

CIA/OCI/BRIEF 107-75
11 JULY 1975

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010009-0

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EAP BRIEF 107-75.4

1. VIETNAM: OFFICIALS IN HANOI ARE, APPARENTLY FOR THE FIRST TIME, MEETING SOME OF THEIR PETROLEUM REQUIREMENTS FROM NON-COMMUNIST SOURCES. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LAST MONTH APPROACHED TWO SINGAPORE-BASED COMPANIES TO PURCHASE 8,000 TO 10,000 TONS OF OIL. THE VIETNAMESE SAID THEY WERE TRYING TO REDUCE THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR AND CHINA. AT LEAST PART OF THE OIL PROBABLY WAS INTENDED FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, WHERE THERE ARE SEVERE SHORTAGES.4

SINGAPORE IS THE LOGICAL SUPPLIER TO BOTH THE NORTH AND SOUTH BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY AND THE AVAILABILITY OF SMALL, COASTAL TANKERS. THREE OF THE FIVE MAJOR SINGAPOREAN REFINERIES HAVE FINANCIAL TIES WITH US COMPANIES AND ARE CURRENTLY FORBIDDEN BY US LAW TO TRADE WITH THE VIETNAMESE.4

ONE OF THE COMPANIES APPROACHED BY THE VIETNAMESE PUT THEM OFF BECAUSE OF ITS PARTNERSHIP WITH US OIL FIRMS. SUBSEQUENTLY, A BRITISH PETROLEUM AFFILIATE FILLED THE

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ORDER FOR THE FUEL OIL, AND THE VIETNAMESE INDICATED THEY WOULD BE BUYING MORE.

THE POTENTIAL OF EVEN A COMBINED NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE MARKET FOR NON-COMMUNIST SUPPLIERS IS NOT LIKELY TO BE GREAT. WHATEVER THE WISHES OF HANOI, THE TWO VIETNAMS CANNOT AFFORD TO BUY MUCH OIL IN WORLD MARKETS. THE LACK OF LARGE EXPORT EARNINGS OR WESTERN FINANCIAL AID PRECLUDES ALL BUT TOKEN HARD-CURRENCY PURCHASES FOR NOW.

AS A RESULT OF SEVERELY DEPRESSED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY SINCE THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER, DISCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE VEHICULAR USES, AND THE TERMINATION OF MOST MILITARY CONSUMPTION, ANNUAL PETROLEUM REQUIREMENTS IN THE SOUTH ARE PROBABLY ONLY ABOUT A THIRD OF THE 2 MILLION TONS IMPORTED IN 1974. ALTHOUGH ENERGY CONSUMPTION WILL INCREASE AS INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT AND TRANSPORT RECOVER, PLANNED CONVERSION OF OIL-FIRED ELECTRIC PLANTS TO COAL, AND REPAIR AND EXPANSION OF HYDROELECTRIC FACILITIES COULD REDUCE

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FUTURE PETROLEUM NEEDS. NORTH VIETNAM'S NEED FOR PETROLEUM IMPORTS—WHICH AMOUNTED TO 775,000 TONS LAST YEAR—IS EXPECTED TO DECLINE BY AT LEAST ONE THIRD, NOW THAT THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH HAS ENDED. Y

ULTIMATELY, VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS HOPE TO MEET DOMESTIC NEEDS FROM OFFSHORE OIL PRODUCTION. COMMERCIAL OUTPUT FROM THIS SOURCE IS UNCERTAIN, HOWEVER, AND IF PROVEN WOULD BE AT LEAST FIVE YEARS AWAY. {CONFIDENTIAL}

2. PHILIPPINES-US:#####//PRESIDENT MARCOS' STAFF HAS DRAWN UP A BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW US-PHILIPPINE BASE AGREEMENT THAT CALLS FOR PHILIPPINE MANAGEMENT AND USE OF THE BASES FOR COMMERCIAL AS WELL AS MILITARY PURPOSES. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF MARCOS' REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL, AND IT IS PROBABLY ONLY ONE OF A RANGE OF OPTIONS HE WILL CONSIDER BEFORE ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASES.//Y

IN RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS, MARCOS HAS BEEN EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR CONTROL OVER THE BASES IN ORDER TO END THE EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY PROVISION OF THE EXISTING AGREEMENT

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AND TO MAKE THE BASES ECONOMICALLY PRODUCTIVE FOR THE PHILIPPINES, WHILE PRESERVING THEIR MILITARY USEFULNESS TO THE US. //THE PROPOSAL DRAFTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MELCHOR'S STAFF ENVISIONS CREATING A US-PHILIPPINE PUBLIC CORPORATION TO MANAGE THE BASES AND SERVICE US MILITARY FORCES. MELCHOR BELIEVES THAT THE FACILITIES AT CLARK AIR BASE AND SUBIC BAY NAVAL BASE CAN EASILY BE DEVELOPED INTO MAJOR COMMERCIAL ASSETS FOR THE PHILIPPINES. //4

//THE PROPOSAL RECOMMENDS USING THE BASES TO SERVICE CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT AND VESSELS OF ANY NATIONALITY. IN DEFERENCE TO THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE US MILITARY, THE PROPOSAL CONCEDES THAT CERTAIN BASE OPERATIONS WOULD REMAIN UNDER COMPLETE US MILITARY CONTROL AND SUGGESTS THAT THIS MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY HIRING THE US AIR FORCE AND NAVY AS SUB-CONTRACTORS. //4

MARCOS IN RECENT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS HAS STRESSED THAT WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS ARE EVENTUALLY WORKED OUT MUST ALLOW THE US TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE PRESENCE

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IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. MANILA'S CONTROLLED PRESS HAS ALSO COMMENTED ON THE NEED FOR CONTINUED US ACCESS TO THE BASES.

MANILA'S FINAL DECISION ON A NEW ARRANGEMENT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE INFLUENCED BY THE OUTCOME OF CURRENT US-SPANISH BASE NEGOTIATIONS THAN BY MECHOR'S GRANDIOSE SCHEME. MARCOS IS CLOSELY MONITORING THE TALKS WITH MADRID AND IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE PROVISIONS GOVERNING COMPENSATION AND JOINT USE OF THE FACILITIES. (SECRET) E-2 IMPDET.H

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF-107-75.4

//CHILE: CHILEAN PRESIDENT PINOCHET'S PENCHANT FOR MAKING DECISIONS ON HIS OWN IS AGGRAVATING RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE RULING MILITARY JUNTA. A REAL RIFT DOES NOT APPEAR LIKELY, BUT THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FACING THE GOVERNMENT COULD PROVOKE CONTINUING CRITICISM BY HIS ASSOCIATES.//4

//PINOCHET HAS ANTAGONIZED THE THREE OTHER JUNTA MEMBERS BEFORE, BUT HIS FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH THEM RECENTLY ON MAJOR DECISIONS, SUCH AS HIS CANCELLATION OF A UN FACT-FINDING TEAM'S SCHEDULED VISIT, HAS CAUSED RESENTMENTS TO FLARE ANEW.//4

//THE CHILEAN LEADER APPARENTLY IS AWARE OF THE FRICTION AND MAY TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE IT. FOR THE MOST PART, THE OTHER SERVICE CHIEFS AGREE ON BASIC GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND WOULD NOT RISK A SPLIT OVER INDIVIDUAL ISSUES OR PERSONAL RIVALRY WITH THE PRESIDENT. OBJECTIONS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE DIRECTED AT THE PRESIDENT'S GO-IT-ALONE ATTITUDE THAN AT THE ACTUAL DECISIONS HE MAKES.//4

//IF PINOCHET CAN SHOW SOME SUCCESSES IN HIS ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES, HE WILL PROBABLY HAVE LITTLE TROUBLE KEEPING THE

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OTHER JUNTA MEMBERS BEHIND HIM-W/Y

//PINOCHET REPORTEDLY IS CONSIDERING THE RELEASE OF IMPRISONED COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER LUIS CORVALAN AS A MEANS OF OFF-SETTING THE BAD PRESS FROM HIS DECISION TO KEEP THE UN MISSION OUT OF SANTIAGO. THIS WOULD NOT HELP MUCH, HOWEVER, AND IF REPORTS ARE TRUE THAT PINOCHET'S GOVERNMENT IS EXPLORING A SOUTH AFRICAN OFFER OF FINANCIAL AND MILITARY AID, CHILE MAY FACE FURTHER ISOLATION. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)// E-2 IMPDET.H

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EUROPEAN BRIEF J07-75.4

1. PORTUGAL: THE PORTUGUESE SOCIALIST PARTY WITHDREW FROM THE FOUR-PARTY COALITION GOVERNMENT LAST NIGHT TO PROTEST THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL'S NAMING OF A MILITARY COMMISSION TO RUN THE SOCIALIST NEWSPAPER REPUBLICA. THE MOVE CAME WHEN REPUBLICA PUBLISHED AN ISSUE UNDER THE CONTROL OF A WORKERS' COORDINATION COMMITTEE WITH AN ARMY OFFICER AS EDITOR.4

THE SOCIALISTS SAY THEIR TWO MINISTERS WILL NOT RETURN TO THE GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL CARRIES OUT ITS PROMISE TO RETURN THE PAPER TO ITS LEGAL OWNERS. THEY HAVE PUT OUT A COMMUNIQUE SAYING THAT THE ALLIANCE OF PORTUGUESE POLITICAL FORCES MUST BE BASED ON THE OBSERVANCE OF PACTS SIGNED BY THEM AND UPON RESPECT "FOR THE PLEDGED WORD." THE CENTER-LEFT POPULAR DEMOCRATS REPORTEDLY ARE CONSIDERING PULLING THEIR TWO MINISTERS OUT OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT AS WELL.4

THE SOCIALIST PARTY HAS THREATENED TO PULL OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT OVER VARIOUS CONTROVERSIES SINCE LAST JANUARY. THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S ANNOUNCED DECISION ON

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WEDNESDAY TO CREATE A SYSTEM OF POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS, HOWEVER,
 MOVED THE SOCIALISTS INTO MORE OPEN DEFIANCE OF THE ARMED
 FORCES MOVEMENT. THE MOVEMENT'S PROPOSALS WERE SEEN BY THE
 SOCIALISTS AND OTHER MODERATES AS A THREAT TO BYPASS POLITICAL
 PARTIES ALTOGETHER.4

A DOCUMENT CIRCULATED AMONG SOCIALIST PARTY MEMBERS
 YESTERDAY SAID THE SOCIALISTS WOULD NEVER ACCEPT POPULAR
 COUNCILS OR ASSEMBLIES CREATED OUTSIDE THE PRESENT PARTY
 SYSTEM. THE PARTY BLAMED THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S ACTION
 ON COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND URGED SOCIALISTS TO PREPARE FOR
 NATIONWIDE DEMONSTRATIONS.4

THE SOCIALISTS' ANGER WAS AROUSED FURTHER BY A DEMONSTRATION
 HELD LAST NIGHT IN FRONT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. IT WAS
 SPONSORED BY THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED LABOR CONFEDERATION AND
 ATTRACTED AN ESTIMATED 15,000 WORKERS. BOTH PRIME MINISTER
 GONCALVES AND PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES PRAISED THE CROWD FOR
 SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE AND ORDER.4

MEANWHILE, MAJOR CANTO E CASTRO—REGARDED AS A SUPPORTER OF

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SECURITY FORCES COMMANDER OTELO DE CARVALHO AND THE LEFTIST NATIONALIST FACTION-LED AN ATTEMPT TO REMOVE GONCALVES AT A REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEETING LAST WEDNESDAY. THE ATTEMPT REPORTEDLY WAS HALTED BY PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES IN AN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN COHESION WITHIN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP.4

IF THE SOCIALISTS STICK WITH THEIR DECISION TO REMAIN IN OPEN OPPOSITION TO THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ARE SUPPORTED BY THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE LEFT ALMOST TOTALLY IN THE HANDS OF THE MOVEMENT, THE COMMUNISTS, AND THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED PORTUGUESE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT. MILITARY LEADERS WILL HAVE TO REORGANIZE THE CABINET, AT LEAST TO REPLACE THE MINISTERS WHO HAVE RESIGNED. IF A NEW COALITION CANNOT BE PUT TOGETHER, THE MOVEMENT MAY BE INCLINED TO SET UP AN ALL-MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO AVOID INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF A GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED ONLY BY THE COMMUNISTS. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: MORE ON SALGOVIC: THE POLITICAL STAR OF VILIAM SALGOVIC, WHO TWO WEEKS AGO WAS APPOINTED TO THE SLOVAK

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PARTY PRESIDIUUM {POLITBURO} TO FILL THE VACANCY LEFT BY THE DEATH OF ONDREJ KLOKOC, HAS EVIDENTLY RISEN FURTHER. ON JULY 7 HE WAS ELECTED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL--ANOTHER OF KLOKOC'S JOBS.4

IN THE PROCESS, SALGOVIC WAS RELEASED AS HEAD OF THE SLOVAK PARTY CONTROL AND AUDITING COMMISSION, BUT THE PROMOTION OF THIS NOTORIOUSLY HARD-LINE SLOVAK TO FILL POSTS FORMERLY HELD BY A MODERATE MUST UNSETTLE MANY SLOVAKS AND CZECHS. INDEED, THE THREE-MONTH DELAY IN PICKING A SUCCESSOR TO KLOKOC SUGGESTS THAT THE CHOICE OF SALGOVIC WAS PRECEDED BY SOME HARD POLITICAL INFIGHTING.4

SOME SOURCES IN PRAGUE ARGUE THAT SALGOVIC WAS "KICKED UPSTAIRS" WHEN HE GAVE UP HIS PARTY CONTROL POST FOR THE LARGELY CEREMONIAL JOB ON THE SLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL. THIS THEORY, HOWEVER, FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SALGOVIC'S PROMOTION TO THE SLOVAK PARTY PRESIDIUUM: HIS MEMBERSHIP ON THIS TOP POLICY-MAKING BODY VISIBLY

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STRENGTHENS THE CONSERVATIVE ELEMENT IN THE SLOVAK
PARTY LEADERSHIP. {CONFIDENTIAL} 2-2 IMPDET.H

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 107-75.4

1. USSR-SOMALIA: DURING A CONVERSATION WITH A SENIOR US OFFICIAL IN MOGADISCIO ON JULY 7, SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAMSONOV ADMITTED THAT THERE IS A MISSILE-HANDLING FACILITY AT BERBERA. HE SAID IT WAS FOR SHORT-RANGE MISSILES FOR THE SOMALI NAVY. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME A SOVIET OFFICIAL HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH A FACILITY EXISTS AT BERBERA.4

SAMSONOV DID NOT USE THE NATO TERM STYX, ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN USED IN MOSCOW NEWS COMMENTARY REFERRING TO SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. OTHER SOVIET MILITARY CLIENTS—SUCH AS IRAQ AND INDIA—THAT HAVE STYX MISSILES DO NOT HAVE A MISSILE-HANDLING FACILITY LIKE THE ONE IN SOMALIA. THE LIFTING AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT IN THE HIGH BAY BUILDING AT BERBERA IS CAPABLE OF HANDLING MISSILES FAR LARGER THAN THE STYX, OR ANY OTHER MISSILE CONSISTENT WITH SOMALI NEEDS OR CAPABILITIES.4

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SAMSONOV MET WITH PRESIDENT SIAD FOLLOWING SENATOR BARTLETT'S TOUR OF BERBERA ON JULY 4. HE MAY HAVE PERSUADED SIAD THAT BARTLETT'S GROUP HAD BEEN ALLOWED TOO EASY ACCESS TO INSTALLATIONS IN THE AREA, BECAUSE CONGRESSMAN STRATTON'S TOUR TWO DAYS LATER WAS MORE RESTRICTED.4

SAMSONOV'S ADMISSION MAY BE THE HARBINGER OF A SHIFT IN MOSCOW'S PRIMARY PUBLIC LINE FROM DENIALS OF SOVIET BASES TO ASSERTIONS THAT ALL MILITARY FACILITIES ARE THERE TO SERVE THE SOMALIS. IT ALSO SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE SOMALIS WILL, INDEED, GET PATROL BOATS FOR THE STYX.4

THE QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER AND HOW ALL THE PUBLICITY WILL AFFECT FUTURE SOVIET USE OF THE FACILITIES. SOVIET INVESTMENT AT BERBERA IS SIZABLE, AND THE SOVIETS WILL CURTAIL THEIR OPERATIONS THERE RELUCTANTLY, IF AT ALL. THEIR INCLINATION PROBABLY WILL BE TO STAY, WITH THE HOPE THAT THE WORST OF THE EMBARRASSMENT IS BEHIND THEM. {SECRET}4

2. MALAGASY REPUBLIC: PRESIDENT RATSIRAKA OF THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC TOLD THE US CHARGE YESTERDAY THAT THE NASA

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THE FAR LEFT HAS GREAT INFLUENCE IN THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT.

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