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Trends in Communist Media

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Trends in Communist Media

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

PARTIES IN EAST, WEST REMAIN SPLIT ON EUROPEAN STRATEGY

Indications continue to accumulate that the question of how communist parties should pursue their goals in Europe during a period of economic crisis and regional political unrest remains a sharply divisive issue in the communist world. The latest indication of this was the failure of the 17-19 November Berlin meeting of CP representatives to complete preparations for the long-delayed European communist party conference and the announcement that still another preparatory meeting would be held in January.

The impasse was further underscored by the publication on the first day of the Berlin meeting of a declaration by the French and Italian CP's announcing their commitment to democratic principles and rejection of any outside interference in their internal affairs-- positions clearly at odds with recent indications of CPSU wishes.

In the meantime, the Soviet party itself has moved to adopt a conservative public posture on these issues, although evidence of internal debate between hardline and softline theorists continues to appear.

EAST BERLIN MEETING The 17-19 November meeting in East Berlin of Politburo-level representatives of 28 East and West European communist parties failed to live up to its advance billing as a session that would "complete" the final document of the proposed European communist party conference.* Instead the communique on the session, as reported by Soviet and GDR media, said a drafting group would "further work over" the document draft and submit a "revised" version to the next preparatory session in January 1976. The January session, it added, would also "discuss" the date for the final conference.

The proposed European party conference, preparations for which had been initiated at a Warsaw meeting in October 1974, was originally scheduled, according to the Warsaw communique, to be held during the first half of 1975. With the work to resolve differences between the Moscow-oriented and independent parties over the conference document continuing into January, it is far less likely that Moscow can convene the final conference prior to the 25th CPSU Congress scheduled for February.

* The 9-10 October East Berlin preparatory session, which had announced that work on the conference document would be completed in November, is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 October 1975, pages 17-18.

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Recent press interviews with West European communist party leaders indicate Moscow has already made some concessions to the independent parties, in the direction of removing from the draft document such features as appeals for revolutionary class struggle, portrayal of the European communist parties as united under Moscow's aegis, and veiled criticism of Peking. The announced plan to submit a revised draft to a January preparatory meeting suggests that Moscow's concessions to date have not satisfied the independent parties. A document watered down to the degree demanded by the independents would appear to vitiate the announced purpose of the conference--to follow up the Helsinki European security conference with a program of struggle for peace, security, cooperation "and social progress" by the communist parties of Europe. The addition of the term "social progress" to the list presumably signifies a new emphasis on seeking to exploit revolutionary situations in West Europe.

NATIONALISM VERSUS INTERNATIONALISM

It is clear from recent comment by Moscow and Prague that the issue underlying the European impasse has been the refusal of the more liberal-minded parties to accept the degree of commitment to internationalism which Moscow has apparently sought to persuade the parties to accept. Thus, a Shalygin commentary, broadcast by Moscow radio in Italian, Romanian and other languages on the 20th, bluntly asserted that "it is clear that Marxist-Leninists have never considered the specific features of national conditions as something absolute." This Marxist-Leninist approach, he declared, "makes more concrete those common things for which all communists strive" and which form the basis of "the cohesion of European communists." Shalygin prefaced this assertion with what amounted to a reminder to maverick parties of the commitment to internationalism which all participating European communist parties had undertaken in first agreeing to attend a European party conference. He further recalled that the proposal for a conference had "met with a very great consensus" and that the communist parties had "agreed on the methods of preparing the conference." Shalygin insisted that due consideration had been given in preparatory deliberations to the opinions of each conference participant.

On 7 November, in the period between the two latest European CP conference preparatory meetings, a Hlivka article in the Bratislava PRAVDA had heavily stressed the primacy of internationalism over national interests. Predicting that the European party conference would have great significance in the context of socialist internationalism and revolutionary class struggle, the article went on to denounce all those who adopt a "petty bourgeois, nationalist manner" toward internationalism. The article strongly defended the Comintern as a positive example of internationalism, pointedly portraying that organization as "an international party" with Lenin's ideas constituting its "governing center." With unmistakable reference to

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the present-day independent communist parties, the article went on to denounce the Social Democrats for throwing proletarian internationalism overboard "under the slogan of 'defense of national interests.'"

In a reference to more recent events, the Hlivka article quoted in boldface type a statement in the main document of the 1969 Moscow international party conference that "loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism" were essential conditions for the "correct orientation" of the communist parties' individual actions. It added, also in boldface type, that "the working out and implementation of the common line of the communist movement" was an important factor in the world revolutionary process and in consolidating the "unity and cohesion" of the world communist movement. The article, which also included a denunciation of Maoism, thus appeared to serve notice on the independent parties that, despite their objections, Moscow and its allies intended to use the European CP conference as a prelude to another world party conference which would be a forum for condemning the Chinese.

FRENCH-ITALIAN
CP STATEMENT

A joint statement issued by the French and Italian Communist Parties on 17 November--the day the East Berlin meeting opened--in effect served notice on Moscow that the European CP conference could not be used as a vehicle for imposing common policies or obligations on European communists. Published after several days of talks in Rome between party leaders Marchais and Berlinguer, the statement reasserted the autonomy of their parties and rejected "all acts" of foreign interference, defended the policy of forming "united fronts" with socialists and other progressives, and declared their loyalty to the principles of political pluralism and universal suffrage and to basic human freedoms. The two leaders further underscored their independence by stating that "all these conditions of democratic life" were "not tactical" but rather "principles" based on "specific objective and historical conditions" in their countries. To date, Soviet media have not commented on the statement.

Considering the two parties' past differences on a number of issues, the appearance of the statement was in itself unusual. In the words of Marchais, it was a statement "which has no precedent," a "truly historical document." Past differing public stands on what the European CP conference final document should contain are illustrative. In an interview published in L'HUMANITE on 13 October, French Politburo member Jean Kanapa had taken issue with the idea of dropping any reference to class conflict and stressing peaceful coexistence instead--an idea reportedly accepted by Moscow and its supporters to placate the Italian CP and other independents. Kanapa declared "we want peace, but we also want socialism." While acknowledging that

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"many parties"---obviously including the Italians---wanted to limit the struggle to peaceful coexistence, Kanapa added that this "does not prevent us from pursuing, quite independently, our revolutionary struggle in France . . . against Giscard's monopolist government and for democracy and socialism."

The day after the Kanapa interview was published, L'UNITA carried the speech by PCI Secretariat member Giancarlo Pajetta at the 9-10 October East Berlin working group meeting. Pajetta voiced satisfaction with the softened version of the draft, merely reiterating that the final version must reflect the principles of consensus, diversity amidst unity, and autonomy of individual parties.

THE SOVIET POSITION It seems apparent the CPSU has taken a harder stand on the issues in dispute than either the liberal-minded parties or outside observers had anticipated. It is likely that the Soviet position on these interparty issues was determined primarily by considerations of prestige and tactics rather than by any broader change of policy. The Soviet leaders probably felt that a point of diminishing returns had been reached in the process of trying to conciliate the liberal-minded parties and decided they could no go further in this direction.

In any event, it is apparent that the CPSU has been moving toward a tougher public position on communist party strategy, the Zarodov article in the 6 August PRAVDA and Brezhnev's well-publicized reception of Zarodov on 17 September being the main items of evidence in point. The apparent contrast between the CPSU's position on issues of party strategy and the Soviet leadership's continued pursuit of detente recalls the widely accepted description of Soviet policy in the 1920's and 1930's as dual-tracked. It is quite possible the Soviet leaders feel that they can encourage communist parties in the West to adopt more aggressive policies without seriously jeopardizing the gains in security achieved through detente, or without forfeiting their chances for further gains.

In the meantime, it is far from clear that the issue is a closed one in the Soviet party. It is not yet apparent whether the debate has continued after Brezhnev's endorsement of Zarodov, but this may be clarified as the latest ideological journals become available.

A good example of this debate was contained in the latest available issue (No. 5) of the most intellectual of the ideology-oriented journals, THE WORKING CLASS AND THE MODERN WORLD, organ of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of the International Workers' Movement. The lead article by V.V. Zagladin, longtime associate of candidate Politburo member Ponomarev, presented a generally hardline interpretation of communist party strategy. Like Zarodov earlier, he

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emphasized the importance of pushing for ultimate, "socialist" goals in the "anti-monopolist" struggle and disparaged the importance of observing the rules of democratic politics. While Zagladin endorsed united front tactics, usually a touchstone of the moderate side in the debate, he made it clear that he envisioned alliances with the socialists as marriages of convenience only, warning against making "compromises" for a few thousand votes.

The other side of the argument was presented in the same issue by the head of the Institute, Timur Timofeyev, in the article immediately following. The main point of his article was a defense of united front tactics and of the necessity of adapting communist goals to the interests of a broad strata of disaffected groups which would be represented in the "anti-monopolist struggle"--a call for moderation, in other words. He directly disputed Zagladin on the matter of making compromises to gain allies. He quoted Lenin as stressing the importance of "the careful, concerned, cautious, and skillful use of every, even the slightest opportunity, for gaining a mass ally." He stressed that these alliances should include even the "bourgeoisie," and he dismissed as "leftist" shouters those who would insist on a "purely" proletarian revolution. Timofeyev wound up with what can only be interpreted as an appeal for caution by the leadership, reminding his readers that communist strategy should be based on a "scientific" assessment of all the factors involved, including particularly the "ripeness of objective conditions," and the "status of the subjective factors"--the desires of the workers themselves, in other words.

A new article discussing the limits on communist participation in "bourgeois" governments in the most recent issue of the journal PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM further suggests that this issue remains very much alive within the communist movement. The late Finnish communist Erkki Touminen, writing in the November issue of this journal, edited by Konstantin Zarodov, quoted Lenin to back up his argument that attempts by communist parties to achieve reform through parliamentary representation constituted an "important but secondary means of influencing the masses." He asserted that even achievements such as wage increases and improved working conditions have been achieved not through parliamentary reform but by mass action. Touminen warned that parliamentary participation must be used as a means to achieve socialist goals, and not to perpetuate capitalism.

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SALT

MOSCOW AFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD ON ARMS TALKS

In the wake of Secretary of State Kissinger's revelation at a 10 November press conference that the latest attempt to reach a compromise on outstanding SALT issues had failed, Soviet media have reaffirmed Moscow's belief in the continued validity of the Vladivostok understanding governing the current negotiations. This message has been contained in a number of foreign-language broadcasts in recent days commemorating the first anniversary of the Vladivostok meeting between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev. Soviet domestic media--which rarely comment on SALT--have carried neither the Vladivostok commentaries nor reports of the Secretary's 10 November remarks. Anniversary broadcasts to North America, as though answering Secretary Kissinger's charges, have acknowledged obstacles in the negotiations and laid the blame on internal U.S. developments.

At the same time Soviet media have withheld judgement on the impact that recent U.S. Cabinet changes might have on SALT and other bilateral issues, despite their stress in reporting it on underlying foreign policy differences within the Administration.

Commemorating the Vladivostok anniversary in a broadcast to North America on 22 November, USA chief editor Valentin Berezhkov made reference to Secretary Kissinger's 12 October remark on Meet the Press that a new SALT accord was 90 percent complete and expressed confidence that "the guidelines of the Vladivostok meeting will prompt the resolution of the final 10 percent of the draft as well." He maintained that the new agreement, "when it is signed at the next Soviet-American summit, will reduce the threat of thermonuclear conflict and stimulate new efforts toward disarmament." Another anniversary commentary broadcast in East European as well as other languages on the 21st affirmed that the Soviet delegation continues to be guided by the terms of the Vladivostok understanding and that the meeting itself was a landmark event which "confirmed the will of the two countries to develop relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence and equal security."

Soviet media did not report Kissinger's 10 November press conference at which he acknowledged that talks had reached a temporary impasse with Soviet rejection of a U.S. compromise proposal, and domestic media have not conveyed the notion that the talks might be in some difficulty. In his commentary broadcast to North America on the 22d, however, Berezhkov accused "the Pentagon" of hindering the final stages of negotiation on a new accord through its insistence on

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"building up America's might." And PRAVDA observer Tomas Kolesnichenko, in a further broadcast to North America on the 24th supporting Vladivostok, said that supporters of SALT in Washington were "locked in battle with those who would like to postpone such an agreement indefinitely or even torpedo it." Kolesnichenko implied as well that the 1976 elections were becoming a factor in the internal U.S. debate.

EFFECT OF CABINET CHANGES Soviet reporting on the recent U.S. cabinet changes has focused on reports that differences between former defense secretary Schlesinger and Kissinger over foreign policy and detente were somehow involved. But Soviet media have been careful not to suggest that Moscow necessarily sees a boost for U.S.-Soviet relations or SALT as likely to follow from Schlesinger's dismissal. In fact, a hint of uneasiness over the changes seemed evident in the most direct comment to date, in an article by PRAVDA's Kolesnichenko on the 16th. He said "any reshuffle in the U.S. Administration concerns primarily the United States, being entirely its own affair. But the world public is closely watching the zigzags in Washington's foreign policy course, rightly believing that this or that conjunctural and tactical consideration should not act to the detriment of the strengthening of peace and international security."

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SOUTH CHINA SEA ISLANDS

CHINESE ARTICLE PRESSES PEKING'S CLAIM TO CONTESTED ISLANDS

China's strongest reaffirmation in nearly two years of its long-standing claims to disputed islands in the South China Sea was publicized in a lengthy article in the 24 November KWANGMING DAILY. The article, signed by Shih Ti-tzu, was carried textually by NCNA's Chinese service on the 26th, after having been summarized by Peking radio and replayed in PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 25th. It attributes China's loss of some of the islands to the actions of "foreign aggressors," without acknowledging that its claims are disputed by Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Peking's decision to press its case publicly in the face of Vietnamese claims to many of the islands marks the latest in a series of signs indicating a cooling of Sino-Vietnamese relations.

Vigorously restating China's claim to the Paracel, Spratly, and two smaller island groups in the area, the KWANGMING DAILY article uses firm language reminiscent of statements from the PRC Foreign Ministry in January and February 1974 that marked the Chinese capture of islands in the Paracel group which had been occupied by the former Saigon government.* The article notes for the first time since 1974 that "many" of the PRC-claimed islands are not yet in Chinese hands, and it asserted that China "absolutely will not allow anyone to invade or occupy our territory under any pretext."

The seriousness of the Chinese commitment to regain the contested islands is repeatedly highlighted in the article. It is replete with references to China's "sacred" and "treasured" islands, "irrigated" with the sweat of the Chinese people, and it notes Peking's "strong will" and "resolute determination" to defend China's "inalienable" rights. The article also underscores Peking's intransigence by going further than other propaganda in recent years to link the island claims with the Taiwan issue, juxtaposing a pledge to liberate Taiwan with the assertion that "all islands belonging to China must return to the embrace of the motherland." The importance of the issue is pointed up as well by the article's references to the strategic importance of the islands, standing astride main shipping routes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Offering more detailed documentation of PRC claims than any Peking comment in recent years, the article maintained that the Chinese were the first to discover the island groups and the first to

* China's coverage of the military action and concurrent reaffirmations of PRC territorial claims are discussed in the TRENDS of 16 January 1974, pages 6-7, and of 23 January 1974, pages 14-15.

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"exercise administration and jurisdiction over them." It cites Chinese claims going back as far as 2,000 years and alleges that Peking's current stance is supported by recent archeological discoveries on the islands and by the fact that past Chinese governments had long exercised administrative control there. It also cites for support maps and atlases recently published in the United States, Japan, West Europe, as well as the Soviet Union.

In maintaining that Soviet atlases had traditionally supported China's island claims, the article offers Peking's first acknowledgment of Soviet media criticism of Chinese military actions in the Paracels.* It complains that following the Chinese move in January 1974 the "Soviet revisionists" launched a "venomous" attack on China. Since January 1974, low-level Soviet propaganda has continued to criticize China's claims to the disputed islands and its use of force in the Paracels. Moscow has implied backing for Vietnamese claims, but has avoided voicing explicit support. Thus, most recently, a 24 November commentary broadcast by Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress in English to Asia labeled China's January 1974 military action an "annexationist act" reflecting Peking's "big power chauvinism" and noted that Asian public opinion had rightfully branded the attack as an "outright betrayal of the cause of the Vietnamese patriots."

PAST TREATMENT OF
CONTESTED CLAIMS Following its military victory over Saigon in the Paracels in January 1974, Peking had muffled comment on the disputed islands, and did not respond to the Hanoi media's 5 May 1975 report that communist Vietnamese forces had captured several islands from the former Saigon regime, including six islands in the Spratly archipelagoes. However, immediately prior to the China visit by Vietnamese Workers Party First Secretary Le Duan in September 1975, Peking radio broadcasts to Vietnam and Taiwan had carried a report by the station's correspondent which reaffirmed China's claims to the disputed islands and recalled for the first time in months the 1974 PRC victory in the Paracels.** In addition, an extensive article on recent Chinese development of the Paracel Islands was published in issue No. 10 of the PRC international magazine CHINA PICTORIAL.

* The author of the article, Shih Ti-tzu (0670 2769 4371), has previously engaged in polemics with the Soviets. An article attributed to him in the March 1974 issue of the PRC journal GEOGRAPHICAL KNOWLEDGE dealt with the background of Peking's claims to the Amur River region and pointedly criticized Soviet claims that the Amur had been in Russian hands for over a thousand years.

** This issue is discussed in the TRENDS of 24 September 1975, page 14.

Hanoi media have not pressed Vietnamese claims against Peking, and they avoided even mentioning the Chinese takeover of the Paracel Islands in January 1974. Since the Vietnamese occupied islands in the Spratlys in May 1975, Hanoi has occasionally reaffirmed that Vietnam will defend all of its territory, including the islands. Thus, for example, North Vietnamese Chief of Staff Senior General Van Tien Dung, speaking at the recent Saigon consultative conference on unification, noted that the Vietnamese armed forces would "firmly defend our territorial integrity, including the territorial waters and airspace of the unified socialist fatherland from Lang Son to Ca Mau, from the frontier to the islands, from the mainland to the continental shelves. . . ."

Peking's heightened stress on the island claims in the current article also has possible implications for PRC policy toward the Taipei government, which claims all the islands and maintains a military garrison on an island in the Spratlys, and toward the Philippines, which claims some of the Spratly Islands. China's dispute with the latter may have been recently eased, however, as both sides agreed in the 9 June 1975 joint communique marking President Marcos' visit to China to settle all bilateral disputes by "peaceful means . . . without resorting to the use or threat of force."*

* The communique is discussed in the TRENDS of 11 June 1975, pages 17-18.

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VIETNAM

NORTH-SOUTH CONFERENCE ON STATE UNIFICATION CLOSES IN SAIGON

Vietnamese media reports on the 21 November closing session of the Saigon political consultative conference on reunification announced that the respective heads of the North and South delegations signed two "important" documents, the conference's final communique and a "list of problems unanimously agreed upon."* The "list of problems" has not been released, and reports on the conference do not project a specific timetable for the creation of a single Vietnamese government.

The media have publicized the conference communique, however. According to a VNA transmission on 21 November, the communique stipulated that general elections for a new national assembly will be held in the first half of 1976, under the supervision of a "national election council" to be made up of an equal number of representatives from the North and South. In addition, the North and South are to have their own separate organs in charge of the elections in their areas--the National Assembly Standing Committee acting in this capacity in the North, and the PRG Advisory Council in the South. In line with this allocation of responsibility, the first session of the "common national assembly" is to be presided over by DRV National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh, the head of the North's delegation to the consultative conference, and by PRG Advisory Council Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, deputy head of the South's conference delegation.

The goal of holding the nationwide elections during the first half of 1976 may be somewhat optimistic, in view of Truong Chinh's assertion at the 15 November session of the conference that a population census would be required in the South prior to the balloting. It could take several months to carry out the census in the South, judging by the experience of the last census in North Vietnam, where conditions should have been better than those prevailing in the South today. The April 1974 census in North Vietnam was first publicly announced in late February, but it was some six months later--on 29 August 1974--before its results were finally released. Presumably northern voting districts will also have to be revised prior to the elections, since the communique indicates there will be one delegate for every 100,000 people--a requirement which would reduce the total of 420 deputies for North Vietnam's 24 million population in the present DRV National Assembly.

* For a discussion of the opening of the consultative conference, see the TRENDS of 19 November 1975, pages 17-19.

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Several delegates at the consultative conference reportedly referred in their speeches to overwhelming international support for reunification, but Vietnamese media coverage of foreign reaction to the conference has been sparse. Among the few published congratulatory greetings was one from Shitikov and Ruben, chairmen of the two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet. There has been no similar message from the PRC, but Peking, like Moscow, carried routine factual reports on the conference.

LE DUAN RETURNS TO HANOI FOLLOWING VISITS TO POLAND, ROMANIA

Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan and a North Vietnamese party-government delegation have concluded a nearly two-month-long tour of East Europe and the Soviet Union, arriving back in Hanoi on 22 November following final visits to Poland (8-13 November) and Romania (13-18 November). Le Duan's tour began in early October and included visits to Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany and Czechoslovakia prior to his arrival in Moscow on 27 October for five days of official talks with Soviet party and government leaders. Le Duan vacationed briefly in the Soviet Union before departing for Warsaw on 8 November.*

A 24 November NHAN DAN editorial welcoming the delegation home recalled an earlier Le Duan visit to Peking in September, as well as the visits to Moscow and East Europe, and hailed the tour as marking a "new and splendid development" in the solidarity and cooperation between Vietnam and the "fraternal parties." NHAN DAN avoided any suggestion that policy differences might have arisen between the Vietnamese and their hosts, claiming a "complete identity of views" had been reached during talks between Le Duan and the leaders of the fraternal parties.

Le Duan's visits to Warsaw and Bucharest followed the pattern set during his October stops in East Europe, including the standard bilateral talks with party leaders, banquets and friendship rallies. The joint statements issued at the conclusion of each visit--on 12 November in Warsaw and 17 November in Bucharest--introduced no new policy positions and routinely affirmed the East Europeans' intention to strengthen bilateral relations with the Vietnamese.

* Le Duan's visit to Moscow is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 November 1975, pages 8-10; his East European tour in the TRENDS of 30 October 1975, pages S1-S3; and his visit to China in the TRENDS of 1 October 1975, pages 13-15, and 24 September 1975, pages 12-14.

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Neither statement indicated that a unanimity of views was reached in the talks, although such claims were made for Le Duan's earlier talks in Moscow and Budapest. A notable change appeared in Le Duan's speeches in Poland and Romania, where he omitted the specific call for "restoration" of solidarity among socialist countries which he had voiced on the earlier leg of his East European tour and again in Moscow. It is not clear whether the absence of this formula, which implies Peking should be accepted into the fold with other communist states, reflects any shift in Hanoi's posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Hanoi media routinely reported on the Polish and Romanian visits, focusing reportage primarily on the portions of speeches dealing with bilateral relations.

ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS During both the Warsaw and Bucharest visits economic agreements were signed covering the 1976-1980 Vietnamese five-year plan. In Poland the 12 November signing ceremony included an agreement on "long-term economic cooperation and trade exchange" for 1976-1980, and protocols on "goods exchange" for 1976 and on the results of the intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation. Vietnamese media reported that long-term loans were included in the agreement. In addition, VNA reported on 23 November that another agreement covering Poland's "non-refund economic aid to Vietnam in 1975" had been signed in Warsaw on the 21st.

Romanian-Vietnamese economic pacts, signed on the 17th, included agreements on long-term loans and goods exchange and payments during the next five years, and protocols on trade for next year and on the results of the intergovernmental cooperation commission meeting. The joint statement also provided for waiving repayment of loans granted by Romania to Vietnam in 1966 and 1970-1973. The Soviet Union and all its East European allies except Poland had announced the cancellation of Hanoi's wartime debts following the Paris peace agreement in 1973.

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ANGOLA

HAVANA IGNORES FOREIGN CLAIMS OF CUBAN AID, U.S. WARNING

Havana has not acknowledged Secretary of State Kissinger's warning, in his 24 November Detroit speech, that "the United States cannot remain indifferent" to Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Angola and the Secretary's admonition that "Cuban meddling" in the Angolan civil war could destroy chances for a rapprochement between Washington and Havana. (A TASS report of the Secretary's speech on the 25th similarly ignored Kissinger's remarks on Angola.) Although Cuban media have given extensive coverage to Angola in recent weeks, Havana's lack of response to the Secretary's warning is in line with its complete avoidance of any acknowledgement of Western press reports of Cuban and Soviet involvement. Unlike Moscow, Havana also has avoided any polemical references to Peking's support to Angolan groups.*

There was no reticence in Cuban media about charging other countries with interference in Angola, however, with Havana deploring "imperialist" maneuvers said to have been carried out by "mercenaries" from the United States, Zaire and South Africa against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which the Cuban Government recognized on 11 November as "the one and only legitimate representative of its people." Thus, Cuban ambassador Ricardo Alarcon, in a UN speech reported by the Havana domestic service on 13 November, said that Angola was "confronting the aggression of imperialism and its colonialist and racist mercenaries." And Luis Gomez Wanguemert, commenting on Havana domestic television on the 12th, asserted that the forces fighting against the MPLA "receive U.S. war material through the area bordering Zaire" and that the MPLA's enemies also "have the support of the racist regimes of southern Africa which are allied to Yankee monopolists." Emphasizing U.S. culpability, Gomez Wanguemert quoted PRENSA LATINA dispatches as providing evidence of an alleged "vast plot of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency" aimed against Portugal and against the MPLA. Claiming that the "CIA plot" was based on "shock forces" recruited from Portuguese "reactionaries" evacuated from Angola, the commentator said "no less than 300,000" were involved in this threat to the MPLA, "the only true representative of the Angolan people."

* For a review of Moscow, Peking, Tyongyang and Hanoi treatment of Angola, see the TRENDS of 19 November, pages 9-13.

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The Cuban leadership's only allusion to direct Cuban support for Angola came from PCC Secretariat member Jorge Risquet, speaking at an Angolan solidarity rally reported by the domestic service on the 12th. Risquet said that Cubans "must reiterate our militant solidarity" and added that "we are ready to demonstrate our solidarity in any field and even give our blood to the Angolan people."

MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW CONTINUES PUSH TO REOPEN GENEVA CONFERENCE, WITH PLO

Routine follow-up Moscow comment on the 9 November Soviet Government* note to the United States proposing reconvening of the Geneva conference on the Middle East has continued to stress the need for Palestine Liberation Organization participation.* Soviet comment has dismissed U.S. and Israeli opposition to PLO attendance as "obstructionism," and also has sought to contrast the usefulness of Moscow's proposal with an alleged failure of the "separatist" Sinai II agreement, viewing the Soviet initiative as proof that Moscow continues to play as important a role in the Middle East as the United States. There has been only sparse, disapproving Moscow comment on proposals for new Syrian-Israeli negotiations as the 30 November expiration date for the mandate authorizing UN peacekeeping forces in the Golan Heights approaches. Comment, as before, has left open the option of bilateral "partial measures" within the Geneva framework as part of a comprehensive settlement.

U.S. RESPONSE TO
SOVIET NOTE

Soviet media are not known to have acknowledged thus far Secretary Kissinger's 12 November remarks at a Pittsburgh press conference in which he said the United States was studying the Soviet note and would be consulting "with all of the interested parties." An indirect Soviet acknowledgement was publicized in an unattributed NOVOSTI agency article, published in the Jordanian newspaper AL-AKHBAR on the 22d. The NOVOSTI article commented that "as expected, Washington has objections" and went on to assert that Kissinger had recently discussed the Soviet proposal in Pittsburgh and had "refused to grant the PLO a seat" at Geneva "unless it changes its attitude toward the aggressor." (Kissinger had called the issue of PLO participation at Geneva "the major difficulty" in the Soviet proposal and had reaffirmed that negotiations with the PLO were not possible unless it recognized Israel's right to exist.) A TASS report of the Secretary's Pittsburgh remarks on the 14th omitted any comments related to the Soviet note on the Geneva conference.

* The Soviet Government note to the U.S. Government, first publicized and carried in full text by TASS and Moscow radio in various foreign languages on 10 November, is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 November, pages 9-10.

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The NOVOSTI article also referred to a U.S. proposal, first made in mid-September, for an "informal" meeting of the Geneva participants preparatory to convening the formal Geneva conference. The Moscow media had previously ignored this suggestion; NOVOSTI called it a "trial balloon" and "alternative proposal" to Geneva, but did not criticize it.

PLO ISSUE Dismissing U.S. and Israeli opposition, Soviet media have continued to stress the need for PLO participation at Geneva, occasionally adding, as in a PRAVDA international review by Tomas Kolesnichenko on the 16th, that the talks would be "an idle exercise" without the PLO. Comment has waffled on the timing of a PLO presence--the most notable feature of Moscow's proposal--with some comment repeating the call for PLO participation "from the very beginning" and other comment avoiding the issue.

Much of Moscow's comment has merely voiced common complaints against alleged Israeli policies, and at times against U.S. Mideast policies. A 17 November TASS report on Prime Minister Rabin's remarks at a weekly cabinet meeting, for example, denounced his statement that Israel would not attend the Geneva conference if the PLO were present and charged that Israel's position proved it did not want a political solution. Other comment has attributed Israel's adamant stand to U.S. moral and political support, arguing that the two governments' policies on the PLO issue coincide.

USSR ROLE To drive home the point that Geneva talks are necessary, Soviet commentators have sought to contrast the ineffective "separatist" approach of the Sinai II accord with Moscow's 9 November call for "joint collective efforts" at Geneva. Some comment has reiterated Moscow's displeasure at being left out of the Sinai II negotiations and its intention to be part of future Arab-Israeli talks. An IZVESTIYA article by V. Kudryavtsev on the 13th expressed this attitude explicitly. He argued that Moscow's recent initiative on Geneva had put the lie to contentions by American and "certain short-sighted Arab circles" that the USSR had "virtually dissociated itself from Mideast affairs, as though the only side which can settle the conflict in the Middle East was the United States," adding that "nothing could be further from the truth."

SYRIAN FACTOR Moscow has continued to say little about the possibility of new Israeli-Syrian negotiations, but limited comment has remained distinctly negative to any such negotiations outside the Geneva framework. An Arabic-language commentary on the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress on the 17th, for example, asserted that U.S. circles still hoped "to

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force Syria unilaterally to make agreements with the aggressor" and "to move it away from the Geneva conference."

Syria's lukewarm-to-indifferent attitude toward the Geneva conference no doubt remains of concern to Moscow. In publicizing Syrian statements on the Mideast situation, Soviet media have been hard-put to find references to Geneva, in their absence resorting to assertions that Soviet and Syrian policies are identical. TASS on the 26th, reporting recent statements and interviews by four Syrian officials, cited them as stressing the need for a comprehensive Mideast settlement; yet none referred to Geneva.*

As in recent months, Moscow has appeared to leave open the possibility of future "partial measures" achieved as an integral part of an overall settlement within the Geneva framework--a position first affirmed in the Soviet-Egyptian communique on Foreign Minister Fahmi's April 1975 visit. The 9 November proposal on Geneva did not rule out such an approach--limiting its criticism in this regard to partial measures achieved "on a separate basis"--and suggested that "the proceedings at the conference should be organized according to agreement between all its participants."

* The most recent high-level Soviet-Syrian communique, issued after al-Asad's 9-10 October visit to Moscow, failed to mention the Geneva conference. Previous high-level Soviet-Syrian communiqués over the past year had. For a discussion of al-Asad's trip, see the TRENDS of 16 October, pages 7-10.

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K O R E A

DPRK OBSCURES UNGA ADOPTION OF TWO CONFLICTING RESOLUTIONS

North Korean comment on the UN General Assembly's adoption on 18 November of two rival, conflicting resolutions on the Korean question has followed Pyongyang's earlier pattern of focusing exclusively on the resolution it sought while virtually ignoring the U.S.-backed resolution and failing to acknowledge that it too was approved by the UNGA. While a DPRK Government statement had been issued on 31 October following the 29 October passage of the two draft resolutions by the UNGA First Committee,* the most authoritative comment on the General Assembly action was a 19 November statement by the DPRK delegation at the United Nations and an editorial in the party daily NODONG SINMUN on the 20th. The comment called for implementation of the Pyongyang-favored resolution and claimed that the United States is now "obliged" to dismantle the UN Command, withdraw its troops from South Korea, and sign a peace treaty with the North.

The delegation statement on the 19th not only failed to mention the UNGA adoption of the U.S.-sponsored resolution but obscured the fact that it was even submitted to the General Assembly. Thus, the statement referred to the "disgraceful defeat" the United States had allegedly suffered in the First Committee and went on to claim that the United States had attempted to counter this defeat by resorting to unspecified "threats and blackmail, fraud and swindle." The delegation argued that with the passage of the Pyongyang-backed resolution, not only was the Western draft resolution rendered "useless" but all past "illegal" resolutions justifying U.S. "occupation" of the South were made "null and void."

While the NODONG SINMUN editorial on the 20th, as summarized by KCNA, also ignored UNGA passage of the U.S.-sponsored resolution, the paper referred to it in claiming, inaccurately, that the resolution called for dismantling the UN Command. The U.S. resolution in fact stipulates that the UN Command would be dissolved when alternate arrangements were found for maintaining the Korean armistice. The editorial, as usual, rejected the U.S. position that the 1953 U.S.-ROK defense treaty provides the legal basis for the U.S. troops which are in the South.

PRC, USSR REACTION As in the case of the First Committee debate, Peking and Moscow did acknowledge that the UNGA passed the two conflicting resolutions. Peking's reaction was

* Pyongyang's reaction to the First Committee's vote is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 November 1975, pages 20-23.

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confined to a 19 November NCNA dispatch which reported selectively on the debate, focusing mainly on PRC delegate Huang Hua's speech following the vote. Echoing Pyongyang's demand, Huang said that provisions of the pro-Pyongyang resolution, co-sponsored by the Chinese, "must be implemented without delay in a comprehensive way." Huang also backed the DPRK in rejecting the U.S. position that only a small number of U.S. troops are in South Korea under the UN Command and that the bulk of them are there under the provisions of the U.S.-ROK treaty. He insisted that the passage of the pro-DPRK resolution by the UNGA made the U.S.-backed resolution "null and void."

Moscow's restrained reaction included a radio commentary broadcast to Korea in addition to brief TASS reports. Stopping short of endorsing the DPRK's specific demands, the radio commentary called the passage of the pro-DPRK resolution "an important step forward" for solving the Korean problem "fairly" as well as a "good basis" for continuing the struggle to "safeguard the Korean people's just cause." It claimed only that adoption of the U.S.-backed resolution "cannot diminish the importance of the achievements" attained by "countries friendly to the DPRK."

JAPAN PROTEST ON SHIP INCIDENT PROMPTS LOW-KEY DPRK RESPONSE

The incident in September during which a DPRK patrol boat fired on a Japanese fishing vessel, killing and wounding several fishermen, has now been officially protested in a Japanese government statement, publicized in the Tokyo press on 19 November after the North Korean embassy in Stockholm turned away Japanese efforts to deliver it on the 17th and 18th. The protest came on the heels of Pyongyang's return of the last wounded Japanese crewman on 14 November.

Pyongyang has responded in a fashion suggesting that it had hoped to avoid an official polemic with Tokyo. Apparently in response to reports in the Japanese press that Tokyo planned to protest the incident, a 17 November NODONG SINMUN commentary, issued the same day on which the Japanese tried unsuccessfully to deliver the protest in Stockholm, denounced "some official figures" in Japan for "slandering" the DPRK and for "distorting the truth," while calling the "untenable act of Japanese official circles" a "trick to use the incident for a foul political purpose." The commentary went on to note that the North wanted "good neighborly relations with Japan out of the desire to establish friendly relations with all countries friendly toward our country, on the principles of equality and reciprocity."

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Following the Japanese release of the protest to the Tokyo press on 19 November, KCNA responded on the 21st with an item suggestive of an "authorized" KCNA statement but not identified as such.* KCNA avoided harsh invective, but did label as "shameful" the Japanese claim that the fishing boat was attacked without warning in international waters. KCNA charged that the Japanese government's actions in "groundlessly" taking issue with Pyongyang's version of the incident reflected Japan's "hostile policy" toward North Korea and its persistent attempts to "infiltrate" the South. The report reiterated Pyongyang's original claim that the vessel had been in DPRK territorial waters and had been duly warned by the patrol boat, while complaining that the "Japanese authorities" were "egging on" the ship's captain to change his story after he had already accepted responsibility for the incident at a September Pyongyang news conference.

* A similar KCNA item issued after the incident is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 September 1975, page 19. Pyongyang's concern to softpedal the issue was also indicated in a message from the North Korean Red Cross on 10 September which suggested the DPRK patrol boat would not have fired had it known the fishing vessel was Japanese.

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON SPAIN: Moscow's initial response to the death of Gen. Francisco Franco and to King Juan Carlos' assumption of power has been generally optimistic. Vitaliy Korionov, writing in PRAVDA on 25 November, said "there can be no doubt that the reactionary oligarchy will do everything to preserve Francoism without Franco." But Korionov went on to claim that "the working class, the working people and all democratic forces" were determined to "frustrate the designs of reaction and thereby open up a new page" in Spain's history. IZVESTIYA's Aleksandr Bovin predicted, in a 20 November TASS report, that "Spain in the end will emerge on the broad road to democracy and social progress." Moscow's treatment of Juan Carlos seemed more generous than that meted out by the Spanish Communist Party, whose Secretary General Santiago Carrillo, in a 3 November broadcast over the PCE's clandestine Radio Independent Spain, called the king a "spiritual son of Franco" and thus "incapable" of providing leadership even during a transitional period. A TASS report of Juan Carlos' first speech as king, on the other hand, noted that the new ruler "acknowledged that the Spanish people are demanding 'profound improvements'" and added that Juan Carlos "hinted at the possibility of reform."

DPRK ON "LIBERATION" OF SOUTH: Pyongyang has used the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kim Il-song Political Institute and the Kang Kon General Military Academy to renew its pledge to "liberate" the South, a theme not used extensively in DPRK propaganda since the 1967-68 period. KPA Chief of Staff O Chin-u declared in an 18 November speech, carried by Pyongyang radio on the 18th, that if the United States triggered a "war of aggression, our people's army and people . . . will liberate the people in the southern half and reunify the fatherland." Cautioning against "indolence and laxity," the chief of staff embellished on Pyongyang's stock rhetoric that a war in Korea might "break out at any moment," adding the warning that Korea was "on the eve of a fierce war." The anniversary was also marked by Kim Il-song's presence and by the reading of what O Chin-u described in his speech as a "congratulatory order" from Kim to the two institutions. In 1965, the last decennial anniversary for these two, only the KangKon academy's anniversary was noted, Kim did not attend, and the commemorative address was given by a cadre of no known official position. In his order, carried by KCNA on the 19th and identified as "order No. 04," Kim called upon the training institutions to stress political work and reiterated the need to "counter the enemy's deceptive peace hoax with revolutionary principle, and answer a war of aggression with a revolutionary war."

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

UNUSUAL DIFFICULTIES BESET USSR FIVE-YEAR PLAN PREPARATIONS

Preparation of the new Soviet five-year plan, which is scheduled to go into effect in January 1976, seems plagued by an unusual variety of difficulties. Published statistics and statements by Soviet leaders have indicated that there will be serious shortfalls in fulfillment of the present 1971-75 five-year plan, and this seems sure to aggravate the normal difficulty in reaching agreement over priorities in preparing the new plan. In addition, work on the new plan is complicated by parallel preparation of a 15-year longterm plan, by delays in carrying out 1973 decisions on reorganization within industrial ministries, and by continuing debate on changes in planning procedures--including the functions of Gosplan itself.

Although the new five-year plan is slated to be approved by the 25th CPSU Congress in late February 1976, there are no signs that it is nearing completion. A tardy preparation would not in itself be unusual, however; at a comparable stage of development of the 1971-75 plan, basic priorities were still being debated and the plan was only partially finished when approved by the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971. This, and the fact that relative investments for heavy industry and light industry were not finally set until late 1971, were confirmed when Brezhnev's previously unpublicized December 1970 and November 1971 plenum speeches were published for the first time in a new collection of his economic speeches.*

SHORTFALLS IN CURRENT FIVE-YEAR PLAN

As the current five-year plan ends, it is clear that agricultural and consumer goods production will fall far short of original goals and that there are serious problems in the heavy industry sector as well. The original five-year plan had called for harvesting an average of 195 million tons of grain a year, but at the end of 1974 Soviet figures indicated an average of only a little over 191 million for the first four years--and this average clearly will be greatly reduced by this year's bad crop. The goal for meat production was an annual average of 14.3 million tons, but the first four years' production averaged only 13.7 million annually.

* For background on the newly issued collection and a discussion of some of the new evidence it provides, see the FBIS Special Report "Soviet Conflicts Over Economic Priorities Since 1972: New Evidence From Brezhnev's Collected Speeches," No. 311, 31 October 1975.

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The growth of food and light industry production (Group B), has been slowed even before the impact of the 1972 agricultural disaster was felt. As indicated by figures listed by G. Sorokin in the August 1975 PLANNED ECONOMY, Group B met its high growth rate goals in 1971, but fell short in each succeeding year and will clearly fall short by a wide margin for the five-year plan period as a whole. Annual goals for Group B were drastically lowered in December 1972, and again in December 1974. The under-fulfillment was acknowledged by Brezhnev and Gosplan Chairman Baybakov in December 1974.

Overall growth of heavy industry (Group A) was good in 1974, winding up slightly ahead of the original five-year plan goals for the first four years: 35.7 percent actual growth vs. 34.7 percent planned growth, according to Sorokin's PLANNED ECONOMY article in August. Even so, it will have to grow at a fast rate to fulfill the ambitious 8.6 percent growth set for 1975 by the original five-year plan. Actual growth in 1974 was a little over 8 percent.

Moreover, Soviet statements suggest that there have been and still are serious shortages of metal and machinery, requiring increases in the originally planned investments. Already in an August 1972 Kokchetav speech, Brezhnev declared that there was a serious metal shortage and that investments in ferrous metallurgy would have to be increased sharply. He announced that investments for this branch in 1973 were being increased 42 percent above the 1972 level, but acknowledged that even this was not enough to solve the crisis. However, he rejected demands by some to increase metallurgy investments by 60 percent, saying that "miracles just don't happen." Despite this increased aid, complaints of continuing shortages of metal were made by Gosplan Chairman Baybakov in December 1973 and December 1974. In another sign of the metal shortage, a June 1974 Central Committee decree censured the Ferrous Metallurgy Ministry and two other ministries for wasting metal and initiated a campaign to economize on its use.

Appeals to help machine building, one of the most favored branches of heavy industry, were made publicly in 1975. Kirilenko, in a March 1975 KOMMUNIST article and a June 1975 election speech, declared that there was a shortage of machinery and that machine-building production must be further increased. He claimed that the Central Committee had recognized this need, implying its approval of increased investments for machine building. Academician A. Tselikov, in a September 1975 KOMMUNIST article, also appealed urgently for a further increase in funds for machine building.* This pressure

* For details on the Kirilenko and Tselikov statements, see the TRENDS of 16 October 1975, pages 25-27.

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occurred after the December 1974 plenum had already increased the planned growth rate for Group A (heavy industry) in 1975, while sharply reducing Group B's goals (Group A's rose from 6.6 percent in 1974 to 7 percent for 1975, while B's dropped from 7.5 percent in 1974 to 6 percent in 1975).

These facts suggest a severe crunch over investments in the next five-year plan. Agriculture's defenders (including Brezhnev and Kulakov) have insisted, and insisted successfully, that investments in agriculture cannot be reduced, and in fact, Polyanskiy and some others have urged more attention to agriculture, not less. Heavy industry's advocates (such as Kirilenko) have been pressing for increases for metallurgy and machine building, while the lagging consumer goods sector has already been cut back and some (including Mazurov) have complained about the failure to satisfy consumer needs. These difficulties appeared to spark some cautious debate following decisions on priorities at the December 1974 plenum.*

CONTROVERSY OVER 15-YEAR PLAN In addition to resource allocation problems, work on the new five-year plan is complicated by preparation of a 15-year plan for 1976-90, which, according to a June 1974 Brezhnev statement, is also to be approved by the February 1976 CPSU congress. However, while most Politburo members closely involved with running the economy (Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Mazurov) spoke enthusiastically of the 15-year plan in 1974 and early 1975, they have failed to mention it recently, perhaps reflecting some uncertainty over whether it would be completed in time for approval by the congress. The longterm plan continues to be mentioned in the press and, according to periodic reports in *PLANNED ECONOMY*, Gosplan continues to work on it. However, while the June 1975 and October 1975 Council of Ministers meetings discussed the draft 1976-80 five-year plan, the 15-year plan apparently was not mentioned.

The reason for the delay appears to be that the different methodology required for the longterm plan is still being hotly debated. N.P. Fedorenko, the academic secretary of the Academy of Sciences' economics division and director of the Central Mathematical Economics Institute, and his fellow mathematical economists insist on a forecasting and goal-oriented approach, while Gosplan vehemently insists on more traditional methods and legally-binding plans.** Politburo members have not publicly taken sides in the disputes over methods.

* See the *TRENDS* Supplement of 23 May 1975, "Soviet Factions Renew Debate Over Economic Priorities."

** See the *TRENDS* of 22 October 1975, pages 22-23.

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SLOW PROGRESS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The five-year plan may also be impeded by a major reorganization that has been under way for several years in the structure of ministries. The reorganization calls for the abolition of main administrations and the substitution of production associations in their place. Ministries were supposed to complete their outlines for this reorganization by the fall of 1973 and change to the new system during 1973-75; however, the Council of Ministers was still approving such newly submitted draft proposals in late 1975, and not all ministries have completed their proposals. Most ministries have not been enthusiastic, as many entrenched officials must be uprooted. Complaints have mounted about ministerial footdragging in preparing these proposals and about the presentation of unacceptable proposals. Apparently because of the extreme delay, in May 1975 the Central Committee stepped in and issued its own decrees approving reorganization plans for three ministries.* This impatience was reflected in Kirilenko's March 1975 KOMMUNIST article, in which he criticized ministerial slowness in creating associations and urged party organizations to press for speeding up of this process. In contrast, Kosygin noted the ministries' progress in finishing their proposals and creating associations in his 1974 and 1975 election speeches, but with no signs of dissatisfaction with their work.

DISPUTE OVER
PLANNING CHANGES

Proposals to change the planning system are probably among the biggest obstacles to completing the new five-year plan. Most current proposals for change would considerably reduce the present powers of Gosplan. Brezhnev himself has encouraged moves against Gosplan, by repeatedly criticizing it and by hinting sympathy for proposals Gosplan opposes. Thus, at the December 1973 plenum Brezhnev ticked off a number of proposals on planning which would have the effect of weakening Gosplan: expansion of ministerial rights, more consideration of territorial planning interests, improvement of planning methodology, and removal of Gosplan's non-planning functions.

Reform-minded economists have led the assault on Gosplan. In the September 1974 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, Fedorenko urged that Gosplan be relieved of current economic administration to concentrate on longrange plans and that Gosplan be restructured along functional instead of branch lines, transferring current planning to ministries. Gosplan's organ PLANNED ECONOMY in October 1974 declared that when Fedorenko spoke of the "need for most serious reorganization of Gosplan," he was speaking only for himself and that his views on many questions of planning had been "justly" criticized. Fedorenko, citing the 10-year experiment in self-financing in the Moscow Main Administration of Vehicle Transport, conducted under the supervision

* See the TRENDS of 16 October 1975, page 25.

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of Fedorenko's institute, proposed that ministries do their own planning and become self-financing. K.N. Rudnev, Minister of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems, had proposed something similar in a 15 August 1974 TRUD article, based on the self-financing experiment in his ministry. Gosplan officials have resisted these ideas, insisting Gosplan should continue to plan for branch ministries and that ministries should remain administrative rather than become essentially economic organs.*

Nevertheless, some of these changes are apparently going to be put into effect in connection with the new five-year plan. The April 1975 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS reported that a December 1974 conference called by Fedorenko's institute had formally recommended that the new system be introduced in industrial ministries starting with the beginning of the new five-year plan, and a January 1975 article in the same journal asserted that several ministries already were preparing to transfer to this system in the first year of the five-year plan.

CONFLICT OVER PRICE SYSTEM Preparation of the new five-year plan is being accompanied by work on improving the price system, and proposed changes in this have sparked debate also. Fedorenko has advocated basing prices on new criteria, particularly social utility. Gosplan's organ PLANNED ECONOMY lauded an attack on Fedorenko's approach in its March 1975 issue, and the October 1975 issue of the journal carried a long article by conservative economist Ya. Kronrod charging that Fedorenko's ideas on prices deviated from Marx's theory of labor as the basis of value.

Disagreement over price policy presumably was reflected in the mid-1974 removal of V.K. Sitnin as chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices and the failure to name any successor for over a year. Sitnin had become chairman in late August 1965, during preparation of the 1965 economic reform, and now at 67 was retired to the Academy of Social Sciences, where he still works on prices. On 21 August 1975 the deputy minister of nonferrous metallurgy, N.T. Glushkov, was appointed his successor. Complaints about the present pricing system have been appearing in the press, notably a March 1975 PLANNED ECONOMY article by A. Komin, deputy chairman of the State Committee on Prices, criticizing shortcomings of the 1967 wholesale price reform and urging improvements in the system.

* For elaboration of the positions of Fedorenko, Rudnev and Gosplan, see the TRENDS of 5 September 1974, pages 18-19, and 23 October 1974, pages 22-24.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 17 - 23 NOVEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2475 items)</u>			<u>Peking (941 items)</u>		
Italian President Leone in USSR	(--)	9%	UNGA 30th Session	(7%)	9%
[Podgorny Speech	(--)	3%]	PRC-Comoro Islands	(--)	5%
China	(5%)	6%	Diplomatic Re-		
World Peace Council	(--)	4%	lations		
Conference, Leningrad			Angola	(18%)	5%
			French Foreign Mini-	(--)	4%
			ster Sauvagnargues		
			in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.