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FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

CONTENTS

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow Justifies Trade Rupture, Minimizes Effect on Detente.	1
East Europe Echoes Soviet Themes on Trade-Detente Issue.	3

CHINA

PRC Congress Normalizes State Apparatus, Elects Officials	5
Chou En-lai Notes Danger of War But Sees No Threat to PRC	11

MIDDLE EAST

Moscow Assails Allon Visit, U.S.-Israeli "Pressure" on Arabs	15
--	----

CYPRUS

USSR Cites Greek Protests Against Turkish Refugee Evacuation	18
--	----

INDOCHINA

DRV, PRG Level Criticism at U.S. Observance of Paris Agreement	19
PRG Council of Ministers Communique Reveals Biannual Meeting	21
Moscow Defends Communist Attacks on GVN, Scores U.S. Aid	21
Sihanouk, Penn Nouth Announce Formal Transfer of RGNU Posts.	23

CUBA

Castro Expresses Solidarity With Latins, Praises Cuban CP.	25
--	----

NOTES

Mao-Strauss Meeting; Albanian Unrest in Yugoslavia; PRAVDA on CSCE Resumption.	27
---	----

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics.	i
--	---

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 1 -

U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW JUSTIFIES TRADE RUPTURE, MINIMIZES EFFECT ON DETENTE

Moscow, in extensive comment over the past week, has sought to justify its renunciation of the 1972 trade agreement with the United States as an appropriate response to the U.S. trade legislation. At the same time, Soviet media have denied that the action implies any change in the Soviet commitment to detente. Three themes have dominated this comment: (1) the contention that the blame for the episode rests with the opponents of detente in the U.S. Congress, and that the Soviet action was a justifiable response to an intolerable affront to national dignity; (2) a denial that the action implies a Soviet retreat from the goals of detente; and (3) an implied warning that a U.S. failure to revise the trade legislation will result in a shift of Soviet trade to such U.S. competitors as West Germany, Great Britain, France, and Japan.

TRADE CONDITIONS The basis of the Soviet Union's self-justifying propaganda is the contention that the conditions that would have been imposed by the U.S. trade legislation amounted to an interference in Soviet internal affairs. The characterizations of the conditions clearly imply that the complaints are directed at the provisions affecting Jewish emigration; specific references to the credit limitations have been few. Aleksandr Bovin, in an article in IZVESTIYA on 19 January, which appears to have been a keynote piece in this propaganda, described the conditions as "economically discriminating," "politically impermissible," and "insulting." The U.S. Congressional action was the more indefensible, other commentators have asserted, in that the Soviet Union gave repeated warnings that it would not accept such conditions, and these warnings were reinforced by the U.S. Administration.

Vitaliy Kobysch, in a New York-dated TASS dispatch in IZVESTIYA on 18 January, observed sarcastically in this regard that only the American people were surprised by the Soviet action. "The papers kept telling their readers that the Russians would agree to any concessions." Commentators have also quoted extensively from U.S. public figures to support their contention that the Soviet action was justified. President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and two members of the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council, John Connor and David Kendall, have been cited as having expressed varying degrees of criticism of the U.S. Congressional action.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 2 -

DETENTE Moscow has sought to limit the impact of its action by insisting that the overall conditions favoring detente still prevail and that its own policy remains committed to the encouragement of mutually beneficial relations with the United States. Nevertheless, it has introduced a tentative note into its assurances on this score by stressing the activities of detente opponents in the West, and by noting that future progress depends on the degree of cooperation shown by the United States. Bovin, for example, noted that the U.S. Congressional action poses again the question of the "limits of confidence," of the "minimum of mutual understanding" without which progress is impossible.

Both Bovin and other commentators, however, have insisted that the Soviet commitment to detente remains unqualified. Anatoliy Krasikov, in a TASS "International Review" on 16 January ridiculing Western speculation about a "sensational change" in Soviet foreign policy, asserted that "no change has taken place. . . and none could take place." The Soviet Union is still committed to detente, he said, and is still committed to making it "irreversible." Aleksandr Druzhinin, in a Moscow domestic service broadcast on 20 January, affirmed that the cancellation of the trade agreement carried no broader implications, even in the sphere of trade itself. "The Soviet Union is ready to cooperate with the United States in all spheres," he said, providing only that it be on the basis of equality.

OTHER PARTNERS A recurrent theme in Moscow's comment has been the implied warning that a failure of the United States to remove the restrictive conditions in its trade legislation would result in a shifting of Soviet trade to U.S. competitors in Europe and Japan. This point was driven home by an article in the London daily THE EVENING NEWS on 15 January contributed by Victor Louis, the reported agent for many of Moscow's more sensitive foreign policy maneuvers. Louis, purportedly reporting opinion held in Moscow, wrote that anything the Soviet Union was going to get from the United States could be obtained elsewhere. Noting that Japan, France, and West Germany already were doing good business with the USSR, including "the supply of American equipment produced under license in their own countries," Louis asserted that it was pointed out in Moscow that Britain could supply the USSR with sophisticated equipment. Referring to the upcoming visit of British Prime Minister Wilson to Moscow, Louis said it would be possible to negotiate increased British trade with the USSR. He added that Soviet trade organizations would have time "to reassess the situation and draw up a list of orders that would have gone to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 3 -

the United States" which, he observed, could set off a "trade boom" with Britain. Hinting access to high Soviet officials, Louis claimed that "it was stressed" to him that the USSR's "technical dependence on America has been 'greatly overestimated' in the United States." This very point that West Europe should now take advantage of the "propitious moment" to play its card and intensify its economic cooperation with the Soviet Union has been the thrust of much of the Soviet comment on the cancellation of the U.S. trade agreement, including the IZVESTIYA article by A. Bovin.

EAST EUROPE ECHOES SOVIET THEMES ON TRADE-DETENTE ISSUE

Moscow's orthodox East European allies and Yugoslavia, in the wake of Secretary Kissinger's 14 January press conference, have defended with varying degrees of vigor Moscow's renunciation of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet trade agreement. At the same time, there is a tendency, particularly on the part of Budapest and Belgrade, to downplay the seriousness of the impasse and to keep the door open for possible reinstatement of the agreement on mutually acceptable terms. There has been no comment so far from Poland--which, with Yugoslavia, already enjoys most-favored-nation-treatment in trade with the United States--or from Romania.

Emphasizing that it was not the USSR which was hardening its stance or acting contrary to the spirit of detente, a Raabe commentary in the East Berlin domestic service on the 17th declared that Congress had violated the Soviet-U.S. summit agreements by attempting to interfere in the USSR's internal affairs. He cited the TASS commentary by Krasikov on the 16th which had pointed out that the Soviet side would never consider posing preconditions regarding U.S. internal affairs. Raabe stressed that it was in America's own national and commercial interest to have a workable trade agreement with the Soviet Union, citing John Connor, head of the Moscow office of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council for the view that "the final word" on the trade issue had not yet been spoken in the United States.

Similarly, an authoritative Dolezal article in the Prague party daily RUDE PRAVO on the 16th took a hard line in denouncing "unacceptable" features of the U.S. trade bill while predicting at the same time that "realism" would ultimately prevail in U.S. trade policy toward the USSR and other socialist countries. The article mentioned only in passing the "special discriminatory amendment" in the U.S. trade bill which made implementation of the 5 July 1974 Prague-Washington agreement on return

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 4 -

of Czechoslovak gold conditional upon Prague's payment of 100 cents on the dollar to settle U.S. citizens' property claims against Czechoslovakia. The same issue of RUDE PRAVO also reported the foreign committees of the two chambers of the Federal Assembly as merely "regretting" the terms of the amendment affecting Czechoslovakia.

Budapest media's notably voluminous comment on Secretary Kissinger's press conference showed characteristic concern both to support Moscow and to keep East-West channels of communication open. Thus, while Hungarian Deputy Premier Huszar declared in a Budapest radio interview on the 16th that the U.S. trade bill "does not suit our conceptions either," a Moscow correspondent's comment carried by Budapest radio on the 19th was predominantly optimistic: Discounting any "permanent" damage to detente, the correspondent saw no signs of any change in plans for Brezhnev to visit the United States this year and sign there a nuclear arms limitation agreement. He added that Soviet-U.S. trade could still develop to some extent "even in the present conditions." The same correspondent, in a 15 January broadcast, had concluded that the fact that the Soviet stand was made public through an announcement by Secretary Kissinger meant that the Soviet Union "does not wish to dramatize the situation." On the 21st, MTI featured President Ford's statement at his press conference that day to the effect that he expected detente to continue and expand despite Moscow's cancellation of the trade agreement.

Yugoslav comment similarly combined stern denunciation of alleged "interference" features of the U.S. trade bill with assessments that the overall progress of detente had not suffered any decisive setback. Uniquely, the Ljubljana DELO on the 16th foresaw at the same time possible "serious internal political consequences" in the USSR if the trade deadlock should be construed as a failure of the peace policy spelled out by Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress.

Tirana, in an 18 January ATA commentary, attributed Moscow's cancellation of the 1972 trade agreement to chagrin over the public exposure of an alleged U.S.-Soviet secret deal to exchange most-favored-nation status for the emigration of Soviet Jews.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

C H I N A

PRC CONGRESS NORMALIZES STATE APPARATUS, ELECTS OFFICIALS

The PRC's 4th National People's Congress (NPC), held from 13-17 January, has formalized state reforms produced by the cultural revolution and generally confirmed as state leaders men who have had much experience in the PRC bureaucracy. The leadership of the State Council has been greatly strengthened by the naming of 12 vice premiers, including eight active Politburo members and alternates. The new organs make only a token bow to youthful activists, though the new constitution reiterates the principle of leadership by "the old, the middle-aged, and the young."

Mao appeared neither at the Congress nor at the preceding party plenum, held from 8-10 January. While actions taken by these sessions formally enhance Mao's powers, they seem clearly designed to insure an orderly succession when he ceases to be politically active. As with the revised party constitution adopted in August 1973, all references to Mao in the new state constitution have been dropped other than references to Mao Tse-tung Thought.

The action of the party plenum in promoting Teng Hsiao-ping to party vice chairman and of the NPC in naming Chang Chun-Chiao a vice premier seem designed to insure orderly civilian succession to Mao and Chou. While neither man is necessarily in line for the top spot himself, the party and state power wielded by the two clearly overshadows that held by any other leaders under Mao and Chou except for Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, who as a military leader is not thought to be eligible for the top party post. Yeh was named defense minister by the NPC but was not made a vice premier, presumably to signal the limits of his state control.

Like the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, the NPC was brief and held in secret. Following completely the recommendations made by the party plenum, the NPC unanimously adopted all resolutions on 17 January. On its first day, the session heard a report on the work of the government by Premier Chou En-lai, a report on the constitution by Chang Chun-chiao (delivered on behalf of the party), and received copies of the draft constitution. None of the reports or documents indicated any changes from current, moderate policy lines. Chang's report was closely tied to constitutional provisions. Chou's report hailed the victory of the cultural

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 6 -

revolution as the most important event of the past 10 years, but concentrated on elucidating the close relationship between revolution and economic production. He referred repeatedly to Mao's role in formulating policy and noted that the "primary task" is to deepen the anti-Lin Piao and Confucius movement; however, he did not indicate that mass movements would be revived, rather stressing the need for study and cadre labor on a regular basis as the tools for insuring proletarian rule. He noted that the masses must "deal steady, accurate and hard blows at the handful of class enemies," carefully reiterating that "the emphasis" must be on "accuracy" in a clear attempt to reduce indiscriminate attacks on leaders.

Chou indicated that the 1974 grain harvest was in the neighborhood of 260 million tons, but he did not supply any hard figures in enumerating PRC economic achievements. Chou stated that the economic plan would proceed on lines ordered by Mao prior to the 3d NPC 10 years ago: the economy will be developed in two stages with the first stage due for completion by 1980 and the second stage--putting China among the front ranks of developed countries--completed by the end of the century. Chou claimed that the current five-year plan would be successfully completed this year and stated that the State Council would draw up a 10-year plan, five-year plans and annual plans to promote fulfilling Mao's goal.

STATE LEADERSHIP All members of the Politburo except for Mao, his chief bodyguard Wang Tung-hsing, and Chi Teng-huei appeared at the NPC session. Chi has made no public appearances since early December and may also be with Mao; he was one of the eight Politburo members made vice premiers. NCNA's 18 January list of state leaders listed the vice premiers in apparent party rank, with Teng first and Chang second, followed by Li Hsien-nien, who has alternated with Teng in performing Chou's protocol duties while Chou has been in the hospital. Peking PLA commander Chen Hsi-lien, the only active military leader among the vice premiers, was listed next above Chi. Hua Kuo-feng, who was also named minister of public security, was made a vice premier, as was Chen Yung-kuei, the model peasant who led the Tachai production brigade. Alternate Politburo member Wu Kuei-hsien, a former model worker from Shensi, was named China's first woman vice premier. Non-Politburo members named as vice premiers were two ministers, Yu Chiu-li and Ku Mu, former minister Wang Chen, and Sun Chien, probably named as a bow to youth, who rose from unknown origins to become an alternate member of the Central Committee in 1973.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 7 -

MINISTERS: Of the 29 ministers appointed by the NPC, over half were already serving in their positions and three held the identical positions prior to the cultural revolution. At least seven were vice ministers of the same ministry or a predecessor ministry before the cultural revolution and one headed another ministry at that time. Three ministers identified since the cultural revolution were replaced by the NPC. One, Minister of Sports Wang Meng, had not been identified by title since last February, though he appeared as a responsible person of the ministry in September. Former Minister of Communications Yang Chieh, who was replaced by cultural revolution casualty Yeh Fei, appeared as minister in December. Former Water Conservancy and Power Minister Chang Wen-pi was last identified in his post in November. All had military backgrounds, though Yang Chieh had served in a civilian post in Kwangtung before coming to Peking, and their departures may reflect continuing moves to reduce PLA power in civil affairs. Not all of the military men brought into ministries during the cultural revolution were removed, however. It is possible that they have chosen to resign from the PLA rather than leave their posts.

In areas which have been especially contentious since the cultural revolution--culture and education--a Chiang Ching supporter Yu Hui-yung was named minister of culture and an old Chou En-lai subordinate Chou Jung-hsin was given the ministry of education. Yu has been on the cultural group under the state council and was named a deputy chief of the group, headed by Wu Te, last year. Yu is the composer of two model operas and has frequently praised Chiang Ching. In a speech reprinted in RED FLAG in May 1967, he noted Chiang's personal leadership over culture and stated that in the model works, "Every word and sentence, every tune and beat, is permeated with heart blood of Comrade Chiang Ching." Chou served as secretary-general of the State Council prior to the cultural revolution and also held other party and state posts.

Only two critical ministries are headed by Politburo members. Yeh Chien-ying formally assumed control of the defense ministry, which he has headed in fact since Lin's demise, and Hua Kuo-feng was named minister of public security. Hua came up through the bureaucracy in Hunan and became the top official there in 1970. He has spent most of his time in Peking in recent years and was elected to the Politburo at the 10th Party Congress in 1973. Hua was concurrently elected a vice premier by the NPC, but Yeh was not--apparently another sign of Peking's sensitivity about giving civil power to military leaders.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 8 -

NPC LEADERSHIP, LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES: Most of the NPC leadership consists of aging, semi-retired Politburo members and former members plus a sprinkling of minority nationality and women representatives. NPC Chairman Chu Te and six of the vice chairman are Politburo members or alternates; four of these leaders are known to be in very poor health; two are members of minority nationalities; the other is Peking chief Wu Te who is frequently called upon to entertain foreign guests and may have been named to the post to ease protocol problems. Wu was also secretary-general of the session, but following the congress the NPC Standing Committee named Chi Peng-fei, former Chinese minister of foreign affairs until last November, to the post. Six former members of the Politburo were also made NPC vice chairman as were other perennials, including Sun Yat-sen's widow Soong Ching-ling, Li Fu-chun's widow Tsai Chang, and Lu Hsun's brother Chou Chien-jen. The only possible concession to the principle of "old, middle-aged and young" may have been the naming of a Shensi trade union official as a new vice chairman. Among the members of the standing committee, youth was represented by Chang Tieh-sheng from Liaoning, noted for "going against the tide" on educational policy in the summer of 1973 and Lu Yu-lan from Hopeh, a young woman noted as a revolutionary rural leader. There was some increase in the number of women named to the standing committee, including the wife of purged Politburo member Tao Chu, who did not himself reappear for the occasion.

Every military region leader was elected a member of the presidium of the NPC, as were most provincial first secretaries. Not reported at the session were Heilungkiang first secretary Wang Chia-tao and Shansi first secretary Hsieh Chen-hua, who have apparently been under attack in their provinces and have made no public appearances since early last year other than in Peking on National Day. The only other first secretary not elected to the presidium, Tsinghai chief Liu Hsien-chuan, has been occupied with other duties in Peking for years and may have previously lost his post; he made relatively few public appearances last year and was identified only as a Central Committee member or as a PLA official. Tsinghai second secretary and military district commander Chang Chiang-lin was also not elected to the presidium.

CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGES

Although the new constitution contains no direct reference to "Chairman Mao," it formalizes his control over the military by placing the office of the chairman of the CCP in command of the armed forces, a power which the previous constitution, adopted in 1954, had given to the now abolished post of head of state. By focusing on the institutional

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

role of the office of the chairman of the party, rather than on Mao himself, the constitution appears aimed at providing the framework necessary for a smooth organizational transition when Mao eventually leaves the political scene.

The new constitution drops all of the personal references to Mao which were contained in the 1970 draft constitution, a document presumably bearing the imprint of Lin Piao, who has been charged with building a cult of personality around Mao in order to advance his own standing within the party and army. Placing more stress on the party's role in guiding state affairs, the new constitution omits the draft's reference to Mao as "head of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" as well as the draft's characterization of Mao as the "supreme commander" of the PLA. The constitution also fails to include the draft's statement that it is one of the duties of PRC citizens to "support Chairman Mao," substituting instead the need to "support the leadership of the CCP." The constitution, however, officially enshrines Mao's Thought, noting that the party is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people and that "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought is the theoretical basis guiding the thinking of our nation."

DISSENT: Aside from the low-keyed treatment given to Mao personally, the only other major difference in the new constitution compared with the 1970 draft version is a passage noting that citizens have the right to lodge written or oral complaints to organs of state at any level regarding "transgressions of law or neglect of duty on the part of any person working in an organ of state" and that no one will be allowed to "hinder or obstruct the making of such complaints or retaliate." The right to file complaints without fear of retaliation with higher level authorities was written into the party constitution at the 10th party congress in August 1973 and a similar statement was also included in the list of rights given PRC citizens in the 1954 constitution. Like the 1970 draft version, the new constitution contains 30 articles compared with the 106 articles of the 1954 constitution.

NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS: The section in the 1954 constitution devoted to the office of the chief of state has been eliminated in the new constitution. The former duties of Liu Shao-chi, the PRC's last chief of state, remain within the NPC and presumably will be exercised by Chu Te as NPC chairman. By making the chairman of the party the commander of the armed forces and by eliminating the office of head of state, a post Liu Shao-chi

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 10 -

allegedly used as a rival power center to the party, the new constitution strengthens the party's control over the government and weakens NPC powers. The NPC may now, for example, remove the premier only "on the proposal of the Central Committee of the CCP." The NPC also appears to have lost its former power to declare war and there is no mention of the National Defense Council, a military advisory group which had previously reported to the NPC. NPC members are also no longer immune from arrest and have lost the power to grant amnesty.

The NPC does, however, retain its power to "approve" the state budget and it is still characterized as the supreme state organ; although the new constitution carefully notes that the NPC functions under the "leadership of the CCP." The length of office for each NPC has been increased from four to five years which "may be extended under special circumstances." NPC sessions are to be held each year, but may be "advanced or postponed" if necessary. Under the 1954 constitution, the PRC was described as a multiparty "people's democratic" state with power belonging "to the people as represented by the NPC" and local assemblies. Under the new constitution the PRC has officially advanced to the stage of "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" with the working class exercising leadership over the state "through its vanguard, the CCP."

ECONOMIC PROVISIONS: The constitution does not call for any radical change in the economic policies which have been in force for the past several years. The production team remains the basic accounting unit within the commune, and the farming of small plots for personal needs as well as a limited amount of household sideline production will be continued. Since the PRC is now a "socialist state," the new constitution has dropped the 1954 guarantees of handicraft rights and the right of inheritance. The new constitution also recognizes only two kinds of ownership, socialist ownership by the whole people and socialist collective ownership by the working people. The 1954 constitution had granted the right of ownership by individual working people and capitalist ownership.

REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES: The revolutionary committee system, which was set up during the cultural revolution, will form the basis of a new system of local government. Revolutionary committees, which are usually headed by party leaders, are to function as the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 11 -

standing committees for the yet to be elected local people's congresses and as local government organs. Revolutionary committee members will be "elected and subject to recall" by the local people's congresses. The committees and their members are also accountable to the state organ at the next higher level. Local people's congresses and revolutionary committees are to work together to approve local economic plans, safeguard the rights of citizens and "maintain revolutionary order."

JUSTICE, RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: The Western concept of due process under the law is given short shrift in the new constitution which places local judges under the authority of people's congresses and revolutionary committees. The "mass line" is to be followed in trying cases and the previously specified right of the accused to legal defence has been omitted in the new constitution.

PRC citizens apparently have lost the right of "equality before the law" as guaranteed in the 1954 constitution, but have gained the "freedom to strike," a provision Chang Chun-chiao specifically noted in his report on the constitution to the NPC as having been "proposed" by Mao himself. Citizens also now enjoy freedom to believe or not to believe in religion as well as the freedom to "propagate atheism." All nationalities have the freedom to use "their own spoken and written languages," but the new constitution fails to reaffirm the right of minorities to "develop" their languages and it dropped a passage from the 1954 constitution granting minorities the right to "preserve" their habits and customs. Autonomous regions will, however, be allowed to continue as organs of self-government for minority nationalities and to "exercise autonomy within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law."

CHOU EN-LAI NOTES DANGER OF WAR BUT SEES NO THREAT TO PRC

Chou En-lai's report to the NPC reflected an evolution of the views he had presented in his report at the 10th party congress in August 1973--his last comprehensive discussion of foreign affairs. His NPC report was particularly notable for its image of a world situation markedly favorable to China. Chou did give more credence to the possibility that contention between the superpowers could lead to world war, but his remarks were couched in a theoretical framework and did not picture China as threatened. He assessed Sino-U.S. relations in positive terms, but he bluntly characterized Sino-Soviet relations as at a standstill.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 12 -

WORLD VIEW Chou departed in two respects from the PRC line on world war and revolution that has been standard for almost five years. He said that the "fierce contention" between the United States and the Soviet Union "is bound to lead to world war some day," and he was equivocal as to whether war or revolution was more likely, saying that "the factors for both revolution and war are increasing." By contrast, Chou at the 10th party congress had quoted the passage in Mao Tse-tung's 20 May 1970 statement that while "the danger of new world war still exists," revolution against imperialism is the "main trend" in the world today. The Mao formulation has been frequently quoted in authoritative Chinese comment up to the present. Reflecting his balanced view of war and revolution, Chou appeared sanguine about the strength of the Third World, and he declared that "whether war gives rise to revolution or revolution prevents war, in either case the international situation will develop in a direction favorable to the people" This assertion is similar to Lin Biao's remark at the 9th CCP Congress in April 1969 when he cited a Mao quotation to the effect that either world war will give rise to revolution or revolution will prevent war.

Chou's remark on the inevitability at some future time of a military confrontation between the two superpowers seemed aimed primarily at disparaging the notion of possible U.S.-Soviet relaxation of tensions under the cover of detente. At the same time, he voiced continued support for Peking's flexible foreign policy approach under the banner of Mao's "revolutionary line in foreign affairs," and he gave heightened attention to improving ties with the developed countries of the so-called Second World. Thus, he offered Peking's highest level endorsement for West European unity against superpower threats and bullying, and voiced Chinese readiness to promote friendly relations with Japan on the basis of the 1972 Sino-Japanese statements. Chou reaffirmed China's intention never to be a superpower, its solidarity with the Third World, and its intention to uphold proletarian internationalism. He also promised to enhance ties with "socialist countries."

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS Chou echoed his assessment at the party congress that Sino-U.S. relations "have improved to some extent" over the past three years. However, he added a phrase giving credit to the United States as well as to

* For recent background on this subject, see the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 17-18.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 13 -

the PRC, stating that improvement had been achieved through "joint efforts of both sides." Though Chou noted that "there exist fundamental differences between China and the United States," he expressed confidence that bilateral relations will continue to improve so long as the two countries carry out "in earnest" the principles of the Shanghai communique.

Chou's assurance stands in contrast to his defensive 1973 assessment of PRC ties with Washington, when he had gone to great lengths to rationalize the need for "necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries." Suggesting that at that time he was having some difficulty justifying Sino-U.S. detente to more rigid ideologues at home or abroad, Chou at the party congress had cited Leninist scripture to distinguish Peking's new policy from Soviet collaboration with Washington. Observing that "there are compromises and compromises," Chou had hammered his point home by invoking Lenin's conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and contrasted it with the "doings of Khrushchev and Brezhnev" as "betrayers of Lenin."

Chou in his much shorter NPC report did not repeat his 1973 references to U.S. "defeats" in Korea and Vietnam and to the "decline" of U.S. power over the past generation. And, although he continued to list the United States ahead of the Soviet Union in commenting on the superpowers, he dropped all reference to "U.S. imperialism," which had been cited frequently in his 1973 report. The premier gave only routine attention to Taiwan, reaffirming determination to "liberate" the island while calling on "fellow countrymen" on Taiwan to join in the liberation struggle.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS Though his discussion of the USSR was shorter and less polemical than his anti-Soviet diatribe at the 1973 party congress, Chou characterized Sino-Soviet relations as at a standstill, openly attacked Soviet "deception" on the border issue, and challenged Moscow to meet Chinese demands concerning the frontier. Chou accused the "Soviet leading clique" of having betrayed Marxism-Leninism and of having taken a series of actions--including subversion and provoking of armed clashes along the frontier--to worsen state relations with China. In his first public discussion of the Sino-Soviet border talks since they began in October 1969, Chou repeated charges

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 JANUARY 1975

- 14 -

which were contained in the Chinese message to the USSR on the 6 November October Revolution anniversary and in an article in the December issue of the Chinese journal HISTORICAL STUDIES.*

Chou claimed that Moscow is totally responsible for the lack of progress because it has refused to adhere to the PRC-USSR understanding reached during the September 1969 Peking meeting between Chou and Kosygin that led to the start of the formal border talks. He said that the understanding included an accord on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force, as well as agreement to withdraw forces from disputed border areas.** Chou said that Moscow has refused to do anything about withdrawing from disputed areas, and has even denied the existence of disputed border areas. He accused the Russians of talking profusely about "empty treaties" on non-use of force and non-aggression in order to deceive Soviet and world opinion, and advised Moscow to stop its "deceitful tricks," negotiate honestly and "do something" to solve "a bit" of the border problem.

* The charges in these pronouncements are discussed in the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 10 January 1975 "Peking Ends Silence on Border Talks, Assails Moscow's Stance."

† This marks the first time Chinese willingness to consider a non-use of force and non-aggression pact with the USSR under terms of the alleged Chou-Kosygin understanding has been reported to the Chinese people. It had been publicized earlier by Peking in the 6 November 1974 PRC message to the USSR, but that message was never publicized for the Chinese domestic audience.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 15 -

MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW ASSAILS ALLON VISIT, U.S.-ISRAELI "PRESSURE" ON ARABS

Soviet comment on Israeli Foreign Minister Allon's 15-17 January talks in Washington has dismissed any idea that the discussions might contribute to improved prospects for new Israeli-Egyptian and/or Israeli-Jordanian negotiations. Rather, Moscow typically has viewed the Allon talks as the latest in a long series of Israeli requests for increased financial and military assistance. In this context, Soviet media have denounced an alleged U.S.-Israeli joint strategy of "comprehensive intimidation" designed to impose disadvantageous bilateral arrangements on individual Arab states by exerting a variety of psychological and military pressures on them. As in other comment in past months, Moscow has also continued to convey resentment at being left on the diplomatic sidelines, accusing Washington and Tel Aviv of seeking through "partial solutions" to postpone, if not prevent altogether, a comprehensive Mideast settlement at a reconvened Geneva conference.

PARTIAL AGREEMENTS Soviet comment on the Allon visit has continued to expound on the dangers to Arab unity posed by ill-intentioned proposals for "interim" solutions, indicating that Egypt was the primary--and perhaps receptive--target of such approaches. IZVESTIYA's Koryavin, in a Beirut dispatch on the 14th, pointed out that Arab press coverage of Allon's visit emphasized the danger to the pan-Arab cause presented by "a so-called 'stage-by-stage' or 'interim settlement.'" And a Moscow domestic service commentary on the 13th, dismissing as "publicity fuss" various Western media reports of new Israeli negotiating flexibility, cited the Syrian AL-BATH as charging that Tel Aviv's policy aimed at creating "the appearance of movement toward peace" by means of partial withdrawal, a plan the paper assessed as "unacceptable in principle."

PRAVDA's international review on the 19th, reported that day by Moscow radio's Arabic service, noted "rumors swirling around" that Allon's visit might be followed soon by a U.S. announcement along the lines that "Israel has agreed to withdraw a few kilometers further from the Sinai and Jordan River in exchange for political concessions from Cairo and Amman." PRAVDA denounced this idea for its omission of Syrian and Palestinian interests and for its aim of dividing the Arab confrontation states by offering them "individual deals." A Mayevskiy article in PRAVDA on the 18th, along the same lines, charged that the United States was striving to "neutralize"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 16 -

Egypt by offering it certain concessions from Israel and isolating it from united action with Syria and other Arab countries.

SADAT INTERVIEW Moscow's handling of a recent interview by President as-Sadat served to reinforce Soviet criticism of the "U.S.-Israeli step-by-step approach," citing the president as rejecting unilateral agreements, but playing down his indication of willingness to consider a new set of negotiations on Sinai. PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov, in a dispatch in the paper on the 18th, asserted that as-Sadat had "reiterated that Egypt rejects a unilateral agreement with Israel on the Sinai peninsula" and that Cairo insists on such a withdrawal taking place in the next three months "accompanied by simultaneous withdrawal from occupied Syrian and Jordanian territories." However, in the interview, published in the 16 January Beirut AN-NAHAR, as-Sadat was quoted as saying that although the next withdrawal must be on all three fronts within three months, "Egypt considers it treason to refuse, for any reason, any occupied Arab land which the enemy returns to us."

While seemingly disinclined to acknowledge this statement, Glukhov did cite an 18 January Cairo AL-AHRAM editorial which, he said, "explained the Egyptian position." Glukhov reported AL-AHRAM as saying that Egypt did not reject the principle of a phased solution or "any opportunity for getting back the Arab territories." However, according to Glukhov, the editorial declared that Cairo "categorically opposes a partial or separate settlement with just one of the Arab states" and firmly asserted that Egypt "will not tolerate maneuvers that undermine the main objective."

KISSINGER VISIT, Moscow has given barest acknowledgment of the
FORD STATEMENTS possibility of a new Kissinger visit to the
Middle East. A TASS dispatch on the 18th, reporting the conclusion of Allon's Washington talks, noted that the Israeli foreign minister had said that Secretary Kissinger "accepted 'in principle' an invitation to visit Israel after he manages to coordinate a new 'interim' agreement with Egypt." TASS added that Allon had emphasized that there had been no U.S. pressure "whatsoever with the aim of persuading Israel into starting earnest negotiations or taking some definite attitude" on them.

Reporting President Ford's interview in the 20 January issue of TIME magazine, a TASS English dispatch on the 13th noted that in answering a question on the Mideast situation and the U.S. and Soviet roles, the President responded that the USSR wants "to refer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 JANUARY 1975

- 17 -

these matters to the consideration" of the Geneva conference (the President actually said the USSR "wants to throw all of these issues into Geneva"). TASS quoted the President as saying that "we do not rule out Geneva at a point, but we feel that in the interim before we go to Geneva we ought to try and make some other additional progress on a step-by-step basis."

A TASS English report on President Ford's 21 January press conference cited him as saying that the danger of war in the area was "very serious" and in order to avoid that "we are maximizing our diplomatic efforts." TASS summarized part of the President's remarks on U.S. arms deliveries to Mideast countries, observing that he "upheld the policy of intensifying deliveries of U.S. armament to the Middle East," primarily to Israel, "justifying" that by the need to maintain the internal security of the various countries as well as to "maintain military equilibrium."*

* TASS on the 21st reported a New York TIMES item on the Allon aid discussions, highlighting the reportedly three-fold increase in the military-economic aid request and noting that the new two-billion-dollar total had been exceeded only once before in the history of U.S.-Israeli relations.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 18 -

C Y P R U S

USSR CITES GREEK PROTESTS AGAINST TURKISH REFUGEE EVACUATION

Moscow thus far has originated no comment on the British decision to allow the evacuation to Turkey of Turkish Cypriot refugees from its bases on Cyprus. Soviet coverage of the evacuation, which began on 18 January and sparked off anti-American and anti-British demonstrations in Cyprus and Greece, has largely been confined to replays of Greek and Greek Cypriot denunciations of the airlift. These reports typically have singled out assertions of a U.S. and NATO hand in the British decision. PRAVDA on the 19th, for example, carried a statement by the Moscow-backed branch of the Greek communist party, the KKE, condemning the British decision as another example of the "subversive activities" of "NATO and U.S. imperialism" directed against Cyprus and Greece. Soviet reportage has described the demonstrations in Cyprus as "anti-imperialist" and directed against "NATO machinations."

Although Moscow has not directly addressed itself to Nicosia's fears that the Turkish Cypriot refugees would be resettled in the Turkish-occupied northern sector, TASS on the 17th reported the Cyprus communist party, AKEL, as denouncing the evacuation and demanding that "an end be put to plans aimed at dividing Cyprus." In the only available East European comment, East Berlin radio said on the 19th that resettlement of the refugees in the north would "lay the foundations" for permanent division of the island.

Both Athens and Nicosia radios have reported the delivery of Soviet diplomatic notes to the three guarantor powers and the United States outlining Moscow's opposition to a bizonal federation of Cyprus which could lead to partitioning; a Turkish spokesman, according to Ankara radio on the 21st, denied that the Turkish Government had received such a note. In keeping with Moscow's usual reticence on such diplomatic activity, Soviet media have made no mention of the Soviet approach. Nor has Moscow broached the possibility of a visit to the USSR by President Makarios, an idea floated by the KKE and AKEL. The KKE organ RIZOSPASTIS said on 27 December that a visit could take place "in the near future." On 10 January, the clandestine Greek-language Voice of Truth--which ceased broadcasting on 14 January--reported AKEL chief Papaioannou as calling such a visit "imperative." A Cyprus Government spokesman, according to Nicosia radio on the 20th, declared that Makarios had "neither been invited nor sounded out on any such visit."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 19 -

INDOCHINA

DRV, PRG LEVEL CRITICISM AT U.S. OBSERVANCE OF PARIS AGREEMENT

In anticipation of the upcoming second anniversary of the signing of the Paris agreement on Vietnam, a number of high-level statements and articles have appeared in DRV and PRG media assessing developments in the South and reflecting Hanoi and the Liberation Front's marked displeasure with U.S. observance of the agreement during the past year. The comment has included a 17 January special communique of the PRG Council of Ministers, specifically marking the agreement anniversary, and the delayed release on 20 January of the text of DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's 24 December National Assembly report discussing the implementation of the agreement over the past year. In addition, the 11 January U.S. State Department note protesting violations of the agreement was denounced by the DRV Foreign Ministry on the 14th* and was the subject of a NHAN DAN "Commentator" article on the 16th and a PRG Foreign Ministry statement two days later. Besides being broadcast in Vietnamese by Hanoi and Liberation radios, these documents were all promptly transmitted in English by VNA and LPA, thus insuring the widest possible foreign dissemination.

The dominant theme pervading the current DRV and PRG comment is Hanoi and Front dissatisfaction with the United States for what is regarded as continued U.S. "military involvement and intervention" in the affairs of South Vietnam, and with what is described as the U.S. "betrayal" of its commitments under the Paris agreement. In presenting evidence for these charges, the propaganda not only cites the customary complaints of alleged U.S. military advisors disguised as civilians, "massive" military aid supplied Saigon just prior to the signing of the Paris agreement, and the "illegal" flow of military equipment into the South since the cease-fire agreement, but also decries what it terms "open threats" by the U.S. Administration. These, according to the propaganda, have included the dispatched U.S. warships into PRG "territorial waters," reconnaissance missions in support of the GVN air force, and the recent introduction of ammunition into the South from the United States, Thailand, and Japan.

* See the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 10-12 for a discussion of the initial DRV response to the U.S. note.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 20 -

The PRG special communique and the Nguyen Duy Trinh report both referred to early 1974 as the watershed date when the United States began "openly reneging" on its Paris agreement commitments. As proof of this, the communique noted that in March 1974 Kissinger justified U.S. support for the GVN on the grounds of the Paris agreement itself and the "long and deep [U.S.] involvement" there. As a further indication of alleged U.S. perfidy in failing to fulfill its obligations, all the documents cited what was termed the U.S. refusal to contribute to DRV reconstruction under the provisions of Article 21 of the Paris agreement, and the PRG special communique pointedly observed that in November 1974 Kissinger had "arrogantly said" the United States "had no responsibility to observe article 21."

The closest Vietnamese communist propaganda comes to adopting a conciliatory posture is in repeating their now familiar offer to sit down at the negotiating table with a government in Saigon--once Thieu has been overthrown. The Commentator article, while calling for Thieu's ouster, did not specify that it was a precondition for negotiations. Instead, it merely cited what it characterized as his "open refusal" to negotiate, claiming that the United States was using Thieu "as an instrument for continuing the war and undermining negotiations." The other documents, unlike the Commentator article, admitted that the PRG took the initiative in effecting the final suspension of the talks at the Consultative Conference at La Celle-Saint-Cloud and at the Joint Military Commission, but were equally as positive in placing the burden of blame on Thieu for "sabotaging" the negotiations.

Both the Trinh report and the PRG special communique implied that the Paris agreement will be satisfactorily implemented only under communist military pressure, thus providing a broad justification for continuing communist attacks. The PRG communique credited the communists with having shown "maximum self-restraint" but maintained that "the more we exercise self-restraint, the more the Thieu clique edges its way along." It explained that this situation had necessitated the 15 October 1973 PLAF Command order which formally called for "counterblows" against the GVN. Similarly, Trinh recalled the October 1973 order and derided U.S. and Saigon complaints about communist "ripostes," observing:

. . . they are trying to arouse among the public anxiety about an eventual confrontation, and a big war. But, as a matter of fact, only when all their schemes and acts of war are foiled can they be forced to renounce war and agree to observe the Paris agreement.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 21 -

PRG COUNCIL OF MINISTERS COMMUNIQUE REVEALS BIENNIAL MEETING

The convening of the customary winter meeting of the PRG Council of Ministers "at the beginning of the year" was revealed in a 17 January communique issued by the Council and broadcast by Liberation Radio on the same date. Presided over by President Huynh Tan Phat, the meeting reportedly reviewed the two years since the signing of the Paris agreement and set forth "tasks and duties for 1975." In addition to the Council meeting's final communique reporting the proceedings, the "special communique on the two-year struggle for implementation of the Paris agreement" was also released on the 17th.

Since January 1972, PRG Council of Ministers sessions have followed the familiar pattern of meeting twice a year--in winter and summer--under the chairmanship of Huynh Tan Phat.* However, media treatment of the latest meeting has departed from past practice by providing only the texts of the communiqués and not publicizing collateral accounts of the Council session. Coverage of earlier sessions had usually included an overall account and sometimes the texts or summaries of the main speeches.

While the communique made no mention of where the Council meeting was held and failed even to provide the usual description of its locus as being in the "liberated area," a 19 January Liberation Radio broadcast reported PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh as visiting Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province on the 15th, two days prior to the issuance of the final communique. Madame Binh has been a frequent participant in past council meetings and the coincidence of her presence in Loc Ninh at the same time the Council was in session strongly suggests the meeting was in fact held in that area.

MOSCOW DEFENDS COMMUNIST ATTACKS ON GVN, SCORES U.S. AID

Scattered Soviet comment on the stepped up fighting in South Vietnam has predictably echoed the contention in Hanoi and PRG media that recent communist attacks and the 6 January capture of Phuoc Binh city were justified retaliation for Saigon violations of the Paris peace agreement. The most authoritative Soviet comment came in a 16 January article by PRAVDA commentator Yuriy Zhukov which defended

* See the TRENDS of 12 June 1974, pages 19-22, for a discussion of the last reported session of the PRG Council of Ministers.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 22 -

the communist forces' "just retaliatory blow" against Phuoc Binh and focused criticism on U.S. aid to the GVN. Zhukov placed responsibility on the United States for the situation in Vietnam, stressing that the Paris agreement envisaged a "political settlement,"* as well as the withdrawal of U.S. forces. He stated that such a settlement had to take place through the "strict observance of the Paris agreement," but that Saigon had "sabotaged" the agreement, refused to acknowledge the PRG, and initiated attacks on PRG-controlled territory. "These aggressive actions," according to Zhukov, "would have been impossible if the United States had fulfilled those stipulations of the Paris agreement which categorically prohibit importing of armaments into South Vietnam, with the exception of a piece-by-piece replacement"

Zhukov also discussed at length the question of future U.S. aid to Saigon, even portraying reported remarks by U.S. military officials and speculation by newsmen on the possibility of U.S. reintervention in Vietnam as part of a campaign to influence the U.S. Congress to increase U.S. assistance. He dismissed the possibility of U.S. intervention as "unlikely," and charged that: "Since Congress is showing obstinacy it is being intimidated by a regular, well-coordinated campaign to cause fear, including the threat of renewed intervention in Indochina if the backbone of the puppets begins to crack." He cited statements by Congressional opponents of Administration efforts to increase aid expenditures and economic factors militating against such an increase, but evinced a wait-and-see attitude toward the final Congressional decision.

Initial Soviet media reports on President Ford's 21 January press conference made no reference to his answers to questions on the situation in Vietnam in which he advocated supplemental assistance to South Vietnam and declined to speculate on what circumstances could occasion U.S. military intervention in the area. Soviet media had earlier cited the 9 January statement by White House press secretary Ron Nessen that the President considered current levels of assistance to South Vietnam to be inadequate.

Soviet media are not known to have acknowledged that the 11 January U.S. note protesting the communist attacks in South Vietnam was sent to the Soviet Union, along with other signatories of the March 1973 international accord on Vietnam. However, the note was mentioned in Soviet reports on the DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements condemning it.

* Underlined words appeared in boldface in the PRAVDA article.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 23 -

SIHANOUK, PENN NOUTH ANNOUNCE FORMAL TRANSFER OF RGNU POSTS

The formal transfer of several RGNU government portfolios from RGNU ministers residing in China and elsewhere abroad to officials in the Cambodian liberated zone was belatedly acknowledged by the Cambodian Front news agency AKI on 14 and 15 January, when it carried announcements of the transfer by Prince Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth. The announcements, in the form of two decrees from Sihanouk and a letter from Penn Nouth, dated 15 and 16 November respectively, gave formal approval to transfers of RGNU ministerial authority to the interior which had already taken place over the past year. They specified that the transfers were in accordance with the landmark November 1973 RGNU decision to have the government and its ministers "entirely established" in the Cambodian liberated zone.* Penn Nouth also disclosed in his letter that he is ready to relinquish his position as prime minister to someone in the interior whenever Sihanouk and the insurgent leaders in Cambodia deem it appropriate.

The pro forma nature of the announcements of the transfer of ministerial posts was acknowledged in Penn Nouth's letter, addressed to ministers abroad, which stated that he was notifying them "as a matter of procedure" to "confirm the actual situation," adding that: "In fact, you effectively for one year and some months abandoned your burdens in favor of our most courageous cadres of the country in the liberated zone." Of the new formal appointments, Prince Norodom Phurissara, Thiounn Thioeunn, Toch Phoeun, Chou Chet, and Ieng Thirith were identified in their respective ministerial posts by Front media in December 1973. Two other announced ministerial appointments--Koy Thuon as minister of national economy and finance and Men San as minister of armaments and military equipment--were acknowledged by Front media in October 1974. The only new appointment was that of Ros Chethor as deputy minister of foreign affairs.

Like the November 1973 announcement of the RGNU decision to shift government posts to Cambodia, the present announcements seem calculated to undercut Phnom Penh charges that the RGNU is a government in exile based in China and that its administration in Cambodia is actually run by the Vietnamese communists. At the same time, the announcements underline the enhanced strength of insurgent leaders in Cambodia, under the leadership of RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan, and the isolation of Prince Sihanouk and his entourage in China from the

* The November 1973 decision on the government transfer is discussed in the TRENDS of 14 November 1973, pages 17-19.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 24 -

operative institutions of government. The announcements also call attention to the growing insurgent administrative structure in Cambodia at a time when Khieu Samphan and other Front leaders have been stressing the importance of a well administered and productive liberated zone in the "protracted" Cambodian "people's war" against the United States and Lon Nol.*

Khieu Samphan and other insurgent leaders in Cambodia have not been heard to mention the current formal transfer of the government posts. NCNA reported the move together with a listing of the new RGNU cabinet on 16 January, while TAES in a 17 January report briefly noted that the transfer had taken place. There has thus far been no monitored Hanoi reference to the shift.

* For recent background on Khieu Samphan's stress on this line, see the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 15-16.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 25 -

C U B A

CASTRO EXPRESSES SOLIDARITY WITH LATINs, PRAISES CUBAN CP

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, in an interview with visiting Mexican newsmen reported by PRENSA LATINA on 11 January, played upon the theme of solidarity with Latin America and disavowed plans to subvert neighboring governments. In one of his strongest statements on the issue of export of revolution since he began to reshape the Cuban regime's hemispheric image several years ago, Castro said, "We cannot extend our private revolutionary objectives to Latin America, because a revolution belongs to the people of each nation and no one can conduct it for them." Expressing confidence in Cuba's current economic and political status, the Cuban leader also said he was willing to trade with the United States and had faith in the ability of the Cuban Communist Party to lead the institutionalization process taking place in the island.

LATIN SOLIDARITY In the past few years, and especially since the Quito meeting of OAS foreign ministers in November 1974, the Cuban regime has attempted to chip away at Latin resistance to rapprochement with Havana by indicating solidarity with nationalist movements in non-socialist countries and by championing almost every conflict with the United States. Thus, Havana radio was quick to echo Latin criticisms of the U.S. Trade Reform Act, asserting on 10 January that the law was another example of "U.S. imperialist policy." Castro underscored the Cuban position during his interview by noting that, although the law was of "no concern" to Cuba, his government accepted a "moral duty" to back countries struggling against discrimination. Gently chiding other Latin nations for failure to offer similar support during the early days of his revolution, the Cuban leader said that Cuba had "combated imperialism alone for 15 years" and was now pleased to see the development of "more national awareness" in the region. In admitting that the conditions for a Cuban-style revolution were "not within sight" in other Latin countries, Castro observed that "one country's solution cannot be copied as dogma in another country" and welcomed the "positive changes" taking place in Venezuela, Mexico and elsewhere.

UNITED STATES Castro claimed that the current growth of an independent spirit in the Americas was a reaction to the discriminatory policies of the United States, whose campaigns of "sabotage, subversion and blockade" had been the "only threats" to Cuba during the past 15 years. In keeping with his recent tendency to extend

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 26 -

the olive branch while simultaneously criticizing the United States, he repeated the offer he made in a 30 November speech to sell sugar to the United States "on a moment's notice." He added, however, that his government was "not impatient" to deal with the United States, because Cuban sugar was sold "to the very last ton" and the island nation was "perfectly prepared" to weather a world economic crisis.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF REGIME

Expressing confidence in Cuba's economic situation, Castro also told the Mexicans that the political instability of the regime's early years was ending and that the "temporary character" of the revolution would yield to permanent institutions. Asked about the much-vaunted institutionalization process supposedly taking place, the Cuban premier, in one of his firmer statements of support for the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), gave considerable credit to the PCC, asserting that Cuba was led by a "vanguard party" which exercised "genuine collective administration." He claimed that once planned elections were carried out, he did not "aspire to any post" and would do "whatever the party wants me to do."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 27 -

NOTES

MAO-STRAUSS MEETING: The 16 January meeting of Mao Tse-tung with FRG opposition leader Strauss, head of the CDU-allied Bavarian CSU party, has underlined the importance Peking attaches to encouraging proponents of West European unity as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. This marks only the second time in recent years that Mao has departed from protocol requirements to meet with a European opposition leader. Last May he met with Edward Heath, the former British Prime Minister, who had long been praised by Peking for bringing Britain into the Common Market and strengthening West Europe's cohesion vis-a-vis Moscow. Strauss also had a separate meeting with Chou En-lai on the 16th and held "friendly and frank" talks with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on the 15th and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua on the 14th. Soviet and East German media have seized on the visit to denounce China's alinement with such European "revenge seekers," with IZVESTIYA on the 15th calling special attention to the two sides' common interest in "militarization" and to Strauss' plans to visit provinces adjacent to the Soviet border in order to see the "heightened" Maoist military development.

ALBANIAN UNREST IN YUGOSLAVIA: Yugoslavia's problems with its small community of ethnic Albanians have been highlighted recently by the arrest and sentencing of five Albanian residents of Kosovo for anti-state activities. On 13 January, REUTER had reported that the arrests had stemmed from demonstrations late last year involving more than 100 persons--mostly students--accusing Tito and the central government of persecution and calling for the merger of the predominantly Albanian-populated Kosovo and other southern Moslem areas with Albania. On the 14th, TANJUG reported that the five were sentenced to terms ranging from three to nine years on a series of charges including attacking the "territorial integrity" of Yugoslavia, "negating" the achievements of Albanians, and inciting "national intolerance." In an apparent effort to play down the affair, Kosovo party chief Mahmut Bakali, in a speech reported by TANJUG on the 16th, contended that under Tito's rule "enormous results" had been achieved in improving the welfare of Yugoslavia's Albanians and stated that the Albanian minority was "deeply and inseparably" linked to Tito and the communist party. Bakali also implied that anti-state activity is not peculiar to Kosovo when he described the sentenced group as "Cominform and irredentist" in nature, thus identifying it with the pro-Soviet group uncovered in Montenegro last year. The absence of comment from Belgrade media and party-state leaders underscores again the increasing signs of improved relations with Tirana.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 28 -

PRAVDA ON CSCE RESUMPTION: A 21 January PRAVDA commentary by Sergey Dmitriyev has given a remarkably upbeat assessment of the prospects for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) following the 20 December-20 January recess. Dmitriyev went out of his way to maintain optimistically that the outstanding problems in the humanitarian and cultural area are all but solved and asserted that "the prospects for completing" the work "are absolutely realistic." At the same time, however, the article was notable for the unusual stress on the distance that remains in resolving the issues surrounding the military-related confidence-building measures (CBM's). Dmitriyev declared that "it is not difficult to perceive that only one aspect of the talks remains in which progress can hardly be characterized as even minimal"--that of the CBM's. Noting that there was "preliminary" agreement on the exchange of observers at military exercises, he stated that there has been "no advance on the most essential measure"--advance notification of large military exercises. He placed the blame for the lack of progress on the "maximalist" positions of NATO states for allegedly trying to "establish control" over the armed forces and armaments of other states. Charging that this approach would contradict the principle of equal security for all sides, Dmitriyev declared that those who insist on this approach "must assume responsibility for an unjustified delay" in the work of the conference. As for the timing of the hoped-for summit finale of CSCE, Dmitriyev, in line with most of the recent authoritative and official statements, avoided a specific time frame, merely calling for the summit "within the shortest possible time."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975

- 1 -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 13 - 19 JANUARY 1975

<u>Moscow (2476 items)</u>		<u>Peking (996 items)*</u>	
Soyuz 17 Flight	(3%) 6%	Fourth National People's Congress	(--) 23%
Australian Prime Minister Whitlam in USSR	(--) 5%	Indochina	(5%) 4%
[Kosygin Dinner Speech, 14 January	(--) 3%]	USSR	(2%) 4%
China	(7%) 5%	Japar	(1%) 3%
Podgorny Greetings on Korean Reunification Conference, Baghdad	(--) 3%	Kissinger Oil "Threat"	(--) 2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* The figures this week exclude brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with FRG leader Strauss.