




Directorate of Intelligence

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Afghanistan Situation Report



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22 April 1986

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
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT



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CHINESE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INSURGENTS



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Beijing's planned increase in military aid to Islamabad this year probably is intended mostly for the Afghan insurgents.



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REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROPOSAL FOR SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN



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The German Afghanistan Committee's proposal for resettling displaced Afghans in the southern Hindu Kush in Afghanistan almost certainly will be resisted by the Kabul regime.



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
AUSTRIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE PROPOSES AGRICULTURAL AID TO QANDAHAR



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The Afghan regime is also unlikely to welcome the Austrian Relief Committee's agreement to expand its successful agricultural assistance program near Qandahar because of the program's potential for strengthening civilian support for the guerrillas.




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KESHTMAND VISITS MOSCOW 

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The Soviets' public treatment of Soltan Keshtmand, Prime Minister of Afghanistan, since his arrival in Moscow on 21 April for an official visit, contrasts sharply with their handling of the visit by President Babrak Karmal. 

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AFGHANISTAN: RESISTANCE VIEWS OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 

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The Afghan resistance has recently become more concerned about the negotiating process but has been unable to form a unified position because of differences over negotiating tactics and the shape of post-Soviet Afghanistan. 

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CHINESE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INSURGENTS



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Beijing will increase its military aid to Islamabad in 1986 by 20 to 30 percent over last year's amount. The aid will comprise mainly light arms and surface-to-air missiles. Beijing also will provide food and medical aid equal in value to its total contributions over the past five years, including 5000 tons of grain and 500 tons of vegetable oil.

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Comment: The value and specific amounts of the aid are unknown. Although  this military and economic assistance is to help Pakistan meet the threat on its border with Afghanistan, we believe that most of it is earmarked for the Afghan insurgents. The infantry weapons specified by the Foreign Ministry official are the types China has been providing to the resistance. The routing of the aid through Islamabad apparently is to mollify Pakistani sensitivity about the matter. In the past, Beijing has generally provided military training and assistance directly to Afghan guerrillas in China. 

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REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROPOSAL FOR SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN

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A new proposal by the German Afghanistan Committee calls for resettling approximately 4,500 refugees displaced within Afghanistan and 500 currently residing in Pakistan to the southern Hindu Kush in Afghanistan. The project--estimated to cost \$2.7 million over two years--would provide families with cash, food, clothing, medical care, and educational benefits, as well as agricultural and technical assistance. Local insurgent commanders have agreed to support the project, provided the present inhabitants of the project area are also aided. 

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Comment: The Pakistanis probably would welcome a program that shows some progress in reducing the number of refugees in country. But the Kabul regime almost certainly would attempt to block such a scheme. Even a small success in resettlement would demonstrate the regime's lack of control over its own territory and give the impression that the resistance is functioning as a government-in-exile. It would also expand the insurgents' support base. 

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AUSTRIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE PROPOSES AGRICULTURAL AID TO QANDAHAR

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The Austrian Relief Committee (ARC) has consented to an expansion of its agricultural assistance program located near Qandahar. Last year the program provided roughly 120 families with food, seed, fertilizer, and other agricultural resources. Local insurgent




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commanders considered the program successful and requested additional aid. The ARC estimates that it would cost roughly \$95,000 to expand the program to an additional 400 families. 


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Comment: Private voluntary organizations are increasingly emphasizing agricultural assistance programs inside Afghanistan. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, the key factor determining whether Afghan families will become refugees is food availability in their home area. An agricultural assistance program that could potentially strengthen civilian support for the guerrillas will not be welcomed by the Afghan Government, particularly in an area where the insurgency is so strong. 


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KESHTMAND VISITS MOSCOW 

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Pravda has announced that Soltan Keshtmand, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, arrived in Moscow 21 April for a state visit. The Pravda article announcing the visit underscored the regime's efforts to broaden its base and its "realistic" position on the question of a political settlement with Pakistan. President Babrak Karmal arrived in Moscow in late March and is apparently still there. 

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Comment: The high visibility given the Keshtmand visit contrasts sharply with the lack of publicity accorded Karmal during his current stay in Moscow. The Soviets may be hoping to build up Keshtmand, a Hazara Shia who has frequently been mentioned as a potential successor to Karmal. Moreover, the Soviets may believe that their efforts to play up the alleged significant changes in the regime's social and economic base of support require giving the Prime Minister some added publicity in his non-party role. The Keshtmand visit also gives Moscow an opportunity to publicize Kabul's alleged readiness to negotiate a political settlement prior to the resumption of the Geneva talks on 5 May. 

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
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
-- During recent conversations with US officials in Islamabad, representatives of private voluntary organizations from France, Belgium, Austria, the FRG, and the UK expressed strong interest in participating in the program to transport wounded Afghans out of Pakistan for treatment. They proposed that aircraft returning from delivering humanitarian aid under the McCollum Amendment be used to move patients to Europe. 

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PERSPECTIVE**AFGHANISTAN: RESISTANCE VIEWS OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS**25X1
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Recent progress in the UN-sponsored peace talks, more determined regime efforts to co-opt insurgent leaders and resistance concerns that a superpower deal is imminent have forced the resistance to begin thinking seriously about the process and consequences of negotiations. The seven-party resistance alliance based in Peshawar agrees on the need for military actions to oust the Soviets but has failed to form a unified position on the negotiations, largely because differences over negotiating tactics and the shape of a post-Soviet Afghanistan could easily provoke the collapse of the alliance.

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We believe that the traditionalist resistance groups would be more willing than the fundamentalists to join a coalition government with elements of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The risk of such defections, in our view, would be greatest if the UN-sponsored peace talks appear to be nearing completion--a time when resistance groups will be jockeying for power in a new government.

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Signs of Resistance Concern


Since last fall, Afghan resistance leaders have been increasingly concerned that an unfavorable peace settlement, a change in Pakistani policy, or a superpower deal on Afghanistan would terminate essential material and financial support. Rumors of a US-USSR deal on Afghanistan circulated widely in resistance circles after President Reagan's meeting with Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev in Geneva last November. In late January

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fundamentalist leader Yunis Khalis told his followers that a political deal on Afghanistan was being considered by the Soviet Union and the United States that endangered the future of the resistance. Even hardliners like fundamentalist leader Gulbuddin complained to US officials in March that the rumors of a political settlement had forced the resistance to

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
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make "gigantic" efforts to maintain the military struggle. 

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
 the resistance began making plans in late January in case Pakistan came under increased pressure to submit to an "unacceptable" settlement in Afghanistan. These plans--some of which have already been implemented--included training small, self-sufficient units and establishing mobile headquarters inside Afghanistan.

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


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A House Divided

Resistance leaders, split along traditionalist and fundamentalist lines over negotiations and the type of government they would prefer in place of the Babrak regime, are taking a closer look at their negotiating options. There are even slight differences within these two groupings. 

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The Traditionalists. The traditionalists--Sayed Ahmad Gailani, Sibghatullah Mojadedi, and Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi--favor returning to power Afghanistan's traditional elites, including former King Zahir Shah, but vary slightly in their attitudes toward the utility of indirect peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In discussions with US officials last August, Gailani said he believed the Geneva process was useful and that Pakistan was adequately representing resistance concerns. After hearing reports that Washington had agreed to join Moscow as a guarantor of the final accord, Mojadedi told US officials in January that "many Afghans in Peshawar had wondered just what it was the US had offered to guarantee." 

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
Information on the traditionalists' views on the most recent round of shuttle talks is sketchy, but we believe they are becoming more amenable to an accommodation with the Babrak regime. 

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


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The Fundamentalists. Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Mohammed Yunis Khalis, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, the fundamentalists advocate an Islamic state and restructuring Afghanistan's traditional political and social institutions. Most blame former King Zahir Shah for the conditions that led to a Communist coup and would reject a role for him in any future government. 

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The fundamentalists disapprove of the Geneva negotiations and would probably prefer direct negotiations instead.

-- Rabbani, in press interviews last July, called the latest round of talks a "blind" that "will get the resistance nowhere.

-- Gulbuddin told US officials in March that he believed the only reason the Soviets participated in the Geneva talks was to shift the blame for the war from Moscow to the resistance's "outside supporters."

-- Khalis doubts the utility of the Geneva talks, 

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-- In 1984 press interviews, Sayyaf said the resistance "won't accept the result of negotiations carried out by someone else on (their) behalf." 


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Gulbuddin's public statements give an idea of what a fundamentalist negotiating position might contain. In radio interviews last October for the resistance alliance, Gulbuddin called for a Soviet troop withdrawal, war reparations, and a solemn pledge by Moscow never to interfere in Afghanistan. He added that in exchange for such a pledge, a new Afghan regime under resistance auspices would not enter into any military alliances, would pursue a non-aligned foreign




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
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policy based on the teachings of Islam, and would "co-exist as peaceful neighbors within our secured border." 



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Spoilers or Collaborators?

Pakistan and the resistance generally agree on the fundamental conditions necessary for a negotiated settlement: a Soviet troop withdrawal, Soviet assurances to cease interference in Afghan affairs, and the safe return of nearly four million refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Islamabad, however, probably is much more willing than the resistance to tolerate a coalition government in Kabul dominated by the PDPA, if not Babrak Karmal. The Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow, for example, told US officials recently that it might be possible to find some sort of "honorable place" for the PDPA in a future Kabul regime--a prospect that would be anathema to most fundamentalists and many traditionalists. 

If the Pakistanis agreed to a settlement which included a major role for the PDPA or otherwise did not meet what we believe are minimum resistance requirements, we believe the insurgents would continue to fight. The insurgents could probably maintain their current level of fighting without resupply--especially in the Panjsher Valley and northern Afghanistan--for at least six months by using weapons from stockpiles, captured weapons, and acquisitions through the black market in Pakistan. 

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 Over the longer term, however, they would probably be unable to sustain much more than a limited resistance without Pakistani--or greater Iranian--support. 

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Although we are fairly confident in our judgments about the Peshawar leadership's views on negotiations, we know little about the views of major resistance commanders inside the country. For several years, the Soviets have sought to work out agreements with important insurgent commanders--such as Panjsher Valley leader Ahmad Shah Masood and Herat commander Ismail


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Khan--but without any lasting effect. We believe, however, that Moscow's chances of obtaining one or two credible resistance defectors will increase if those commanders see a settlement coming. 

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Outlook

Wide-ranging differences between insurgent groups are likely to continue to prevent the resistance from working out an approach to negotiating issues. Even if the resistance were invited to play a role in the Geneva process, we think it unlikely that the Peshawar groups could agree to participate, much less forge a coherent approach to the various issues. Indeed, many leaders are probably aware that discussions over negotiating issues would seriously split the insurgent coalitions. Although some resistance leaders will continue to press for direct negotiations with Moscow, we do not believe any of the resistance leaders will risk striking a separate deal with the regime or Moscow anytime soon. 

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A lack of resistance unity will make it difficult for Pakistan to secure an agreement that meets with resistance approval. Islamabad, which has been closest to the fundamentalists, is likely to consider the views of Gulbuddin and Rabbani more carefully than those of the other resistance groups--particularly because the fundamentalists have been the most effective militarily and the most vocal about continuing to fight if an agreement is reached without their consent. If Kabul succeeds in luring back a traditionalist, however, Pakistan will face increased domestic pressure to recognize the Kabul government. 

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