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Secret

1. SPAIN: MOVES BY THE GOVERNMENT TO LIBERALIZE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ARE FALLING SHORT OF LEFTIST EXPECTATIONS WHILE STIRRING UP STRONG OPPOSITION FROM THE FAR RIGHT.4

LEFTIST DEMONSTRATIONS IN MADRID LAST THURSDAY ILLUSTRATE THE GOVERNMENT'S DIFFICULTY IN MAKING A CONVINCING SHOW OF LIBERALIZATION. A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN REPORTEDLY HAD SAID EARLIER IN THE WEEK THAT PEACEFUL MANIFESTATIONS OF OPPOSITION WOULD BE TOLERATED, AND THIS BREAK WITH THE FRANCO TRADITION WAS CONFIRMED WHEN THE INTERIOR MINISTRY GAVE PERMISSION FOR THE DEMONSTRATION.4

WHEN SEVERAL HUNDRED LEFTISTS GATHERED IN FRONT OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, HOWEVER, THEY WERE ATTACKED BY MEMBERS OF THE EXTREME RIGHTIST GUERRILLAS OF CHRIST THE KING. THE ATTACK TRIGGERED INTERVENTION BY POLICE, WHO BY MOST ACCOUNTS USED A MINIMUM OF FORCE TO DISPERSE THE CROWD. AT LEAST TWO WOUNDED DEMONSTRATORS WERE TAKEN TO THE HOSPITAL.4

THE DEMONSTRATION, LIKE MOST RECENT LEFTIST RALLIES, FOCUSED ON DEMANDS FOR COMPLETE AMNESTY FOR ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. THE KING

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JUAN CARLOS' PARDON DECREE OF NOVEMBER 25 HAS BEEN WIDELY CRITICIZED BY THE LEFT ON THE GROUNDS THAT ITS AMBIGUOUS WORDING WOULD ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO FAVOR COMMON CRIMINALS WHILE VIRTUALLY EXCLUDING POLITICAL PRISONERS.4

IN FACT, OF THE ESTIMATED 15,000 PRISONERS IN SPANISH JAILS, ALMOST A THIRD HAVE ALREADY BEEN FREED BY THE KING'S PARDON. ONLY 235 OF THOSE RELEASED ARE CONSIDERED POLITICAL PRISONERS, BUT OBSERVERS IN MADRID ESTIMATE THIS MAY CONSTITUTE ALMOST HALF OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. LEFTIST CLAIM, HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME 2,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND THEY WILL DOUBTLESS CONTINUE THEIR PROTESTS.4

THE NEW MINISTER OF JUSTICE, ANTONIO GARIGUES, MAY INTERPRET THE DECREE MORE LIBERALLY THAN HIS PREDECESSOR, PAVING THE WAY FOR FURTHER RELEASES. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE BY RELEASING TWO OF SPAIN'S BEST KNOWN POLITICAL PRISONERS--
4 DISSIDENT PRIEST FRANCISCO GARCIA SALVE AND COMMUNIST LABOR LEADER
3 MARCELINO CAMACHO. BOTH MEN WERE ORIGINALLY FREED BY THE KING'S
2 PARDON AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER REARRESTED FOR INCITING DEMONSTRATIONS.4
1 IN OTHER MOVES, THE GOVERNMENT HAS LIFTED PREVIOUS FINES ON

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PRIESTS FOR "OBJECTIONABLE" SERMONS, AND THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION HAS ANNULLED SOME SANCTIONS ON STUDENTS WHO VIOLATED ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE. THE MILITARY ALSO HAS DROPPED CHARGES AGAINST THREE OF THE OFFICERS DETAINED LAST SUMMER ON CHARGES OF SEDITION.

WHILE THE GOVERNMENT'S INITIAL MOVES TOWARD LIBERALIZATION HAVE FAILED TO APPEASE THE LEFT, THEY HAVE STIRRED UP OPPOSITION IN THE RIGHTIST-DOMINATED PARLIAMENT. ON FRIDAY, RIGHT-WINGERS IN PARLIAMENT CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER ARIAS TO APPEAR BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE TO EXPLAIN THE GOVERNMENT'S "POLITICAL PROJECTS."

PARLIAMENTARY CRITICS ALSO SINGLED OUT THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, JOSE MARIA DE AREILZA, WHO SAID ON WEDNESDAY THAT THE EXILED HEAD OF THE SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY, SANTIAGO CARRILLO, IS ENTITLED TO A PASSPORT "LIKE ANY OTHER SPAINARD," AND SHOULD NOT BE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY. AREILZA WENT ON TO POINT OUT,

HOWEVER, THAT "PROBLEMS OF A JUDICIAL NATURE" MIGHT AWAIT CARRILLO IN SPAIN SHOULD HE RETURN.

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2. CEMA: CONVOCATION OF THE DELAYED CEMA SUMMIT CONTINUES

TO SLIP. THE SOVIETS ARE 25X1C

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PLANNING A JANUARY MEETING, BUT THINKS THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR A SESSION THAT SOON ARE BLEAK.4

ROMANIAN DISSENT ON ISSUES THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY WANT TO RAISE AT THE MEETING HAS BEEN A FACTOR IN THE DELAY, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT MOSCOW WOULD PERMIT BUCHAREST'S RECALCITRANCE ALONE TO POSTPONE THE SUMMIT. HEAVY TRAVEL SCHEDULES, PREPARATIONS FOR PARTY CONGRESSES IN POLAND AND THE USSR, AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF COMPLETING PLAN COORDINATION PROTOCOLS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS AMONG THE CEMA COUNTRIES HAVE ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE DELAYS.4

THE SOVIETS HAVE CIRCULATED A DOCUMENT ON CEMA INTEGRATION--TO BE RELEASED AT THE SUMMIT--WHICH REPORTEDLY HAS THE CONCURRENCE OF ALL THE EAST EUROPEANS

4 EXCEPT THE ROMANIANS. [REDACTED] BUCH- 25X1C

3 AREST IS DICKERING OVER THE DOCUMENT'S LANGUAGE ON:4

2 CEMA-EC TIES: THE ROMANIANS SEEM AGREEABLE TO CEMA-

1 EC NEGOTIATIONS, BUT REPORTEDLY INSIST THAT THE DOCUMENT SPECIFICALLY

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MENTION THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL CEMA COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN TIES WITH THE EC. THE SOVIETS, WHO ARE RELUCTANT TO DILUTE THE MULTI-LATERAL APPROACH, PROBABLY ARGUE THAT NO REFERENCE IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE SAFEGUARDS ARE WRITTEN INTO THE CEMA CHARTER.4

CEMA-SPECIALIZATION: THE ROMANIANS BELIEVE THAT SOVIET-PROPOSED WORDING WOULD PRECLUDE EFFORTS BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES TO BUILD OR EXPAND CERTAIN INDUSTRIES. BUCHAREST HAS LONG BEEN CONCERNED THAT CEMA DECISIONS ON SPECIALIZATION THAT ARE BASED SOLELY ON ECONOMIC CRITERIA AND TAKEN FROM A CEMA-WIDE PERSPECTIVE WOULD FAVOR THE MORE DEVELOPED CEMA COUNTRIES AND THEREBY PERPETUATE ROMANIA'S LESS DEVELOPED STATUS. AS A COUNTER, THE ROMANIANS HAVE 4 ARGUED--THIS YEAR AND IN THE PAST--THAT THEY AND 3 OTHER LESS-DEVELOPED CEMA COUNTRIES DESERVE POLITI- 2 CALLY-MOTIVATED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO EQUALIZE THE 1 DEVELOPEMENT OF ALL CEMA MEMBERS. THE SOVIETS RE-

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FUSE TO CONSIDER ROMANIA A LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRY.4

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THE ROMANIANS OBJECT TO ALLOWING THE SOVIETS TO HAVE FULL CONTROL OF A JOINTLY DEVELOPED PROJECT (AND ITS PRODUCTION) ON SOVIET TERRITORY, EVEN AFTER MOSCOW HAS REPAID EAST EUROPEAN DEVELOPEMENT ASSISTANCE. THIS, IN EFFECT, IS A DEMAND THAT MOSCOW EARMARK GREATER QUANTITIES OF RAW MATERIALS FROM SUCH JOINT PROJECTS FOR THE EAST EUROPEANS. WHILE THIS DEMAND IS IN LINE WITH ROMANIAN EFFORTS TO GET MORE OF CERTAIN RAW MATERIALS FROM THE SOVIETS, IT IS INCONSISTENET WITH BUCHAREST'S VIEW THAT JOINTLY DEVELOPED PROJECTS ON ROMANIAN SOIL ARE SUBJECT ONLY TO ROMANIAN CONTROL.4

4 THE ROMANIANS MAY BE DISSENTING ON OTHER ISSUES.
 3 THE SOVIETS AT ONE TIME WERE PROPOSING THAT CEMA'S
 2 PLANNING COOPERATION COMMITTEE BE GIVEN INCREASED
 1 POWER TO DIRECT OTHER CEMA UNITS AND THAT IT BE PUT

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ON A FULL-TIME OPERATING SCHEDULE. MOSCOW CLEARLY HOPES THAT SUCH STEPS--WHICH ARE AIMED AT GREATER EFFICIENCY AND INTEGRATION--WILL COUNTER ROMANIAN DELAYING TACTICS WITHIN CEMA. BUCHAREST WILL RESIST ANY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES THAT HAVE A SUPRANATIONAL RING AND IDEALLY WOULD LIKE TO PERPETUATE A CREAKY, INEFFICIENT CEMA STRUCTURE.Y

OTHER EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON THESE ISSUES ARE UNCLEAR. [REDACTED] CLAIM THAT THE POLES AND HUNGARIANS TACITLY SUPPORT THEM ON THE EC ISSUE, APPARENTLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT CRITICIZED BUCHAREST'S STANCE. [REDACTED] SAYS THE POLES AND HUNGARIANS ALSO SUPPORT ROMANIAN VIEWS ON JOINT DEVELOPEMENT PROJECTS, WHILE THE HUNGARIANS SHARE THEIR ATTITUDE ON SPECIALIZATION.Y

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IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT ANY OTHER EAST EUROPEAN DISSENT WOULD FOCUS ON SPECIFIC ECONOMIC PROPOSALS BY MOSCOW. [REDACTED] THE

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SUMMIT WOULD MAKE "PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT" DECISIONS IN AGRICULTURAL AS WELL AS THE RAW MATERIAL SECTORS. ALL THE EAST EUROPEANS, OF COURSE, ARE EAGER TO GET FURTHER SOVIET ASSURANCES ON LONG-TERM DELIVERIES OF RAW MATERIALS, BUT IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THIS OVERALL ISSUE CAN BE--OR IS INTENDED TO BE--RESOLVED BEFORE A CEMA SUMMIT. ANY SOVIET EFFORT TO SEEK EVEN PARTIAL SOLUTIONS IN THESE OR OTHER SENSITIVE AREAS COULD FURTHER DELAY A CEMA SUMMIT.

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3. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: SEVERAL RECENT ARTICLES IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK PRESS THROW COLD WATER ON HOPES THAT THE COMING 15TH PARTY CONGRESS MIGHT TAKE A SOFTER LINE TOWARD OSTRACIZED REFORMERS OF THE DUBCEK ERA.

THE ARTICLES ARE PART OF THE ACTIVITY COMMEMORATING THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF "LESSONS," A CENTRAL COMMITTEE DOCUMENT APPROVED IN DECEMBER 1970. INASMUCH AS THEY STRESS THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF "LESSONS," THE PRESS COMMENTARIES SUGGEST THAT THE

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CONGRESS WILL NOT MAKE A DRAMATIC GESTURE TOWARD NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BY PROVIDING A WAY TO REHABILITATE LARGE NUMBERS OF THE OSTRACIZED REFORMERS.4

THE REGIME'S DEFENSE OF THE DOCUMENT IS NOT SURPRISING. "LESSONS" WAS INTENDED TO SERVE AS BOTH A POST MORTEM OF "WHAT WENT WRONG" IN 1968 AND AN APOLOGIA FOR THE RESTORATION OF RIGIDLY ORTHODOX COMMUNIST RULE. MOREOVER, THE DOCUMENT RATIONALIZED THE ROLES THAT SEVERAL OF THE PRESENT LEADERS PLAYED DURING THE REFORM ERA. IT ALSO EXONERATED THE SYSTEM BY BLAMING THE NOVOTNY AND DUBCEK REGIMES FOR MAKING THE PARTY VULNERABLE TO THE "RIGHTIST" ON-SLAUGHT.4

THE COMMENTARIES POINT OUT THAT POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS WAS POSSIBLE WITHOUT RESORTING TO "SECTARIAN APPROACHES WHICH AGGRANDIZED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COERCIVE APPROACHES." THEY ALSO STRESS THE "DIFFERENTIATED" CASE-BY-CASE

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APPROACH TO REHABILITATION THAT PARTY CHIEF AND
PRESIDENT HUSAK REPORTEDLY FAVORS. ALTHOUGH THE
ARTICLES THUS SUGGEST THAT THE "MODERATES" SCORED A
VICTORY, SELECTIVE REHABILITATION FALLS CONSIDERABLY
SHORT OF WHAT MANY EMIGRES HAD HOPED FOR.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

//CAMBODIA-LAOS: CAMBODIA HAS FOR THE FIRST TIME SUPPORTED LAOS AND VIETNAM IN THEIR DEMAND THAT THE THAI EXPEL THE REMAINING US MILITARY PRESENCE FROM THAILAND.//

//THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON FRIDAY FOLLOWING THE VISIT TO PHNOM PENH BY LAO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER PHOUN SIPASEUT STATED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES FACE A THREAT TO "PEACE AND SECURITY" AS LONG AS US MILITARY BASES AND LAO AND CAMBODIAN "TRAITORS" REMAIN IN THAILAND. THIS IS THE FIRST OFFICIAL LAO VISIT TO CAMBODIA SINCE THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER THERE AND RECIPROCATES THE VISIT OF CAMBODIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER LENG SARY TO LAOS IN OCTOBER.//

//ENDORSEMENT OF HANOI'S POSITION ON THE US PRESENCE IN THAILAND REFLECTS PHNOM PENH'S CONCERN THAT IT KEEP MORE OR LESS IN LINE WITH ITS COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS IN INDOCHINA. THE CAMBODIANS, HOWEVER, HAVE NOT JOINED HANOI AND VIENTIANE IN INSISTING THAT BANGKOK RETURN ALL AIRCRAFT AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TAKEN INTO THAILAND DURING THE LAST STAGES OF THE WAR AS A PRECONDITION FOR

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NORMALIZING RELATIONS. PHNOM PENH'S CONTINUED SILENCE ON THIS
ISSUE MAY REFLECT ITS INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THAILAND
AND THE CAMBODIAN LEADERSHIP'S APPARENT DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN A
BASICALLY INDEPENDENT STANCE IN INDOCHINA.

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8. CUBA: A MASSIVE RALLY IS TO BE HELD IN HAVANA ON DECEMBER 22, OSTENSIBLY TO GIVE THE CUBAN PEOPLE THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPROVE THE DECISIONS AND PROGRAMS EMANATING FROM THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S FIRST CONGRESS. THE SIX-DAY CONGRESS, WHICH ENDS ON DECEMBER 22, HAS BEEN HELD UNDER THE TIGHTEST SECURITY CUBA HAS EVER EXPERIENCED. 4

AT THE CONGRESS, DELEGATES UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED NEW PARTY STATUTES, THE REORGANIZATION OF CUBA'S ADMINISTRATIVE DEVISIONS, A FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN, AND A NEW CONSTITUTION THAT IS TO BE SUBMITTED TO A REFERENDUM ON FEBRUARY 15. 4

PARTY FIRST SECRETARY FIDEL CASTRO IS LIKELY TO USE THE MASS GATHERING ON DECEMBER 22 TO PRESENT THE NEW PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE PEOPLE, TO TELL THEM MORE ABOUT CUBA'S MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, AND TO REPLY TO PRESIDENT FORD'S REMARKS ON DECEMBER 20 ON CUBAN-US RELATIONS. [REDACTED]

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2. BOLIVIA-CHILE: BOLIVIA'S PRESIDENT BANZER ANNOUNCED ON DECEMBER 21 THAT CHILE HAD RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO LA PAZ'S DEMAND FOR AN OUTLET TO THE SEA. 4

ALTHOUGH BANZER WAS VAGUE ABOUT DETAILS, HE SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN SOON TO IRON OUT SPECIFIC CONDITIONS--PARTICULARLY WHAT BOLIVIAN TERRITORY WOULD BE GRANTED CHILE IN EXCHANGE FOR A CORRIDOR NORTH OF ARICA ALONG THE PERUVIAN BORDER.Y

BANZER SAID THAT CHILE WAS CONSULTING PERU ON THE OFFER AS REQUIRED BY A 1927 PROTOCOL. PERU'S ACCESSION WILL BE THE BIGGEST HITCH BECAUSE LIMA MIGHT WELL IMPOSE CONDITIONS THAT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER PARTIES.Y

WHILE THE CHILEAN RESPONSE WILL BE GREETED WITH GREAT FANFARE IN BOLIVIA, A SOLUTION IS FAR FROM ASSURED AND DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING COULD BE PROLONGED..

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3. //ARGENTINA: THE REBELLION OF DISSIDENT AIR FORCE OFFICERS CALLING FOR THE OUSTER OF PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA PERON IS APPARENTLY ALL BUT OVER. PERON REMAINS IN OFFICE FOR THE MOMENT, BUT HER HOLD IS TENUOUS AT BEST.//Y

//THE REBELLIOUS AIR FORCE OFFICERS FAILED IN THEIR REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER SERVICES AND SUPPORT ELSEWHERE IN THE AIR FORCE WAS ONLY LUKEMARN. ONE ARMY GENERAL WHO

PRONOUNCED HIMSELF "IN REBELLION" HAS BEEN DISMISSED. AT NO TIME WAS THE REBELS' POSITION VERY STRONG; THEY HAVE HAD VIRTUALLY NO FIREPOWER AT THEIR DISPOSAL. AS NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDED ON DECEMBER 21, THERE WAS NO RENEWAL OF THE DECEMBER 20 BOMBING AND STRAPING OF THE REBEL STRONGHOLD. //Y

//PRESIDENT PERON, FACING THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGE YET TO HER AUTHORITY, REACTED IN HER USUAL FASHION. HER OFFICE ISSUED DEFIANT STATEMENTS OF HER REFUSAL TO STEP DOWN; SHE REMAINED, FOR THE MOST PART, SECLUDED WITH A HANDFUL OF SUPPORTERS. ONCE AGAIN SHE WAS REPORTED ILL. //Y

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1. LEBANON: SYRIAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF SHIHABI RETURNED HOME FROM BEIRUT ON SATURDAY AFTER TWO DAYS OF TALKS WITH THE PRINCIPAL LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN POLITICAL LEADERS.4

WHILE IN BEIRUT, SHIHABI PUBLICLY CREDITED RIGHT-WING PHALANGES PARTY LEADER JUMAYYIL WITH BEING "PREPARED TO FIND A SOLUTION TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE LEBANESE CRISIS." SHIHABI'S VISIT MAY HAVE BEEN AIMED MAINLY AT PRESSING LEFTIST LEADER JUMBLATT TO TEMPER HIS POLITICAL DEMANDS AND TO COOPERATE WITH PRIME MINISTER KARAMI IN FORMING A NEW CABINET.4

ON FRIDAY, JUMBLATT ANNOUNCED THAT LEBANON WAS "AT THE BEGINNING" OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THAT COULD TAKE TWO OR THREE MONTHS TO IMPLEMENT. AMBIGUOUS THOUGH IT WAS, THIS WAS HIS MOST OPTIMISTIC STATEMENT IN SEVERAL WEEKS.4 SO FAR, HE HAS NOT DIRECTLY BLAMED LEBANESE CHRISTIANS FOR THE ASSASSINATION ON SATURDAY OF TRIPOLI GOVERNOR QASSIM AL IMAD. AL IMAD, A CIVIL SERVANT, GENERALLY SHARED JUMBLATT'S LEFTIST VIEWS AND, LIKE JUMBLATT, WAS A DRUZE.4

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FOR THE PRESENT, DRUZE, MUSLIM, AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS ARE BLAMING THE SLAYING ON UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS WHO WANT TO PERPETUATE THE FIGHTING. INTERIOR MINISTER SHAMUN CLAIMS TO HAVE EVIDENCE THAT RADICALS WHO IN THE PAST HAVE USED SNIPING ATTACKS TO SPARK A RESUMPTION OF GENERAL HOSTILITIES ARE NOW PREPARING A SERIES OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS.4

THE SYRIANS MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE JUMBLATT TO ENDORSE THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS REACHED DURING JUMAYYIL'S VISIT TO DAMASCUS EARLY THIS MONTH. THAT PLAN REPORTEDLY PROVIDES FOR:

- IMPLEMENTATION ~~OF~~ OF AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE;
- EXPANSION ~~OF~~ THE CABINET TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF JUMAYYIL AND JUMBLATT;
- AGREEMENT TO MINOR, LARGELY COSMETIC POLITICAL CHANGES WHILE PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH IS IN OFFICE;
- NEGOTIATIONS ~~ON~~ ON MORE FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS AFTER A NEW PRESIDENT IS ELECTED NEXT AUGUST.4

LEBANESE CHRISTIANS PROBABLY WOULD ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS

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ON THE THEORY THAT THEY WOULD BRING IMMEDIATE PEACE AND ALLOW TIME TO QUALIFY OR BACK AWAY FROM THE PLEDGE TO NEGOTIATE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE COUNTRY'S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. JUMBLATT AND OTHER LEFTISTS ARE RELUCTANT TO GIVE UP ANYTHING IN RETURN FOR MERE PROMISES OF REFORM. THEY, TOO, HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES IN THE FIGHTING THIS YEAR, HOWEVER, AND MAY NOW BE CONVINCED THAT FRANJIYAH IS NOT LIKELY TO RESIGN OR MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS BEFORE HIS TERM EXPIRES.

ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS, EVEN RADICAL LEFTIST IBRAHIM QULAYLAT HAS MELLOWED

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QULAYLAT'S HEADQUARTERS ON SATURDAY ISSUED A STATEMENT SAYING THAT THE LEBANESE CRISIS CAN BE SOLVED ONLY "BY THE POLITICAL PROCESS."

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2. OAU: THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ANNOUNCED ON FRIDAY THAT A MAJORITY OF ITS 46 MEMBER STATES HAVE AGREED TO HOLD AN EMERGENCY MEETING ON ANGOLA FROM JANUARY 10 TO 12 IN ADDIS ABABA. THE SUMMIT--THE OAU'S FIRST EXTRAORDINARY GATHERING OF CHIEFS

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OF STATE SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE ORGANIZATION 12 YEARS AGO--WILL BE PRECEDED BY A ■■ TWO-DAY MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE MINISTERIAL SESSION WILL DEBATE VARIOUS APPROACHES FOR DEALING WITH THE ANGOLA SITUATION AND SET THE AGNENDA FOR THE SUMMIT.4

OAU MEMBERS ARE BADLY DIVIDED OVER THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM, AND THE SUMMIT--WHICH COULD TURN OUT TO BE ACRIMONIOUS--MAY CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TOWARD AN AFRICAN SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT. MOST OAU STATES STILL CLING TO AN OUTWARDLY NEUTRAL POSITION, BUT SOUTH AFRICA'S MUCH-PUBLICIZED ROLE IN THE SUPPOORT OF THE NATIONAL UNION IS CAUSING MANY GOVERNMENTS TO WAVER. SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTION IS CONSIDERED A MORE IMMEDIAATE THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF ANGOLA AND TO AFRICAN INTERESTS THAN IS EITHER SOVIET OR CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.4

AT ■■ THE SUMMIT, SUPPORTERS OF THE POPULAR MOVEMENT WILL TRY TO GET THE CONFEREES TO ABANDON THE OAU'S PRESENT STANCE OF NEUTRALITY AND RECOGNIZE THE MOVEMENT AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. THEY WILL ARGUE THAT SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF THE POPULAR MOVEMENT'S RIVALS HAS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO WORK TOWARD THE OAU'S PREVIOUS GOAL OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. THEY

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PROBABLY WILL PUSH FOR A RESOLUTION THAT CONDEMNS SOUTH AFRICA AND ASKS OAU MEMBERS TO AID THE POPULAR MOVEMENT.4

THE FEW AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS THAT PRIVATELY SUPPORT THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE NATIONAL UNION--NONE HAS OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED THEIR REGIME--WANT TO KEEP THE OAU OFFICIALLY NEUTRAL. THESE COUNTRIES AND NATIONAL UNION LEADER JONAS SAVIMBI HOPE IN THE SHORT TIME LEFT BEFORE THE SUMMIT OPENS TO PROMOTE A BACKLASH AGAINST SOVIET AND CUBAN ASSISTANCE TO THE POPULAR MOVEMENT. SUPPORT WILL BE SOUGHT AT THE SUMMIT FOR A BLANKET CONDEMNATION OF ALL OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA AND FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY.

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