

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160017-6

██████████ TCM 75-41

C

1 of 1
No. 41

Trends in Communist Media

16 Oct 75

~~Confidential~~

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

~~Confidential~~

16 OCTOBER 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 41)

This report is based exclusively on foreign media materials and is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.



CONTENTS

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PRC Says U.S. Violates "Principles" of Shanghai Communique . . . 1

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Soviet Editor Defends Detente, Sees Administration Conflict . . 3

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

RED FLAG Demonstrates Increased PRC Intransigence to USSR . . . 5

MIDDLE EAST

USSR Uncommunicative on Syrian President Asad's Moscow Visit . . 7

VIETNAM

DRV Joins PRG in Attacking U.S. Refugee Repatriation Plan . . . 11

LAOS

Kaysan Speech Highlights Lao 30th Anniversary Celebrations . . . 13

KOREA

DPRK Celebrates 30th Anniversary of Korean Workers Party . . . 15

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

November Completion Set for European CP Conference Document . . 17

Belgrade Media Fail Bijedic PRC Visit, Play Down Differences . . 19

SPAIN

Moscow Links Base Agreement to U.S. Attitude on Executions . . . 21

USSR

October Anniversary Slogans Reflect Foreign Policy Continuity . . 23

Moscow Ignores Anniversary of 1965 Economic Reform 24

Economic Articles Suggest Tilt Toward Heavy Industry 25

NOTES

PRG Price Controls Rescinded; Liberation Radio From Saigon;
PRC Provincial Leadership; PRC Agricultural Conference;
PRC Instructions to Province; PRC-Portuguese Timor 28

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics i

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

- 1 -

SINO - U. S. RELATIONS

PRC SAYS U.S. VIOLATES "PRINCIPLES" OF SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE

Peking's current charges of alleged U.S. "connivance" with "Tibet traitors" in Tibet independence activities in the United States were made at a somewhat higher level of authority than other Peking complaints related to bilateral relations since the Shanghai communique, signed during President Nixon's February 1972 visit to China. Moreover, Peking's timing of the release of the 13 October statement by the spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Information Department--only six days before Secretary Kissinger's scheduled arrival in China for talks with its leaders--seems to serve notice that Peking intends to maintain a firm stance on disputed bilateral issues. There is no media evidence suggesting any major change in Peking's general attitude toward the United States: Concurrent Peking treatment of U.S.-related issues has maintained its normally discreet handling of the United States, and top Chinese leaders, including Teng Hsiao-ping, have met with two U.S. groups touring China.

Following the 1972 Nixon visit, Peking had made no public anti-U.S. statements devoted to bilateral issues until this year. Both previous cases in 1975 were less authoritative than the current statement and were in response to publicly reported U.S. actions. In April Peking noted the U.S. cancellation of a PRC dance troupe tour, and in September it reported the cancellation of a China tour by a U.S. mayors' delegation because of PRC objections to receiving the mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico.*

The 13 October NCNA report of the current statement detailed a series of private Chinese complaints to the U.S. over Tibetan activities in this country. It stated that on 30 July 1974 the PRC Liaison Office in Washington had privately complained to the State Department about the actions of a so-called "office of Tibet" in New York City which allegedly circulated news bulletins spreading anti-PRC "slanders." The Liaison Office is said to have restated its position to the State Department on 8 August 1975, and added that the United States should also act to stop the U.S. tour, beginning this October, of a Tibetan song and dance troupe. According to the statement, on 8 October the Chinese once again reiterated their position. Peking alleged that the State Department repeatedly refused to take action, on the "pretext" that the Tibetan actions were in accord with the U.S. Constitution and laws, and it charged that by having "obstinately clung to its

* The past Chinese complaints are discussed respectively in the TRENDS of 2 April 1975, pages 17-18, and of 17 September 1975, pages 10-11.

- 2 -

unreasonable position" the United States had shown that it "openly connives at and supports" "the treasonable activities of the Tibetan traitors in the United States." The statement affirmed that the U.S. stance represents "an undisguised interference in China's internal affairs" and a "flagrant violation of the principles of the Shanghai communique."

COMPARISON WITH PAST COMPLAINTS The current statement is more authoritative than those issued following the previous two incidents this year. Peking reported the dance troupe incident in a 2 April 1975 NCNA "interview" with the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the spokesman of the information department of the foreign ministry. The cancellation of the mayors' visit was discussed in a 16 September 1975 NCNA report of "observations" made by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. The earlier Chinese charges were also less harsh. They had complained that the U.S. actions were contrary to "the spirit" (ching shen 4737 4377) of the Shanghai communique, but the current statement for the first time said that the U.S. position was a "flagrant violation" of "the principles" (yuan tse 0626 0463) of the 1972 communique.

Past authoritative Peking charges of alleged foreign interference in Tibet have usually focused on Indian involvement, but the Chinese once before--since the signing of the Shanghai communique--publicly complained of U.S. interference in this Chinese "internal affair." NCNA reported on 28 July 1972 remarks by PRC representative Wang Jun-sheng at the 27 July session in Geneva of the UNECOSOC, in which Wang took a passing swipe at U.S. actions in the United Nations over the Tibet question. He charged that "in the past few years, at the instigation of the United States, the Chiang Kai-shek clique and India, the United Nations on several occasions discussed and adopted illegal resolutions on the so-called 'questions of Tibet' . . . thus leaving behind dishonorable records."

- 3 -

U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

SOVIET EDITOR DEFENDS DETENTE, SEES ADMINISTRATION CONFLICT

V.M. Berezhev, chief editor of the journal USA, has asserted in its most recent issue that statements by Defense Secretary Schlesinger regarding a possible U.S. first use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union "probably reflect a struggle about detente underway in U.S. ruling circles." Complaining--as have other USA Institute members recently--about such indications of increased opposition to improved U.S.-Soviet relations in Washington, Berezhev underscored his own support for a Soviet policy of further cultivating the U.S. connection by stressing the critical importance of U.S.-Soviet relations in resolving world problems in general. Previous Soviet analyses of the alleged new "campaign" against detente in the United States have avoided a direct implication that there was disagreement within the Administration itself, and have in fact cited approvingly--as did Berezhev once again--statements by Administration officials rebutting those who have argued that only the USSR stands to gain from detente.

Berezhev devoted the bulk of his article to an assessment of the prospects for U.S.-Soviet detente. Like virtually every other Soviet assessment, his concluded that the prospects were bright in the long run despite current problems. Berezhev observed--echoing earlier attempts at clarification made by U.S. officials--that part of the resistance to detente had been encouraged by confusion over the meaning of the French word itself. He emphasized that "detente" in Soviet policy meant first and foremost a movement away from confrontation and international tension and had nothing in common with the broader concept of "entente."

Repeating the arguments of earlier Soviet rejoinders to Schlesinger, Berezhev said that in talking openly about the use of nuclear weapons against the USSR, the defense secretary was acting counter to the understanding reached between the two countries regarding the prevention of nuclear war. According to Berezhev, "relapses" such as the first-use discussion "are particularly dangerous because the return of our countries to the conditions of confrontation would sharply worsen the whole international situation." Berezhev maintained that despite such difficulties U.S.-Soviet relations were "developing steadily," and he looked forward to a new summit and SALT agreement to restore momentum to the process of normalization.

- 4 -

Berezhkov made clear his own moderate views on defense and foreign policy issues by touting the benefits of parity in U.S.-Soviet military relations and by challenging the applicability to present-day conditions of Clausewitz' familiar dictum on war as a continuation of politics. Positions on this tenet have come to serve as touchstones to distinguish military hardliners from pro-detente advocates in the Soviet Union. According to Berezhkov, "universal war can no longer be regarded as a means of policy because of the destructiveness of the weapons which each of the sides possesses." This position has also been taken by USA Institute members Arbatov and Bovin in the past in a pattern of advocacy which has clearly been intended to express a pro-detente view.

Berezhkov also voiced agreement with Brezhnev's relaxed view of the current military threat to the USSR by quoting his 13 June 1975 election speech assertion that "now the leaders of the bourgeois world cannot seriously expect to decide the historical argument between capitalism and socialism by force of arms." This has become another disputed formula in the detente issue. A contrasting point of view was presented by Defense Minister Grechko in a speech two weeks before Brezhnev's. In a 29 May appearance before an all-Army conference, Grechko had said that the forces of reaction and aggression still "have not abandoned their plans to resolve the dispute between capitalism and socialism by force of arms."

16 OCTOBER 1975

- 5 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

RED FLAG DEMONSTRATES INCREASED PRC INTRANSIGENCE TO USSR

Against the background of recently heightened polemics against the USSR, a lengthy article in RED FLAG (No. 10) under the authoritative byline Liang Hsiao has strongly implied that China cannot have normal state relations with the "social imperialists" until the entire Soviet political-economic system is changed.* The article, carried by Peking radio on 14 October, detailed Soviet "hegemonism" in its relations with other countries, highlighting the Chinese thesis that the USSR's system makes it the more dangerous and aggressive of the two superpowers. The author asserted flatly that real change in Soviet aggressive policies will require a fundamental change in the Soviet economic and political system, not merely Moscow leadership or policy shifts. Past Chinese comment had stated that despite ideological differences, the PRC could have normal state relations with the USSR, a theme missing in recent Chinese pronouncements.

Liang described Moscow as a "latecomer" to the world imperialists' "feast" eager to make up for lost time and stated that the Soviet system of "state monopoly capitalism" made it the more formidable enemy. According to Liang, the Soviet system is "more monopolistic, more concentrated, and more tightly controlled" and therefore the Soviets are "more brutal in their aggression and expansion abroad." While acknowledging Soviet economic and technological inferiority to the United States, Liang stated that the USSR's ability to squeeze out surplus wealth to militarize the Soviet economy made it equally formidable militarily.

The article concluded with a discussion of Soviet internal and world forces opposed to Moscow's ambitions, noting especially that the Third World--"the main force combatting imperialism"--has come to see more clearly the "true colors of the Soviet social-imperialists" and is "increasingly directing its struggle against this deadly enemy." It also cited evidence of "new advances" by the developed Second World countries against Moscow's policies, concluding that Soviet social imperialism, though outwardly fierce, is weak internally and a true "paper tiger."

* Peking media recently have stressed the alleged danger of war stemming from the USSR, including the danger of a Soviet "surprise attack" against China. See the TRENDS of 1 October 1975, pages 7-10, and 8 October 1975, pages 1-2.

- 6 -

TENG HSIAO-PING REMARKS According to Western press reports, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping took a line similar to the RED FLAG article during an 18 September conversation with West German conservative leader Strauss. He reportedly dismissed rumors that China was ready to normalize relations with Moscow, noting that a precondition for improved relations would be a Moscow change in its "political orientation." A Moscow radio broadcast in Mandarin beamed to Southeast Asia on 6 October took issue with Teng's alleged statement, contrasting it with Peking's heretofore standard public position that ideological differences with Moscow should not preclude normalization of state relations.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

- 7 -

MIDDLE EAST

USSR UNCOMMUNICATIVE ON SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASAD'S MOSCOW VISIT

The scanty media treatment of President al-Asad's 9-10 October "friendly" visit to Moscow--with no advance announcement--was a far cry from the ruffles and flourishes with which he was welcomed on his "friendly official" visit in April 1974.* Even though the recent visit was not official, it is unusual for Moscow reportage on the activities of a visiting head of state to be virtually nonexistent, comment scanty, and the communique uncommunicative to the extent of revealing merely that discussions were held on unspecified Mideast issues. While various theories could be advanced for the paucity of coverage, the most plausible explanation would seem to lie in a coolness resulting from differences over aspects of the Mideast problem and Syrian military aid requests. Moscow in the past, however, has papered over Soviet-Arab frictions with more finesse and appropriate protocol gestures than were displayed on this occasion.

MIDEAST, MILITARY ISSUES Differences appeared to emerge five days after al-Asad's visit, in a distinctly cool announcement broadcast by Moscow's domestic service on the 15th which revealed for the first time that the Syrian foreign and defense ministers had remained in Moscow for talks after al-Asad went home. Until this announcement Moscow had not acknowledged that the ministers stayed behind; the Damascus paper TISHRIN had reported, according to Beirut radio on the 12th, that they had stayed "to conclude the discussion of subjects raised" during al-Asad's visit.

Moscow radio said that Soviet foreign and defense ministers Gromyko and Grechko had met with their Syrian counterparts, Khaddam and Talas, and "exchanged views" on "questions concerning the further development of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as on the problems of the Middle East settlement." The item, reporting that the Syrians had left for home that day, noted that the talks were conducted in a "friendly and business-like" atmosphere. This is in contrast to the warmer characterization

* The April 1974 visit--which featured live radio/TV coverage of airport ceremonies, an al-Asad speech over Moscow television, and a signed joint statement--is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 8-11. Al-Asad had previously visited Moscow in February 1971 and July 1972, and stopped for a talk with Brezhnev en route to the DPRK in September 1974. He paid at least one "private" visit to Moscow, in October 1972, which was announced by Damascus--but not by his hosts--after his return.

in the communique on al-Asad's visit, which described the atmosphere of his talks as one of "friendship, cordiality, and complete mutual understanding." (Despite the ceremonial flourishes, as-Asad's April 1974 visit produced only a "thorough and constructive exchange of opinions" in an atmosphere of "frankness and mutual understanding.")

+ Mideast Issues: Underlining the narrow focus of the talks, the communique stated simply that the two sides "discussed the situation in the Middle East and its effects on the international situation as a whole." It added a watered-down version of Moscow's usual call for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and for support of Palestinian rights, including their right to their own state: The sides "stressed their determination to do everything in their power to have the legitimate rights of the Arab states and the Arab people, including the Arab people of Palestine, restored and insured."

There was no mention of the Geneva conference, which Gromyko recently advocated in his UN General Assembly speech last month. Damascus had gone along with Moscow in calling for renewal of the Geneva talks in the last three high-level Soviet-Syrian discussions--Gromyko's visits in February and April 1975 and al-Asad's September 1974 stopover in Moscow.

Two presumably prime topics of discussion, the Sinai II accord and the Lebanese situation, were touched on in comment pegged to the visit. In PRAVDA's weekly international review on the 12th, Korionov indirectly placed the Syrian visit against the background of Sinai II, which al-Asad has called on as-Sadat to abrogate and which Moscow derogates in muted fashion. Introducing innocuous comment on the Soviet-Syrian talks drawn from the language of the communique, Korionov observed that the Soviet Union supports "a real and not illusory settlement" of the Mideast problem--Moscow's cryptic way of referring to an overall solution versus the U.S.-sponsored "partial steps." A Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 11th hailing the "deep mutual trust" in Soviet-Syrian relations went on to discuss Lebanon, charging that "provocative acts" against that country were designed to divert attention from "partial solutions" in the Mideast.

+ Military Issues: While the presence of the defense ministers at the talks during al-Asad's visit and the later talks reported by Moscow radio on the 15th pointed to a discussion of military topics, Moscow made no mention of military aid in material surrounding the visit. Moscow's Arabic-language commentary on the 11th did refer to Arab concern over U.S. "secret commitments" to Israel stipulating that the United States would continue to arm Israel. But in another instance, Moscow seemed to make a studied effort to avoid the subject of military aid. Thus TASS on the 13th, reviewing Syrian

- 9 -

media coverage of al-Asad's visit, ignored allusions to U.S. military aid to Israel in the Damascus paper TISHRIN. According to the SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY on the 12th, TISHRIN had implied that the Moscow talks concerned increased Soviet military aid to Syria to correct "the imbalance in power in favor of the Zionist enemy," and, in implicit criticism of Egypt, stressed that Syria was seeking to create a united Arab policy and "an Arab deterrent force" which would be able "to distinguish between friends and enemies."

While the brevity of the communique might explain the absence of any reference to Soviet assistance in Syria's defense, this contrasts with the last four communiqués and reports on high-level Syrian talks since April 1974. In September 1974, for example, the USSR pledged "readiness" to "contribute further to strengthening the economic and defense capacity" of Syria. And communiqués in February and April this year, on Gromyko's visit to Syria and his counterpart's visit to Moscow, referred to "the importance of strengthening the defense potential" of Syria under conditions of "continued Israeli aggression."

TREATMENT OF VISIT Reportage on al-Asad's visit was confined to the announcement of his arrival and the communique released on the 11th, both of which were featured in the central press. Normally Moscow would also, at a minimum, report the holding of talks, the ritual luncheon or dinner, perhaps a reciprocal function by the guest, and departure ceremonies. However, these routine events were merely acknowledged in the communique.* Thus the document listed, as is customary, those participating in the talks; it mentioned a luncheon at which Brezhnev and al-Asad exchanged "friendly toasts"; and it reported those present for al-Asad's departure.

The communique gave no indication of any discussion of bilateral relations other than to refer to the leaders' "determination to continue to strengthen friendship between the two states." The document additionally stressed that "no one will be allowed to shake this friendship, to damage it"--a common sentiment in Moscow's comment on Soviet-Arab relations in general and an echo of Gromyko's September UNGA address in which he referred to the "deep roots" of Soviet-Arab friendship and added that "we do not think anyone will succeed in undermining it."

* The communique was so identified by TASS English and in foreign-language broadcasts; PRAVDA, however, called it a "report" on the visit.

16 OCTOBER 1975

- 10 -

Meager followup comment has been generally confined to the language of the communique. A TASS dispatch from Damascus on the 13th, summing up Syrian media comment, provided generalities along the line that the visit was "successful" and important for strengthening Soviet-Syrian relations and establishing a just and durable peace. Comment in Arabic from the unofficial Radio Peace and Progress and from Moscow radio on the 10th and 11th stressed the "good tradition" in Soviet-Syrian relations of holding "regular consultations and personal contacts" and regularly exchanging visits. Such "regular" exchanges have been one-sided: Other than a series of Gromyko visits in the first part of 1974 and 1975 related to Secretary Kissinger's disengagement negotiations, no top Soviet leader has visited Damascus since Podgorny's brief call less than a month after the June 1967 war.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

16 OCTOBER 1975

- 11 -

VIETNAM

DRV JOINS PRG IN ATTACKING U.S. REFUGEE REPATRIATION PLAN

The U.S. plan to allow Vietnamese refugees who want to return home to do so aboard a ship leaving from Guam continues to draw low-level Vietnamese communist protests. The latest comment still avoids making any flat statements that the refugees would be turned away, while stressing that the U.S. plan would impinge on Vietnamese sovereignty. North Vietnam's first official reaction came in a 15 October DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which supported the condemnation of the U.S. repatriation effort contained in the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 4th.* Attendant media comment has placed the burden of blame for the "sinister scheme" on the "hotheads in Washington" and, in one instance, seemed to absolve the prospective repatriates themselves of any wrongdoing.

Taking the same tack as the PRG, the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement warned the United States it could not "dodge its responsibility" by declaring that repatriation was a "matter concerning the evacuees themselves" or by stating that it "has nothing to do with it." The DRV spokesman's statement, said that this "irresponsible and adventurous act" of the U.S. Government "violates the sovereignty of Vietnam and misleads public opinion." The earlier PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement had appealed directly to the refugees, warning them to be aware of an "enemy plot" and assuring them that repatriation would be considered on an individual basis in conformity with the sovereign rights of Vietnam. The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's did not repeat such an appeal to the refugees but instead addressed "demands" to the United States that it respect Vietnamese sovereignty and "immediately stop this act."

An 11 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary and a Liberation Radio commentary aired on the 13th--both pegged to the PRG spokesman's statement of the 4th--provided detailed information on the U.S. repatriation plan itself but did not depart from the essential arguments set forth in either of the statements. The VNA version of the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary declared that the PRG "resolutely will not permit the Ford Administration . . . to send the vessel Thuong Tin carrying 1,600 refugees to South Vietnam," but characteristically avoided any mention of the reception the

* The PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 8 October 1975, pages 5-6.

- 12 -

refugees might receive once they reached South Vietnam. Implied that the refugees were innocent victims of the U.S. actions, an unattributed NHAN DAN article of the 16th described the repatriation operation as "the forcible shipping back to South Vietnam of people previously taken by force therefrom."

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue

16 OCTOBER 1975

- 13 -

L A O S

KAYSON SPEECH HIGHLIGHTS LAO 30TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

Laos observed the 12 October 30th anniversary of the proclamation of independence from French colonial rule with commemorative ceremonies at both the Pathet Lao headquarters in Viengsay and at the capital of Vientiane. Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) Chairman Souphanouvong delivered a brief opening speech at the traditional anniversary rally in Viengsay; however, the major address--billed by the media as an "important speech"--was delivered by LPF Vice Chairman Kayson Phomvihhan. Although Kayson was not identified by the media in his position as secretary general of the Lao communist party--the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP)--his assumption of the keynote role, which has been exercised by Souphanouvong in the past, served to reinforce the party's shift since July toward open acknowledgment of its control of the Lao Front.*

The theme of Indochinese solidarity was underlined with the unprecedented turnout for the Viengsay celebrations of high-level delegations from North and South Vietnam and Cambodia. The North Vietnamese party-government delegation was led by Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo member and National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh, the DRV's highest ranking party official following First Secretary Le Duan, who is on a tour of Eastern Europe. The delegation from South Vietnam, billed as representing the PRG, NFLSV, and the South Vietnam Committee of the VWP, was led by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat and included Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung, a member of the VWP Central Committee. The Cambodian Front and government were represented by a delegation headed by Ieng Sary, deputy prime minister responsible for foreign affairs. As in past years, the media also noted the presence of lower level foreigners, including "specialists" from China and the Soviet Union.

KAYSON ADDRESS While not identifying Kayson Phomvihhan as a party official, the PATHET LAO NEWS AGENCY noted that he delivered his anniversary speech on behalf of the central committees of both the LPRP and the LPF. He is last known to have made a public statement on the anniversary in 1970, when Pathet Lao media carried a lengthy article by him which was notable for its explicit discussion of the historical role of the

* For background on media treatment of the LPRP, see the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, pages 24-26.

- 14 -

Lao communist party and its forerunner, the Indochinese Communist Party.* There have been few public statements by Kayson in the intervening years, although Pathet Lao media did publicize his speech at the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971. More recently, the official party paper SIANG PASASON, which began nationwide distribution in Laos in mid-August, published in serial form a lengthy article by Kayson that is not yet available in translation.

The bulk of Kayson's speech consisted of a historical review tracing the Lao revolution over the past 30 years; it also touched upon Lao relations with other countries. In voicing thanks for past international support, Kayson singled out North Vietnam for particular attention, expressing "everlasting gratitude to the DRV--our brother and intimate comrade who has stood side by side and shared weal and woe with us since ancient times" for its "great and invaluable assistance." Kayson professed "deep gratitude" to the PRC, the Soviet Union, and other fraternal socialist countries for "selflessly and effectively rendering material and moral support and assistance." He stressed the importance of the policy of "fraternal, comradely combat coordination" between the three Indochinese countries and the LPRP's "correct international line of independence and self-mastery" and "spirit of relying on themselves."

Kayson reiterated the standard Pathet Lao position on the United States, noting that Laos had decided to "maintain" diplomatic relations with the United States on the basis that Washington "sincerely respect the sovereignty and independence of Laos, must not interfere in the internal affairs of Laos, must cease its support of the ultrarightist reactionaries, and must keep its promise to help heal the wounds of war in Laos."

Kayson also noted that Laos had agreed to "maintain fraternal and neighboring relations" with Thailand, but he warned Thailand in standard terms that the Thai "powerholders" would be held responsible for "all serious consequences" if they did not cease supporting exiled Lao "traitors" and instigating provocations along the Lao-Thai border. Kayson repeated the Pathet Lao's stock demands that Thailand return Lao property removed by fleeing rightists and "drive out and repatriate" the "reactionary chieftains" still hiding in Thailand.

* The 1970 Kayson article is discussed in the TRENDS of 7 October 1970, pages 11-12.

16 OCTOBER 1975

- 15 -

K O R E A

DPRK CELEBRATES 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF KOREAN WORKERS PARTY

Pyongyang's commemoration of the 10 October 30th anniversary of the KWP was highlighted by a 9 October rally and a banquet on the 10th, both addressed by Kim Il-song. Neither Kim's speeches nor an anniversary editorial in the party daily NODONG SINMUN broke any new policy grounds. Kim displayed an attitude of reconciliation toward the South while not modifying standard DPRK positions, and he reiterated Pyongyang's demand that the armistice agreement be replaced by a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty, "on condition" that U.S. troops withdraw from the South. While pledging cooperation with "all socialist countries," Kim warned the Third World against being manipulated by "big powers." A speech by Vice President Kim Tong-kyu at dedication ceremonies for a new cemetery for revolutionary martyrs focused on Kim Il-song's first wife, possibly part of a campaign to groom their alleged son as Kim Il-song's eventual successor.

As usual, Kim stressed the theme of Pyongyang's independence, especially in foreign affairs, noting that the KWP developed its relations with other parties and countries on the basis of "complete equality and mutual respect." He also noted that the North always solved its problems "according to its own judgment and decision, proceeding from the interests of the Korean revolution." Kim promised the KWP would strive to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the international communist movement and socialist forces, and would promote friendship and cooperate with "all socialist countries."

Kim praised the Third World as a "dependable ally of the socialist forces." He urged the Third World to unite in order to make rapid progress without relying on "big powers." He also urged them to change international organizations so they would no longer be manipulated by "big powers."

Only three communist countries--Romania, Cuba, and Hungary--sent delegations to Pyongyang for the anniversary. The absence of any special CCP representation probably reflects the fact that a high-level delegation headed by Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao had just visited the DPRK in late September. At the time, Chang offered congratulations to the KWP on its anniversary. Peking also greeted the anniversary with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, party greetings, and a PRC leadership turnout at the DPRK embassy reception. Moscow's treatment reflected the chilly state of Soviet-Korean relations. Moscow sent the usual congratulatory message, but no top leaders

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue

- 16 -

attended the DPRK ambassador's reception in Moscow, and PRAVDA noted the occasion with a correspondent's dispatch from Pyongyang, rather than an editorial.

RPR PRESENCE Anniversary functions spotlighted the presence of representatives from the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, a Marxist-Leninist party allegedly operating in South Korea. In his introductory remarks to the main 9 October Pyongyang rally, Vice President Kim Tong-kyu noted the presence of the RPR delegation. Kim Il-song did not mention the RPR in his rally address, but at the 10 October banquet he offered congratulations to "comrade representatives of the RPR and South Korea revolutionaries," and toasted them at the end of his speech. DPRK media had noted the presence of RPR representatives at the 25 June Korean War anniversary and September National Day functions this year in Pyongyang--for the first time since the party was founded in 1970--but speakers at those functions had not specifically acknowledged their presence. Pyongyang media still have not returned to emphasizing the role of the RPR in the struggle in the South, as they did before the North-South dialog started in 1972.

KIM'S WIFE AS Dedication ceremonies at the new cemetery
REVOLUTIONARY MARTYR for revolutionary martyrs on 13 October
 took special note that Kim Chong-suk, Kim
Il-song's first wife who died in 1949, is buried there. Her interment in the cemetery comes against the background of a year long, low-key press campaign to idolize her. In his speech at the dedication, Vice President Kim Tong-kyu singled out "the indomitable communist revolutionary fighter Comrade Kim Chong-suk" and described her as "infinitely faithful to the great leader" and as a "paragon of revolutionaries."

Kim Tong-kyu also noted that Kim Il-song cherished "parental feelings" not only for martyrs but also for their children and recalled that Kim has looked after martyrs' children "to raise the children so that they can take over the revolution and carry it forward." Kim Tong-kyu further noted that under Kim Il-song's tutelage the children had "grown into trusted personnel serving our revolution" and were mature enough "to carry out the wishes of their parent." The reference to children taking over the revolution, in conjunction with praise of Kim Chong-suk, may relate to rumors that an alleged son of Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-suk is now a high-level official being groomed to replace his father. Such a son, Kim Chong-il, has never been mentioned in monitored DPRK media.

- 17 -

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

NOVEMBER COMPLETION SET FOR EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE DOCUMENT

Amid conjectures in Western media that preparations for an all-European conference of communist parties were hopelessly deadlocked Soviet and East German media on the 10th announced that a two-day "working group" meeting in the GDR capital had decided that the conference editorial commission would meet in November to "complete" the final conference document. The 9-10 October working group session was attended by representatives of 27 European communist parties, including the CPSU's Ponomarev and Politburo-level figures from the independently oriented Romanian, Yugoslav, Italian, and Spanish communist parties. The communique on the session did not announce agreement on anything other than the November deadline, noting only that the East Berlin meeting took place in a spirit of "fraternal communist cooperation and a constructive exchange of opinions on a democratic basis."

The latest meeting was referred to in the communique as the "third" working group session--following the publicly announced first and second sessions in February and April of this year, respectively. The communique thus ignored additional working group sessions on 12 May and 1-5 July, which had been reported only by Western and Yugoslav media. The Yugoslavs reportedly boycotted the May meeting and played a notably recalcitrant role at the July gathering. All the working group sessions have been held in East Berlin, the planned site of the final conference.

According to Western press speculation, the high-level 9-10 October session and its decision to complete the document draft in November may have resulted from concessions by the Soviets to the maverick parties in the interest of convening the conference prior to the 25th CPSU congress in February 1976. The speculation suggests that the Soviets have yielded ground on the mavericks' chief demands--that conference decisions must not be binding on the participants and that there must be no criticism of Peking at the conference. Concessions were implied in an interview with SED Politburo member and Secretary Axen published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 13th. Axen specified that his party would submit a "revised" draft of the conference document to all participating parties prior to the November meeting of the editorial commission convened to complete work on the document. Going beyond his previously more restrained estimates of progress in the preparations, Axen characterized the latest meeting as "clearly" successful, adding that the demonstrated

- 18 -

collective aim of the European communist parties was an "early and successful holding of our conference."*

SOVIET STANCE Despite apparent behind-the-scenes concessions, Moscow has maintained a public posture of ideological firmness on the conference issue. Thus, a Davydov commentary on the East Berlin meeting, broadcast by Moscow radio in Romanian, Serbo-Croat and other East European languages on the 13th, asserted at the outset that the meeting demonstrated the European communist parties' desire to "coordinate their actions" in struggling for international security and social progress. The talk appeared to pinpoint the Italian and French communist parties as disruptive elements in the conference preparations: It cited Italy and France as countries where communists had gained influence, while in the same breath scoring those trying "to split the communist parties, undermine their unity and divide them on national issues." It went on to charge that bourgeois propaganda in various countries was coordinated in its disruptive activities, with the support of Peking.

In a move particularly offensive to the ruling Yugoslav and Romanian parties, the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine--Moscow's rationale for the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia--was revived in the new Soviet-East German 25-year friendship treaty signed by Brezhnev and SED First Secretary Honecker in Moscow on 7 October, two days prior to the East Berlin conference working group session. The treaty asserted in its preamble that "the support, strengthening, and protection of socialist achievements . . . are the joint internationalist duty of the socialist countries," and bound the two signatories to this duty in Article 4. While the Romanians have not so far commented on the treaty, the Belgrade POLITIKA on the 10th deplored the pact's revival of the "defense of socialist gains" doctrine at the present time of accentuated detente in Europe. It recalled that the doctrine had last appeared in the new USSR-Czechoslovak treaty of 6 May 1970. The commentary avoided any reference to the high-level preparatory session then in progress in East Berlin, attended by LCY Executive Committee Secretary Grlickov.

* Axen's estimate of progress in the conference preparations earlier this year and the Romanian, Yugoslav and Italian communist parties' reservations on the proposed conference are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 17-19.

- 19 -

BELGRADE MEDIA HAIL BIJEDIC PRC VISIT, PLAY DOWN DIFFERENCES

Initial Belgrade comment has assessed Premier Bijedic's 6-12 October official visit to China as contributing to better mutual understanding of the two countries as well as opening the door to greater bilateral cooperation.* While acknowledging continuing differences between the two regimes, BORBA and the party daily POLITIKA have suggested that existing differences are not insurmountable. Yugoslav comment has referred only sparingly--and defensively--to Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's anti-Soviet remark at a 6 October banquet for Bijedic which prompted the Soviet and six other Moscow-allied envoys to walk out in protest.

A Vlado Teslic commentary in the 15 October BORBA, called the visit a "great success," asserting that the discussions of international issues had brought the two countries "closer together" and opened the door to better understanding and cooperation in "all spheres." On specifics, Teslic indicated that the Yugoslav delegation attempted to explain Belgrade's support for the policy of detente and its participation in the European security conference. He asserted that the Yugoslavs represented these policies as part of the "struggle against hegemonism" and bloc divisions.

POLITIKA's permanent Peking correspondent, Dragan Rancic, on the 13th acknowledged that "ideological and interstate differences . . . have remained and they will objectively exist in the future too . . . However, he also tended to minimize the Belgrade-Peking differences over detente. He stated that "on the basis of new knowledge . . . it was possible to interpret the Chinese thesis about the inevitability of war . . . as an expression of an effort to postpone a possible new world conflict . . ." Rancic also claimed to detect a weakening of Peking's traditional hardline stance against Belgrade's "revisionist" domestic policies.

The communique on the visit, while noting the two sides' "satisfaction," acknowledged continuing differences in describing the Teng-Bijedic talks as "frank and friendly." Accordingly, it contained no reference to international issues. In the only reference to substantive results of the visit, the two sides, noting the "fruitful development" of their relations thus far, called for further developing and strengthening "multi-form" cooperation and agreed to establish a mixed trade committee. A warming of relations was also suggested in another part of the communique which revealed that Mao, during an 8 October "cordial and friendly" conversation with Bijedic, had asked the premier to "convey his regards" to Tito, a point not mentioned in earlier reports on the meeting.

* Initial comment on the visit is discussed in TRENDS of 8 October 1975, pages 11-13.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

- 20 -

BANQUET INCIDENT An 11 October Zagreb VJESNIK commentary by Zeljko Brihta provided the only Yugoslav report on the banquet walk-out prompted by Teng's remark that "the most dangerous source of war today is the superpower which most fervently preaches peace." However, a TANJUG Russian-language report on the commentary deleted the reference to the incident. Brihta belittled the incident as "not really important but interesting for some people" who might cite it in conjecturing that Moscow and the United States would be offended by Belgrade's improved relations with Peking. Rejecting such speculation as "tendentious and calculated," he asserted that "no one has any reason . . . to be 'angry' if Yugoslavia improves its relations with this or that country"

Outspoken Zagreb radio commentator Milika Sundic on the 13th struck an even more defiant posture in criticizing the "first" East European reaction to the visit, an unidentified Hungarian radio commentary. Rejecting the commentary's alleged contention that Peking was courting Belgrade as an anti-Soviet maneuver, Sundic asserted that Yugoslavia was not a "puppet that allows itself to be used to settle the accounts of third parties."

- 21 -

S P A I N

MOSCOW LINKS BASE AGREEMENT TO U.S. ATTITUDE ON EXECUTIONS

Soviet comment on the 4 October U.S.-Spanish announcement of agreement in principle on U.S. bases in Spain has portrayed the accord as a consequence of Spain's isolated position and Washington's failure to join the "worldwide" protest against the recent execution of five anti-Franco terrorists.* While Moscow traditionally maintains public opposition to bases on foreign soil and has specifically condemned the U.S.-Spanish agreement in the past as an attempt to draw Spain into NATO,** current criticism has focused directly on U.S. willingness to "close one's eyes to terror and reprisals" and "cynically weigh what position is advantageous to it." Claiming that the new agreement propped up the beleaguered Madrid government at a critical moment, Moscow has wondered how "respected members of American society" could "keep silent and not defend the victims of Franco's dictatorship."

Although early Soviet coverage of European and other protests against the executions took little notice of the Ford Administration's cautious response, Moscow became more vocal following the announcement of the renewed base agreement. Many observers linked Washington's stance to the successful conclusion of the lengthy negotiations over bases and military aid. Thus, an A. Krivopalov commentary in IZVESTIYA on 9 October deplored the fact that Franco had received "mighty support from over the ocean" just at a time when "the whole world is protesting against new crimes by the Madrid regime." Krivopalov echoed earlier comment in noting that the Spaniards, realizing the value of the bases, had "increased the stakes," and he implied that the U.S. attempt last summer to bring Spain into NATO had been a part of the negotiations. He noted, however, that the Spaniards recently had become "more obliging" and concluded that "the 'special' U.S. position on the executions had been assessed in a proper way."

Although placing less emphasis on the U.S. response to the executions, PRAVDA read events in a similar way, a 9 October

* Soviet reaction to the executions is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 October 1975, pages 33-34.

** Moscow's criticism of the 1970 renewal of the bases agreement as an attempt to bind Spain "to the NATO military system by the back door" is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 August 1970, page 28.

Aleksandr Istomin article claiming that the isolated Franco regime had reversed its hard-bargaining position vis-a-vis the United States in an effort to "avert the collapse of the regime by relying on the U.S. military presence." While IZVESTIYA discussed the "U.S. position" and the "U.S. State Department's" agreement with Franco, PRAVDA seemed more inclined to shift the blame to "the Pentagon's militarist circles," asserting that the Pentagon's desire to maintain the bases "by means of supporting the reactionary dictatorship" clearly "contradicts the national interests of the Spanish people." Istomin claimed that the new agreement "is regarded everywhere as an affront to world public opinion" and that it had caused "displeasure even in NATO countries."

While most comment has followed this line in depicting the United States as virtually alone in its accommodating attitude toward Madrid, Albert Grigoryants, on Moscow radio's 12 October international observers roundtable program, indicated that other Western countries had faltered in their determination to "freeze relations with Madrid." Grigoryants said that the ambassadors of West European countries who had been recalled from Madrid were gradually returning to their posts and that at the EEC session in Luxembourg, "the view predominated that Spain deserves to be treated gently." Grigoryants echoed other comment in his treatment of the bases issue, however, noting that, after "procrastinating and haggling stubbornly," the "Francoists now have given up easily." Like IZVESTIYA, the roundtable observer attributed the volte-face to Madrid's "due recognition" of the "United States' special stance on the executions." Grigoryants asserted that the U.S. support would "multiply the suffering of the Spanish" but ultimately would prove "incapable of saving a regime which is rejected by the people."

16 OCTOBER 1975

- 23 -

U S S R

OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY SLOGANS REFLECT FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUITY

The CPSU slogans for this year's October Revolution anniversary--the 58th since the 1917 revolution--are virtually identical to the May Day slogans issued in mid-April 1975, except for a few verbal modifications that take account of recent international developments or draw attention to current emphases in internal propaganda. The twice-yearly CPSU slogans have been significantly abbreviated in recent years.

In the latest slogans addressed to international issues, the main changes are as follows:

- + The slogan on European security was changed to reflect the completion of the final, third, stage of CSCE. It now calls for implementation of the "principles and accords" adopted by the conference.
- + A brief greeting to the peoples of Indochina was replaced by a slogan recognizing the "historic victory" of the Vietnamese people in the "complete liberation" of their country and hailing the "patriots of Laos and Cambodia, who have upheld the freedom and independence of their countries."
- + The slogans covering ruling communist parties and non-ruling parties in the West were unchanged from previous versions. Thus, they failed to shed any further light on the issues surrounding the controversial 6 August PRAVDA article by Konstantin Zarodov on revolutionary tactics.

In the slogans addressed to domestic issues, new phraseology was introduced to pay tribute to the 250th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences and the current celebration of the Stakhanovite movement. In addition, a slight change of phraseology in one of the slogans seems to raise the status of the Soviet intelligentsia from its traditional ideological rank as a social "stratum" to a full-fledged "class." The former slogan hailing the unity of the working class and the peasantry has now been amplified to read: "Long live the unbreakable union of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and people's intelligentsia." Whatever the ideological implications of the change, this is probably intended to stress the "socialist" credentials of the intelligentsia at a time when the regime is concerned about domestic dissidence and the possible internal effects of the Helsinki agreements.

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

- 24 -

MOSCOW IGNORES ANNIVERSARY OF 1965 ECONOMIC REFORM

The anniversary of the 27-30 September 1965 CPSU plenum on Kosygin's economic reform has passed without notice in the Soviet press--a silence in striking contrast to the fanfare earlier this year on the 10th anniversary of the March 1965 plenum which launched Brezhnev's new agricultural program. This blackout probably reflects not only the cooling of official attitudes toward the 1965 economic reform, but also Brezhnev's increasing attempts to reduce Kosygin's role as the chief administrator of economic policy. These efforts, evident since 1974, are also reflected in a series of new Central Committee decrees which suggest that party officials are directly exercising functions normally handled by the Council of Ministers.

The ignoring of the 10th anniversary of the September 1965 plenum is the more striking since Soviet calendars prepared earlier had noted the date. The blackout even included specialized economic papers such as ECONOMIC GAZETTE and SOCIALIST INDUSTRY and economic journals such as PLANNED ECONOMY and QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, as well as all republic papers, including areas like Belorussia, which in the past had displayed notable enthusiasm for the reform. KOMMUNIST, instead of the expected anniversary article, carried an editorial on Brezhnev's newly published collection of speeches on the economy.

By contrast, the March 1965 agricultural plenum anniversary was marked with numerous editorials and articles, the publication of a special book and the holding of a well-publicized ceremony attended by several Politburo members. Moreover, regime figures (including Brezhnev) have participated in extensive celebrations over the past month marking the 40th anniversary of the Stakhanovite movement--an economic approach fundamentally at odds with that of the economic reform.

Some foreshadowing of this imbalance in treatment of the two 1965 plenums was provided by the October 1974 celebration of the 10th anniversary of the October 1964 plenum which removed Khrushchev and placed Brezhnev and Kosygin in power. In almost all articles published to observe that occasion, the economic reform and Kosygin were ignored, while Brezhnev and his economic programs were eulogized at length.*

Brezhnev has been increasingly asserting his role in economic policy over the past year. In October 1974 he clearly infringed on

* See the TRENDS of 17 October 1974, page 6, and 27 November 1974, pages 23-25.

- 25 -

Kosygin's well-established prerogatives by addressing the Council of Ministers on economic policy; in mid-1975 he became an economic authority in his own right with the publication of a collection of his speeches on the economy, matching Kosygin's published collection of speeches, most of which concentrate on economic matters. The most recent indications of this trend have been several Central Committee decrees seemingly reflecting the assumption by the Central Committee of a role normally exercised by the Council of Ministers.

The decrees in question were followups to a 2 March 1973 joint Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree which had ordered ministries to switch to a production association structure and submit schemes for such reorganization to the Council of Ministers for approval. According to Brezhnev's assistant, K.U. Chernenko, head of the Central Committee's General Section, in the August QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, the Central Committee in May 1975 had issued decrees approving schemes prepared by three ministries. This is the first report of Central Committee decrees on this subject; previously, ministerial schemes were always reportedly approved by the Council of Ministers. IZVESTIYA on 6 September 1975 reported that the Council of Ministers had recently approved the schemes for the three ministries, presumably following the Central Committee action. This procedure appears to reflect an unusual intervention by the party leadership into the normal government chain of command; it violated not only the normal division of party and government functions but also the procedure specifically called for in the original, 2 March 1973 decree.

ECONOMIC ARTICLES SUGGEST TILT TOWARD HEAVY INDUSTRY

The subject of economic priorities, rarely discussed in Soviet media this year despite current preparation of the 1976-1980 five-year plan, has been raised by recent articles in KOMMUNIST and PLANNED ECONOMY. Both suggest that the tilt toward heavy industry adopted at the December 1974 CPSU plenum continues to characterize official policy and current planning. The September KOMMUNIST article strongly argued for further increasing the priority for machine building, and the August PLANNED ECONOMY article provided data showing that the growth rate of consumer goods production is declining even more sharply than before. The endorsement for machine building recalls Kirilenko's insistence earlier this year that there was a shortage of machinery and that the Central Committee had authorized increased investment in the machine building industry.*

* See the TRENDS of 25 June 1975, pages 19-21.

- 26 -

The September KOMMUNIST article on the future of the machine building industry was authored by Academician A.I. Tselikov, longtime director of an institute for design of metallurgical machinery. Tselikov wrote that despite machine building's "somewhat preferential growth rate compared with many other branches," its growth "still cannot fully satisfy us" and should be accelerated. He argued that Soviet machine building's share of industrial production is still lower than that in some economically developed capitalist countries, that shortage of capacity still prevents the machine building industry from filling all orders for equipment, that much Soviet machinery is obsolescent and must be replaced, and, worst of all, that technological progress is being slowed because the "extremely overloaded" machine building industry cannot rapidly start mass producing newly developed types of machinery. Further, he argued that machines are "the most profitable items to export," but unfortunately these exports cannot be expanded "because of lack of sufficient capacity in machine building."

Tselikov carried his advocacy of heavy industrial priority to the point of questioning the policy of encouraging heavy industrial enterprises to produce consumer goods--a policy strongly advocated by Brezhnev himself in 1970-71. Tselikov complained that such production was "scattered among a huge number of enterprises," resulting in inefficient, unmechanized small-scale production. He asked: "Should one be surprised by the fact that at many enterprises consumer goods are manufactured with wide use of manual labor without even a production line?"

The subject of priorities was also raised by an article in the August issue of Gosplan's journal PLANNED ECONOMY, which provided data on the current growth rates in heavy industry and consumer goods production. The article, by G.M. Sorokin, director of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, showed that the consumer goods' share of industrial production is actually less now than it was before the consumer program was adopted in 1971. His figures indicated that group A (heavy industry) would fall only slightly short of its five-year plan goals (45.5 percent actual increase versus 46.3 percent planned increase), but that group B (consumer goods) would fail by a wide margin: 37 percent actual growth versus 48.6 percent planned growth. Sorokin's figures indicated that group A fulfilled its planned growth every year except 1972 and 1975, while group B fulfilled its planned growth only in 1971. The data show that the shortfall in group B was even greater this year than in 1972 and 1973, when the agricultural disaster was blamed for the shortfall.

Although acknowledging the failure to fulfill the promise of preferential growth for group B, Sorokin did not call for more

investment in B, but rather reasserted heavy industry's priority and attacked "some economists" for "turning consumption into an absolute."

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue

NOTES

PRG PRICE CONTROLS RESCINDED: Commodity price controls announced in two PRG regulations dated 22 September apparently have been rescinded and the Saigon Military Management Committee has "accepted responsibility for the shortcomings" in implementing the new pricing policy, according to the 6 October issue of the Saigon newspaper TIN SAN (Morning News). The paper stated that the items involved were to revert to the prices set prior to the 22d, when South Vietnam exchanged its old GVN currency for new banknotes issued by the communist authorities. SAIGON GIAI PHONG of 7 October said the repeal of the price regulations came in a Military Management Committee communique which also contained a "public self-criticism" of its shortcomings. Praising the committee for its frankness, SAIGON GIAI PHONG went on to warn that the committee "must resolutely oppose all manifestations of bureaucracy, arrogance, and irresponsibility...."

LIBERATION RADIO FROM SAIGON: Liberation Radio, the official radio of the PRG, has apparently followed the example set by LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY on 16 June and moved its transmitting site from the Hanoi area to Saigon. Since 15 October Liberation Radio has been broadcasting on the same shortwave frequencies formerly used by Saigon radio, and monitorable programs now come on the air with the announcement "This is Liberation Radio broadcasting from Ho Chi Minh City [Saigon]." In the past Liberation Radio had not designated a place of origin. Conversely, Saigon radio has not been heard to broadcast on any of its listed frequencies since the 15th. In late June Saigon radio had eliminated regularly scheduled shortwave broadcasts for general audiences, although these same frequencies at times were put back into use to broadcast news of special interest such as the launching of the "anti-comprador bourgeoisie" campaign and the currency exchange program. Saigon Radio may still be airing programs of municipal interest on low-powered transmitters, but their inaudibility outside of Vietnam precludes technical confirmation.

PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: NCNA on 8 October announced the death in Peking on the 3d of Yunnan province chief Chou Hsing. The memorial meeting for Chou was highlighted by wreaths from the CCP's top three leaders--Mao, Chou En-lai and Wang Hung-wen--as well as by a central leadership turnout headed by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. To fill Chou's post, Peking has once again rehabilitated a former victim of the cultural revolution. The NCNA report announced that Chia Chi-yun, the former first secretary of the Kweichow provincial party committee who slipped from public view in 1966, has been named

- 29 -

to replace Chou in Yunnan. Chia delivered a speech at the memorial meeting in Peking, and he was reported by Kunming radio on 13 October as in charge of local Yunnan services for Chou. Chou's death and Chia's return to public life in Yunnan apparently have not triggered any local leadership upheavals, as Chia headed a routine turnout of provincial party leaders. The Kunming report on local memorial services for Chou also noted that Nanking Military Region Commander Ting Sheng had sent a wreath for the service. Ting, who was under poster attack in the early stage of the anti-Confucius campaign, last appeared in June, missing both Army Day and National Day turn-outs.

PRC AGRICULTURAL CONFERENCE: NCNA on 15 October reported a plenary session that day in Peking of the national conference on learning from Tachai in agriculture. The conference began on 15 September in Shansi Province, home of the model Tachai production brigade. The plenary session was attended by all currently active Peking-based Politburo members, the heads of several central ministries and many provincial party chiefs. Yeh Chien-ying headed the list of leaders present, and Politburo member Hua Kuo-feng made a "concluding" report to the meeting, which was presided over by long-time Tachai leader Chen Yung-kuei. NCNA released no details of Hua's report and it did not comment on any of the substantive issues before the conference, which presumably is being held to put a mass imprint on the agricultural goals of next year's new five-year plan. An 11 October NCNA report on discussions at the conference, however, reiterated the need to stress agricultural development as the key to speeding industrial growth. The report criticized some errant cadres for failing to direct sufficient resources to agriculture, declaring that "only after modernization of agriculture can we promote modernization of industry, national defense, and science and technology."

PRC INSTRUCTIONS TO PROVINCE: A 12 October Hangchow report on a Chekiang rally to welcome returnees from National Day activities in Peking revealed that central leaders continue to be concerned about local problems. The broadcast noted that local representatives were given "many important instructions" when they were received in Peking by "leading comrades of the central authorities." Last July Peking ordered PLA troops into Hangchow industrial plants to end factionalism and raise production. The rally was presided over by recently appointed Chekiang Military District Commander Chang Wen-pi, who personally led troops into several local factories last July. It stressed the need to strengthen "party spirit, unity and discipline." Provincial secretary Tieh Ying specifically urged implementing "the series of instructions issued by Chairman Mao

and the party central committee with perseverance and to the letter." Tieh called upon local leaders to "criticize bourgeois factionalism in a more extensive and deeper way" and to "increase the industrial production for the fourth quarter to a fairly large extent." Some progress in combating factionalism was reported in a 14 October Hangchow broadcast which praised the party committee of the provincial public security bureau for having "exposed and criticized a very small number of people who have insisted on practicing bourgeois factionalism."

PRC-PORTUGUESE TIMOR: A 14 October NCNA commentary has offered China's first assessment of the situation in Portuguese Timor since Lisbon began its decolonization program last year. The commentary, supporting a message to the UN Security Council four days earlier by FRETILIN (The Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor), characterized FRETILIN as being in the vanguard of the "national independence movement in Portuguese Timor (East Timor)." The article did not explicitly condemn the group's two adversaries--the Timor Democratic Union, which favors retaining close ties with Lisbon, and the People's Democratic Association of Timor, which favors the incorporation of East Timor into neighboring Indonesia. However, it highlighted recent FRETILIN military gains at its adversaries' expense and stated that it had "the support of most of the people." NCNA also noted that Indonesian forces had carried out a military raid against an East Timor town and it cited, without explicit criticism, comment by Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik and from the Indonesian press encouraging the union of East Timor with Indonesia. Over the past year the Chinese have given considerable publicity to Portugal's decolonization moves in Africa, but had heretofore remained silent on decolonization plans for Lisbon's East Asian enclaves in Timor and Macao. Peking claims Macau as an integral part of China, but has shown no sign of wanting it back in the near future.

- 1 -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 6 - 12 OCTOBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2598 items)</u>		<u>Peking (938 items)</u>	
GDR 26th Anniversary	(--) 15%	UNGA 30th Session	(8%) 15%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--) 3%]	[Chiao Kuan-hua Speech	(4%) 4%]
USSR Academy of Sciences	(--) 8%	[Sihanouk Speech	(1%) 3%]
250th Anniversary		Yugoslav Premier Bijedic	(--) 14%*
[Brezhnev Speech	(--) 5%]	in PRC	
China	(7%) 4%	DPRK Workers Party 30th	(1%) 12%
Brezhnev Greetings on WFTU	(--) 3%	Anniversary	
30th Anniversary		PRC-Bangladesh Establish-	(--) 6%
Lao Independence 30th	(--) 3%	ment of Diplomatic	
Anniversary		Relations	
DPRK Workers Party 30th	(--) 3%	Lao Independence 30th	(--) 4%
Anniversary		Anniversary	
		Announcement on Kissinger's	(--) 3%
		Upcoming Visit to PRC	

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Bijedic.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160017-6

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

16 October 1975

A D D E N D U M

to

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA, 8 October 1975 (VOL. XXVI, No. 40)

The attached pages were inadvertently omitted from this issue of the TRENDS; they follow immediately after page - S 4 - of the Supplementary Article "PRAVDA Editorial Article Attacks Shortcomings in Philosophy."

Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160017-6

- 5 -

acknowledged some shortcomings and promised to eliminate them. Glezerman concluded the discussion while adding more of his own sharp criticisms, especially of an article by Grushin which he said did not help "our ideological struggle."

FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The philosophy dispute appears to extend into international issues too. The outspoken January 1974 editorial cited Brezhnev's optimistic August 1973 Alma-Ata statement about the value of increased contacts and exchange of information under detente, and used this as an argument for the need to develop more effective and realistic philosophical theory and social science research to cope with increased contacts.

Frolov has apparently increased the number of articles on foreign affairs. During the 5 February 1974 Institute of Philosophy discussion of the journal's work, one speaker, noting the journal's articles about peaceful coexistence, complained that they more properly belonged in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, since they did not really concentrate on the philosophical aspects of foreign affairs. In the Academy of Social Sciences discussion reported in the August 1975 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, Momdzhyan criticized the reduced number of articles on historical materialism and dialectical materialism, and Frolov acknowledged that he had reduced space for dialectics and some other philosophical subjects in order to run more articles on socio-philosophical problems of society, the scientific-technical revolution, and foreign policy.

The journal has published articles which are clearly at odds with Zarodov's 6 August 1975 PRAVDA article. Zarodov rejected a "moderate" approach for Western communist parties in their struggle for power, scorned elections and electoral majorities, and warned against a communist party submerging itself in general leftist movements and losing its identity as the leader of leftist forces. T.T. Timofeyev, director of the Institute of the International Workers Movement, wrote a strongly pro-united front article in the May 1975 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, stressing that joining broader coalitions of leftists is just as important today as it was during the 1930's when the Comintern adopted this tactic and in World War II when the Soviet Union collaborated with the West. He denied accusations that such a line is not revolutionary and that peaceful coexistence means preserving the status quo. He specifically raised the subject of Portugal, arguing that the Communist Party should join the general democratic leftist movement and work for an intermediary stage rather than seeking direct transition to a dictatorship of the proletariat.

- 5 6 -

He condemned those who urged "speeding up" of events and "jumping over" necessary stages in Portugal.

This argument was continued in an August 1975 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY editorial devoted to the 40th anniversary of the 1935 Comintern congress which initiated the united front tactic. The editorial lauded this tactic as equally valid today. It cited Brezhnev's May 1975 war anniversary statement that differences of social systems are no obstacle to joint efforts and that the wartime collaboration should be regarded as a model that is still valid. This issue of the journal was signed to press on 6 August-- the day Zarodov's article appeared.

Zarodov's conservative line appeared endorsed by Brezhnev when PRAVDA on 18 September reported Zarodov's special private audience with Brezhnev, who had "highly rated" the work of Zarodov's journal PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM. There was no reason given for the highly unusual meeting, leaving the conclusion that its sole purpose was to lend Brezhnev's weight to Zarodov's controversial article. Philosophy's role in foreign policy was emphasized in the next day's PRAVDA article which declared that one of the main tasks of philosophers is to analyze the world revolutionary process and its rules of development in individual countries and regions.