

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

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1 June 1984

Att. ER84-2246

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:  Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

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SUBJECT: Status of Efforts to Exploit Grenada Documents

1. The exploitation of the Grenada documents is essentially being handled by a Grenada Working Group chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary Gillespie. I attended a meeting of the Group on 1 June at which the following was discussed:

a. Transfer of copies of the documents from DIA custody to the National Archives would begin as soon as possible. It was hoped that enough copies of the documents would be transferred and catalogued by 1 August 1984 to allow a formal opening of them to the general public.

b. The US Army has prepared an unclassified study of the documents based on some 17 themes. (see attachment A). A Task Force was formed to produce short public releases of this material as soon as possible.

c. Walt Raymond of the NSC will head a working group to prepare a major academic conference on the documents based on several themes, including Grenada as a prototype of Marxist revolution and Soviet use of proxy regimes to spread revolution.

d. Tony Gray of DOD ISA will head a group to expedite production of an unclassified study of the documents written by Michael Leeden under contract to State and DOD. (see attachment B).

2. A group working under contract to DDI/ALA has completed screening all the available documents for intelligence value and has nearly completed summaries of key documents. The Intelligence Community will then produce an updated Memorandum to Holders of the IIA Grenada: A First Look at Mechanisms of Control and Foreign Involvement, hopefully by the end of July.

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
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3. A relatively large number of key documents have already been released for public review or to selected audiences, including those dealing with attempts to influence the Socialist International. A draft letter from Austin to Andropov requesting KGB help in training intelligence officers is one of those documents already released to the general public.



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THEMES

THEME A: That the revolutionary government in Grenada routinely violated human rights.

THEME B: That the revolutionary government in Grenada practiced and condoned discrimination against and exploitation of women.

ND / THEME C: That the revolutionary government in Grenada practiced and condoned racial discrimination.

THEME D: That the revolutionary government in Grenada attempted as a matter of policy to control or suppress religion.

THEME E: That the revolutionary government in Grenada was developing a one-party state which was to become a one-party dictatorship.

THEME F: That the revolutionary government in Grenada was so dominated by Cuban involvement as to effectively lose its independence.

THEME G: That the revolutionary government in Grenada was so dominated by agents of other nations as to effectively lose its independence.

THEME H: That the revolutionary government in Grenada adopted an active program of exporting revolution and subversion.

THEME I: That the revolutionary government in Grenada asked for and received military assistance far beyond reasonable defense requirements.

ND / THEME J: That the revolutionary government allowed Grenada to be used as an intelligence collection base for foreign powers.

THEME K: That the revolutionary government in Grenada deliberately adopted a specifically pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban foreign policy, without regard to Grenada's own interests.

THEME L: That the revolutionary government in Grenada embarked on a program of collectivization and expropriation without regard to Grenada's needs.

THEME M: That the revolutionary government in Grenada adopted active propaganda measures aimed at its own people.

THEME N: That the revolutionary government in Grenada attempted to socialize Grenadans into a blind adherence to official policy.

ND / ND / ND / THEME O: That the revolutionary government in Grenada was manipulated by specific Cuban or other foreign persons.

THEME P: That the revolutionary government in Grenada deliberately mounted a propaganda campaign intended to oppose US national interests.

ND / ND / ND / THEME Q: That specific members of the revolutionary government were of unsavory character.

Ledeer 362-5869

Romerstein 485-8650

## General Introduction

by Michael Ledeer and Herbert Romerstein

The military action by the United States and the members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States in October, 1983, brought to a close the four-year rule of the New Jewel Movement on the island of Grenada. In the course of the brief occupation of Grenada, the combined armed forces found a considerable body of documents, composing an extensive archive of the NJM regime. All in all, there were roughly 35,000 pounds of material, ranging from official government treaties, orders, minutes and correspondence to personal diaries, telexes to and from many foreign countries, video tapes, films from the Soviet Union, and bank documents concerning the personal finances of government and party leaders. Rarely has such a complete documentary picture of a Communist state been available to Western students, and the entire lot will shortly be available to scholars and other interested parties.

Pending the completion of the Grenada Archive, we were asked to assemble a cross-section of documents to give a preliminary picture of Grenada during the rule of Maurice Bishope and the NJM from April, 1979 to October, 1983. It was a daunting task, for the richness of the material made our selection difficult; the present selection could easily be replaced almost in its entirety by other material of similar interest. Nonetheless, we have

striven to give representative samples from areas likely to be of concern to students of communism, on the one hand, and of international relations on the other. These were the areas we judged to be most important for a first look at the Grenada documents. To these we added some material dealing with life on the island during the NJM period, particularly those documents illustrating the question of human rights. These include reports of treatment of prisoners, legal proceedings and the like, as well as the attempts by the regime--and its international allies--to deal with political opponents. This latter subject necessarily includes the ongoing conflict with the churches.

We believe that the documents in this collection give an accurate picture of Grenada under the NJM, although it is certainly not a complete picture. When one chooses a few hundred pages out of tens of thousands, the best that can be hoped is that the selection was done fairly, with an eye to understanding rather than in an effort to argue a thesis. Whether we have succeeded will eventually be judged by those who work their way through the full archives.

Finally, while this work was done for, and paid by, the Government of the United States (Ledeen worked as a consultant to the Department of State; Romerstein is an official of the United States Information Agency), the selection of the documents and the introductory material is entirely ours, and we did our work without any pressure from anyone, except insofar as we were urged to work as fast as was reasonably possible. For this freedom to

make the selections we deemed most representative, and the patient support throughout the many months we worked on the documents, we are grateful indeed, above all to the two senior officials who authorized the project: the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Fred Ikle.

#### **The New Jewel Movement:**

The Grenadan Revolution that overthrew the Gairy regime was designed to create a Communist society, and to bring Grenada into the Soviet orbit. While the leaders of the New Jewel Movement recognized that they needed to pretend to respect political pluralism, and to feign a genuine desire for good relations with all neighboring countries (above all the United States), the actual direction that Maurice Bishop and his colleagues in the government wished to take was clear from the outset. The close working relations with the Government of Cuba--both in Grenada and in Cuba itself--showed that Bishop intended to model his revolution on the Soviet Union's and, more immediately, that of Fidel Castro; the attention showed to delegations from the Soviet bloc and from such radical regimes as Qaddafi's Libya and Kim il Sung's North Korea, along with the lack of exchanges with such

traditional friends as Great Britain demonstrated the NJM's real intentions. By September, 1982, Bishop himself could give an extended "now it can be told" speech to the leaders of the Party and the Government, aptly entitled "Line of March for the Party". In that key presentation, Bishop flatly stated that the goal of the NJM was to "ensure the leading role of the working class through its Marxist/Leninist Party backed by some form of the dictatorship of the proletariat." Copies of the Line of March were closely held; each copy was numbered by hand, and Party members were expected to keep its contents confidential.

The Line of March contains Bishop's personal reflections on the tactics he adopted shortly after the seizure of power. People from all social strata were included in the original ruling council, and "this was done deliberately so that imperialism won't get too excited and would say 'well they have some nice fellas in that thing; everything allright.'" This little deception was abandoned by the time of Bishop's speech, when the NJM was in complete control, and Bishop was quite explicit about the way in which control was exercised:

Consider how people get detained in this country. We don't go and call for no votes. You get detained when I sign an order after discussing it with the National Security Committee of the Party or with a higher Party body. Once I sign it--like it or don't

like it--it's up the hill for them.

Candidates for "the hill" were identified through a clandestine system that monitored the population, the predominantly American students at the Medical School, and foreign visitors. The Special Branch divided the island into regions for surveillance, potential opponents of the regime were identified (generally on a class or religious basis), and closely watched. In addition, major institutions were targeted for surveillance: the government, the trade union, the police, the Medical School and the churches. That this represented a clear departure from previous practices is indicated by the statement from the head of the Special Branch, Michael Roberts, in a report to the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Security in May, 1980 (Document IV): "The old MI 5 methods of work, after experimentation, have proven to be not effective enough..."

### **The Churches**

Church leaders were subjected to particularly close surveillance, and the Grenadans received considerable help in countering religious influence from the Cubans and Nicaraguans.



In a document outlining the basic counterintelligence operations of the Interior Ministry (Document I), the scope of the NJM's concern with the churches is amply demonstrated, for Government agents were instructed to:

--Monitor all sermons by the various parish priests and preachers in the society;

--The controlling of all hierarchy (sic) meeting of the church in particular the Catholic and Anglicans;

--Controlling all elements of the society that pay visits to the hierarchy;

--Tapping of the Hierarchy of all the leading counter churches phones.

(The term "counter" was used as shorthand for "counterrevolutionary" by virtually all Grenadians).

The NJM took these security measures against Church leaders because they believed that all major religious institutions on the island were opposed to the revolution. In a Top Secret report written in March, 1983 (Document VIII), Michael Roberts

found that the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Methodist and Seventh Day Adventist Churches were all hostile to the NJM, with the first being the most important because of its size and internal discipline. Roberts was concerned at the use of the Jerusalem Bible by the Catholics, because "this bible is written as a novel and is very easy to understand not being written in old English...This means that the Church in understanding the struggle...has 'revolutionized' is (sic) main ideological weapon--the bible." Moreover, the Church distributed the Pope's New Year's message, and Roberts considered it to be "the Church's foreign policy document and no doubt will be used to criticize our foreign policy." Similar concerns were expressed about the other churches, to the point where by July, 1983, Keith Roberts, the Interior Minister, could write that "in the medium term, if serious measures are not taken, we can find ourselves faced with a Poland situation...we see the Church in the immediate period as being the most dangerous sector for the development of internal counter revolution." (Document IX)

But perhaps most indicative of the great concern about the churches was the interest taken by the Cuban Communist Party. The Cubans played a major role in this, as in virtually all aspects of life on the island, and the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party prepared an extensive analysis of "the religious situation in the country, and the contacts for further cooperation between the PCC and the NJM regarding the question." The Cubans concurred that the churches were "in harmony with the

campaigns carried out by the reactionary governments in the Caribbean..." and were distressed at the lack of effective action by the NJM. For example (Document VII), the Cubans lamented that the Grenadans had not infiltrated the churches ("there are no signs of systematic progressive projections within the Grenadian clergy"), and indeed as of the time of the report (August, 1982), the Grenadans had not even appointed a person to take charge of religious questions. This was remedied forthwith, as Selwyn Strachan was named to this position, and was supposed to spend nearly three weeks training in Cuba before starting work. The Cubans foresaw that Strachan would "basically include the information work at the beginning and regular contacts with collaborators from Christian organizations." In other words, he would place agents inside the churches, and then attempt to manipulate the latter from within.

The other main Cuban suggestion was to bring Grenadan religious leaders and laypersons into contact with Nicaraguan church figures "and other Latin American circles linked to the theology of liberation and, in general, to the idea of a church committed to the revolutionary positions".

### The Soviet Connection

From the beginning, Bishop and the other NJM leaders sought to bring Grenada into the Soviet orbit, and there are thousands of documents showing the intimate relationship that came to exist between the USSR and Grenada. Sometimes the relations were embodied in formal treaties between Grenada and Soviet bloc countries, as well as with such Soviet proxies as Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea. On other occasions there were secret agreements, as for providing counterintelligence materiel, training for agents, and so forth. We have included several of the treaties and party-to-party agreements, that gave Grenada a vast quantity of armaments as well as military and political training. Thousands of weapons, far more than could have been required for the security requirements of the tiny island, were shipped by the Soviet Union and Communist bloc countries. Overall, the documents showed that the Soviet, Cuban, North Korean and inferred Czechoslovakian agreements included the following items, that were to have been delivered by 1986:

--Approximately 10,000 assault and other rifles;

--Over 4,500 submachine guns and machine guns;

--More than 11.5 million rounds of 7.62 mm  
ammunition;

--294 portable rocket launchers with more than 16,000 rockets;

--84 82 mm mortars with more than 4,800 mortar shells;

--12 75 mm cannon with 600 cannon shells;

--60 antiaircraft guns of various sizes, along with nearly 600,000 rounds of ammunition;

--15,000 hand grenades, 7,000 land mines, 60 armored personnel carriers and patrol vehicles;

--156 radio stations, more than 20,000 uniforms and tents for more than 5,000 persons.

In the estimation of the Department of Defense, this equipment would have been sufficient to equip a fighting force of roughly 10,000 men, with half of that number actually in the field. Furthermore, there was evidently some thought given to special forces, since the Soviets promised to provide an airplane capable of transporting 39 paratroopers.

All of this made Grenada a real military threat to its neighbors, most of whom had only local constabularies rather than standing armies. And there was little question that Grenada was going to be used for military purposes, since General Hudson Austin's deputy, Liam James, noted in his notebook on March 22, 1980, "airport will be used for Cuban and Soviet military." (Document 11b).

The Soviets duly appreciated the geopolitical significance of acquiring a proxy in the Western Hemisphere, as can be seen from the picturesque account of a meeting between Major Einstein Louison, the Chief of Staff of the Grenadan Army (who had gone to Moscow for military training), and his Soviet counterpart, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov. According to the Grenadan notes on the meeting (Document 12), Ogarkov told Louison, "over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in Latin America, today there are Nicaragua, Grenada and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador." The Grenadans saw themselves in the same context, and their Ambassador to Moscow, W. Richard Jacobs, reminded his comrades in Grenada that their importance to the Soviets would eventually depend on their success in exporting revolution: "to the extent that we can take credit for bringing any other country into the progressive fold, our prestige and influence would be greatly enhanced (sic)." Jacobs felt that the first such project should be Suriname.

There was certainly no lack of Soviet support for Grenada intelligence and counterintelligence operations. A draft letter

dated February 17, 1982 from General Hudson Austin to Yuri Andropov, then the chief of the KGB, requested training courses for three Grenadans in counterintelligence and one in intelligence work. Austin thanked Andropov for the "tremendous assistance which our armed forces have received from your party and government in the past." (Document 14).

Perhaps the most intensive Soviet assistance to Grenada came in the field of indoctrination, for it was necessary to train a new Communist generation on the island. The Soviets participated in some of the "ideological crash courses" that are referred to in the minutes of several meetings of the Politbureau and the Central Committee, and they also invited Grenada to send students to the highest level Soviet training school for foreign communists, the Lenin School in Moscow. The Lenin School has been in operation since the 1920s, and has trained the leading communists in almost every country of the world. The NJM students there reported on their training, including courses in "social psychology and propaganda" and "party organization--intelligence/security." (Documents 15 and 16). And of course the Cubans did a lot of this work, offering training in journalism, crowd control, propaganda, billboard painting and newspaper and cartoon writing and drawing. A secret agreement between the Cuban Communist Party and the NJM provided for training of Grenadans in Cuba and on Grenada. The document was signed for Cuba by Manuel Piniero, the former head of Cuban intelligence (the D.G.I.), and currently the head of the America

Department of the Central Committee, which is the covert action arm of the Communist Party.

Twenty Grenadans were invited to Vietnam to study anti-chemical warfare, anti-radioactivity warfare, "reeducation of anti-social and counterrevolutionary elements," and "Yankee tactics and the weapons used in Vietnam." (Document 18). Others were invited to Czechoslovakia, Libya, East Germany and North Korea. We do not know whether the invitations were accepted, but the proposals themselves show how thoroughly Grenada was integrated into the Soviet world.

#### Relations with the United States

The leaders of the Government and the Party regarded the United States with constant hostility. There were several contacts between the NJM and the Communist Party, U.S.A., both to raise money for Grenada and to coordinate propaganda and public relations strategies in the United States. There was also the usual guidance from the Cubans, in the person of Gail Rizo, the wife of the Cuban Ambassador to Grenada. Gail Rizo, nee Reed, was an American herself, and had been active in American radical organizations, including the Venceremos Brigade, during the nineteen sixties. Prior to the trip of Prime Minister Bishop to



the United States in 1983, Mrs. Rizo gave him a list of detailed suggestion on how he should conduct himself in his contacts with American officials, as well as recommendations of which Americans he should meet. In addition, she reminded him that Parodi of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington would be available to him if needed.

One of the most useful documents in understanding the Grenadans' attitude toward the United States is the set of handwritten notes, evidently written by one of the Grenadan participants in the conversation, describing Bishop's meeting with National Security Advisor William Clark. (Document 20). The notes reveal that while there was some American concern about the ideological direction of the Bishop regime (Clark at one point stresses the American desire that Grenada remain within a Western legal framework), the main obstacle to better relations between the two countries was not political, but geopolitical: Washington was worried about the large numbers of Cubans and Russians on Grenada. Clark, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, and the United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States, William Mittendorf, stressed that the American Government wanted actions, not mere declarations of good intentions from the Grenadans.

In their efforts to convince the United States to leave them alone, the Grenadans exerted considerable effort to create a lobby in Washington and to organize a propaganda network throughout the country. They carefully monitored the American

media--often with help from the Cubans, especially Gail Reed Rizo--responded vigorously to criticisms, attempted to identify correspondents and television producers sympathetic to their point of view, and even discussed with the Communist Party U.S.A. the possibility of starting a radio station in New York City (These themes are found throughout the minutes of the Politbureau and the Central Committee. See, for example, minutes for Politbureau of 13 May, 1982, for their preoccupation with a CBS broadcast they did not like). A public relations firm in New York was hired to watch the less important publications.

Finally, Grenada coordinated its efforts with those of other Soviet bloc countries and proxies in supporting and encouraging the world-wide peace movement, and in turning its emotions against the United States. In April, 1981, a NJM representative attended a World Peace Council Congress in Havana, and met with his counterparts from the USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary and the National Committee of Quebec. He reported that assistance would soon be forthcoming from the Soviets, the Hungarians and the East Germans.

### **The Socialist International**

The Socialist International was founded in 1889 by those socialist organizations that objected to the control of the First International by anarchist elements (it was therefore often referred to as the Second International). In 1919 those groups supporting the Russian Bolsheviks left the Second International to form the Third (Communist) International. The primary differences between the communists and the democratic socialists were on such questions as single-party dictatorships, human rights and the communist belief in the necessity for violent revolution. The Socialist International has existed for many decades as a democratic force, and includes democratic socialist leaders who are active participants in the international dialogue.

In the words of the Declaration of the Socialist International adopted in Oslo in June, 1962, the Communist "one-party dictatorships represent in fact tyranny, denying those freedoms of speech religion, criticism, voluntary organization and contacts with the outside world which are the essence of a democratic society". (See Declarations of the Socialist International, London, 1978, pg. 13). The SI was therefore a natural target for the communists, and some of the Grenada Documents show that "Active Measures" were conducted against the SI by Grenadans and others acting under direction from the America Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. To further the objective of subverting the SI, a "Secret Regional Caucus" was formed by the Nicaraguan

Sandinistas, the Grenadan NJM and others in the Latin American Committee of the SI. The NJM had sent observers to SI meetings even before their successful revolution, and Bishop applied for membership in the Socialist International in late 1979. The application was accepted the following November at a Congress in Madrid.

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#"Active Measures" is an expression used by the Soviets for their influence operations. Soviet Active Measures are coordinated by the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (I.D.), which engages in both over and semi-overt activities. The KGB conducts the covert Active Measures in coordination with the I.D.

Overt Active Measures include use of those communist parties under Soviet control and the International Soviet Front Groups (such as the World Peace Council);

Covert Active Measures include forgeries, agents of influence to place stories in the press, or influence government officials, and so forth.

Some Soviet Active Measures are carried out through surrogates (usually the intelligence service of another Communist bloc country). In the Western Hemisphere, the Cuban Communist Party's

America Department conducts Active Measures on behalf of the Soviet Union. The America Department combines both the overt and covert Active Measures by having officers of the Cuban Intelligence Service (the DGI) operate on behalf of the Department. The intimate link between the two can be seen by the fact that the current chief of the America Department, Manuel Pineiro Losada, formerly headed the DGI. For more details, see hearings of the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Covert Action, 1980 and Soviet Active Measures, 1982.

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The Grenadans, taking their cue from the Cubans and from the Soviets, viewed the Socialist International as a potential enemy, and one unsigned document--apparently from the 1980-1981 period--defended the decision to join the SI, but made clear that it was not because of enthusiastic belief in the organization's principles. Membership was supported on two grounds:

1. It provided access to international movements which could be convinced to support New Jewel Movement policies.
2. The New Jewel Movement could utilize its

membership in the SI to "express organized support for the progressive struggles; in Southern Africa, the Western Sahara, Palestine, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and other parts of Latin America etc."

There was evidently some concern within the government of Grenada that the NJM might be violating its own principles by being a member of a social democratic organization. The author of the document responded that the Socialist International was "sufficiently flexible to permit dissention" and therefore "membership in the SI should be retained. It has proved useful and if Grenada's foreign policy initiatives are strengthened it can prove even more useful in the future." (Document 5, pg. 10)

The most detailed documents concerning the Socialist International were apparently not written by Grenadans, but rather by Cubans. Two documents found stapled together seem to have been written by a Cuban and then translated into English (we believe they were written by the same person as Document 11, who is definitely Cuban). They contain sophisticated analyses of the SI from a Marxist/Leninist perspective. One of them--Document 6--is a report on the 15th Congress of the Socialist International held in Madrid in November, 1980. The report makes reference to internal documents that had been circulated confidentially among the members of the SI Bureau. These confidential documents showed that there were internal conflicts on a number of

questions. The author of the report complained that the "rightist and conservative sectors of the International" (who, as we shall see, included persons who are now the heads of government in Italy, Spain and Portugal) had succeeded in including in a draft resolution references to "the Afghan problem; events in Poland...(and) the U.S.S.R.'s alleged arms-race policy."

The nature of the conflict between communism and democratic socialism was spelled out in detail in the other document (Document 7). "In the main contradiction of our times between capitalism and socialism, led by U.S. imperialism and the USSR, respectively social democrats as a whole are on the imperialist side up to now." Thus the social democrats were enemies of the communists, and efforts by the SI to exert an influence on Latin America were to be resisted:

We see a dual nature in the projection of social democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. On the one hand, it does represent a permanent enemy of the essential objectives of the communist and left movements in that this trend intends to prevent the triumph of socialist revolutions and the materialization of the communist ideal. On the other hand, it is obvious that certain political positions of the social democracy can be used by the

revolutionary and progressive forces of the continent at given junctures of the struggle against a repressive and fascist military regime and of the confrontation with U.S. imperialism. Hence, in our view, while ideological struggle is necessary, we should implement ways and methods of case-by-case treatment of the parties related to social democracy who positions coincide with certain tactical objectives (sice) of the Latin American revolutionary movement.

#### **Democratic Socialist versus the Marxist/Leninists**

Unison Whiteman, minister of external relations of the Bishop Government, attended an emergency SI meeting on Latin America and the Caribbean in Panama in early 1981 (the meeting was held over two days, February 28 and March 1). Whiteman had a dispute with former Prime Minister Carlos Andres Perez of the Venezuelan Democratic Action Party. The subject was El Salvador, and Carlos Andres insisted that if the SI meeting was going to condemn the United States for supplying arms to the Salvadoran Government, the Cubans and the Soviets should also be condemned for arming the guerrillas. Whiteman responded that "the U.S. supply of arms



to the Junta is a notorious fact, that the U.S. officially and publicly stated this; that S.I. should not speculate on where the freedom fighters are getting arms from; that in any event we should not equate arms for the oppressors with weapons to defend the people in their just struggle." Whiteman worked for a compromise resolution that named no names, and he implied that the tone of the resolution was only hostile to the United States. (Document 8).

Whiteman's position was that of the Cubans. One of the most illuminating documents in this regard is a Spanish-language report on a meeting of the SI in Nicaragua on June 25, 1981. The report was signed by Manuel Pineiro Losada, former chief of Cuban Intelligence and currently head of the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party, which is in charge of "Active Measures." Not surprisingly, most of the officials of the America Department are officers of the DGI, the Cuban Intelligence Service. In this document, Pineiro complained of efforts by the democratic socialists to urge the Nicaraguan regime in a more moderate direction, and Pineiro was particularly upset with the actions of Carlos Andres Perez and Felipe Gonzales, the head of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). Attached to Pineiro's report were two documents: an account in Spanish of the discussions between Bayardo Arce (a member of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua) and Felipe Gonzales and Carlos Andres Perez for the SI; and an apparently intercepted telex from Hans Eberhard of the German Social Democratic Party to Walter Hacker, the International

Secretary of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. There was also a poor English translation (we have made a fresh translation, included here). Evidently, the Cubans' distrust of the social democrats was so intense that they carefully watched the behavior of their principal enemies within the SI.

The conflicts between the democrats and the communists within the Socialist International emerged at virtually every meeting of which the Grenadans had a record. At a meeting in Bonn on April 1 and 2, 1982, for example, NJM representative Fennis Augustine found that while there was considerable support for Grenada within SI ranks, "some have reservations on what they see as a Marxist thrust of the NJM. I believe that close relationship with Cuba will continue. Nicaragua's position is a little more difficult, although there was a great degree of understanding and sympathy for them by the time the meeting was finished." Augustine found that some of the social democratic parties were worried about the actions of the Sandinistas, and cited in particular Carlos Andres Perez' party's criticisms of the Nicaraguans. Augustine was also disturbed to encounter SI support for greater democracy in Nicaragua, including elections, a two-party system, human rights, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

The same meeting was the subject of another report, this one unsigned. But internal evidence suggests that it was written by a Cuban, and it is quite similar to documents 5 and 6. It would not be surprising to have a Cuban report of an SI meeting, since

the Cubans were almost always present at the site of such meetings, even though they were not permitted to attend. But they gave instructions to the Grenadans (and perhaps also to the Nicaraguans), and were thus able to get detailed reports on what transpired. In any event, the author of the report, while disturbed that the democratic socialists were attempting to neutralize the "revolutionary" countries in the region so as to limit Cuban influence, he boasted that the "right-wing" forces within the SI (identified as Felipe Gonzales of Spain, Mario Soares of Portugal and Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, two current prime ministers and one former president of their countries) were effectively neutralized (Document 12).

But Cuban/Grenadan optimism turned out to be misplaced, for at a meeting of the Socialist International European Bureau in Basle, Switzerland on November 3 and 4, 1982, there was outspoken criticism of both the NJM and the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. According to the report of the meeting submitted by Chris DeRiggs, a member of the NJM Central Committee and Minister of Health, there was strong opposition to a resolution expressing solidarity with Grenada and Nicaragua. The leaders of the criticism included Mario Soares, Bettino Craxi of the Italian Socialist Party, and Rita Freedman of Social Democrats, USA. According to DeRiggs, "their major line of attack was that Grenada was a one-party state and, therefore, could not be considered a democracy."

Both DeRiggs and Paul Miller of the PNP of Jamaica tried to

justify the lack of any opposition party in Grenada, but apparently their rhetoric was not convincing, for they pondered ways in which the Socialist International could be turned to their own purposes. DeRiggs suggested that the forces of the Latin American Left within the SI could be used to lobby the European Socialists, and he observed that Guillermo Ungo of the Salvadoran MNR--the political wing of the guerrilla movement--had achieved a certain degree of success along those lines. Thus, in DeRiggs' words, "it is felt that similar efforts from other SI members in the region can help to exploit contradictions existing even within the membership of SI parties like the Socialist Party of Portugal." In other words, it was necessary to work within the member parties to produce a shift in outlook. By January of the following year, these ideas had taken a more concrete form.

#### **The "Secret Regional Caucus"**

On the 6th and 7th of January, 1983, a Secret Regional Caucus was held in Managua, consisting of five parties affiliated with the Socialist International, and the Communist Party of Cuba. The five SI parties were:

--The FSLN of Nicaragua, represented by Antonio Jarquin (misspelled as Marquin in the document);

--The Salvadoran MNR, represented by Hector Oqueli (this party is one of the groups composing the guerrilla movement, and Oqueli is the Secretaru of the Socialist International Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean, which has given a patent of respectability to the Salvadoran insurgents);

--The Chilean Radical Party, represented by Freda (the leadership of the party later denied that it had sent a representative;

--The Jamaican PNP, represented by Paul Miller;

--The New Jewel Movement, represented by Chris DeRiggs.

The main topic of the meeting was the Socialist International. In DeRiggs' words, they considered "initiatives to neutralize forces within the SI that are hostile to us." And what were these forces? "Our principal enemies are to be found among the parties of Soares and Horgo (sic, Pietro Longo, the leader of the Italian Socialdemocratic Party) in Portugal and Italy respectively--the Social Democrats of the USA are also our sworn enemies." DeRiggs boasted that of the 14 members of the SI Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean, seven were generally progressive and some within a Marxist-Leninist line. The Secret Regional Caucus report shows that a resolution on

Latin America and the Caribbean drafted by Hector Oqueli of the Salvadoran MNR, that was subsequently submitted to the SI, was actually based on guidelines laid down at the meeting. A decision was made to maintain the Secret Regional Caucus, and to "review membership in the future."

This document is of considerable importance, since it shows that the NJM was fundamentally opposed to the democratic ideals of the Socialist International, that the Grenadans, along with others in the region, worked in lockstep with the Cubans to undermine the effectiveness of the SI, and that the Grenadans' greatest objection to the Socialist International was the SI's insistence on democratic institutions and democratic elections. In fact, on February 3, 1982, Benny Languigne, the permanent secretary in Maurice Bishop's office, showed the Prime Minister a draft letter addressed to the official magazine of the SI, Socialist Affairs. The letter protested a story in the magazine stating that Grenada would have elections in the near future. In fact, there was no such intention.

## Conclusion

The documents we have selected for this volume represent, in our opinion, a representative sample of the total archive. We believe that those who take the time to study them will find a

remarkable consistency, a single-minded dedication to the NJM's objectives of creating, over time, a communist society on the Soviet model. The several documents that recount the internal crisis that led to the fall and murder of Maurice Bishop in the autumn of 1983 do not indicate any strong divergence of vision between Bishop and those who replaced him; rather, the struggle appears to have been almost exclusively personal. The complaints against Bishop were of inefficiency, of insufficient ideological coherence, of lack of strong leadership and guidance, not of political deviation or betrayal of the goals of the revolution. We do not see evidence that Bishop was removed because the Cubans or the Soviets were dissatisfied with his political orientation; so far as we have been able to discover, there is no reason to think that his conversation with Judge Clark and other American officials earlier in the year led his colleagues to believe that he was "soft on imperialism."

An archive of the dimensions and richness of the one brought back from Grenada will provide scholars with a treasure-trove of information about the Caribbean, about Soviet and Cuban foreign policy, about a great variety of international organizations (including the sometimes humorous negotiations the Grenadans had with the International Monetary Fund), and about the problems encountered by orthodox communists in their attempt to mold a new generation of Grenadans who had had little contact with Marxism/Leninism. We have given here only a brief overview of a few of the themes that most interested us. We will be pleased if

this serves to whet the appetites of a wide audience for this collection of documents, and for the many more that will be available to the public at large within a few months.



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18 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Grenada Archives

Sporkin is producing a report on status of Grenada archives. Mike Ledeen is said to be analyzing them for either Defense or State. We need to look into them to see whether there is material which ought to be disseminated and can be released as soon as possible instead of waiting for the full archives to be sifted and analyzed. For example, there is supposed to be a letter from Bishop to Andropov requesting KGB help.

William J. Casey

DCI

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