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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

31 March 1986

PAKISTAN: INTENTIONS ON A SETTLEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN

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Summary

We believe Pakistan's fundamental goals on Afghanistan remain unchanged under the new civilian government--to get the Soviets out and to repatriate more than 3 million Afghan refugees. Pakistani officials are moderately optimistic that, because of their hardline approach, Moscow may be willing to consider an agreement that meets these goals. We believe the Junejo government's response to domestic opposition to its current Afghan policy is more likely to affect the form of policy actions than their substance.

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Islamabad would be most likely to switch gears on Afghanistan if it felt abandoned by its allies, the Afghan resistance collapsed, or a neutralist-minded government took over--none of which is an immediate risk. Significant deterioration in the domestic security or economic situations would also increase pressure on Islamabad to be more accommodating to Moscow and Kabul.

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The Cordovez Shuttle: Less Than Meets the Eye

In our judgment, Pakistani expressions of optimism about prospects for the UN-brokered peace negotiations on Afghanistan reflect Islamabad's hopefulness that its hardline strategy is paying off, and that Moscow may be moving toward a settlement that satisfies both of Islamabad's requirements: return of

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] the Pakistan/Bangladesh Branch, South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 31 March 1986 was used in its preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to Chief, South Asia Division, [redacted]

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refugees to Afghanistan and withdrawal of Soviet forces. Projecting the impression of movement probably is at least as important for Prime Minister Junejo's government as it was for the Zia regime. Domestic pressure to reach some accommodation with the Kabul regime has increased slightly with stepped up, Soviet-inspired Afghan efforts to destabilize the border region and domestic political liberalization, although Afghanistan is still not a dominant domestic political issue. [redacted]

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According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, UN Special Representative Cordovez, during his 7-18 March shuttle talks, had the impression that Kabul would agree to resume indirect talks focused on troop withdrawal in May if Islamabad agreed to undertake direct talks upon completion of the comprehensive agreement. Cordovez drafted a diplomatic note that outlined that understanding and stated for the record that the Afghans had presented a draft timetable that had been reviewed by the Pakistanis. [redacted]

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Islamabad has not shared this timetable with us, but Pakistani officials did tell our Embassy that Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan found the draft unacceptable on "eight or nine" counts. Based on the record of past negotiating rounds, we speculate that the Afghan proposal fell short because of:

- Failure to guarantee simultaneity. Pakistan knows the refugees will not go home before Soviet troops begin to leave. Islamabad also has insisted that Soviet troops withdraw as support for the resistance--interference in the eyes of Kabul and Moscow--ends; the Afghans say troops will be withdrawn only after interference ends.
- Failure to guarantee Kabul's noninterference in Pakistan. Islamabad is concerned about a revival of Pashtun demands, supported by Kabul, for a Pashtun tribal homeland that would include land in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. The Pakistanis want a measure of recognition for the existing border by Kabul and Moscow.
- Failure to delineate a pullback from specific areas upon a ceasefire. Pakistan would like to see some demonstration of Soviet good faith to encourage the refugees to return.
- Failure to offer a less-than-protracted timeframe for withdrawal. Pakistan has suggested a relatively rapid withdrawal--within six months--to reduce the potential for resistance-initiated incidents and to reassure the Afghans that Soviet airmobile troops will not attack as the refugees return to their villages.
- Failure to stipulate international guarantees of the withdrawal. The Afghans have agreed that international guarantees will cover the "comprehensive" settlement, but

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Pakistan wants guarantees to apply to the separate bilateral on troop withdrawal as well. Kabul and Moscow have insisted that an agreement on troop withdrawal should be a bilateral agreement between them; Islamabad wants to ensure that such an agreement does not provide a loophole for Moscow.

-- Failure to drop insistence on closure of the border. Moscow has long wanted the Pakistan-Afghan border sealed against the infiltration of weapons and munitions. Islamabad probably believes that such a demand is unrealistic given the nature of the border and that it would provide the Soviets a pretext for renegeing on the withdrawal agreement. [Redacted]

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The Missing Five Percent

Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan told our Ambassador that he could divulge only 95 percent of the proceedings during the Cordovez shuttle mission because of concerns about US leaks. He indicated he would pass the remaining 5 percent personally to Secretary Shultz. In our judgment, the Pakistanis sincerely believe that a leak could be damaging--jeopardizing not only the talks but the steadfastness of the resistance. [Redacted]

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We do not know what the 5 percent covers. Given the Pakistani rejection of the draft timetable, we doubt that they view leaks of the timetable, or even any other Soviet concession, as of major concern. We believe it more likely that the 5 percent is a Pakistani offer--probably one that addresses Pakistan's own concerns about implementation of a settlement. For example, Islamabad may have offered assurances that it will make the post-settlement transition as smooth as possible, perhaps by guaranteeing that it will work to limit fighting among the resistance groups. [Redacted]

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Islamabad, the Afghan Resistance, and Negotiations

Islamabad has begun talking to resistance leaders about the negotiations. Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan briefed a resistance delegation on the status of the Geneva talks in January, according to the Embassy, and has promised the resistance leaders that Pakistan would discuss a peace settlement with them before it is finalized. [Redacted]

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Any recent Pakistani contacts with resistance leaders may have been intended primarily to allay their concerns about a sellout by either Pakistan or the United States. Over the winter, resistance leaders were agitated by rumors of a deal between the United States and the Soviet Union at the Geneva Summit. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Publicly, Islamabad is also putting new emphasis on Afghan input into the negotiations. In his National Day speech on 23 March, Junejo emphasized that Pakistan wants a peaceful and honorable political solution of the Afghanistan problem "in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan people." He added that any political solution must be consistent with United Nations and Islamic Conference resolutions on Afghanistan. [Redacted]

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The New Government and Afghanistan

We believe that Junejo--like Zia--wants to see a speedy end to the Afghan problem through a political settlement. He almost certainly is concerned about the potential ability of the opposition to mobilize public opinion against the government on Afghanistan and, by extension, the US-Pakistani strategic relationship. He probably even fears that an adverse turn in the war or in the NWFP could enable the opposition to force mid-term elections that might result in his defeat. [Redacted]

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We believe, however, that several factors militate against Junejo opting for a premature settlement:


-- Continued military backing. Key military leaders-- including Zia, Army Vice Chief Arif, and Intelligence Chief Akhtar--are unflagging in their support for the insurgency as an integral part of Pakistan's defense against the Soviet threat. Zia apparently has ensured that the Pakistani military oversees security policy through its representation on the Defense Cabinet Committee (DCC).



the DCC has jurisdiction over all defense and internal security matters--presumably including Afghan policy. Junejo chairs the DCC, which also includes the Ministers of Interior and Foreign Affairs (both appointed by Zia and retained by Junejo in the new Cabinet) the joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three service chiefs (including Zia as Chief of Army Staff). As Army Chief, traditionally the most influential position in Pakistani politics, Zia has considerable power to bring to bear against Junejo if he threatens the military's interests.*

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-- Parliamentary support for the current policy. The government easily won endorsement for its Afghan policy during the parliamentary debate last December.




while support for the insurgents is not popular among parliamentarians, they do not see an "honorable" alternative.

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-- Broad popular consensus. Polls by Gallup Pakistan consistently have indicated that the majority of the Pakistani public--even sympathizers of parties who call for direct negotiations with Kabul--support the current policy.

-- A realization that US assistance is vital to Pakistan's economic and defense needs. Junejo does not want to alienate Washington on the heels of negotiations for a new multiyear assistance package and while Congressional approval is still required.



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-- A desire not to alienate China, Saudi Arabia or, and other Muslim nations. [Redacted]

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Pakistan's Contacts with Moscow

Zia recently acknowledged to a Western reporter that Islamabad was in touch with Moscow "directly and indirectly."

[Redacted]

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Reporting from the US Embassy in Islamabad, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] suggests that the most significant of these contacts from the Pakistani perspective came during Foreign Minister Yaqub's meeting in Moscow with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko last August. Yaqub's optimism apparently dates from that discussion [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Despite Moscow's initiatives, we believe that Yaqub and other Pakistani leaders maintain a healthy skepticism of its intentions. More recently, Pakistan appears to have contacted Moscow to crosscheck Cordovez's reports of the negotiations. Not only is Cordovez typically more optimistic than developments warrant, but he often tells each party what it wants to hear:

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Perceptions of the US Role

Pakistani leaders do not perceive a change in Washington's attitudes on Afghanistan, [Redacted] although some undoubtedly question Washington's staying power. They probably share the typical Pakistani's deep-seated suspicion about Washington's steadfastness as an ally that stems from the two Indo-Pak wars, reinforced by perceptions of US retreats from Iran and Lebanon. [Redacted]

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Pakistani decisionmakers are unlikely to see any alternative to reliance on US assistance to meet the Soviet threat in Afghanistan. We attribute the civilian government's early emphasis on at least the appearance of greater nonalignment in Pakistani foreign policy--Zia recently said it was "unrealistic" to expect Washington to come to Pakistan's defense--to Junejo's desire to preempt public criticism about Islamabad's close ties to Washington. [Redacted]

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Outlook

We expect the Pakistanis to continue to encourage Soviet flexibility in the negotiations by expressing optimism about prospects for success. We also believe Islamabad might seek to increase contacts with Moscow. [Redacted]

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Islamabad will hesitate to take steps it believes might alienate Moscow and jeopardize the talks. In our judgment, it will particularly resist forming an overt channel to provide humanitarian assistance to the insurgents or the Afghan population inside Afghanistan--especially with the United States as the easily identifiable sponsor of such an effort. [Redacted]

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We do not believe that Zia's departure from the DCC, which would occur if he stepped down as Chief of Army Staff, would result in a policy shift towards accommodation with Kabul and Moscow. Other senior military leaders would remain supportive of current policy. [Redacted]

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We believe a major shift in the Pakistani attitude toward Afghanistan and the negotiations, however, would result if the United States seemed to be moving away from support for the resistance, if the resistance began to come apart, or if an opposition neutralist government came to power in Islamabad. We also believe Junejo would come under increasing domestic pressure to reach an accommodation if the law-and-order situation in the NWFP (or elsewhere in Pakistan) or the economy were to deteriorate significantly and erode public confidence in the government. [Redacted]

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