


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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Chile: Clampdown on the Universities

The pattern of arrests and dismissals of university personnel and students over the past month suggests that a massive purge is unfolding. The latest round of detentions has struck a damaging blow at the universities' capacity to function usefully in Chile's educational system.

A government-directed shakeup of the administration of the University of Chile is apparently under way. A new vice-rector has been named to head the eastern campus in Santiago, a focal point of the student and faculty dissent. More faculty members have been discharged at the Catholic University in Santiago, where conflict again erupted last week. Only three or four members of the 15-man political science faculty now retain their jobs. Press sources claim that the dismissals stemmed from plans to hold a seminar on "the crisis of democracy in the world" which was to have included participation by former President Eduardo Frei. The majority of those arrested at the Catholic University were members of Frei's Christian Democratic Party.

While high level Chilean officials, including President Pinochet, have alleged that the expulsions and arrests were prompted by illegal political activity on the campuses, there is some evidence that a more probable reason was the government's intention to replace dissenters with government supporters. The number of persons jailed or ousted from the universities is not clear. Meanwhile, many appeals for writs of habeas corpus submitted on behalf of those still being held have been rejected by the courts.

The wives of some professors in custody have denied the government's charges and have told US Embassy officers that their husbands were not political activists

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but victims of personal grudges. Some charge that disgruntled colleagues--seeking promotions or bitter over losing their jobs--have fingered others as Marxists.

So far, the government has been vague about the specific nature of its charges, which has reinforced questions about the legitimacy of its actions. The US Embassy says the over-all effect has been the trampling of university autonomy and deteriorating morale in the educational community. Representatives of the University of California, which has an educational exchange agreement with the University of Chile, are concerned about the continued existence of educational freedom in Chile and are considering terminating the exchange program.

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Whatever may be the government's intentions in moving against the universities, it will further damage Chile's image abroad and have a negative effect on hopes for a meaningful liberalization of its security restrictions.

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Regionalism: With and Without the US

Increasing involvement in international conferences has given the Latin American governments a broader context in which to examine and sharpen the focus of their own special interests.

The Latin's' experiences in various UN activities and especially their connection with the Group of 77 and the nonaligned movement have convinced them of the value of solidarity with other blocs with similar problems and aspirations. At the same time, the Latins have become more conscious of themselves as a region and have a clearer sense of how they can meet certain needs on a regional basis. Despite the poor results of most regional and subregional experiments of the past, the Latin Americans are taking a new look at the potential benefits of the OAS and the proposed Latin American Economic System (SELA), the former with and the latter without the US.

At broad, global forums, the Latins have seen their interests diluted in the flood of grievances from less developed areas and they have also seen the intensity of the Latin cases fade alongside the bitter determination of the participants in the Middle East and other politically divided areas. While the Latins value the concept of a new international order and other third-world principles and agree with the tactic of mass lobbying, they are also aware of specific economic and political goals that might be better served by efforts within the regional community.

Playing on this theme, the new and energetic secretary general of the OAS, Argentina's Alejandro Orfila, is winning converts to his conviction that the pan-American forum can be a key court for the presentation of Latin American positions, propositions, and complaints to

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Washington. Orfila strongly advocates a de-Latinization of the OAS procedures, which after years of juridical disputation have become mired in minutiae.

Orfila evidently has sold his practical approach to Mexican President Echeverria, one of the OAS' strongest critics. Echeverria has instructed his delegates to back Orfila fully in the effort to revitalize the OAS and take the lead in bringing greater decisiveness and rationality into the organization. Echeverria has also contacted his rival for Latin leadership, Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez, to ask for Venezuela's cooperation with Orfila. Both Mexico and Venezuela seem ready to increase their financial support of the OAS as well.

Working committees have begun assembling in Panama to labor over the statutes and principles of SELA, which will be the subject of a full Latin and Caribbean conference there beginning October 15. SELA--a brainchild of Echeverria and Perez--is slowly developing acceptability in the rest of the hemisphere as a forum in which the Latins can marshal their assets in practical business schemes. In SELA, they can cope with differences in size and development among the countries by means of special privileges for the poor. Gradually, SELA is emerging as the vehicle by which the Latins can find the consensus with which they hope to challenge the US at the OAS.

The many Latin American barriers of cultural division, regional rivalries, and differing political and economic systems will remain as formidable as they have been in the past. But Latin advocates of regional cooperation are increasingly confident that the lessons of old failures and the new momentum for altering international relationships will lift them over these hurdles.

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Nicaragua: Anderson Articles Fallout Continues

President Somoza continues to orchestrate his counterattack against Jack Anderson's published allegations of Somoza's abuses, including AID fund misuse.

The major daily Novedades--owned by Somoza--has headlined and praised Ambassador to the US Sevilla-Sacasa for his efforts to rebut the charges. The Nicaraguan Government has also quickly released a US State Department note, in reply to a formal request from Sevilla-Sacasa, stating that no official documents were given to Anderson and that there are no claims regarding illegal expenditures of AID funds by any Nicaraguan government organization.

Other aspects of the counterattack have included the firing of Somoza's press secretary and increased censorship of La Prensa. This daily is owned by opposition leader Joaquin Chamorro, who Somoza believes to be the source of information for Anderson's columns. Somoza is also beginning efforts to have his rubber-stamp congress stage an official show of support.

Because the original Anderson articles were seen by few in Managua, the Nicaraguan strongman allowed Novedades to publish laundered translations of the columns. However, given that his selective editing may be exposed and that his continued public campaign may spark another column by Anderson, Somoza may find that he has succeeded only in generating further embarrassment for himself.

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Cuba: Provinces to Disappear

A specially administered area in eastern Cuba may be the forerunner of a new political-administrative subdivision designed for adoption throughout the country. The new jurisdictional structure could be introduced as early as next year, but the timing probably depends on popular acceptance of the new concept.

Cuba currently comprises six provinces, which themselves are divided onto 59 regions and 416 municipalities. The draft constitution now under study defines Cuba only in terms of regions and municipalities and makes no mention of a provincial level of public administration. This treatment of the highest tier of government below the national level matches the ambiguity of previous cryptic indications of structural changes, suggesting that the Castro regime was sending up trial balloons to test popular receptivity to the demolition of a sociological feature having deep historical roots. The matter was finally brought out more clearly by Castro himself on July 26, when he explained that the reorganization was required by "social and political reality."

The Tunas territorial subdivision in Oriente province gives a hint of the new system. The territory is made up of three of the province's 13 regions, and consists of 6,664 square kilometers with a population of 382,000 people--compared to the province total of 36,601 square kilometers and 3,008,000 people. The territory is governed from a key regional transportation center for the area, and its governor is Faure Chomon, a member of the Cuban Communist Party Secretariat, who was shifted to the territory in late 1970.

Using the Tunas territory as a guide, the new political-administrative structure is likely to consist of between 20 and 25 units at the regional level. Because no information is available on the subdivision of

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the Tunas territory itself, however, no valid conjecture can be made about the reorganization at the municipality level. Whatever the breakdown, the impact will be considerable. The structures of the party, several of the mass organizations, and some government ministries are based largely on the provincial political-administrative boundaries, and major changes in these entities would have to be made to accommodate the new system.

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Argentina: Major Scandal Unlikely

Peronist legislators have side-tracked Radical Party efforts to investigate the financial dealings of President Peron and former social welfare minister Jose Lopez Rega.

The controversy was touched off by press reports in mid-August that President Peron had diverted about \$800,000 from Peronist welfare funds to her late husband's estate. Spokesmen for Mrs. Peron blame the improper transfer on her lawyer--former Interior Minister Benitez--and claim that she is taking steps to correct the mistake. Other Peronists, however, have attempted to defend the action by noting that the check was intended to cover a portion of the inheritance due the sisters of Peron's former wife Evita. They also argue that only a fraction of the amount congress appropriated to Juan Peron two years ago in restitution for property confiscated during his overthrow in 1955 had been put into his account. The Radicals claim that their repeated requests for a full accounting of the amount budgeted for restitution have not been answered by the government.


The Radicals have been fairly low-key in their efforts to launch an inquiry. Their proposal, which would set up a special investigatory commission, suggests a calculated effort to gain favorable publicity for the party while avoiding an uncontrolled escalation of the debate on political corruption. The Peronists have nevertheless responded to the disclosures with great apprehension, probably out of fear that a thorough investigation would reveal extensive misuse of government funds by Mrs. Peron's administration.

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Because the problem of graft is endemic throughout the Argentine political system, it is rarely a topic of public debate. The surfacing of this issue is an obvious attempt by President Peron's opponents to force her from office. The danger of such an action, however, is that a scandal of major proportions would discredit civilian politics in general in the eyes of military leaders and probably much of the general population.

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Stalemate in Surinam

The defection from the predominantly black ruling coalition of three non-Creoles representing Javanese, Chinese, and Hindustanis, has deprived the government of its legislative majority and brought parliament to a standstill with independence barely two months away.

The impasse was dramatized at the opening of the new legislative session last week when the failure of both the government and the opposition to gain a majority prevented consideration of the annual budget. The deadlock is especially inopportune since the constitution to be implemented after independence still has to be adopted.

One solution would be to dissolve parliament and hold elections. Despite reports to the contrary, however, Minister-President Henck Arron apparently opposes calling an election prior to the November 25 independence date because of the possibility that his coalition could lose, and because of the likelihood that an election would intensify racial divisions.

Arron is trying to rebuild his coalition. He is pressuring the defectors to return and has persuaded Minister of Economics Edward Bruma, whose divisive tactics precipitated the defections, to make concessions to the Chinese merchant community in order to regain the allegiance of the Chinese representative. The Chinese have yet to be placated but their traditional desire to stay out of the political spotlight in Surinam may facilitate Arron's task. His efforts are hindered, however, by his being seen by non-Creoles in the government as too susceptible to Bruma's influence.

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Many of the non-militant members of Arron's government favor forming a new "national" cabinet which would include opposition party centrists. Arron prefers not to take this step, partly because he is aware that such a move could cause Bruma to bolt the coalition altogether, taking with him many of the young activists in Arron's party.



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The most likely prospect for the next two months is for Arron's coalition to mend its differences sufficiently to retain minimal control until independence. After that milestone, however, Surinamese priorities are almost certain to take a new and probably chaotic course.

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
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Chile: Church Again Blasts Regime

The Chilean Catholic Church has taken another step toward open criticism of the junta this week by publishing a document implying strong condemnation of the government's human rights stand. In public statements last month, church leaders hinted that they were becoming impatient with the lack of progress in curbing the more flagrant abuses by security and intelligence forces.



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Although the government apparently is not taken to task directly in the document drafted by the bishops, it is clear that the regime is the unspoken target. The statement emphasizes that there will not be any real peace in Chile until its citizens enjoy "the right to physical and moral integrity." In their toughest language yet, the church leaders state their conviction that man "cannot be subjected to physical torture, outrage or terror, either by way of punishment or to force him to say what he is not willing to say in order to harm himself or others." Implicit in the statement is the church's concern over the security forces' continued practice of ignoring existing legal safeguards against arbitrary detention and torture.

The government's social and economic policies also come under fire, particularly the reduction in public services and the suffering of the needy as a result of current austerity policies. The church has consistently taken issue with the government over the failure to institute measures to improve the well-being of the lower classes.

In other portions of the document, the church expresses its belief in the right "to study" and "to think"--obvious references to the widespread purge in the universities evidently being undertaken by the

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government. The recognition that some sectors have lost their rights, that a number of national leaders have been "dispersed or scared," and that almost all possibilities of dialog have been closed is a clear indictment of official treatment of the "recessed" opposition parties, especially the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). PDC leaders have privately voiced the same criticisms.

While the church acknowledges the service rendered by the armed forces in freeing the country from Marxist dictatorship, it warns Chilean leaders not to "create new obstacles by making mistakes which might turn out to be irreparable." The strong tone of the bishops' statement is probably intended to pressure the government to take some positive action to remedy its "errors." President Pinochet is reportedly planning to announce some liberalization measures in a major address on the September 11 anniversary of the coup, and church leaders evidently hope their plea will be heeded. The government will undoubtedly flinch at the latest blast from the church hierarchy, but it will probably try to reconcile its differences without resort to polemics.

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Cuban Chronology For August 1975

- July 31-
August 2 - Foreign Trade Minister Marcelo Fernandez Font heads Cuban delegation to the SELA conference in Panama.
- August 1 - PCC secretariat member Antonio Perez Herrero meets with Yemeni and South Vietnamese Communist Party officials in Havana.
- August 2 - Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio announces in San Jose that Costa Rica will "soon establish trade relations with Cuba."
- August 4 - President Dorticos recovered from back surgery and returns to work.
- August 5 - Castro interviewed by Pravda on the communists' future in Latin America. He discusses results and implications of Latin American-Caribbean Communist Party meeting held in June in Havana. He also expresses warm admiration for the army officers running Portugal. Castro is also quoted as paying admiring tribute to the Soviet detente policy as an important factor in advancing the fortunes of the international communist movement.
- August 6 - National Bank of Cuba director Raul Leon Torras arrives in Kuwait for meetings with finance and foreign affairs ministers.
- Chilean MAPU delegation headed by Jaime Mujica, arrives in Cuba.

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- August 8 - Trinidadian economic-scientific delegation arrives in Havana.
Cuba and Czechoslovakia sign energy cooperation protocol.
- August 9 - Castro returns \$2 million ransom paid by Southern Airways in November 1972 for a hijacked airplane.
- August 12 - The National Committee of the Central Organization of Cuban Workers (CTC) releases a communique expressing solidarity with the struggle for independence of the Puerto Rican people.
- August 13 - Cuban ambassador to Argentina Emilio Aragonés Navarro escapes unharmed from an attack in front of the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires.
- August 15 - Nguyen Thi Binh, foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam arrives in Cuba.
Cuban ambassador to Colombia Fernando Ravelo Renedo arrives in Bogota.
- August 16 - The Dominican Center for the Promotion of Exports (CEDOPEX) issues a report foreseeing the reestablishment of trade with Cuba.
50th anniversary of the creation of the Cuban Communist Party is celebrated. Castro speaks.
- August 17 - Mexican President Echeverría arrives for an official six-day visit to Cuba. Joint communique issued on August 22.

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- August 18 - Portuguese military delegation headed by Vice Admiral Rosa Coutinho arrives in Havana at the invitation of Raul Castro.
- August 21 - The Department of State announces that US firms based on foreign soil will be allowed to do business with Cuba for the first time in 12 years.
- August 24 - Raul Castro speech marks anniversary of Cuban Women's Federation. He salutes role of Cuban women in building socialism.
- August 25 - Philippine First Lady Imelda Marcos arrives in Havana on official visit. Relations will be resumed between the two countries "in the shortest time possible."
- August 25 - Raul Roa heads Cuban delegation to the non-aligned countries' foreign ministers' meeting in Lima.
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- August 26 - Cuban agricultural and engineering experts arrive in Jamaica.

Japanese foreign trade delegation arrives in Havana.
- August 29 - Cuba and USSR sign cooperation protocol for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

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