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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, National Security
Resources Board

SUBJECT: Utilization of Refugees from the
Soviet Union in US National Interest

At the request of the Secretary of State,
the enclosed report on the above subject is circulated
herewith for the information of the other members of the
National Security Council.

This report was prepared by the Policy
Planning Staff of the Department of State, and has been
approved by the Under Secretary of State.

SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Executive Secretary

Enclosure: PPS 22/1

cc: The Secretary of State (without enclosure)
The Director of Central Intelligence ✓

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C O P Y

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FPS 22/1

POLICY PLANNING STAFF
Department of State

UTILIZATION OF REFUGEES FROM THE
SOVIET UNION IN U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST

March 4, 1948

THE PROBLEM

To increase defections among the elite of the Soviet World and to utilize refugees from the Soviet World in the national interests of the U.S.

Definition of Terms

- a. Soviet World -- That part of Eurasia, including the USSR, which extends from the Oder-Trieste line in the west to Korea in the east and which is under Soviet control or predominant influence.
- b. Elite -- Important government and party officials, military officers, the intelligentsia, the managerial class and highly-qualified technicians.
- c. Refugees -- Persons who have recently fled from the Soviet World for reasons of political dissent, (This classification does not include the generation of Russian emigres immediately following the Russian Revolution.)

ANALYSIS

1. The phenomenon of defections from the USSR has existed since the Russian Revolution. These desertions result from the fact that the Soviet regime rules by oppression and fear.
2. During the confusion of World War II, defections of Soviet citizens occurred on a mass scale.
3. With the extension of Soviet influence beyond the borders following the war, there began the flight of a new class of political refugees--those from the "new democracies".
4. The total number of refugees from the Soviet World now in free Europe and Asia is unknown because a large portion of

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them are not in DP camps but are underground, living under false names and forged documents. Estimates of the number of Soviet refugees alone range as high as 700,000.

5. A continuation of these desertions can be depended upon to have the following effects on the Soviet World:

a. At a minimum, such defections constitute a drain on the Soviet World. Leadership and talent are drained by desertions on the part of the elite. Defections on a relatively small scale by the elite produce disproportionately far-reaching effects. Defections by the ordinary citizen--peasant and unskilled worker--are significant only if accomplished on a mass scale. This cannot occur so long as the police controls of the Soviet World remain as effective as they are now.

b. Such desertions, especially on the part of the elite and more particularly when the refugee is enabled to tell his story, serve to explode the Soviet myth. Kravchenko's book and Gousenko's testimony, for example, neutralized to an appreciable extent the effectiveness of a major weapon of Soviet aggression--propaganda.

c. Any marked increase in the rate of present defections by the elite would create wide repercussions in the ruling classes of the Soviet World. All-pervasive distrust and suspicion would be aggravated, denunciations would be compounded and repressive measures multiplied. Such a chain of events would have a stifling effect on the creative capabilities of the Soviet World, damage its overall productive efficiency and generally tend to exert a demoralizing influence. This would obviously be particularly true of Soviet and satellite official establishments in the free world where the opportunity for desertion is the greatest.

6. It has been observed that the spur to desertion is oppression and fear--fear on the part of the potential refugee for his personal security. The reverse of the medal is that the greatest deterrent to defection is the possibility or certainty that flight will not result in a greater degree of personal security. The deterrents to desertion are now so great that only the most desperate citizens of the Soviet World will make the break for freedom. The two principal deterrents are:

a. The absence of assurance of asylum for political refugees. A political refugee cannot be sure that he will not be turned back to the authorities whose oppression he

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fled. In the case of Soviet refugees, there is still in operation an agreement under which the U.S. authorities are obligated to return deserters to the Soviet authorities.

b. The fact that the democratic world possesses no organization which can provide refugees any assurance that they will find personal security in a free society. So far as the U.S. is concerned, the inflexibility of our present immigration legislation does not make special provision for political refugees. And if a political refugee is able to get to the U.S., there is no organization charged with responsibility for assisting him to find a secure place in American society.

7. As a result of this situation only a small fraction of those willing and able to escape from the Soviet World are now deserting, and the vast number of those who have fled and are now refugees in free Europe and free Asia are rapidly becoming demoralized.

8. There has thus far been no systematic and concerted effort on the part of this Government to utilize refugees from the Soviet World in the furtherance of U.S. national interests. No combined effort has been made to screen the elite among the refugees for information regarding the Soviet World. No overall study has been made of the possibility of utilizing either the elite or the mass of these refugees in U.S. national interests.

9. Meanwhile, information in the U.S. regarding the USSR is incomplete. The Soviet satellite areas like the USSR are tending to become a terra incognita. Soviet expansion has meant therefore that the area of American knowledge regarding Eurasia has been shrinking instead of growing. The deficiency in American knowledge of the Soviet World can be classified in three categories:

a. The Government is inadequately informed regarding the Soviet World; even in official intelligence there are large and vitally important gaps.

b. Scholars and writers specializing in the Soviet World are more poorly informed than the Government and, what may be even more important, are not in agreement regarding the basic facts regarding the Soviet World. Many of these moulders of public opinion accept and propagate in varying degrees myths about the Soviet World.

c. The public is, of course, least informed regarding the true nature of the Soviet World. In our type of

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democracy, this makes difficult the formulation of dispassionate and realistic policy and increases vulnerability to Fifth Column operations.

10. We are ill-equipped to engage in the political and psychological conflict with the Soviet World, now forced upon us. Our information program, for example, is suffering from an acute shortage of personnel who have specialized knowledge of the target areas of the Soviet World.

11. Among the refugees in this country and Western Europe are political leaders from the Soviet World, men like Mikolajczyk, Nagy and G.M. Dmitrov. These men and lesser political figures among the refugees are the potential nucleus of possible Freedom Committees encouraging resistance movements in the Soviet World and providing contacts with an underground. No systematic study has been made by this Government of whether these political leaders might, by private or official means, in this country or elsewhere, be enabled to further U.S. national interests.

12. As for the mass of refugees in Free Europe and Free Asia, no significant proportion of them can be brought to the U.S. They must migrate elsewhere or remain where they are. No systematic study has been made by this Government of whether the mass of refugees can be utilized in U.S. national interests during the present crisis and whatever may eventuate therefrom.

CONCLUSIONS

It is in the U.S. national interest to take measures which will encourage the desertion of the elite of the Soviet World. There is also obviously a need to utilize refugee resources available in free Europe and free Asia to fill the gaps in our current official intelligence, in public information, and in our politico-psychological operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the national interest and as a matter of national policy, it is recommended that:

1. So far as is practicable and desirable, this Government should promptly remove present deterrents and establish inducements to defections on the part of the elite of the Soviet World. SANACC, including a representative of the Department of Justice, is charged with undertaking a study of this subject and making specific

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recommendations of measures to be taken.

2. The Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Forces and the CIA should promptly begin in free Europe and Asia a systematic and combined program of screening refugees from the Soviet World and acquiring documentary material regarding the Soviet World with a view to obtaining intelligence regarding the USSR and its satellites. SANACC is charged with the formulation of this program.

3. During the screening, selection should be made of:

a. Not more than 50 qualified social science scholars from the Soviet World to be brought to the U.S. Selection should be made by a representative of the Social Science Research Council or some other qualified body of American scholars. The selection should have the approval of a representative of the Department of Justice and of the representatives of the Departments mentioned in 2. above.

b. Such physicists, chemists and other specialists in the physical sciences and technology as can make a needed contribution to American knowledge in these fields. The procedure for selecting these scientists and their ultimate disposition in the U.S. is to be determined by SANACC.

c. Not more than 50 qualified specialists to be brought to the U.S. for use as broadcasters, script writers, translators, etc., by the Voice of America and other propaganda activities. Selection should be made by a representative of the State Department, with the approval of a representative of the Department of Justice. SANACC, including a representative of the Department of Justice, is charged with studying the security and legal problems involved in bringing these three categories of selected refugees to the U.S. and with recommending measures necessary to facilitate their movement to and residence in the U.S.

4. The Government should encourage and, if necessary, support the efforts now being made by American scholars and educational institutions to establish in Washington a social science institute composed of refugee and American scholars for the purpose of doing basic research studies on the Soviet World. The Department of State (OIR) is charged with maintaining contact with the academic world in this enterprise.

5. SANACC, including a representative of the Department of Justice, is charged with undertaking a study and submitting recommendations regarding the possible utilization of refugee political

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leaders in U.S. national interests.

6. . A study should be made of whether the mass of refugees from the Soviet World now in free Europe and Asia can be effectively utilized to further U.S. interests in the current struggle with the USSR and whatever may eventuate therefrom. CIA should be requested to prepare a report and recommendations on this subject.

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