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
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FPD: 0024/75
3 July 1975

FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST

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Foreign Press Digest: -- 0024/75 -- 3 Jul 75

Translations from Militaerwesen (42)

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ARMY GEN HOFFMANN CRITICIZES NATO

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jan 75 pp 3 - 13

[Editorial by Army Gen H. Hoffmann, member of the politburo of the SED Central Committee and GDR Minister for National Defense]

A Good Initial Position for the 1974/75 Training Year

/Text/ The 1974/75 training year has started well in all the sectors of the National People's Army and the border troops. In the midst of our working population the army members are preparing themselves with new initiatives in the struggle for a high degree of combat power and combat readiness for the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the liberation from fascism and the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact. The goals that we have set for ourselves are high, the foundations on which we build on are solid.

What characterizes the efforts and the results of the 1973/74 training year that we need continue and enlarge? Characteristic were the efforts for higher results in troop leadership, in education and training; their objective, critical and progress-oriented spirit. Characteristic was the struggle for the direct troop relevance of our ideological work; the intensive efforts to strengthen the authority of the party organizations and their closeness to the masses. Characteristic was the effort to strengthen our comradeship-in-arms, particularly with the Soviet Army, and to increase the combat power and combat readiness of our formations and troop units in accordance with alliance obligations.

If we look over the results we can state:

The work of all of us has paid off! Over the past year--and this is one of the most valuable results--the political consciousness of the great

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mass of our army members, their performance willingness and their operational readiness have increased. All the activities of the political and military leadership, of training and education, have led with more effectiveness to a marked increase in the combat readiness of the troops and staffs of all the services and the border troops.

We have made progress because we could always count on the diligence and initiative of our soldiers, our NCO's and junior lieutenants, on the energy and high performance of our officers, generals and admirals, and on the activity of our civilian employees, because all the members of the NVA and the border troops left no stone unturned to strengthen the defensive capability of socialism.

We have made progress because our party and its Central Committee, the Council of Ministers of the GDR and the national defense council have always paid close attention to our National People's Army and the border troops and have consistently worked to develop our entire socialist national defense.

We have made progress because the working class, the collective farmers and the socialist intelligentsia, together with our entire working population, have created good conditions for the military protection of socialism. Thus we enjoy a good starting position to successfully resolve the tasks of the current training year.

In which political and, in particular, political-military environment will we have to fulfill these tasks?

Detente--the Principal Tendency in International Relations

"We live in a time," said comrade Brezhnev at the occasion of the ceremony celebrating the 25th anniversary of the GDR. "In which the basic conditions for a fundamental reformation of international relations are present, in the first instance here in Europe."¹

These fundamental changes in the world political arena and in international relations are the lawful result of the global peace initiatives, principally on the part of the Soviet Union, which characterized our collective peace and security policy also in the past year. The decisive foundation which allows these successes to flourish has been and continues to remain the steadily increasing strength and radiation capability of the socialist system in the political, economic, military and intellectual-cultural areas. It is this strength that guarantees that detente has today become the main tendency in international relations. It encourages and strengthens those working masses who are still living in the imperialist sphere of influence in their anti-imperialist struggle.

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Thanks to the might of the Soviet Union and the growing international influence of our socialist community of states, the way towards good neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation among states of differing social order is being prepared day by day. Preliminary successes can already be seen in the limitation of the armaments race in practical sectors, and the genuine prospect to commence the limitation of arms has begun to appear. Not least of all the growing strength and activity of the Soviet Union and its allies is witnessed by such facts as the checking of the military conflicts in the Near East and on Cyprus. In both cases it has been the constructive foreign policy of the Soviet Union, that is true to its principles and has as its objective the safeguarding of the sovereignty of peoples, which has contributed in decisive measure to the start of political negotiations.

Successes in the anti-imperialist struggle can be registered also on other fronts. In Portugal, the fascist dictatorship has collapsed. And although the forces of reaction are trying everything to inhibit the alliance between the progressive parties and the movement of the armed forces in order to prevent the transition of the former Portuguese colonies to the path of national independence, its machinations have not been successful to date. In Greece too, whose working people have for years been under the whip of the fascist military, the reactionary groupings have had to retreat.

The successes of the Soviet Union, of the other socialist states, of the anti-imperialist liberation movement and of the international workers' movement, these are the one, the dominant, the progress-oriented side of the global happening. On the other hand, the opponents of socialism, of peace and democracy also left nothing undone in the last year to delay the process of international detente and the growth of the progressive forces that is connected with it.

The fascist junta in Chile not only is reinforcing its systematic oppression of the working people and of all democrats in the interior of the country, it also is playing a decisive role in the encirclement of Peru by U.S. imperialism and the Latin American oligarchies which are also directed against other progressive countries and movements in South America. The imperialist leadership group in Israel is also maintaining its aggressive and hegemonistic policy against the Arab peoples.

NATO is Planting Charges Against Detente

The leading circles of the imperialist camp are maintaining as before their policy of strength, of the arms race, of threats and blackmail based on military force. Thus Kissinger, the Secretary of State of the United States, declared 20 August 1974 in Miami in an address to war veterans associations of the United States, that the United States will

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have to remain "a superior military power" because the military might of the country is the foundation of its diplomatic strength. It is necessary therefore to bring its "military strength into harmony with its foreign policy objectives." The United States therefore would never accept "the strategic superiority of another power." In pointing to the fact that the United States has at present about one third of its conventional forces deployed abroad, Kissinger stated candidly that these troop contingents "are not serving abroad just to do the foreigners a favor."

Even though the internal contradictions within the NATO Pact are coming to the fore stronger than ever--for instance the fourth Middle Eastern War and the military altercations between Greece and Turkey in connection with Cyprus--the imperialists have thus far always succeeded to bridge the contrasts between the member states on the basis of their common class interests, to strengthen the alliance particularly between the U.S. and the Western European NATO states and to expand the political and military action capability of the military bloc. Notwithstanding all the rivalries over armament profits among the imperialist concerns, NATO has also succeeded in attaining a relatively high degree of arms cooperation and to advance the integration of the Western European communications systems and of their logistical systems. All these efforts aim in the final analysis at a separate Western European military alliance under the NATO roof which will also have control over the British and French nuclear arms and their delivery systems.

At the beginning of November 1974, American Secretary of Defense Schlesinger visited the FRG. In the course of his visit he emphasized the importance of that country as a "bastion of NATO." The FRG should become more conscious of its decisive role in view of the political situation in Europe. FRG Defense Minister Leber, for his part, assured the visitor that the FRG would maintain its position in the alliance. The cooperation with the United States never functioned as well as now. Latest results of this "well-functioning cooperation" are already in evidence! Thus the FRG is increasing the number of brigades in its army from 33 to 36 and is improving the combat strength of five additional brigades through mechanization in particular through the allocation of tanks. The advance guard role of the FRG within the NATO alliance was honored by Schlesinger with the final confirmation that the U.S. forces stationed in the FRG were to be strengthened by two brigades, two artillery battallions and one attack helicopter company at a cost of the logistical forces.² We will thus have to count on five more NATO brigades in the attack deployment of NATO on the territory of the FRG beginning with 1975.

The NATO strategists are putting their main emphasis on the qualitative improvement of their forces in order to make these even more effective

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and mobilization-independent. In this way the nuclear units of the NATO forces have been strengthened by phasing in of the operational-tactical "Lance" missile system and the F-4E "Phantom" fighter. In the case of the ground forces the anti-tank and anti-aircraft forces are being strengthened and the fire power and attack capability of the units is being reinforced. The U.S. Army for instance has started to equip its units with the M 60 A 2 tank and is supplying the FRG forces with the M 60 A 1 tank as well as the continued use of the "Leopard" tanks and the "Marder" self-propelled guns. New combat vehicles are also coming into use among the British and the Belgian ground forces.

The NATO air forces are improving their combat possibilities through more modern weapons and equipment, by means of rockets and bombs of high accuracy and target effect as well as with devices for electronic counter measures. Air defense was improved by changes in the alert system and command and control measures. Cooperation with the air defense system of the land forces has been more closely coordinated, the low-level reconnaissance service has been expanded and the anti-aircraft rocket forces have undergone technical modernization.

The naval forces of NATO were able to maintain throughout the year a high degree of operational readiness for units of its attack and security forces while at the same time maintaining its reconnaissance and observation missions.

Between 45 and 65 percent of all the naval units were constantly at sea. The activities of the naval forces have been extended with respect to the duration, the strength and the ocean space used for the completion of the combat task. The equipment with new guided missile patrol boats, marine helicopters as well as other modern weapons and equipment was continued.

The improvement of the NATO military potential also extends to the operational preparation within the territory of the NATO states and in particular that of the FRG. The construction of protected air bases, fortified combat positions, of tactical air bases and depots on the regular air bases was advanced. This is true also regarding the improvement of the military communication network. Along the border strip reinforced concrete towers have been started that are intended to house radio and radar reconnaissance installations. The traffic net has been extended and the construction of barriers has been continued. The linking of the military pipelines into a supply net has commenced.

The facts cited here are only a part of that which the most important NATO states are doing for the purposes of armament, and to raise their aggressive capabilities, and are examples of the explosive charges that are being heaped up against detente. With good reason Comrade Honecker

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said at the beginning of the party training year: "It is this way, that while one part of the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries view peaceful coexistence as the only alternative to a nuclear war in view of the strength of socialism, other circles of monopoly capitalism--particularly the military-industrial complex--do not want to let go of the bankrupt conceptions of the cold war and are attempting not only to stop the process of detente, but to reverse it. Our foreign and defense policies therefore must take into consideration all the variables."³

What Does it Mean to Make the Detente Process Irreversible?

To make the process of detente irreversible requires today and in the future a hard struggle to prevent the imperialist system and its most aggressive circles from altering in its favor the balance of forces.

To make detente irreversible requires:

--to continue along the way of the strengthening of socialism in all sectors and with always higher effectiveness, to strengthen the weight of our collective foreign and security policies through close and intensive collaboration with the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries;

--to block the path of the forces of the imperialist camp that desire to return to the practices of the "cold war" through a constant strengthening of the collective defense strength of socialism, and to limit increasingly their possibilities of embarking on military adventures;

--to supplement the political detente through measures of military detente, to limit step by step the armaments race and to end it eventually completely in order to move on to actual disarmament at a later date;

--to create a system of collective security as an alternative to the presently existing military blocs and to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations concerning European security as an important step along this way;

--to give life to the international agreements concluded to date through the development of economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation, and to regulate the relations among states of a differing social order on the basis of principles of peaceful co-existence.

Our efforts for a dependable military protection of socialism and for the safeguarding of peace will contribute decisively to the future development of detente. Under the conditions of the socialist peace offensive and the successes of international detente the requirement for a

high degree of combat power and combat readiness of our troops does not diminish, it increases. To maintain and to perfect it remains the central problem of our total activity. All sectors of military life are subordinated to this task. Its purposes are served by troop leadership, by our political-ideological training as well as by operational and combat training, by logistical and medical maintenance. We have always looked upon high combat power and combat readiness as a unity of political-ideological, military and military-technical factors. But the extent to which the totality of these factors is translated into effective military results depends in the last analysis always on the personal dedication of our people. The personal dedication and engagement of our soldiers, our NCO's, junior lieutenants, officers and civilian employees has to be organized militarily at the same time that it is motivated ideologically. Only this unity allows us to realize a decisive part of our military superiority over every imperialist aggressor. But the extent to which we succeed, the extent to which the ideological work becomes troop-effective and permeates all of military life, depends to a large degree on the capability of our commanders and political workers, on the strength and effectiveness of our basic organizations.

The Great Responsibility of Party and Political Organs

To create a clear understanding of the complicated questions of the international class struggle and the development of the political-military situation, that is the direct responsibility of our party and political organs. This task has consequences for an informative, lively and convincing political activity and for the operational leadership of all sectors. The commanders must be able to depend on their deputy for political affairs as a leading party functionary as they would upon themselves. Where the deputies for political affairs and all political officers do full justice to their leadership tasks in the guidance of the political-ideological work, where they demonstrate how every communist must work to direct the thinking and the action of army members towards the disciplined performance of the military tasks and thus towards the accomplishment of the orders of the commander, they wield at the same time the most effective influence on the strengthening of the authority of the party and of the individual leadership.

We must pay closer attention to the changes that have occurred in the thinking, feelings and conduct of our young citizens and of all our people as we organize and guide the political work. The draftees of today have a generally high educational level and a higher political maturity, they are more self-conscious and demanding in the best sense of the word, and they are also more critical and intolerant vis-a vis phenomena that do not fit into their concept of socialism. While this doubtlessly creates favorable conditions for a more effective political education, it also forces a more careful, more differentiated and more

varied organization of this educational process. Whoever tolerates a schematic approach or routine in the organization and leadership of the political work, whoever approaches the tasks of today and tomorrow with the methods that were barely acceptable yesterday will be denied success in his work!

Among the most significant traits of our young soldiers, NCO's, junior lieutants and officers as the sons of our socialist GDR is that most of them want to be challenged and can be challenged intellectually. They seek confirmation and recognition as valid socialist personalities. They want to be taken seriously, they want to think and act independently. They also do not accept a finished political world view, they want to elaborate one for themselves. They are susceptible to substantive information and convincing arguments. Therefore one of the decisive conclusions as regards ideological work in all its forms--for political training and social sciences education, for up-to-date political information as well as for the daily agitation work according to military requirements--must be: more relevance, more vividness and genuine discussion, at the same time more theoretical thoroughness and pedagogic-methodological mastery, more, and more systematic, study of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, of the party decisions and of the latest contributions of Soviet military science.

Points of Emphasis in the Political-Ideological Work

Our entire political-ideological work in the coming months is under the influence of the two historic anniversaries of May 1975. In the light of the three past decades, on the basis of historical facts and our own experiences we need to emphasize the historic achievement of the Soviet Union and its armed forces in a convincing manner, we need to demonstrate it as an act that next to the October Revolution has had the greatest influence on world history. We have to explain clearly to our army members that the Warsaw Pact represents a coalition of a completely new and socialist character whose socialist basis is a guarantee of its peace-sustaining function and which has for the past two decades consistently realized the Leninist demand for a collective defense of socialism.

The conscious application of the unity of history and policy--as it also finds its expression in the creation and growth of the Warsaw Pact--makes it easier to understand the mission of the socialist armed forces; demonstrates to our army members and civilian employees their high degree of personal responsibility for the dependable military protection of socialism and for the safeguarding of peace; and sharpens their perspective for future tasks. What are the main points of emphasis on which we should concentrate ourselves in this connection?

First of all it is important to explain convincingly the worldwide offensive of socialism, the historic achievements in the development of

socialism/communism as a unity and the successful balance sheet of the GDR that is connected with it. By this we mean the permanently high growth rate of industrial production which is a characteristic trait of socialist society and the related steady improvement in the material affluence of people, the betterment of working and living conditions and the stability of the economic and social situation of the working masses. We mean here the completely new way of life represented by socialism.

Second, we direct ourselves to the training for socialist internationalism and patriotism, to the providing of convincing evidence concerning the decisive role of the Soviet Union and of the socialist community of states in the world process of revolution, we orient ourselves to the steady strengthening of the alliance with the Soviet army and the other fraternal socialist armies. Regardless of which tasks we have to solve and which problems have to be mastered in the struggle for high combat readiness--always and forever we are led by our guiding star of socialist internationalism. We must strengthen the conviction that a socialist patriot is always a consistent and dependable internationalist. For us as army members this means the strengthening and broadening of the alliance relations between the National People's Army and the Soviet Army in all its multiple forms.

Third, we have to explain thoroughly the role of the socialist military power in the struggle for peace and security against the opposition of the reactionary and aggressive forces of imperialism. A high state of combat readiness of our forces presupposes clarity concerning the dialectic of the struggle for international detente and the military strengthening of socialism.

Fourth, we direct our efforts in realization of the decisions of the Eighth SED Party Congress and the Ninth Delegates Conference of the party organizations of the NVA and the border troops towards the unmasking of the class enemy and his hostile policies, particularly his military intentions.

Effective ideological activity and truly socialist troop leadership also means daily concern with the question of socialist relations among the army members. These consciously-formed relations reflect the character of our armed forces, they are a decisive nurturing ground for the combat morale, the will to perform, the discipline and whole gamut of training results. Socialist relations are and remain an essential objective necessity in the solution of military tasks in the attainment of high combat power and combat readiness.

The tasks for the 1974/75 training year have been placed before us. To order them for the separate services, for the border troops, their

formations units and installations is one side of the equation. But to solve them with the leading strength of the party organizations with the dash of the Free German Youth, with the wealth of ideas and the creative force of all the army members and civilian employees in the daily military life, that is the other side. Much will depend on how all supervisors, all party functionaries, all training officers in the NVA and the border troops will succeed to make the political high points of the new training year--the 30th anniversary of the liberation from fascism and the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact--a dignified occasion of exemplary and creative performance of military duties. "Soldier Initiative 75--United With The Allies--Strong and Combat-Ready!"--this is the motto that describes our military thinking and acting in the 1974/75 training year. As soldiers of socialism we are gauging our internationalist attitude primarily according to the state of our combat readiness and on our ability to carry out combat and security missions together with the Soviet Army and the other allied armies.

Among the most important concerns and tasks of socialist competition in the 1974/75 training year are the following:

--to diffuse and absorb the Marxist-Leninist world view in an atmosphere of stimulating learning and comradely assistance;

--to develop the military and military-technical knowledge, the specialist capabilities and skills of army members in a goal-oriented manner, in particular to direct initiatives towards the exemplary care and maintenance and the most effective employment of weapons and equipment:

--to further strengthen the military esprit de corps, to insure in particular that the training standards are met by each army member in quality fashion and to integrate the new soldiers rapidly and in a comradely manner into the existing collectives;

--to strengthen military order and discipline and to promote socialist relations in the collectives.

In socialist competition too, success does not arrive by itself but it must be organized. This competition must be used even more skillfully as a leadership technique. But this again is only possible if we succeed in bringing every collective and every single comrade into the discussion concerning the objectives of the competition, to promote new initiatives, to develop political motives in a goal-oriented manner and to create the necessary material and organizational conditions besides the ideal bases for the accomplishment by everyone of his duties in an honorable manner.

Let us tap with united and increased strengths under the tested leadership of the party of the working class, those practically inexhaustible

wellsprings that result from the socialist character of our army--for the benefit of our common concern of socialism and communism! Let us make a worthy contribution in honor of the 30th anniversary of the liberation of our people and the 20th anniversary of our socialist alliance, by not relaxing in the struggle for high combat power and combat readiness in the defense of socialism and the safeguarding of peace!

FOOTNOTES

1. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (B edition), 7 Oct 74.
2. DIE WELT, Hamburg, 6 Nov 74.
3. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (B edition), 22 Oct 74.

NATO ALLIANCE SEEN SUFFERING FROM US-EUROPEAN RIVALRY

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jan 75 pp 29-37

[By Col Dr. A. Charisius and Lt Col Dr. T. Dobias of the
Military History Institute of the GDR]

/Text/ When the "Declaration Concerning Atlantic Relations" was signed on 26 June 1974 in the course of a summit conference of the 15 NATO nations, most mass media in the European capitalist countries received it without enthusiasm. The declaration had been published during a council meeting of the treaty organization on 19 June. The media described the declaration as a new and significant step in the supposedly highly successful 25 year history of NATO but at the same time they could not avoid noting the continuation of the political crisis of the alliance. The FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG wrote on 27 June 1974: "The Declaration of Ottawa which the heads of government of the North Atlantic Treaty nations signed with such ceremony on Wednesday in Brussels, is not to be misinterpreted as a historic event...the new era still has not commenced." On the other hand, FRG chancellor H. Schmidt noted that the "Atlantic Declaration (is) more than a piling up of platitudes.... After all the debates of the past twelve or fifteen months such a general declaration is...highly useful."¹

Actually the "Atlantic Declaration" does mark a certain milestone in the context of the lively public discussion in progress since the beginning of 1973 concerning the future shape of the alliance in general and of the relations between the American and the European monopoly bourgeoisie which is evolving further, in particular. Even Western commentaries confirm that this declaration was not able to eliminate the objectively active contradictions among the imperialist states or governments. The

political-military speaker of the CDU/CSU faction in the FRG Bundestag, M. Woerner summed it up this way: "The present condition of NATO gives little reason for a celebration."² And the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU commented on this problem on 20 June 1974 as follows: "The worth of solemn declarations has often proved to be of short duration. The NATO declaration of Ottawa...at best has a symbolic value...but no one in NATO has any doubt that in spite of the solemn declaration quarrels will continue. Quarrels concerning the defense contribution of the separate countries, quarrels because of the economic competition struggle EEC-USA." A dramatic demonstration that the high expectations of the leading NATO circles thus far have not been realized may be seen in connection with the Cyprus conflict. NATO policy took a public position against the neutrality course of the government headed by Makarios and led to a sharp military confrontation between the alliance members, Turkey and Greece. Only on 4 April 1974 the (then) chancellor of the FRG, W. Brandt, declared pompously: "NATO has given the world more security. A war between the partners of the alliance has become unthinkable."³ That this misinterpretation by Brandt proved so tragic for the people of Cyprus is obvious.

The true background of the crisis phenomena in the North Atlantic Pact consists of the sharpened contradictions between the member states which entered a new phase at the beginning of the 1970's in consequence of the general crisis of capitalism which also entered a new stage at that point. This became particularly obvious in the open economic rivalry between the United States and the countries of capitalist Europe that are members of the European Economic Community (EEC), as well as in the deepening financial, trade and oil crisis.

The increasing instability of the imperialist system, the contrasts between its economic power centers, the failure of the postwar strategies of international monopoly capitalism and the crisis in the relations between the imperialist and the developing countries taken all together and raised to a higher power by changed balance of forces in favor of socialism affect more intensively than heretofore the imperialist treaty system. The first secretary of the central committee of the SED, Erich Honecker, assessed the causes of this development as follows: "If one analyzes the processes, it becomes ever clearer that the current crisis development is by no means exclusively dependent on cyclical economic factors but includes all sectors of capitalist society. Evidently the general crisis of capitalism has entered a new phase...that involves the entire social system of capitalism."⁴

The intensifying economic contrasts that are accompanied by differences among the various NATO countries in the political and military area are confronted by the intensive efforts of all the important member states to achieve an effective coordination of their anti-socialist policies

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and military strategy. The expression of this effort is the NATO double strategy that has been practiced in recent years. The simultaneous effect of centrifugal and centripetal factors and tendencies thus characterize the situation of the NATO alliance after a quarter century of aggressive policy and strategy. The Declaration of Ottawa demonstrates the pre-dominant tendency in the military sector to further unify and strengthen the military potential of the pact.

From the "New Atlantic Charter" to the "Declaration Concerning Atlantic Relations."

Proceeding with the intention to diminish the growing contrasts with their European allies--particularly the EEC countries--to reassert the threatened leadership role in the imperialist world and particularly in NATO and to gear the pact more adequately to the class struggle conditions of the 1970s, the leading circles of the United States are seeking to regulate their relations with their competitive partners in principle as well as in detail. For this purpose they loudly proclaimed 1973 as "the Year of Europe," during which these questions were to be essentially clarified. The results were to be affirmed in a common declaration of principle that was described by H. Kissinger as the "New Atlantic Charter."⁵ In his speech of 23 April 1973 at the annual meeting of the "Associated Press" in New York he outlined in his (then) role as Presidential Advisor on National Security Affairs the pertinent program of the United States. He based himself on the political doctrine of the United States for the 1970's according to which the decisively negative changes in the environment of American capitalism required a new definition of its global strategy--particularly in reference to the socialist community of states--as a cornerstone of its relations with the European allies. Kissinger proceeded from the concept that an "era formed by the decisions of the previous generation was coming to its end" because in his formulation, i.e. "the revival of Europe is an incontrovertible fact" and because "regarding strategic military relations between East and West...American strategic superiority has shifted to a relation of approximate parity."⁶ According to Kissinger, these factors have caused a dramatic change of the psychological climate in the West--a change that poses the greatest challenge to statesmanship in the West."⁷

The concept of a "New Atlantic Charter" which the then advisor of the U.S. President expostulated essentially aimed at strengthening the political leadership role of the United States in the capitalist part of the world with the help of NATO, to confine the economic competition within limits through a reaffirmation of political and military dependency and reorganize anew the anti-socialist front. To this end the European allies of the U.S. were to be persuaded that:

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1. "the United States has global interests and responsibilities" whereas the European NATO powers only had "regional interests," which "in the new era...were not automatically identical;"⁸
2. larger concessions were to be made to the U.S. economic interests in the competition for world markets in which connection Kissinger regarded the intended economic negotiations with the EEC states concerning trade and monetary questions as "the touchstone of mutual statesmanship;"⁹
3. they should accept a consultation requirement in the foreign policy area which would have meant nothing less than submitting all foreign policy activities of the European capitalist countries vis-a-vis the socialist countries, but in particular also regarding the oil-producing countries, to the approval of the United States;
4. to agree to higher arms expenditures in order to relieve the strained balance of payments of the United States and to thereby increase the effectiveness of NATO as an instrument of anti-socialist double strategy;
5. to agree to the inclusion of Japan in the political, but above all, in the economic policy consultations.

All these principles that were to be established in the "New Atlantic Charter" were intended to stabilize NATO and to increase the effectiveness of the alliance. While maintaining the dominant role of the United States, it was at the same time the intention of the leading circles of U.S. imperialism to reinforce the material contributions on one hand and on the other, the independence of capitalist Europe and Japan in the struggle against the three revolutionary global currents of our age--in particular against the socialist world system. The actions of the imperialist states in combination with the acceleration of the arms race were to have been coordinated more effectively with the objective of regaining the strategic initiative in the international class struggle by an offensive adaptation to the altered balance of force relations between socialism and imperialism. The NATO states agreed in substance with the aspirations for a "New Atlantic Charter" and its reactionary objectives. As is known, the arms expenditures and the qualitative improvement of the military might of the European NATO group is being pushed ahead despite the progressive political detente.

If the concepts and plans of the United States nevertheless were criticized strongly by many of its European allies and even rejected openly by the ruling circles of France it is due to the main reason cited earlier, namely the economic contrasts between the United States and the EEC countries. The latter, in particular France, but also the FRG, refused to have military-political and economic questions linked in the nature of an ultimatum and to permit themselves to be pushed unconditionally

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into the second rank of a regional status. They therefore elaborated their own concepts for an "Atlantic Declaration." The imperialist contradictions delayed the drafting of a declaration acceptable to all the member states and led among other things to the repeated postponement of the planned European trip of the then U.S. President R. Nixon in the year 1973. The negative result--for the United States--of the Israeli aggression in October 1973 and its consequences further increased the tensions within NATO.

After a tug-o-war that lasted for months, a compromise between the more extensive demands of U.S. imperialism and the primarily military/political interests of the European NATO states was reached on the basis of the anti-socialist platform of the pact, leading to the "Declaration Concerning Atlantic Relations" of June 1974.

It is to be emphasized in this connection that throughout the phase of public differences and discussions among the leading members of the pact, the Alliance itself was never questioned, but the basic issue consisted in the search for its effective adaptation to the conditions of class struggle of the 1970s, dominated by the requirement for a continued contest with socialism placed on the alliance by the monopoly bourgeoisie.

The "Declaration Concerning Atlantic Relations" Continues the Old NATO Course

The central part of the entire document is the declaration concerning the irreplaceability of NATO as the basis of imperialist foreign and military policy. Tied to this inseparably is the confirmation of the anti-socialist main direction of the Pact for the remaining years of the 1970's and also in the transition to the 1980's. In this connection there are no differences worthy of note among the partners of the alliance. The "Declaration" states demagogically that "the members of the alliance renew in this 25th year since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty their dedication to its goals and its ideals."¹⁰

The double strategy of NATO directed against the socialist community of states is being continued as a counteraction against peaceful coexistence, notwithstanding the progress of political detente in Europe and other parts of the world as well as the application and expansion of the bilateral treaties with socialist states and the multilateral negotiations in Geneva and Vienna. NATO secretary general J. Luns pointed openly to the goals of this strategy when he declared in October 1973: "The Soviet Union believes in the preservation of the present situation in Europe.... We believe in the opposite."¹¹

On the basis of this "declaration of principle" the document--though it uses legalistic language--announces common measures for increasing the

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effectiveness of the pact organization and the armament efforts of primarily the European Group of NATO countries.

It is significant for the character of the Declaration that it contains only political-military statements in contrast to the more extensive and complex concepts of H. Kissinger in April of 1973. Economic policy declarations and statements concerning the inclusion of Japan into trade and monetary coordination measures are missing almost entirely if one disregards the noncommittal passage according to which the NATO states intend to work towards the strengthening of their Western security relations through the harmonization of relations in the political and economic sphere."¹²

This fact confirms the initial thesis that the present "Atlantic Declaration" is on one hand a compromise between the concepts and interests of the United States and those of the European capitalist countries merged in the EEC. On the other hand it affirms, notwithstanding all differences of opinion, the unified anti-socialist political platform of the pact and reveals the aggressive character of this military coalition in that it places a priority on the further qualitative improvement of its military might. The key politico-military statements of the declaration include:

1. The unchanged anti-socialist military and political platform of NATO is reaffirmed. The declaration continues the military policies decided on in recent years and the flexible strategy of the pact. The NATO countries affirm their position that will also remain in the future the basis of their common anti-socialist activities as the aggressive political/military alliance of the key imperialistic states. FRG war minister G. Leber defined this position in a government declaration before the Bundestag: "The basis for our security, the most important prerequisite for our continued existence in the East-West balance of forces...remains the cohesion, the resolve of the North Atlantic Defense Treaty. Because this is so, the care of this alliance and the responsibility to promote its stability and credibility remains one of the most important tasks to which we all must dedicate ourselves."¹³

Even more than before, the legend of an alleged military threat on the part of the Warsaw Pact must serve as a rationale. The "Atlantic Declaration" states directly: "The Alliance must pay close heed to the dangers to which it is exposed in the European sector and must take all required measures to prevent them."¹⁴

2. This is why the document emphasizes the readiness of the member states of the alliance to improve qualitatively the NATO forces, particularly in Europe in order that these may be effectively employed as a backstop and instrument of the double strategy. The "AD-70" directive, which is

to be supplemented in appropriate fashion, remains in force. Point 10 of the Declaration proclaims: "The members of the alliance are of the view that their common will to unite their efforts for the purpose of common defense imposes on them the obligation to maintain and to improve the effectiveness of their armed forces and that each member is required to accept an appropriate share of the burden of the common security according to his role in the structure of the alliance."¹⁵

The "Atlantic Declaration" thus formulates explicitly the obligation sought particularly by the United States and the FRG from the European alliance nations; to push ahead the armament and force improvement of NATO to strengthen particularly the conventional striking force of its armies despite the positive developments in international relations. According to Leber "the credibility of the alliance strategy presupposes that each country makes an appropriate contribution, and specifically requires that the conventional defense capability of Europe not be neglected." He continues: "Once again--and this not only as a resolution for us--: the European allies must maintain with their conventional forces the assurance that the United States will use its strategic potential for the protection of Europe."¹⁶ In this connection the passage in the Declaration should not be disregarded which states that the basic military situation and the continued improvement of the pact forces is not to be altered either by "present or future negotiations."

3. The Declaration illustrates that notwithstanding the deep economic contrasts between U.S. imperialism and its Western European competitors there continues agreement concerning the military/political leadership role of the United States within the alliance.

The military preeminence of the United States is underlined emphatically. "The contribution to the security of the entire alliance which is represented by the nuclear forces of the United States that are stationed in the United States as well as in Europe and by the presence of North American forces in Europe (remains) indispensable," according to the text of the Declaration.¹⁷ G. Leber justifies this position of the European NATO countries by affirming: "The security of Europe (is) identical with that of the United States of America."¹⁸

It is to be noted generally in this connection that the close military interdependence of the European NATO states with the United States which has for long been strived for and also practiced by the FRG imperialists has now found its expression in the "Atlantic Declaration." Evidently the leading circles of the FRG were able to accomplish their purposes in this regard. According to this concept the countries of the European NATO Group are on the one hand directly dependent on the U.S. nuclear force in the foreseeable future irrespective of possible steps in the direction of a "political union" of the capitalist countries of Western

Europe with its own military forces within the NATO framework. On the other hand, according to the argumentation of the military experts of FRG imperialism and of other EEC politicians, the United States is likewise made dependent on the economic, political and military potential of the Western European states as the decisive support factor in its global strategy. The most recent "White Book" of the FRG government illustrates this actual interdependence in an emphatic manner. It states that "the political and military presence of the United States and Canada in Europe" must be maintained because it also serves "American interests which are explained by the weight of western Europe in the power balance of the two world powers, by the importance of the European coastline for the United States and by the close traditional political, economic and cultural relations with Europe."¹⁹

Precisely in this sense, U.S. foreign minister H. Kissinger stated in a speech before the war veterans organization "American Legion" in Miami on 20 August 1974: "About one third of our conventional military forces are stationed abroad...they are not there just to do a favor to the foreigners overseas. They are abroad as a part of our own defense."²⁰ And American Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger emphasized for his part: "I do not doubt that in the eyes of most Americans the American commitment for European security represents a substantial part of American security itself." He continues: "The American forces placed under NATO control will not be cut. They are being given the highest priority. Their readiness is constantly being improved and their equipment modernized."²¹

Declarations of this kind on the part of the key NATO politicians indicate that there are in the alliance influential circles who desire to continue the arms race and to practice the bankrupt policy of strength vis-a-vis the socialist community of states in a new guise. In view of this situation the meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the Warsaw Pact member states in April 1974 issued a renewed warning "that the enemies of international detente, the adherents of the cold war, the forces of imperialism and of reaction have not laid down their arms. They are attempting to work against the process of detente which responds to the aspirations of all peoples, they desire to inhibit this process." It was emphasized: "The militarist circles are seeking to activate NATO."²²

4. The "Atlantic Declaration" discloses for the first time in a NATO document a. also establishes the concept to a certain extent that the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France "are in a position to take over their own deterrent role which contributes to the strengthening of the general deterrent force of the alliance."²³ This is intended to mean both that these nuclear forces are a firm part of the nuclear deterrent force of NATO and that it may provide the basis for a West European nuclear military power.

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A critical analysis of the main military/political statements of the "Atlantic Declaration" allows the general conclusion that the key NATO powers have put aside their economic policy differences to agree on the preservation and strengthening of the NATO Pact and on common principles and harmonized activities against the socialist community of states. At the same time the increasing role of the Western European NATO states within the alliance has been confirmed officially. Contradictions and commonalities thus continue to form part of the picture of NATO. In its current development phase the alliance reflects the general crisis of capitalism in the 1970's. It continues to include a tendency towards aggression and reaction against the main currents of our time.

At a meeting of Soviet soldiers Erich Honecker warned against these peace-threatening activities when he stated: "We cannot neglect that with the arming of imperialist states, particularly the United States and the FRG, the material bases of a policy of aggression not only have been maintained, but have been strengthened in a dangerous manner. Certain imperialist forces are redoubling their efforts to perfect the military instrument of NATO and to protect it against the crisis phenomena of capitalism. This policy is supplemented by efforts to delay and interfere with the European security conference and the arms limitations talks."²⁴

The principles of the Declaration reflect the new conditions of capitalism-- in the first instance the changed military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. However the anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary direction of the Pact remains substantially unaltered. This was confirmed anew by NATO Secretary General J. Luns on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of NATO when he said: "We do not need any new objectives, we only need to emphasize and update our old goals."²⁵ And the American member of Congress, M. T. Clare has formulated with brutal frankness the global strategic aims of U.S. imperialism. According to his view "it is still necessary to maintain our superior power position on this planet whether in the military or economic field and to strengthen our control over foreign markets and sources of raw materials. To achieve these goals it is necessary to keep Soviet power in check...it is also necessary to keep our capitalist allies in a state of constant subordination, and to destroy the national liberation movements in the third world countries."²⁶

To accomplish the goals of the pact, the key NATO powers are searching for modified strategies and new forms of the coordinated employment of their potential. The efforts of the United States have as their special goal a continuation of the qualitative arms race according to the principle of the division of labor, in order to attain a position of military strength from which the global U.S. strategy and the anti-socialist double strategy of NATO can be carried through. H. Kissinger said this openly in the speech that has already been quoted above "America (has to) remain

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an unsurpassable military power...the military might of America is the foundation of our diplomatic strength." This is why it is necessary to have "the military strength accord with the foreign policy goals." Besides the quality improvement of the strategic nuclear forces this involves especially the strengthening of the "tactical forces" because the latter represent "the most important tool of our diplomacy in times of crisis."²⁷

The arms race pushed forward by the militaristic circles of the United States and its allies is linked with the hopeless attempts to alter the military balance of forces through the gaining of advantage over the Soviet Union and its allies in the current negotiations on arms limitations and troop reductions. "In these negotiations the NATO countries do not proceed from the principle of equal security, but propose troop strength reductions that would give them clear advantages. Moreover, they are closing the door against any real arms reduction by wanting to agree only on the reduction of troops but not on the reduction of weapons," the DEUTSCHE VOLKSZEITUNG commented in the FRG.²⁸

In his talk before the Soviet soldiers cited above, Erich Honecker characterized this unreal range of NATO objectives as follows: "This shows that the imperialist military policy continues to do everything to subvert the policy of peaceful coexistence and of detente. It continues to be aimed at the strategic objective of the destruction of socialism."²⁹

The anti-socialist goals re-emphasized once again in the NATO "Atlantic Declaration" are directed unequivocally against further detente in Europe and other parts of the world. They violate the principle of equal security for all participating states in the negotiations concerning arms limitations and troop reductions. This is why these goals will founder on the strength and the determination of the socialist community of states as well as on the growing popular will for a secure peace. The imperialist states cannot forever inhibit this process.

Political detente will be completed by measures in the military field.

FOOTNOTES

1. H. Schmidt, Interview with CBS Television New York on 7 Jul 1974 according to BULLETIN DES PRESSE UND INFORMATIONSAMTES DER BUNDESREGIERUNG (Bonn), No 83, 9 Jul 74, p 835.
2. M. Woerner, "Defense Must Once Again Become Solid in the Double Concept of NATO" in SICHERHEITSPOLITIK--Heute (Bad Honnef), No 2, 1974, p 252.

3. W. Brandt, "Declaration on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of NATO," in BULLETIN DES PRESSE UND...No 46, 9 Apr 74, p 441.
4. 12th Congress of the Central Committee of the SED. Final statement of Comrade Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED, Berlin, 1974, p 102.
5. The title chosen by H. Kissinger for the declaration principle concerning the definition of the aggressive goals and revision of the means, methods and responsibilities of NATO actually represents a crude misleading of international public opinion. Whereas the "Atlantic Charter" signed 14 August 1941 by the then U.S. President and Prime Minister of Great Britain, contained principles for the democratic and peaceful shaping of international relations after victory over fascist Germany and militarist Japan, (13 states among them the USSR joined this precursor of the UN Charter up until the end of the Second World War), the document proposed by the US in 1973 represents an anti-socialist action program for NATO in the decade of the 1970's.
6. Kissinger, Address to the annual meeting of the Associated Press on 23 April 1973, quoted by USIA (New York) 20 Aug 74.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Declaration Concerning Atlantic Relations in BULLETIN DES PRESSE UND...No 78, 21 Jun 74, p 736.
11. NATO Letter (Brussels) No 6, 1973, p 25.
12. Declaration...op. cit.
13. G. Leber, Principles of the Security Policy of the Federal Republic, address to Bundestag of 27 Mar 1974 in BULLETIN DES PRESSE UND... No 41, 25 Mar 74, p 387.
14. Declaration...op. cit.
15. Ibid., p 736.
16. G. Leber: Principles...p 388.
17. Declaration...op. cit., p 755.

18. G. Leber, Principles...p 357.
19. White Book 1973/74 For the Security of the Federal Republic and For the Development of the Bundeswehr, Bonn, 1974, p 25.
20. H. Kissinger, loc. cit.
21. J. Schlesinger, "The Continuing Need for NATO Improvements," in: INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (New York), 3 Jun 74.
22. Communique of the Meeting of the Advisory Political Council of the Warsaw Pact Member States, in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 14 Sep 74.
23. Declaration...op. cit., p 733.
24. E. Honecker, "Creation and Growth of the GDR a Result of the Fraternal Alliance," in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 14 Sep 74.
25. Quoted in THE TIMES, London, 4 Apr 74.
26. Quoted in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Paris), March 74.
27. H. Kissinger, loc. cit. (USIS).
28. "Steps to Arms Limitation," in DEUTSCHE VOLKSZEITUNG, Duesseldorf, 15 Aug 74.
29. E. Honecker, "Creation and Growth of the GDR..."op. cit.

DETAILS PROVIDED ON DEVELOPING OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jan 75 pp 52-58

[By Lt Col R. Graubner of the Ernst Thaelmann Officer's Academy]

/Text/ It is primarily the commanders in the first and second grades who provide direct training and education for our soldiers and noncommissioned officers. The commander characteristics which are necessary for this must be developed at the military academies and must subsequently be perfected and stabilized in the course of service with the troops. The problems existing in conjunction therewith affect the instructors and educators at the military academies as well as the officers in the troop units. The development of commander characteristics is a complex and multiform process. This complexity and multiformity must be taken into account and mastered by us in our day-to-day work. We will be in a better position to do this if we penetrate more deeply into the ideological-psychological components of the development of commander characteristics. Admiral W. Verner has stressed that "the development of solid political and military knowledge, the hardening of one's determination, the development of socialist convictions and class-conscious conduct to a significant extent follow inevitable psychological-pedagogical laws which can in no case be circumvented."¹

Ideological-psychological aspects of the development and stabilization of commander characteristics are as follows:

--The work of the commander is, above all, work in the service of the working class and its party. It therefore requires first of all the development of politico-ideological convictions, which constitute the

main area of the entire commander characteristics complex. It is particularly the socialist basic convictions which provide an extraordinary stimulative and guiding force for the actions of the commander. They decisively determine the course of his activities as well as the way in which he relates to his military work and to the military collective. His politico-ideological convictions help the commander to orientate himself correctly in concrete situations calling for military decisions, to proceed in a partisan manner, and to act with political awareness.


--In connection with the development and stabilization of commander characteristics, one must take note of the fact that the activities of a commander under modern combat conditions have changed significantly compared to former wars. On the one hand, the scope of the tasks to be carried out has grown enormously and, on the other hand, the time available for carrying out these tasks has been reduced substantially. In order to develop commander characteristics among the officer trainees and young officers, even more intensified combat and troop-related political and military activities must be organized at the military academies and training approaching combat conditions must be organized in the troop units.

--Commander characteristics consist of politico-ideological and military awareness factors which at any point in time determine the performance, the conduct, the thinking, and the actions of the officer personality. Well-founded decisions can only be made by a commander in whom the necessary characteristics have been developed in the course of his prior training and activities. The way a commander acts at any one time depends to a considerable extent on the level of development of such characteristics as politico-ideological convictions, thoroughness, practical application, speed and perseverance, boldness as well as clearheadedness in his calculations, originality and validity of his decisions, and creativeness and a sense of responsibility.

--Commander characteristics are structured psychical phenomena the individual psychical components of which are of varying significance and value. In this connection, let us take a closer look at the commander characteristic called "sense of responsibility." This characteristic is first of all a political category. Its development is connected with a multitude of other characteristics such as a sense of duty vis-a-vis the tasks posed by the party of the working class, and a sense of duty vis-a-vis technical equipment entrusted in one's care. We have attempted to depict the structure of the "Sense of Responsibility" commander characteristic by means of a chart (Fig. 1).

--Being able to recognize and understand the structuredness of such central characteristics makes it easier for us patiently and purposively to develop these characteristics in our officer trainees and young officers.

Figure 1. Structure of "Sense of Responsibility" commander characteristic



--Commander characteristics are stabilized in varying degrees. It becomes apparent again and again that structures of psychical characteristics can be quite variable, depending on the objective demands made on the personality involved as well as depending on the level of development in any particular case. It has not been our experience that the characteristics striven for through educational influences in an officer trainee unit or in an officer's collective will after a certain time produce the same measure of stability among all officer trainees or officers. This, however, does not contradict the fact that military work calls for a high level of stability in the case of certain characteristics such as, for instance, discipline. One may refer to this characteristic as being stable when, in a certain situation, an officer trainee or an officer conducts himself in a disciplined manner also in the absence of his superiors, when discipline has become a necessary requirement for him. The stability of psychical characteristics must be understood with a view to their variable capacity for stress and power of resistance. In the course of training attention must always be paid to the degree of marked development of a characteristic. This applies particularly, however, when it is necessary to reduce unfavorable characteristics. The level of stability of characteristics shows up very well in situations which call for proving one's mettle. For instance, we are able to get information concerning the educational work

done in the case of individual officer trainees for the purpose of developing stable commander characteristics when we observe how they conduct themselves in situations of complex severity.

--Commander characteristics become all the more pronounced the more generally recognized and significant social factors they contain. These are contained in basic documents of our party, in service regulations, instructions, and orders. The latter are therefore to be considered valid as a standard for measuring the level of markedness of a characteristic when making a comparison of what it "should be" and of "what it is." From this it becomes quite apparent that personality characteristics, and particularly commander characteristics, can not be examined without regard to class aspects, nor independent of the existing social conditions, nor apart from the ideology prevailing in the state.

Development of Commander Characteristics in the Training and Education Process

When developing commander characteristics, we must always use as our point of departure the tasks which have to be solved in our National People's Army during the coming years. At the Ninth Delegates Conference of the SED party organizations in the National People's Army and in the border troops of the German Democratic Republic it was emphasized that the steady improvement of the combat readiness as well as the systematic and consistent organization of the efforts to bring about an increase in the fighting strength of the military units above all presuppose troop-related politico-ideological work on the part of all responsible commanders.² The objective of this politico-ideological work consists in the members of the armed forces fulfilling their military duties in an exemplary manner.

If the commander characteristics necessary for accomplishing this are to be developed in the training and education process at the military academy, then each instructor and educator must have clear concepts of the ideological-psychological content of these characteristics. We have, in the course of discussions, asked instructors and educators to tell us what such commander characteristics are. They then frequently mentioned such qualities as courage, boldness, ability to make decisions, devotion to and respect for subordinates, and endurance. As important as these attributes are, they plainly also show up the fact that the assumed range of commander characteristics is frequently too limited.

In order to be able to answer correctly the question of which commander characteristics must be developed, we must use as our point of departure the primary functional areas of commanders on the first and second officer rank levels. Figure 2 represents an attempt to demonstrate the relative value ranking of the individual primary function areas as well

as their interrelationships and dependence on one another. In order to meet the requirements in these three areas, a commander on the first or second officer rank level needs to have a multitude of characteristics. The diagram clearly shows that fundamental commander characteristics are necessary for carrying out activities in all three functional areas, and that specific commander characteristics are required for the solution of concrete tasks in the area of their work as political educators, military leaders, and instructors. To disregard such a subdivision would be tantamount to a denial of the dialectic unity of things general and specific.




Figure 2. Main functional areas of the activities of a commander on the first and second officer rank level and the characteristics to be developed.

Key:

- I. Political Educator
- II. Military commander
- III. Instructor

1. Fundamental commander characteristics for the performance of work in all three functional areas.
2. Specific characteristics for the functional areas of political educators.
3. Specific characteristics for the functional area of military commanders.
4. Specific characteristics for the functional areas of instructors.

We have tried in the following to coordinate commander characteristics and the main functional areas. We realize that such coordination is problematic. However, it is precisely the experts who call for it again and again since, by taking recourse to it in connection with making assessments and with other analytical efforts, it is possible to make an evaluation of the level of development of the commander personality through the use of concrete criteria.

Fundamental commander characteristics are the following: Class-linked ties and convictions; political steadfastness; ability to demonstrate and to explain to subordinates the policy of the SED in a true-to-life manner, interestingly and clearly; skills in the sphere of working with people for the purpose of establishing socialist relationships with subordinates; revolutionary pluck and objectivity; discipline and productive-creative thinking and acting; fast thinking; ability to observe; perseverance in connection with mental efforts; thoroughness and ability to relate to actual practice; alertness; ability to work with subordinate officers and noncommissioned officers in the fulfillment of their functional duties; ability to organize, guide, and evaluate socialist competition efforts; self-reliance; stability and balance of purpose and emotions; boldness; steadfastness; resolution; readiness to take risks; comradeship; friendliness; trust; confidence; readiness to help; and revolutionary vigilance.

Specific characteristics for political educators are the following: Ability to cooperate in the party and FDJ /Free German Youth/ organizations; ability to prepare, carry through, and evaluate political instruction; ability to organize and carry out cultural and leisure-time activities; and ability to develop and strengthen socialist militant collectives.

Specific characteristics of military commanders are as follows: ability to lead military units in combat (situation assessment, decision making, issuance of combat orders, and so forth); ability to organize and maintain strict military discipline and order.

Specific characteristics of instructors are the following: Ability to make preparations for the educational program with respect to both contents and methodology, and ability to carry it out and evaluate it; ability to set up and utilize training bases and means; ability to keep training records; ability to direct and carry through the maintenance and servicing of weapons, vehicles, and equipment.

We have cited here only those characteristics which we believe to be the most important ones. It is only the complete totality of commander characteristics, their mutual interrelationship and interdependence which produce complete developed socialist commander personality. It is formed and developed primarily in the political and military training process and in the course of combat exercises. The shaping of socialist commander personalities requires that all instructors and superiors help in bringing out the politico-moral characteristics. The political and moral convictions of the commander become the motive for his actions, the principle underlying his work, and the rule for his entire conduct. Through them, his entire behavior pattern is ideologically focused and oriented. The manifold requirements of modern combat and of complex

training which are being posed for an officer on the first or second rank level, however, make it also necessary that he develop his mental capabilities and will power.

Development of Productive-Creative Thinking

Modern combat calls for high-quality conduct in the politico-moral and human relationship spheres--along with flexible thinking and with the ability to lead troops correctly and continuously. In assessing tasks, therefore, all superiors and instructors should always reflect on just what contribution to thought training is made by whatever task is assigned in any particular instance. The following suggestions should be kept in mind in connection with thought training:

--Availability of factual knowledge, thorough political and military knowledge of lasting value, and mastery of our service regulations are a prerequisite for creative thinking.

--Practical application of acquired knowledge is a necessary condition for durable knowledge.

--Cursory information leads to pseudo knowledge and to superficial thinking.

--Imparting to others ways and techniques for arriving at solutions requires creative thinking.

--Trainees must be given time for thinking--insight into and recognition of relationships require time.

--Commanders on the first and second officer-rank levels are to an increased extent to be enabled to organize and carry through training which approaches combat conditions. Army General Hoffmann has emphasized that "this requires that in setting up exercises, including those conducted by military units, one must avoid all that is routine and formalism, and it requires that the combat training be shaped in an imaginative and variegated manner."³

This requirement to an increased extent presupposes the development of capabilities for productive-creative thinking. We shall point out with the aid of a comparison chart what we mean by this (Fig. 3).

Possibilities for enabling us to promote productive-creative thinking include the following:

--Increasing the capacity for spontaneous action and self-reliance of the trainees;

Figure 3. Comparison of productive-creative thinking and reproductive-schematic thinking

	Reproductive-schematic thinking	Productive-creative thinking
Objective:	known	known only in general outlines, indicating direction in which solution lies.
Grasp of Situation:	Initial situation, the problem, and algorithm are known.	Starting situation must be analyzed independently in order to be able to recognize the problem.
Means of Solution:	All materials and information necessary for solution are known.	Not known. Must be found through recognition efforts.
Solution Rules:	Solution procedures are known; solution algorithm exists.	Way to solution must be found through independent analysis of the problem.

--setting high standards for the entire training program (for instance, carry out fully all provisions of the training program complex);

--creating conditions in which independent thinking and acting are required;

--assigning tasks for which it is necessary independently to find ways towards a solution and the solution itself;

--ordering written notes to be taken;

--discussing task solutions under varied conditions.

Creative solutions and imaginativeness in combat training presuppose the commander's ability to recognize inevitabilities, require of him a high degree of systematology in the acquisition and application of his knowledge, call for fast thinking and the ability to figure things out and to discriminate.

This emphasis on the significance of productive-creative thinking does not at all mean that the commander should renounce reproductive-schematic thinking in connection with combat activities. In many situations it is

sufficient for the fulfillment of assigned tasks. Furthermore, thinking in line with a solution algorithm stored in one's memory requires less energy.

If we wish to enable the officer trainees and the young officers to do more creative thinking, then we must also educate them to question traditional ways of arriving at solutions as well as to be courageous and willing to take risks in their decision-making and in the carrying through of decisions made by them.

Summation and Conclusions

Commander characteristics are politico-moral and military awareness factors and have an action-regulating function. It is necessary to give priority to the selection and development of politico-ideological convictions from the multitude of these characteristics, since the former are ideologically central to all other characteristics.

In connection with the development and stabilization of commander characteristics for the first and second officer rank levels, the following is to be taken into consideration: As a result of his previous political, educational, and professional development, each officer trainee carries along with him certain prerequisites on the basis of which further development is to take place.

All superiors and instructors at the military academies must continually contribute to a purposeful and coordinated shaping of commander characteristics.

The foundation for shaping the profile of a commander is created at the military academies. "However, the real university at which an officer attains the maturity of a commander is in the field with the troops. Here the complicated process of shaping a commander is organically connected with the entire system of combat and political training and military education."⁴ The new troop training programs will make a particularly substantial contribution to the development and stabilization of commander characteristics in young officers. Higher combat training standards require of all of us a higher level of political and military educational work.

Commander characteristics are developed, above all, in the course of direct exercise of political and military leadership functions. Officer trainees and young officers should purposefully and systematically take up party and FDJ organization functions, and they should be used in training guidance work.

For the development and stabilization of commander characteristics, it is urgently necessary to develop correct concepts of modern warfare, of

its peculiarities, and of the methods required for achieving victory. Possibilities for meeting this requirement are literary discussions of Soviet war novels and memoirs, as well as discussions in the company clubs which are also actively participated in by superiors.

The development of stable commander characteristics calls for training which approaches combat conditions. In addition to the use of other possibilities, the latter can be achieved by an active opponent--that is, not be a merely assumed opponent, shooting above the heads of participating personnel, imitation of battle noises, such as whistling of bullets, detonation of bombs and rocket launchings, as well as severe physical and mental strains.

FOOTNOTES

1. Verner, W.: "Steadily Increase the Effectiveness of Political and Military Training and Education in the NVA." In MILITAERWESEN (Berlin), Issue No 3, 1973, p 5.
2. See: "From the Report of the Secretariat of the Political Main Administration of the NVA to the 9th Conference of Delegates of the SED Party Organizations in the National People's Army and the Border Troops of the GDR." Speaker: Comrade Admiral Waldemar Verner. In PARTEIARBEITER /PARTY WORKER/, Berlin. Special Issue 1, 1974, p 38.
3. Hoffmann, H.: "Into the New Training Year with Vigilance and Combat Readiness." In MILITAERWESEN (Berlin). Issue 1, 1974, p 8.
4. Davidenko, V./Kurenk, K.: "The Commander as Battle Organizer." In MILITAERWESEN (Berlin). Issue No 9, Edition A, 1972, pp 101 and following pages.

MASS PARTICIPATION IN 'SIGNAL GDR 25' DETAILED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jan 75 pp 64-69

[By Col M. Hummel, military scientist]

/Text/ In preparing for the 25th anniversary of our GDR the FDJ /Free German Youth Organization/ and the GST /Society for Sport and Technology/ have jointly carried out the military-political and military sports mass campaign "Signal DDR 25." It addressed itself to our entire youth and to an increased extent reinforced the political basic convictions and increased the combat readiness and combat abilities of our young people, and it deepened their friendship and comradeship-in-arms with the glorious Soviet Army. "Signal DDR 25" gave new impulses to the various forms and methods of socialist military education in the VDJ, in the GST, and in the "Ernst Thaelmann" pioneer organization, and it helped to develop further something which had already proved its worth.

In the course of the "Signal DDR 25" campaign, extensive and effective politico-ideological work was performed in the sphere of socialist class education of our youth.

Utilize Political Discussion for Socialist Class Education

The focal purpose of the political discussions was to reinforce the knowledge and the conviction that:

--the defense of our socialist fatherland and of the revolutionary accomplishments of the workers' class is an objective inevitability of the socialist revolution and of socialist reconstruction;

--the comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet Army and with the armed forces of the other states of the Warsaw Pact is a necessary requirement of socialist internationalism and is basic to our security;

--there exists an inseparable relationship between the struggle for peace, security, and detente and the need for a high level of readiness for the defense of socialism;

--imperialism is aggressive by nature, and its military policy continues now as before to be aimed at the destruction of socialism.

Good results were achieved, because the executive boards of the FDJ and the GST had prepared the discussions thoroughly, i.e. had organized them using staff-work procedures, had based them on concrete questions, and had conducted the discussions in as small groups as possible.

For instance, during "Comradeship-in-Arms Week" the comrades and friends of the FDJ kreis leadership and the kreis executive board of the Nordhausen GST made a successful beginning with the "Drushba" campaign initiative. In the entire kreis, military-political round-table discussions were conducted in more than 30 FDJ and GST basic organizations with the outstanding assistance of the kreis secretariat of the SED. Discussion partners of the young people included the members of the central staff and of the bezirk and kreis staffs of "Signal DDR 25" as well as leading comrades of the SED kreis leadership, the military organs, and the Soviet Army. In the course of the discussions, our young people expressed their views quite frankly and, in doing so, raised some interesting questions. Almost all participants in the small discussion groups, consisting of some 15 to 20 friends, were given a chance to have their say. On many occasions the discussions continued into the late evening hours. In the course of the more than 32,000 discussion sessions it was confirmed again and again that the growing military strength of socialism constitutes an important factor of the peace policy of the Soviet Union and of the socialist community of states. There was a deepening of the realization that the socialist military might is protecting mankind from a third world war and that it reduces the imperialists' chances of realizing their reactionary political objectives. Attentively and impressed with what they heard, the young people listened to the statements made, to the reports concerning the struggle for power of the workers' class and its party, and to accounts given by officers of the National People's Army and of other military organs concerning their own personal development in connection with the growth and development of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet comrades reported on the selfless struggle for the liberation of our people from fascism. The discussion sessions held in the "Tradition Rooms" or in the "Lenin Rooms" of the Soviet garrisons were particularly popular.

At many locations the girls and boys drew concrete conclusions from the political discussions. The youngsters opted for participation in civil defense work, in the "Hans Beimler contests" of the FDJ, in the pre-military training of the Society for Sport and Technology, and for an extended period of service in the National People's Army or for taking up some military occupation.

Think and Act Along Internationalistic Lines

The deepening of the friendship and comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet Army and the development of internationalistic thinking and acting on the part of our youth constituted a determining element of the "Signal DDR 25" campaign. Friendship meetings and military sports and cultural events involving Soviet army personnel and komsomol members in the Soviet army were staged in almost every other FDJ or GST basic organization. In the Karl-Marx-Stadt West city district, for instance, the close ties with the komsomol members in the Soviet Army established via the basic organizations of the Industrierwerk /Industrial Works/ state enterprise and of the state-owned "Fritz Heckert" machine tool combine, have already become a solid traditional fact. During the course of the "Signal DDR 25" campaign, new agreements were entered into between the FDJ executive board and the Komsomol organizations of a Soviet garrison. Friendship meetings, visits to the "Lenin Rooms," joint subbotniks /free labor contributions to the state/, and sports and cultural events were carried out.

The "Friendship Meetings" during "Comradeship-in-Arms Week," the initiatives carried out by the "Revolutionary Military Traditions" messenger relay service in connection with the campaign, field trips to places commemorating the revolutionary armed struggle of the working class, to places of the glorious struggle of the Soviet Army in connection with its smashing of Hitlerite fascism, as well as the visits to the Tradition Rooms of the National People's Army and to the Lenin Rooms of the GSFG /Group of Soviet Forces in Germany/ provided for hundreds of thousands of young people first-hand experiences of friendship and comradeship-in-arms. It is the task of the FDJ central offices and GST executive boards steadily to perfect this aspect of politico-ideological work. Our Minister for National Defense, Army General Heinz Hoffmann, has evaluated "the ever more conscious turning of our youth toward our Soviet class comrades and comrades-in-arms, their increasing feeling of solidarity with their comrades in the uniform of the first worker and peasant army in the history of mankind,"¹ as being characteristic of the "Signal DDR 25" campaign.

In connection with their efforts to safeguard the protection of socialism, many FDJ and GST collectives have been outstandingly successful in combining the cultivation and preservation of the revolutionary military

traditions with more recent and even the most recent traditions of their own. In Sonderhausen Kreis, the work results of the "Revolutionary Military Traditions" messenger relay service were applied in connection with the formation of the "Thaelmann Cabinet" and this important concern was thereby brought home for many youngsters. Other FDJ and GST basic organizations, such as those of the state-owned Berlin housing construction combine, worked up written accounts of their work in the sphere of traditions and in so doing involved many of their members in these efforts.

The greatest possible continuity is to be striven for in future work involving traditions. At the present time it is the "FDJ Friendship Relay" campaign in connection with the preparations for the 30th anniversary of the liberation from fascism which offers many possibilities for acquainting the young people with the historical knowledge and experiences gained in the struggle of the working class. The revolutionary historical traditions of the working class are enriching the historical awareness of our young generation, are developing class consciousness, and are making the image of imperialism clearly apparent. Visits to places commemorating the Soviet Army's heroic struggle are particularly well suited for acquainting the young people with the liberator role played by the Soviet Union and its armed forces and for further developing their internationalistic thinking and acting.

Apply the Experiences Gained from "Signal DDR 25" to Socialist Military Education:

Socialist military education comprises a wide range of political, cultural, organizational, and technical activities, many of which were applied in a concentrated manner during the "Signal DDR 25" campaign. The various measures taken in the spheres of politics, sports-connected field trips, and military education in the "Ernst Thaelmann" pioneer organization were already at the time of the 1974 spring vacations influenced by the "Signal" campaign. Helga Labs, the president of the pioneer organization, has written the following on this subject: "In the 'Ernst Thaelmann' pioneer organization, the pioneer maneuvers have in recent years developed a solid tradition. In line with the experiences gathered by the 'V. I. Lenin' pioneer organization, the annual pioneer exercises have become a climactic point in the military-political and military sports work carried out by the friendly pioneer organizations."²

The comrades and friends of the Schoenfeld POS /Polytechnical Advanced School/ in Prenzlau Kreis also transformed their initial 1974 maneuver into such a climactic event.

The political basic idea of their maneuver contains the friendship and comradeship-in-arms of the armies of the Warsaw Pact. By way of

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preparation, the pioneers and FDJ members were acquainted with the Soviet Army, the National People's Army, the Polish Army, and the People's Army of the CSSR.

On the occasion of afternoon group meetings of the pioneer organization and at FDJ meetings, discussions were held, wall newspapers were drafted, small exhibits were prepared, and replicas of the rank insignia of these armies were worked up. In this way all participants in the maneuver acquired a concrete and clear concept of the brotherhood-in-arms with the socialist fraternal armies.

When making their preparations, the Schoenfeld pioneers had many helpers: The director of the school, the entire faculty, the parents' council, the parents' aktiv /parents' activist group/, the executive board and management personnel of the LPG /Agricultural Producer Cooperative/ and the VEG /state farm/, representatives of the National People's Army, representatives of the People's Police, as well as other government and social organs. All of them were enthusiastic advisers and co-organizers. In so doing they not only organized something for the Young Pioneers and Thaelmann Pioneers, but they also played, learned, and did some celebrating with them.

The Schoenfeld pioneer maneuver was only part of the many political, educational, sports-connected travel, and cultural measures carried out in the course of the entire school year. The experienced-based fact that the socialist military education of our youth can be carried out successfully only with the help of the great number of people serving without pay applies not only to the "Friendship Maneuver" of our Young Pioneers and Thaelmann Pioneers. Within the framework of the "Hans Beimler Competitions" of the FDJ, the "Signal DDR 25" campaign was to a considerable extent also participated in by the members of the FDJ and by representatives of the school-attending youth. The FDJ basic organizations and the pedagogical collective of the 14th and 32nd secondary schools in Berlin prepared and carried through the "Hans Beimler" competitions in an exemplary manner, and this was true not only in connection with "Signal DDR 25." We can draw the following conclusions from their work and from the work of other POS and EOS /Expanded Advanced School/:

1. The political content of the competitions, Hans Beimler's struggle and way of life, as well as current military-political questions should be discussed in the FDJ groups in the course of making preparations for the competitions. Round-table discussions with prominent guests, debates and club evenings or afternoon group meetings as well as tape-recorded programs have proved to be very useful in this connection. The "Hans Beimler" competitions are meaningful whenever the girls and boys learn

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about Hans Beimler's struggle and chosen path of life and are thereby stimulated to live and to act in line with the example set by him.

2. The military-sports portion of the "Hans Beimler" competitions is much sought after whenever it is shaped so as to make it interesting and varied. It must not be a mere appendix to school sports which can be attended to in passing, as it were. The competition results should be given wide publicity.

3. For educating FDJ members to become self-reliant and individually responsible, it is highly important that the Hans Beimler staffs be composed of FDJ members and students. Individual responsibility for carrying out political and military-sports measures should be promoted to a far-reaching extent by the educators, the representatives of the military organs, and the comrades of the Society for Sport and Technology.

4. The "March of Proven Competence" should conclude the continuous conduct of the "Hans Beimler" competitions. The meetings with veterans of the party and of the worker movement, with members of the Soviet Army, and of the National People's Army, as well as military sports events and the Maneuver Ball become climactic events and lasting experiences. In the 1973/74 school year, the "Wehrausbildung" /Military Training/ working associations have for the first time begun their activities in the POS on the basis of agreements entered into between the Ministry for Popular Education, the Ministry for National Defense, and the central executive board of the Society for Sport and Technology. A new and solid form of military-political guidance and education was thereby created in addition to the "Hans Beimler" competitions of the FDJ. Using the initial experiences of the working associations as a point of departure, the FDJ managers are now going ahead with recruiting a large number of their members as participants in the various measures to be carried out and with developing close cooperation with the working association leaders.

In connection with the "Honorary Service Pledge" within the framework of the mass campaign, much effort was devoted to setting up and activating the "FDJ Collective of Applicants for Military Occupations." Its role and responsibility was to a decisive extent developed further by the "Signal DDR 25" campaign. The applicants' collectives constitute an important element in the continuous work of recruiting applicants for military occupations. They call for the undivided attention of the leaderships of the FDJ, the GST, the recruitment and induction headquarters, and the pedagogues and educators at our schools. The deputy minister and chief of the political main administration of the National People's Army, Comrade Admiral Verner, in the course of a central experience exchange concerning guidance for and the activities of the "FDJ Collective of Applicants for Military Occupations," said: "The recruitment of suitable young people for officer and noncommissioned

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officer careers is an important political task which is embedded in the formation of developed socialism in the GDR." He characterized the activities of the FDJ applicants' collectives as follows: "Successfully paying attention to the officers and noncommissioned officers of tomorrow is closely tied to active participation of the young people concerned in military formation life, and especially so in the military-political, defense-political, and technical areas in the FDJ and GST. It is, and continues to be, interesting, alive, and multiformed work with our youth, and it is work which is a source of fun and pleasure."

From this it follows, on the one hand, that work in the applicants' collective must not have an exclusively "inward" orientation, but that it is a solid component part of the social work of the FDJ and GST collective concerned. On the other hand, however, it must be understood that, for the military organs and for the FDJ and GST, the recruitment of future professional military personnel does not just begin with the admission of the young people to the FDJ applicants' collective. On the contrary, from an FDJ and GST socialist military education which is broadly conceived and which takes into account the appropriate age factors, there develop the potentialities for securing the necessary future military cadre supply.

In his contribution to the central opinion exchange of the FDJ applicants' collective, Comrade Bernd Heider, the 2nd secretary of the Dresden district FDJ headquarters, reported on the manifold aspects of vocational guidance and recruitment. Commenting on the opinion exchanges with parents and on events staged for all FDJ members of a basic organization, he said: "We know that the girl friend, the fiancée, and the young wife frequently exert a significant influence on our decision to join the armed forces. For this reason, forums, tape-recorded programs, and the staging of events which include girls and young women are part of the work carried out by the applicants' collective, and for that matter, of the methods of socialist military education."

And so we would like to call attention once more to the need for organizing this work in a multiform and imaginative manner.

The following should particularly be taken into consideration in connection with the work of the FDJ applicants' collective:

1. Providing successful guidance for applicants' collectives presupposes close cooperation of particularly the recruitment and induction centers, the FDJ staffs, and the executive boards of the GST. All instances of parallel or solitary action have a harmful effect on the work flow in the applicants' collectives and they have a restrictive effect on their radiative force.

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2. The greatest possible attention needs to be paid to the work which is differentiated according to the years during which care and guidance is to be provided and for which the overall program of the political main administration of the National People's Army and of the central council of the FDJ provides important instructions. In this connection one should not strive for a maximum of measures to be carried out. Success is guaranteed primarily by staging events which are tuned to future needs and which are qualitatively well prepared.

3. The members of the applicants' collectives should be provided extensive possibilities for gathering experience in the premilitary training of the Society for Sport and Technology. Nowhere else is there a better chance for the future career officers and career noncommissioned officers to prove their worth as group or platoon leaders and to reinforce their professional motivation.

Guidance Experience Gathered Jointly in the Sphere of Socialist Military Education

Under the leadership of the SED and assisted by the members of all the armed forces of the GDK, the FDJ and the GST have worked together well in the "Signal DDR 25" mass campaign, and they have made progress in the sphere of providing political guidance to their basic organizations. Using as a point of departure experience already gathered by them, the staffs which had been formed on the kreis, bezirk, and national levels did very good work for the "Signal DDR 25" campaign. Their members advised the FDJ and GST administrations and personally helped to carry out extensive political work jointly with the FDJ and GST functionaries. A great number of party and army veterans declared themselves willing to hold political discussions in the youth collectives and to report on their rich militant experiences. By means of their own personal examples, they exerted a direct influence on the class-linked thinking and actions of the young people. Many honorary assistants from the ranks of the military, government, and social organs--particularly reservists of the National People's Army--also were active in the staffs of the "Signal" campaign. Through them, coordination of the various educational functions in the sphere of socialist military education was improved. At the same time, the responsible representatives of the various social enterprises and organizations saw to it that the FDJ and the GST were being given effective support.

To what should attention be paid in the sphere of guidance work?

1. On the basis of decisions made by the secretariats of the central council of the FDJ and of the central executive board of the GST, the "Signal DDR 25" staffs are to continue to operate as honorary and advisory FDJ and GST organs on the bezirk and kreis levels. It is their

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task to give expert advice to leadership personnel, to help with co-ordinating the various initiatives, and to cooperate in politico-ideological work.

2. The relationships with experienced fighters of the party of the working class and of the armed forces which have developed as a result of the "Signal" campaign should be stabilized, especially the close working contacts with the committees of the antifascist resistance fighters on the kreis and bezirk levels.

3. "Signal DDR 25" was given guidance on the basis of a joint decree of the secretariats of the central council of the FDJ and of the central executive board of the GST. Accordingly, the bezirks and kreises have worked up common work concepts. The initiatives carried out in preparation for the 30th anniversary of the liberation from fascism and for the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact constitute new tests for the cooperation of the FDJ, the GST, and the military organs.

We will submit another report in connection with the "Defense-ready Youth Rally," to be staged in April 1975 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the beginning of military operations for the liberation of Berlin by the Soviet Army on the Seelow Heights.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hoffmann, H.: Speech on the Conclusion of the "Signal DDR 25" Campaign. In: DOKUMENTE, ERGEBNISSE, ERFAHRUNGEN AUS DER WEHRPOLITISCHEN UND WEHRSPORTLICHEN MASSENAKTION "SIGNAL DDR 25" /Documents, Results, Experiences of the Military-Political and Military Sports Mass Campaign "Signal DDR 25"/, Berlin, 1974, p 4.
2. Labs, H.: "Socialist Military Education in the 'Ernst Thaelmann' pioneer organization." In: KONKRET (Berlin). Issue No 7, 1974, p 5.

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GREATER EMPHASIS TO BE PLACED ON FIELD TRAINING

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jan 75 pp 113A-118A

[By Lt Col Dr H.-L Ewert, engineer of the Friedrich Engels Military Academy]

/Text/ The basic documents for combat training in the NVA /National People's Army/ call for intensified field training. Field training is a necessary prerequisite for and an important component part of combat training approaching battle conditions.

In actual practice, however, this realization and knowledge is frequently disregarded. I propose in the following to examine and discuss with the aid of some examples the reasons for the fact that field training is so important and how this requirement of the basic documents can be met in the course of operational-tactical training.

The Terrain Is an Important Situation Element

For combat operations of the ground forces, the terrain has always been the "scene of action" and thus one of the elements of any combat situation. It is the most important component part of the battlefield to which, as is known, there belong additionally the situation elements of season/weather, time of day, nuclear and chemical warfare situation, as well as the economic conditions of the area and the socio-economic composition of the population.

From this it follows that most of the preparation of the staffs and troops for combat operations in a possible war, which means combat training in times of peace, must also take place in the field. It is

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necessary to emphasize this fact and it must form the basis for pertinent deliberations. It is to be understood, of course, that the training terrain in any particular case can as a rule not be identical with the probable battlefield of a possible war. But it should at least be similar to it and the terrain conditions in the maneuver area should be similar to those of the battlefield concerned.

This becomes most clearly apparent in connection with the training of individual soldiers, crews, service teams, groups, platoons, and so forth. Of course, the soldiers are able to learn important aspects of handling their weapons or their technical equipment in the classroom, at the firing range, at the driving school facilities, or on the traverse. Complete mastery of weapons and of military technical equipment can, however, be attained only under conditions which are similar to those of actual warfare. In other words, combat training and, of course, particularly complex training, must actually take place in the field. In this connection, one of the things soldiers must be enabled to do is to utilize effectively the tactical properties of the terrain for the solution of their combat tasks. This, for instance, applies with reference to the possible influence of the terrain:

--on the movement of the troops and of the technical equipment on the battlefield;

--on observation and camouflage;

--on fire-direction and direct-aim weapons (especially infantrymen's weapons) and on cover against enemy fire;

--on protection of troops against the effects of nuclear and chemical weapons;

--on orientation on the battlefield; and, last but not least,

--on making terrain modifications by army engineers.

In this connection it should be taken into consideration that as a rule the soldiers are given no topographical maps at the time of their training nor in cases of actual warfare. Their direct contact with the terrain is therefore a dominant factor. This fact is well reflected in the combat training programs which, as a matter of fact, consistently use these realizations as a point of departure.

In this context, things are somewhat different with commanders and staff officers. Of course, the essence of what we have said above with reference to the soldiers also applies to their personal conduct on the battlefield. They have the additional task, however, of carrying out command

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tasks in the preparation and conduct of battles and operations. For this, the topographical maps are an indispensable tool--not only in war but already at the time of their operational-tactical training.

Development of the Topographical Map as a Model of the Terrain

For a better understanding of the problem which we have posed, it is necessary in this context to take a look at its historical and technical development. As long as the commander (commanding general) was able to have a direct view of the battlefield and of the troops operating on it--in so doing he mostly was standing on the so-called command observation post--it was possible for him to secure all information necessary for his command activities directly on his own or through messengers, and to store such information in his memory or to incorporate it immediately in his thought processes. In such cases the tactical and topographical information was presented verbally.

However, when, due to the increased scope of the battles, the commanding generals were no longer able to have a direct overview of the battle and when the number of information items had grown considerably, they ordered maps of the respective terrain areas to be prepared for them. The necessary terrain information (information on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of objects in the terrain) was gathered by the specialists concerned (topographers) in good time, prior to the beginning of combat activities, and was presented in graphic form.

It should be pointed out at this juncture that, in line with today's views on this subject, we consider the map signs used in this connection to be communicative graphical signs which are part of a universal language and which are consequently in principle suitable for the presentation of information.

Through true-to-situation and true-to-scale presentation of the various map signs on the maps and through intended similarity of the map signs with the respective terrain objects, the topographical maps fulfill the requirements expected of a model, which constitutes a not unimportant aspect for our deliberations. Provided he knows the meaning of the various map signs and the principles of the drawn-to-scale graphic presentation, a person looking at it can visualize in his head a precise picture of the represented piece of terrain concerned and, in addition, he can obtain further information concerning it from the map through cartometric procedures or analogical deductions. One is therefore actually justified in saying that a topographical map is a two-dimensional model of the terrain.

Thus, in the initial period of their development in the military sphere, topographical maps were mainly used for orientation on the battlefield and in part also for orientation during marches, and they gave the

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commanders necessary information concerning the terrain. Commanders, however, needed even then already primarily information on the situation of the troops, positions, fortifications, and so forth, which they were no longer able to survey directly. For this reason there developed in parallel with this a suitable similar method for graphic presentation of tactical information. As in the case of terrain information, such presentation of tactical objects and features is accomplished in an analogous manner through the use of so-called tactical signs. Since the location of these tactical objects and features has a relationship to the terrain objects, the true-to-scale graphic presentation of tactical signs is most easily accomplished through entering them on topographical maps. The graphic presentation and thus also the simultaneous storing of tactical information has therefore right from the beginning taken place through the presentation of corresponding tactical signs on maps. From this it follows, on the other hand, that the existence of respective topographical maps is a basic prerequisite for this procedure.

Thus it is clear that, just as in the case of depicting terrain on maps, one may in connection with showing tactical objects and features by insertion of their tactical signs on topographical maps speak of a two-dimensional model of certain important aspects of a battle.

Consequently, the map and the graphic presentation of the situation together perform for the observer the functions of a model of the most important aspects of the battlefield. In this manner, not only existing conditions (information concerning the situation) are given in connection with preparations for battles and operations, but parameters of planned measures (combat tasks) are also presented.

With the establishment of these facts it has also been proved that the terrain and its presentation through coordinates and maps continues to be for military purposes a reference source for all operational-tactical objects and features of the battlefield, and thus at the same time a general basis for orientation. The second aspect in this important context from which, as we know, the significance of the terrain for modern military considerations is derived, results from the need for taking into consideration the influence exerted by terrain conditions in connection with the preparation and execution of combat activities and operations.

On the basis of these objective facts it is therefore today customary and a matter of course

--that the starting position or, generally speaking, the troop positions, be shown on topographical maps.

--that decisions, particularly situation assessments, but also the graphic presentation of the decision, be made with the aid of topographical maps;

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--that the planning of battles and operations be carried out on topographical maps;

--that primarily topographical maps be used as a basis for the planning and organizing of battle and operations support; and

--that, as a rule, combat assignments be made with the use of topographical maps.

From these statements concerning the historically necessary step of graphic presentation of the terrain and of important aspects of a battle, there naturally also are some noteworthy conclusions to be drawn. The officers of the staffs as a rule do not know the situation from personal observation, but work with the respective information which they have obtained from the map with respect to the terrain and from graphic entries on the maps with respect to the operational-tactical situation. This presupposes that such information has been kept current through proper reconnaissance measures and through graphic presentation of the results of the latter. In other words, in their command activities, the officers do not work with the objects and features themselves, but with suitable presentations (models) of them, and they are doing this with a high degree of abstraction. This logically presupposes that they are actually able, when looking at such graphic presentations, to get a precise mental picture of the objects and features which have been depicted.

For this, they must:

--first, have previously seen or experienced similar objects and features and must know their characteristics and behavior patterns, and;

--second, must know the principles of graphic true-to-scale presentation and the significance (semantics) of the tactical or map signs.

How Is Field Training Carried Out?

The first requirement resulting from the above-cited conclusions can be met only through comprehensive field training, in connection with which working with maps and with the terrain must be a dialectic entity in order to achieve the necessary feedback effect. In order to meet this requirement the officers must, in addition, be well versed in the reading of topographical maps in order to be able to make optimum use of the information contained in them.

It is, however, possible to read and think in a certain language only if one knows its alphabet and syntax.¹ In our specific case, this means that we must know the map signs and the principles of their presentation. To know them means to be able to attribute to each map sign its proper

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meaning in verbal, spoken language and to have a correct idea of what the shown terrain object actually looks like.

There have been cases when, at the beginning of their training at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy, officer trainees had only limited knowledge and skills of this type. If, however, a commander has only a limited understanding of map signs then, of course, this means that he is not capable of making use of all information on the topographical maps--which provide information on details and specific aspects of the terrain--for an assessment of the situation, for making decisions, and for providing guidance in combat. In training officers one should therefore pay particular attention to seeing to it that they acquire skills in the proper reading of maps and in working with maps in the field. This can be achieved, for instance, by their constantly comparing small, actually visible pieces of terrain with the graphical presentation of the latter on the topographical maps in the course of their field training and by their thus learning to understand the meaning of the most important map signs.

The best possibility for acquiring such capabilities and skills continues to be the practice of having officers themselves make a topographical survey of a small piece of terrain. By making a survey of individual terrain objects and by graphically presenting them with the appropriate map signs along with an appropriate legend, they will have passed a practical test of the active part of this work process. This then will significantly facilitate their getting a correct mental picture of the terrain with the aid of a map when they perform the passive part of this work process, when they read the map. Since this is no longer done today, the shortcoming resulting from this must be offset by intensified field training.

We propose to use a few examples of how this can be accomplished. In this connection it should be pointed out once more, however, that the demand for intensified field training within the framework of the operational-tactical training does not, of course, conflict with the customary principle of the planning, organization, and direction of battles and operations with the use of topographical maps. On the contrary, the above described need for using the expedient command tool--the map--has actually become greater because of the effects of the revolution in the military sphere. Under modern conditions, the preparation and execution of combat activities by the staffs of the troop units and formations can as a rule take place only on the basis of topographical maps because of the considerable expansion of the combat and operations areas as well as because of the limited time available for preparations. This trend is going to become even more pronounced.

The military topography service takes this development into account by making properly scaled maps available for all command levels. All of

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them are properly and uniformly up to date and are highly accurate. Their generalized presentation of the terrain, complemented by appropriate indications of qualitative and quantitative characteristics of important terrain objects, makes possible a quick understanding of the terrain when studying the maps. Thus these cards are to serve as a basis for orientation, as a reference system for the presentation of operational-tactical information, and as a basis for terrain assessment for the officers who, as a rule, have never seen the particular terrain in the zone of operations and who at the time of planning are not yet in a position to enter it. They must therefore always make efforts to get detailed information with respect to decisions they have made on the basis of graphically presented data or other determinations in the terrain. Such efforts must be made in unison with the work carried out with the use of a map and they can be made, for instance, in connection with reconnaissance, when organizing joint action, and in assigning combat tasks.

It is a known fact that two objectives can be pursued when carrying out reconnaissance missions. Either it is necessary to collect additional detailed and current information concerning certain important terrain sectors or object or about troop-connected circumstances which must still be taken into consideration for making a decision, or the details concerning certain elements of the decision must be determined directly in the terrain on the basis of existing concrete situations. In both cases it is therefore possible for the officers to examine and to get a detailed picture of the information obtained with the aid of the entries on the model of the terrain and of the battle. In addition, it is useful for all reconnaissance units to carry out topographical orientation when beginning their work. The same applies whenever organization of joint action takes place in the field or when combat tasks are assigned in the field. These requirements for the conduct of warfare must be fully considered in the course of operational-tactical training and, of course, they call for intensified field training, albeit not at any price but to the extent that it is necessary in connection with the practical preparation and direction of battles and operations. In the course of operational-tactical field training, each post should by all means carry out topographical orientation when it begins its work. In the case of most training measures it is also possible to reexamine in the terrain and possibly to correct assessments of the terrain made on the basis of the map such as, for instance, the terrain conditions with a view to mobility, to firing, to observation, to orientation, and so forth.

Topographical Orientation

Because there continue to exist varying concepts of topographical orientation, I would like in the following to offer some pertinent guidelines.

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Topographical orientation in the above cited cases, with favorable terrain features and good visibility, is to be carried out as the first activity, using topographical maps or aerial photographs. Its objective is to acquaint the participating officers with the terrain and it forms the basis for tactical orientation. Its task is to indicate precisely and in a situation-related manner prominent objects in the terrain through a comparison of the map and of the terrain. This can be done on the basis of an instruction or through independent individual familiarization.

Topographical orientation comprises the following:

1. Determination and establishment of a main compass bearing.

It is indicated in the direction of the action via, if possible, two prominent objects in the terrain.

The target designation for these terrain objects (terrain points) can be accomplished through giving them a label and, in addition, through directional data (straight forward, half-right, half-left) or through indication, or through mentioning the appropriate march-direction number.

2. Determination of one's own location.

It can be indicated by a marking of the respective map square and its subdivisions (1 to 9, or a to d) and of a prominent terrain object which coincides with it, or through its complete Gauss-Krueger coordinates (accurate up to approximately 50 meters), or through directional or distance relationships to prominent objects located nearby.

3. Determination of Control Points.

The control points should make possible rapid orientation by map and they lose their significance after the topographical orientation.

They may therefore be chosen on the basis of aspects other than observation and fire direction. The topographical control points are indicated by assigning a number to the control point concerned, by the bearing toward and distance from the latter, and through labeling the terrain object concerned. At the same time the precise location of the control point is indicated on the map.

4. Clear indication of objects in the terrain with respect to their location in the terrain and on the map (panoramic orientation).

This part of topographical orientation is carried out by sectors, in which connection it is possible to address oneself to the tactical objects immediately after reference to the topographical objects.

Depending on where the respective objects can best be recognized, one addresses oneself to them either first in the terrain via direction and distance, and then on the map within their map square, or one does so in reverse order. For addressing oneself to them in the terrain, the previously determined control points are to be utilized. For the panoramic orientation by sectors, the following distance zones may be subdivided thusly:

Foreground, up to 500 meters.

Intermediate area, up to 1,000 meters.

Background, beyond 1,000 meters.

In hilly or mountainous terrain or at higher command levels, the radii of these distance zones may, if necessary, be increased. It is useful to show the boundaries of these zones on the map as semicircles around one's own position. The act of addressing oneself to an object takes place from the foreground via the intermediate zone to the background and, within the zones, always from right to left.

In connection with panoramic orientation by sectors the terrain is, depending on the location of favorable orientation control points, subdivided into several sectors the apex of which is in each instance one's own position. These are also to be entered on the map through depiction of their lateral boundary lines. Within the sectors, which are to be dealt with by proceeding from the right to the left, one locates and addresses oneself to the objects going from the front to the rear.

Panoramic orientation by sectors is advantageous in situations when natural contours form the borders of such sectors or zones. Subdivision into sectors is, however, more useful in cases of terrain with surface coverage or of terrain which is broken up.

In summary, the question of why intensified field training is necessary may be answered as follows:

Since the combat activities of ground forces always take place in the field, attention must be paid in preparing and executing them to all the conditions resulting from the interrelationships existing between them. Due to the proportions of possible modern-day battles and operations, the topographical and tactical information necessary for easier understanding and processing by the officers is presented and stored graphically.

Since, in addition, the topographical maps as well as the graphical presentation of operational-tactical information on the maps at the same

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time perform for the user the functions of models, they are an important working tool and in this respect provide the basis for the solution of many military command tasks.

This makes it necessary that officers be able to read the maps effectively and that they be in a position to get, on the basis of the maps, a correct mental picture of the terrain sector (battlefield) concerned.

It is to be assumed that, in principle, decisions thus arrived at with the use of topographical and tactical information must be correct, for otherwise the above referred model function would not be an actuality. However, to achieve maximum congruity, it is necessary over and over again to make comparisons between the graphic presentations and objective reality. This feedback process takes place in the field, particularly in the course of reconnaissance operations, in connection with combat task assignments, and with organization of cooperative efforts, especially in the sphere of topographical orientation. These aspects must therefore be taken into consideration in connection with operational-tactical training of officers, and they constitute well-founded justification of the demand for intensified field training made at the beginning of this article.

FOOTNOTE

1. See also Ewert, H. L.: "Terrain and Modern Military Considerations." In: MILITAERWESEN (Berlin). Edition A, Issue 7, 1972, p 106 and following pages.

PHYSICAL FITNESS PROGRAMS FOR OVER-40 ARMY MEMBERS DISCUSSED

Last Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jan 75 pp 119A-123A

[By Hans Posske, sports instructor at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy]

/Text/ Developing high physical performance capacity in all members of the army--the very basis for high combat readiness in the NVA /National People's Army/--requires taking into consideration age differences which are particularly great in the officer corps. This was taken into consideration in the 1973 military physical fitness program by instituting age Groups IV (40-45) and V (45-50).

As regards many older comrades the question arose, which I consider quite justified, to what extent had the peculiarities of aging been taken into consideration in the norms and programs for military physical fitness training (MKE) of these age groups. For it is known that generally after about 35 years of age active participation in sports comes to an end, and that also about the same time changes specifically connected with age make their appearance in increased measure. Since valuable MKE experience with officers over 40 has hitherto been only slightly subject to generalized dissemination, I would like to present in this article some experiences which were gathered with officers of this age group in MKE at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy.

What Are the MKE Tasks and Goals for These Officers?

Just as for other members of the army, so also for officers over 40, MKE should enable them to fulfill their military class task at all times. However, the biological-medical side of the aging process must be taken

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more seriously into consideration precisely as regards the military physical fitness training of these officers. The essential thing about the MKE, even for officers who are over 40, is to build up and perfect basic characteristics of physical movement such as endurance, strength, agility and flexibility. In developing the motile characteristics of speed and elasticity, it is necessary in the case of army members over 40, to bear in mind particularly that the elasticity of the muscular system is already severely limited. Taking as our basis the limits of the performance capacity of the officers, and paying special attention to the condition of the organism in increasing the demands placed upon it, we at the academy have led even older officers to good performances in the areas of swiftness and elasticity.

MKE at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy is based upon training programs which are responsive to the high demands placed on the socialist officer personality. Here the text reads: "Military physical fitness training, combined with recreational sports and self-training, has as its goal, the development in all officers of an optimum degree of bodily capability. The officers must be intimately acquainted with the methods of physical fitness training and sports, and in a position to carry out military physical fitness programs as an essential part of the training principle. It is especially important that the officers perform physical training on a regular basis. In this way the readiness to perform will be so fully shaped up that the officers--making allowance for age--will be able to perform all combat tasks, as a result of systematic inurement to bodily hardship. In addition, it is our task to improve the level of the physical capability of the officers universally. Here, more particularly, characteristic ranges of bodily movement, and movement skills in military sports, taking into consideration individual peculiarities such as age and state of health, are developed and stabilized at optimum levels. When the officers become convinced that a high physical performance capability is the basis for being equal to all the demands posed by armed combat, then only will the MKE have fulfilled its goals and the tasks set for it."

Interrogation of graduates who studied at the military academy some 10 years ago, and who at that time had already passed their 40th year, revealed that MKE at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy makes a contribution in developing high qualities of elan and readiness for action, and that the demands made by the MKE, as differentiated on the basis of age groups, are fulfillable. Many of these officers emphasized that regular sports activity, which they began at the military academy, has now grown to be a necessity for them.

Which MKE Methods Do We Apply?

The presentation method, and the methods of practice and training, and of examination tests are applied at the Friedrich Engels Military

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Academy for the acquisition and retention of physical motility traits and military sport skills.

The demonstration of an exercise or of a unit sequence of movements is emotionally very effective, especially in making the presentation to older officers. Among the aspects of a presentation which simply must be taken into consideration are plastic visibility, an explanation of the rationale of the exercise and the usefulness of the exercise in combat-related situations--and here the physiological effects on the human organism should also be discussed. It is particularly important that the MKE special teacher or even the sports organizer themselves go through the MKE training together with the older officers who have not been active in sports for longer periods of time, and that this be done in a spirit emphasizing joy, in entertaining variety, and in a wideranging, many-sided and systematic way, that is, moving progressively from the easier to the more difficult. With pedagogical deftness and perceptivity, with praise, and occasionally using humor also, good performance readiness can be achieved with officers more than 40-years old.

The example set by others exercises an influence upon these officers that is not to be underestimated. Many of the officers questioned repeatedly confirmed that improvements in their own personal performance in various events was traceable in part to the fact that they followed the example of other comrades. In every military unit of regimental size there are surely older officers who are exemplary models in the field of sports. Every officer over 40 should make it his goal to emulate these comrades so as to heighten his muscle tone, and his physical and mental performance capacity.

An additional factor that we ought to take into consideration throughout the MKE and bring to bear in a meaningful way is the personal ambition of our comrades. To direct this along the right channels, not permitting excessive demands to be imposed upon it, is frequently not easy. With ambitious comrades it is necessary to balance off willingness to perform against existing performance capacity. The results achieved in MKE training at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy show that we have understood very well indeed how to apply this principle.

Along with the method of presentation, we use practice and coaching as training methods. By exercise we mean the acquisition and consolidated retention of a unit sequence of movements, and also the development of the performance capacity of the officers. Here the ability of the special teacher to break down and analyze difficult unit sequences of movements into their elements is extraordinarily important. When we speak about coaching and conditioning in the military physical fitness

training program, we mean by this the systematic increase in the physical demands made upon the body.

The method of examination tests occupies a broad area in MKE training. It enables us to define the performance capacity of every officer. We use the following examination tests at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy:

--Compound tests (climbing, throwing grenades at distant targets, 1000-meter run);

--Tests of strength (climbing, bending and stretching the arms on the bar, and weight-throwing);

--Swimming tests (100-meter timed swim, diving, swimming in full uniform);

--Other tests and performance controls.

By means of these tests, we establish for each officer beginning values. Performance controls take place at regular intervals during the course of the school year. We record the accomplishments attained, for only in this way is it possible for us and the officer involved to evaluate realistically the current state of his performance capacity. In the case of especially weak performances, it has proven valuable for the MKE special teacher to set up individual coaching and conditioning programs, or to win over particularly proficient officers to accept responsibility for sponsoring their weaker comrades. Performance examination tests are also a climactic point in the military sports training of older officers. Here (in conformity with norm tables), and on the basis of the grades achieved, is established officially what progress the officer has made in a prescribed period of time. (Two compound examinations, one strength and one swimming test are given in the course of the teaching year, whose four grades make up the annual or final grade.) We consider the examination-test of physical performance capacity to be an essential precondition for methodically correct, systematic and purposefully targeted physical perfection and self-education. In this connection, reference is made to a special feature involved: it is precisely the older officers who, especially after more prolonged interruptions in regular participation in sports, do not always evaluate realistically their performance capacity, with a resultant increase in the danger of accidents. Safety stations and emergency assistance are very important for this reason. Even if a high degree of readiness to assume risk is required of all officers, it is nevertheless a top priority commandment of MKE training always to do its work without any accidents.

What Is the Substantive Content of the MKE and What Are The Forms Used For Physical Training?

All bodily exercises which are directly brought to bear for the improvement of military operations and activities constitute the content of the military physical training program.

Stamina and strength are built up as basic motility characteristics. We at the military academy accomplish endurance conditioning by runs of 1,000 to 3,000 meters and more. Officers over 40 begin here with an average time for the 1,000 meters of between 5 and 6 minutes, and improve this gradually to between 4 and 5 minutes. Where it is at all possible, the running should be done in the woods or along park paths, because that is easier on the feet and ankle joints. On hard-surfaced tracks and streets it is advisable to wear sport shoes with thick rubber or crepe soles. Cross-country runs are among the most efficacious forms of endurance conditioning that are used at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy. In the course of this we raise the running time from 5 to 40 minutes. Cross-country running results chiefly in an improvement in the balance of relationships of the heart-circulatory system.

Central in training older officers to build up their strength are gymnastic exercises to strengthen their muscles. In the overall program of training to build up strength, especially in conditioning the circulation, great caution is called for to prevent damage to health. If apparatus like barbells and sand sacks are used, then care must be taken to increase gradually their weights so as to avoid injuries to the spine. For the same reason, in pairing off for exercises, attention is to be paid to matching weights and sizes. To maintain the elasticity of the muscles, regularly performed stretching exercises are to be incorporated into the gymnastic program, and exercises which promote swiftness of movement and shortness of reaction time. Small games should be organized with and without medicine balls, or relay games, climbing, hands-only climbing, and chinning executed in joyful competition. It is especially important after every exercise for strengthening the body to loosen by shaking movements the muscles which have been subjected to strain. Stretching, strengthening and loosening exercises should, furthermore, always be alternated with one another.

Swimming is a skill in movement with high general value. Above all it strengthens confidence, increases the joy of living and the powers of resistance of the organism. Consequently, great attention is paid to swimming at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy. In addition to the breaststroke, sidestroke, swimming fully clothed, and underwater swimming, lifesaving and carrying grips are also taught and learned. Endurance swims of up to 800 meters are also on the program.

The following results achieved by an officer-student group (average age: 45) show that even raising performance levels is possible with resolute, target-oriented training. These comrades achieved an average time of 2 minutes and 55.8 seconds on the first 100-meter swim. This is the equivalent of the grade "good." After 2 years of MKE training, which means 2 hours MKE plus 2 hours of leisure-time sport per week, the average time came to 2 minutes and 18.1 seconds, which is to say the grade "very good." The underwater swimming and swimming fully clothed were events that were likewise accomplished first with "good" and then with "very good." As regards underwater swimming, it must be admitted that officers 40-45 years old are graded "very good" at 18 meters, and that 8 meters is considered sufficient for a passing grade. Officers over 45 are excused from underwater swimming.

But the older officers also achieved pretty good performances in other events. Thus the beginning achievement of an officer-student group (20 comrades whose average age was 46) for throwing grenades at distant targets was 29 meters on the average. After 2 years of MKE it was 33.24 meters, which is the equivalent of the grade "good." Initial time for the 1,000-meter run of 4 minutes and 37.6 seconds was improved to 3 minutes and 56.3 seconds (grade "very good"). These officers also achieved a notable result with the overall average grade of "good" in the test of strength (climbing, bending and stretching the arms on the bar, and weight lifting). The following examples are to demonstrate how systematic endurance training (in every endurance sport hour the 1,000-meter stretch is run two or three times) has an effect on performance. Lt Col W.--born in 1926--began with 4 minutes 50 seconds time for the 1,000 meters, and improved this during 2 years to 3 minutes and 45 seconds. Another eight officers from the same student group (all born in 1926-1929 period) improved their times from 4 minutes 40 seconds to between 3 minutes 40 and 45 seconds.

How Do We Establish the Degree of Stress and Strain?

We have already pointed out at the beginning of this article that one of the basic principles of MKE training is to forestall damage to health and to eliminate excessive stress and strain. We establish the degree of stress and strain by measuring pulse frequencies (pulsebeat per minute) above the wrist, at the temples or in the arteries of the neck. We use as our basis of evaluation the values set forth in summary form in table 1.

Table 1. Pulse Frequency as Degree of Stress and Strain

<u>Pulsebeats per minute</u>	<u>Stress and Strain</u>
80 to 120	low
120 to 160	high
160 to 180	very high

In the case of older officers the rate of 190 pulsebeats per minute should not be exceeded. Only when the pulse frequency has returned to 100-120 beats per minute may a start be made with further physical strain.

In addition to measurements of pulse values, other indications provide information about fatigue, which can be interpreted as evidence of high stress and strain, and to which particular attention must be paid in the case of older officers; for example: reddening of the face, paleness, feelings of dizziness (noticeable because of uncertain gait), and heavy sweating. Cases of severe exhaustion must be closely watched. In such cases the stress and strain has to be reduced or even completely eliminated. And in the case of circulatory disturbances, heart complaints, shortness of breath, or complaints about the overall supportive organic functioning, consultation with a physician must be initiated. The physician will, when it is necessary, prescribe partial release from burdens and the substitution of such exercises as will help to eliminate the complaints. We have set up at the military academy alternative events for those officers who have been provisionally released from certain sports on a partial basis. For example: if an officer has been released from running, he can substitute for this climbing on the ropes. We have available for MKE training also two home treadmills (stationary bicycle speed measurers), which we likewise use for the sports activity of partially released officers.

Here is an old rule of thumb still valid for all officers who train on their own: the important thing is not the particular sport chosen, but decisive is the frequency and intensity of practice. To remain physically fit, one should subject the circulatory system at least twice a week to increased strain.

One can use the fitness norms according to "Pausch" (Table 2) as guidelines for measuring one's own performance capacity.

Table 2. Fitness Norms according to "Pausch"

<u>Event</u>	<u>Under 25</u>	<u>25-34</u>	<u>35-44</u>	<u>45-54</u>	<u>Over 54</u>
Arching the body from a back-to-the-floor position	40-times	30-	22-	15-	10-times
Pushups	20	18	15	12	8
Chinups	8	7	5	3	1
1,000-meter run	4:30	5:00	5:30	6:00	whatever
Endurance swim	1000 m	1000 m	800 m	800 m	600 m

For the maintenance and improvement of physical performance capacity a healthy lifestyle also plays a decisive role. It is precisely those officers who display excessive overweight who have the most difficulties in meeting sport norms. There is only one thing to do for these comrades: low-fat foods, less fluids, an end to heavy smoking, regular participation in sports. Much running, swimming, working out with light weights and intensive participation in ball games, like volleyball, handball and basketball.

What has been written in this article about goals, tasks, methods, content and forms in initiating sport activities for members of the army over 40, does not match by any means a program or motif-plan for a military physical fitness program in general terms. But if this article does make a contribution so that all officers--without respect to their age--come to understand that physical training is an essential factor in raising combat readiness, then it has achieved its purpose. For officers who would like to enter more deeply into questions of military physical fitness training--including MKE with officers over 40--we recommend the handbook by Tappert and Jodl, "Physical Fitness Training and Sport for Socialist National Defense."

'MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE CONCENTRATION' VALUES EXPLAINED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jan 75 pp 108B-112B

[By Lt Col Dr G. Kollande and Lt Col Dr W. Lewa]

/Text/ The promotion, maintenance and, in the event of illness, the restoration of health constitute the foundation of the psychic and physical performance capacity of man. In the NVA /National People's Army/ this has great significance for the permanent combat readiness and fighting power of the members of the armed forces.

In the GDR the defense of health and protection of work is an overall social task that is to be accomplished with the help of the latest findings of science and technology. Only in this way can the principles of socialist health policy as laid down in the constitution of the GDR be implemented. These principles and thereby also the right to protection of health and working power of all GDR citizens are implemented in the NVA with the DV /implementing regulation/ 010/0/010--health protection. This law reads to the effect, among other things:

"3. (1) Commanding officers and supervisors are responsible for the maintenance and implementation of health protection. It is up to them to institute all necessary measures on the basis of legal requirements and military regulations, and to introduce their subordinates to these and to teach them these in depth."¹

This presupposes that the responsible parties know and understand the relevant regulations and provisions sufficiently to apply them in an advantageous way. In the service area of the LSK/LV /Air Forces and Air Defense Command/ frequently asked questions are the reason why in

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this article we have gone into the nature and significance of MAK values in particular depth.

The Concept MAK Value

Whereas in the United States the term "Maximum Acceptable Concentration (MAC)" was introduced, in international usage the neologism coined in the German-speaking world, "Maximum Workplace Concentration (MAK)," prevailed.² MAK values are limiting values or highest permissible concentrations for materials that are otherwise injurious to health, which--in the light of the given state of knowledge--under normal environmental conditions daily impinge upon men during the course of a workshift of limited duration, and which as a rule under these circumstances are not injurious to health. These limiting values are ascertained for the most part by experiments on animals or by means of long-term observation. Deliberate exposure experiments on people are not possible, as is readily understandable.

Those materials are regarded as harmful which, in certain concentrations, are able to do harm to the living organism. Maximum permissible concentrations (MAK values) have been established for nontoxic dusts and for materials dangerous to health which make their appearance in the form of gases, vapors, smoke, dust and mists. The MAK values, or more precisely the abbreviation MAK_D signifies: maximum permissible workplace concentration as the average concentration during a 9-hour period of time.³

The workplace in this connection is the place where one stays permanently or temporarily for the execution or control of a work process. The workplace can extend over only a part or over the entire working area, depending on operational procedures. And so if materials of this sort are absorbed by people in concentrations exceeding the limiting values, this can result in damage to the organism. Absorption can take place through the respiratory system, the digestive system or through the skin. The complete elimination of such air pollution would undoubtedly be the surest way of absolutely avoiding such damage. Today, however, in many instances still, that can only be achieved by an indefensible technical and economic expenditure, and is, particularly under specific military circumstances, not always within the realm of possibility. The maximum workplace concentration (MAK) is specified in milligrams of the harmful substance contained in a cubic meter of air at a temperature of 20 degrees centigrade and a pressure of 760 torrs. Since the concentrations of harmful substances at the workplace may be subject to variations in time, maximum workplace concentrations are to be construed as time-weighted mean values with reference to the duration of a work shift. Very high concentrations of toxic materials could occur for brief intervals, causing severe damage without, however, exceeding the MAK value

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for the average concentration, calculated on the basis of the duration of the entire work shift. For this reason it was necessary to establish highest peak concentrations permissible for brief periods of time. The definition of this permissible peak concentration (MAK_K--also designated ZSK in the literature) is as follows: maximum permissible workplace concentration as a short-time concentration on a 30-minute basis.⁴

MAK_K values have special significance in the military realm, since here, often only temporarily and for short periods of time, operations take place under the influence of toxic materials. To avoid confusing one with the other, herewith a brief discussion concerning the terms MIK and MIE which have become widely known in connection with the GDR Environmental Quality Control Law.

MIK values (Maximum Intromission Concentration) are limiting values for air pollutants which exert an influence upon the environment beyond and outside the places of work. In the light of the findings of medical science to date, there are still no harmful effects upon the human organism to be expected, when these values are complied with. MEK values (Maximum Emission Concentration) stipulate maximum permissible concentrations of injurious substances in waste gas, maximum permissible quantities of injurious substances per unit of production or per unit of time. These are the basis for compliance with MIK values.⁵

The Contents of MAK-Value Charts

MAK values for non-toxic dusts are defined in TGL $\overline{\text{TGL}}$ (GDR norm) 22 311,⁶ and those for toxic substances in TGL 22 310.⁷ All dusts are classified as nontoxic that do not have toxic (poisonous) effects on the human body which, nevertheless, can do harm to health or at the very least impair it. Those dusts are most harmful which contain pure crystalline silicic acid, especially those whose particles are less than 5 micrometers in size. But this is also matched by talc (magnesium silicate) and asbestos dusts. The nontoxic dusts arising in military operations are generally not harmful to health, just burdensome. In the air force and air defense sector, quite sizeable quantities of talc are handled in servicing and packing lifesaving and braking parachutes. Our investigations established that here the permissible MAK values for talc were being exceeded, and that it is necessary in this sort of work to wear dust-filter masks. An article on this subject appeared in the magazine AUSBILDER, vol 9, 1974. In repair and general reconditioning work, for example in sandblasting operations, really serious perils to health can certainly arise. For this reason limiting values must absolutely be watched carefully.

MAK values for toxic substances, which appear in the form of gases, vapors, dust, smoke and mists are of very great importance in NVA

activities. Those substances are called gases which under normal conditions, that is at 20 degrees centigrade and 760 torrs pressure, exist only in a gaseous state. Because of the characteristic common to all gases, to fill up every space available to them, they spread very easily throughout the entire work space and beyond. If a concentration of toxic gases occurs at the workplace, they are taken into the human organism through the respiratory system, and then, depending on the degree of concentration, certain symptoms of poisoning appear. Examples of such gases are: carbon monoxide, the halogens fluorine, chlorine and bromine, hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide.

As is known, liquid compounds develop certain vapor pressures, depending on the temperature. In this process particles detach themselves from the surface of the liquid and expand as vapor in the surrounding atmosphere. Dangerous vapor concentrations can even arise from liquids with slight vapor pressure. For example, the vapor pressure of quicksilver amounts to only 0.0013 torrs at a temperature of 20 degrees centigrade, which gives a saturation concentration of 14.2 milligrams per cubic meter as against the MAK value of 0.1 milligrams per cubic meter. Solvents with toxic effects also vaporize easily. Examples to be named are: benzene, methylbenzene, as well as trichloroethylene, carbon tetrachloride, tetrochloroethylene (the last are often referred to by their short names: tri, tetra and per). Their vapor pressures under temperatures of 20 degrees centigrade mostly are between 10-100 torrs. If two solvents with the same MAK values are available, that solvent always is to be preferred which manifests the lower vapor pressure. Reference should also be made at this point to ASAO /Accident Prevention Order/ no 728, which should be carefully considered when dealing with solvents, and which supplies the measurement of the degree of danger involved.⁸

If the temperature of the environment is essentially lower than the temperature of the vaporizing liquid, supersaturation quickly takes place, which causes condensation. If the condensed particles take the form of little drops of liquid, mists, arise; if in the form of solids, then smoke.⁹ Toxic dusts are particles of solid material poisonous in effect, and which, because of the smallness of the size of the particles can maintain themselves airborne for longish periods of time. Among these are: metal dusts (lead, chrome), dust of metallic oxides (lead oxide, cadmium oxide), dusts of metal salts (from quicksilver salts), and dusts from organic compounds (pesticides). Depending on the size of the particles, such toxic dusts can be absorbed by the body principally through the respiratory or the digestive systems.

In Table No 1 some MAK values are given for toxic substances, which could possibly turn up under military conditions.

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110023-4

Table No 1.

(Excerpted from the MAK value chart of TGL 23 310)¹⁰

<u>Substance</u>	<u>MAK_D</u> <u>mg/m³</u>	<u>MAK_K</u> <u>mg/m³</u>
Acetone	1,000	2,000
Glycol-(1.2)	100	200
Ammonia	25	25
Gasoline of all distillate varieties, without aromatics	1,000	2,000
Benzene	50	100
Lead sulphide	0.15	0.8
Lead tetraethyl	0.03	0.075
Chlorine	1	1
Chlorinated naphthalene	1	1
Formaldehyde	2	2
Carbon dioxide	9,000	27,000
Carbon monoxide	55	110
Methanol	100	300
Petroleum (mist)	3	15
Sodium hydroxide	2	2
Nicotine	0.5	0.5
Pentychlorophenol	5	15
Phenol	20	20
Propanol (2)	200	600
Nitric acid	3	5
Sulfur dioxide	10	10
Carbon disulfide	50	100
Sulphuric acid	1	1
Sulfur trioxide	1	1
Nitrogen monoxide	20	30
Turpentine	300	600
Tetrochloroethylene	300	900
Carbon tetrochloride	50	100
Trichloroethylene	250	750
Vinyl chloride	500	1,000

Army members in the LSK/LV [air forces and air defense] sector frequently have much to do with a great many of these substances or come in contact with them. As is known, airplane fuels, rocket propellants and lubrication materials are made of various saturated and unsaturated hydrocarbons with mixtures of phosphorous, sulphur and other elements. Many of these toxic substances are contained in storage tanks, or encountered in tanking planes and rockets, and as pyrolytic products in exhaust gases.

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Both by prolonged contact with the skin as well as by breathing in vapors, injury and poisoning take place, if the accident prevention orders are not obeyed. For example, lead tetraethyl is used as an antiknock compound for piston engines. By this very fact, danger exists in repair work on these motors and in the utilization of this lead gasoline for cleaning purposes. Exhaust gases contain, along with other substances in various amounts, carbon monoxide, which can, for example, when warming up vehicles in closed garages, accumulate to considerable concentrations. Since carbon monoxide has an affinity (tendency to unite) with hemoglobin (the pigment of the red blood corpuscle), which is 300 times greater than that of oxygen, but this is not perceived by the organs of smell, this danger goes unperceived. It was established, as a result of our own investigations, that the flight engineer, when providing security and supervision for crane flights with the Mi-4 helicopter, is exposed to carbon monoxide concentrations exceeding MAK values, if he does not wear a CO filter mask. We have already reported in comprehensive detail in another place¹¹ about the toxic effects of the substances mentioned, and about the utilization of methanol for deicing takeoff and landing runways.

Often the threshold at which odors become perceptible is regarded as a sufficient indicator of the harmful concentration of a toxic substance. However, in many cases this is extraordinarily dangerous, because the odor threshold can already be located in the toxic concentration zone. In addition it should be noted that the reaction capacity of the organs of smell has been weakened in those people who work in an environment whose atmosphere is already loaded with toxic materials. In any event, however, perception by the sense of smell of a harmful substance should be the occasion for testing MAK values by objective methods. A few harmful materials are listed in Table No 2, whose odor threshold lie above the MAK_D and even above the MAK_K. Along with these, are others whose perceptible odor indicates a critical or permissible concentration.

Table No 2. (MAK_D and MAK_K Values With Relation to Odor Thresholds¹²-- data in milligrams per cubic meter)

Substance	MAK _D	MAK _K	Odor Threshold
Methanol	100	400	3,000
Benzene	50	100	300
Carbon Tetrachloride	50	100	50
Phosphorus hydrogen	0.1	0.4	4
Aceton	1,000	3,000	1,000
Ethyl Alcohol	1,000	4,000	1,000
Tetrachloroethylene	500	1,000	350
Sulphur Dioxide	10	30	8
Carbon Disulfide	30	100	3
Phenol	20	20	2
Hydrogen sulphide	15	30	0.2
Ozone	0.2	0.5	0.03

Establishing and Evaluating MAK Values

It is possible to establish a so-called quantitative definition of the presence of toxic substances with a gas detection device in combination with test tubes. A precisely defined quantity of air is sucked through a particular test tube and comes into contact with a reagent that changes color by zones in the presence of toxic substances. The results are interpreted by means of tables and scales. By comparison with MAK value tables, the results permit inductive conclusions about the degree of damage and danger involved. Of course what must be regarded here is the simultaneous presence of a number of harmful substances which, observed separately, can have a cumulatively increasing or counteractingly neutralizing effect. As long as no evidence to the contrary comes to hand, a combined effect must be assumed to be cumulative in nature. And very often other methods of analysis must be employed. Only appropriately trained specialist personnel can determine and evaluate toxic concentrations of harmful substances in the air. The commanding officers must have a documentary overview over the toxic substances which are present in his area of responsibility, and, when circumstances require, initiate the necessary investigations in cooperation with the responsible chief of the medical service and the security representative. First and foremost the rule must hold that toxic materials should never be allowed to begin to impinge on a person. This can be achieved, for example, by hermetically sealing the original source or setting up automatic remote controls. There where this is not possible--and that will often be the case under military conditions--then there must be available, and used, properly functioning vacuum-cleaning, aerating and ventilation facilities, and also personal means of protecting the body and appropriate accident prevention clothing. Even when the permissible limit concentration is not exceeded, the appropriate safety rules must be absolutely obeyed. In this connection, particular reference is made to: the "Collection of Important Accident Prevention Orders, Accident and Fire Prevention Orders (ABAO), and Work Hygiene Norms: Working Materials for Unit Medical Officers" of the Greifswald Military Medical Section, 1970; the "Catalog of Accident Prevention Measures, of First Aid and Therapy in Dealing with Chemical Compounds, Part I," (1972); DV 98/12; and AO 12/69 of the Deputy Minister and Chief of Rear Services; and also to the necessary information about legal regulations and military rules in the LSK/LV which are a matter of official record and to be found in Instructions 010/3/003.

Final Conclusions

To implement measures for accident prevention and health protection in the National People's Army all existing regulations and rules are to be carried out in practice and subject to continuous controls. Also a part of this effort is the prevention of harmful effects on health from harmful substances in the surrounding air.

One of the methods of supervision is determining the concentration of harmful substances in the air, and comparing the results with the established mandatory workplace concentrations. Where necessary, the responsible manager of the medical service must take the initiative and make sure that these methods are employed and that control over industrial hygienic conditions is included. In conformity with the principle of individual leadership, commanding officers at all levels are responsible for the implementation of and obedience to the rules of health protection and accident prevention.

FOOTNOTES

1. DV 010/0/010: Health Protection, p 8.
2. See W. Grund, P. Schmidt, and D. Sprecher: "Concerning Problems of Maximum Workplace Concentrations." In: DAS DEUTSCHE GESUNDHEITSWESSEN (Berlin), Vol 15, 1967, pp 706-711.
3. GDR Standard TGL 22 310: Permissible Concentrations of Toxic Substances in the Atmosphere at the Workplace, effective 1 October 1968.
4. Idem.
5. Fifth Implementation Order for the National Environmental Quality Control Law: Preserving Atmospheric Purity. GESETZBLATT DER DDR (Berlin), No 13, Part I, 17 January 1973.
6. GDR Standard TGL 23 311: Maximum Permissible Concentration of Non-toxic Dusts at Workplaces, effective 1 October 1968.
7. Ibid., TGL 22 310.
8. Accident Prevention Order (ASAO) 728: Characterization of Solvents and Thinning Liquids, and of Products in Which Solvents and Thinning Liquids are Contained. GESETZBLATT DER DDR (Berlin), No 83, 1952, p 11.
9. D. Sprecher: "Gases, Vapors, Dusts, Smoke, Mist." In: ARBEITSSCHUTZ-INFORMATIONEN (Berlin), Vol 2, 1973, pp 42-44.
10. H.-P. Lengsfeld: "Labor Hygiene and its Peculiarities Under Military Conditions." In: HANDBUCH FUER MILITAERMEDIZIN, Berlin, 1972, p 452.
11. W. Lewa, J. Friedrich, G. Koliande: "Concerning a Few Toxicological Problems in the Air Force Sector." In: LUFTVERTEIDIGUNG (Strausberg), Vol 7, 1970, pp 19-21.

12. Industrial Toxicology, I-III. In: ARBEITSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE LEHRBRIEFE as Vols 14, 15, 16. This is a series on the labor hygienic, labor physiological and labor psychological bases for giving form to the organization of labor, Berlin, 1970.

USE OF ROADS SEEN AS VITAL FACTOR IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jan 75 pp 118B-120B

[By Col G. Roething, engineer-economist]

/Text/ Road marches deserve special attention now as ever for the fulfillment of daily training tasks and for the shifting of troop units up to regimental size. In what follows, therefore, some instructions will be given for the utilization of roads under present circumstances.

The "Order for the Prevention of Damages During Military Maneuvers" (UeVO)¹ contains the "Principles of Highway Utilization." Here are also set forth measures for avoiding damage to roads outside the troop maneuver areas. Practical experience has shown that these principles have not always found sufficient respect. And so it came to pass, that for troop movements roads were used which were not made a matter of record beforehand. Such a mode of operations--and here the responsible parties ought to be quite clear about this--is a threat to all further tasks. Marches are component parts of combat tasks. They must be conscientiously prepared and well organized.

To protect and guarantee the performance of tasks in the new operational set-up presupposes that troop movements can be executed swiftly, on time, under cover and in a disciplined manner. Success in modern combat depends essentially upon the extent to which regimental and other troop units can reach the areas ordered without losses. The enemy will shirk at nothing in any conceivable war to impede the smooth execution of the troop movement. To this end he will apply the methods of covert combat in the most thoroughgoing way. And for this reason it is now important to pay even more attention to the problems of combat security.

I have taken up in a separate article the extensive and extraordinarily important tasks of combat security.

What Has to be Taken Into Consideration in the Utilization of Highways?

Even though the UeVO sets forth concrete stipulations in this matter, experience shows that these are not always obeyed and taken into consideration even in the planning and preparation stages. And so it has happened in a few cases that a "Plan for Highway Security" was not worked out at all. This plan, however, is a component part of the planning documents for preparing and executing maneuvers, examination tests of combat readiness, and other military measures.

In the plan for highway security, the road to be used must be stipulated. Likewise it must be established what is to be done to avoid damage to the roads, and, in the case of damages which have occurred despite preventive measures, what is to be done to deal with and eliminate these.

What Are the Considerations Which Determine the Selection of Roads for the March?

Here the following distinction is to be made regarding:

--roads which are to be traveled in any direction and for any purpose (hereinafter designated as "outside the command area"), and;

--roads which are to be utilized continuously or at regular intervals (hereinafter designated as "permanently used roads").

The Utilization of Roads Outside the Command Area

Attention is called to the obligation of reporting and obtaining permission from the WBK (Housing Construction Combine) for all marches with wheeled and caterpillar-tread vehicles on public highways outside the command area;

--a. when wheeled vehicles exceed 10 in number;

--b. when one or more caterpillar-tread vehicles are involved.

Coordination of all marches takes place at the territorial authority's office. These authorities possess supervisory discretion to the extent that these roads are utilized and needed. In the light of this consideration the march plan submitted will be approved or a new plan laid out. The nonobservance of the stipulations of the UeVO would have as its consequence, among other things, that the roads selected for the unit to be moved could not be utilized. This would mean that the column

would not reach the area into which it was ordered at the time stipulated. And so it could happen, for example, that the commanding officer of a technical flight unit would be unable to ensure combat readiness at a new airfield.

Those roads are to be chosen above all for links in the march route which are marked in the "Map of March Highways for Wheeled and Tracked Vehicles." The roads to be used and the necessary blocking-off measures on roads without international traffic are to be registered with the Bezirk recruiting and induction headquarters (WBK) having jurisdiction over the area 15 days before the start of the march, in conformity with No II/5 (3) of the UeVO. It lightens the work of the WBK, if a map of the march road or a sketch of it is attached to the registration. This will also contribute to good cooperation with other WBK's, when the boundaries of one WBK's territory are traversed. The roads stipulated in the registration notice can only then be used when and if they are confirmed by the WBK.

Special attention should be given to ultimate changes or instructions by the WBK, which are attached to the registration. Among others, these could be:

--changes in the succession of roads for the march;

--information about roadblocks (detours);

--measures to prevent damage in crossing over blacktop-surfaced streets, such as, among other things, the application of sand or gravel, laying down some kind of track or path reinforcing elements. These instructions are to be followed unconditionally by commanding officers in the preparatory phase of and during the march. It must further be remarked, that the specified and confirmed roads for the march are unconditionally the ones to be used. Every deviation from the march route is the cause of subsequent irregularities, so that:

--control points set up by the organs of the military transportation system along the march roads are not passed;

--members of the People's Police are not deployed along the right roads, and unforeseen hindrances to traffic could arise.

If during the course of the march a local change is decided upon, which has taken place within a short span of time and has not yet been included in the processing of the registration by the WBK (new blacktop paving on a street, for example) then the most favorable alternative for continuation of the march should be worked out in consultation with local organs (the mayor or the People's Police).

Permanent or Recurrent Use of Roads

Included here are roads which lead from the garrison area to the garrison maneuver fields, to railroad loading and unloading points, to assembly points. Furthermore, roads in the garrison area and within the troop maneuver grounds are continuously or recurrently used. Stretches of road used by the drivers' schools are also to be included. Roads of this sort have only to be registered once for approval by the responsible WBK.

Necessary changes or additions must be submitted to the WBK prior to 15 September of the year in question, on a map scaled 1:50,000.

General Instructions for Road Marches

All possible effort must be made by divisional, regimental and other troop units to avoid accidents, excessive wear-and-tear, and damage of any sort. Consequently, it is a matter of taking into consideration that:

1. Control check points are to be set up at railroad grade crossings, at bridge crossings where the visibility is poor, and at other danger spots;
2. On roads and grade crossings with overhead electric cables, combat materiel (weapons, antennas and other things) must be placed in such a position that a safety clearance of 1.5 meters is maintained;
3. The permissible load limit is not to be exceeded in crossing over bridges;
4. Tracked vehicles are forbidden to travel on express highways or cross them at grade level;
5. In crossing bridges and going through underpasses the speed of tracked vehicles is to be limited to 10 km/hr maximum;
6. Blacktop roads (paved with tar, asphalt, or other bituminous material) may not be used by tracked vehicles when the temperature is over 20 degrees centigrade. When such temperatures prevail during marches with wheeled vehicles, the roads are to be used in such ways as not to damage the abrasion surfaces or pavement top (by limiting speed, by avoiding single-file ruts);
7. Large-scale and heavy-load transportation is governed by the stipulations of the "Road Traffic Permissible Access Regulation (StVZO)," of the Road Traffic Ordinance (StVO), Section 21: "Loading of Vehicles;"

and of the DV Implementing Regulation 054/0/001: "Motor Vehicle Service," Appendix 2. For the sake of permanently high combat readiness it is necessary to pay even more attention to problems of road utilization. The conscientious and strict observance of the principles of the UeVO contributes in the last analysis to the process of achieving the best possible result in combat training and in combat service.

FOOTNOTE

1. See ANORDNUNGS- UND MITTEILUNGSBLATT, Part I, No 10, 1969 (F/6).

VICE-ADMIRAL EHM CALLS FOR GREATER EFFORT BY PEOPLE'S NAVY

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jan 75 pp 98C-102C

[By Vice-Admiral W. Ehm, Deputy Minister and Chief of the People's Navy]

/Text/ The power balance in the world continued to change during the past year in favor of the socialist community of states. The strength of socialist military power and its great battle strength and combat readiness contributed and contribute materially to the fact that imperialism has to adapt itself to real conditions, even though powerful forces are opposed to such an adaptation.

By fulfilling the tasks set in the 1973/1974 training year, the National People's Army /NVA/ and the People's Navy as one of its component parts, side by side with the socialist comrades-in-arms, has made its contribution to this development.

"The invincible military power of socialism with the Soviet Army as its nucleus has materially contributed to the attainment of results of world historical proportions through the realization of the peace program of the 24th CPSU Party Congress" stated comrade Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the SED Central Committee to soldiers of the Soviet Army on occasion of a visit with the troops in the fall of 1974.¹

The military-political situation in Europe and in the world as a whole is characterized by the trend of detente. But while the socialist community of states is determined to safeguard socialism, peace and the struggle for implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence even by military means and to make the progress attained so far irreversible, imperialism

is making increased efforts in order to keep the option of application of military power open.

One cannot overlook that the reactionary circles of international monopoly capitalism are attempting to apply the brake to the process of detente. They are increasing their anticommunist and anti-Soviet baiting and are constantly endeavoring not only to maintain but also dangerously expand the material foundations of the policy of aggression.

The minister of national defense of the GDR, Army General Heinz Hoffmann, stressed in an address to graduates of the 1974 class of military academies: "We have no illusions that we are confronting today in the shape of the armed forces of the United States, of the FRG, and NATO in general, a military machine, which has the most modern weaponry, is ready for war to a large degree, and is the most dangerous and strongest one ever produced by imperialism."²

As members of the People's Navy we are able to confirm this statement over and over again by our constant confrontation with the forces of the Federal Navy of the FRG and the other navies of the aggressive NATO bloc. These fleets are steadily increasing their battle strength and readiness for aggression in the area of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, whereby especially the material expenses are increasing steadily. This applies particularly to the Federal Navy of the FRG, which starting with the past year introduced into service in rapid succession type 143 and 148 missile-firing assault boats as well as type 206 submarines and which started to equip and/or re-equip its destroyers and naval aircraft with missile weaponry, and which prepared for quite some time new construction of hydrofoil /missile-firing assault boats/ and frigates. Also, other NATO navies, such as those of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, intend to carry out in the next few years extensive fleet expansion programs, which are clearly designed for aggression, in order to increase the presence and battle strength of the maritime aggression forces of imperialism considerably. The picture is not different in the area of the ground forces and air forces and of the other service branches of the member states of NATO. In view of these facts, the socialist countries were forced to draw the necessary conclusions.

The Consultative Political Committee of the member states of the Warsaw Pact stressed therefore the following in its conclusions during last year's session: "As long as the NATO bloc exists and as long as no disarmament measures are being implemented, the countries of the Warsaw Pact consider it necessary to strengthen their defense potential and to develop close cooperation among each other in this direction."³

This obligates us to remain vigilant at all times and to miss not a single moment in maintaining the battle strength and combat readiness of

our People's Navy on the required level and in developing the collaboration with the fraternal fleets still more closely and effectively.

The jubilee year of our socialist GDR proceeded in the staffs, formations and units of the People's Navy under the sign of great efforts for the fulfillment of the main military task, which was decided at the Eighth SED Party Congress and which establishes today and also in the future the fundamental content and the most important directions of our joint work in the strengthening of national defense.

The year 1974 was full of dynamics and important results. It placed before us great tasks and required for their fulfillment the conscious and creative fulfillment of duties by all members of the NVA and its service branches as well as of the border troops of the GDR.

The increase in battle strength and combat readiness was the central goal of the socialist competition which was conducted under the motto "Soldiers' Task 25--like Thaelmann: Resolute to Do Combat and Combat Ready at any Time!"

The results obtained thereby and the new findings made are an expression of the fact that we have taken further steps for the protection of our joint achievements under the leadership of our Leninist combat party and on the side of our socialist comrades-in-arms. The results of training, inspections, and exercises demonstrate the increased combat readiness of the People's Navy convincingly. We, the members of this NVA service branch, demonstrated our determination, side by side with our comrades-in-arms and in the spirit of socialist internationalism, that we would not permit a situation, in which the vital interests of socialism would be violated, the security of our frontiers would be threatened, and the established foundations of European security would be put in question.

This was also demonstrated by the good performance of the People's Navy at a command staff exercise of the allied Baltic Sea fleets in the autumn of 1974. The members of our service branch considered this important exercise to be a high point of the preparations for the 25th anniversary of the GDR and of the conclusion of the 1973/1974 training year. This was evidenced by the fact that their actions were motivated by an effort to provide excellent performances as concrete personal and collective contributions to the day of honor of our socialist republic and to the strengthening of the comradeship-in-arms with the fraternal armies and fleets, as well as an expression of our increased internationalist responsibility.

The joint exercise carried out under the command of the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy, provided again a genuine

confirmation of the worth of our young fleet on the side of the experienced brothers-in-arms. The results obtained in the course of the exercise clearly demonstrated the readiness and capability of the allied Baltic Sea Fleets, as well as of the other branches of the United Armed Forces, to insure a reliable military protection and the inviolability of the maritime frontiers of our socialist community of states at any time.

It gave us an emotional lift to participate in the experience and events of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the GDR as an event of great political importance.

By its close relation with the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community of states, the GDR belongs today to the strongest and most influential power of the world. This was also demonstrated convincingly by the festive meeting in our capital, Berlin, on the occasion of our great anniversary and was expressed especially in the addresses of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, and of the First Secretary of the SED Central Committee, Comrade Erich Honecker.

The official visits to Rostock-Warnemünde of the fleet units of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet and the Polish Navy, which were under the command of the respective chiefs of the two fleets, Admiral V. V. Mikhailin and Vice Admiral L. Janczyszyn, developed into moving demonstrations of the socialist unity of peoples and comradeship-in-arms.

The pride of belonging to this great community of socialism is being added to the joy over the successes attained in the construction of socialism in the GDR. We are a part of that power which points the way into the future for all of humanity.

During the anniversary festivities in honor of our state, all of us felt deeply that the GDR is a socialist state of workers and peasants, which is allied to the USSR forever and irrevocably and is an inseparable component of the socialist community of states.

From this derives for us a great obligation in the sense of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialist solidarity.

The People's Navy as a component of the NVA and as an equal partner of the allied Baltic Sea fleets of the Warsaw Pact has the fundamental task to continue to perfect its battle strength and combat readiness during the 1974/75 training year. The conditions under which we will have to solve the main military task will by no means become simpler in the future.

The staffs, units and formations must adapt themselves in shorter time spans to changes in weaponry, equipment and structure of our own forces and those of the opponent.

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110023-4

To meet the main military task requires that every member of the People's Navy and especially the superiors on all levels grow in step with the assigned task, with our republic, and with our people.

To meet the main military task requires from all of us to make increased demands on ourselves in order to meet the growing requirements of our national defense also in the future. In doing so, the attention and efforts of all superiors will have to be directed to obtain maximal effectiveness for such potentials as:

--personal conduct of political and military training as a uniform process of education and training;

--development of iron discipline and unconditional obedience among subordinates;

--development, maintenance, and strengthening of socialist relations between superiors and subordinates as well as among all army members;

--constant self-improvement, self-training, and self-education in order not only to solve the daily tasks of the present and the future but also to be prepared at any hour for the defense of the socialist fatherland.

The full effectiveness of those potentials in their entirety results in a high combat readiness, and it is the next task of troop command to fully develop the potentials arising from the class character of the socialist armed forces.

The decisive factor in this complex process is the human being, who comprehends and consciously shapes the social interrelationships.

It is for this reason that politico-ideological education is and remains the nucleus of socialist leadership of people in our armed forces and is therefore the most important task of the superiors on all levels.

In the 1974/75 training year, the leadership activity of commanders and polit organs in political work as well as all forms of political work will have to be directed more clearly and concretely toward the solution of the military tasks of the People's Navy and will have to be oriented toward priorities still to be determined in more detail and an all-round stronger fleet-relatedness.

This has to be based more consistently on factors and criteria of combat readiness and on the requirements and stresses of combat actions of naval forces. In this respect we can build upon the comprehensive experience and manifold perceptions of political work in the People's Navy, which were obtained during the past year in inspections and tests and in the preparation and execution of important training measures and which still must be evaluated and made known more thoroughly.

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110023-4

In conducting socialist competition during the past training year, the People's Navy was able to attain the best results so far. It was clearly demonstrated that the struggle for high combat readiness is unthinkable without socialist competition as the motor for development of mass initiative. This initiative increased in breadth and scope. Especially valuable is the fact that the percentage share of fulfilled commitments increased in comparison with preceding years.

Socialist competition in the new training year will be conducted under the motto: "Military Initiative 75--United with the Comrades-in-Arms--Strong for Battle and Combat Ready!" It will be necessary in this respect to use socialist competition still more effectively for motivating mass initiative in the direction of fulfillment of political and military tasks as well as toward the further improvement of the international education and deepening of the basic internationalist position of the members of the People's Navy. This competition is to be conducted in two stages, whereby the first stage will have the "Week of Comradeship-in-Arms" and the 19th anniversary of the NVA as high points, while the second stage will have as high points such events as the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, the 30th anniversary of liberation from fascism, and the "Week of Youth and Sportsmen."

We shall purposefully concentrate the socialist competition "Military Initiative 75--United with the Comrades-in-Arms--Strong for Battle and Combat Ready!" in such a manner that the political and military tasks will be met in all formations, units and installations of the People's Navy with high quality and excellent results. In this respect, performance comparisons and exchanges of experience with the Soviet and Polish brothers-in-arms will have to be systematically developed with full utilization of the capabilities of the individual formations and units.

The words of our comrade Erich Honecker are a guideline for us in this respect: "The members of the NVA must measure their actions against the strict standards set by their Soviet brothers-in-arms. They know: these standards incorporate the experience tested in the decades of the struggle for reliable military protection of socialism. They act in accordance with the proven internationalist motto: to learn from the Soviet Union means to learn how to be victorious."⁴

The good and excellent performances of the members of the People's Navy, which were achieved during the past training year under the unerring leadership of the party in all areas of political and military training, offer a guaranty that new and outstanding results will testify to the readiness and capability of our people also in 1975, the first year of the second quarter century of our GDR. The newly started training year places before us new political and military trials. The tested class- and arms alliance of the states of the Warsaw Pact provides the assurance that increased tasks will be handled also in the future. This firm alliance

has proved itself in two decades as a reliable guarantor for the inviolability of the socialist community of states. We have jointly repelled all provocations and squashed all attempts of aggression, with which imperialism intended to restrain and destroy socialism. Jointly with our class comrades and brothers-in-arms, we shall also in the future see to it that there is no chance left for imperialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. VOLKSARMEE, Berlin, No 38, 1974, p 3.
2. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (A-edition), 12 October 1974.
3. VOLKSARMEE, op. cit.
4. Ibid.

DEFICIENCIES CITED IN POLITICAL TRAINING IN PEOPLE'S NAVY

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Jan 75 pp 103C-108C

[By Comdr W. Rickert, Comdr L. Schmelzer, and Comdr R. Luderfinger]

/Text/ The main military task, as it was decided by the Eighth Party Congress, comprehensively establishes the fundamental content and main directions of our work for strengthening national defense. Politico-ideological education remains in this respect the nucleus of socialist command.

Politico-ideological work among sailors and noncommissioned officers in the units of the People's Navy has special weight. Since they lack experience to a certain degree as far as life and the class struggle are concerned, they must be given a clear political answer to questions of political and military life, which can be complicated at times.

As is known, the decision of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee on "The Tasks of Agitation and Propaganda for the Further Implementation of the Decisions of the Eighth SED Party Congress" of 7 November 1972 opened up a new and significant chapter of ideological work.

The Political Training Order signifies for the NVA /National People's Army/ a concrete application of the Politburo decision in the area of GWW /advanced social science training/ and political training.

It is the purpose of this article to provide a first evaluation of the three years of intensive activity of commanders political organs, and party and FDJ /Free German Youth/ organizations in behalf of an effective implementation of the Political Training Order. This evaluation will place special stress on organizational and methodological aspects.

A positive example is being provided in this respect by the "Jo" unit. In principle, all officials of the political section participate in the monthly consultations. By preparing themselves thoroughly and over a long time, they are able to contribute to the preparation of the topic with constructive proposals, suggestions and arguments. The comrades of the political section are unanimous in the opinion that they are receiving valuable assistance and valid suggestions for their own political work in the respective field of activity. These consultations should always conclude with consistent directives for each area of responsibility. This will lead to an appropriate coordination of all political measures and a meaningful support by every official.

Also, conceptual discussions of the monthly topics of the GWW and political training take place in all political sections and/or working groups for political work of the equivalent units. They represent the real center of concern in the leadership cycle for preparation of political training. What matters here, above all, is that the topics are prepared in a practice-related and troop-related manner. Experience gained so far indicates that this demanding task is not always easily manageable, but requires a high degree of political, theoretical, and military expert knowledge. It is necessary to guide the activities of the political organ and also of the staff to the decisive criterion, which culminates in the question: How can one utilize the manifold opportunities of GWW and political training in such a manner that a concrete increase in battle strength and combat readiness can be achieved?

This cannot therefore remain exclusively a matter for the Polit organ in the unit but must become increasingly a matter to be dealt with also by all staff members of the unit.

The one-man activity of the propagandist, which still takes place here and there, must therefore become a thing of the past. The collaboration, ideas, and creative initiative of a large circle of responsible comrades are required in order to develop training in an interesting and varied manner and to connect it with the military tasks. The best results are registered by those commanders and political organs, which fashion the political training days into real high points of political and military work.

Pre-Training Leads to Increased Effectiveness of Political Training

Three years of practice on the basis of the new political Training Order point clearly to the following: pre-training is in fact the fulcrum and pivot of further improvement of political training. Wherever the training group leaders assigned a proper place to pre-training, for example at the "Doe" unit, political training gained visibly in quality and educational effectiveness. The contribution of pre-training to fulfillment of the military tasks has grown.

Concerning the Quality and Conduct of Advanced Social Science Training
and Political Training

The leadership documents of the Main Political Administration, above all the study guidelines and reading materials, are an essential foundation for GWW and political training. It is an important task for commanders, political organs, party and FDJ organizations to implement the content-orientation provided by those documents in a troop-related manner and on a high level. What is at present characteristic for the leadership process in GWW and political training in the People's Navy?

Characteristic is, above all, the steady endeavor by all command levels to find the most effective forms and methods for the conduct of GWW and political training. A monthly consultation of responsible officials of the political organs on content-orientation of the individual GWW and political training topics has proven itself well in this respect on the level of the political administration and the political section of the units.

It was thus possible to develop and implement uniform concepts and well-founded argumentations with respect to the basic politico-ideological problems of the respective topic. At the same time, these monthly consultations form an important starting point for the effective guidance of subordinated Polit organs, primarily the Polit sections of the units, on whose work the success and effectiveness of training activities depend to a high degree. The People's Navy has discarded, in principle, the previous practice according to which consultations in the political sections concerned themselves primarily with the organizational support of the GWW and political training. Priority is being given today to the discussion and clarification of the following questions:

--What politico-ideological goal is being pursued with the topic and which convincing arguments are to be brought into play with respect to the basic problems of the topic?

--How can the political training topic contribute to the fulfillment of the military task of the respective month?

--What is the present frame of mind and status of opinion and how must they be taken into account in political training?

--Which tasks result for the party- and FDJ organizations with respect to implementation of political training?

--Which measures of political mass work have to be included in political training in order to enhance the emotional effectiveness of instruction?

Which special experiences and trends are discernible? The GWW as one of the main forms of Marxist-Leninist qualification of training group leaders has gained in value as a means for special preparation of political training. In most of the units, the training group leaders for sailors and noncommissioned officers are combined into independent GWW training groups. It should be stressed in this connection that the pre-training group leader serves at the same time as the training group leader of these comrades in the GWW. This corresponds also to the new Political Training Order. This regulation offers the opportunity to combine the GWW measures in a better manner with the growing requirements of political training in as far as content and timing are concerned. Also the theoretical preparation of the training group leaders for political training, especially for similar topics in the GWW, can take place already in the GWW instructional framework. More time is being gained for methodological and pedagogic problems in pre-training. This practice was successfully applied by the Kohn unit. On the other hand, some other regiments still proceeded in a manner in which the training group leaders of the political training were distributed individually to the GWW groups of the officers. The same requirements were placed on them as on any other GWW participants. This applies to study and participation in seminars; they even were tested and given grades, which clearly contradicts the political Training Order and should not be permitted by the political organs. We want to cite the Political Training Order with respect to another problem of pre-training. Paragraph 3, section VII states: "The pre-training of the training group leader is a part of the service preparation and comprises the evaluation of the preceding instruction course, briefing on the central topics of political training, the methodological and pedagogic preparation of instruction, the preparatory seminars, and other measures."

Without attempting to provide a standard for all units, we want to point out the following proven work rhythm for pre-training:

--The evaluation of instruction in the preceding month should be carried out by the training group leader and should take place immediately after the political training. On the day of pre-training attention is devoted to the comprehensive opinion of the political section with respect to evaluation of training.

--The preparatory seminar on the current topic is the most important part of pre-training and signifies for the training group leader the real high point in the preparation for political training. The Political Training Order points out that four hours are to be scheduled for the preparatory seminar. This is a minimum requirement. This makes it very clear that most of the time is to be devoted to the preparatory seminar as the nucleus of pre-training. Some of our training group leaders encounter difficulties in creating problem situations in political training, in developing a contest of differing opinions, and in fashioning training an in interesting

and illustrative manner. The preparatory seminar should therefore be used to develop an interesting contest of differing opinions among the training group leaders themselves and thus to demonstrate, if possible, within the circle of training group leaders what is involved in performing ideological work in an attractive, interesting, and emotionally effective manner. This provides some of the most effective assistance to training group leaders. There arises another problem in connection with this. Good experiences of training group leaders are not being utilized sufficiently for everybody in the preparatory seminar. The pre-training group leaders do not follow sufficiently the suggestions of the best training group leaders and do not sufficiently generalize the experiences of those leaders.

--The pedagogical and methodological preparation of instruction is being carried out in two basic forms: the pedagogic-methodological preparation of instruction as an independent element of pre-training and the pedagogical-methodological preparation of instruction as a consciously fashioned component of the other elements of pre-training."¹

What matters at present in the People's Navy is to train the training group leaders pedagogically and methodologically more consciously and purposefully in every pre-training course. This is the major concern to which the two named elements have to be applied meaningfully. The lecture of a pedagogue proves to be really useful only when the pedagogical problems are combined as closely as possible with a current problem of political training. Practice shows that the ideas and thoughts of the persons involved constitute the greatest available reserves.

--About one hour should be allocated to instruction on the next topic. It was proven unsuitable to conduct instruction on the immediately impending training topic on the same day on which the preparatory seminar takes place. The most favorable solution is when one month passes between instruction on the topic and the preparatory seminar. This allows sufficient time to the training group leaders to prepare themselves conscientiously for the preparatory seminar. Instruction on the topic of the subsequent month should therefore take place at the end of a pre-training, if possible. In this view, instruction on the topic is given priority in the pre-training system.

As was noted over and over again, the inclusion of films and television in political training is very customary in most units of the People's Navy. However, there is frequently a lack of a subsequent discussion about the basic political and artistic purpose of the film in connection with the respective political training topic. The "Doe" unit provides very good results in its film work. The newest documentary films are being shown there on a regular basis, and discussions are being held on how to shape argumentation successfully with the help of the films or scenes selected.

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Books have an important place in political training. It has been an accepted routine for many years at the "Doe" unit to have library officials lecture to the training group leaders and to let them demonstrate with illustrative examples from well-known and new literary works how to use books in political training.

A Few Suggestions for Political Training

As is known, political training provides for commanders and political organs an effective means for the education and formation of socialist military personalities. This is fully clear, in principle, to all officers, ensigns, and noncommissioned officers of the People's Navy. The good results obtained in political training speak for themselves in this respect. The best results were obtained in such units of the People's Navy:

--in which political training is considered to be an inseparable component of political and military command activity and is being handled as an important means of command of subordinated personnel;

--in which political training is being given all necessary support by commanders, staff officers, and party and FDJ organizations;

--in which conscientious planning, preparation, and execution of pre-training and political training are provided and in which energetic measures are taken against all disturbances and phenomena of disorder, which are detrimental to the effectiveness of this training.

On the other hand, there still are phenomena in the People's Navy, in which superficiality and routine have a negative influence on the effectiveness of political training.

This applies to such facts as:

- unjustified exemption from political training;

--carrying out of political training during periods in which percentage participation is very low due to furlough and other measures.

--lack of coordination of measures of political work with the monthly topics of political training;

--unjustified coincidence in the same time period of the GWW in the staffs and of political training in the units.

We want to discuss especially the last named defect more in detail.

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The Political Training Order establishes that "officers of the staffs of regiments and battalions, who are not training group leaders, are to be used in the preparation and execution of excursions, plant visits and so forth."

The Political Training Order also states:

"Those participants in the GWW who are not being used as training group leaders of political training are to be briefed on a regular basis on the topics of political training of soldiers and noncommissioned officers and are to be included in discussions, Dia /expansion unknown/ lectures or Dia sound-track lectures, film- or book discussions and so forth."

This places a clear and precise requirement on the GWW participants, who are not training group leaders. If, however, the GWW in the staffs is scheduled for the same days at which political training is scheduled, the support of political training given by officers of the staffs is limited. Everyone who has once acted as a training group leader knows how important it is when staff officers exert an influence on political training through lectures, discussions during instruction periods, and other measures and thus support the training group leaders in their responsible educational work. To relinquish these additional potentials is tantamount to permitting a loss in the pace of ideological work. We have to devote all our attention, understanding help, and effective guidance especially to the training group leaders. They are the most important propagandists of the party. Great demands are being made on them month after month. They have to convey the views of the party on the basic political problems of our time with pedagogic delicacy, with thorough theoretical substantiation and with clarity. They also have to deepen the scientific world outlook of the members of the People's Navy. It is an attractive, but at the same time also a very difficult and demanding task. If we realize that the overwhelming majority of our training group leaders are young officers of the first or second service ranks and these comrades have to accomplish also many other complex military tasks, we will understand that they deserve our special esteem.

We are referring here especially also to the older officers who have gone through all those difficult stages to a greater or lesser degree. They should unselfishly and intelligently pass on their rich experience to the young commanders, GA /Combat Sector/ commanders, company chiefs, and platoon leaders.

In the following we will make a few remarks on utilization of the centrally provided training materials and on the material and technical possibilities for political training.

The Main Political Administration provides extensive training materials. The study guidelines are substantiated as to content and are prepared pedagogically and methodologically. The reading material, too, is theoretically well founded and prepared in an intelligible manner. The lectures are being prepared on a constantly higher level, even though they do not always fully meet requirements. The sound-track lectures, Dia series, and graphic materials provide the possibility to give greater variety to instruction. These are genuine improvements of the effective development of political training. In addition, the naval units must consider a whole series of capabilities available to them, which are not always being used. This applies to films, radio and television broadcasts, maps, graphics, wall charts, and other teaching aids.

Praiseworthy are also such initiatives as, for example, the procurement of art picture portfolios for the training group leaders in the "Doe" unit. Those pictures make it possible for the training group leaders, after a corresponding preparation in pre-training, to conduct goal-oriented discussions in the training groups and to awaken interest in noncommissioned officers and sailors for problems of socialist art.

The preparation of a wall newspaper dealing with the current topic of political training has had a positive effect in different sections of the "Jo" unit. It is being published two weeks ahead of the political training and familiarizes the training participants with the most important problems of the topic. In addition, the training participants prepared a variety of other simple instructional materials. This brings a gain to the immediate development of the training itself and stimulates the sailors and noncommissioned officers to concern themselves with individual ideological problems of the topic well in advance of the actual political training. We want to suggest here again the reading of the brochure "This is the Way Our Best Training Group Leaders and Propagandists are Doing It," which was published by the Political Administration of the People's Navy. Its statements have full validity and provide valuable suggestions.

Party Work and Political Training

The statement that political training is in essence party training continues to have full validity.

An increase in the effectiveness of political training presupposes a strengthening of the influence of the basic organizations on political training. This applies not only to the preparation and execution of political training but also to the regular evaluation of its results and effectiveness in practice, in combat training and combat service, and in other areas of military life.

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Especially the last thought plays a large role in the evaluation by the 11th Delegates Conference of the SED Party Organizations and really should be emphasized by an explanation mark: "We can truly speak of a full understanding of the basic political problems of our time only when the theoretical knowledge of the power and strength of socialism and of the aggressive policy of the imperialist class enemy is being translated into aware actions of the army members."²

First results have become available in the meantime. Simultaneously with the entering into forces of the new Political Training Order, it has become a proven practice in the majority of the basic organizations to have regular consultations on the preparation, execution, and evaluation of political training and to establish measures for improvement. We want to mention here again the positive example provided by the "Doe" unit. The political organs of the unit place great value on the demand that the members and candidate members of the basic organizations are well prepared regularly and thoroughly for political training and discussions on the ideological front, in general. This means, above all, that they are equipped with convincing arguments and are being prepared for an active political collaboration in debates on instruction matters. The past shows how much the members and candidate members of our party are in the foreground of the discussion, how valuable the word of the party members is, and how much they provide a model and example. In order to do justice to their role of providing a model, they need, however, a high degree of Marxist-Leninist knowledge and convincing arguments and capabilities to valiantly support the policies of the party on the side of the training group leaders. But the basic organizations also have to develop thoughts about the party members who work as training group leaders. This concerns mostly young officers who have a college-level knowledge, as a rule. These officers have, however, often difficulties in applying this knowledge successfully in practice. The basic organizations also have the task therefore, together with the training group leaders, to guaranty a troop-related and lively political training and to provide a concrete answer to the question of how the best possible support can be given to the training group leaders. Training group leaders often complain about too great a burden. They expect more assistance for their responsible activity, for example, more assistance for an undisturbed assurance of individual study and individual preparation for political training. Despite the fact that the Political Training Order provides clear statements in this respect, frequent infractions occur and such complaints are often justified. The basic organizations should therefore make greater demands on military superiors to supply genuine and effective assistance to the training group leaders.

This concludes our remarks on some problems of the preparation and execution of political training as it is being conducted in the area of the

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People's Navy. The authors do not claim to have dealt with the problems exhaustively and comprehensively. All we intended to do was to provide a few impulses and suggestions to commanders, political workers, training group leaders, and propagandists which are intended to help them to meet the higher requirements of the Political Training Order in a better manner.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Freudenreich: "What is the Pedagogical and Methodological Instruction Preparation? What does it want to do and what can it do?" In: PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin, No 8, 1973, p 26.
2. H. Bruenner: "In Connection with an Evaluation of the Party Elections: a Continuation of the Purposeful Increase of the Combat Strength of the Party Organizations. In: PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin, No 3, 1974, p 4.

See also: H. Knaefel: "Level and Effectiveness of Advanced Social Science Training." In: MILITAERWESEN Berlin, No 11, 1972, pp 20-26.

W. Wunderlich: "Increased Requirements on the Conduct of GWW." In: MILITAERWESEN, Berlin, No 10, 1973, pp 3-12.

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110023-4