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BRIEF

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**Secret**

LAOS: ALL SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS IN LAOS ARE NOW MADE BY A SMALL GROUP OF REVOLUTIONARIES WHO REMAIN SECLUDED NEAR SAM NEUA, DEEP IN THE MOUNTAINS OF NORTH-EAST LAOS--ALTHOUGH THE LAO COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FOR APPEARANCES SAKE THAT PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG IS THEIR PUBLIC LEADER AND SOUVANNA PHOUMA IS THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT IN VIENTIANE. THE SAM NEUA REVOLUTIONARIES ARE THE REAL LEADERS OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF LAOS, WHICH FOR YEARS HAD BEEN SO SECRETIVE THAT FEW LAO EVEN KNEW OF ITS EXISTENCE.

THE COMMUNISTS IN 1956 FORMALLY DISCARDED THE NAME PATHET LAO, WHICH LITERALLY MEANS LAO LAND. THEIR OVERT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WAS NAMED THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY WAS THE DESIGNATION GIVEN THEIR MILITARY ARM. WESTERN OBSERVERS AND MANY LAO, HOWEVER, CONTINUED

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TO USE PATHET LAO OR SIMPLY THE INITIALS "PL" TO REFER TO THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS.4

WHATEVER ITS OVERT FORM, THE DRIVING FORCE OF THE LAO LEFT IS THE LAO COMMUNIST PARTY, FORMED AS THE LAO PEOPLE'S PARTY AFTER THE INDOCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS DISBANDED IN THE EARLY 1950S. FROM AN INITIAL MEMBERSHIP OF 600 IN 1955, THE PARTY HAS GROWN TO AN ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF 15,000-20,000.4

IN CLASSIC COMMUNIST FASHION, THE PARTY'S CHAIN OF COMMAND IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THAT OF THE FRONT. PARTY MEMBERS OCCUPY VIRTUALLY ALL KEY POSITIONS IN THE FRONT, THE ARMY, AND IN THE PHALANX OF AFFILIATED SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS. THEIR POSITIONS AND RANKS IN THESE GROUPS, HOWEVER, OFTEN DO NOT REFLECT THEIR ACTUAL POSITIONS IN PARTY CIRCLES.

THE COMPOSITION AND RANKING OF THE TOP PARTY LEADERSHIP ARE CAREFULLY GUARDED SECRETS. IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG, CHAIR-

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MAN OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE COALITION JOINT NATIONAL POLITICAL COUNCIL IS A RELATIVELY LOW RANKING MEMBER OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, IF HE IS A MEMBER AT ALL. PHOUMI VONGVICHIT, THE SOPHISTICATED AND RELATIVELY WESTERNIZED COMMUNIST WHO HOLDS THE TITLE OF COALITION DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, ALMOST CERTAINLY OUTRANKS SOUPHANOUVONG ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.4

THE TOP POST IN THE PARTY--SECRETARY-GENERAL --IS HELD BY KAYSONE PHOMIVIHAN, WHO HAS NOT VISITED VIENTIANE FOR 25 YEARS, BUT WHO APPARENTLY SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME IN HANOI AS WELL AS SAM NEUA. NOUHA PHOUMSAVAN, WHO SERVED IN THE SECOND COALITION IN THE EARLY 1960S AND HAS TRAVELED SEVERAL TIMES TO MOSCOW AND PEKING, SERVES AS KAYSONE'S DEPUTY.4

OTHER KEY MEMBERS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE INCLUDE GENERAL KHAMPTAY SIPHANDONE, COMMANDER OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY; SAMANBOUNGRAKET,

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ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; PHOU NE  
SIPRASEUTH, CURRENTLY ACTING DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN  
VIENTIANE; SANAN SOUTHICHAK, A HIGHLY SKILLED AGITPROP  
SPECIALIST; SISANA SISANE, PROPAGANDA CHIEF FOR BOTH  
THE FRONT AND THE PARTY; APHEUI KEOBOUNHEUANG, A  
LOGISTICS SPECIALIST; SALY VONGKHAMSAO; AND POSSIBLY  
FOUR OR FIVE OTHERS.4

ALTHOUGH ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT  
SINCE AT LEAST THE EARLY 1950S, MOST HAVE REMAINED  
DEEP IN THE COMMUNIST ZONE AND FEW OF THEM WOULD BE  
RECOGNIZED BY NAME--EVEN IN LAOS. DESPITE THEIR LONG  
SERVICE, THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ARE  
RELATIVELY YOUNG AS A GROUP: KAYSONE IS ABOUT 50,  
KHAMPTAY IS 49, AND THE REST ARE IN THEIR FIFTIES OR  
EARLY SIXTIES.4

THE MOST IMPORTANT COMMUNIST LEADERS WITH VERY  
FEW EXCEPTIONS ARE LOWLAND LAO EVEN THOUGH THE RANK

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AND FILE OF THE FRONT AND ARMY ARE DRAWN FROM THE HIGHLAND MINORITY TRIBES OF EASTERN LAOS WHO CAME UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL EARLY IN THE MOVEMENT. WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS OF SOUPHANOUVONG AND PHOUMI VONGVICHIT, THE SENIOR MEMBERS ARE NOT FROM THE TRADITIONAL LAO RULING ELITE. THESE PEOPLE WERE COMMUNISTS--HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THE VIETNAMESE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.4

THE SENIOR COMMUNIST LEADERS HAVE LITTLE FORMAL EDUCATION. OF THE KNOWN CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS, ONLY SOUPHANOUVONG HAS A UNIVERSITY DEGREE AND MANY OF THE OTHERS DID NOT EVEN ATTEND THE FRENCH LYCEES IN INDOCHINA.4

IN CONTRAST TO THEIR COMRADES IN CAMBODIA, THE LAO COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN DEPENDENT ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THEIR MOVEMENT. IT WAS UNDER THE AEGIS OF HO CHI MINH'S VIET MINH THAT SOME 150 ANTI-FRENCH LAO MET IN AUGUST 1950 TO UNITE

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TO FORM THE "PATHET LAO" MOVEMENT. ALL THE PARTICIPANTS AT THIS MEETING HAD CLOSE TIES WITH THE VIETNAMESE. ONE MAJOR GROUP CONSISTED OF COMMONERS, INCLUDING KAYSONE AND NOUHAK, WHO SINCE 1946 HAD BEEN ORGANIZING RESISTANCE BANDS IN THE HILLS OF EASTERN LAOS. A SECOND GROUP CONSISTED OF A SMALL SPLINTER FROM THE LAO ISSARA, THE ORIGINAL LAO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT. THESE ARISTOCRATS, LED BY PRINCE SOUPHAOUVONG, DECIDED TO COOPERATE WITH THE VIETNAMESE AND CONTINUE THE RESISTANCE RATHER THAN FOLLOW SOUVANNA PHOUMA AND OTHERS INTO A FRENCH-SPONSORED GOVERNMENT IN VIENTIANE.4

VIET MINH TROOPS IN THE EARLY 1950S INVADED LAOS AND PROVIDED THE LAO COMMUNISTS WITH THEIR FIRST TERRITORIAL BASE IN THE BORDER PROVINCE OF SAM NEUA. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE TRAINED AND ADVISED THE LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY FROM THAT TIME ON AND, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IT WAS THE

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NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY THAT DID THE FIGHTING FOR THE LAO COMMUNISTS IN NEARLY ALL MAJOR BATTLES. HANOI, THROUGH ITS ADVISERS IN SAM NEUA AND THROUGH CONTACTS WITH SENIOR LAO LEADERS, STILL PROVIDES THE LAO ADVICE, DIRECTION, AND COHESION.4

MANY IN THE LAO COMMUNIST INNER CIRCLE HAVE DEVELOPED CLOSE TIES WITH SENIOR VIETNAMESE LEADERS, AND MANY SPEND CONSIDERABLE TIME IN HANOI. SEVERAL OF THE SENIOR LAO HAVE VIETNAMESE FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS. KAYSONE'S FATHER IS VIETNAMESE. A NUMBER OF THE LAO COMMUNISTS HAVE VIETNAMESE WIVES. (SOUPHANOUVONG IS SAID TO HAVE MARRIED A SECRETARY OF HO CHI MINH.) KAYSONE, SISANE, SOUPHANOUVONG, AND POSSIBLY SEVERAL OTHERS RECEIVED SOME FORMAL EDUCATION IN VIETNAM.4

SOME OBSERVERS OF THE LAO POLITICAL SCENE



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A FACTION WITHIN THE SAM NEUA LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN

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UNHAPPY WITH THE CONTINUED DEPENDENCE ON THE VIETNAMESE. THIS "NATIONALIST" FACTION IS SUPPOSEDLY LED BY SOUPHANOUVONG AND PHOUMI VONGVICHIT AND ALLEGEDLY INCLUDES LESSER FIGURES WHO WERE EDUCATED IN FRENCH INDOCHINA LYCEES, HAVE SOME FAMILY TIES TO THE TRADITIONAL LAO LEADERSHIP, AND WHO HAVE OVER THE YEARS MAINTAINED LESS INTIMATE CONTACT WITH THE VIETNAMESE. MEMBERS OF THIS FACTION ARE SAID TO BE LESS LIKELY TO FOLLOW NORTH VIETNAMESE DIRECTIONS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO IMPOSE A RIGID COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN LAOS.4

WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME COMMUNIST LEADERS FIND THE VIETNAMESE CONNECTION HARD TO SWALLOW, THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE EVER BEEN A SERIOUSLY DIVISIVE ISSUE. SINCE THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT WAS LAUNCHED FORMALLY IN THE EARLY 1950S, NO SENIOR LAO COMMUNIST HAS EVER DEFECTED [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A PURGE OF THE TOP RANKS.

SOUPHANOUVONG AND OTHERS MAY AT TIMES HAVE AR-

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GUED FOR A LINE MORE INDEPENDENT OF HANOI AND FOR LESS STRINGENT COMMUNIST POLICIES. THEY CLEARLY REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THEY CAN GO ONLY SO FAR IN DEVELOPING AN INDEPENDENT LINE WITHOUT PROVOKING THEIR POWERFUL VIETNAMESE BENEFACTORS. IN ANY CASE, KAYSONE, NOUHAK, KHAMPTAY AND THE OTHERS, WHO OWE THEIR POSITIONS TO THE VIETNAMESE AND WHO FOR 30 YEARS HAVE HAD INTIMATE TIES IN HANOI, CALL THE SHOTS FOR THE LAO COMMUNISTS. THE LAO COMMUNISTS MAY EVENTUALLY SEE ADVANTAGES IN CULTIVATING THE SOVIETS, CHINESE, AND EVEN WESTERN STATES IN ORDER TO MOVE TO A MORE INDEPENDENT POSITION. BUT FOR THE TIME BEING, THE PRESENT CAST OF LEADERSHIP WOULD BE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY TO DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT OFFEND THEIR VIETNAMESE COMRADES. 4

THE COMMUNISTS' BASIC OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPOSE A MARXIST-LENINIST SYSTEM ON LAO SOCIETY, ONE THAT IS PRESUMABLY CLOSE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MODEL.

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FOLLOWING THE VIETNAMESE PATTERN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE LAO ARE MOVING MORE SLOWLY THAN THEIR CAMBODIAN COMRADES TOWARD TRADITIONAL COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES.4

AS A FIRST STEP, THE LAO HAVE BEGUN TO IMPOSE A VARIETY OF CONTROLS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. WHILE FAIRLY STANDARD IN THE COMMUNIST CONTEXT, THESE CONTROLS ARE WHOLLY NEW TO THE LAO, WHO ARE USED TO GOVERNMENT NEGLECT. THE COMMUNISTS PRESUMABLY WILL ALSO EXTEND PROGRAMS DEVELOPED OVER THE YEARS IN THE SO-CALLED LIBERATED ZONE. THESE HAVE LESS TO DO WITH THEORETICAL COMMUNIST SOCIAL REFORMS THAN THEY DO WITH MORE PRACTICAL MATTERS SUCH AS INCREASING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, PROVIDING BASIC SERVICES IN HEALTH AND EDUCATION, AND ENCOURAGING COMMUNAL PARTICIPATION IN ROAD MAINTENANCE AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES.4


COMMUNIST PROGRAMS MAY HAVE MORE IMPACT IN VIENTIANE, THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT CITY IN LAOS. MANY LAO SUSPECT THAT THE COMMUNISTS SOON WILL SOLVE THE

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CAPITAL'S PERSISTENT UNEMPLOYMENT PROGRAM BY MOVING NON-PRODUCTIVE PEOPLE TO THE COUNTRYSIDE TO ASSIST IN MEETING THE COMMUNISTS' OFT STATED GOAL OF "GAINING NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN RICE." MOST IF NOT ALL OF THE CAPITAL'S REFUGEE POPULATION PROBABLY WILL ALSO BE MOVED BACK TO THEIR HOMES.4

THE COMMUNISTS OVER THE YEARS HAVE PROVIDED FEW HINTS ON PLANS FOR ANY RADICAL REORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY OR THE ECONOMY. THEY PAY LIP SERVICE TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY, BUT HAVE BEGUN TO NATIONALIZE LAOS' FEW MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING INDUSTRIES AND ARE LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR SIMILAR MOVES AGAINST THE PRIVATELY OWNED BANKS. THESE MOVES WILL HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON LAOS' PRIMITIVE ECONOMY.

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
**ARGENTINA: PRESIDENT PERON APPARENTLY IS DETERMINED TO RESUME HER DUTIES NEXT WEEK, DESPITE STRONG PRESSURE ON HER TO EXTEND HER LEAVE OR EVEN RESIGN. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED SHE WILL RETURN TO THE CAPITAL ON OCTOBER 16 AND ATTEND AN IMPORTANT PERONIST RALLY THE NEXT DAY.**

**THE US EMBASSY REPORTS THAT BOTH ACTING PRESIDENT LUDER AND INTERIOR MINISTER ROBLEDO FLEW TO THE PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT ON OCTOBER 7 TO CONFER WITH PERON. LUDER ALMOST CERTAINLY URGED HER TO REMAIN OUT OF THE PICTURE. ROBLEDO, SAID TO DIFFER WITH LUDER ON THE ISSUE ALL ALONG, MAY WELL HAVE URGED HER TO COME BACK.**

**WHEN THE TWO MEN REACHED BUENOS AIRES LATE ON OCTOBER 7, THEY REFUSED TO REVEAL THE RESULTS OF THEIR TALKS. ROBLEDO SAID ONLY THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE AT THE RALLY AND THAT ALL ELSE WAS SPECULATION.**

**MEANWHILE, OPINION IN POLITICAL, PRESS, AND MILITARY CIRCLES CONTINUES TO HARDEN AGAINST PERON. ACCORDING TO A PRESS ACCOUNT, THE COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE ALSO VISITED THE PRESIDENT TO TELL HER**

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
THAT THE MILITARY WANTED HER TO PROLONG HER VACATION.4

THE OFFICERS REGARD THE CONTROVERSY OVER HER ROLE AND HER DEMONSTRATED INABILITY TO LEAD AS DETRIMENTAL TO THE PURSUIT OF THEIR PRINCIPAL GOAL, THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM. IN RECENT DAYS, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS CREATED TWO NEW BODIES DESIGNED TO STREAMLINE THE ANTI-GUERRILLA EFFORT AND GIVE THE MILITARY A STRONGER HAND IN THE FIGHT.4

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THE GENERALS AND LEADER WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY STEP UP THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVAIL ON PERON TO STAY AWAY.

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
1. MOROCCO: KING HASSAN, IN REMARKS TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN RABAT ON OCTOBER 8, REITERATED A PROMISE HE MADE IN AUGUST TO AWAIT THE FORTHCOMING ADVISORY OPINION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BEFORE RESORTING TO FORCE IN SPANISH SAHARA.4

HASSAN SAID HE WOULD INFORM HIS COUNTRYMEN OF THE COURSE OF ACTION MOROCCO WILL TAKE ONCE THE COURT'S OPINION—WHICH MAY BE RELEASED SOON—IS KNOWN. HASSAN ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB STATES IN RETURN FOR WHAT MOROCCO PROVIDED DURING THE OCTOBER WAR AND IN SUBSEQUENT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ALSO APPEALED TO AFRICAN STATES, REMINDING THEM THAT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL LIBERATION WERE IMPORTANT CONCEPTS IN THEIR PAST.4

THE KING'S REMARKS HAVE EASED SOMEWHAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION, BUT HE HAS NOT ABANDONED HIS YEAR-END DEADLINE OR HIS THREAT TO USE FORCE IF NECESSARY. IF THE COURT'S OPINION IS AMBIGUOUS OR UNFAVORABLE TO MOROCCO, HASSAN PROBABLY WILL INITIATE SOME FORM OF MILITARY ACTION IN SPANISH SAHARA.

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


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IN A PARALLEL SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER LARAKI ALSO APPEALED FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. HE ARGUED THAT THE ASSEMBLY, IN RECOMMENDING PROPOSALS FOR THE DECOLONIZATION OF SPANISH SAHARA, MUST RESPECT THE "FUNDAMENTAL LAW" OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA. HE ALSO CRITICIZED SPAIN REPEATEDLY AND REAFFIRMED MOROCCO'S CLAIM TO THE SPANISH ENCLAVES OF CEUTA AND MELILLA IN NORTHERN MOROCCO. HE CALLED ON SPAIN TO NEGOTIATE THEIR RETURN, DRAWING A PARALLEL BETWEEN HIS COUNTRY'S CLAIM TO THE ENCLAVES AND SPAIN'S TO GIBRALTAR.4

BY REVIVING ITS CLAIMS TO THE NORTHERN ENCLAVES AND LINKING THEM TO MADRID'S CLAIM TO GIBRALTAR, MOROCCO MAY BE HINTING THAT IT WILL SUPPORT SPAIN ON GIBRALTAR IN RETURN FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT ON THE SAHARA AND THE NORTHERN ENCLAVES.

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1. PORTUGAL: THE PORTUGUESE CABINET ISSUED A TOUGH STATEMENT THURSDAY NIGHT WARNING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE ACTION AGAINST ANY GROUPS USING VIOLENCE AND CALLING FOR A JOINT MEETING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO MAP OUT MEASURES THAT WOULD GUARANTEE STABILITY. THE STATEMENT ENDORSED THE RECENT ACTIONS OF THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS AND THE SOCIALISTS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND INDIRECTLY CONDEMNED THE COMMUNISTS FOR SUPPORTING THE CONTINUING WAVE OF MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND INDUSTRIAL AGITATION.4

MUTINIES BY EXTREME LEFTIST SOLDIERS HAVE POLARIZED PORTUGAL'S FACTIONS, AND AS ROOM FOR COMPROMISE BECOMES PROGRESSIVELY NARROWED, VIOLENCE IS BECOMING MORE LIKELY.4

SOCIALIST PARTY LEADER MARIO SOARES, ADDRESSING A SOCIALIST-SPONSORED PRO-GOVERNMENT RALLY IN COIMBRA ON WEDNESDAY, WARNED THAT UNLESS A MINIMUM OF ORDER AND STABILITY IS CREATED WITHIN A MONTH, PORTUGAL WILL FACE GREAT ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS. HE SAID THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CANNOT BE SOLVED BY DISORDER OR DEMONSTRATIONS LIKE THOSE RECENTLY INSTIGATED BY THE FAR LEFT

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AND APPLAUDED BY THE COMMUNISTS. SOARES WAS RESPONDING TO A RECENT COMMUNIST PARTY STATEMENT THAT THE SEIZURES OF MILITARY UNITS BY THE FAR LEFT WERE LEGITIMATE ACTS AND "A LIVELY EXPRESSION OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE WORKING PEOPLE."4

SOARES SAID THAT AFTER 18 MONTHS OF REVOLUTION, THE PEOPLE ARE TIRED OF DISORDER. HE SAID THE AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN FORMED TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CALM IN WHICH THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS COULD BE SOLVED.4

AFTER THE RALLY, THE SOCIALIST DEMONSTRATORS MARCHED TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY REGION TO REITERATE THEIR SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT.4

THE COMMUNISTS HAVE DENOUNCED AS A "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY PROVOCATION" A PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION BY THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS ON WEDNESDAY EVENING IN PORTO, WHICH WAS CLIMAXED BY A FREE-FOR-ALL WITH ROCK-THROWING LEFTISTS. ABOUT 5,000 POPULAR DEMOCRATIC PARTY SUPPORTERS CLASHED WITH DEFENDERS OF AN ARTILLERY POST SEIZED BY DISSIDENT SOLDIERS ON TUESDAY. THE COMMUNISTS APPEALED TO PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES TO TAKE "ENERGETIC

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ACTION" AGAINST THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS, WHOM IT ACCUSED OF TRYING TO STORM THE POST BY FORCE.4

EXTREME LEFT ELEMENTS OCCUPYING THE ARTILLERY POST REACHED A STANDOFF WITH LOYALIST FORCES ON THURSDAY AS THE NORTHERN REGION COMMANDER, GENERAL VELOSO, AGAIN BACKED AWAY FROM THE USE OF FORCE TO QUELL THE MUTINY. VELOSO'S EARLIER EFFORTS TO ENFORCE DISCIPLINE HAVE MADE HIM THE PRINCIPAL TARGET FOR LEFTIST ATTACKS.4

VELOSO IS BELIEVED TO HAVE ENOUGH LOYAL TROOPS TO REASSERT CONTROL IN PORTO IF HE IS ORDERED TO DO SO, BUT SUCH ORDERS HAVE APPARENTLY NOT BEEN ISSUED. THE HOPE APPARENTLY IS THAT VELOSO CAN RESTORE ORDER WITHOUT RESORTING TO EXCESSIVE FORCE AND THUS RISKING BLOODSHED AND POSSIBLY WIDENING THE AREA OF CONFLICT. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A PLENUM OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE EARLY THIS WEEK RELEASED OLDRICH SVETSKA FROM HIS POST ON THE SECRETARIAT AND APPOINTED HIM EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE PARTY DAILY, RUDE PRAVO, A POST HE HELD FROM 1958 TO 1968. JOSEF HAVLIN, CURRENTLY THE CZECH

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MINISTER OF EDUCATION, WAS ELECTED TO REPLACE SVETSKA AS PARTY SECRETARY.4

THESE SHIFTS PRESAGE A TOUGHER IDEOLOGICAL LINE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BOTH MEN ARE VETERAN HARD LINERS. HAVLIN, WHO STAUNCHLY SUPPORTED OUSTED PARTY BOSS NOVOTNY AND ADOPTED A PARTICULARLY TOUGH LINE TOWARD RESTIVE STUDENTS IN 1967, WAS DROPPED FROM ALL OFFICES DURING THE DUBCEK ERA. LIKE SVETSKA, HE HAS HAD PREVIOUS PRESS EXPERIENCE, AND WILL NOT HESITATE TO CRACK THE IDEOLOGICAL WHIP IN THE REGIME'S DRIVE TO HAVE THE MEDIA MORE CLOSELY REFLECT THE VIEW FROM THE KREMLIN. THE HUSAK LEADERSHIP HAS--SINCE MID-SUMMER--CRITICIZED "NUMEROUS PROBLEMS AND SHORTCOMINGS" IN THE COUNTRY'S PRINTED MEDIA AND PRAGUE RECENTLY RELIEVED THE MORE MODERATE MIROSLAV MOC FROM HIS POST OF EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE PARTY DAILY.4

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPROVED A LETTER TO PARTY ORGANIZATIONS ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE 15TH PARTY CON-

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GRESS NEXT APRIL. PARTY CHIEF HUSAK DESCRIBED THE NOTE AS "AN IMPORTANT IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL DOCUMENT." THE PLENUM ALSO APPROVED A REPORT TO THE PRESIDIUM ON THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND THE FOOD INDUSTRY.

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3. BULGARIA-IRAN: AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION HIGHLIGHTED THE VISIT BY IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDA TO BULGARIA LAST WEEK. THE TALKS CONTINUED THE PERIODIC EXCHANGE OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES--THE LAST BEING BY PARTY CHIEF ZHIVKOV TO IRAN IN 1974.4

THE VISIT RECEIVED LOW-KEY COVERAGE IN THE BULGARIAN PRESS. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED ON OCTOBER 6 CONTAINED LITTLE OF INTEREST, AND FEW DETAILS ON THE AGREEMENTS WERE RELEASED. THE TALKS DID, HOWEVER, CARRY FORWARD BULGARIA'S EFFORT TO EXPAND ITS SURFACE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK AND INDUSTRY. IRAN AGREED TO PURCHASE RAILROAD PASSENGER AND FREIGHT CARS, AND

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BULGARIA'S DIRECTOR OF FREIGHT CAR MANUFACTURING PLANTS WILL VISIT IRAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR FURTHER TALKS. THE BULGARIANS WILL ALSO INCREASE THEIR EXPORTS OF MEAT, CHEESE, BUTTER, AND OTHER FOODSTUFFS.4



ONE OF

THE MAIN SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION WAS THE IMPROVEMENT OF SURFACE TRANSPORTATION THROUGH BULGARIA TO FACILITATE SHIPMENTS TO IRAN. BOTH COUNTRIES STILL CONFRONT THE TURKISH BOTTLENECK SEPARATING THEM. TURKEY'S LIMITED RAIL CAPACITY HAS CONTRIBUTED TO ENDEMIC RAIL CONGESTION AT THE BULGARIAN-TURKISH BORDER. SOFIA HAS BEEN TRYING--WITH LITTLE SUCCESS--TO PERSUADE THE TURKS TO TAKE SOME COOPERATIVE ACTION ON THEIR SIDE OF THE BORDER.4

THE COMMUNIQUE DID NOT MENTION THE QUESTION OF OIL. THE SUBJECT CERTAINLY IS OF MORE THAN PASSING INTEREST TO THE BULGARIANS, HOWEVER, ESPECIALLY IF THERE IS ANY PROSPECT THAT THEY COULD OBTAIN IT ON CONCESSIONAL

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TERMS. [REDACTED]

4. BULGARIA: THE BULGARIAN PARTY FAITHFUL HAVE BEEN WARNED AGAINST ANY RELAXATION OF IDEOLOGICAL VIGILANCE IN THE POST-HELSINKI PERIOD. WRITING IN THE OFFICIAL PARTY ORGAN ON SEPTEMBER 29, LYDUMILA ZHIVKOVA-- MINISTER OF ART AND CULTURE--NOTED THAT THE PARTY WILL FACE "CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES" IN THE PERIOD AHEAD. THERE WILL BE "SOME TENDENCIES," SHE STRESSED, TO PROPAGANDIZE "BOURGEOIS INFLUENCE... ANTICOMMUNIST CONCEPTS AND TENDENCIES LIKE VIOLENCE, RACISIM, DISCRIMINATION, PORNOGRAPHY...."

ZHIVKOVA'S REMARKS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE RIGID ORTHODOXY OF THE BULGARIAN REGIME. IT IS THE TIMING OF THE PUBLICATION THAT IS SIGNIFICANT. LYDUMILA, WHO IS PARTY CHIEF ZHIVKOV'S DAUGHTER AND APPEARS TO ENJOY GROWING PROMINENCE IN GOVERNMENT AND PARTY CIRCLES, HAD JUST RETURNED FROM THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE OF SOCIALIST MINISTERS OF CUL-

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TURE. ZHIVKOV, WHO HAS BEEN GIVING INCREASING PRIORITY TO IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE US AND GAINING ACCESS TO MUCH NEEDED WESTERN TECHNOLOGY, IS KEENLY AWARE OF THE ACCOMPANYING NECESSITY TO INCREASE POLITICAL DISCIPLINE AT HOME. THIS EFFORT TO SHARPEN THE PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL AWARENESS DURING THE EAST-WEST DETENTE ERA IS LIKELY TO GROW AS BULGARIA APPROACHES ITS 11TH PARTY CONGRESS IN MARCH 1976.

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5. YUGOSLAVIA-BULGARIA:

THE YUGOSLAV AND BULGARIAN REGIMES HAVE AGREED TO CON- VENE A JOINT MEETING OF SCHOLARS TO RECOMMEND WAYS TO DEFUSE THE TANGLED MACEDONIAN ISSUE.4

THE INSPIRATION FOR THIS VENTURE REPORTEDLY CAME DURING A MEETING BETWEEN PARTY LEADERS TITO AND ZHIVKOV AT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT. SINCE THE CSCE SES- SION, THE YUGOSLAV POLEMIC AGAINST SOFIA'S REFUSAL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A MACEDONIAN MINORITY AND THE BULGARIAN MAJORITY HAS SLACKENED.4

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WHILE JOINT EFFORTS ARE A STEP FORWARD, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL MANAGE TO DO MUCH MORE THAN SETTLE THE DUST FOR A BRIEF TIME. THE SPIRIT OF THE TITO-ZHIVKOV TALKS IN HELSINKI COULD FOUNDER RATHER QUICKLY IF THE BULGARIANS PROCEED WITH A PLANNED CENSUS THAT OMITTS A CATEGORY FOR "MACEDONIANS." YUGOSLAV MACEDONIANS VIEW THE CENSUS AS AN INDIRECT BULGARIAN CHALLENGE TO THEIR NATIONHOOD AND, ULTIMATELY, TO THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR NO ROOM FOR COMPROMISE WITHOUT PROMPTING CHARGES THAT BELGRADE IS SELLING OUT THE INTERESTS OF THE SMALLER MINORITIES-- A SERIOUS MATTER IN MULTI-NATIONAL YUGOSLAVIA.

EVEN IF SOFIA DEFERS THE CENSUS, A HOST OF OTHER ISSUES REMAIN OUTSTANDING. AMONG THEM ARE JOINTLY CLAIMED CULTURAL HEROES, EXPLANATIONS OF THE "LIBERATION" OF YUGOSLAV MACEDONIA DURING THE WAR, AND LINGUISTIC CLAIMS.

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