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Remarks

Executive Secretary
1 Oct 84
Date

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
Executive Registry	
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1 October 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
 FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
 SUBJECT: Africa

did a good piece of work here on the state of play in Africa. It would be interesting to see a comparable piece done on Latin America. I don't know where it ought to be done, probably NSC.

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William J. Casey

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SUBJECT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ADMINISTRATION STRATEGIES IN AFRICA,
1981-84

This paper attempts to delineate the strategies formulated for advancing the national security interest in Africa from 1981-1984 and give some assessment as to their effectiveness. Since the author was a participant, it is necessarily biased in interpretation but at the same time each accomplishment can be documented.

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The paper will look at vital US interests, the setting in Africa inherited in 1981, ambient factors, the policy development process, the six strategies developed, and a brief notation of accomplishments and non-accomplishments.

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US Interests: US geostrategic interests in Africa can be said to be four: access to the West African oil pool, access to output from the strategic minerals ridge running from Central to South Africa, the denial of strategic ports and airfields to our enemies, and the protection of our interests in the African portion of Southwest Asia which shield the Middle East oil pool and related strategic lines of communication and transport.

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Setting: The period 1975-1980 saw an accelerated erosion of vital US and Western interests in Sub-Saharan Africa and concomitant gains by the Soviet Bloc and other radical forces hostile to our interests. By 1980, the Soviets counted, in their own terminology, 18 African states as "socialist-oriented" or better (in their terms), with five African states (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Congo, Benin) regularly listed as the most "progressive" (revolutionary democratic states with vanguard parties, in their terms). The Soviets had fielded almost 5,000 military advisors, over 40,000 Cuban combat troops, garrisoned two pro-Soviet regimes with surrogate troops (Angola and Ethiopia), and had penetrated the vital defense sectors of 18 African states through the supply of Soviet arms and advisors. "Revolutionary," pro-Soviet or radical anti-US regimes had taken power in the Seychelles, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Congo.

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Libya also had developed successful momentum, having put into power a client in Chad and maintained him with a garrison of 10,000 troops in Chad. Libya began training insurgents and terrorists for operations into Mali, Niger, Sudan, and Somalia.

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US policy during this period was one of confusion, mixed signals, and disengagement. A few examples of outstanding follies of the Carter Administration included repeated efforts by Assistant Secretary Dick Moose to get President Carter to unilaterally recognize the MPLA regime in Angola without conditions, (Moose was blocked by Brzezinski twice but succeeded on his third try - only to have his effort undone by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), the provision of tens of millions in grant assistance to a hostile Mozambique regime which declined to even offer thanks; the serious damage to bilateral relations with Zaire by Pat Derian who chose to hold President Mobutu to a unique standard of "human rights" - and who disregarded heinous violations elsewhere. This latter folly undid the positive support we gave to President Mobutu when he faced Soviet-surrogate sponsored invasions of Zaire in 1977 and 1978 from Angola. The facilities agreement with Somalia, a positive move, was delayed for two years by NSC staffer Paul Henze who distrusted Somalis. UN Ambassador Don McHenry threatened the South African Government with economic sanctions in order to get them to the Geneva Conference, and then was astounded to find the South Africans resentful and uncooperative. UN Ambassador Andy Young referred to the Cuban combat forces in Angola as a force for stability in Africa.

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Economic and Environmental Factors: 1981 saw the continuing reverberations of the 1979 oil shock, the impact of the worldwide recession of 1979, the effects of overborrowing during easy credit years in the early 1970s, the negative effects of nationalization, bureaucratization, and overstaffing of economic and agricultural sectors; the impact of a persistent drought in Africa; the destruction of native agricultural producers due to controls and disincentives; the subsidization of urban masses at the expense of rural peoples --- in short, almost every African nation was in severe difficulties and some faced desperate circumstances.

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Indigenous Political Factors: The general breakdown of central order of heterogenous populations in Africa states played a major part in disputes, insurgencies, and civil wars. Some insurgent groups had demonstrated a persistence and sophistication that posed serious challenges to pro-Soviet or pro-Libyan regimes - UNITA in Angola, EPLF and TPLF in Ethiopia, CCFAN in Chad as examples. The increasing frequency of military coups, particularly by unsophisticated, idealistic junior officers and nco's was a growing phenomenon. South Africa played a unique role in developments in the southern third of Africa, and posed a significant problem to Soviet interests in southern Africa.

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Policy Background:: In 1981, there was a pressing need to move in five separate but related policy theaters. The momentum of Soviet gains must not only be broken but it must be visibly broken in the eyes of the Third World leaderships. The unconstrained imperialism and terrorism of Libya had to be contained and countered. Several points of interstate conflict were providing real and potential access to the Soviets to exploit and deepen its involvement and influence, and these conflicts needed to be defused. The proliferation of hostile, Marxist-Leninist orientations of African governing elites had to be reversed while our remaining friends needed to be succoured. A large number of African governments needed to be stimulated into making tough economic reforms and restructurings to break out of the downward spiral of African economies, and needed to be supported when they undertook these difficult reforms. Along with this, the effects of a multi-year drought on suffering African peoples called for a greater and more timely response. A series of policies were developed - some by State, some by NSC, often appearing ad hoc but in fact consistent with the overall policy design - were developed utilizing US strengths and exploiting Communist and radical weaknesses.

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The strengths we used were obvious, but nonetheless heretofore not used in a consistent pattern. They included: the patent superiority of private agriculture to produce foodstuffs, and private enterprise to stimulate and sustain commerce and industry; the ability and generosity of the US to provide massive amounts of bilateral economic and humanitarian assistance, much on soft loan or grant terms; our potential (albeit frequently unused) influence in the major international financial institutions, especially the IMF and World Bank; the ability of the US military to supply superior training and, selectively, superior equipment, again on soft loan or grant terms; and the societal differences between us and the Soviets which enables us to be comfortable with genuine nonalignment in the Third World while the Soviets cannot. The Soviet weaknesses which we exploited were equally obvious, but never brought home to Africa in a comprehensive manner. They included: the Soviets' almost absolute unwillingness to extend economic or humanitarian aid due to Soviet economic distress; the counterproductive Soviet insistence on repayment for massive Soviet arms shipments in previous years, much of which had turned to junk, and Soviet dunning of clients; Soviet unwillingness to supply spare parts or make in-country repairs on equipment supplied; Soviet racism which favors lighter-skinned Africans and alienates black Africans; and Soviet apparent inability to comprehend in policy terms African tribal realities.

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Bureaucratic Difficulties: Our policies had to encompass some institutional orientations deeply ingrained in the USG in its several agencies,-- specifically, State opposition to military assistance or covert action, or indeed any action outside "traditional" diplomacy; JCS aversion to committing any resources to Africa-period; AID aversion to establishing political criteria for any aid program; Treasury opposition to using our influence in the IFIs on behalf of any African government or making exceptions to textbook solutions; Commerce and USTR opposition to any constraints on US exports; CIA fear of leaks and consequent reluctance to engage in covert action activities; and the universal bureaucratic fear of and resistance to White House/NSC direction or orchestration of policies. It is a sad truism that even Presidentially-appointed secretaries, deputy, under, and assistant secretaries of agencies shortly become coopted into the institutional view.

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Specific Strategies: The most serious Soviet gains had taken place in Southern and Lusophone Africa, and there we needed to counterattack. The Libyans had made significant gains in Chad and posed a threat to friendly states in the Horn and West Africa, and this had to be contained. The expansion of radical, Marxist-Leninist ideology had spread to virtually half of the 47 African states, and this had to be halted and reversed.

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To accomplish this we developed six interrelated strategies:

A. To stop the spread of Marxism-Leninism and to increase frictions between Soviet clients and their patrons, we developed a strategy which might be termed reduction to cutoff. Egregious acts of hostility against our interests by African governments would be met by a sliding scale of responses ranging from freezing existing US assistance, to reductions, to total cutoff, depending on the pattern of hostility presented to us. This strategy has two major attractions: it allows African states to define what sort of relationship they want with the US by their conduct; and it requires that we not necessarily do anything against hostile-behaving states, but merely stop doing things for them. Repetitive patterns of hostile actions would be met by total cutoff, including termination of bilateral assistance, no favorable votes in the IFIs, pressure on our allies to slow or stop their assistance, all these steps when combined with the ambient circumstances of economic, environmental, and domestic political problems of African states were judged to probably produce positive results. They have. The initial test case was Mozambique, which in March 1981 expelled US embassy officers after a particularly nasty outrage against them and then followed this by outspoken hostility towards us. At NSC direction, all aid immediately ceased - for the first time in history a wheat shipment was turned around on the high seas, an aid survey team was withdrawn, and a clear signal was given. A year later, Mozambique initiated a dialogue which led to major policy and conduct reversals on its part. This strategy was also pursued with positive effect in Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo, Guinea, Benin, and Madagascar. There was significant bureaucratic resistance to this strategy, which prevented its wider application or in some cases its full application.

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B. The second important strategy follows from the first and may be called reciprocal improvements. This called for responding to positive reversals of negative policies by African governments in a firm, controlled but constructive manner. Clear conditions for improvement were to be agreed upon and once agreed, assistance could be resumed and, if the positive improvements by the African governments continued, increased. As African governments yielded to the realities of their circumstances and discovered that the United States was no longer providing free lunches, they began in increasing numbers to discreetly approach us and the IFIs offering fundamental changes in policies in return for a resumption/increase in assistance. It was important that we not succumb to the temptations of either gloating or holding out for overnight, revolutionary change (a course, unfortunately, still argued by some conservatives, which would ask many of the governments to commit

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suicide). It was also important to keep the IFIs out in front in terms of posing the conditions of fundamental restructuring of the government and economy, which they have performed. Sixteen of the eighteen principal Soviet clients in Africa have made such approaches to us, the French, or the IFIs, or a combination thereof. Twenty-four African states have accepted restructuring away from Marxist models.

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C. The third important strategy called for some recognition to "old friends", that handful of African states which continued to support Western interests and policies and which had been so devastated by previous Administration policies. Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Senegal, Liberia, Zaire, Botswana were given priorities in assistance which demonstrated our appreciation of their support and shared interests.

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D. The fourth strategy called for increased security assistance to states threatened by external aggression. Subsumed under this was our effort to contain both Libyan direct aggression and Libyan subversion and terrorism. Timely and increased assistance to Sudan, Somalia, Chad, directly frustrated several Libyan and Ethiopian destabilization efforts. Our deployment of US assets to Sudan and our emergency security assistance to Chad and Somalia has, according to intelligence, had a constructive impact on the Soviets, the Ethiopians, and the Libyans, and while it has not stopped more subtler forms of subversion it has inhibited direct, cross-border aggression. Also subsumed under this strategy was our successful effort to get the French socialist government to meet its security commitments in Africa.

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E. The fifth strategy applied was to increase the costs to the Soviet Bloc for its adventures and aggressions in Africa where feasible, and at least not to take actions which would reduce their costs. The costs to the Soviets of sustaining its African client regimes both economically and militarily have increased significantly. The Soviet reluctance to bear economic assistance costs has played a large part in alienating seriously some of these erstwhile clients. In the last two years the Soviets have had to commit over \$1 billion in both Ethiopia and Angola in military aid to sustain the local regimes from growing insurgencies. We tried to at minimum not take actions to discourage the agencies which were increasing Soviet costs, whether it be freedom fighter movements attacking Soviet client governments, or economic pressures due to reduced assistance from the West.

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F. The sixth strategy employed was to work to defuse conflicts and potential conflicts which offered the Soviets an opportunity to increase its influence through its one effective

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means - quick and massive military aid. The major target of this effort was along the periphery of South Africa, where both direct conflicts and paramilitary cross-border warfare were on the increase. Our major Southern Africa initiative was designed with this in mind, and has borne real fruits in this regard.

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ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

-- We have dealt the Soviets a stunning political/psychological reverse in the Third World, with a majority of former clients visibly beginning the dismantling of Moscow-approved structures and policies. Several former Soviet clients have openly complained of Soviet niggardliness in aid and unresponsiveness. The Soviets have been unable to project their power further in Africa since 1981.

-- We have blocked Soviet attempts to expand their foothold in Zambia and Botswana through military assistance.

-- We have partially removed and blocked the Libyans in Chad, got Qadhafi enmeshed in a no-win situation which is costing him both financially and politically, and placed him in confrontation with French military forces.

-- We blocked serious Libyan/Ethiopian aggressions in Sudan and Somalia.

-- We have strengthened our access to the governments and states possessing the strategic minerals ridge.

-- With the exception of Luanda and Dahlak Island, (which predate 1981), we have continued to deny Soviet efforts to gain new strategic ports and airfields.

-- With some considerable effort, we continue to protect our equities in Southwest Asia/Horn of Africa against Soviet and Libyan efforts to expand their influence.

-- The Soviets and Cubans remain enmeshed in no-win insurgency situations in Ethiopia and Angola, where, despite massive investments in treasure and men, their clients' circumstances continue to deteriorate.

-- In Southern Africa, we have devastated the Soviet position of influence in Mozambique, sustained the anti-Soviet attitude in Zimbabwe, ousted Soviet influence in Botswana, defused several regional points of conflict between South Africa and neighboring states (which gave the Soviets new opportunities to meddle), damaged the Soviet position in Angola, and kept them extraneous to serious regional negotiations. This all developed from our southern Africa policy initiative.

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-- We have also seen the severe damaging of a major and long-term Soviet agency for action in Southern Africa, the African National Congress (ANC), which has lost its access to Mozambique, Swaziland, and to a degree Botswana, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe.

-- We have developed a successful dialogue with the senior echelons of the South African Government, and through this have been able to influence and support elements thereof which are promoting regional detente and reform away from apartheid domestically. This new relationship has also permitted us to intervene - albeit selectively - to overturn or ameliorate human rights violations and mount discreet funding programs for black trade unions, black students, and human rights organizations inside South Africa.

-- At NSC initiative, we were able to facilitate a US visit by UNITA leader Savimbi in December, 1981. Also at NSC initiative, we were able to undertake, using the ICRC and PVOs, programs supplying medicines and foodstuffs to peoples under the control of UNITA in Angola and TPLF and EPLF in Ethiopia, offsetting similar "humanitarian" aid sent through the regimes controlling the capitals. The Ethiopian program was precedent-setting in that for the first time it opened PL 480 funds for use in cross-border food supply operations into rebel-controlled areas, and of course has application elsewhere in the world. (S)

-- We have converted almost all military assistance to Africa to grant assistance rather than loans (FMS), reflected the reality of their inability to pay and that loans exacerbated their economic crises, and we have increased the amounts of military assistance, primarily to old friends.

-- We have maintained in a time of budget stringency a steady improvement in overall assistance levels to Africa, and have succeeded in getting a dramatic doubling of emergency humanitarian assistance to combat drought effects. We have also proposed a new \$500 million, five year Economic Policy initiative to Congress, which will enable us to better support those governments making difficult but necessary economic reforms and restructurings. We have also proposed to Congress new measures designed to expedite the delivery of emergency food assistance. (S)

NON-ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

-- We have been unable to sway our allies from continuing to lend significant assistance to the Mengistu Soviet client regime in Ethiopia, thus not maximizing the possible pressure.

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-- We have been unable to get Congress to approve any meaningful security assistance to Zaire despite President Mobutu's exemplary record of support to the US.

-- We have been unable to completely cut off trade and even EXIM Bank assistance to the regimes in Angola and Ethiopia, due primarily to the "unrestricted export" school of thought prevalent in the higher reaches of Commerce and the across-the-board bureaucratic resistance to the Presidential use of the authority granted by the Chaffee Amendment.

-- We were unable to obtain Congressional repeal of the Clark Amendment, and our 1981 effort was less than total. Similarly, we were unable to drum up interest for a constructive interpretation of Clark to preclude licensing or EXIM loans to the MPLA regime, despite the apparent logic of the position.

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-- Despite the successes in altering economic/political policies within African states, we have been less successful in altering their foreign policies in line with our interests, and there remains considerable reluctance by State, AID and others to use this as a strategic guideline or condition on our bilateral relationships, despite good missionary work by USUN, NSC, and indeed Congress (Moynihan Amendment).

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-- The Soviets have strengthened their ties to and control over Ethiopia, have deepened their relationship with President Rene's regime in the Seychelles (which came to power in 1977). On our watch, there are two new regimes - Ghana and Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) - which could move to a closer relationship with the Soviets.

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CONCLUSION: Over the past 3 1/2 years we have developed a coherent, six-part strategy to Africa, have made a sincere effort to implement it, and have seen it bear positive results. The strategy remains valid, but needs to be more tightly and more comprehensively applied, and daily vigilance is required to counter regular efforts at backsliding from various agencies. While the strategy is not comprehensively articulated as I have tried to do above in any policy document, each aspect or specific strategy is contained in the several NSDD's applicable.

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