


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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

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
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CPSU Politburo Members at Foreign Party Congresses

According to an official at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, party boss Brezhnev will attend the next congress of the Polish Communist Party which is scheduled to begin on December 8. Assuming he goes, it will be the 13th foreign party congress to his credit. He heads the list of full members of the Politburo performing this chore.

Since becoming General Secretary in 1964, Brezhnev has concentrated on the six East European members in more or less good standing of the "socialist commonwealth", leaving "less important" congresses to other members of the Politburo. He attended the Romanian Congress in 1965, but in 1974 left the job of representing the CPSU in Bucharest to Kirilenko. That same year, Kirilenko also attended the Yugoslav Congress, thus ending the long-standing Soviet practice of boycotting congresses of the Yugoslav party. Kirilenko and Pelshe each has six congresses under his belt.

Full members of the Politburo with highly visible government positions do not attend the congresses of foreign parties. Andropov, Grechko, Gromyko, Kosygin, Mazurov, and Podgorny have not attended a foreign party congress in the last 10 years. (Andropov and Mazurov each attended one congress during this period, but neither at the time was a full member of the CPSU Politburo.) Kulakov and Polyansky have also attended no foreign party congresses.

A list of Politburo members attending the congresses of foreign parties since October 1964 follows:

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Andropov--1965--Romania
(became full member Politburo 1973)

Brezhnev--1965--Romania
1966--Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Hungary
1967--East Germany
1968--Poland
1970--Hungary
1971--Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Poland
East Germany
1975--Hungary

Grechko--none

Grishin--1968--Poland (with Brezhnev)
1972--Italy

Gromyko--None

Kirilenko--1965--Chile
1970--France
1971--Mongolian People's Republic
1974--Romania
Yugoslavia
1975--Italy

Kosygin--None

Kulakov--None

Kunayev--1971--India

Mazurov--1964--Belgium
(became full member Politburo 1965)

Pelshe--1965--Denmark

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1967--France
1968--India
1969--Finland
1972--Finland
1975--Finland

Podgorny--None

Polyansky--None

Shcherbitsky--1971--Bulgaria

Suslov--1966--Italy



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Yugoslavs to Take More Active
Role in Europe

Belgrade is preparing to take advantage of its position as host for the follow-up CSCE meeting in 1977 to press its views on post-Helsinki Europe.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Yugoslavia intends to assume a very active role in following the implementation of the Helsinki accords. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Belgrade's preliminary view is that the East is showing a "restrictive tendency" regarding confidence-building measures, while the West is over-emphasizing the Basket III agreements. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Yugoslavia sees this as a perpetuation of the bloc-to-bloc mentality in Europe which is the greatest danger to the Helsinki agreement.

Belgrade has long envisioned itself as a spokesman for the interests of smaller European countries against bloc interests. If [Redacted] Yugoslavia assumes an activist role in CSCE implementation, it might cause some waves in Western Europe. These would be small, however, compared to the potential Soviet reaction if Yugoslavia pressed its case for CSCE implementation in Moscow's eastern buffer area. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Yugoslavia-Bulgaria: Mladenov Visit
Improves Tone of Relations

Sofia and Belgrade have apparently decided to try to come to grips with the seemingly omnipresent problems in their bilateral relations. Quick solutions are not likely, but, provided both sides abide by the new spirit of reasonableness, there could be a hiatus in the squabbling between the two Balkan rivals.

The new attitude emerged during Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov's visit to Belgrade from November 11 to 13. In talks with his Yugoslav counterpart Milos Minic, Mladenov apparently addressed major bilateral issues, including the sensitive Macedonian problem. Press announcements referred to the discussions as "friendly" and "frank," and described the atmosphere as one of "full openness and readiness" to discuss their difficulties.

Minic and Mladenov agreed on an eventual meeting of Presidents Tito and Zhivkov to discuss "ways and means" for resolving their disputes. The summit is, however, clearly dependent on an effort by the two sides to limit polemics.

During toasts at official dinners in Belgrade, both men recited their differences, but said the problems should not rule out future close cooperation in all spheres. The communique summarizing the talks accentuated a mutual desire to improve relations based on the principles of "equality, independence, respect for territorial integrity... and noninterference in internal affairs."

The communique attached "exceptional importance" to mutual efforts to harness "information activities" as a means of building an atmosphere of trust. This presumably means that vociferous


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
Yugoslav press polemics and the occasional inflammatory publications appearing in Bulgaria will be held in check for a time.

Agreeing to discuss their differences is the most progress toward improving Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations in several years. A number of factors could still undermine these good intentions. The most immediate threat is the Bulgarian census scheduled for December, which will, Belgrade fears, omit a category for Macedonians. Jointly claimed cultural heroes, the role of the Bulgarian military in "liberating" Yugoslavia during World War II, and Belgrade's wariness of Sofia as a stand-in for Soviet interests all offer hotheads on both sides of the border opportunities to scotch any progress.

On Balkan cooperation and the proposed Carmanlis conference, the two seem to be moving closer together. Stressing the importance of bilateral cooperation, Minic and Mladenov supported multilateral efforts "only in those fields that are really acceptable and of interest to the Balkan countries." Sofia has declared it is against any multilateral activity of a political nature, and Belgrade has emphasized that it is premature even to consider ambitious inter-Balkan ties.



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Annex

Soviet Relations with Western Europe,
October to mid-NovemberCSCE/NATO

Controversy over CSCE implementation centered on the military-related "confidence-building measures" (CBMs) that NATO and the neutrals had succeeded in incorporating in the conference final act against the strenuous effort by the Warsaw Pact to curtail its application.

The initial reaction of the Soviets and their allies to CBMs, notably Brezhnev's speech at Helsinki, was at least superficially positive. In subsequent weeks, however, the Soviets seemed to be disconcerted by the scale of both the NATO exercises and the notifications preceding them. The NATO members had determined to adhere scrupulously to the text of the Helsinki accord and provided full advance notification not only of exercises meeting the numerical threshold (25,000 troops), but also some smaller ones.

Meanwhile, the Soviets launched an unusually voluminous and vehement propaganda attack on NATO's series of fall exercises, which it claimed were unprecedented in scope. Soviet media asserted that these exercises violated the spirit of Helsinki and, by reviving the specter of a Soviet threat, constituted a lame effort by Western militarists to neutralize the achievements of the conference. The NATO exercises may have seemed larger than usual to the Soviets because a number of exercises were integrated into a single program (Autumn Forge).

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Initially, CBMs were spared from criticism, but beginning on September 15 several articles charged that the advance notification of maneuvers was irrelevant and that notification did not obviate the deleterious effect of the maneuvers on detente.

Soviet criticism of CBMs tapered off in October and was not formalized by leadership endorsements. Nevertheless, the Soviets have not yet officially acknowledged Western notification of exercises, sent observers, or provided notification of their exercises. Using the argument that the presence of Warsaw Pact observers would undermine the position that the NATO exercises were inconsistent with detente, the Soviets reportedly advised their allies that they, too, should neither acknowledge receipt of notifications nor send observers to the exercises. All the Warsaw Pact members, including the Romanians, took the advice.

The Soviets are obviously uncomfortable with CBMs and their unresponsiveness to NATO notifications seems designed to make it easier for the Warsaw Pact not to invite observers to its exercises. The Soviets may also hope that their policy will encourage NATO to see the agreement as less stringent. There has been no evidence to date to confirm speculation that the Warsaw Pact has either failed to provide notification of an exercise meeting the parameters for notification, or revised its exercise format to keep from meeting the parameters.

Technically, the Soviets are on solid ground since, at their insistence, the Helsinki text covering the CBM's stipulates that they should be undertaken voluntarily. Still, if the Soviets flagrantly disregard the CBM provision, they will be held to account when the day of reckoning comes in Belgrade two years hence.

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