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Afghanistan Situation Report

25X1

17 June 1986

IMC/CB 79-81

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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT		25X1
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WIDESPREAD COMBAT OPERATIONS BEGIN	2	25 <b>X</b> 1
Soviet and Afghan troops from Konduz, H Jalalabad, and the Kabul-Bagram areas i regiment-size operations last week, as	nitiated military	
pressure on the insurgents intensified.		25X1 25X1
CONTINUING AFGHAN-INDIAN MILITARY RELATIONSH	1IP2	25 <b>X</b> 1
A recent meeting in Kabul of Indian, So Afghan Air Force officers to discuss th of an Afghan SU-22 by Pakistani F-16s s military cooperation between India and	e shootdown suggests	
regime may be growing.	-	25 <b>X</b> 1
UNDP COUNTRY PROGRAM FOR AFGHANISTAN	<b>4</b>	25 <b>X</b> 1
Donors to the United Nations Development (UNDP) are opposed to a new country propagation of the probably anable to block completely funding to K	ogram for will be	
		25 <b>X</b> 1
IN BRIEF	4	
PERSPECTIVE		
THE WAR IN MAY	6	25 <b>X</b> 1
The Soviets again assumed most of the oburden against the insurgents in May. steps to prevent the Afghan military from the changeover in leadership within People's Democratic Party of Afghanista	They took com reacting the	
Insurgent activity was restrained somewater of Ramadan on 7 May.	what by	25 <b>X</b> 1
	17 JUNE 1986	25 <b>X</b> 1
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THE LITTLE WAR IN GHOWR PROVINCE	10
Ghowr Province, a rugged area in west-central Afghanistan, is essentially controlled by the resistance. The Soviets do not consider it an important strategic region and probably will not	
attempt to drive out the insurgents.	
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication should be	

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	17 June 1986	25
	COMMENT: The distorted version of the incidentin which an SU-22 was shot downprobably was, in part, an effort by the Soviets and Afghans to save face.  Nevertheless, the exchange is another indication of a continuing Indo-Afghan military cooperation. Last	
	First were not yet proficient on the F-16.	25.
	proficiencies. The Indian officers were given an inaccurate account of the incident that claimed Pakistani pilots were not yet proficient on the F-16.	-
	Pakistani F-l6 fighter tactics, capabilities, and crew	
	Pakistani F-16s, according to the US Embassy in Kabul. The Indians ostensibly were investigating	
	Air Force officers in Kabul in late May to discuss the 17 May dogfight between Afghan fighter-bombers and	
CONT	INUING AFGHAN-INDIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP  Indian Air Force officers met with Soviet and Afghan	2
	west or Pagnman.	25
	operation in Wardak Province west of Kabul left 47 regime soldiers killed and 60 wounded. Several Soviet-Afghan military groups continue sweeps in the hills	
	Empassy sources report a recent Soviet-Afghan three-day	
		25
		25X
		25X
	Na Lamadala Badenedase of Ronduz.	25
	motorized rifle regiment at Konduz and a command post set up at Pol-e Khomri are involved in operations about 55 kilometers southeast of Konduz.	
	major elements of a Soviet	25X1 25
	Several regiment-size Soviet and Afghan combat operations were under way last week in an effort to maintain pressure on the insurgents.	OFV
MIDE	SPREAD COMBAT OPERATIONS BEGIN	2
Man		



	January, an Afghan Army general made an official visit to India, and there were unconfirmed reports that Indian Army officers observed operations in the Panjsher Valley.	
UNDP	COUNTRY PROGRAM FOR AFGHANISTAN	
	A meeting of donors to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was recently convened to discuss the Afghanistan country program for 1987-1991, according to the US Mission in Geneva. The UNDP representative in Kabul has tried to dissuade the Afghan regime from seeking a new country program because current project activity could be jeopardized if the governing council reacts adversely to a new proposal. The regime insists, however, that it will present a country program next June. Opposition from the "Group of 8" donor countries—the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the US—prevented adoption of country programs in	
	1984 and 1985.	
	COMMENT: The "Group of 8" probably will object to a new country program for the reasons it cited previously: unwillingness to legitimize the regime, the possible use of project aid for the regime's military and political efforts, and the uncertain security conditions in country. They probably will not totally cut off project funding, however, because of Soviet and East European pressure in the United Nations and a desire to avoid denying assistance to the Afghan people. Accordingly, they probably will agree to continue the current practice of funding a limited	
	number of projects on a case-by-case basis.	
IN B	RIEF	
	17 June 1986	

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		25X1
	Bakhtiar Airlines maintenance personnel plan to strike if their demands for restored salary levels are not met by the end of June,  Salaries were reduced by 50 percent after the recent nationalization of the airlines. It is unknown whether other Bakhtiar	25X1 25X1
	The Kabul regime has asked Hazara and Turi leaders to form 5,000- and 2,000-man militia forces respectively for operations along the Afghan and Pakistani border,  Plans for the creation of these Shia militias reflect Najibullah's interest in widening support for the regime among Afghan tribes and bolstering Kabul's severely understrength armed forces. But the regime almost certainly will fail to enlist as many men as it wants.	25X1 25X1 25X1
	many men as it wants.	25X1
	17 June 1986 NESA M 86-200 5 SOVA M 86-200	

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PERSPECTIVE	•
THE WAR IN MAY	
In May, Soviet ground forces carried most of the load in counterinsurgency operations, reversing the trend in recent months when the Afghan Army bore the brunt in major offensives. During the changeover of leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in late April and early May, Soviet forces evidently took precautions to prevent the Afghan military from reacting forcefully to Babrak Karmal's replacement.	
Insurgent activity probably was constrained by the beginning of Ramadanthe holy month of fastingwhich began on 7 May.	
Clipped Wings	
The Soviets tried to minimize the chances of violence over the replacement on 4 May of Babrak Karmal as Communist Party leader. All military movement by Afghan forces in and out of Kabul was prohibited starting as early as 28 April, and Afghan Army units in the capital were largely disarmed.	
US Embassy in Kabul commented that Soviet troops were out in force in the capital during the change in leadership. Some of the controls apparently continued into at least mid-month and were a source of friction.	
Soviets Out Front  The major Soviet and Afghan combat operation in May was centered in the 'Ali Kheyl area, where insurgents-primarily from the National Islamic Front-had been harassing an Afghan Army garrison. Following several days of airstrikes, operations commenced on 14 May, with an unsuccessful attempt	71
reach 'Ali Kheyl.	25 25 25
17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX 6 SOVA M 86-20056JX	

mh. Dalla 'a Candahaa	Bu!	
The Battle in Qandahar	Province	
Mo atan infiltration	the Carrieta ave	huilding o
To stem infiltration, security belt around Q	andahar similar	to the one around
Kabul.  concentric circles of will be manned by Sovi	security posts.	l comprise three The outer ring middle one by
		17 June 1986
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militia. insurgent forces to move in and ou	and the innermost be have found it increat of Qandahar city,	singly difficult although they	
every day.	Soviet and Afghan po	sitions nearly	
security outposts insurgents. The	ets and Afghans have along routes normal interdiction effort cost of transporti	ly used by allegedly has	
province.	e cost of transporti	ng supplies in the	
food and fuel by regime confiscated guerrillas' suggest exemption cards reeligible males by impact of the decity, some insurge	have had unintended the guerrillas tried local merchants to red the items. In add stion to have civilies ulted in a major retained the regime. Because is it is suspect the original metals are suspect the original metals and suspect the original metals are suspect the original metals are suspect the original metals are suspect to	to block sales of egime forces, the ition, the ans destroy draft ound-up of draft-e of the negative orale in Oandahar	
	a government agent.		
probably were limited the month, according frequency and integrate. The airport	ed attacks throughous ted somewhat by the sket attacks on Kabus ing to the US Embass ensity were lower the st and the Dar ol Ama been the main targets	onset of Ramadan l increased during y, although the an in past an Palace areas	
rockets.		2.2.2.2.2.2.3010	
	Li	ater in the month,	
		17 June 1986	
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		25X1
	the insurgents ambushed a large Soviet military convoy near Kowt-e Ashrow. According to the US Embassy in Kabul, the insurgents destroyed nearly 18 vehicles during a six-hour attack.	25X1 25X1
	Outlook	
	the planning for another large-scale offensive in the Nazian Valley in Junean attack postponed from Mayindicate that Soviet ground units will once more be the major participants. This suggests that the Soviets are not ready to give primary responsibility for all major actions against the guerrillas to the Afghan Army. The limited successes this year, in which Afghan infantry and armor units have been the primary ground forces component, almost certainly are the result of the massive firepower	25X1
	certainly are the result of the massive firepower supplied by Soviet artillery and combat aircraft.	25X1 25X1
	17 June 1986 NESA M 86-2009 9 SOVA M 86-2005	

	10	17 June 1986 NESA M 86-20092JX SOVA M 86-20056JX	25X
By early fall 1985, th countryside around Cha confined the Soviet ba airfield. Soviet forc column in November. M	ghcharan. They ttalion to the es organized a	essentially city and nearby reinforcement	
			25X
Soviet convoys:  In an attack in Se insurgents ambushe vehicles were dest ll wounded. Despi frequent air attac days to travel thr Chaghcharan.	d a 500-vehicle royed, five sol te a helicopter ks, the Soviet	e convoy. Nine diers killed, and escort and convoy took three	
Jamiat-i-Islami and Ha based in the Farsi Val	rakat-Inqilab-i ley frequently	Islami insurgents harass regime and	25X
Holed Up in Chaghchara	<u>n</u>		05)
Lines of communication vulnerable to interdice roads are few and of personal mountainous. Access to passes, which are patronal passes, which are patronal mountains and passes are patronal mountains.	tion by the gue boor quality, and o Chaghcharan i	errillas. The nd the terrain is as limited t <u>o a few</u>	25X 25X
their control of the r	egion in the fo	preseeable	25 <b>X</b>
Rugged Ghowr Province largely controlled by regime forces maintain provincial capital of unimportance of the areffort, the Soviets ar	the insurgents. only a token per Chaghcharan. Government	Soviet and presence in the Given the relative terinsurgency	•
THE LITTLE WAR IN GHOWR PRO	OVINCE		25 <b>X</b>
PERSPECTIVE NESA			25)
			25)

the area as strategically insignificant and probably  17 June 1986	2
The Soviets probably will maintain their presence in Ghowr at current levels so long as it remains sufficient to retain control of Chaghcharan. They view	
	2
The Soviets now depend on aircraft from Shindand to resupply their garrison in Chaghcharan and to protect convoys.	2
	4
Objective: A Minimal Presence	,
Fighting continued through the night, and at about noon the following day, the column began a slow retreat, with helicopters covering the movement of the remaining vehicles back to Shindand. The insurgents claimed to have killed at least 43 Soviet and regime troops and destroyed or disabled some 20 vehicles.	2
	2
carrier hit a mine and was destroyed, halting movement on the road, and the insurgents opened fire on the stopped vehicles. Only the intervention of MI-24 helicopters prevented a major disaster for the force,	
Insurgent small arms and RPG-7 fire slowed the convoy, while guerrillas from several factions set an ambush near the city of Tulak. The lead armored personnel	
The second secon	
	2
	2
for the force,	

	17 June 1986 25 NESA M 86-20092JX 12 SOVA M 86-20056JX	5X1
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	are unwilling to expend more resources trying to quell the insurgency there. For their part, the insurgents probably will remain unable to force the Soviets out of Chaghcharan.	5 <b>X</b> 1
	are unwilling to expend more resources trying to guell	
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