

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170006-7

TCP 05-75

C

1 of 1

Trends in Communist Propaganda

5 Feb 75

No. 5

**Confidential**

**FBIS**

# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

Classified by 000073  
Subject to General Declassification Schedule  
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Declassified  
Two Years From Date of Issue

National Security Information  
Unauthorized disclosure subject to  
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONTENTS

### GROMYKO MIDEAST VISIT

USSR, Syria Set Geneva Deadline, Egypt Fails to Endorse. . . . .	1
USSR-Egypt Statement Ambiguous on Brezhnev-Sadat "Exchange". . . . .	3
Gromyko Refers to Palestinian "State," Meets PLO Leader. . . . .	6

### USSR-PORTUGAL

Moscow Cites Lisbon Denial That USSR Sought Port Facilities . . . . .	8
---	---

### VIETNAM

DRV First Secretary Le Duan Speaks on 45th Party Anniversary . . . . .	9
Peking Ignores DRV Diplomatic Relations Anniversary. . . . .	12

### MEXICO

Moscow, Havana Blame "Rightists" for CP Member's Death . . . . .	14
--	----

### NOTES

U.S.-Soviet Relations; Moscow on Portuguese Developments . . . . .	16
--	----

### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. . . . .	i
--	---

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 1 -

## GROMYKO MIDEAST VISIT

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's current visits to Damascus and Cairo clearly seem to reflect Moscow's continuing concern to assure that the United States does not play the sole diplomatic role in efforts toward an Arab-Israeli settlement. It is noteworthy that Gromyko's trip to Cairo was not announced by TASS until 26 January (the Damascus visit was announced on the 29th), after Israeli Foreign Minister Allon's 17 January announcement in Washington that Secretary Kissinger would be paying another visit to the area. This follows the pattern last year, when Gromyko made visits to Cairo and Damascus in late February-early March and to Damascus twice in May during the Secretary's disengagement talks in the area.\* The omission of Baghdad--the third capital on Brezhnev's postponed Mideast tour--from Gromyko's itinerary further underscores the fact that the visit was connected with the Arab-Israeli issue.

Gromyko's Damascus visit was notable for the first specification--from either Moscow or Damascus--of a deadline for the resumption of the Geneva conference no later than the end of February or beginning of March. Cairo failed to support this deadline, the joint Soviet-Egyptian statement calling only for "immediate resumption" of the talks. Egypt did renew its March 1974 endorsement of Soviet participation in all aspects and stages of a Mideast settlement including in "all working committees" of the Geneva conference.

Gromyko's Cairo talks apparently did not resolve bilateral issues; the joint statement ambiguously noted the importance of an unspecified "exchange of views" between as-Sadat and Brezhnev on "most important aspects" of bilateral relations. While Cairo media reported President as-Sadat and Gromyko as saying that Brezhnev's Mideast trip would be rescheduled, no confirmation of this has been received from Soviet media thus far.

## USSR, SYRIA SET GENEVA DEADLINE, EGYPT FAILS TO ENDORSE

Moscow has been pressing in recent weeks for a return to the Geneva conference, at the same time sniping at U.S. diplomatic efforts to bring about new "phased agreements" between Israel and Arab states.

---

\* Gromyko visited Damascus last year on a split trip on 27 February-1 March and 5-7 March, interrupted by talks in Cairo 1-5 March, while Secretary Kissinger was also in the region. He paid two more visits to Damascus in May, also meeting Secretary Kissinger in Cyprus on 7 May and in Damascus on 25 May.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 2 -

Now, in the 3 February Soviet-Syrian statement on Gromyko's Damascus talks, both sides have gone on record for the first time in setting a time frame for reconvening the Geneva conference, urging that it be resumed "immediately, in any case not later than February-beginning of March." For its part, Damascus had previously joined with Moscow in a 27 September 1974 statement--issued after a two-day visit by President al-Asad to Moscow while en route to North Korea--stressing the "necessity of resuming the Geneva Mideast peace conference at the earliest date." An earlier series of joint Soviet-Syrian communiqués, issued during Gromyko's three visits to Damascus last spring, had omitted any mention of the Geneva conference, reflecting Syria's reluctance at that time to commit itself to attendance at the conference.

**GROMYKO STATEMENTS** Both in his Cairo arrival remarks and in his Cairo banquet speech on the 3d Gromyko urged resumption of the Geneva talks at the earliest date. He called it necessary for "all who can make a contribution" to settlement of the problem to sit at a conference table, and, in what appeared to be a swipe at Secretary Kissinger's negotiating efforts, he added that "considerations of sheer prestige and the more so vanity should be brushed aside." He professed to be pleased to see that "on this question, just as on many others," the Egyptian and Soviet views coincide, "if we see Egypt's position correctly." The MENA version of Gromyko's statement omitted Gromyko's understanding of a coincidence of views--the only MENA variation from the TASS account of the speech.

**SOVIET-EGYPTIAN STATEMENT** Cairo declined to endorse the Soviet-Syrian deadline for resumption of the Geneva talks. The joint statement instead advocated "immediate" resumption, in line with the calls for "early" or "earliest" resumption in the December and October 1974 statements on Fahmi's Moscow visits. As in the December communique, the sides expressed the view that the Geneva conference was the most suitable forum for discussing all aspects of a Mideast settlement. The Egyptian side reaffirmed its view on "importance and necessity" of Soviet participation in all stages of a Mideast settlement, including participation in all working organs which might be set up at the Geneva conference. An identical statement in the 5 March 1974 communique on Gromyko's last visit to Egypt had been attributed to both sides.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 3 -

SADAT REMARKS As-Sadat has frequently expressed his acceptance of both the Soviet call for resuming the Geneva talks and the U.S. "advocacy of a step-by-step solution," remaining evasive on the date when "we will all go to Geneva." Speaking to journalists on 4 February after his meeting with Gromyko, he again balanced his remarks. He said he was looking forward to Brezhnev's visit and then, responding to a question, said he welcomed Dr. Kissinger's visit, adding that "we maintain the best of relations with the two big powers," and are always ready to hold discussions with them. He said he had discussed the Mideast problem frankly "with my friend Gromyko," and remarked that "the international momentum is slow and speed is a must." He disagreed with the term "partial steps" since, he said, it was interpreted as if Egypt were preparing to conclude a partial agreement with Israel, when it was "urgent" that Israel withdraw on all three fronts. In support of the Geneva talks, as-Sadat recalled that "I was the first to call for convening the Geneva conference," and added everything concerning peace would be agreed on there.

As-Sadat has mentioned no specific date for resumption of the Geneva talks, but in a 2 February meeting with Egyptian journalists and information officials, he indicated that he regarded the expiration of the UN Disengagement Observer Force mandate on the Golan Front at the end of May as the critical period. "Unless the situation changes before this date," he said, the situation might become "explosive," and he called on the United States--"the one which can influence Israel"--to "make a quick decision in this connection."

#### USSR-EGYPT STATEMENT AMBIGUOUS ON BREZHNEV-SADAT "EXCHANGE"

The joint statement on Gromyko's 3-5 February visit to Cairo, taken with as-Sadat's remarks on matters to be discussed during Brezhnev's "coming" visit to Cairo, seem to suggest that problems in bilateral relations remain. However, the statement did not specify a meeting between the two. It seemed deliberately ambiguous in saying that as-Sadat and Gromyko, in discussing bilateral relations, "stressed the great importance of the exchange of opinions" between Brezhnev and as-Sadat "on the most important questions of these relations." The statement thus left it unclear whether such an exchange had already occurred or was still pending. Soviet media thus far have not mentioned, much less confirmed, that Brezhnev's Middle East visit is to be rescheduled; statements by as-Sadat and Gromyko to the effect were reported by Cairo media.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Moscow has provided virtually nothing in the way of upbeat coverage of Gromyko's Cairo visit, the first in almost a year, other than to note that in the final Fahmi-Gromyko talks on the 4th the foreign ministers expressed "complete satisfaction" with the "exchange of views" on bilateral relations and key issues of the Mideast situation. TASS' brief report on Gromyko's four-hour meeting with as-Sadat on the 4th said the conversation took place in a "businesslike and friendly" atmosphere--the same characterization used in the joint statement--and the two "thoroughly discussed the state" of bilateral relations. In contrast, TASS' 2 February account of Gromyko's "warm and friendly" conversation with Syrian President al-Asad had said they expressed "satisfaction" with the progress of Soviet-Syrian relations. TASS said Gromyko and as-Sadat "exchanged opinions" on the complex and tense Mideast situation; in Damascus, Gromyko and al-Asad gave "much consideration" to this issue, and al-Asad expressed appreciation for the role of the USSR "which renders all-round assistance" to the Arabs.

SADAT, GROMYKO REMARKS  
ON BREZHNEV VISIT

TASS gave no indication that as-Sadat and Gromyko had met with journalists after their talk; Cairo radio and MENA

reports cited as-Sadat as telling reporters that political, economic and military subjects had been surveyed and "I believe we are starting a new page" in Soviet-Egyptian relations on a "realistic" basis. Foreshadowing the phrase in the joint statement on a summit-level exchange of opinions, as-Sadat said that discussion of "certain topics" had been completed "after reaching an understanding and a decision" on them and "other topics" would be discussed "during Brezhnev's coming visit to Cairo." Gromyko affirmed, according to the MENA account, that Brezhnev's visit "would take place shortly," but said the date would be set later. Asked whether Brezhnev's Cairo visit would precede or follow his visit to the United States, Gromyko said that had not been decided: "Brezhnev's visit to the United States is scheduled, and its date will be fixed later."

The Cairo radio report cited Gromyko as calling the talks "extremely useful and constructive." He also mentioned discussion of bilateral cooperation "particularly in the political and economic spheres, and military cooperation between the two countries"--seemingly relegating the military aspect to second place. The joint statement on the visit, as reported by Moscow's domestic service on the 5th, did not specify military subjects in noting that questions concerning further development of relations in the "political, trade, economic, and other fields" were discussed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 5 -

FAHMI-GROMYKO TALKS      Prior to Gromyko's meeting with as-Sadat, remarks by Gromyko and Foreign Minister Fahmi had indicated that their talks had not ironed out Soviet-Egyptian differences. MENA reported Gromyko as saying, at the end of the first session of talks on the 3d, that they were held in a "constructive" atmosphere (TASS described them as "warm and friendly") and dealt with "one topic--a review of certain problems" in Soviet-Egyptian relations, with attention centered on the Mideast situation "within this framework." Gromyko added that one meeting was not enough to deal in depth with "practical matters concerning what steps can be taken or discussed."

In his banquet speech on the 3d Gromyko in effect acknowledged Soviet-Egyptian differences, observing that "any setbacks, blemishes in our relations" pleased those who from the beginning did not want friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations to develop. He asserted that the two countries "must be guided by their own interests," which he termed inseparable from the broader interests of the struggle for world peace.

In reporting Foreign Minister Fahmi's banquet speech, TASS pointedly deleted his reference to Arab military strength, citing him as saying that the Arab countries had to "strengthen their forces in all fields"--Fahmi here added "and particularly to double their defensive capacity"--to be able to deter aggression. TASS did report Fahmi as saying that Egypt wanted the USSR to have an effective role in supporting the Arab cause, but omitted his statement that in talks in Moscow, including the 26 December meeting with Brezhnev, "I was careful to underline this point." Nor did TASS include Fahmi's statement that as-Sadat, in defining the basis of Egyptian policy, had said that Cairo was "quite prepared to establish the best relations with the Soviet Union."

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN TREATY      Perhaps in an implicit rejoinder to recent remarks by President as-Sadat about the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian treaty, Gromyko mentioned the treaty both in his arrival remarks, as reported by PRAVDA on the 14th, and in his Cairo banquet speech, when he termed it of "special significance" since the "high level" of Soviet-Egyptian relations depended on it. TASS' report on the as-Sadat/Gromyko meeting also noted that the sides had resolved to "widen and deepen" their bilateral relations on the basis of the treaty. A reference to the treaty in this same context

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 6 -

also appeared in the joint statement on the visit as carried by Cairo media. While Moscow versions of the statement available thus far made no mention of the treaty, it presumably will appear in the text when published in PRAVDA, judging by similar Soviet media treatment of the same passage in the "announcement" on Fahmi's meeting with Brezhnev last October.

In recent interviews, as-Sadat has suggested some doubts about the effectiveness of the treaty. He was reported as saying in a 12 January ROSE AL-YUSUF interview that he expelled the Soviet experts in 1972 because the USSR had not fulfilled its obligation under Article 8 of the treaty, which refers to strengthening Egypt's "defense capacity." When he was asked in his 20 January LE MONDE interview if he would denounce the treaty if Moscow did not deliver requested arms, as-Sadat said he "cannot rule out such a possibility, but it is very difficult to take a decision which would run counter to Egypt's interests and those of the Arab world generally." He would have to "reflect a great deal before taking such a decisive step," he said, adding that no other power was in a position to replace the USSR in this sphere but that "nevertheless, my patience has limits." Asked again, in a French TV interview reported by MENA on 27 January, whether he had lost the "strategic reserve" represented by the treaty, as-Sadat replied that this had not happened "yet," and said the treaty was "still effective and absolutely no change occurred in this regard."

#### GROMYKO REFERS TO PALESTINIAN "STATE," MEETS PLO LEADER

Previous Soviet leadership usage of various formulations acknowledging Soviet support for some form of Palestinian "statehood" (gosudarstvennost') since September 1974 suggests that little special importance should be attached to Gromyko's reference to a Palestinian "state" (gosudarstvo) in his dinner speech at Damascus, reported by PRAVDA on the 3d. Gromyko made the first known reference by a top Soviet official to "state" in affirming Moscow's support of legitimate Palestinian rights, "in keeping with their national aspirations right up to the establishment of a state of their own." However, Podgorny, in an 8 September 1974 speech, had made the first Soviet elite reference to some form of Palestinian "statehood," and Moscow since then has used, interchangeably, a variety of formulations that reveal no particular pattern.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 7 -

It seems doubtful Moscow assigns much significance to or draws any distinction among the various formulations, having once gone on record in support of some sort of Palestinian entity. Brezhnev followed up Podgorny by stating in an 11 October speech that it was necessary to satisfy the Palestinians' right to their own "national home" (ochag). Since then, Soviet comment has used statehood and national home, separately or together, and has also used such expressions as "national entity" and "national authority," while some TASS English reports have cited Egyptian officials and Palestinian leaders on the question of a Palestinian "state."

As an example of Moscow's inconsistency on this matter, TASS' 4 February report on Gromyko's Cairo dinner speech cited him as referring to the Palestinians' right to statehood; a Moscow Arabic-language report on the same speech said Gromyko had expressed Soviet support for the Palestinians' right to establish their "national authority" (as-sultah al-wataniyah). Still another variation appeared in the Soviet-Egyptian statement, which referred to Palestinian national rights including their right to self-determination and "their own national home." Curiously, the Soviet-Syrian statement made no mention of any Palestinian entity, merely advocating assurance of Palestinian "national rights."

GROMYKO-'ARAFAT MEETING      Gromyko again met with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman 'Arafat while in Damascus, as he had during his trips to the area last year. A Moscow domestic service report on the "warm and friendly" talk on 2 February said particular attention was devoted to the problem of safeguarding the Palestinians' legitimate national rights and their rights to self-determination and statehood. The report indicated that one topic of discussion was the question of PLO participation in the Geneva peace conference, Gromyko calling for attendance of "a PLO representative" with "the full rights of a delegation." No mention was made of 'Arafat's position. The final statements on Gromyko's visits in both Damascus and Cairo called for PLO representation at Geneva. Suggestive of PLO footdragging on this issue, an Arabic-language commentary broadcast by Moscow on the 4th asserted that "Geneva alone will provide the PLO the opportunity to participate in efforts to achieve a Mideast settlement," warning that Israel "aims to exclude the PLO" from these efforts.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 8 -

## USSR - PORTUGAL

## MOSCOW CITES LISBON DENIAL THAT USSR SOUGHT PORT FACILITIES

Moscow media have reported the Portuguese Foreign Ministry's denial that the USSR had asked Portugal to provide port facilities for the Soviet fishing fleet. But the wording of the Moscow media reports and differences between Moscow Radio and TASS accounts have left some confusion as to whether the issue in contention is the use of port facilities or a more permanent establishment of "bases" for the Soviet fishing fleet.

Moscow Radio on 2 February briefly reported the Portuguese Foreign Ministry's denial that the USSR had asked permission for its fishing fleet "to call at Portuguese ports." Coming two days after initial Western press agency reports of such a Soviet request, the terse, two-sentence Moscow Radio item avoided any attribution to the Soviet government while noting that the Portuguese Foreign Ministry had described the reports as "totally unfounded."

Moscow Radio's account of the Portuguese Foreign Ministry denial was carried in several of its African and European broadcasts at midday and on the evening of the 2d. TASS did not carry the Portuguese denial until the 4th, when its English service transmitted essentially the same report, although the TASS account stated that "allegations" by the Western news agencies suggested the USSR was asking for "bases" for its fishing boats.

Moscow refrained from commenting directly on Western press speculation concerning the alleged Soviet request until the 4th, when TASS commentator V. Goncharov ridiculed the New York TIMES Lisbon correspondent for reaching the "wise" conclusion that there exists a "Soviet threat" to the NATO states. While citing the Portuguese Foreign Ministry's denial that the USSR had requested "bases for its fishing vessels," Goncharov pointed out that it was normal practice for Soviet fishing boats to use "the services of many foreign ports" to replenish fresh water and food supplies and "sometimes make repairs." Arguing that this is a "generally accepted practice of long standing," Goncharov maintained that it has "never occurred to anyone to make a sensation out of this." He concluded that in light of the Portuguese denial, the "provocative campaign" by the "American" media has "failed miserably."

CONFIDENTIAL

5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 9 -

## VIETNAM

## DRV FIRST SECRETARY LE DUAN SPEAKS ON 45TH PARTY ANNIVERSARY

The 45th anniversary of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) on 3 February was marked in standard fashion by a Hanoi meeting at which First Secretary Le Duan delivered the main address. The first secretary's address was most notable for its detailed recounting of the importance of political struggle in the Vietnamese revolution. In outlining conditions for a settlement in South Vietnam, he called for a new Saigon regime, but stopped short of recent PRG and authoritative Hanoi pronouncements demanding the overthrow of President Thieu. In discussing party tasks for the coming year, the first secretary maintained Hanoi's silence on the party's long-delayed fourth party congress, suggesting that North Vietnam is still not prepared to set a date for the national party gathering.\*

The party anniversary is the first of the DRV's long-heralded "three major anniversaries" to be celebrated in 1975, and will be followed by the 85th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth, on 19 May, and the 30th anniversary of the founding of the DRV, on 2 September. As in the case of previous quinquennial anniversaries, the party landmark was observed with emulation campaigns, editorial comment, and the publication of a revised party history. Le Duan had also addressed the 40th anniversary meeting in 1970, and 10 days later North Vietnamese media publicized a major article by the first secretary marking the anniversary, describing the work as a "very important and very basic document."

The traditional Hanoi meeting prompted the turnout of the entire North Vietnamese Politburo, with the usual exception of Pham Hung who has not been reported by the media to have been in North Vietnam since 1967. The Politburo similarly appeared in full force at the 1970 anniversary meeting, except for Le Duc Tho who was in Paris for a French Communist Party congress. Politburo member Truong Chinh gave the brief opening and closing remarks at this year's meeting-- a task assumed five years ago by DRV President Ton Duc Thang, who, this year, was merely listed in the presidium of the meeting.

---

\* The Third VWP congress in September 1960 was preceded by more than a year of reports of provincial preparations and other publicity.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 10 -

LE DUAN SPEECH      Keeping to the general outline of his anniversary speech in 1970, Le Duan devoted the greater part of his remarks to summarizing the "revolutionary" achievements in Vietnam since the inception of the party in 1930. In this context, he dwelt upon the tactics of political struggle and the historical lessons to be drawn from their use in the 1945 August Revolution.

While Le Duan did not directly link these tactics of the past to the present-day situation in the South, his implication is clear that they would be equally effective now and should be used given the proper opportunity. Le Duan noted that the VWP had always employed violence to obtain its revolutionary goals, but pointed out that this did not imply that only armed struggle was involved. According to Le Duan, the party "from the outset attached paramount importance . . . to political struggles, to building a 'mass political army' of the revolution . . . ." Terming the August Revolution "a general insurrection ingeniously combining political struggle with armed struggle," he argued that its development in Hanoi, Hue, and Saigon was the consequence, not only of armed struggle in the countryside, but the result of having thrown "all of the political and armed forces into do-or-die attacks on the nerve centers of the enemy in the cities and towns." Without utilizing these tactics, Le Duan claimed that a "unique opportunity" would have been lost.

It is unclear whether Le Duan's historical discussion reflects his current views on strategy in South Vietnam, but it is notable that an historical passage in his 1970 party anniversary speech seems, in retrospect, to have been related to his views on the strategy to be pursued then. In the 1970 speech he gave unusual attention to the party's "flexible" tactics in dealing with Nationalist Chinese and French forces in 1946--involving temporary "reconciliation" with first one and then the other to gain time to prepare for the resistance war. His historical allusion then--three years before the Paris peace agreement--could well have reflected his support for Hanoi's policy of seeking an agreement short of the final communist goals, in order to remove U.S. forces and gain a respite in the struggle in South Vietnam.

Le Duan's discussion of the situation in South Vietnam, in his current speech, did not include the strident demands that have become standard since the 8 October 1974 PRG statement. The PRG statement--focusing on the need to overthrow Thieu "and his gang" before there can be negotiations for a settlement--has been recalled in recent authoritative DRV comment, including that on the anniversary

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

of the Paris peace agreement. While at one point lauding the South Vietnamese urban struggle to overthrow the "clique of lackeys," Le Duan's remarks on a settlement seemed to be couched in deliberately moderate tones when he said:

A complete end to U.S. involvement and interference, and the formation in Saigon of a new administration standing for peace and national concord and scrupulously applying the Paris agreement, constitute at present important conditions for reaching a settlement of the South Vietnam issue.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 12 -

### PEKING IGNORES DRV DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ANNIVERSARY

Monitored Peking media are not known to have mentioned the 25th anniversary of the 18 January 1950 establishment of PRC-DRV diplomatic relations. Hanoi's only known reference to the anniversary, a 1 February VNA report, noted a message from PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, as well as one from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko marking the 25th anniversary of the 30 January 1950 establishment of USSR-DRV diplomatic relations.

Such reduced Peking treatment contrasts sharply with the last decennial PRC-DRV anniversary--the 20th--in 1970, when ambassadorial receptions in both Hanoi and Peking were reported at length by NCNA, including speeches by PRC and DRV vice premiers.\* Peking's silence on the diplomatic anniversary also contrasts with the treatment Peking has given the 45th anniversary of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP), which was marked by a 1 February greetings message from the CCP Central Committee and a 3 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, the same handling given the 40th VWP anniversary in 1970.

The VNA 1 February report on the Chinese and Soviet Foreign ministers' messages--possibly delayed to permit Hanoi to give balanced treatment of comparable anniversaries for its two major allies--did not disclose whether there had been any PRC-DRV anniversary celebrations in either Hanoi or Peking, but did note that Chiao had praised Sino-Vietnamese relations as based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and had said bilateral relations have "constantly been enhanced." Soviet media, on the other hand, have noted receptions in both Moscow and Hanoi to mark the 30 January anniversary of USSR-DRV relations and have also noted Gromyko and Kosygin messages to their DRV counterparts. DRV media have acknowledged the Soviet observances, as well as the exchange of messages between Kosygin and Pham Van Dong.

Peking's apparent ignoring of the PRC-DRV relations anniversary this year is the more noteworthy in the light of its recent media treatment of other celebrations marking the 25th anniversaries

---

\* The fact that NCNA did not carry Chiao Kuan-hua's message is not unusual. Peking over the past year has given such PRC leader's messages limited publicity, usually restricting coverage to broadcasts beamed to a particular country.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 13 -

of the establishment of PRC relations with other close socialist allies, the DPRK and Romania. Last October NCNA similarly reported celebrations that month on the 25th anniversaries of PRC-DPRK relations and of PRC-Romanian relations. NCNA reported receptions hosted by the DPRK and the Romanian ambassadors in Peking, and by Chinese ambassadors in the respective capitals, and it highlighted remarks testifying to close unity and friendly relations.

PEKING ON VWP  
ANNIVERSARY

The Central Committee message and the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 3 February VWP anniversary reaffirmed the usual testimonials to Sino-Vietnamese solidarity. Sino-Vietnamese friendship was said to be based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and able to stand any test; the founding role of Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung in establishing Sino-Vietnamese ties was duly noted; and Peking promised continued resolute support for their allies' struggle.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 14 -

## MEXICO

## MOSCOW, HAVANA BLAME "RIGHTISTS" FOR CP MEMBER'S DEATH

Soviet and Cuban media have protested the death--announced on 5 January--of long-time Mexican Communist Party (PCM) member Hilario Moreno while in Mexican police custody and the incarceration of other PCM members. Moscow and Havana have shown caution in treating the Mexican incident and have followed the lead of the PCM in blaming Moreno's death on "rightist forces" said to have infiltrated the police, rather than on the government of President Luis Echeverria, whom Fidel Castro recently described as the "Mexican president who has been most friendly with Cuba" since the success of Castro's revolution in 1959. The Soviet and Cuban reactions in the Mexican case contrast sharply with their wholesale condemnation of the Guatemalan Government following the recent death of Guatemalan Communist Party chief Humberto Alvarado.\*

TREATMENT OF  
ADMINISTRATION

During the early years after Castro came to power, relations between Cuba and Mexico, the only OAS member which never broke diplomatic ties with the Castro regime, often were formally correct rather than warm. However, communist media characterizations of Mexico have become more flattering since the 1970 inauguration of Luis Echeverria, whose Third World-style politics and dialogue with leftists in his country have won a considerable measure of approval from Moscow and Havana. The PCM, a Moscow-line party, also backs the president's foreign policy, although still occasionally chastising him for an "antipopular" approach in maintaining tight control over domestic politics.

In the past few months Echeverria's "firm" posture toward the United States has been given special attention, PRAVDA noting on 23 October 1974 that his border meeting with President Ford demonstrated the Mexican president's determination to "uphold an independent line." Mexico's increasingly critical attitude toward the Chilean regime also was praised, and on 27 November, Cuban commentator David Nunez Segura touted Mexico's rupture of relations with Chile as "an important contribution to moral uprightness." Mexican support for the lifting of OAS sanctions

\* For a discussion of the response to Alvarado's death, see the TRENDS of 31 December 1974, pages 23-24.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 15 -

against Cuba won further accolades from communist officialdom, and, on 10 January during a visit to Cuba by a Mexican delegation led by Mrs. Echeverria, Castro told reporters that Echeverria was Mexico's "most progressive chief of state" since 1940 and "the most friendly toward Cuba."

PCM A potential test of these close relations was provided  
EVENTS by the arrest of PCM activists Hilario Moreno and Eusebio Martinez on 29 December last year and the subsequent announcement by the Mexican police that Moreno had committed suicide in his cell and that the PCM was implicated in a plot to subvert Central American governments. Further complicating matters was the later arrest of at least one PCM leader and other leftists in connection with a series of bombings which have been variously attributed to guerrilla groups and to rightwing elements in league with the CIA.

In an 18 January PRAVDA article--Moscow's only public response to the recent events--writer K. Kurin views the incidents as a "campaign of provocation" by reactionaries and imperialists seeming to "goad the official authorities to anticommunist actions." In phraseology typical of Moscow's treatment of left-of-center Latin governments, the writer asserted that Mexico's "secret police" had used the "absurd pretext" of a supposed plot to strike against the PCM and the "constructive foreign policy of President Luis Echeverria." Kurin played down the death of Moreno--noting only that the police had "alleged" suicide--possibly because the Mexican government had already appointed "an observer of the presidency" to monitor the continuing investigation of the death.

PRENSA LATINA reports, like PRAVDA, have avoided direct criticism of the Mexican government and have viewed the events as a "provocatory campaign" of "anticommunist slander" that has been denounced by the country's leaders. Thus, on 17 January the Cuban agency reported that Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party had "backed the PCM demand" that the police end their "persecution" of communists. Going a step further than Moscow, Havana quoted Mexican sources who associated the CIA with the "persecution," noting on the 23d that the Mexican socialist party had described recent events as "an escalation started by the CIA to drive the country into a situation of violence."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

5 FEBRUARY 1975

- 16 -

## NOTES

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: Soviet comment in the wake of Moscow's cancellation of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet trade agreement has included sporadic hints of retaliation against the "discriminatory" U.S. trade bill. At the same time, the comment has continued to stress the desirability of U.S.-Soviet detente, and there have also been references to Brezhnev's scheduled trip to the United States this year. According to a 1 February Budapest radio report, PRAVDA's authoritative political commentator Yuriy Zhukov in a recent Moscow TV talk cited Brezhnev's scheduled U.S. trip as, like the Vladivostok summit, a significant step in consolidating detente. And a 25 January PRAVDA report of President Ford's meeting with a group of young Soviet journalists included his statement that he expected Brezhnev to visit the United States this summer. Zhukov's Moscow TV talk also reportedly included a remark that in view of the cancellation of the trade agreement, "the Soviet Union was not paying, among other things, the Lend-Lease debts outstanding from World War II." As has happened occasionally in the past, Zhukov's talk apparently was not reported by the Moscow radio or press. His statement on Lend-Lease had been foreshadowed in an 18 January IZVESTIYA commentary by Bovin, which had implied that the compromise reached on this issue in the 1972 trade agreement was no longer operative. Bovin had also hinted that the present moment would be propitious for West Europe to intensify its economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, a hint that was reinforced in NEW TIMES on the 24th and IZVESTIYA on the 28th, both of which cited American publications for the conjecture that the U.S. trade bill would lead the USSR to transfer its orders from the United States to other Western countries. Implied criticism of the trade bill by President Ford in his 21 January press conference was noted in several commentaries that buttressed Moscow's demand for a revision of the bill's objectionable features.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 17 -

MOSCOW ON PORTUGUESE DEVELOPMENTS: Moscow has continued its relatively low-keyed and selective reporting of recent events in Portugal at a time of heightening tension prior to the scheduled constituent assembly elections. Two constant Moscow themes suggest that "reaction" has not yet given up in its attempts to reverse the gains of the past nine months and that all "progressive" forces must fight to continue their unity with the Armed Forces Movement (MFA). Moscow has reported the increasing difficulties between the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Socialist Party (FSP) and has cited PCP statements on the alleged "movement to the right" by PSP leaders. But Moscow has not acknowledged the recent strong attacks by Socialist leader and Foreign Minister Soares linking the PCP to the Soviet Union. Similarly, Soviet media have generally ignored the charges by the PSP and others that the Communist Party has "conspiratorial" plans to carry out a coup in Portugal. Instead, Moscow has reiterated PCP leader Cunhal's urgings that the socialists and communists cooperate and remain united with MFA in order to advance the "democratization" of Portugal. Thus, typically, TASS on 1 February reported that the situation in Lisbon was "tranquil" following the agreement by the PCP and PSP to cancel their planned demonstrations at the request of the MFA and the "fiasco" of the attempt by "left extremists and reactionaries" to cause disturbances in Lisbon. At the same time, Moscow has issued its usual swipes at NATO for its "concerns" over the situation in Portugal and Spain, with a TASS summary of a 4 February PRAVDA article asserting that the current NATO naval maneuvers reflect the concerns of the NATO "strategists" over the outcome of the upcoming elections in Portugal and the development of the "democratic struggle in Spain."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1 -

## A P P E N D I X

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 27 JANUARY - 2 FEBRUARY 1975

<u>Moscow (2602 items)</u>			<u>Peking (847 items)</u>		
China	(9%)	5%	Fourth National	(57%)	7%
Gromyko in Syria	(--)	4%	People's Congress		
Salyut 4 Flight	(2%)	4%	Vietnam	(1%)	5%
Tenth Indian CP	(--)	3%	[Paris Peace	(1%)	3%]
Congress			Accord Second		
USSR-DRV Diplomatic	(--)	3%	Anniversary		
Relations 25th Anni-			Angola Independence	(4%)	4%
versary			[Chou Greetings	(--)	3%]
Vietnam Paris Peace	(--)	2%	Gambia Foreign Minister	(--)	3%
Accord Second Anni-			Njie in PRC		
versary					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.