



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

~~Secret~~

25X1

# Spain: Communism in Crisis

25X1

**An Intelligence Assessment**

~~Secret~~

*EUR 85-10142  
August 1985*

*Copy* 304

**Page Denied**



**Directorate of  
Intelligence**

**Secret**



25X1

# Spain: Communism in Crisis



25X1

**An Intelligence Assessment**

25X1

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office of  
European Analysis, with contributions from [redacted]  
[redacted], Office of Central Reference, and [redacted]  
[redacted] EURA. It was coordinated with the  
Directorate of Operations. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, West European Division,  
EURA, [redacted]

25X1

**Secret**

*EUR 85-10142  
August 1985*

Secret

25X1

**Spain: Communism in Crisis**

25X1

**Key Judgments**

*Information available  
as of 28 June 1985  
was used in this report.*

Spanish Communism is in trouble, and we see little prospect that it will recover during the next few years. Conflict over personalities and policies over the last two years has produced multiple splits. A breakaway group has formed a pro-Moscow party—the Communist Party (PC)—and the “legitimate,” relatively more moderate, Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has split again into warring factions led by Secretary General Gerardo Iglesias and former Secretary General Santiago Carrillo. The conflict among the rival factions is not likely to be resolved until 1986 at the earliest; a general election, which must be held by then, may give one or another faction an advantage. Even so, that faction would probably need several more years to consolidate its ascendancy over the other factions, much less reestablish Communism itself as a significant political force.

25X1

The absence of a strong Communist party during this period is likely to strengthen the ability of Socialist Prime Minister Gonzalez—the probable winner of the next election—to pursue a middle-of-the-road course. In particular, it will improve his chances of keeping Spain in NATO, eventually integrating militarily into the Alliance, and renegotiating the bilateral basing agreement with the United States on terms acceptable to Washington.


25X1

Over the longer term we believe the hardline pro-Soviet PC has a good, if somewhat less-than-even, chance of eventually supplanting the PCE as the dominant Communist party—largely because the infighting is likely to disillusion the relatively moderate PCE voters and drive them away from the Communist fold. Although the future of Spanish Communism would fall into the hands of its most rigid and orthodox proponents, PC dominance might be good news for the United States. The PC would be more opposed to Spanish cooperation with NATO and the United States than the PCE, but its greater radicalism would make Communism a more marginal political force and render it less able to influence policy.


25X1

We believe it is somewhat more likely, however, that the PCE’s generally stronger leadership, broader current electoral base, and—at least for now—greater trade union support may be enough for it to beat the PC decisively in the next election and to restore its once-dominant position among Spanish Communists. Should the PCE manage to overpower the PC, its political fortunes would rejuvenate, and it would become again a serious competitor for leftist votes. Stronger Communist competition for

Secret



25X1

votes on the Socialist Party's left flank could make it somewhat more difficult for Gonzalez to pursue moderate domestic and foreign policies—including his attempt to increase Spanish participation in Western security efforts. More positive, the PCE's relatively firm commitment to the electoral process would help to integrate radicals into Spain's still new democracy. 

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

**Contents**

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Introduction	1
The Franco Era	1
Problems Emerge	1
Underlying Difficulties	1
Declining Vote Totals	2
The PCE Splits Apart	3
Carrillo Challenges Iglesias	4
The Pro-Soviet Challenge	5
Regional Elections in Galicia and Andalusia	5
Outlook	6
PCE Ascendancy	7
PC Ascendancy	7
Implications	8
The Stakes for Gonzalez and Spanish Democracy	8
The Stakes for the United States and NATO	9

25X1

Secret


Secret




25X1

---


**Programs of Different Communist Factions**

**Communist Party of Spain (PCE), led by Secretary General Gerardo Iglesias**  
Opposes NATO membership and the US military presence and advocates neutralism . . . favors entering EC on current terms as a net plus for Spain . . . supports a "mixed" economy . . . says increased internal demand is needed to revive economy, not the increased exports sought by the government . . . advocates liberalized credit for small business . . . soft-pedals issue of agrarian reform . . . promotes broad coalition of left-of-center groups but rejects cooperation with dissident Communist groups. 

**Communist Party of Spain (PCE) dissident faction led by former Secretary General Santiago Carrillo**  
Opposes NATO membership and the US military presence, and advocates neutralism . . . against EC membership on pragmatic grounds that current terms are unfavorable to Spain . . . supports liberalized

credit for small business . . . soft-pedals agrarian reform . . . disagrees with Iglesias more on electoral tactics than on party programs . . . favors cooperation between different Communist factions against the Socialists and other left-of-center groups 

25X1

**Communist Party (PC), led by Secretary General Ignacio Gallego**  
Opposes NATO membership and the US military presence and advocates neutralism . . . against EC membership on the ideological ground that it increases Spain's links to the capitalist bloc . . . favors greater autonomy for the Basque provinces and Catalonia . . . advocates breakup of large agricultural estates . . . favors providing a clear Marxist-Leninist alternative to the voters rather than joining in a common front with other Communist or left-of-center groups. 

25X1


25X1

Secret

Secret




25X1


**Spain: Communism in Crisis** 

25X1

**Introduction**

The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has experienced more than its share of growing pains in the post-Franco era. Spanish parties in general have not had time to form the rich and complex ties to interest groups and institutions that give parties in more established democracies their identity, purpose, and staying power. Although the PCE had the strongest organization of any Spanish party at the beginning of the transition to democracy, it failed to consolidate its position as the dominant left-of-center party, in our view, because voters were suspicious of the Communist label and associated the party negatively with the civil war and other troubled periods in Spanish history. Electoral disappointment in turn brought to the surface latent divisions over ideology and personalities that we believe will ultimately redefine the face of Spanish Communism. This will have significant repercussions for Spanish democracy and for Spain's security relations with the West. 

point for antiregime sentiment by indiscriminately tarring all his opponents as "Communists." Pablo Picasso spoke for many when he explained why he joined the PCE in the 1940s: "I am against Franco. The only way to show it was to join (the party); that way I demonstrated that I belonged to the other side."



25X1


In addition, Communist leaders took steps to help increase their dominance of the left. According to an academic expert, Santiago Carrillo, who had become the PCE's Secretary General in 1959, was convinced that the party needed to project itself as an authentically Spanish organization not under Moscow's thumb. Along with Georges Marchais in France and Enrico Berlinguer in Italy, Carrillo gambled that Eurocommunism—support for Western-style democracy and independence from Moscow—would be so successful with the electorate that party hardliners would be intimidated and he would be able to keep the party united behind him. His most dramatic gesture came in 1968 when he pointedly condemned the Soviet and East Bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia.




25X1

25X1

**The Franco Era**

By the time of Franco's death in 1975, the PCE had become the major party on the left. It began to acquire this position during the civil war of 1936-39, largely because of its role as a conduit for Soviet aid to Franco's opponent, the Second Republic. Moreover, after his victory, Franco virtually wiped out the PCE's principal leftist rivals—the large Socialist and anarchosyndicalist organizations that had dominated the left before 1936. 

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, academic experts—trying to predict the shape of post-Franco Spain—assigned great weight to the political base that the Communists had built through their underground activities and, later, through the shift to Eurocommunist policies. Those experts also noted the similarity in social structure between Spain and Italy and concluded that the Communists would be at least as important in Spain as they were in Italy. 

25X1

25X1

Over the next four decades, the Communists consolidated their influence over the left by being the only group to maintain an extensive underground structure. They infiltrated Francoist student groups and acquired a wide following among intellectuals. They also penetrated the regime's fascist-style trade unions and used them as a cover for their own underground trade union—the Workers Commissions (CCOO or Comisiones Obreras). Franco inadvertently boosted the PCE's stock and helped to make it the reference

**Problems Emerge**

**Underlying Difficulties**

Although the Communists were in a strong position coming out of the Franco era—their 200,000 members in 1977 were about twice the strength of any other party—they were unable to maintain their

Secret



Secret

dominance over the left during the transition to democracy. In part, the failure stemmed from the same problems that plagued other West European Communist parties advocating Eurocommunism during the late 1970s. Carrillo's opposition to Moscow and his reformist policies angered the PCE's ideological purists, while his continuing embrace of the hammer and sickle and other historic party symbols roused the suspicions of moderate center-left voters.

In our view, a more fundamental problem—the increasing irrelevance of Communism to modern conditions—further eroded the party's position. By the late 1970s, the share of blue-collar workers, Marx's supposed revolutionary vanguard, in the Spanish labor force had begun declining while that of white-collar workers had begun increasing. Higher living standards, moreover, made blue-collar workers more politically moderate at the same time that television and the rest of the mass media increased their sophistication, helping to erode the traditional working-class subculture. As Spanish academics joined their West European counterparts in proclaiming the dawn of a "postindustrial" and "postideological" age, the PCE still tried to explain the world in terms of a Marxist ideology shaped by 19th-century class conflict. Carrillo and other Communist leaders acknowledged that automation and new information technologies had brought enormous changes, but they argued that those transformations would produce an ever-expanding army of exploited and unemployed workers and that the new technologies would also be instruments for neocolonialist control over the Third World. Those claims simply did not carry much weight with many workers who knew that they were living better than their parents had ever dreamed.<sup>1</sup>

The PCE, like other West European Communist parties, also faced tactical problems, including strong competition for left-of-center voters. The Socialist Party (PSOE) became the Communists' biggest competitor. Though largely an invention of the post-Franco era, the PSOE had a name that went back to

<sup>1</sup> Spanish per capita GDP nearly tripled during the last two decades of Franco's rule from \$1,130 to \$2,940 (in constant 1975 dollars). By way of comparison, Spanish per capita GDP climbed from 23 to 41 percent of the corresponding figures for the United States during those years.

the 19th century and was synonymous with a respected reform tradition. PCE leaders, moreover, were on average a generation older than their Socialist rivals—a decided disadvantage in establishing rapport with one of the youngest and most youthful-thinking electorates in Western Europe. Nor did Carrillo's advocacy of Eurocommunism altogether free the PCE from the taint of association with totalitarian Bloc countries, in contrast to the unambiguously democratic Socialists. The latter problem was only worsened by the apparent contrast between US and Soviet behavior in the period. While Washington appeared to many Spaniards to be retreating inward after the Vietnam war, the Soviets were continuing a massive arms buildup program, intervening in Africa, Afghanistan, and Poland, and taking a hard line against Sakharov and other dissidents.

In addition to the general problems that the PCE shared with other West European Communist parties, Carrillo had to wrestle with unique difficulties connected with Spain's transition to democracy. By 1975, Spaniards from both the left and the right had come to look on the civil war as a terrible blunder that must never be repeated. "Liberty Without Anger"—the title of a best selling record—reflected the national mood; reconciliation was the national goal. Under these circumstances, the PCE's hard-earned reputation as the focal point for unyielding opposition to Franco since the civil war—which did so much to boost the party's prestige while the dictator was alive—gave the party a more contentious image than its rivals and, in our judgment, actually undercut its electoral appeal once he had died.

#### Declining Vote Totals

The PCE's difficulties in attracting voters became obvious when the first election of the post-Franco era was held in 1977. The party won only 9 percent of the vote and 20 of 350 seats in the lower house of parliament (the Cortes). By contrast, the archrival

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

PSOE polled 28 percent of the vote and won 118 seats, and Adolfo Suarez won the right to continue as Prime Minister when his newly formed Center Democratic Union (UCD) received 37 percent of the vote and 165 seats. These disappointing results apparently convinced Carrillo that he had to try all the harder to project a moderate, responsible image. That same year he became the first leader of a West European Communist party to deny the "socialist" and "democratic" character of the Soviet Union. [redacted]

Although Carrillo did play an important role in channeling pent-up leftist aspirations for change away from the streets and into the parliamentary arena in the 1979 election, he could not shake the PCE's newly acquired "loser" image. Because the Spanish electoral system severely underrepresents smaller parties, the Socialists argued convincingly that it was better to vote for the PSOE, which had a chance of winning, than to waste a ballot on the Communists.<sup>2</sup> In the end, the PCE barely improved over its previous showing, winning just 11 percent of the vote and 23 seats, compared to 31 percent and 121 seats for the Socialists and 35 percent and 168 seats for Suarez's victorious Center Democrats. [redacted]

The long agony of the PCE began in 1979. Party factions that had been willing to work together in the hope of electoral gain now blamed each other for defeat. The focal point for party debate was the contradictions in Carrillo's version of Eurocommunism. The "renovators"—a group of idealistic middle-class intellectuals such as Manuel Azcarate and Amparo Rubiales—argued that Carrillo would not do well at the polls until he extended to the party the same commitment to democracy that he professed in national politics. Pro-Soviets took a different tack. They charged that Carrillo's criticism of Moscow had confused the PCE's natural working-class constituency and that the party should return to ideological

<sup>2</sup> Spain's modified system of proportional representation overrepresents front-running parties in general and does so particularly in smaller provinces. In 1977, the front-running Center Democrats' 37 percent of the vote generated 47 percent of the seats and the Socialists' 28 percent of the vote produced 34 percent of the seats, while the Communists' 9 percent of the vote garnered only 6 percent of the seats and the conservative Popular Alliance's 8 percent of the vote obtained only 4 percent of the seats. That same skewing in favor of front-running parties and against also-rans has persisted through every election since then. [redacted]

orthodoxy. In March 1982, pro-Soviets in industrial Catalonia—the Communists' greatest bastion—bolted and formed the Communist Party of Catalonia (PCC) to compete with the United Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC), which was the PCE's local affiliate. [redacted]

By the time of the next general election in October 1982, intraparty bloodletting had disillusioned many party members. According to press reports, membership had fallen from more than 200,000 in 1977 to approximately 70,000, and the party had lost much of its credibility with the electorate. Fratricide, equally in vogue in the ruling Center Democratic Union, had similar implications for that party's popular standing. Among the major parties, only the Socialists and the conservative popular Alliance (AP) projected images of unity, and the Socialists went the AP one better by also persuading the voters of their moderation. These considerations dictated the results of the election—a smashing victory for the Socialists who won 46 percent of the vote and an absolute parliamentary majority with 201 seats, a second-place showing for the AP, which garnered 26 percent and 106 seats, and oblivion for the UCD, which promptly dissolved itself after receiving just 7 percent and 11 seats. For their part, the Communists won less than 4 percent of the vote and just four seats—one less than the number required to have their own parliamentary group. [redacted]

### The PCE Splits Apart

The party's fortunes had sunk so low and the popular verdict seemed so clear that Carrillo resigned a week after the October election. Gerardo Iglesias, whom Carrillo designated as his successor, appeared at first to Spanish political observers as an ideal front man—young, photogenic, and a Carrillo loyalist—but neither bright nor articulate and altogether unaccustomed to the glare of publicity he would experience as the PCE's new chief. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Rather than rely on the discredited but still powerful Carrillo for advice, however, Iglesias turned to Nicolas Sartorius—the intellectual scion of an aristocratic family who was the party's most respected tactician as well as its secretary general. Together, Iglesias and Sartorius laid out a two-pronged strategy to reunite and rebuild the PCE. To ease differences with the pro-Soviets, the PCE stepped up its criticism of the United States and played down its disagreements with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Iglesias and Sartorius sought to establish the PCE as a responsible alternative party of the left by pursuing a policy of "convergence"—that is, close cooperation—with trade unions, leftist regional parties, small self-styled "green" groups, and the new Progressive Federation composed largely of ecologists, feminists, and other independent leftist groups. [redacted]

#### Carrillo Challenges Iglesias

Since early 1983, however, infighting between Carrillo and Iglesias has badly split the PCE and even thrown into question the continued existence of the party. Iglesias's budding relations with Sartorius and his determination to pursue an independent course quickly frayed his relations with his former mentor. Since then, Carrillo has directed most of his fire at Iglesias's convergence strategy—apparently not particularly troubled that he had promoted essentially the same policy before the regional election in Galicia in 1981. In an apparent attempt to appeal to the emotions of the remaining hardcore Communists, he argues publicly that, at its best, convergence is a fuzzy doctrine that is bound to confuse leftist voters. At its worst, in his view, convergence suggests a loss of confidence in Marxism, and it could strip away the PCE's Communist identity and make it just another leftist party. [redacted]

Carrillo has argued publicly, moreover, that the accommodating posture toward other leftist groups inherent in convergence presupposes a blurring of differences with the Socialist Party. In contrast, he maintains that the PSOE is the principal obstacle to PCE expansion and that the Communists should make themselves a clear alternative to the Socialists. However, Carrillo has coupled these indictments of Iglesias's political strategy over the past two years with a turnaround in his earlier criticism of Moscow and has joined Iglesias in going out of his way to praise Soviet foreign policy—particularly on peace

and disarmament issues. He has also portrayed himself recently as occupying the middle ground of Spanish Communism and has claimed that Iglesias and the pro-Soviets should join with him in a common electoral front. [redacted]

Iglesias nevertheless has profited from his incumbency. Although Carrillo still has a sentimental hold on the loyalties of rank and filers as well as of party leaders he helped to promote, ideology and tradition incline Spanish Communists to fall in behind their new leader—a tendency that is reinforced by the dependence of many high-ranking members on their salary as party officeholders. Another key factor in Iglesias's favor, according to press reports, has been support from CCOO trade union Secretary General Marcelino. He and many other CCOO leaders have backed Iglesias, in our view, less because they are committed to the political line he represents than because they see him as the head of the strongest Communist faction. They probably believe that his success in beating back Carrillo's challenge would bring the quickest end to the Communists' infighting and thereby reduce the possibility that the CCOO itself could be pulled into and torn apart by the conflict. [redacted]

A series of setbacks at party meetings during the past year has almost certainly convinced Carrillo that he faces eventual defeat. As any last hope of regaining respect or power has faded, though, he seems to have been seized by a nihilistic fury—almost as if he were trying to bring the entire PCE crashing down on the heads of his ungrateful heirs. His rhetoric has reached apocalyptic extremes. During the past two months, he has publicly called party leaders drunks, revisionist transvestites, and fascists. When Iglesias recently convened extraordinary regional party congresses in Madrid and Valencia to oust *carrillista* party leaders, those local party bosses countered with extraordinary congresses of their own and said they would fight in the courts to maintain their official standing. Iglesias's supporters, [redacted] believe they will win any litigation, but worry about how long it could drag on and even more about whether Carrillo's supporters might still continue to occupy party buildings and offices and make it necessary to use force to oust them. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

The fight between Carrillo and Iglesias has been especially devastating because the PCE, like other Communist parties, resembles a close-knit family. More than other Spanish parties, it has tried to provide its members with a wholistic world view. It uses its own journals, festivals, package tours to Bloc countries, and other community-building activities to reinforce the strong Communist political subculture. Precisely because the party's mission means so much, however, party members do not treat differences over it casually. The conflict between Carrillo and Iglesias has made virtually every PCE affiliate into a house divided against itself. Alfonso Guerra, the Socialist Party's tart-tongued number-two man, summed up his view publicly by observing recently that Carrillo is on the verge of achieving in two short years what Franco failed to do in 40—destroy the PCE.

key Iglesias backers, who until recently had been confident of their ability to withstand Carrillo, have now begun to worry about whether Guerra's barb might prove true.

**The Pro-Soviet Challenge**

Despite Iglesias's attempts to ease strains with Moscow-oriented factions, these efforts have not met with much success. Pro-Soviets did not settle for increased criticism of the United States, and they attacked Iglesias and his policies from the outset. When it became clear that they could not prevail against him within the PCE, they met, according to Embassy reporting, in January 1984 with the PCC and four other Communist groups with apparent Soviet backing and formed the pro-Moscow Communist Party (PC). The new party declared its solidarity with the Soviet Union and defined itself as a Marxist-Leninist party committed—somewhat inconsistently—to the dictatorship of the proletariat, restoration of the republic, and a decentralized state that would permit Basque and Catalan independence. The PC elected the 71-year-old Ignacio Gallego as its leader. Gallego is a largely untutored former agricultural laborer whose ideological orthodoxy helped him rise high among the exiled PCE leadership after the civil war.<sup>3</sup>

Gallego is trying to establish an organization in every major city and is working especially hard to woo CCOO affiliates away from the PCE.

the PC probably still has fewer than 30,000 members compared with nearly 70,000 for the PCE. According to press reports, moreover, much of the PC's support is concentrated at the extremes of the age spectrum—members over 65 who are still rooted in the ideological simplicities of earlier times and young, unsophisticated radicals who are unwilling to adjust to the pragmatic give-and-take of Spain's new democracy. The PC also failed to demonstrate much strength last year during the CCOO's Third Congress and in a regional election in Communist stronghold Catalonia.

**Regional Elections in Galicia and Andalusia**

We believe regional elections in Galicia this fall and Andalusia next spring may demonstrate the suicidal consequences of the Communists' continued factionalism. Galicia is a backward, generally conservative region far removed from the national political mainstream. It does, however, have significant pockets of industry along the Atlantic coast, and local Communists, Socialists, and other leftists have vied intensively in the past for working-class support in those areas. Political pundits, moreover, have made what is likely to prove the self-fulfilling prophecy that trends in this region will be a portent of national political trends—including whether the PCE can overcome its differences and mount an effective challenge to the Socialists. The Communists, accordingly, have every incentive to put their differences behind them in a common effort to reestablish the PCE's electoral credibility in one of the last regional votes before the national parliamentary election, which will be held by the end of 1986. Instead, the Galician Communists actually split in June into two separate, warring parties.

The situation is—if anything—even worse in Andalusia, the only other area where a regional election is likely to occur before the national election. Andalusia is the largest of Spain's 17 regions, containing 17 percent of the country's total population. It may also

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

---

**Soviet Views**

*Soviet actions suggest that Moscow has decided to give enough material and symbolic support to the PC to keep up the pressure on the PCE, but has otherwise held back from committing itself decisively in the struggle between the two parties. The Soviets probably realize that an at least quasi-independent party like the PCE might garner greater electoral support and prove more effective than the PC in advancing Moscow's main objectives in Spain—undermining support for Spanish military cooperation with the United States and NATO. They almost certainly also know that the history of Spanish Communism is littered with efforts to form rival parties to the PCE, and that most of those attempts quickly degenerated into doctrinaire grouplets without popular followings. Nonetheless, the Soviets probably do not trust Iglesias much more than they trusted Carrillo earlier, and they are probably well aware that the PCE's recent backpedaling from anti-Sovietism owes much to the pressure the party was experiencing on its left flank. The PCE, moreover, has produced considerable political heartburn for Moscow in the past.*

*PCE leaders believe, [redacted] that the Soviets spent more than \$150,000 to help the PC get started. The Soviets and other Bloc countries—particularly Czechoslovakia and East Germany—have regularly contributed to it since then and, according to the US Embassy, may have largely underwritten the \$450,000 cost of the PC's new headquarters. Moscow has also offered to provide political training in the Soviet Union for middle- and upper-level PC cadres. Nonetheless, the Soviets sent a lower-ranking delegation to the PC's founding congress in January 1984 than they did to the PCE congress the previous month. They have also continued to recognize the PCE itself, explaining to not altogether pleased party officials that Spain has become one of several countries—like Sweden and India—where the CPSU maintains relations with two Communist parties.*

25X1

25X1

25X1

be the most leftist. Iglesias and Sartorius recognize Andalusia's potential as a springboard for the PCE's national recovery. They have strongly backed the effort of Cordoba mayor Julio Anguita—probably the PCE's most popular and respected officeholder—to fashion a broad convergence-style coalition of leftist groups in his campaign for the presidency of the regional government.

The key to doing well in eastern Andalusia, however, lies in the Communist organization in Granada where Carrillo's supporters are strong and have attempted to undermine Anguita's effort. The US Embassy has recently reported that local Communist infighting has badly tarnished the party's image with Andalusian voters. The Communists' disarray has almost certainly also reduced the party's appeal to other leftist groups as a potential electoral partner and is thereby likely to abort a potentially favorable test of Iglesias's convergence strategy.

**Outlook**

Spanish Communists, according to the press, recognize how much their conflicts have hurt their public standing and electoral prospects, but the factionalism has become so bitter and personalized at every level that we doubt they can stop the fratricide soon. Some Spanish pundits have even suggested that the war will not peter out until the contestants have exhausted themselves and permanently destroyed Communism as a political force.

We acknowledge that possibility, but nonetheless believe that the Communists have considerable recuperative potential and are not likely to remain weak indefinitely nor to be replaced easily as the Socialists' principal left-of-center competition. In recent years Greens, dissident Socialists, and assorted leftist free

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

6

Secret

spirits have all tried to launch new parties, but the Communists enjoy some underlying political strengths greater than any of those groups—particularly the residual loyalty that many Spanish leftists continue to feel toward the Communist label as a result of their record during the civil war and in the anti-Franco underground. [redacted]

The Soviet Union will certainly retain a stake in maintaining a Communist party of some sort to promote its interests in Spain. Survey data show that the Soviet Union still enjoys considerable prestige among many voters to the left of the Socialists, and we believe that its influence could be significant in helping Spanish Communists fend off challenges. [redacted]

Additionally, the CCOO gives the Communists a base of support that no putative rival can match. The CCOO currently enjoys roughly the same strength nationwide as the Socialist UGT, and the unpopularity of the government's industrial reconversion policies and social security reforms might even give the CCOO the edge in the next round of trade union representative elections in 1986-87. [redacted]

We also find evidence that the Communists could be passing through the worst of their crisis and that either the PCE or the PC will eventually establish ascendancy and restore Communism as a significant political force on the left with a chance to regain a 10 percent or so share of the national vote. No recovery, however, is likely to begin until at least a year or so after the next general election. [redacted]

#### **PCE Ascendancy**

Regarding the possibility of a PCE comeback, we note that Carrillo appears likely to lose much of his destructive force soon. Although he has certainly engendered deep splits in the PCE, press reports indicate that his own base of support in the party is shrinking rapidly, and we think he would have trouble carrying out a recent, thinly veiled threat to form a new party. Hardcore leftist voters who are strongly supportive of Moscow would probably opt instead for the PC, while Communist voters attracted to Eurocommunism as Carrillo originally articulated that concept would probably stick with the PCE. Carrillo might be able to persuade enough voters to follow him

to play the "spoiler" in the next election, but we doubt that many would be inclined to throw away their ballot more than once. Nor do we believe that Carrillo could have a future in the PC—particularly since Gallego rebuffed the public feelers that Carrillo sent out to him earlier this year. [redacted]

We believe that Carrillo's gradual departure from the scene will leave the PCE with a better-than-even chance to banish the PC to the margins of the left and to reassert its leadership of Spanish Communism. Support from the CCOO is a principal factor favoring that outcome. Spain's rapid social and economic development over the past three decades favors the PCE as well. In our view, Spain is simply too modern for Stalinism to be more than a fringe phenomenon. [redacted]

In several elections since 1977 (including most recently the nationwide municipal elections of 1983), the PCE demonstrated that it can win as much as 8 to 11 percent of the vote—considerably more than a fringe.<sup>4</sup> Communist disarray has certainly hurt the party and will probably continue to handicap Iglesias's convergence strategy, but polls published by reputable firms indicate that the Communists—with some help from Gonzalez's centrist policies—have still managed to maintain the support of approximately 5 percent of the voters. Those same polls indicate that the PCE is still more popular than the PC. Once campaigning begins, the PCE will also probably benefit from the contrast between the youthful Iglesias and the geriatric Gallego. [redacted]

#### **PC Ascendancy**

On balance, we believe the odds are somewhat less favorable that the PC will eclipse the PCE as the dominant force in Spanish Communism. The principal factor that could lead to this outcome is the Communists' dwindling electoral base. As relatively moderate sectors of the electorate have grown disillusioned by party infighting and have drifted away, the remaining hardcore of true believing radicals and died-in-the-wool Moscow sympathizers becomes more

<sup>4</sup> This would make the Communists roughly comparable in strength, for example, to the Italian Socialist Party of Prime Minister Craxi. It would also make it much more difficult for the PSOE to repeat its 1982 performance and win a legislative majority. [redacted]

Secret

Secret

important—despite their small size in terms of the national electorate or even the Communist vote itself at its peak. If, moreover, three separate Communist slates compete in the next election, none might win a single seat. That loss would strike the PCE especially hard because it would be the only party that had any seats to lose. The PCE, moreover, would be more vulnerable to the verdict of the ballot box because it would be running as the most unambiguously democratic Communist party. In order to make good Gallego's claim that the momentum on the far left has shifted away from the PCE, on the other hand, the PC does not need to win as much as it needs for the PCE to lose. Loss of the PCE's representation in parliament would reduce its usefulness to Moscow and—in addition to the Soviets' other reservations about the party—quite possibly lead the Soviets to shift even more of their support toward the PC. That circumstance, in turn, might be enough to persuade many PCE supporters who have slogged through disaster after disaster to finally give up and leave the field to the PC. [redacted]

### Implications

#### The Stakes for Gonzalez and Spanish Democracy

Strife among the Communists—at least until the next national election—will be a mixed blessing:

- On the one hand, it will be a big boost to Prime Minister Gonzalez's Socialist Party. The absence of united opposition from the left leaves Gonzalez free to continue his courtship of the centrist voters who were a key factor in his landslide election victory three years ago. As Gonzalez bids for centrist support, right-of-center parties can do no less themselves, and Spanish politics will shift more toward a centrist, consensual focus. These trends, in turn, generally favor the US goal of supporting Spanish democracy.
- On the other hand, the Communists' disarray risks making at least some far-left voters conclude that they are political orphans providing fodder for the antidemocratic left and even leftist terrorist groups. Although the PCE has stood the furthest to the left of the principal political parties and has frequently bid for votes with demagoguery, it has nonetheless

helped to integrate some of the most alienated voters into democratic practices and values. Opinion surveys, in fact, indicate that about 2 percent of Spanish voters place themselves on the far left of the political spectrum. [redacted]

Assuming either the PCE or the PC establishes hegemony over Spanish Communism over the longer run as we expect, the implications for Spanish democracy would differ somewhat:

- Under Iglesias and Sartorius, the PCE would be more firmly democratic than the PC under Gallego, but it would also compete more effectively with the PSOE for leftist voters, and the Socialists would probably tilt a bit more to the left in order to meet that challenge. [redacted]

The consequences of a PC takeover of the leadership of Spanish Communism would be more far reaching:

- We believe that a hardliner victory and demise of the PCE would produce a political vacuum between the PC and PSOE. Greens or other leftists would almost certainly seek to rally former PCE members behind them in a bid to fill that gap. Since voters to the left of the main body of Socialist strength are not much more than 10 percent or so of the national total, splitting that group between two separate parties rather than uniting behind a single, relatively moderate Communist party would free the PSOE to continue its highly profitable courtship of middle-of-the-road voters. Less positively, PC domination of Spanish Communism would, in general, tend to reinforce the isolation of the far left's political subculture from the parliamentary mainstream. Worse, we expect that the PC would succeed to some extent in using the CCOO in much the same way that the similarly hardline Portuguese Communists use the CGTP trade union in their country—as an unrelenting battering ram that resorted to continued strikes and demonstrations to undermine whatever government was in power. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

8


Secret

**The Stakes for the United States and NATO**

The likelihood that Communist infighting will continue through the next election and that the Communists will probably need at least a year or so to rebuild after that likely debacle is good news for Western security interests. By then, whichever party won the election—most likely the Socialists—would already have made most key decisions on NATO membership and integration and on renewal of the bilateral agreement with the United States that expires in 1988.

25X1

25X1



Secret



**Page Denied**

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

**Secret**

**Secret**