Yugoslavia: Internal Security Capabilities

An Intelligence Assessment
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An Intelligence Assessment

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Yugoslavia: Internal Security Capabilities

Key Judgments

Since Tito’s death in 1980, concern about the effectiveness of Yugoslavia’s highly decentralized internal security forces has grown as the country faces a prolonged period of economic austerity, public disgruntlement with leadership performance, and continuing regional and ethnic tensions. We believe that federal control is now adequate to manage any localized disturbances that might result. But we foresee serious command and coordination problems—including those involved in monitoring potential Soviet destabilization efforts—should economic problems lead to nationwide protests or should a major ethnic or interregional conflict develop.

The trend toward decentralization of the civilian security apparatus in Yugoslavia stands in sharp contrast to the strong central control apparent in other Communist countries. Abuse of power by the secret police almost two decades ago gave impetus to demands for greater regional control over security, and today most Yugoslav leaders staunchly defend the resulting decentralization. Like most parts of the country’s political structure, power was deliberately dispersed among the country’s six republics and two autonomous provinces so that no region would be dominated by another. The state security network today is an array of regional and provincial organizations only loosely controlled by the federal government.

The leadership recognizes weaknesses in the security apparatus and is making efforts to improve coordination among the various federal and regional security components. Legislation was passed last year returning some power now held by local officials to federal authorities. But such measures only begin to address weaknesses that would have serious consequences if the fabric of post-Tito Yugoslavia began to unravel:

- Because they are highly decentralized, the security services routinely squander much of their time responding to the political needs of Yugoslavia’s powerful regional leaders. They have been known to try to protect these leaders by covering up local security problems, as happened with the outbreak of Albanian nationalist disorders in Kosovo in 1981.

- Effective federal action against security threats requires consensus among the regions, but longstanding distrust of Belgrade’s intentions and rivalries among the regions makes this difficult.
• The services invest disproportionate time and energy in monitoring, and sometimes disrupting, the activities of dissidents at home and hostile emigre groups abroad, a use of resources that distracts from other threats to the country’s security.

• The security forces have only a limited ability to monitor Soviet and other Eastern Bloc intelligence operations in Yugoslavia—activity that appears to have been on the rise in recent years.

We think the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA), the national institution least affected by regional divisions, would probably be needed in a major domestic crisis to buttress the civilian security forces.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Judgments</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Impact of Decentralization</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Strengths</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real and Potential Weaknesses</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing With Nationalists</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The War on Hostile Emigres</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring Regime Critics</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering Foreign Intelligence Services</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Bloc Activities</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts To Improve Effectiveness</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Federal Controls</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intervention</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlook</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Yugoslavia: Internal Security Capabilities

Introduction

The Yugoslav party's ouster in July 1966 of hardline Vice President Aleksandar Rankovic, who was also de facto head of the national secret police, was a watershed event in Tito's 35-year rule. For much of the preceding 20 years, Rankovic had been a prominent leader of Serbian-based opposition to political and economic reform, and he had ruthlessly used the secret police apparatus as his personal tool to keep political dissidence and ethnic unrest in check. His dramatic removal at the hands of party reformers, with Tito's nod, opened the way for the decentralization of the security system as well as the party and government.

In marked contrast to Rankovic's highly centralized and tightly knit machinery, the state security network today is an array of regional and provincial organizations only loosely controlled by the federal government. Stemming from reforms begun in 1966, the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs (Interior Ministry) now supervises Yugoslavia's two nationwide police organizations—the civilian State Security Service (Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti—SDB) and the People's Militia (Milicija). Both the SDB, committed to the largely secret war against subversion, and the Milicija, charged with traditional police functions in preserving law and order, are formally organized on a decentralized basis, with authority widely dispersed among the six republics and two autonomous provinces.

Most Yugoslavs applaud the decentralization and corresponding easing of police repression since Rankovic's demise, and few would now pay the price in personal liberties for a return to the kind of security establishment over which he presided. Nonetheless, since Tito's death in 1980, top Yugoslav leaders and security professionals have become increasingly concerned about the ability of the country's decentralized security apparatus (see inset) to confront a major domestic crisis. This paper will analyze Yugoslavia's internal security system and assess its capabilities. It also will examine how the state security network is coping with threats from foreign intelligence services, particularly those of the Soviet Union.

The Impact of Decentralization

Under normal circumstances, the security services carry out their duties adequately, and during brief periods of intensive effort they sometimes turn in impressive performances. Effectiveness, of course, varies with the service and with the problem. Most of the services, however, also exhibit serious weaknesses that would undermine their ability to cope with a major interregional conflict or nationwide disturbances.

General Strengths

On the positive side, the security forces are well organized and supplied for physical security and internal stability operations. For instance, larger People's Militia units possess armored vehicles. Units of the crack federal antiterrorist commando brigade are completely airmobile and capable of rapid deployment to any trouble spot. Since the 1981 Kosovo riots, Yugoslav press reports have indicated an increase in riot-control training involving the regional Milicija, mobilized units of the Military Auxiliary Police, Territorial Defense, and command elements of the regular Army. In large-scale stabilization operations, the regular Army would also be used to back up the police commando units.

The Yugoslavs have had some notable successes in coordinated planning. From a security standpoint, the 1984 Winter Olympic Games held in Sarajevo were an unqualified success.

The Yugoslavs went to work well in advance of the games, setting up a federal task force to direct and
Yugoslav Intelligence and Security Services

The Interior Ministry is responsible for the SDB and the People's Militia, but the National Defense Ministry and Foreign Affairs Ministry also have their own intelligence units. The Federal Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order, directly responsible to the State Presidency, coordinates all internal security policy (see figure 1).

The Interior Ministry, now headed by Dobroslav Culafic, has the most influence on security at the federal level:

- The SDB is mandated to detect and suppress all forms of subversion, espionage, sabotage, political and religious opposition, and other antiregime activity; to conduct operations against foreigners engaging in espionage or other subversive activities; and to provide protection for ranking officials of the government and party. In addition, the SDB keeps the leadership informed about public reactions to government and party measures. Abroad, the primary function of the SDB is to penetrate and monitor hostile emigre organizations and to protect Yugoslavia's borders from hostile infiltration. The SDB is now headed by Under Secretary Srdan Andrejevic. Federal supervision and coordination of republic SDB organizations has been weak. In practice, republic leaders control the selection of republic SDB directors and fully control the activities of lower level SDB offices within their purview.

- The People's Militia (Milicija) performs basic law enforcement duties as well as on-the-spot riot and terrorism control. At the federal level, it has an airmobile "brigade" of commandos specially trained for riot control and other critical operations. The Milicija cooperates with the SDB against subversive and dissident threats. Like the SDB, it is completely decentralized.
Page Denied
coordinate special security preparations. Over 16,000 security personnel were involved in the operation, including elements of the SDB, the Milicija and police reservists, special technicians, and local civil defense organizations. The Yugoslav security forces contacted and worked closely with security agencies to monitor the actions of hostile groups residing in those countries. In some cases, the authorities expelled or temporarily relocated foreigners—mostly from the Middle East—whom they regarded as potential security risks.
Real and Potential Weaknesses
At the same time, civilian security officers are handicapped by weaknesses often stemming from decentralization. Republican and provincial officials, who have virtual autonomy in defining internal security problems, naturally resist any concession of their authority to a centralized secret police. Most security personnel serve local political bosses intent on protecting their own interests, even to the point of occasionally suppressing information of activities that could be politically embarrassing.

They have a stake in perpetuating the status quo through privileges and benefits (such as better pay and housing) not available to the average citizen, a particularly coveted advantage in a struggling economy. And, despite these benefits, many of these security officers are not immune from corruption and have been known to take bribes for a variety of favors ranging from expediting access to the tangled bureaucracy to overlooking smuggling operations.

Internal contradictions in the Yugoslav political system make it difficult for the state security services to determine assignments and set priorities. As the only legal party in the country, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) has the power to declare any form of opposition criminal and a threat to state security. But, because the LCY's leaders constantly vie with one another along factional and ethnic lines, there is often little agreement as to what constitutes a real threat. There is consensus only on the main sources of security threats: "internal enemies," including regional nationalists; hostile emigre groups; and foreign subversives—all of whom are said to conspire to undermine the Yugoslav revolution and the Titoist system.

Regional authorities often use their near-complete control over local civilian security forces to advance their own interests. While explicitly charged with combating economic and white-collar crime, they often steer the police away from political and economic corruption in high places and concentrate instead on weakening local political opponents.

The regional security organs, especially in Croatia and Serbia, also devote inordinate time and energy to monitoring hostile emigres around the world. This, in turn, detracts not only from their ability to monitor major economic crimes but also foreign espionage—especially from the Soviet Union.

At the federal level, the commitment to securing consensus among competing regional interests often inhibits formulation of a well-coordinated internal security policy. The devotion to consensus is so strong that reports submitted to the State Presidency on the internal security situation must go to great lengths to provide a balanced presentation of security problems.

If a threat is found in Serbia, one must also be recorded for the other regions; if the Soviet Union is mentioned, the United States must also be cited.

Resistance to recentralization of police power and to centrally dictated internal security policy, of course, remains strong for good reason. A long history of serious abuse of police power—particularly during the Rankovic era—has created a residual mistrust of Belgrade among the regions. Regional leaders still recall that Rankovic used the police to advance the special interests of his own clique—mostly Serbs and Montenegrins—at the expense of some Yugoslav ethnic groups, especially Albanians, Croats, and Muslims. Yugoslavs also remember that Col. Gen. Ivan Miskovic, Tito's special security adviser, was deposed in 1972 after he repeatedly used both the military and civilian security services to accuse liberals and reformers falsely of collusion with emigre terrorists.
Kosovo 1981

In March 1981, alarmed civilian leaders in Belgrade ordered the Army and special federal police commandos into action against Albanian nationalist demonstrators in Serbia’s autonomous Province of Kosovo, where Albanians constitute the overwhelming majority. A high-ranking Yugoslav journalist, reflecting on the Kosovo riots, said that for three days it appeared as though the Army would have to use its heavy weapons, tanks, and even aircraft.

Our analysis of the events before, during, and after the riots leads us to emphasize three sobering facts about Yugoslav internal security capabilities: the local political authorities could not be trusted to provide Belgrade with reliable security assessments or to cooperate with federal policy, the local police were unreliable or inadequate to deal with the disturbances, and the threat of military force was the only reliable instrument to restore order.

The Kosovo party chief and two of his highest security officials were subsequently removed.

Local police were unprepared for the riots. They were either overwhelmed by the number of rioters or unwilling to attempt to assert control. Not only were the crack federal Milicija commandos dispatched to subdue the rioters, but also Belgrade had to draw down regular police units from other republics. For example, many older and more experienced policemen were transferred from Belgrade to Kosovo, leaving young, inexperienced officers to patrol Belgrade. These rookies would probably not have been able to handle similar disturbances in the capital.

Although the military was not needed to confront the rioters, they played backup for the police and often sealed off areas while the police commandos conducted search and destroy operations. The military, which is still in Kosovo, has more than tripled its strength there since 1981. Many Yugoslavs point to the continued occupation as evidence that the Army is the only power in Yugoslavia that can guarantee public order.

Dealing With Nationalists
In our view, the security services do a credible, although sometimes overzealous, job in handling one of their highest priority tasks—curbing outbreaks of regional nationalism among the country’s many antagonistic ethnic groups. Yugoslavia’s criminal laws allow for arrest and prosecution of citizens for verbal statements that could be interpreted as nationalist. Several republics regularly report the jailing of individuals for singing nationalist songs or making statements that the authorities deem provocative. Such police action has raised questions about Yugoslavia’s human rights practices, but it has also constrained ethnic tensions.

The greatest challenge the security forces currently face on the nationalism front is in the southern province of Kosovo, scene of the 1981 Albanian ethnic disorders (see inset). Although the authorities are able to rely on an extensive network of agents and collaborators working against nationalists in Croatia, Vojvodina, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, in Kosovo only a heavy and costly presence of security forces, including military units, is deemed sufficient to keep the lid on. Yet Interior Minister Culicic, speaking publicly before the Assembly this June, said that during the past year and a half 16 underground organizations and groups with 362 members had been uncovered in the province. Tensions between Kosovo’s Albanian majority and Serb and Montenegrin minorities, meanwhile, are deepening as the fast-growing Albanian population strengthens its hold and the minorities continue to take flight.
The War on Hostile Emigres
Tied in with the SDB’s efforts to control nationalists at home is its secret, tireless war against hostile emigre groups—many of them violence prone—and critics in exile around the world. The effort and resources the SDB commits to this ongoing operation appear to be enormous, and the tactics sometimes extreme. The regime’s concern stems in part from its continuing desire to settle wartime accounts, its compulsion to intimidate and isolate known exiled opponents, and its paranoia in the face of any opposition, no matter how remote or weak. Generally, the SDB of each republic conducts operations against its co-nationals in exile. Although all regions are required to share information and coordinate their actions through a federal board of directors in Belgrade, they apparently allow each region to conduct its own operations against hostile emigres with little interference from Belgrade.

The Internal Enemy: A Lexicon

Some of the most common political threats as defined by the Yugoslav security services:

- **Nationalism** is any manifestation of ethnic or regional chauvinism, ranging from singing forbidden songs to the commission of overt acts of violence against the regime. The SDB assumes there are connections between local nationalists, hostile emigration groups, and meddlesome foreign powers.

- **Clericonalism** is seen as a vehicle for combining antiregime and nationalistic behavior, often with the active support of foreign interests. The secret police target leaders and adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Muslims, as well as smaller communities.

- **Anarcholiberalism** generally characterizes liberals, reformers, and westward-leaning dissidents who advocate a more open political system in Yugoslavia. Officially so-labeled, ex-Yugoslav Vice President Milovan Djilas was expelled from the party and imprisoned in the 1950s. Several ideological currents run through this group, but the regime sees them as similarly anti-Communist and strongly influenced by “Western” intelligence services. “Bourgeois rightist” has recently been used synonymously with “anarcholiberal.”

- **Unitarism**, on the other hand, represents opposition to the policy of decentralization and advocacy of a more authoritarian and centralized government. This characterization also includes nationalists, particularly “great Serb hegemonists,” who would seek to dominate the other Yugoslav nationalities from a central government in Belgrade.
Monitoring Regime Critics
Another large part of the SDB's effort involves monitoring the political attitudes of Yugoslav citizens, notably regime critics.

Last year the police began to concentrate on the most highly visible regime critics and dissidents. The crackdown began in April 1984 when veteran regime critic Milovan Djilas and 27 other dissidents were temporarily arrested in Belgrade, but it stalled because of opposition from moderate elements in the party.

The State Presidency and the Interior Ministry in October 1984 directed a new offensive against "westward-leaning," antiparty dissidents in the media and the intellectual communities. But the trial of the "Belgrade Six"—a result of...
Soviet Meddling: “The Cominformist Affair”

Yugoslavia’s sensitivity to Soviet-backed subversion, and its potential impact on bilateral relations, was graphically illustrated 11 years ago following the arrest and trial in Yugoslavia of 32 pro-Moscow cominformists. One of the largest indictments of anti-regime opponents in recent decades, the pro-Soviet group allegedly held a secret congress in the city of Bar, Montenegro, in 1974 of a “Communist Party of Yugoslavia” bent on overthrowing the Tito government and installing an orthodox Soviet-style regime.

The members of the group were sentenced to prison terms of from one to 14 years, a total of 82 cominformists, making up four different groups, were sentenced before the end of the decade.

Belgrade’s handling of the affair suggests it wanted to put Moscow on notice while containing damage to bilateral relations. Tito publicly acknowledged a foreign connection, but stopped short of pointing the finger at Moscow. Moscow, for its part, publicly distanced itself from the group and warned that the incident should not be exploited to damage ties.

The cominformist affair, nonetheless, brought a halt to a warming trend in bilateral ties begun in the early 1970s.

Even after Tito’s death in 1980, Belgrade had been concerned about attempts by cominformists to smuggle in propaganda from Soviet Bloc countries, notably Bulgaria, to stir up ethnic strife.

Soviet Bloc Activities. Yugoslav officials are particularly concerned about Soviet efforts to influence Yugoslavia’s internal situation (see inset).
The biggest Eastern Bloc spy operation since the cominformist purges of the mid-1970s surfaced in October 1984. A Yugoslav military court convicted nine people, including at least five Bulgarians, for spying on military installations. Also last October, three Bulgarians were reportedly sentenced for espionage against a Yugoslav nuclear reactor and research facility.

Efforts To Improve Effectiveness

Yugoslavia’s open borders make it difficult to screen the thousands of people who enter and leave the country each week. Foreigner watch lists and similar bulletins keep border control officials alert to the movements of known individuals, but the volume of tourist traffic from Eastern Bloc countries alone makes effective surveillance nearly impossible.  

A controversial law passed early in 1984 has enhanced the legal jurisdiction of the federal-level security apparatus over its regional counterparts, and federal authorities also have begun to play a more assertive role in improving cooperation and coordination among civilian security agencies.

The leadership’s efforts to enhance federal control so far have had only marginal success, and the conflict between federal and regional security interests continues unresolved. Abuses of police power are less likely in the future, as measures to maintain oversight and discipline are tightened. But we believe a major domestic crisis would probably strain local security forces to the breaking point, making eleventh-hour federal intervention—perhaps even martial law—necessary to restore order.

New Federal Controls

The federal government in March 1984 passed legislation that returns to it some of the authority in regional security matters that it lost over the last 18 years. Belgrade enacted the following major revisions to its 1974 Law on State Security:

- The federal Interior Ministry, including its secret police, was empowered to conduct inquiries and investigations without consulting local officials.

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2 In 1982 nearly 711,000 Eastern Bloc tourists visited Yugoslavia and of these almost 300,000 were Soviet citizens.
- The federal interior minister was given explicit responsibility for coordinating the work and methods used by federal and local police.
- The minister was authorized to issue "binding procedural instructions" to ensure uniform enforcement of federal laws.

The new law is intended to allow the federal security forces to make firsthand security assessments in potentially troublesome regions. Advocates of the legislation, primarily former Interior Minister Dolanc, argue that sole reliance on information from local security organs would be disastrous, as apparently was the case before the Kosovo riots in 1981.

We have yet to see the new powers put to a test, and the law, in any case, still protects regional autonomy. It includes oversight provisions to hold the police accountable to regional legislatures for their activities. It also provides that the collective State Presidency must agree beforehand that "special security conditions" warrant federal investigations within regional jurisdictions. Direction for such special police actions is likely to originate in the Federal Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order, the Presidency's primary agent in implementing internal security decisions.

In a genuine crisis, we think the federal SDB would be tempted to operate directly at the council's behest and possibly even to launch an independent crackdown on regime opponents within certain republics or provinces, without clearing every action with the Presidency.

Even in these circumstances, though, a number of factors would operate to keep the SDB within its authority. The system at the federal level is organized to preserve discipline: the interior minister and key generals in military security serve at the pleasure of the State Presidency and the Parliament, which controls budgets; the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order under the State Presidency directs all internal security policy; and a parliamentary oversight committee holds the security forces responsible for their actions and can demand access to their files.

In the lower SDB ranks, discipline and control are maintained through screening for political reliability, professional training, and indoctrination. Most important, membership in the Communist Party and loyalty to the regime are basic requirements for selection and continued employment.

Military Intervention

The Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) is widely recognized as the national institution most resistant—though not immune—to ethnic and regional divisions and as the ultimate defender of the Yugoslav state. Large-scale disturbances would, in our view, require federal police and YPA assistance. If the disturbances spread throughout the country, limited federal police assets would quickly attenuate and regular YPA units would have to be called in to impose stability.

The YPA, however, is not experienced in internal stability operations. Most Yugoslav soldiers are untrained in riot-control techniques and know little about urban combat. They also would probably be more susceptible to provocation and overreaction than trained civilian police. Exercises combining federal and regional police with military units have been infrequent and rarely have extended beyond regional boundaries.

The YPA has come to play an increasingly important political role during Yugoslavia's era of decentralization, but we doubt the military aspires to play a predominant role in the country. Military leaders have gained political influence in recent years, largely because of their growing representation in the party organization and their frequent assignment to top security and defense posts. Prominent military leaders, while displeased with some trends in their country, take pains to point out that their legitimate political mission is to prod civilian politicians and not to promote any alternative program of their own. Most appear to appreciate that a complete military takeover—inevitably thrown up as a worst case scenario for contemporary Yugoslavia—would end unrest only at a heavy political cost both at home and abroad.
Outlook

In the absence of a major national crisis, which we do not foresee in the near future, the Yugoslav leadership’s remarkable capacity to broker workable, albeit minimal, solutions—essentially “muddling through”—will probably continue to help the authorities deal with security problems. Yugoslavs, moreover, will continue to draw some comfort from their record of surmounting several crises in the postwar period—including the break with Stalin in 1948, the Rankovic purge in the mid-1960s, the Croatian “rebellion” in 1971 and the Kosovo riots in 1981—despite the lack of strong federal institutions.

Despite that record, however, we believe the decentralized security services are not well prepared for a new crisis requiring interregional cooperation. In contrast with Tito’s day, the decentralization process is now far more entrenched, and the system actively works against the emergence of a strong national leader in Tito’s mold. The Yugoslav political culture has become more Westernized in recent years and, as the recent Belgrade Six trial revealed, many of the government’s traditional national security arguments have lost their force with a more critical press and among a more astute urban population.

A new national crisis also cannot be ruled out. A major downturn in the economy, though not now expected, is still possible over the next few years; political protests and sharply increased labor problems, along with growing pressure to end IMF-mandated austerity, could rapidly draw down federal government resources. Tensions between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, meanwhile, remain potentially explosive. Concerted action by the security services has kept control since 1981, and it may be able to do so for some time to come. But the underlying ethnic conflict appears as resistant as ever to a peaceful solution.

Politically influenced threat assessments will continue to hamper preemptive and reaction capabilities. The federal Interior Ministry, aside from the small gain made under the 1984 Law on State Security, does not appear likely to recover much control or leverage over its regional counterparts. Significant expansion of federal security assets is unlikely because of budgetary restrictions. The regions, extremely defensive of their autonomy, will probably continue to deny Belgrade any greater access to local security assets. In fact, regional bosses are likely to use the local secret police to resist federal policy directives, and even to intimidate local supporters of such directives.

Because contingency plans are unrehearsed, Belgrade in a real crisis might have to solve major command and control problems on a trial-and-error basis. Extended political inaction coupled with poorly coordinated crisis control measures might even lead some zealous security officials to take the law into their own hands. The danger of this happening would be highest if hostile ethnic groups found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades.

Based on our reading of political will among Yugoslav leaders, prospects also appear dim for significantly improved capability to monitor and counter Eastern Bloc operations inside Yugoslavia. We think the Soviets and their allies, meanwhile, are likely to continue efforts to infiltrate the government and to cultivate a clandestine network of agents inside Yugoslavia. This would leave Yugoslavia vulnerable to the actions of Eastern Bloc provocateurs in the event of growing domestic unrest.
Secret