

ER 84-2730/1

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC 03808-84
2 July 1984

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

SUBJECT: The Cuban Revolution

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of 26 June 1984, Subject: Development Claims
and Realities of the Cuban Revolution

We have no problems or comments on the article on "Development Claims and
Realities of the Cuban Revolution."

[Redacted Signature]

STAT

Executive Secretary

cc: Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Col. John H. Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

NIO/LA [Redacted] (2 July 84)

STAT

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee
- 1 - ExSec of State
- 1 - ExSec, Dept. of Defense
- 1 - NIO/LA
- 1 - D/ALA/DDI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - ES

DCI
EXEC
REC

L-290



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 26, 1984

TO: ARA - Mr. Langhorne A. Motley
 INR - Mr. Hugh Montgomery
 S/P - Mr. Peter Rodman
 EB - Mr. Richard T. McCormack
 CIA -

| |
|--------------------|
| Executive Registry |
| 04-2730 |

 STAT

FROM: S/LPD - Otto J. Reich *OJR*

SUBJECT: Review and Clearance of paper:
 "Development Claims and Realities of
 the Cuban Revolution"

We plan to make this document public in whole or in part(s). I would appreciate it if your office would review the document and give us your comments or suggestions by close of business Monday, July 2, 1984.

*Phoned 'No Comments' to
 John Miller Deputy to
 Otto Reich 7/3/84
 JBC*



DEVELOPMENT CLAIMS AND REALITIES

OF

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

PREPARED FOR:

THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

FOR

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

The Cuban revolution has been presented as a challenge to the rest of the Americas. It is an alternative approach to social and economic development based on a marxist-leninist model. The loss of freedom it entails is justified in terms of what can be accomplished in meeting basic needs. After 25 years in power, it is worth asking: How does Cuba compare? What has been accomplished?

In this paper, an effort is made to provide a basis for such comparison. Some restrictions on the availability of comparative information from independent sources limited the selection of indicators. In essence, four groups of indicators were chosen related to: a) economic growth; b) changes in the economic structure; c) meeting basic needs in health; and, d) meeting basic needs in education. There is also a brief introduction on Cuba's claims and what the basic needs approach means.

The format and scope have been selected to provide a quick basis for comparison. The data has been drawn basically from the World Bank's World Development Report for 1983. Perhaps a broader coverage of indicators would be desirable, but lack of objective series for comparison limited the scope of indicators that could be used.

The balance shows that, contrary to the general impression created by Castro's propaganda, the record is not favorable to the Cuban revolution. For almost every indicator, other countries have made more progress than Cuba. What makes this record more tragic is that these are the areas of success usually mentioned to justify the loss of freedom imposed by the Castro regime on the Cuban people.

CUBA'S CHALLENGE

At the Extraordinary Session of the Interamerican Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay in August, 1961, Ernesto Guevara, the head of the Cuban delegation, said the following: "The rate of growth that is given [by the Alliance for Progress] as a beautiful thing for all the Americas is 2.5 percent of net growth. Bolivia announced 5 percent for ten years; we congratulate the Bolivian representative while telling him that with a little effort and the mobilization of popular forces, he could say 10 percent. We speak of 10 percent of development without any fear, 10 percent of development is the rate that Cuba foresees for the coming years. [...] What does Cuba expect to have by 1980? A net per capita income of three thousand dollars; more than the United States currently has." (Reunión Extraordinaria del Consejo Interamericano Económico y Social a Nivel Ministerial, Punta del Este, Uruguay, el 5-17 Agosto 1961. Actas y Documentos. Unión Panamericana, Secretaría General, Organización de los Estados Americanos, Washington, D.C., 1962, p. 213)

In 1966, Fidel Castro made the following statement: "In our system no one works to make profits for any individual; we work to satisfy the needs of the people, to enrich the country, to raise the productivity of labor; [...] because our resources will increase and it will be possible to take care of the most pressing needs of the people in the same measure as labor productivity increases.

These are the things that make our case different from that of the other Latin American nations. We are ahead of them. And in a world where the population increases more rapidly than the output of foodstuffs, how will the underdeveloped nations be able to face this tremendous problem without Revolution, without doing precisely what we are doing?" (Fidel Castro Speaks. ed. Martin Kenner and James Petras. Grove Press, New York, 1969, p. 195)

These statements were based on several underlying assumptions and had a number of implications:

- a. Economic freedom and individual incentives are not compatible with the satisfaction of popular needs.
- b. Socialist planning is able to identify the needs of the people more accurately than free expression of preferences through market mechanisms.
- c. Socialist planning can allocate resources more efficiently than other economic systems and, consequently, will be capable of raising labor productivity and promoting economic development.
- d. Without a Cuban-style revolution, Latin American nations cannot fight underdevelopment as effectively as Cuba.

As a corollary of these postulates, in terms of human rights, the Cuban revolution claims to give priority to economic, social and cultural rights as opposed to civil and political rights. Nutrition, health, education, social justice and employment are deemed to be "the true human rights". (cidh, p.5) Claiming significant advances in meeting "basic human needs", statistics on Cuban life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy and school enrolments are presented as positive accomplishments of greater import than the accompanying stagnating GNP per capita during the Castro period, not to mention lost freedoms.

THE BASIC NEEDS APPROACH

The basic-needs theory assumes that a direct, public-sector supported approach to alleviating poverty is required to offset insufficient consumer knowledge, unequal income distribution and non-uniform dissemination of productivity-enhancing innovations. Emphasis is placed on improving health, nutrition and basic education, especially in rural areas - items intended to build up a critical minimum level of basic human capital. These improvements in the stock of human capital are theorized to

contribute over time to increased productivity and growth.

The central question which has been investigated relative to the theory is whether current growth is sacrificed for future growth while minimum basic needs levels are being attained and, if so, whether the increased growth in the future is sufficient to offset earlier growth foregone. One prominent group states that "the trade-off is likely to take the form of a longer gestation period for investment in assets held by the poor rather than a permanent reduction in GNP." (Redistribution with Growth, p. xix). Thus, the payoff for investing in basic needs is seen to be overall economic growth as measured by a GNP-equivalent in a later stage.

Two very broad conclusions have emerged from numerous related investigations. First, it appears that countries making substantial progress in meeting basic needs do not have substantially lower GNP growth rates. Second, the attainment of a higher level of basic needs satisfaction appears to lead to a higher growth rate in the future. (Hicks, p. 992)

The intent of this analysis is to examine and compare Cuba's performance under the Castro Government to that of other Latin American and Caribbean countries in light of the basic needs theory. Such an effort is handicapped by limitations in availability of data. One of the consequences of the highly centralized organization of the Cuban society under the revolution, is that the availability of statistical information is entirely controlled by the government. The government has not facilitated the availability of data necessary to appraise Cuba's economic performance. For example, one glaring deficiency is the lack of reliable data on national accounts to observe the evolution of such indispensable indicators as Gross National Product - or the equivalent GSP indicator used by centrally planned economies - at constant prices.

The hypothesis in this paper is that Cuba, at the time of the revolution, had already attained a relatively high level of meeting basic needs and could have advanced at that time into the subsequent stage of economic expansion and growth foreseen by the theory. Instead, limited attainments in improving satisfaction of basic needs have been accompanied by lack of growth in GNP. The resources used for generating greater basic needs fulfillment (in the form of public-sector supported consumption, especially in health care and education) and for military expenditures have diverted resources away from productive investment. In addition, by breaking away from its traditional markets and alliances, Cuba deprived itself of the opportunity of sharing in industrial development resulting from the various integration schemes in the Americas.

Although in this paper no discussion in depth is made of the role of the military, it should be noted that in 1980 Cuba spent 6.1 percent of its GNP on military expenditures. This was the highest percentage in Latin America for that year and a not uncommon expenditure for Cuba during the last 25 years. Higher average expenditures were recorded only for Warsaw Pact countries and the Middle East. (Sivard, p. 33-35) Another indicator of the militarization of Cuba and its economic impact is that annual income per capita has been higher for military positions than for state-supported civilian positions or private farmers. "By 1977 the average military wage was 17 percent above the civilian one." (Mesa-Lago, p. 155) Further, for the period 1970 through 1982, military employment fluctuated between 6 and 9 percent of the total labor force. (Wharton, p. 10) These rates are several times higher than those of any other country in Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, the percentage of overall population in the military in 1981-82 in Cuba was 2.32, while in Brazil it was .22, in Argentina .66 and even in Chile only .82. (Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence, p. 2)

The tables selected illustrate Cuba's advanced position in

the region before the revolution, as well as its position approximately twenty years later. In comparing Cuba's performance to that of other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, a key measurement, often conveniently overlooked, is that of percentage improvement relative to the 1960 base. In most cases, we have utilized this relative percentage improvement to rank the performance of all countries surveyed. Under this approach, countries starting at high levels in 1960 and making small increases would not have high rankings in percentage change in meeting basic needs. However, under basic needs theory such countries should demonstrate strong growth in GNP per capita. That is, they have moved to the stage when minimum basic needs can be met along with increased investment.

Cuba has performed well in some indicators but neither percentage improvement nor absolute levels of basic needs attainment have been accompanied by acceptable GNP growth given Cuba's advanced beginning position. On the other hand, significant progress has been made by countries following western development models both in terms of GNP growth and basic needs attainment, without the loss of individual freedom experienced in Cuba. Lack of adequate information has prevented a comparison on employment. It should be recognized that this is an indicator where Cuba's progress is acknowledged to be substantially better than in the other countries in the Americas.

COMPARISON OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

The first group, Tables 1-4, deals with GNP performance, energy consumption per capita and an average index of food production per capita. Table 1 ranks the twenty-one countries included according to average annual percentage growth in GNP per capita between 1960 and 1981. These range from Brazil with an average 5.5 percent per year, to Cuba with a -0.6 to +0.5 percent yearly average over the period. Thus, Cuba's GNP per capita has basically been stagnant since the revolution while countries with

both lower and higher absolute initial levels of GNP per capita (and lower levels of basic human needs attainment) have grown at faster rates. From this table it is evident that the stock of wealth available for attending to basic needs has not grown in the case of Cuba.

Table 2 provides an interesting comparison of changes in relative rankings in GNP per capita over time. Cuba went from third place in 1952 to fifteenth place in 1981, a decrease of twelve. Paraguay went from eighteenth place to eighth over the same time period, the largest positive increase among the countries surveyed. Cuba's relative position has clearly not been maintained by the economic policies followed during the Castro period. Other countries reflect more moderate variations in their rankings.

Concrete evidence of Cuba's stagnating GNP is provided by the fact that there are shortages of all sorts of consumer goods including durables such as automobiles and television sets. According to Luxenburg, the number of passenger cars went from 159,000 in 1958 to 80,000 in 1976. Television receivers increased in number from 500,000 in 1960 to 650,000 in 1977, but Cuba's rate of increase (30 percent) was much less than that experienced by other Caribbean countries during the same period. For example, Puerto Rico went from 173,000 receivers in 1960 to 631,000 in 1977, an increase of 265 percent.

Table 3 covers the percentage increase in energy consumption per capita since 1960, a measure of growth in production and industrial expansion. Cuba ranks fourth from the bottom with a 48 percent increase. Over half the countries have at least a 100 percent increase during the period. As an indicator of growth, energy consumption may have been affected by the conservation policies resulting from the oil crisis. However, it is known that Cuba has had limited access to more energy efficient technology for its industrial plant. Therefore, even allowing for

conservation measures this growth performance is poor.

Table 4 presents an index of increase in food production per capita based on comparing the period 1969-71 with 1979-81. Cuba shows a growth of six points, a little above the mean for these countries during this ten-year period. It should be noted that these base years were catastrophic for non-sugar agriculture in the country due to the immense effort necessary to produce the sugar harvest of 1970. Presumably, production was higher in earlier years and Cuba would show even less improvement if the base period were set before the ten million ton sugar harvest effort began.

TABLE 1
GNP Per Capita
(ranked according to percentage increase)

| | \$ <u>1981</u> | Average Annual Growth (%) <u>1960-81</u> |
|--------------------|------------------------|--|
| Brazil | 2,220 | 5.1 |
| Ecuador | 1,180 | 4.3 |
| Mexico | 2,250 | 3.8 |
| Paraguay | 1,630 | 3.5 |
| Dominican Republic | 1,260 | 3.3 |
| Colombia | 1,380 | 3.2 |
| Panama | 1,910 | 3.1 |
| Costa Rica | 1,430 | 3.0 |
| Guatemala | 1,140 | 2.6 |
| Venezuela | 4,220 | 2.4 |
| Argentina | 2,560 | 1.9 |
| Bolivia | 600 | 1.9 |
| Uruguay | 2,820 | 1.6 |
| El Salvador | 650 | 1.5 |
| Honduras | 600 | 1.1 |
| Peru | 1,170 | 1.0 |
| Jamaica | 1,180 | 0.8 |
| Chile | 2,560 | 0.7 |
| Nicaragua | 860 | 0.6 |
| Haiti | 300 | 0.5 |
| Cuba | 880-1,110 ^a | 0.6 - +0.5 ^a |

^a Although in 1982 the World Bank stopped providing specific estimates for Cuban GNP per capita, it locates Cuba within this range.

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

TABLE 2
Relative Position - GNP Per Capita and Change

| | <u>Rank</u> <u>1952</u> | | <u>Rank</u> <u>1981</u> |
|--------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| Venezuela | 1 | Venezuela | 1 |
| Argentina | 2 | Uruguay | 2 |
| Cuba | 3 | Argentina | 3 |
| Chile | 4 | Chile | 4 |
| Panama | 5 | Mexico | 5 |
| Uruguay | 6 | Brazil | 6 |
| Brazil | 7 | Panama | 7 |
| Mexico | 8 | Paraguay | 8 |
| Colombia | 9 | Costa Rica | 9 |
| Costa Rica | 10 | Colombia | 10 |
| Dominican Republic | 11 | Dominican Republic | 11 |
| Guatemala | 12 | Ecuador | 12 |
| El Salvador | 13 | Peru | 13 |
| Nicaragua | 14 | Guatemala | 14 |
| Honduras | 15 | Cuba | 15 |
| Ecuador | 16 | Nicaragua | 16 |
| Peru | 17 | El Salvador | 17 |
| Paraguay | 18 | Honduras | 18 |
| Bolivia | 19 | Bolivia | 19 |
| Haiti | 20 | Haiti | 20 |

Sources: For 1952, "Tipología Socioeconómica de los Países Latinoamericanos", published as a special issue of the Revista Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Vol. 2, OAS, Washington, DC, 1963. For 1981, ranking results from World Development Report 1983 estimates.

TABLE 3
Energy Consumption Per Capita
(Kilograms of coal equivalent)
(ranked based on percentage increase from 1960)

| | <u>1960</u> | <u>1980</u> | <u>Absolute Increase</u> | <u>Percentage Increase from 1960</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------|--------------|------------------------------|--|
| Haiti | 16 | 88 | 72 | 450 |
| Paraguay | 80 | 300 | 220 | 275 |
| Panama | 468 | 1,623 | 1,155 | 247 |
| Dominican Republic | 158 | 517 | 359 | 227 |
| Ecuador | 216 | 692 | 476 | 220 |
| Brazil | 385 | 1,102 | 717 | 186 |
| Costa Rica | 311 | 829 | 518 | 167 |
| Bolivia | 169 | 452 | 283 | 167 |
| El Salvador | 145 | 357 | 212 | 146 |
| Jamaica | 654 | 1,440 | 786 | 120 |
| Mexico | 786 | 1,684 | 898 | 114 |
| Nicaragua | 181 | 362 | 181 | 100 |
| Honduras | 149 | 292 | 143 | 96 |
| Colombia | 519 | 970 | 451 | 87 |
| Peru | 433 | 807 | 374 | 86 |
| Argentina | 1,177 | 2,161 | 984 | 84 |
| Guatemala | 180 | 308 | 128 | 71 |
| <u>Cuba</u> | <u>920</u> | <u>1,361</u> | <u>441</u> | <u>48</u> |
| Chile | 833 | 1,137 | 304 | 36 |
| Uruguay | 1,020 | 1,160 | 140 | 14 |
| Venezuela | 3,014 | 3,039 | 25 | 1 |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

TABLE 4Average Index of Food
Production Per Capita

(1969-71=100)

| | <u>1979-81</u> |
|-----------------------|----------------|
| Brazil | 125 |
| Colombia | 122 |
| Guatemala | 116 |
| Argentina | 116 |
| Paraguay | 111 |
| Costa Rica | 110 |
| <u>Cuba</u> - - - - - | <u>106</u> |
| Mexico | 106 |
| Uruguay | 104 |
| Venezuela | 104 |
| El Salvador | 104 |
| Panama | 102 |
| Bolivia | 102 |
| Dominican Republic | 99 |
| Chile | 97 |
| Écuador | 97 |
| Jamaica | 90 |
| Haiti | 89 |
| Nicaragua | 87 |
| Peru | 84 |
| Honduras | 80 |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

COMPARISON OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

The second group, Tables 5-7, covers a variety of indicators selected to illustrate the evolution of the economic structure over time in terms of an increasing proportion of industrial production and manufactured exports and a decreasing proportion of agricultural production and primary commodity exports. In very broad terms, this is generally associated with the progress toward development. However, oil exporting countries distort the accepted "normal" progression toward greater development.

Key indicators of change in production structure available for cross-country comparison are the percentages of labour in the main sectors of the economy. It is recognized that the validity of these indicators may be affected by changes in labour productivity.

Table 5 presents the percentage of the labor force in agriculture relative to the 1960 base. Large percentage decreases would reflect a change in production structure, allowing for no major change in labour productivity. Cuba is ranked number seven with a decrease of 16 percent. The largest decrease was Colombia, with 25 percent. The smallest was Ecuador with 5 percent. As to the starting base, it must be noted that in 1960, only Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Venezuela had a lower proportion of agricultural labour force.

Table 6 contains the inverse of Table 5, the percentage of the labor force in industry and services relative to the 1960 base. Here, Cuba ranks seventh with a 16 percent increase. The greatest increase was experienced in Colombia, with a 25 percent increase. Only five countries had an equal or greater percentage of their labor forces employed in the industrial and service sectors in 1960 - Jamaica, Venezuela, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina.

These two Tables together indicate that Cuba started with a relatively high percentage of its labor force in the industrial and service sectors and a smaller percentage in agriculture. With this sort of breakdown, Cuba started the period in a good position to make further progress in changing its economic structure. On the basis of these indicators, Cuba shows less progress than many other countries in the region.

Table 7 presents the comparison among countries for share of manufactured exports ranked on absolute percentage increase relative to 1960. Cuba shows no change in the twenty-year period, although decreased dependence on sugar was a major goal of the revolution. Cuba is ranked the lowest of all countries for which data was available. This comparison reflects the price Cuba has paid for isolating itself from its neighbours. The progress of other countries in the region in increasing the share of manufactures is due in most cases to the various regional integration schemes. Cuba decided to integrate its economy within the COMECON and was assigned the role of a basic commodity producer. Had this not been the case, Cuba would most likely have experienced increases similar to those of Jamaica (48 percent) or Costa Rica (29 percent). It is significant that in 1960 these two countries had exactly the same share of manufactured exports (5 percent) that Cuba had.

TABLE 5
Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture
 (ranked on basis of absolute percentage decrease
 relative to 1960 base)

| | <u>%</u> <u>1960</u> | <u>%</u> <u>1980</u> | <u>Absolute</u> <u>Percentage</u> <u>Change</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Colombia | 51 | 26 | (25) |
| Panama | 51 | 27 | (24) |
| Costa Rica | 51 | 29 | (22) |
| Brazil | 52 | 30 | (22) |
| Mexico | 55 | 36 | (19) |
| Nicaragua | 62 | 43 | (19) |
| Dominican Republic | 67 | 49 | (18) |
| Jamaica | 39 | 21 | (18) |
| Venezuela | 35 | 18 | (17) |
| <u>Cuba</u> - - - - - | <u>39</u> | <u>23</u> | <u>(16)</u> |
| Peru | 52 | 39 | (13) |
| Chile | 31 | 19 | (12) |
| Paraguay | 56 | 44 | (12) |
| El Salvador | 62 | 50 | (12) |
| Guatemala | 67 | 55 | (12) |
| Bolivia | 61 | 50 | (11) |
| Uruguay | 21 | 11 | (10) |
| Argentina | 20 | 13 | (7) |
| Honduras | 70 | 63 | (7) |
| Haiti | 80 | 74 | (6) |
| Ecuador | 57 | 52 | (5) |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

TABLE 6
Percentage of Labor Force in Industry and Services
(ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
relative to 1960 base)

| | <u>%</u> <u>1960</u> | <u>%</u> <u>1980</u> | <u>Absolute</u> <u>Percentage</u> <u>Change</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Colombia | 49 | 74 | 25 |
| Panama | 49 | 73 | 24 |
| Brazil | 48 | 70 | 22 |
| Costa Rica | 49 | 71 | 22 |
| Nicaragua | 38 | 57 | 19 |
| Mexico | 45 | 64 | 19 |
| Dominican Republic | 33 | 51 | 18 |
| Jamaica | 61 | 79 | 18 |
| Venezuela | 65 | 82 | 17 |
| <u>Cuba</u> | <u>61</u> | <u>77</u> | <u>16</u> |
| Peru | 48 | 61 | 13 |
| Paraguay | 44 | 56 | 12 |
| Guatemala | 33 | 45 | 12 |
| El Salvador | 38 | 50 | 12 |
| Chile | 69 | 81 | 12 |
| Bolivia | 39 | 50 | 11 |
| Uruguay | 79 | 89 | 10 |
| Argentina | 80 | 87 | 7 |
| Honduras | 30 | 37 | 7 |
| Haiti | 20 | 26 | 6 |
| Ecuador | 43 | 48 | 5 |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

TABLE 7
Percentage Share of Merchandise Exports
Manufactures
 (ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
 relative to 1960 base)

| | <u>%</u> <u>1960</u> | <u>%</u> <u>1980</u> | <u>Absolute</u> <u>Percentage</u> <u>Change</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Jamaica | 5 | 53 | 48 |
| Brazil | 3 | 39 | 36 |
| El Salvador | 6 | 39 | 33 |
| Costa Rica | 5 | 34 | 29 |
| Mexico | 12 | 39 | 27 |
| Dominican Republic | 2 | 24 | 22 |
| Guatemala | 3 | 24 | 21 |
| Argentina | 4 | 23 | 19 |
| Colombia | 2 | 20 | 18 |
| Chile | 4 | 20 | 16 |
| Peru | 1 | 16 | 15 |
| Paraguay | 0 | 12 | 12 |
| Nicaragua | 2 | 14 | 12 |
| Honduras | 2 | 12 | 10 |
| Uruguay | 29 | 38 | 9 |
| Ecuador | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| Venezuela | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| <u>Cuba</u> | <u>5</u> | <u>5</u> | <u>0</u> |
| Bolivia | - | 3 | - |
| Haiti | 0 | - | - |
| Panama | - | 9 | - |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

COMPARISON OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF
HEALTH PROGRESS

This subject falls squarely into the boundaries of basic human needs theory, reflecting the results of public health policies and improvements in levels of nutrition. Tables 8-11 deal with some selected health indicators for which comparative data is available. Table 8 covers population per physician ranked on the basis of percentage decreases relative to 1960. In actual proportion, Cuba still ranks below Uruguay and Argentina. In terms of progress, Cuba ranks number eleven in this category, going from 1,060 to 700, a decline of 34 percent. Honduras experienced the largest percentage decrease, 75 percent, although it still has a high absolute number of people per physician, 3,120. In addition, it should be pointed out that the figures do not reflect the net availability of doctors since many Cuban doctors are sent overseas by the Government.

Table 9 presents percentage increases in life expectancy at birth. Here Cuba ranks in the bottom one-third in progress during the period of comparison with a 16 percent increase. Again, Honduras had the highest increase, 28 percent. As for the preceding indicator, Cuba started the period under investigation with a very favorable absolute number; only two or three countries surpassed it in either indicator in 1960. This suggests that human needs fulfillment had already reached much more than a "basic" level before the revolution. ✓

Table 10 covers percentage decreases in infant mortality relative to 1960. In this category, if we utilized World Bank figures Cuba would rank number one, with a decrease from 66 per 1000 to 19 per 1000, or 71 percent. Other sources have indicated (cidh p. 194, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1977, p. 107) that the actual number (for 1955-59) was 32 or 33 per 1000 rather than 66. If this is so, Cuba's improvement is much less dramatic, a 41 percent decrease. This places Cuba at number twelve in the

ILLEGIB

ranking, with an improvement falling below the mean decrease of 44 percent. Jamaica occupies the number one spot, with a 69 percent decline, from 52/1000 to 16/1000, the lowest absolute number in 1981 for all countries.

Table 11 presents percentage decreases in the child death rate. Here, Cuba ranks number four, with an 80 percent decrease, from 5 per 1000 to 1 per 1000, behind Chile, Costa Rica, and Panama. Again, in the base period Cuba enjoyed a very low child death rate; only Jamaica, Uruguay and Argentina had a lower rate.

It is interesting to note that although Cuba began and ended the period with a relatively favorable rating for each of the four indicators discussed, there was a good deal of fluctuation in the incidence of contagious disease during the period. The table presented below illustrates a variety of situations, from measles, syphilis and acute diarrhea which steadily worsened over the period, to hepatitis and tuberculosis which both worsened before beginning a decline.

Rate of Contagious Diseases in Cuba
(per 100,000 inhabitants)

| | <u>Measles</u> | <u>Syphilis</u> | <u>Acute Diarrhea</u> | <u>Hepatitis</u> | <u>Tuberculosis</u> |
|------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1959 | 10.3 | 0.7 | 5,707 ^b | 5.0 ^a | 27.6 |
| 1967 | 165.9 | 13.1 | 6,165 | 139.6 | 37.2 |
| 1977 | 263.3 | 39.2 | 7,358 | 123.2 | 13. ILLEGIB |

^a 1961

^b 1965

(Mesa-Lago, p. 167)

ILLEGIB

Therefore, contrary to the widespread impression that Cuba's favorable health conditions are a result of the priority given by the present regime to this basic need, the fact is that Cuba's progress has been less than that of other countries in the Americas. In absolute terms, Cuba's position is not too much better than the high base it started from. It is perhaps in making health services available to the rural population that Cuba's claims are more justified. Since no data for comparison among countries is available, all that can be done is to note the point.

TABLE 8
Population per Physician
 (ranked on basis of percentage decrease relative to 1960 base)

| | <u>1960</u> | <u>1980</u> | <u>Absolute Change</u> | <u>Percentage Change Relative to 1960 Base</u> |
|-------------|--------------|-------------|----------------------------|--|
| Honduras | 12,620 | 3,120 | (9,500) | (75) |
| Panama | 2,730 | 980 | (1,750) | (64) |
| Bolivia | 3,830 | 1,850 | (1,980) | (52) |
| Dominican | | | | |
| Republic | 8,220 | 4,020 | (4,200) | (51) |
| Costa Rica | 2,700 | 1,470 | (1,230) | (46) |
| Uruguay | 960 | 540 | (420) | (44) |
| El Salvador | 5,260 | 3,040 | (2,220) | (42) |
| Ecuador | 2,670 | 1,620 | (1,050) | (39) |
| Venezuela | 1,510 | 950 | (560) | (37) |
| Brazil | 2,670 | 1,700 | (970) | (36) |
| <u>Cuba</u> | <u>1,060</u> | <u>700</u> | <u>(360)</u> | <u>(34)</u> |
| Nicaragua | 2,690 | 1,800 | (890) | (33) |
| Mexico | 1,830 | 1,260 | (570) | (31) |
| Argentina | 740 | 530 | (210) | (28) |
| Colombia | 2,640 | 1,920 | (720) | (27) |
| Peru | 1,910 | 1,390 | (520) | (27) |
| Haiti | 9,230 | 8,200 | (1,030) | (11) |
| Paraguay | 1,810 | 1,710 | (100) | (6) |
| Chile | 1,780 | 1,920 | 140 | 8 |
| Jamaica | 2,590 | 2,830 | 240 | 9 |
| Guatemala | 4,420 | 8,600 | 4,180 | 95 |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

TABLE 9
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
 (ranked on basis of percentage increase)

| | <u>1960</u> | <u>1981</u> | <u>Percentage Increase</u> |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------------------|
| Honduras | 46 | 59 | 28 |
| Guatemala | 47 | 59 | 26 |
| El Salvador | 51 | 63 | 24 |
| Haiti | 44 | 54 | 23 |
| Peru | 47 | 58 | 23 |
| Ecuador | 51 | 62 | 22 |
| Dominican Republic | 51 | 62 | 22 |
| Nicaragua | 47 | 57 | 21 |
| Bolivia | 43 | 51 | 19 |
| Chile | 57 | 68 | 19 |
| Colombia | 53 | 63 | 19 |
| Venezuela | 57 | 68 | 19 |
| Costa Rica | 62 | 73 | 18 |
| Paraguay | 56 | 65 | 16 |
| Mexico | 57 | 66 | 16 |
| Brazil | 55 | 64 | 16 |
| <u>Cuba</u> | <u>63</u> | <u>73</u> | <u>16</u> |
| Panama | 62 | 71 | 15 |
| Jamaica | 64 | 71 | 11 |
| Argentina | 65 | 71 | 9 |
| Uruguay | 68 | 71 | 4 |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

TABLE 10
Infant Mortality Rate
(aged 0-1)
per 1000 Births

(ranked on basis of percentage decrease)

| | <u>1960</u> | <u>1981</u> | <u>Absolute Decrease</u> | <u>Percentage Decrease</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Jamaica | 52 | 16 | 36 | (69) |
| Panama | 68 | 21 | 47 | (69) |
| Costa Rica | 83 | 27 | 56 | (67) |
| Chile | 114 | 42 | 72 | (63) |
| Venezuela | 85 | 40 | 45 | (53) |
| Peru | 163 | 85 | 78 | (48) |
| Paraguay | 86 | 46 | 40 | (47) |
| Colombia | 103 | 55 | 48 | (47) |
| Dominican Republic | 119 | 66 | 53 | (45) |
| El Salvador | 136 | 75 | 61 | (45) |
| Ecuador | 140 | 80 | 60 | (43) |
| <u>Cuba</u> - - - - - | <u>32</u> * | <u>19</u> | <u>13</u> | <u>(41)</u> |
| Mexico | 91 | 54 | 37 | (41) |
| Honduras | 145 | 86 | 59 | (41) |
| Nicaragua | 144 | 88 | 56 | (39) |
| Haiti | 182 | 112 | 70 | (38) |
| Brazil | 118 | 75 | 43 | (36) |
| Argentina | 61 | 44 | 17 | (28) |
| Guatemala | 92 | 66 | 26 | (28) |
| Bolivia | 167 | 129 | 38 | (23) |
| Uruguay | 50 | 39 | 11 | (22) |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

* Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1977, p. 107.

TABLE 11
Child Death Rate
(aged 1-4)
per 1000

(ranked on basis of percentage decrease)

| | <u>1960</u> | <u>1981</u> | <u>Absolute Decrease</u> | <u>Percentage Decrease</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Chile | 18 | 2 | 16 | (89) |
| Costa Rica | 8 | 1 | 7 | (88) |
| Panama | 5 | 1 | 4 | (80) |
| <u>Cuba</u> - - - - - | <u>5</u> | <u>1</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>(80)</u> |
| Paraguay | 9 | 2 | 7 | (78) |
| Venezuela | 9 | 2 | 7 | (78) |
| Peru | 38 | 9 | 29 | (76) |
| Dominican Republic | 20 | 5 | 15 | (75) |
| El Salvador | 26 | 7 | 19 | (73) |
| Colombia | 14 | 4 | 10 | (71) |
| Ecuador | 28 | 8 | 20 | (71) |
| Honduras | 30 | 9 | 21 | (70) |
| Nicaragua | 30 | 10 | 20 | (67) |
| Haiti | 47 | 17 | 30 | (64) |
| Brazil | 19 | 7 | 12 | (63) |
| Mexico | 10 | 4 | 6 | (60) |
| Argentina | 4 | 2 | 2 | (50) |
| Guatemala | 10 | 5 | 5 | (50) |
| Bolivia | 40 | 23 | 17 | (43) |
| Uruguay | 3 | 2 | 1 | (33) |
| Jamaica | 3 | - | - | - |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

COMPARISON OF SELECTED INDICATORS OF
EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS

Education is one of the basic needs that are emphasized by Cuba to justify the regime's success. The final group, Tables 12-15, gives information on a variety of educational indicators over the twenty-year period. For the tables on school enrollment a number over 100 percent indicates over-age students in relation to the specified age group. This is due to grade repeaters or late entrants. The comparison can be misleading in the absence of detailed explanations because a decrease may result from a better rate of grade promotion. Keeping this warning in mind, the following comments are made.

Table 12 covers the increase in the number of people enrolled in primary school as a percentage of a specified age group. Cuba had a small increase of 3 percent, number fourteen in the ranking. Cuba began the period with a relatively high percentage, exceeded only by Uruguay. Colombia made the most impressive improvement with a 51 percent increase.

Table 13 deals with the increase in the number of people enrolled in secondary school as a percentage of a specified, standard age group. In this area, Cuba made more progress, ranking number one with a 57 percent increase. This reflects Cuba's comparatively low percentage in 1960, 14 percent of the age group enrolled in secondary school.

Table 14 presents the increase in the number of people enrolled in institutions of higher learning as a percentage of a standard age group. Cuba made some progress in this area also, ranking number five with a 17 percent increase. It should be pointed out here that academic freedom is strictly curtailed in Cuba. Universities are not independent and research conducted must be approved of by the state and the communist party. This facilitates state control of research content and results. (cidh, p. 91-92)

In addition, relevant for all levels of education, is the politicized nature of the course work. Primary school students are taught basic marxist concepts and "polytechnic" courses which attempt to ready them for manual work with tools and machines. (cidh, p. 223) From that point, through the university, no independent schools exist and no alternate points of view are tolerated. (cidh, p. 229-230)

Table 15 presents percentage changes in the adult literacy rate based on 1960 status. In absolute terms, Cuba ranks number one, with 95 percent. Cuba ranks number six in this category in terms of progress from a relatively high starting point. Countries making real progress in this area started with much lower literacy rates than Cuba. This indicates, once again, that Cuba had already fulfilled a high level of basic human needs before the revolution.

TABLE 12
Educational Indicators - Primary
Number enrolled in school as percent of age group
(ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
relative to 1960 base)

| | <u>%</u> <u>1960</u> | <u>%</u> <u>1980</u> | <u>Absolute</u> <u>Percentage</u> <u>Change</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Colombia | 77 | 128 | 51 |
| Mexico | 80 | 120 | 40 |
| Nicaragua | 66 | 100 | 34 |
| Peru | 83 | 112 | 29 |
| Guatemala | 45 | 69 | 24 |
| Ecuador | 83 | 107 | 24 |
| Honduras | 67 | 89 | 22 |
| Bolivia | 64 | 84 | 20 |
| Argentina | 98 | 116 | 18 |
| Haiti | 46 | 64 | 18 |
| Panama | 96 | 113 | 17 |
| Costa Rica | 96 | 108 | 12 |
| Dominican Republic | 98 | 106 | 8 |
| Chile | 109 | 117 | 8 |
| Jamaica | 92 | 99 | 7 |
| Paraguay | 98 | 102 | 4 |
| Venezuela | 100 | 104 | 4 |
| <u>Cuba</u> | <u>109</u> | <u>112</u> | <u>3</u> |
| Brazil | 95 | 93 | (2) |
| Uruguay | 111 | 105 | (6) |
| El Salvador | 80 | 74 | (6) |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

TABLE 13Educational Indicators - Secondary

Number enrolled in school as percent of age group
(ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
relative to 1960 base)

| | <u>%</u> <u>1960</u> | <u>%</u> <u>1980</u> | <u>Absolute</u> <u>Percentage</u> <u>Change</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| <u>Cuba</u> - - - - - | <u>14</u> | <u>71</u> | <u>57</u> |
| Peru | 15 | 56 | 41 |
| Nicaragua | 7 | 43 | 36 |
| Panama | 29 | 65 | 36 |
| Colombia | 12 | 46 | 34 |
| Argentina | 23 | 56 | 33 |
| Chile | 24 | 55 | 31 |
| Ecuador | 12 | 40 | 28 |
| Costa Rica | 21 | 48 | 27 |
| Mexico | 11 | 37 | 26 |
| Dominican Republic | 7 | 32 | 25 |
| Bolivia | 12 | 36 | 24 |
| Uruguay | 37 | 60 | 23 |
| Brazil | 11 | 32 | 21 |
| Venezuela | 21 | 39 | 18 |
| Paraguay | 11 | 26 | 15 |
| Honduras | 8 | 21 | 13 |
| Jamaica | 45 | 57 | 12 |
| El Salvador | 13 | 23 | 10 |
| Guatemala | 7 | 16 | 9 |
| Haiti | 4 | 12 | 8 |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

TABLE 14
Educational Indicators - Higher
Number enrolled in school as percent of age group
 (ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
 relative to 1960 base)

| | <u>%</u> <u>1960</u> | <u>%</u> <u>1980</u> | <u>Absolute</u> <u>Percentage</u> <u>Change</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Ecuador | 3 | 35 | 32 |
| Costa Rica | 5 | 26 | 21 |
| Panama | 5 | 23 | 18 |
| <u>Cuba</u> - - - - - | <u>3</u> | <u>20</u> | <u>17</u> |
| Venezuela | 4 | 21 | 17 |
| Peru | 4 | 16 | 12 |
| Argentina | 11 | 23 | 12 |
| Mexico | 3 | 15 | 12 |
| Brazil | 2 | 12 | 10 |
| Dominican Republic | 1 | 10 | 9 |
| Colombia | 2 | 11 | 9 |
| Nicaragua | 1 | 9 | 8 |
| Chile | 4 | 12 | 8 |
| Uruguay | 8 | 16 | 8 |
| Honduras | 1 | 8 | 7 |
| El Salvador | 1 | 8 | 7 |
| Guatemala | 2 | 9 | 7 |
| Paraguay | 2 | 7 | 5 |
| Bolivia | 4 | - | - |
| Haiti | - | 1 | - |
| Jamaica | 2 | - | - |

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, 1983.

TABLE 15
Adult-Literacy Rate
 (ranked on basis of absolute percentage increase
 relative to 1960 base)

| | <u>%</u> <u>1960</u> | <u>%</u> <u>1980</u> | <u>Absolute</u> <u>Percentage</u> <u>Change</u> |
|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Nicaragua | 38 ^a | 90 | 52 |
| Bolivia | 39 | 63 | 24 |
| Peru | 61 | 80 | 19 |
| Venezuela | 63 | 82 | 19 |
| Colombia | 63 | 81 | 18 |
| Mexico | 65 | 83 | 18 |
| <u>Cuba</u> ----- | <u>78</u> ^a | <u>95</u> | <u>17</u> |
| Honduras | 45 | 60 | 15 |
| Brazil | 61 | 76 | 15 |
| El Salvador | 49 | 62 | 13 |
| Ecuador | 68 | 81 | 13 |
| Panama | 73 | 85 | 12 |
| Costa Rica | 79 ^a | 90 | 11 |
| Paraguay | 75 | 84 | 9 |
| Uruguay | 85 ^b | 94 | 9 |
| Haiti | 15 | 23 | 8 |
| Jamaica | 82 | 90 | 8 |
| Dominican Republic | 65 | 67 | 2 |
| Argentina | 91 | 93 | 2 |
| Chile | 84 | - | - |
| Guatemala | 32 | - | - |

^a Organization of American States, Tipologia Socioeconomica de los Paises Latinoamericanos, Revista Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Segunda Epoca - Volumen 2, Numero Especial, 1963.

^b Ibid, percent for year 1957.

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1983, Oxford University, Press 1983.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (cidh). La Situación de los Derechos Humanos en Cuba Séptimo Informe. Washington: Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1983.
- Hicks, Norman L. "Growth vs Basic Needs: Is There a Trade-Off?" World Development, November - December, 1979, pp. 985-994.
- Kenner, Martin and James Petras, eds. Fidel Castro Speaks. New York: Grove Press, 1969.
- Luxenburg, Norman. "Comparative Developments in The Caribbean." Iowa City, Iowa, 1982.
- Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. The Economy of Socialist Cuba - A Two - Decade Appraisal. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981.
- Sivard, Ruth Leger. World Military and Social Expenditures 1983. Washington: World Priorities, 1983.
- Unión Panamericana. Reunión Extraordinaria del Consejo Interamericano Económico y Social a Nivel Ministerial, Punta del Este, Uruguay, el 5-17 Agosto de 1961 - Actas y Documentos. Washington: Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1962.
- Unión Panamericana. Tipología Socioeconómica de los Países Latinoamericanos. Revista Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Segunda Epoca - Vol. 2, Número Especial. Washington: Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1963.
- United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence. Special Report No. 103. Washington: United States Department of State, 1982.
- Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Inc. A Description of the Cuban Economic Analysis and Forecasting System (CEAFS) with Projections for the Cuban Economy to 1985. Pennsylvania: By the Author, 1983.
- The World Bank and the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. Redistribution with Growth. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- The World Bank. World Development Report 1983. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.