29 OCT 1984

14 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: **NIO/General Purpose Forces**

FROM: **Deputy Director of Central Intelligence**

SUBJECT: Your Article in the Spring 1984 Issue of "Studies in Intelligence" 3 Attached

1. I refer to your quote from page 12 of the "Studies," "In a sense we are advocating a NATO "takeover" of US intelligence..." Further, on page 13 you say, "...we need relief from obsolete doctrine. It is not a task for any single level of responsibility. In the US Government there should be a National Security Council senior interdepartmental group (SIG) to formulate policy on NATO intelligence matters and to coordinate the efforts of the various agencies and departments on the subject."

2. Fortunately the drafters of the National Security Act of 1947 and various Presidents in their Executive Orders have given the responsibility as well as authority over intelligence matters to the DCI. What perplexes me is why are you, as a serving officer of the DCI, advocating that that be changed?

STAT

John N. McMahon

DCI EXEC REG

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# THE CIA CANOE POOL

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The question recurs with remarkable consistency. Not even the wording changes. When I meet casual acquaintances at the office most of them eventually ask, "Are you still canoeing to work?" The question is a cut above the usual elevator chatter, but I do bridle at that word "still," since it implies there is a reason I might stop. For the fourteen years I have been a member of the CIA canoe pool, getting there has been at least half the fun; there is no question of stopping.

Of course, you need special circumstances before canoeing to work becomes feasible, and I am grateful for the way these circumstances have worked out for me. What has made the canoe pool possible is a pair of unwitting conspiracies—one between nature and the National Park Service, the other between Allen Dulles and a nineteenth-century Marylander named Matthew Ruppert.

## The Setting

The broad, tidal Potomac as it lazes past downtown Washington is familiar to nearly everyone, and fair numbers have seen it as it comes off the piedmont plateau at Great Falls, a dozen miles upstream. The setting for the canoe pool is the much less familiar stretch between the tidal river and Great Falls. For much of this stretch the salient feature is inaccessibility. The terrain itself is difficult, since most of the way from Great Falls to Georgetown the river runs through a steep-sided gorge, more precipitous on the Virginia than on the Maryland side. But the Park Service (which owns most of the land) has thrown up further barriers in the form of scenic parkways. In Maryland the parkway has turnouts providing access to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which runs parallel to the river. In Virginia, however, the road is a four-lane, almost exit-free speedway that gives motorists no chance to stop and discourages anyone else from crossing it.

To be sure, people walk, bike, and jog by the thousand along the C&O Canal towpath, but almost nobody uses the Virginia shore. Few people, moreover, have any way of using the river itself, and most of those who do are whitewater enthusiasts who stay in the first few miles below Great Falls, where the exciting rapids are. Farther down, the river and the woods on the Virginia side constitute what I have come to think of almost as a private preserve: a narrow strip of near-wilderness, protected by a series of natural and man-made obstacles and used by almost no one.

It was at a point in Virginia on the edge of this stretch that Allen Dulles decided to build the new CIA headquarters, back when nobody worried about

the cost of gas and it was the "in" thing to move out of town. My office moved to its new quarters in the fall of 1961, leaving behind "temporary" buildings from World War II that were about to make way for the Kennedy Center. Commuting from Maryland and the District of Columbia was painful at first: the beltway around Washington had not been finished and everyone had to inch across crowded bridges in the District. But three resourceful colleagues of mine discovered the Sycamore Island Canoe Club, set up by Matthew Ruppert and some friends in 1885 and occupying two islands near the Maryland shore almost exactly opposite the Agency building. Thus was born the CIA canoe pool, and its members actually saved commuting time until the beltway was finished.

I did not join the canoe pool until 1970, at first because we lived too far away in the District and then out of inertia after we moved to Maryland. (When we lived in the District my car pool did buy the canoeists a child's edition of *Hiawatha* and leave it under their canoe.) Since then all three original members have retired and I have become one of the canoe pool's mainstays.

### Cowbell, Raft, and Bike

Sycamore Island is an acre or two in area; it lies off the Maryland shore about fifty yards from the canal towpath. On it stand a clubhouse (which has quarters for a caretaker) and an ancient shed full of canoes that often are almost equally ancient. To reach it you descend a short flight of steps from the towpath and yank on a rope that rings a cowbell on the island. This summons the caretaker, who pulls a small, barge-like ferry across to the steps.

From the island over to the Virginia shore is about a third of a mile. There are no rapids, although the current is brisk when the river rises. The CIA building lies up a steep, wooded bluff and across the parkway, about half a mile from the river.

On a typical morning I wheel my bicycle down our driveway in Bethesda and head for the ferry landing, a little over three miles away. At the landing I meet anyone else who is paddling that day, and we ring for the caretaker and cross to the island. I leave my bicycle in the clubhouse. We unchain our canoe and paddle across. The canoe is left chained to a tree (three canoes have been stolen over the years—the river is not *that* remote), the paddles are hidden, and we hike up through the woods on the remnants of a path, complete with stone steps, that was built when the land was a private estate before World War II. We cross the parkway on the cloverleaf that is also carrying our car-encapsulated colleagues, show our badges to the guards at the gate, and walk through the parking lot to the building. Door-to-door, the operation takes a little under an hour in the morning; the trip home takes a bit longer because of the uphill bike ride.

"What do you do when it rains?" my elevator acquaintances sometimes ask. The rule is, if it's raining in the morning we drive to work; otherwise we paddle and rely on ponchos if it rains on the way home. But sometimes the rule is hard to apply. Some of us are more eager (or masochistic) than others, and we have been known to have long jesuitical debates by telephone over whether a given weather condition qualifies as rain. Afternoon thunderstorms send us scurrying to cadge rides from our office colleagues, and because a poncho is poor protection for a cyclist, I have been known to quail at the sight of a cold winter rain and beseech my friends for a ride.

There are other problems that a non-canoeist might not anticipate. Mud, for example. I have an agreement with my wife that my method of commuting will not add significantly to her laundry pile, and my muddy trousers often test the limits of that agreement. Things are worst in the aftermath of high water, when the emergent riverbank has a consistency almost impossible to describe; Mark Twain's "too thick to drink, too thin to plow" comes close. It is easy to sink in shin-deep. A clothes brush at the office helps, but there still are days when I must try to maintain my dignity with patches of dried mud on the lower third of my trousers.

Or spider-webs. In summer the spiders in the woods on the Virginia shore are incredibly productive. Twenty webs may appear across the path overnight, and some of my colleagues maintain that the spiders lie in wait to throw their webs across our faces. In spider season the first canoeist up the hill carries a branch which he waves in front of him. I am constantly reminded of the "simba" rebels at the height of the Congo crisis who waved palm fronds to ward off bullets.

These are inconveniences rather than obstacles. Most of the time the annoyances are less severe than the traffic jams on the beltway. I maintain, moreover, that commuting by canoe is far safer than driving; it is just that we have become inured to the dangers of the latter. If conditions are anywhere

near normal I think nothing of making the trip by myself. There is not even any particular obstacle to commuting after dark.

## Rhythms

A logistic outline like this misses most of the important things, of course. The chance to observe a little corner of wilderness day in, day out is a rare privilege for a deskbound suburbanite. One gets, for example, a glimpse of the long and varied rhythms of the natural world. Deep scars in a treetrunk, gouged by the chain holding my canoe when tree and canoe were submerged in the 1972 flood, are almost healed; where two trees on the hillside have fallen, honeysuckle has used the extra light to move in on the jack-in-the-pulpit; stubby trees on the outcrops in midstream get stubbier with every flood and ice-storm; fill dirt, dumped when the parkway in Virginia was being built, has been only lightly covered with humus in over twenty years.

Or the seasonal rhythms: the bluebells that come up along the river no matter how much silt has been put down in high water; the unvarying sequence of wildflowers with wondrous names: toothwort, then squirrel corn, then troutlily; the joepye-weed festooned with swallowtail butterflies in late summer. I am smug in my knowledge that dutchmen's breeches will appear on a certain patch of ground in April, that a transit of scarlet tanagers can be expected the first week in May, that the raspberries will ripen in July and the pawpaw in September. Wood ducks and mallards produce broods every year; orioles invariably nest in the sycamores, and one year we discovered a Carolina wren's nest right beside the path. We wait for the river to change from summer's olive drab to its wintertime gray-brine green.

There is a long roster of more or less permanent inhabitants: ospreys, herons, pileated woodpeckers, occasional deer, raccoons (rarely seen, but their tracks are everywhere), and the geese—barnyard and Canada—that are fed by the caretaker on the island. And beaver: it astonishes my elevator friends that beaver live right in metropolitan Washington, but they are numerous enough to cause a good deal of damage to trees along the bank. They are nocturnal, and it is not too unusual to see one swimming home in the morning. On occasion we have drifted downstream behind a beaver for a hundred yards, and one evening when I was hurrying through the woods after working late, I nearly tripped over a beaver that was browsing absentmindedly by my canoe.

We have become connoisseurs of sunrises. Spring and fall produce misty scenes out of an oriental painting, and the trees on the Virginia shore explode with color when the autumn sun hits them. On a frigid winter morning we may be spectators to a bleak interplay involving northwest wind, bright sun, dark clouds, and blue sky. Only sodden summer mornings are predictable, and it is during summer that mobilizing for the canoe pool is hardest.

It surprises many people, even those familiar with the pressure-cooker effect of a Washington August, that canoeing comes hardest in summer. I sometimes mitigate the discomfort by making the transit in swimming trunks and taking a quick dip. In the morning I still am relatively cool by the time I reach the top of the hill, where I change into business gear just before emerging from the woods. A dip does not help much with the uphill bike ride home, of course, and I must rely for motivation on the prospect of a cold beer.

### Winter Variables

Winter canoeing is a joy by contrast. Another elevator question is, "Do you mean you canoe all *winter*?" The answer is emphatically yes—if the river is not too high, if there is not too much wind, and if the ice is either absent or negotiable. Yes, the canoe pool kept going even in the chilly winter of 1983-84. We obviously must pay closer attention to the many variables involved since the margin for error is drastically reduced, but the variables themselves may combine in ways that offer unexpected opportunities. To take one example, a strong current or a good wind can keep the river ice-free at temperatures well below freezing. To take another, the floating slush that sometimes dots the river slows the canoe but keeps waves down on a windy day. (Slush on a morning of dropping temperatures is a warning, on the other hand. The original canoe pool once took more than an hour rather than the usual ten minutes to cover the third of a mile back to the island.)

At Washington's latitude, prolonged cold spells are rare and extensive ice is not often a problem. We have had the sustained cold necessary for a solid freeze only three times in the fourteen years I have been paddling. Those three times—the winters of 1977, 1981, and 1982, when the river froze all the way across—we crossed on foot, assuaging the inevitable worries with a wide and creative variety of safety devices: a 14-foot bamboo pole; an ice axe; an

automobile towline, so neatly and tightly coiled that it could not conceivably have been used in an emergency; a 15-foot length of rope with the owner at one end and his briefcase bouncing along at the other; and most improbable and useful of all, a canoe. A canoe turns out to be a first class life support system in and on the ice, and with it the pool kept going in conditions that once stopped it.

Walking across when you know the ice is ten inches thick becomes almost comfortable; but what about a thaw? What about the times the ice builds out from shore, getting thinner and thinner as it approaches open water? I found that a canoe was in its element in these conditions if I brought along an ice axe and a sturdy paddle. Putting part of my weight on the canoe while walking beside it reduced the chance of breaking through, and the canoe was a refuge, easy to scramble into, if I misjudged. The ice axe was sometimes useful for chopping a path, but more often for propelling the canoe across the ice in the same way the paddle pushed it through the water. The paddle got the canoe through ice too thin for the ice axe to grip.

As a result I missed very few days, not just during the depth of the cold spell in 1981 but during the thaw that followed. In 1982, by contrast, I hardly crossed the ice at all. The difference lay in the almost infinite number of variables that affect the quality of river ice. In 1981 the river was exceptionally low, the current was minimal, and the ice formed solidly. In 1982 the ice was more treacherous even though the temperatures were lower. A somewhat higher river level and a heavy fall of snow (which weighed down the ice and let water onto the surface, turning the snow into slush) spelled the difference.

In many ways wind is the most daunting and frustrating of the winter variables. When we are paddling it tries to capsize us, slew us around, and send us sideways all at the same time; and when crossing the ice I have been

propelled briskly to the southeast in an almost friction-free environment. A good winter breeze also brings the wind-chill factor down to zero or below, and because in winter it usually blows straight downstream it reinforces whatever current there is. It was on such a day, when we all were chilled to the bone and there was no way we could stop paddling for even a few seconds, that a colleague remarked he had to keep looking to see if his arms were still on.

For most of the winter, of course, questions of this sort do not arise. Occasionally we get a quiet and beautiful snowfall, which usually occurs when the temperature is around freezing and the river is ice-free. Much more often there simply is nothing to report: there is no ice, the wind is not particularly strong, and the weather is just the normal dreary Washington fare. Dreary or not, I find it more salutary to be out in the weather than to grumble about it from inside; somehow the winter thereby becomes easier to get through. I now do not get really impatient for spring until mid-March.

**Proof Against the Absurd**

Aside from the obvious benefits—the chance to see wildflowers and pileated woodpeckers, the exercise, the insights into the workings of nature—what do I get out of all this? Part of the answer is that regular contact with the earth is as important for me as it was for Antaeus.* Another part (and it may be saying the same thing in a less metaphorical way) is that for a moment I get to evade modern man's almost complete dependence on secondhand information. People now are very largely containerized, physically and even mentally, and without really noticing it we have come to rely on what others tell us about the world beyond our narrow boxes. I suppose this has always been true, but the ratio between the great mass of secondhand data and the small amount we pick up on our own can never have been greater than it is now. It is all too easy to ignore the distinction—to forget that nearly everything has been through a process of selection, organization, and interpretation before we get it. This is a particularly serious danger for professional information-processors like me, but I think the proposition holds for most people. At any rate, the canoe commute does give me a firsthand glimpse of what is going on beyond the various manmade containers I inhabit; I benefit from regular access to information that clearly is unmediated.

Beyond that, I find it simultaneously humbling and encouraging to be reminded that it is an endless process out there, always and yet never changing. At a less cosmic level it is satisfying to understand from my own experience (to take just one example) why the Eskimos have a vital need for many terms to distinguish among different kinds of ice. And not least, when things seem to be settling into a pattern of sustained wackiness either at home or in the office, a fixed point of reference like the canoe crossing is useful even if it is brief.

*In Greek mythology, Antaeus was a giant of Libya, son of Poseidon and Gaea (earth), long invincible in wrestling because his strength was renewed every time he touched the earth, his mother. Heracles held him off the ground and throttled him.

There was only one time when the reference point itself seemed to be working loose. One summer morning, when the mist was still heavy on both the Potomac and my brain, I suddenly noticed that the river was full of dozens of squirming beings ten or twelve inches long, each of them with a huge mouth that stuck above the surface. For a long moment I felt as if I had wandered into a Brueghel painting; then I realized that the surface was covered with insect corpses, the result of some sort of mass death upstream, and the squirming beings were catfish that had come up from the bottom to scoop them in. Relieved that the river was still proof against the absurd, I resumed paddling toward a world I knew was not.

# DISCLOSURE PROBLEMS IN ESPIONAGE PROSECUTIONS



Enforcement of the principal provisions of the United States espionage laws often poses a serious problem for our defense and intelligence agencies. The statutes at issue, 18 U.S.C. §§793 and 794, are among the most often used in espionage prosecutions. Since these statutes actually or potentially necessitate damaging disclosures of national security information [1] to defense counsel and, through public trial, to foreign adversaries during the course of prosecution, the statutes should be reformulated to eliminate this dilemma unless such disclosures are required as a matter of law or for some other compelling reason.

## Statutes

Title 18 U.S.C. §§793 and 794 (Appendix A), respectively, proscribe the gathering or obtaining of documents or information "relating to the national defense" [2] and the communication or delivery, or attempted communication or delivery of such documents or information to a foreign government or faction or an agent thereof. To be proscribed, such acts must be done with "intent or reason to believe" that the documents or information are "to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation." These requirements are a problem because they impose upon the government the obligation to prove to a jury in open court that the documents or information at issue are related to the national defense and that the defendant acted with the requisite intent or knowledge.

## Elements of Proof

To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§793 and 794, the government must prove that the documents or information at issue in the case meet the statutory standard. In *United States* v. *Gorin*, 312 U.S. 19 (1941), the Supreme Court adopted a broad definition of what information relates to the national defense.

> National defense, the Government maintains, is a "generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establish-

[1] "National security information" is intended to mean information which would be subject to the various espionage statutes. As will be seen, as a practical matter this means classified information.

[2] 18 U.S.C. §793(a) uses the phrase "*respecting* the national defense" to describe the covered information and documents while 18 U.S.C. §§793(d)-(f) and 794(a) use "*relating* to the national defense" and §794(b) uses "relating to the *public* defense" (emphasis added). No distinctions were intended by the use of these differing formulations.

> ments and the related activities of national preparedness." We agree that the words "national defense" in the espionage act carry that meaning.[3]

Under such a broad definition, however, it would be difficult for a person to know what specific acts are proscribed, since many foreign communications, dealings, and relationships in the private and commercial sectors pertain to military-related matters. The Court disposed of such overbreadth objections in *Gorin:*

> . . . we find no uncertainty in this statute which deprives a person of the ability to predetermine whether a contemplated action is criminal under the provisions of this law. The obvious delimiting words in the statute are those requiring "intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation." This requires those prosecuted to have acted in bad faith. The sanctions apply only when scienter is established.[4]

Since the obtaining and transfer of national defense information is thus proscribed only when done with the requisite "bad faith," in the absence of self-incriminating statements or a confession by the defendant, about the only way to convince a jury on this element is to prove that the information is so important that the defendant had to have an intent or reason to believe that his acts would injure the United States or benefit a foreign state.

The cases subsequent to *Gorin* developed further what information was excluded from coverage and how the government could go about proving that information relates to the national defense. Thus, information released by the defense establishment or which is otherwise publicly available is not covered by the statutes, regardless of the defendant's intent.[5] On the other hand, the fact that the information at issue is classified is admissible as evidence of defense-relatedness,[6] although a jury would still have to determine as a separate matter that the defendant had an intent or reason to believe that the information would injure the United States or give advantage to a foreign nation.

### Costs of Disclosure

A CIA General Counsel once stated that "nobody doubts the proposition that some prosecutions, and due to the elements of the relevant offenses, virtually all espionage prosecutions, cannot be maintained except at the price of disclosing information that otherwise would and should remain secret for

[3] *Gorin* v. *United States*, 312 U.S. at 28.

[4] *Id.* at 27.

[5] *United States* v. *Heine*, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), *cert. denied*, 328 U.S. 333 (1946).

[6] *United States* v. *Soblen*, 301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).

reasons of national security."[7] While this statement was made broadly with respect to all prosecutions that in some manner may require the disclosure of classified information to enable the case to go forward, it clearly represents a judgment that espionage cases in particular exact a high price. While the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)[8] has established a statutory framework to obtain pretrial and trial rulings concerning the relevancy of classified information claimed to be necessary in federal criminal prosecutions, it is primarily of benefit in non-espionage cases where the defendant seeks broad discovery of sensitive classified matters (often unrelated to any real issue concerning the government's case of any defense) in order to force the government to drop the case rather than disclose the requested information. Obviously, when a central element of the offense involves classified information, as with 18 U.S.C. 793 and 794, or is claimed to be necessary to enable the defendant to cross-examine the principal government witness called to establish how documents or information will injure the United States or give advantage to a foreign adversary, CIPA is of limited or no utility.

In some relatively recent espionage cases, the government has avoided high disclosure costs that might have resulted had it not been for the tactics of defense counsel. For example, in *United States* v. *Moore*,[9] a former CIA employee was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 794(a) for attempting to pass to the Soviet Union various documents relating to the national defense. Two of the charges upon which he was convicted concerned portions of classified CIA phone directories containing the names of numerous employees under cover. The defense counsel failed to cross-examine the government's principal witness who testified concerning the importance of the phone directories and the damage that passage to the Soviets would have caused. While it is doubtful that defense counsel could have persuaded the jury that the documents did not relate to the national defense, he could have increased the cost to the government by exploring in open court whether it had been disclosed publicly that persons listed in the directory worked for CIA or if any had been compromised to the Soviets in other ways.

Similarly, in *United States* v. *Kampiles*,[10] another former CIA employee was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 794(a) for selling to an agent of the Soviet Union a top secret technical manual for the KH-11 satellite system. The government's principal witness concerning the importance of the compromised information was the CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology. The witness gave general testimony concerning the importance of the KH-11 system and how the technical manual would help the Soviets take countermeasures. Defense counsel did not seriously cross-examine on these points or press for a detailed explanation of how the manual would provide

[7] *Espionage Laws and Leaks: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives*, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, (1979) (letter of Anthony A. Lapham to Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice) (hereinafter cited as *Hearings*).

[8] 18 U.S.C. App. III.

[9] Unreported. D. Md. 1978.

[10] 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979) *rehearing and rehearing en banc denied* (1980).

additional help to the Soviets if they already knew the United States had reconnaissance satellites, or whether the United States had noted any decrease in the KH-11 effectiveness since the manual was compromised. Such questions would have clearly been permissible and would almost certainly have led to the additional disclosure of classified information. While the defense tactics in both *Moore* and *Kampiles* may have resulted from conscious decisions not to contest the defense-relatedness of the information involved in order not to unnecessarily prejudice the jury against the defendant, these cases should make it clear that the current espionage statutes offer the government no assurances that it alone will be able to control the amount of sensitive information that will be disclosed at trial.

**Possible Reformulation of Statutes**

It should be possible to proscribe the conduct that is covered by 18 U.S.C. 793 and 794, at least insofar as those statutes are aimed at classical espionage, without requiring the United States to confirm specific damage to the national security or further exacerbate that damage. In their authoritative treatise on the espionage statutes, Professors Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. had the following to say about the broad manner in which classical espionage can be proscribed under our legal system:

> The essence of classical espionage is the individual's readiness to put his access to information of defense significance at the disposal of agents of foreign political organizations. Granted that the harm that results from his conduct is a function of the importance of the information transferred, there should be no hesitation, regardless of the banal quality of defense information involved, to punish the citizen whose priorities are so ordered or foreigners whose job it is to risk apprehension. We believe, therefore, that the information protected against clandestine transfer to foreign agents should be defined broadly, probably more broadly than in current law. In this context, we see no dispositive objection to making knowing and unauthorized transfer of classified information to foreign agents an offense, without regard to whether information is properly classified. That a spy might earn complete immunity by stealing secrets so serious that their significance cannot be disclosed in court—a clear possibility under current law, and also under S.1 and S.1400—is an outcome that should be avoided, if possible.[11]

In some contexts, the knowing passage of classified information to foreign agents is an offense under current law without regard to the propriety of the classification. Thus, under 18 U.S.C. 798, the passage to a foreign government of classified information concerning devices used for cryptographic or communications intelligence purposes is an offense without regard to whether the

[11] The Espionage Statutes and the Publication of Defense Information 73 Colum. L.R. 929, 1084 (1973). Professors Edgar and Schmidt would support a revision of the current law to streamline the proscription of classical espionage. *See* Statement of Harold Edgar and Benno Schmidt, Jr. in *Hearings*, *supra*, note 7, at 112-13.

information is properly classified.[12] This is also the case under 50 U.S.C. 783(b) with respect to passage of classified information by employees of the United States to certain foreign representatives.[13] Since it is difficult to see any First Amendment issues in such cases,[14] the only concerns in drafting an appropriate statute to broadly cover communication of classified information to a foreign power and associated preparatory conduct should be the mental state or scienter needed to establish the offense and the sentencing process and severity of punishment to be imposed. Presumably, since the government would not have to prove the underlying significance of the information to the jury, it should be required to show that the defendant knew that the United States accorded a specific degree of protection to the information and that the defendant's action was intended to benefit some foreign organization. Finally, in order not to impose a severe penalty out of proportion to the offense, provisions for *in camera* proceedings prior to sentencing should be considered to allow the court to determine the importance of the classified information involved. A draft statute which contains these requirements is at Appendix B.

[12] *United States* v. *Boyce*, 594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir.), *rehearing denied* (1979).

[13] *Scarbeck* v. *United States*, 317 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir.), *cert. denied*, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).

[14] One of the main purposes of the freedom of speech and press clause of the First Amendment was to ensure the unfettered discussion of matters of importance and interest to the public. The public interest and the First Amendment, likewise, permit legislative efforts to prevent acts, be they characterized as speech or otherwise, which are harmful to the public. The Supreme Court recognized very early in its development of First Amendment law that there are "evils that Congress has a right to prevent." *Schenck* v. *United States*, 249 U.S. 247 (1919). In view of the unquestioned appropriateness of proscribing espionage, the only real issue becomes one of ensuring that no legitimate speech or press activities are swept within the proscription.

## APPENDIX A

### Espionage Laws

**18 U.S.C. 793**

§ 793. Gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information

(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, research laboratory or station or other place connected with the national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers, departments, or agencies, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, stored, or are the subject of research or development, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or any department or agency thereof, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place so designated by the President by proclamation in time of war or in case of national emergency in which anything for the use of the Army, Navy, or Air Force is being prepared or constructed or stored, information as to which prohibited place the President has determined would be prejudicial to the national defense; or

(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy, take, make or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or

(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this chapter; or

(d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the

injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or

(e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or

(f) Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information relating to the national defense, (1) through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having knowledge that the same has been illegally removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or lost, or stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction to his superior officer—

Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

(g) If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.

June 25, 1948, c. G16, 02 Stnt. 730; Sept. 23, 1950, c. 1024, Title I, § 18, GI Stat. 1003.

**18 U.S.C. 794**

§ 794. Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government

(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of a foreign nation,

communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.

(b) Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or communicates, or attempts to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.

(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.

June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 737; Sept. 8, 1954, c. 1261, Title II, § 201, GS Stat. 1219.

## APPENDIX B

### Draft Statute

**H.R._____/S._____**

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* that this Act may be cited as the "Espionage Prevention Act of 1984."

SEC. 2. Chapter 37 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following sections:

§ 800. *Espionage*

(a) Whoever, without authorization, knowingly collects or attempts to collect classified information with the intent that such information be communicated to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.

(b) Whoever, without authorization, knowingly communicates, or attempts to communicate, classified information to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power shall be punished by imprisonment for any terms of years or for life.

(c) Prosecution under this section shall be barred unless, prior to the return of an indictment or the filing of an information, the Attorney General and the head of an appropriate department or agency responsible for the classified information jointly certify in writing to a court with jurisdiction that, at the time of the commission of the offense, the classified information involved was properly designated as classified information.

§ 801. *Defense to Espionage*

Whoever, in the course of official duties on behalf of the United States, engages in conduct described in Section 800 of this Chapter with a reasonable belief as to the authority to do so shall not be guilty of an offense under section 800.

§ 802. *Sentencing*

(a) For purposes of sentencing an individual convicted of an offense defined in section 800, the court shall consider the nature of the classified information involved in the offense. Cases which involve classified information deserving a high degree of protection shall, absent especially mitigating factors, receive a greater sentence than cases which involve information requiring lesser degrees of protection.

(b) Life imprisonment shall not be imposed except in time of war declared by Congress or when the court determines that the classified information involved poses an exceptionally grave danger to the national security or to the life of any person.

(c) For purposes of determining an appropriate sentence the court is authorized to conduct such *in camera* proceedings as it determines are necessary for a full understanding of the nature of the classified information involved in the offense. Upon request of the United States for good cause, such proceedings or portions thereof may be held *in camera ex parte*.

§ 803. *Definitions*. For purposes of section 800 of this Title—

(a) The term "authorization" means having authority, right or permission pursuant to the provisions of a statute, executive order, directive of the head of any department or agency who is empowered to classify information, order of any United States court, or provisions of any rule of the House of Representatives or resolution of the Senate which governs release of classified information by the respective House of Congress.

(b) The term "classified information" means information or material designated and clearly marked or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or executive order (or a regulation or order issued pursuant to a statute or executive order), as requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security.

(c) The term "communicate" means to disclose, impart, transfer, convey or otherwise make available to another, but does not include publication by the media.

(d) The term "foreign power" means—

(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States;

(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations;

(3) an entity that is directed or controlled by a foreign government or governments;

(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor; or

(5) a foreign-based political organization.

(e) The term "agent of a foreign power" means any person who acts on behalf of a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining classified information.

(f) The term "Attorney General" means the Attorney General of the United States (or Acting Attorney General) or the "Deputy Attorney General."

SEC. 3. The table of sections for chapter 37 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

§ 800. *Espionage*

§ 801. *Defense to Espionage*

§ 802. *Sentencing*

§ 803. *Definitions*.

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# THE INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND OF OPERATION TORCH*

**John C. Beam**

Robert Murphy was a career diplomat who served the State Department for 42 years, beginning in 1917 in Switzerland. In 1940, in the early days of World War II, he was charge d'affaires at the embassy in Vichy, France, following France's defeat that spring. Together with the naval attache, Commander Roscoe Hillenkoetter,** he reported to Washington on the conditions in Vichy and in French North Africa. He and Hillenkoetter reported that the Nazis had left French Africa to its own devices and that it contained 125,000 combat-trained men on active service. They reported also that if France was going to fight again anywhere in the war, North Africa would be the place.

The reports elicited no comments from Washington. Murphy did not even know whether they were of interest to anyone until he was abruptly summoned to Washington and told by Under Secretary Sumner Welles that his reports had been passed to President Roosevelt, that he had read them carefully, and that the President wished to talk to Murphy. Murphy described that meeting in November 1940:

> There is no official record, so far as I know, of that hour-long conversation which opened very informally. . . . This situation intrigued Roosevelt, who believed that North Africa was the most likely place where French troops might be brought back into the war against Nazi Germany. Spread out on his desk was a large map showing all of French North and West Africa, and the President told me that he had given much thought about how to help French officers who were operating in the relatively independent conditions prevailing in Africa. The President then said that he wanted me to return to Vichy and work unostentatiously to get permission to make a thorough inspection tour of French Africa and to report my findings to him. The French African policy of the United States Government thus became the President's personal policy. He initiated it, kept it going, and he resisted pressures against it, until in the autumn of 1942 French North Africa became the first major battleground where Americans fought Germans. . . . As Roosevelt concluded his suggestions for my African assignment, he said casually, "If you learn anything in Africa of special interest, send it

*Reprinted by permission of *Parameters*, Journal of the US Army War College.

**Hillenkoetter rose to flag rank and served as Director of Central Intelligence from May 1947 to October 1950.

> to me. Don't bother going through State Department channels." . . . Thus I became one of President Roosevelt's "personal representatives," assigned to carry out secret missions under his orders during World War II.[1]

This was the opening of a new world for Murphy, the diplomat. It would include secret meetings, the use of a false name, and the clandestine reception of a submarine on the coast of North Africa. President Roosevelt did not hesitate to use his bureaucracy in imaginative ways.

**Approach to Weygand**

Murphy made his inspection tour and sent his report to Roosevelt, who used it as the basis of his African policy. At the President's direction, Murphy also made contact with General Maxime Weygand, the senior ranking official of Vichy in Africa. Roosevelt had encouraged Murphy to cultivate Weygand—even, as a fellow Roman Catholic, to go to church with him. Weygand, despite having participated in the surrender to the Germans, was respected by both French and Allied officials. Roosevelt considered this tough, 74-year-old soldier a potential ally against pro-German elements in Vichy and against the Germans themselves.

Murphy had recommended in his report that he negotiate an agreement with Weygand under which the United States would provide food and other essential material to the population of North Africa. The President approved, and the resulting Murphy-Weygand Accord was signed in early 1941. Roosevelt's political and strategic motive behind the agreement was to counter German influence and retain the goodwill of the French and native populations. The agreement was also intended to encourage anti-Vichy, anti-Fascist sentiments among the French military in North Africa. Roosevelt could not do more than this in 1941. In the 1940 election he had assured American mothers that their boys would not be sent into any foreign wars. Yet he wanted to block any move that Hitler might make into the region, a possibility that could close off the entire Mediterranean and endanger American interests in the South Atlantic and the Southern Hemisphere.

The accord provided for an American Control Commission, which Murphy headed in Algiers, to oversee the distribution of the American goods and to ensure that they did not go to aid the German war effort. The commission, a reflection of both Murphy's skill and Weygand's basic pro-Allied sentiments, called for the presence of twelve "vice consuls." Under a secret agreement initiated by Murphy and Weygand, these men would be allowed to use codes and employ couriers carrying locked pouches, "a privilege usually restricted to diplomatic missions and not extended to consular offices in French North Africa." As Murphy described it,

> This secret understanding . . . became the basis of one of the most effective intelligence operations of the war, for it provided that Americans not only could watch what transpired in French Africa, but also could get out uncensored confidential reports to our Government.[2]

Information-gathering of this sort was unfamiliar to the bureaucracy of Washington and created a great deal of discomfort both in the State Department and in the War Department. A reflection of this was the fact that the State Department could not provide the specialized personnel called for by the project, "involving as it did a certain amount of irregular activity and danger."[3] The department turned to Army and Navy intelligence for specialists who could appreciate objects and events of military significance. Murphy further related that North Africa seemed almost another planet to military intelligence in 1940 and, moreover, it had no personnel qualified in Arabic. Additionally, the

> services were reluctant to associate themselves with a State Department enterprise, but after considerable discussion, the chiefs of Intelligence at length agreed to assign to Africa several reserve officers, commissioned as vice consuls, and to pay their salaries—providing the State Department would pay their other expenses. The men thus selected all had some experience in France and knowledge of the French language. . . . Then somebody pointed out that commissioned officers, if they performed civilian functions while on active duty, could be shot as spies if war broke out. So some of the officers who had been selected were discharged. So now they were civilians—and who would pay them? The services were operating on a financial shoestring. It was finally decided to pay them from the President's emergency funds.[4]

By midsummer 1941, the twelve "vice consuls" were in Algiers, Tunis, and Casablanca reporting on harbor facilities, road and rail networks, order of battle information, and attitudes of French officers toward fighting Germans. A sampling of the material sent to Washington shows that they also provided detailed sketches and maps of the roads, airfields, and port facilities in North Africa. In addition, the officers cultivated sources within the military establishment who provided them with copies of original documents from the military files. Murphy sent these back by cover letter using the State Department terminology of the day. An example:

> *Subject:* Immediately Available Munitions Supplies Within Algeria. I have the honor to enclose copies of documents which were taken from the official archives of the 19th Army Corps Area (Algiers) which have been secured by Vice Consuls Boyd and Knox from a source we have found reliable. As in the case of the official effectives' list (see my dispatch No. 1572 of July 28, 1942, Military Effectives in Algiers), there is of course a certain amount of secret supplies and depots which are not known to the Axis Armistice Commissions.[5]

The volume and quality of the information provided by these officers was later praised highly by Eisenhower, and their work was credited as a contribution to the eventual success of Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa.

**"That Savage Conglomeration"**

The Germans in North Africa, however (and fortunately), did not have so high an opinion of the vice consuls. An intercepted German intelligence report of 16 March 1942 stated,

> Since all their thoughts are centered on their social, sexual, or culinary interests, petty quarrels and jealousies are daily incidents with them. Altogether they represent a perfect picture of the mixture of races and characters in that savage conglomeration called the United States of America, and anyone who observes them can well judge the state of mind and instability that must be prevalent in their country today. . . . Lack of pluck and democratic degeneracy prevails among them, resulting from their too easy life, corrupt morals, and consequent lack of energy. . . . They are totally lacking in method, organization and discipline. . . . We can congratulate ourselves on the selection of this group of enemy agents who will give us no trouble.[6]

Despite these unkind observations by the Germans, the vice consuls were active and working seriously at their duties. They were also in danger of being misunderstood by their own masters, however, when they expressed a need for discreet settings to meet their contacts who were providing them with information. In the days before OSS and its successors provided budgets for safehouses, the State Department had to be approached carefully for money for unorthodox purposes. Murphy sent the following letter in support of such a request.

> In any propaganda effort from what I have seen in Europe through the years, I should say that personal contact with a few powerful individuals under favorable auspices is of the greatest importance. Among the elements composing "favorable auspices" would be an appropriate establishment where contacts could be received, friendly meetings arranged and conversations carried on without surveillance. Under present conditions, hotels are utterly unsuitable and many contacts refuse point blank to meet our people in hotels or public places. . . . In Marrakech our Vice Consul was able to obtain the house of an American citizen which is suitable for this purpose. He fortunately obtains it at a low rental. . . . Aside from acquainting you with our small efforts along these lines, the purpose of the foregoing is to inquire whether the Department would be disposed to add a special allowance for, shall we say, "propaganda," a much abused and naughty word, but it will serve in this case to describe activity in behalf of the allied cause. . . . If so I feel that an allotment should be made out of the President's Fund of $500 monthly for Fez and Marrakech.[7]

Murphy eventually received his funds, but was instructed to obtain from the officers in question subvouchers to support his accounts.

Information-gathering was an important part of Murphy's task, but he had also the greater mission of enlisting Weygand to take action to prevent a

German invasion or, as events later developed, to assist the Allies in their takeover. As Dr. Arthur Funk described in his *Politics of TORCH*,

> Murphy knew that his primary responsibility required a continuous relationship with Weygand—cautious, diplomatic, not so close as to alarm the Axis but sufficient to reassure the French that the United States would sooner or later help in defeating Hitler.[8]

Unfortunately, although Murphy did an admirable job of cultivating Weygand, he very likely caused the failure of this important part of his mission by his insistence on the use of the State Department cipher system.

From before World War I to the middle of World War II, the US diplomatic codes were open to any cryptanalyst in the world who wanted to make the effort to read them. State paid no attention to this arena, and in 1941 a unit of the German Foreign Ministry, Pers Z, was reading the US diplomatic traffic. Murphy was sending to Roosevelt his most sensitive negotiations with Weygand, including a request from Weygand for military assistance and Roosevelt's assurance that it would be forthcoming. Murphy insisted on using the State Department codes to preserve his autonomy, and even though American officers in Eisenhower's command pointed out their insecurity, he was certain that the Germans had not broken his codes. As early as 12 August 1941, however, the state secretary of the German Foreign Office could hand to von Ribbentrop fully solved copies of Murphy's telegrams of 21 July and 2 August.[9] The result was that on 18 November 1941 Weygand informed Murphy that the Germans had told Vichy that unless Weygand were removed, they would occupy all of France and let the French population starve while the German Army lived off the land. Weygand was recalled and retired to southern France. He never again played a role in the war effort.

**First Arena for Clandestine Activity**

Murphy entered 1942 having to start again to find an individual like Weygand or to construct an underground network that would accomplish the same purpose. By then the United States had entered the war and OSS (then known as the office of the Coordinator of Information, or COI) came to North Africa. COI was formed in July 1941 based on a suggestion from Churchill to Roosevelt that America needed an arm solely for intelligence and covert operations. General William Donovan was named its chief, and one of the first steps was to submit a plan to Roosevelt for operations in North Africa. Like Roosevelt, Donovan had seen the Mediterranean as a potential battleground and had all along urged Allied control of the African coast. Roosevelt approved the plan, and Donovan appointed Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Eddy as naval attache at the US Legation in the International Zone of Tangier, Morocco, in December 1941.

Eddy had been born in Syria, spoke Arabic fluently, and had considerable experience in the Middle East. He had served in World War I and had won five banks of decorations with the Fighting Fifth Marines. (In a briefing session which Eddy gave for General Strong, Chief of Army Intelligence, and General George Patton in July 1942, Patton noted the ribbons—two more rows

than he had—and grunted, "I don't know who he is, but the son of a bitch has sure been shot at enough.") [10]

The final decision to go ahead with the landings and serious preparation for them did not take place until late July 1942. But Eddy's arrival in December 1941 brought to Murphy and his team a heightened sense of participation in a major enterprise. This came largely from the fact that North Africa was the first arena for OSS clandestine activity in the field. Donovan, wishing to establish his new agency in the Washington bureaucracy, generated a great deal of activity with the generous budget he was allotted by Roosevelt.

At the same time, however, the arrival of Eddy and COI compounded the confusion in the command structure in North Africa. At this point it was chaotic. Murphy was working for the State Department but was detached from it on verbal orders from the President. His salary came from State, and his expenses came from the President's emergency fund. His vice consuls, who were reporting to him, were being paid also from the President's emergency fund. Eddy's upkeep came from COI's budget. Eddy was assigned to the Legation in Tangier and was instructed to work with Murphy. Another military officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Solborg, was working for Donovan as assistant military attache in Lisbon. There he was responsible for organizing clandestine activities in both the Iberian peninsula and North Africa. He also was instructed to coordinate his activities with Murphy. Murphy was theoretically in charge.

This disorganization in the field was a reflection of the overall American approach to intelligence activities during the period. Historically, it was a subject the country's leaders did not want to deal with, but with the United States having been thrust into world affairs, men like Roosevelt saw the need for organized and discreet information-gathering. Murphy's assignment was a beginning, and the formation of COI was the next step in the process. How this unfamiliar new arm was going to fit into the government bureaucratic structure was a problem then, and for many officials it remains a problem to this day.

Eisenhower attempted to deal with the wartime command relationship by urging General Marshall to advise the President to make the COI directly responsible to the JCS. But the Army had a problem with its officers engaging in spying or subversive actions. Eisenhower recommended that such work in foreign countries "be conducted by individuals occupying a civilian rather than a military status." Despite such status, however, Ike recommended that they "be subject to the higher control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." In June 1942 Roosevelt changed COI to OSS and did place it under the JCS in the chain of command. Murphy's role was later clarified when, at his request, he was formally detached from the State Department to the Office of the President as Roosevelt's personal representative, until after the landings when he was named adviser for civil affairs under Eisenhower. He was among the first civilians to serve on the inner staff of an American military commander's headquarters in wartime.[11]

Fortunately, Murphy and Eddy, the men in the field, had the personalities and good sense to be able to get along and work together in all this early confusion. Murphy became part of the overall plan for North Africa that General Donovan had submitted to the President. It stated in part "that the aid of the native chiefs be obtained, the loyalties of the inhabitants cultivated, fifth columnists organized and placed, demolition materials cached, and guerrilla bands of bold and daring men organized and installed." [12]

As one of their first moves to achieve these noble goals, Eddy and Murphy set up a clandestine radio network across North Africa. The key station *Midway* at Tangier was located in a winepress overlooking the airfield; *Lincoln* was in Casablanca; *Yankee* was in Algiers; *Pilgrim* in Tunis; and *Franklin* in Oran.[13] But Murphy's intensified and untraditional activities troubled some of his more orthodox colleagues. He wrote,

> Those transmitters were immensely useful to us. One of them was installed in the attic of the Casablanca consulate general, and this disturbed one of our senior consular officers who thought it might be contrary to regulations. He said . . . rather dejectedly, "Murphy, I hope you know what you are doing. But I should like to make clear that I disapprove of espionage." [14]

The State Department was not the only place where one could find disapproval of unorthodox activities. Many military officers were also not ready to accept them. Eddy had submitted a preliminary plan for subversive activity in connection with the landings, and Donovan had set aside $2 million for these secret plans. Most of the suggestions were accepted by the JCS with the proviso that control of all secret activities in connection with TORCH should be vested in the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower. But there was little enthusiasm on Eisenhower's staff for clandestine activities. In one instance, OSS proposed that members of the Nazi military staff in North Africa (many of them Gestapo officers) be assassinated when the landings began. The assignment for this cold-blooded task had already been accepted by the father of a French boy shot by the Germans in Paris. Eisenhower's aides did not take the suggestion seriously, though, and it was "squashed at a higher level." A plan that eventually was carried out involved smuggling out of Morocco two experienced hydrographers (one the captain of a tugboat company; the other, chief pilot of Port Lyautey) who were familiar with the North African coastline. Eisenhower had not approved the plan, however, and was furious when he heard of it. An investigation revealed that General Patton had approved the project but had neglected to inform Eisenhower's staff.[15] Another OSS project possibly inadvertently provided the inspiration for the deception coup that the British later carried off in *The Man Who Never Was*. In this an officer of General De Gaulle's Free French Forces was to be assigned to the OSS team at Tangier. The Gaullist officer left London in a British plane, but it crashed or was shot down over Spain. The Frenchman was killed, and his papers, which contained highly classified information, were seized by the Spanish police (and undoubtedly made available to the Germans).[16]

These were only a portion of the activities OSS carried out in North Africa, but Murphy, still the man in charge, found himself playing more unfamiliar roles after serious planning for TORCH got under way.

**Winter Underwear**

Washington needed a first-hand appraisal of the situation in the unknown territory of North Africa. Murphy was called to Washington in August to describe his operational plan and to discuss his selection of French military officers who could provide a friendly reception for the landings. His underground had selected General Henri Giraud, a respected officer who had escaped from a Nazi prison, as the man who could take control of the French forces. After explaining his plan to Roosevelt and the JCS, Murphy was instructed to go to London and brief Eisenhower. In keeping with the overall need for complete secrecy, Murphy was put in a lieutenant colonel's uniform, given the name McGowan, and ferried across the Atlantic in a B-17 Flying Fortress. General Marshall had told him he would be disguised in a lieutenant colonel's uniform because "nobody ever pays any attention to a lieutenant colonel." [17]

In London he briefed Eisenhower and his advisers on North Africa and entered his role as war planner based on his knowledge and special experience in that area:

> I was the only person at the London conference with prolonged experience in Africa itself, and from questions asked I could see that Eisenhower and some of his officers had mental pictures of primitive country, collections of mud huts set deep in jungles. . . . Eisenhower then prudently inquired whether winter underwear would be necessary, and I told him it was, especially on the high plateau in eastern Algeria. Thousands of American soldiers appreciated that the following winter.[18]

Murphy admitted to his "appalling ignorance of military matters" and wrote that he was participating in the initial important offensive of World War II not knowing the first principles of military science. It was here, however, that he provided the contribution to military planning that his successors would follow in later years. "My interests had always been political and my professional training was in diplomacy," he wrote. "But I took comfort in the knowledge that the expedition to French Africa would require political as well as military strategy." [19]

Eisenhower also gave credit to the political considerations of the military operation. Regarding "discussions involving political possibilities," he wrote

> Our concern over these affairs illustrates forcibly the old truism that political considerations can never be wholly separated from military ones and that war is mere continuation of political policy in the field of force.[20]

That much of the London meeting was devoted to this political side of military operations came about because the United States was invading neutral

territory. The preparations included covert political action, which in this case meant organizing an underground network of individuals sympathetic to the Allied cause.

In London it was decided that General Mark Clark should make a trip to Algeria to meet with Murphy and some of his French conspirators in order to reassure the French and to obtain a first-hand assessment of the situation there.

The clandestine reception of Clark in North Africa, later well publicized, was arranged by Murphy, who once again played more the role of an intelligence operative than a diplomat. Clark and his party flew from London to Gibraltar and proceeded to Algeria by submarine. After arriving on the Algerian coast, they saw prearranged light signals from a house Murphy had borrowed for the occasion. The party rowed to the shore in kayaks and "from the darkness they heard a voice: 'Welcome to North Africa,' said Robert Murphy, alias Lieutenant Colonel McGowan. 'Damn glad we made it,' said Clark." [21] Clark had a long and successful meeting with the representatives of Murphy's underground, but afterward, while they were waiting for night to fall before returning to the submarine, word came that the police were on the way. In reality the police were looking for smugglers, but the party did not know that. Clark's group divided and hid in the cellar and upstairs. Murphy now played another perhaps unaccustomed role. He and his assistant received the police while the owner of the house explained that Murphy was an American diplomat at his house as a guest for a pleasant party. The party of course included some ladies, who were upstairs. The scene of empty wine bottles and the hint of ladies were enough to convince the French police that they need not search further.

Clark made it back to the submarine with only minor additional mishaps, including losing his trousers while trying to launch a boat in the surf, and Murphy returned to Algiers to complete preparations for the landings.

## Lessons

The invasion took place on 8 November as scheduled, but it met opposition by units of the French military, especially the navy. The result was 1,800 Allied casualties. What went wrong can be attributed to many factors, but the principal one was that after Weygand's recall there was no officer in overall charge who could suspend French operations. Murphy had a group of officers up to divisional level who could sow confusion, but the senior officer they brought in proved to be ineffective.

Eisenhower described the preparations and results from his perspective:

> From Mr. Murphy we learned the names of those officers who had pro-Allied sympathies and those who were ready to aid us actively. We learned much about the temper of the Army itself and about feeling among the civil population. . . . He gave us a number of details of French military strength in Africa, including information concerning equipment and training in their ground, air, and sea

> forces. From his calculations it was plain that if we were bitterly opposed by the French a bloody fight would ensue; if the French should promptly decide to join us we would expect to get along quickly with our main business of seizing Tunisia and attacking Rommel from the rear. It was Mr. Murphy's belief that we would actually encounter a mean between these two extremes. Events proved him to be correct. On another point, however, he was, through no fault of his own, completely mistaken. He had been convinced by the French Generals . . . that if General Henri Giraud could be brought into North Africa . . . the response would be immediate and enthusiastic and all North Africa would flame into revolt, unified under a leader who was represented as being intensely popular throughout the region. Weeks later, during a crisis in our affairs, we were to learn that this hope was a futile one.[22]

In the end, TORCH was a strategic success. In military terms it was a host of firsts. Among these, it was the largest amphibious operation to that time, and it was the first invasion to be planned by commanders and staffs of two nations with different outlooks and military experience. The military organization was truly impressive, bringing together as it did an armada from widely separated points of the earth to rendezvous at a number of points on the African coast on target and on time. In intelligence terms, it launched OSS and provided experience in organization and planning for its future operations.

The most valuable result was the degree of civilian-military cooperation and understanding it exhibited. This is perhaps less extraordinary now, but it still remains an important factor where men of different backgrounds have to cooperate on a single venture. An American diplomat pursuing his normal duties was suddenly and dramatically pulled from his accustomed world to that of intelligence and planning for a large-scale military invasion. The quality of the man is shown in the fact that he could adapt, relate to his military counterparts, and earn the respect of all concerned. His lack of success in an important aspect of the operation was unfortunate. But in all operations there are many variable factors, and other key factors in this shortcoming may remain obscured. The fact remains that without Murphy's efforts the Allied casualty total would likely have been much higher.

The story of Murphy's work illustrates well the interrelationship between military and civilian partners in operations, especially in those parts of the world with complex political situations. Having the resources of a man such as Murphy who is assigned to an area and who thus knows the terrain and, especially, the political scene is vital. Equally essential is military and civilian understanding of the contribution each makes to the operation.

What Murphy stated in his book about his own ignorance of military matters is revealing. He said that Eisenhower and many of his brother officials had the benefit of previous instruction in political problems,

> such as the excellent course given at the Army War College and other military schools, but I had had no equivalent training in military matters. Nowadays [1964] we try to teach our diplomats a

> great deal about military affairs, and we try also to teach our professional soldiers more about world politics and diplomacy. In 1942, American soldiers and diplomats alike had to contend with large areas of ignorance.[23]

We may have come far since 1942 in mutual education on military and political matters, but in honesty we must admit that gaps still exist in mutual understanding between military and civilian officers, perhaps even more problematic than the gaps in our awareness of the cultural and political factors of the Third World. We should seek to fill the former no less than the latter before American soldiers are once again sent into an unfamiliar war zone. The cooperation of Murphy with Eisenhower and Eddy provides an example for us to follow.

**NOTES**

1. Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 67-70.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.
5. Dispatch No. 1573, 28 July 1942, from Murphy to the Department of State, National Archives.
6. R. Harris Smith, *OSS, The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Los Angeles: Univ. of California Pres, 1972), p. 39.
7. Letter from Murphy to G. Howland Show, Assistant Secretary of State, 20 February 1942, National Archives.
8. Arthur Layton Funk, *The Politics of TORCH* (Lawrence, Kans.: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1974), p. 18.
9. David Kahn, *The Codebreakers* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 497-98.
10. Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 157.
11. Murphy, p. 106.
12. Ford, p. 155.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Murphy, p. 108.
15. Smith, p. 57.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
17. Murphy, p. 102.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-04.
20. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 88.
21. John S. D. Eisenhower, *Allies* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982), pp. 139-40.
22. Dwight D. Eisenhower, pp. 86-87.
23. Murphy, p. 104.

*Dessert*

## PAR - FAITS (AND OTHER FAITS)

[redacted] 25X1

What follow are quotations from Performance Appraisal Reports that [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] compiled over the years and for which he composed introductory 25X1
comments. The quotations are rendered faithfully, with typographical and other errors intact, for they contribute to the fun. The subjects, supervisors, and reviewing officials mentioned and quoted in this compilation are to remain forever, and mercifully, anonymous.

*The Golden Rule—Redux:*

"I believe that the readers of this PAR, as well as the previous one written by the Rating Officer, should know that the Rating Officer and I have had and continue to have many strong personal and professional differences of opinion. He believes, for example, that I have reached my level of competency, and I believe that he has exceeded his."

*Mastering the surprise ending:*

"It should be recognized that by employing the proper technique, very comfortable shoes can be made from a sow's ear but making a silk purse requires an entirely different raw material."

*Making no bones about it - in the vernacular:*

"Subject is also responsible for all Headquarters support of a complex covert action operation aimed at maintaining the political stability of a regime headed up by a weirdo who goes around saying things like 'dat get me shame'."

*When faint praise is called for:*

"Operationally, Subject was not loafing."

*For one who skates well on thin ice:*

"Subject is quick to spot thin stuff and do something about it — particularly when it comes to good operational tradecraft."

*For one who can bench press human dynamics while reciting from Rabindranath Tagore:*

"His ability in oral expression and human dynamics was strongly demonstrated . . ."

*Growth Potential:*

"As the period drew to a close, Subjects apparatus had begun taking shape. . . ."

*Being hugely successful:*

"He largely recruited a high level source."

*What to do to protect colleagues from being hit by large and fast moving desks:*

"Mr. D. continued to be the Elmer's glue of the large and fast-moving Laos Desk."

*Almost flawless—so to speak:*

"His English is flawless, if not close to it."

*When in doubt clutter things up; its good for cover:*

"He characteristically complicates simple things."

*The smiling, freely offered thumb in the eye:*

"One thing not noted previously is his calm and pleasant demeanor which tends gratuitously to mask his toughness as a case officer."

*The clairvoyant case officer:*

" . . . His operational reporting is often on time, often ahead of time."

*Then there's this little QP drummer:*

"He marches to the beat of his own drummer."

*Although not a hot-head:*

"This officer has a warm mind."

*His eyes are clear but his prose is measured and smoke-watered:*

"With the perspective of twenty months of overview of his long march, rather than with the smoke-watered eyes of those who peer too closely into his campfire, I conclude that his pace has been measured."

*Big jokes from little mischiefs grow?*

" . . . his personal eagerness tends sometimes to lead him into small mischiefs."

*Although an off-quay visionary he can trumpet, and drum, and stomp his foot all at the same time:*

"He has been like a one-man band trying to cover the waterfront on a far-frontier."

*The Good Humor Man endures:*

"He has endured rapid personnel changes with good humor."

*The hyperactive dog of a case officer:*

" . . . He is a man of constant motion—some of it unnecessary . . . he bloodhounds even the longest odds and opportunities."

*Although some may wonder:*

"All said and done, Mr. S. is human."

*When tippling leads to being Freud, and the naked truth must be revealed:*

"At the right psychological moment he unfrocked himself in a German cafe."

*The crawl-on-your -belly- and -hiss- approach:*

" . . . a target of opportunity whom he approached in his own inimical style."

*Dignity in catastrophe:*

"Subject handles flaps with aplomb."

*Standing tall in the Lilliput of Liaison:*

"Due to his height this man should probably be directed along liaison lines or staff work."

*The runaway case officer:*

"He is not only a self-starter but a self-goer—at times tending to go too fast."

*Unless one speaks quietly and carries a big stick:*

"The operational carrot is easily lost sight of and is difficult to catch."

*The Case of the Abandoned Suitcase:*

"He began to pursue ops leads as soon as his suitcase hit the ground."

*The cape-and-dagger jock:*

"He involves himself athletically in Base and local activities."

*The strong tryer:*

"I would rate his effort to do the job as strong."

*When finishing working hard on his syntax . . .:*

"He at least secured his own housing on which he has been working hard to fix up."

*The monosyllabic hot dog:*

"His performance has been—WOW"

*The musty Middle East:*

"This officer has been associated long enough with Arab affairs. He now needs fresh air."

*After making good strides in the wrong direction . . . :*

"He has made good strides in the right direction."

*The gritty performer:*

"This officers performance has been outsanding."

*The forward leaning, vine swinging Case officer:*

"Mr. K. moved in sure-handed fashion."

*The Compleat hard target Case officer:*

"He is a hard-nosed supervisor and a hard-headed officer."

*Besieged, bothered and bewildered:*

"He has reached a standoff with the bureaucracy around him."

*The operational arsonist:*

"Subject has kept the target fires burning."

*When aptitude isn't apt:*

"His apptitude for spelling is poor."

*When he's not plodding he lies down, humps his back and makes himself small:*

"He is steady and defendable."

*Because his compass came in his air freight . . .:*

"It took the officer less than one week after his arrival here to get his bearings."

*Just give him a tune-up, but don't touch the cheerful plugs:*

"He tries hard in a situation that has him more stymied than most of us, and he plugs along cheerfully."

*The lean and meaningness officer:*

"He has brought new energy and meaningness to the program."

*While shunning the unusual infinitude of every day chores . . .:*

"He handles the usual infinitude of occasional case officer tasks."

*To be some kind of mixed up butterfly . . .:*

". . . He needs to get the operational chrysallis out of the political coccoon it is in."

*He trembles at dullness, but-:*

"He confidently attends all sorts of events of interest . . ."

*The wary grunter:*

"He gives a negative first impression, primarily because he is inarticulate."

*When the anatomy of an Advance Work Plan is necessarily obscure:*

"Mr. S. has had supervisory responsibility for parts of two I.A.'s . . ."

*Not risking over confidence:*

"He can look back at this job as 'pretty well done'."

*The little engine with the retarded spark:*

"During the reviewing period this officer has made good use of the limited intelligence resources available to him."

*Somewhere down there is gold; it just doesn't pan out:*

"Subject probably has much good in him. Somehow, though, it has not come through."

*The tribal wit:*

". . . he is a happy headhunter."

*In addition to avoiding prickly confrontations . . .:*

"Subject is not one to sit on his laurels."

*Migratory fixation:*

"I am looking forward to the next reviewing period when the birds will come home to roost." (next FR) "They have, and they have settled on the highest branches."

*Seen through a glass darkly:*

"Insofar as I am able to comprehend it, I have no quarrel with the substance of the rating officer's comments."

*To be continued.*

*This article is classified CONFIDENTIAL.*

# INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

*Vietnam: A History.* By Stanley Karnow. Viking, New York; 1983; 750 pp.

From the beginning Americans found Vietnam an exasperating land. In 1820, John White, captain of a Massachusetts clipper ship, became the first American to visit Vietnam, but his efforts to negotiate a commercial treaty met rebuff from the Vietnamese, already fearful of foreign influence. A generation later, the U.S.S. Constitution, "Old Ironsides," inadvertently got caught up (nor, for Americans, would this be the last time) in a dispute between the Vietnamese and the French, which culminated with the United States Government disavowing the actions of its warship and extending an official apology to the Vietnamese Emperor. Lyndon Johnson may have sensed the torment this strange land would eventually bring him. Only weeks after succeeding the murdered John Kennedy, long before Vietnam came to obsess him, the new President confided to an aide that he had a "terrible feeling that something has grabbed me around the ankles and won't let go." (p. 324) That something, of course, developed into America's longest, and only losing, war.

Stanley Karnow is an American journalist who has devoted much of his career to Asian affairs. First visiting Vietnam in 1959, well before the United States transformed the country into an American outpost, he returned periodically over the next two decades and in 1981 spent seven weeks there interviewing many high-ranking communist officials, as well as dozens of the North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and South Vietnamese soldiers who fought so long and paid so dearly for a peace that has yet to come. These interviews forced Karnow to reevaluate some of his own preconceptions about the war; they furnish the most original material in his book, *Vietnam: A History*, which is the companion volume to last fall's Public Broadcasting System television series on the war.

Karnow (like most authors) writes that he undertook his task with no special cause to plead. Indeed, this study is remarkably free of the passions that have so long surrounded consideration of the war. He resists the oversimplifications and stereotypes that have characterized much of the writing about Vietnam, recognizing that the issues usually were considerably more complex than either hawks or doves acknowledged. Opposition to the Saigon government, he rightly notes, did not necessarily connote support for the communists. Many of the Buddhist militants, student activists, and others who led the resistance to Prime Minister Diem were as anti-communist as Diem himself, counting among their grievances against Diem his inability to defeat the Viet Cong.

In another illustration of this balanced tone, Karnow observes that it may be impossible to say with finality whether the American destroyer *Maddox* was in Vietnamese territorial waters in August 1964 when North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats fired at it. The question is pertinent because it was this incident that precipitated the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Washington took it for

granted that Hanoi adhered to the three-mile limit set by the French, he writes, but "it could have been equally assumed that they had switched to a twelve-mile limit such as China observed." Thus, the American warship was "conceivably" violating North Vietnam's sovereignty (p. 366), he concludes, adopting a tone far more cautious than most pronouncements on the subject.

This is not to suggest that Karnow's account is bland or lacking in judgments. Writing of General Nguyen Khanh, he remarks that it seems almost beyond belief that America's commitment in Vietnam rested by 1964 on "so sleazy a surrogate." (p. 335) Prime Minister Ky once showed up at a high-level conference dressed "like a saxophone player in a second-rate nightclub." (p. 425) Maxwell Taylor was "a conventional soldier with little patience for Vietnam's political complexities." (p 378) William C. Westmoreland was "gullible" and "naive," "a corporation executive in uniform, a diligent, disciplined organization man who would obey orders." (pp. 345, 551, 557) In pursuing possible diplomatic solutions to the war, Johnson and his advisers displayed "a rare combination of ineptitude and intransigence." (p. 495) Never sectarian in his assessments, he turns his fire on the other side as well, labeling Hanoi's communist government in 1981 "an inept and repressive regime incompetent to cope with the challenge of recovery." (p. 27)

Karnow offers measured judgments on controversies that have peppered discussion of Vietnam for a generation. For instance, he unequivocally addresses the question of whether the conflict could more correctly be called a civil war or a North Vietnamese invasion of the South. Central to this matter is the issue of when North Vietnamese main force units infiltrated south—prior to the arrival of American combat forces, or only in response to these deployments. The decision to send North Vietnamese troops south, he writes, was made in the spring of 1964, long before the White House considered introducing American forces in significant numbers into Vietnam. By April the first North Vietnamese regulars were already on their way, followed at the end of the year by complete units. "The Communists had added a new and significant dimension to the struggle," Karnow observes. (p. 334) The widely held notion that the Viet Cong represented an indigenous and autonomous insurgent movement, he adds elsewhere, was by late 1964 nothing more than a myth.

As for the destruction wrought by American firepower, Karnow is equally forthright. While pointing to the unprecedented tonnage of US bombing, he also notes that the dikes along the Red River, the destruction of which might have killed "hundreds of thousands," were never targeted. Nor were Hanoi, Haiphong, and the other northern cities subjected to the kind of "carpet bombing" common during the Second World War. (p. 415) Even the "Christmas bombing" of 1972 inflicted only a fraction of the damage its critics initially claimed. The B-52s, Karnow avows, "were programmed to spare civilians, and they pinpointed their targets with extraordinary precision." (p. 653) Karnow judges that the bombing backfired for the Americans, stiffening the North's resolve and enabling Hanoi to ask for greater sacrifice from its citizens.

Turning to the matter of responsibility for Saigon's fall in 1975, Karnow implies that culpability lay primarily with Nguyen Van Thieu and his corrupt regime. Later claims that the American Congress had undermined the will of an ally by refusing it needed supplies, Karnow writes, were little more than a maneuver to avoid the onus for Saigon's "almost certain collapse." (p. 667) Karnow cites a Pentagon study that revealed that of the $700 million in American aid allocated to Saigon in that final year, less than half had actually reached Vietnam by the time of Hanoi's final victory. The remainder consisted of goods still in the pipeline, or had not yet been spent. Money, it seems, was the least of Saigon's problems; and no amount of outside aid, short of massive armed intervention, could permanently prop up a government that neither earned nor received the support of its people.

Some, missing the commitment and moral certitude the war aroused in proponents and opponents alike, will find Karnow too evenhanded. Quite often his judgments are implied rather than stated, a technique which makes them less sharply drawn than they otherwise would be. But on the major issues, he is clear enough. Vietnam was a misguided endeavor, a "tragedy of epic dimensions" which nobody won. (p. 11) The United States, "motivated by the loftiest intentions, . . . rip[ped] South Vietnam's social fabric to shreds." (p. 439) The enemy, "imbued with an almost fanatical sense of dedication to a reunified Vietnam under [its] control," saw the war as a continuation of two thousand years of resistance to foreign domination; ideology played a distinctly secondary role in the struggle. (p. 17) The United States, failing to recognize this fundamental situation, then compounded its error by viewing the conflict as a military problem, susceptible to solutions more appropriate to a conventional war for territory. "The real problem," Richard Nixon wrote in his diary, "is that the enemy is willing to sacrifice in order to win, while the South Vietnamese simply aren't willing to pay that much of a price in order to avoid losing." (p. 642)

One of the themes tying this fat book together pertains to the frustrations Saigon caused the United States. Karnow makes shambles of the contention that South Vietnamese officials were little more than American puppets. Indeed, it was almost the other way around, for by the late 1950s, Washington had invested too much in building up the South as an anti-communist bastion to allow it to succumb to the communist insurgents or their sponsors in Hanoi. Thus, South Vietnam, not Washington, held most of the cards, as American officials repeatedly discovered when Saigon ignored their demands for political reform or military assertiveness. Their very helplessness gave the South Vietnamese leverage with respect to their American partners, for as a Saigon official candidly admitted to Karnow, "Our big advantage over the Americans is that they want to win the war more than we do." (p. 383) The South Vietnamese were, Karnow repeatedly reminds us, clients who refused to play the part.

Intelligence professionals will find the fragmented and rather cursory treatment Karnow accords their field something of a disappointment. In the final analysis, the entire US involvement in Vietnam, lasting a quarter century

and costing close to 58,000 American lives and untold billions of dollars, rested upon an erroneous assumption: that Ho's brand of communism represented little more than an extension of Soviet or Chinese power. From time to time, American officials entertained the "theoretical possibility," as Dean Acheson phrased it, that Ho might be another Tito, but they never seriously tested this notion. (p. 176)

Had they done so, they might have discovered that, like the relationship tying Saigon to Washington, links between Hanoi and its sponsors in Moscow and Beijing suffered through a tortuous series of twists and turns. The Chinese provided the Viet Minh with advisers and weapons as early as 1950, and during the next 25 years, supplies from abroad played a crucial role in the communist resistance to first French, then American power. Foreign assistance, for instance, more than compensated for the damage American bombing caused, while toward the end of the war SAMs and other sophisticated air defense systems provided by the Soviet Union enabled Hanoi to inflict heavy casualties on American fliers. On the other hand, neither Moscow nor Beijing proved willing to subordinate its perceived national interests for the sake of ideological solidarity. In 1954 Zhou Enlai, fearful that a continuation of the war against the French would draw the United States more deeply into Indochina, pushed Ho's representatives at Geneva into concessions they were loath to make. Pham Van Dong, the longtime prime minister of North Vietnam, angrily walked away from the last round of the negotiations muttering that Zhou "has double-crossed us." (p. 204) In later years there would be further disputes over both diplomatic and military strategy. Remembering Mao's advice that Hanoi pursue a policy of protracted guerrilla war, Pham Van Dong bitterly recalled to Karnow in 1981 how the Chinese leader "was always ready to fight to the last Vietnamese." (p. 329) In the 1960s, Ho would find Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West similarly distasteful, all the more so because the Kremlin urged him to postpone his plans to "liberate" the South. But American decision makers, caught up in their image of a monolithic communist threat, rarely paused to consider the implications of these differences. Seldom has a failure in understanding—a breakdown in the intelligence process, if you will—had more devastating consequences for the United States, or for those unfortunate enough to find themselves in the Americans' path.

CIA remains throughout this book a shadowy presence, its role never defined, its impact seldom explored. Karnow writes from time to time of "intelligence," but more often than not, he is referring to the military intelligence officers in Westmoreland's headquarters in Saigon. He cites the West Point textbook that termed Tet an "intelligence failure ranking with Pearl Harbor," but renders no firm judgment on the accuracy of this assessment. Instead, he writes that "like medieval scholars interpreting theological scriptures, various intelligence specialists detected different meanings" from the ample supply of indicators available in the weeks before the offensive. (p. 543) CIA's role in this process of evaluation is not specifically mentioned—a recurring characteristic of the book which Agency officers will find irritating.

Karnow's account of the coup against Diem exemplifies his treatment of CIA. He makes Lucien Conein, identified as "one of the star performers in the CIA's 'department of dirty tricks,' " an energetic participant in the intrigues against the Ngo family. (p. 283) The single reference to John McCone suggests that the DCI opposed overthrowing Diem. Whether Conein was operating contrary to orders from Langley (which seems unlikely), or McCone muted his opposition to the coup is not clear. Complicating matters further, Karnow portrays John Richardson, Saigon station chief, as an initial supporter of the plotters who subsequently developed doubts and was removed from his post by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in order to reassure the conspirators of American backing. So while CIA in the person of Conein is painted as a co-conspirator, the Agency's role in Diem's ouster remains obscure.

In discussing the arcane political intrigues in South Vietnam, Karnow is considerably more blunt. "The American intelligence establishment in Saigon simply could not cope," he writes (p. 337), referring to the difficulties of monitoring the multitude of plots endemic to the South Vietnamese capital in the mid-1960s. He also recounts an (in retrospect) embarrassing CIA judgment in October 1964 that the communists would probably avoid actions which might bring "the great weight of US weaponry" down on them. (p. 402) As for Hanoi's Easter offensive in 1972, he notes that its magnitude and duration stunned American commanders, again despite warnings the communists were planning such a move. As with his account of Tet, Karnow makes no recommendations concerning the age-old problem of separating intelligence wheat from the far larger amount of chaff.

Karnow does credit the Agency with recognizing that the conventional military tactics and the commitment of ever larger American ground forces favored by the Pentagon simply would not work, and he quotes Agency analyst Willard Matthias' mid-1964 forecast of a "prolonged stalemate" in which a negotiated settlement and neutralization might offer the best possible alternative. (p. 403) He writes that no solid evidence substantiates the allegations that CIA was behind Lon Nol's 1970 coup against Prince Sihanouk. And in describing the Agency-run Phoenix program, he admits that his 1981 interviews in Vietnam forced him to reevaluate his earlier negative assessment. The program was far more effective in disrupting the Viet Cong infrastructure than he had initially believed, he concludes—adding, however, that it was so riddled with corruption and abuse that perhaps seventy percent of the suspects detained under its auspices were able to buy back their freedom with judicious bribes to the South Vietnamese.

Other issues of interest to intelligence officers engage Karnow's attention only slightly. He briefly mentions the order of battle controversy that eventually pitted Agency analyst Sam Adams against both the Pentagon and Adams' own superiors, but does not substantiate Adams' contention that the military deliberately underestimated enemy strength. Instead, Karnow implies that the number juggling Westmoreland allegedly engaged in was more or less routine; had Johnson sought a less optimistic estimate, he could easily have obtained one among the welter of competing agencies circulating statistics in Washington. One reads these pages without getting any sense of the domestic

debate touched off by Senator Stuart Symington's ballyhooed charges that the CIA was running a "secret war" in Laos. In fact, Laos receives short shrift from Karnow throughout the book. The single reference to the infiltration of enemy supplies through Sihanoukville gives no indication of the intensity this controversy provoked, nor of the damage to CIA's reputation it wrought. The 1969 Green Beret case, in which Agency officers were accused of complicity in the execution of a Viet Cong suspect, is passed over in silence. John McCone and Richard Helms each rate one citation in the book's index, William Colby two, and George Carver, Helms' longtime Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, none. Thomas Powers in his biography of Helms credits Carver with turning the "wise men" against the war in the month after Tet. (*The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, pp. 243-45) Karnow relates the same incident but assigns the prominent role to the State Department's Philip Habib. (p. 562)

Could better intelligence have prevented the debacle Vietnam became? In theory, yes—providing it enabled American officials to shed their preconceptions about the supposed identity of purposes linking Ho Chi Minh and his foreign backers. But Washington did not slide unawares into the quagmire that was Vietnam. At each stage in the escalation, Johnson was fully aware of the hazards ahead. By July of 1965, Karnow tells us, he had already sensed that a commitment in Southeast Asia might require as many as 600,000 American soldiers. Johnson ultimately failed "because he misjudged the enemy's capacity to withstand pain," because he expected Hanoi to balance anticipated gains against costs as he believed Americans would have done. "The trouble with our policy in Vietnam," a Pentagon official later conceded, was that Washington policymakers "anticipated that the North Vietnamese would respond like reasonable people." (p. 396) Only if the nation's intelligence experts had persuaded the decision makers that Hanoi operated under a wholly different calculus of reasonability would we have been spared Vietnam.

Aside from its shortcomings in the field of intelligence, Karnow's organization strikes the reader as uneven and at times imbalanced. Save for his introductory chapter, he does not get beyond 1954, at which time the United States began to supplant the French in Indochina, for more than two hundred pages. Still, his emphasis on this earlier period serves as a useful reminder that for many Vietnamese, the American war was merely the latest episode in a struggle encompassing two thousand years of resistance to foreign domination.

With the exception of a single chapter, Karnow focuses on the decision makers, not the Vietnamese peasantry, the soldiers, or the American civilians back home. As a consequence, although he characterizes the war as a "test of endurance in which the side able to last longer would prevail" (p. 464), it is not entirely apparent why the other side was able to hold out longer than we were. He provides many partial explanations, but never a sustained argument, asking his reader instead to piece together the reasons from among the hundreds of pages of text.

Karnow usefully reminds us just how easy it was to slip into a large-scale commitment in Vietnam, how logical it all seemed at the time. The war was

"a struggle this country cannot shirk," the New York *Times* solemnly intoned during the Kennedy years. (p. 255) At the same moment, Senator J. William Fulbright, subsequently one of the leading opponents of "executive encroachment" upon legislative prerogatives, was suggesting that the country's global responsibilities required granting the President "a measure of power in the conduct of our foreign affairs that we have hitherto jealously withheld." (p. 359) Perhaps one of the lessons of Vietnam should be for us to beware of that which seems all too logical.

Could the United States have won the war? American GIs apparently think so. Karnow cites a Veterans Administration study a few years ago that showed that 82 percent of the veterans polled believed they had been sent to fight a war Washington politicians would not let them win. But most indicators would point otherwise. Saddled with an ally unwilling or unable to save itself, and only marginally understanding the nature of the conflict, the United States gradually escalated its role in the war. Ironically, the further Washington intervened, the weaker the non-communist forces in South Vietnam became, as they lost all possibility of turning aside allegations of surrogating for America. As a consequence, the United States never had a serious chance to do more than stave off defeat. And such an objective, when measured against the costs entailed, increasingly proved insufficient to most Americans.

STAT

*MI-6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations, 1909-45.* By Nigel West, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London; 1983; 253 pp.

Nigel West, the young British writer who earlier gave us the two-volume history of MI-5, the British Security Service,* this time has tackled an even more arcane and difficult subject, the story of the origins and operations up to 1946 of MI-6, the British Secret Intelligence Service. This latest book by the prolific West (true name Rupert Alason) is *MI-6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations, 1909-45.*

The first question one has about a book on so secret an organization must concern the author's sources. In an illuminating introduction, West describes some of the problems he faced. He notes that SIS secrecy has rarely been penetrated. Even Professor Hinsley and associates, who have had access to the official records, have managed to produce only the dryest of narratives. Although Hinsley's two volumes are immensely valuable as detailed accounts of British intelligence in wartime, especially on the cryptographic side, they have been widely criticized for omitting virtually all mention of personalities. The late Sir Maurice Oldfield, Chief of MI-6 from 1973-78, commented that the two volumes** were remarkable for not having any names in them, giving the impression that the intelligence war was won by committees in Whitehall rather than by people. But even more indicative of the secrecy which surrounds British intelligence is the fact that volumes three and four of Hinsley's great work, which were to have been published by now, have not appeared and a shroud of mystery surrounds their fate. It has been widely rumored that Mrs. Thatcher became alarmed that the first two volumes, even emasculated as they are, represent an unwarranted breach of security.

How then did Nigel West pull together enough material to pack 253 pages with such fascinating detail? West agrees it was not easy, but admits he took advantage of the large amount of material already published concerning wartime intelligence operations, particularly about the codebreakers, SOE operations, and OSS activities with the British and Allied organizations. Certainly the first two volumes of Hinsley's work must have been helpful when it came to untangling the story of the early efforts to establish a workable intelligence system. But West's intention, he makes quite clear, is to concentrate on MI-6 operations, i.e., the stations overseas, their agents and staff, as well as the SIS*** organization at home. His aim is to give the reader an understanding of how MI-6 as a whole played its wartime role, but to do so without the frustrating coyness of previous commentators. In this he states he was much assisted by information volunteered by former MI-6 officers and their agents. He says he was fortunate in tracing former members of the staff

**MI-5: British Security Service Operations 1909-45*, the Bodley Head, London, 1981; and *A Matter of Trust: MI-5 1945-72*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982.

****British Intelligence in the Second World War*, Volumes I and II, by F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1979 and 1981. For a review, see *Studies in Intelligence*, Winter 1983, Volume 27, Number 4.

***SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) and MI-6 are used interchangeably in this review, MI-6 having been an early cover designation under the War Office.

from each of the overseas stations. He justifies such help by noting that the structure and methods of SIS as he describes them in his book have little relevance to the organization's current operations, although many intelligence professionals would take issue with this. He says that the few hundred SIS officers and agents he interviewed have, to a man, retired, and that some senior former officers volunteered their assistance, although West nowhere cites specifically an MI-6 source. Finally, West claims he gave the Ministry of Defence the opportunity to ask for alterations and, where these seemed justified to West, he agreed to them.

West unquestionably received valuable assistance from many retired officers, but he also got some very important help from a completely unexpected quarter. To West's surprise, he discovered that the Public Records Office at Kew holds a large number of SIS documents which somehow escaped the "weeders." The Public Records Act, 1957, established the principle of releasing the British Government's secret documents after half a century. In 1967 the period was reduced to thirty years for all government records, although the Lord Chancellor's permission may be sought to delay the release of files deemed to be particularly sensitive. Some government departments, such as the Security Service (MI-5), are exempt from the act altogether. Almost all documents sent to Kew pass through the so-called "weeders," who have the discretion to remove from the files what they deem to be trivia before delivering material to the records office. West (from his experience with researching this book) believes these weeders probably consign to the shredder much important historical material.

West also discovered that the Foreign Office weeders in particular allowed considerable material to pass into the permanent records, not realizing they were overlooking most sensitive secret information. This was especially true of MI-6 records, because the service had been obliged to shelter under the cover of the Foreign Office, especially in operations abroad. West notes that from the files titled "54 Broadway" it is apparent the weeders were unaware that this was the headquarters of SIS. It was from this gold mine of records that West unearthed so much material about MI-6 stations abroad prior to World War II. From these documents he obtained names and facts which directed him to personalities still alive who apparently were prepared to talk.

Talk they did, about operations and other events concerning which even the most determined investigator might otherwise have had no clue. In fact, like many of their American counterparts, it appears these British officers, though supposedly bound by the Official Secrets Act, have been particularly garrulous about their past occupation. It is not too hard to picture; the old codger is sought out at his lair in clubland, probably Boodles or the Travellers, plied with drink and a good lunch during which he is questioned about some old scandal which resulted in a suicide or some similar tender memory. The veteran responds; he believes he must put the matter straight and suddenly West has his story. The method, used with astonishing success by David Martin and John Sawatsky earlier, seems never to fail. Certainly the Public Records Office at Kew was of invaluable help, but despite those titillating leads most would have gone nowhere had not many old-timers been prepared to talk with

a looseness that does not match the image we have of the close-mouthed British secret intelligence officer.

As indicated earlier, one of the most notable features of this book is the large number of names of ex-SIS people which appear in it, although one should not be misled into thinking all those mentioned were sources (to begin with, many are dead). But one may assume that many of those named were sources. In this aspect, the book's contrast with Hinsley's cannot be more astonishing. In some respects, it is what makes West's book so attractive, especially to readers who worked with the British intelligence service during or after World War II. All the characters are there, from General Menzies (never mentioned in the Hinsley books) to registry and secretarial personnel. The list is unending, but one cannot resist ticking off a few: Harry Carr (still alive in his nineties and one of the most famous post World War I Baltic station chiefs); Colonel Valentine Vivian; Eddie Boxshall (for nearly twenty years station chief in Bucharest); the Gibson brothers (Harry and Archie); Leslie Mitchel (he ran "the Shetland bus"); John Bruce Lockhart; "Biffy" Danderdale (he brought out the Enigma machine from the Poles); and Sidney Reilly. And West admits only a few of the stories from each could be crowded into this incredible book. What's more, many of these officers served for as many as two decades after the war. So it is not as though they stepped off stage in 1945.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the period from the origin of the modern service in 1909 up through World War I and on to the year after the outbreak of the Second World War. This first section is devoted largely to the beginning of the service under the redoubtable Captain Mansfield Smith-Cumming, RNR, who when pinned under the vehicle after a serious auto accident cut off his own leg with a pen knife in a vain attempt to save his mortally injured son who had been driving. SIS was begun because the British Government had been caught napping by the Boer War and knew next to nothing about the enemy. A committee established to investigate the intelligence situation found that although everyone believed the British had the most superb organization in the world, they in fact hardly had a single agent worth his salt anywhere in Europe. The establishment of MI-6 followed, and the service prospered during World War I. Mansfield Smith-Cumming died in harness at the age of 64 in 1923, and was succeeded by Admiral Hugh Sinclair, thus maintaining the Royal Navy influence on the service. Between the wars, SIS deteriorated. By 1940 the intelligence situation was a shambles. There had been major miscalculations of German military strength and even the early Enigma decrypts were being ignored by the military services because they thought the code name represented merely another questionable SIS agent in the field. Once Enigma became fully accepted and the MI-6/MI-5 counterintelligence operations began to pay off, the situation improved for SIS in Whitehall.

By 1945 the role of MI-6 in the postwar world was being assessed. It was clear that after the liberation of Western Europe there would be a prolonged struggle over the areas occupied by Soviet forces. Even by the end of 1944 this area had become depressingly extensive: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had all but disappeared. Poland, Hungary, Romania, and others in the path of the

Russian war machine would be next. To deal with the spreading menace of the Soviets, Major General Sir Stewart Menzies, then Chief of MI-6, established a new Section IX to concentrate on the USSR. There was a struggle within the service as to who should head this new and vital department intended to combat Russian espionage. The choice was an ambitious young officer who had previously worked in the counterespionage department known as Section V. Enter H.A.R. (Kim) Philby.

Putting the book down, one wonders what West will do for an encore. His earlier books about MI-5 took that service first from its origin in 1909 to 1945. The second volume ranged from 1945 through 1972, a period dense with security disasters to the British Government. The obvious question that arises is whether West will pursue his earlier pattern and follow this book with a second covering the postwar period through 1972, or thereabouts. If that is his plan, we may expect fireworks. The British Government reacted vigorously to the second book on MI-5, although in the end it was able to do precious little about it. It would be surprising if it were not even more vehemently negative to a second volume on MI-6 covering a period of equal delicacy for the British Government in its foreign as well as domestic affairs. Furthermore, although there are many overt sources (some of dubious quality) for this period which could be helpful (after all a good deal has been written about Philby, the Crabbe episode, the Berlin Tunnel, George Blake) it is obvious such fruitful sources as the Public Records at Kew would not be available for much of this period. One suspects, also, the weeders may have been sent back after West's revelations to have a second go at what is left. The old boys might talk, but when it comes to events so close in time and of such political sensitivity one wonders how West will fare. And the government may act even more decisively than it did with the second MI-5 book. But this has its political risks, too. It will be fascinating to see what develops if there is another volume. If it is anything near as good as the book under review here it will be a winner, even though this may embarrass the British, as well as some other friendly governments, including our own.

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*This review is classified CONFIDENTIAL.*

*Inside the Soviet Army*. By Viktor Suvorov. Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, New York; 1982; 296 pp.

*The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine*. By Andrew Cockburn. Random House, New York; 1983; 338 pp.

Both books cover more ground than the titles indicate. Both are important in today's world because they shed light on what goes on inside the Soviet Union. Both books help put the US - USSR confrontation in somewhat better perspective. Both are important to intelligence professionals, but for different reasons.

I found *Inside the Soviet Army* by Viktor Suvorov (an assumed name) to be an enlightening glimpse inside that starkly closed society. Here is a Soviet defector with 15 years active duty in the Army, obviously an intelligent and perceptive individual, answering questions which have plagued Western analysts for years. He helps the reader understand how the Russian soldier and the Russian officer *think*. I agree with General Sir John Hackett, who wrote the foreword, that every serving officer in the Western world should read this book, as should every politician and member of the public who takes the threat of World War III seriously. Although the author's title is *Inside the Soviet Army*, one must remember that to the Soviets the word "Army" is all-encompassing. In fact, they use "Land Forces" to identify what we in the US refer to as "Army." Thus, Suvorov is really examining the entire Soviet defense structure.

Have you ever looked at the hopeless maze which is an organizational chart of the Soviet hierarchy—and wondered who runs the country and who makes the major decisions? Suvorov sweeps away the confusing cobwebs and identifies the basic troika which makes all important decisions in the Soviet Union: The Party, the Army, and the KGB. When one leg of this triangle gets too long, the other two (who may despise each other) unite and chop that leg off. Did you wonder why Khrushchev fell from power so suddenly? Suvorov explains that the Party was suddenly too strong. The Army and the KGB joined forces and ousted him. Similarly, the Army and Party joined forces to eliminate Beria, Stalin's chief inquisitor and head policeman, who sought supreme power after Stalin's death. A precarious but strangely durable balance exists among the three elements of the troika. We in the West, particularly our decision makers and intelligence analysts, need to understand this balance of power and its implications.

Have you ever wondered why the Soviets continue to tolerate the insolent and unruly government of Romania, yet reacted so violently to events in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968)? Suvorov explains that no Soviet citizen would want to move to Romania; therefore, Romania is no threat and can be tolerated. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, glimmerings of democracy were appearing and these represented serious threats which could not be tolerated. As Suvorov explains, the fear of having its citizens learn about the Free World and the fear of having those citizens defect *influence almost every major decision*. For example, in the Soviet Union,

maps which have any detail at all are classified SECRET and are not available to the public, even to most military. The reason: it is hard to make one's way out of Russia without a map.

Suvorov describes how the Soviet concept of detente grew out of lessons learned from the costly 1940 invasion of Finland. Having lost upwards of one-and-one-half million men in the invasion, and having never put a tank on the streets of Helsinki, the Soviets found that by means other than force they obtained total capitulation of the Finns. To this day, Suvorov reports, the Soviets are not anxious to attack militarily any country with the strength and will to defend itself.

Suvorov analyzes the five major components of the Armed Forces and gives us not only their strengths and weaknesses but also their "pecking order," which has nothing to do with seniority. He gives a splendid description of higher field command in the Soviet military—that is, the Strategic Directions, which correspond most closely to our major joint commands in the overseas theaters, and which contain, essentially, four Fronts, a Group of Tank Armies, and a Naval Fleet. He exposes the Warsaw Treaty Organization for what it is, a political sham. In the event of war in Europe, all Soviet and Soviet satellite forces will immediately fall under direct Soviet command.

Suvorov's chapters on strategy and tactics, mobilization and equipment are superb, as are his final two chapters: the "Soldier's Lot," and "The Officer's Path." You will find literally hundreds of eye-opening facts and observations in these and earlier chapters. For example, under tactics, Suvorov repeats a question he generally asks Western officers at the conclusion of his lectures. He states that he has never had the correct answer yet from a Western audience. The question involves how a Soviet regimental commander would commit his reserve when three of his motor-rifle companies are on the move: the first is under murderous fire and its attack has crumbled; the second company is advancing slowly with heavy losses; the third company has suffered an enemy counterattack and, having lost all of its command personnel, is retreating. According to Suvorov, there is only one possible answer for the Soviet commander. What is it? Make your own decision before you read further. Answer: the Soviet commander must use his reserve to reinforce the second company which is advancing, however slowly; the others do not qualify for help nor are those company commanders entitled to ask for help. Suvorov is showing us what Kipling meant when he said, "East is East and West is West . . ."

As a related subject, the defector Suvorov supplied much of the background on which General Sir John Hackett's new best-seller, *The Third World War: The Untold Story*, is based.

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*The Threat*: Andrew Cockburn, a Western journalist who specializes in military subjects, states in his first chapter that "it is the true shape and scope

of Soviet military capability that concerns us. . . ." This statement and the title represent, as best I can determine, the purpose of the book. Cockburn does a yeoman's job of examining Soviet military forces and weapons systems while concurrently examining those of the US. This technique results in a form of net assessment which has always been, by whatever name, a logical way to perform intelligence analysis. Regrettably, the technique has never been fully exploited in the West, probably because decision makers have not demanded it of their intelligence chiefs and the intelligence chiefs have not sought to trespass on ground hallowed by chiefs of operations.

Cockburn's findings, at virtually each step of the way, are that the Soviets are not nearly as formidable as the Pentagon would have us believe. For example, starting with current military manpower figures: 5.8 million Soviets vs 2.2 million US, Cockburn, by eliminating various categories of noncombat Soviet troops which we do not have in our Armed Forces (border guards, railway construction) and by subtracting the excessive numbers (compared to ours) required to perform tasks (Soviet military airlift employs 100,000 military while our Military Airlift Command employs only 37,000), he arrives at a net figure of approximately 2 million combat troops on each side. Whether you agree with Cockburn's analysis is not as important as the fact that he challenges the reader to look at the threat more closely, more realistically, and with the view that many human factors must be considered along with the sheer numbers of forces and weapons.

As he moves along in his book, Cockburn becomes less and less tolerant of the military bureaucrats in both countries. In fact, he eventually gives the picture of two bumbling bureaucracies, spending huge amounts of money on many of the wrong things, exaggerating each other's capabilities to keep the wheels of the military-industrial complexes turning . . . meanwhile leading the world toward an inevitable confrontation.

Perhaps not taking into full account the fact that the US has suffered more in the past from underestimation of its opponents than from the reverse, his intolerance of inflation of the Soviet threat by US bureaucrats erupts in the final chapter, "The Consequences of Threat Inflation." In this chapter he warns of growing militarism in both countries and draws a parallel with the situation in Europe in 1914 when the generals found themselves helpless to control the monster they had created. Cockburn's warning is certainly valid. Yet I wish that he had found some way to recognize this important factor: *Neither the US nor the Soviet Union can afford to underestimate the other.* The stakes are too high.

Cockburn has performed extensive research and produced a controversial book. Every reader can find something to like and something to dislike in it. Whether his assessments are always valid is not as important as the fact that he shakes bushes and challenges "rutted" thinking. This, in my view, is his major contribution.

ROBERT W. WILLIAMS