try and deliver same ground tomorrow so stand by. Resistance Brittany commanded by Mission Aloes dropped night 4/5 to Frederick, Cotes du Nord. Same night Ronald dropped to Gilbert, Finisterre. Ronald in charge liaison FFI with Aloes whose orders he will transmit to them. Ronald has direct contact with Aloes by radio."

7 August From SFHQ to Horace (1195)

"Army command ask resistance to take all steps to protect road St Brieuc-Guingamp-Morlaix after cavalry and armored divisions have passed well in advance of other elements. Protection should be carried out only by organized units."

8 August From SFHQ to Horace (1196)

"Reported air attack yesterday two freighters Brest harbor. Presume these were tankers reported by your 4th. Can you confirm with details results."

8 August From SFHQ to Horace (1197)

"Aloes mission wishes obtain from you daily report situation and numbers your effectives armed and unarmed,

(1191) C-240 5 Aug 44

(1193) C-280 5 Aug 44

(1195) C-507 7 Aug 44

(1197) C-6175 8 Aug 44

(1192) C-1049/98 5 Aug 44

(1194) C-6156 6 Aug 44

(1196) C-576 8 Aug 44

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JEDBURGHS

Operations, Team Daniel (Cont'd)

It was quite obvious that we had not dropped on the right dropping ground; no arrangements had been made for us and we were not expected.

We were directed by this Maquis to a local Headquarters. When we arrived we found four wounded officers and sergeants of the SAS who had been there a month and a half.

We waited until early morning and then proceeded by car to the headquarters of Frederick situated about 12 kilometers away.

When we arrived at Frederick's we found Colonel Eono's mission all there. They had all dropped on Frederick's ground on the night before.

[We had made arrangements with the four SAS officers that our packages and containers, which had not all been found the previous night, would be kept at their headquarters and retrieved later. They were not packages belonging to the team.]

We reported to Colonel Passy and Colonel Eono and spent the rest of the morning getting ourselves organized. That afternoon Aloes moved to Kerien, where they installed themselves in a school. Frederick stayed, since he was situated in the Maquis 6 kilometers north of Kerien. We stayed with the Frederick headquarters.

During the next few days it became evident that our mission of liaison between Chef FFI and the Aloes mission was not possible as the Aloes mission, Jedburghs and Chef FFI were constantly touring Brittany on their own jobs and were for a great part of the time together.

[We found ourselves at Frederick's headquarters with little

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or nothing to do and occupied ourselves with anything of urgency which arrived in the absence of other people. We made visits to Colonel Eono's headquarters trying to find some kind of a job which would occupy our time.]

During this time the situation in Brittany was as follows:-

The Boche were completely disorganized and existed only in scattered groups of varying sizes. The main ones being at St Brieuc and Guingamp. Others were reported to be at St Connan and along the north coast at Plestin. The two groups at St. Brieuc and Guingamp were by far the largest.

The Maquis were performing admirably, though the speed with which information and orders could be passed was not sufficiently fast for them to be able to keep contact with all the groups of Germans. Therefore, there was a certain amount of German activity not under surveillance.

The Germans intention at this stage seems to have been to reach the larger towns and to await the arrival of the Americans. They did not wish to surrender to the Maquis. Other Boche were making attempts to get to the coast, presumably to try to get embarked.

Three actions of some importance took place while we were there:

1. At St Brieuc the Germans were occupying the aerodrome and a small part of the town. They had among them considerable numbers of white Russians. It was decided to attempt to get them to surrender. The instigator of this plan was a Colonel of an American reconnaissance column which had just entered St Brieuc. The parlementaire party in a jeep under the white flag consisting of an American Colonel, Commandant Duperier,

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The Americans later attacked the Germans and took the town. The Germans fleeing in small parties towards the west, were reported over the region of Guingamp/Plouaret.

During this time we heard of hard fighting at St Malo but as it was outside the zone of our departmental chef FFI we have no precise information about the fighting there.

The following day 45 German custom officials were brought into Kerien and interrogated and sent to St Brieuc to the American prison camp. Some had come from Guernsey and the Channel Islands.

Jedburgh Headquarters

Frederick's Headquarters was composed of:-

Major Wise
Captain Aguirec
Sergeant Kehoe
M Marceau (departmental chef du region)

There were also six convoyeuses, all of whom were school mistresses; a Maquisard calling himself Joseph who was in charge of provisions for the Maquis; two gendarmes on bicycles who were liaison agents; and a small floating population of chauffeurs and Maquisards undertaking various duties.

This collection of personnel seemed to work admirably. The work of the convoyeuses was deemed by all of the utmost value and importance. The women had undertaken tasks of the greatest difficulty and danger, such as conveying of orders to distant maquis, conveying of money and information all over the department, reconnaissance and any general duty involving movement in German towns and villages. They travelled about 125 kilometers daily on bicycles, and were in general a magnificent aid to the headquarters organization. The same can be said of the two gendarmes.

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6 September. We saw Ellipse, DMR 5 and Major Rewez explained his intention of forming a new light column with material which we were to go and get in London. Ellipse agreed and gave us permission to return to London.

10 September. We arrived in London on a Hudson Operation. Technical Sergeant Denneau was left in Limoges with all our equipment to await a message from us.

11 September. We gave a report to Colonel Carleton-Smith on the possibilities of selecting a new mission somewhere else. We agreed with him to abandon the idea of the "colonne legere" and to devote our activities to the new mission. It was necessary for Lieutenant Singlaub to return to the Correze to pick up several men that were to be used on the new mission and to get Technical Sergeant Denneau and our equipment.

18 September. Lieutenant Singlaub left for France on a Hudson operation and landed at Le Blanc where transport was waiting to take him to Limoges. Major Wise (1631) of team Frederick returned with Lieutenant Singlaub on this trip as he was also to be on the new mission. In the meantime Lieutenant Leb returned to Paris to make the necessary arrangements there.

20 September. Lieutenant Singlaub and Major Wise went into the Correze and contacted the necessary parties. Arrangements were made for their transport to Paris by auto.

It might be added at this point that while in the department of Correze we were approached by many individuals who implored us to make a report of the political situation there. They stated that the methods used by the political groups in power were just as frightening as those used by the Germans. While the political situation is not within the scope of our mission we would like to state that it, on several occasions,

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actually hampered our work. The two political factions refused to work together and often were working against each other. It was reported to me that the armaments plant at Tulle is now reconverted by the FTP to making weapons for themselves. The use that these weapons will be put to in "liberated" France can only be surmised.

25 September. Lieutenant Singlaub arrived in Paris with Technical Sergeant Denneau and men that they went after. Contacted Lieutenant Leb there and the men were turned over to the EMFFI by orders from Colonel Manuel.

28 September. Entire Team James returned to London by Plane.

Wireless Report.

Dropped on night of 10/11 August. Everything was in good order. Set up station on 12 August and made contact strength 3's in and 3's out. Took both skeds of that day to pass initial message. From then on could not make contact on Jed set. Used radio of Mission Tilleul for a few days until I was able to get a B-2 from the Maquis. After that contact was made every sked with 4's and 5's both in and out. Except for a few times when interference at home station was too heavy.

The coding on incoming messages was very good, with the exception of one message that was received two weeks late!

The first few days the encoding on our end was done by officers but when things began to pop they were kept busy all the time so operator had to hold down that job.

Antennae used were of varied lengths and directions. Found that antennae in line with base was most successful.