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P & PD		21 July	86	
Talking Points	s for Your Meeting with	Ambassador Bar	tholomew	
The Base Talks	3			
current negoti	sing issue in bilateral ation over the future ound was on 10 July, and y October.	of the US milit	ary presence.	
Spanish Negoti	ating Position			
agreement that willing to all largely intact forces permane andespeciall of the airbase want to largel Madrid will al	ators say they are present expires in 1988 and had not been to be an are presented at 1988. In return, they want airbases at Zamer and a second are also seek increased grant and spanish military materical	ave hinted that Rota Naval Base the US to cease agoza, Moron, ish are offering ergency deployment out-of-area of aid, additions	they are to remain se basing g the US use ent, but they operations. al US	
item on their agron a miss Spain. TNATO proves the US for Although atmospher negotiato	sh are trying to make the agenda. They are all ement last December to ion-by-mission basis for they are arguing instead ides a net increase in the Spanish are trying e at the negotiating to a sure on Washington.	so trying to be substitute Spar US forces will that Spanish western security to maintain anable, they will	ack away from anish forces thdrawn from membership in ty even with amicable be very tough	
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This paper Analysis.	was prepared by	Office of I	European	25 X 1
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Several factors will encourage the Spanish to compromise. Discord with the US over the bases might diminish Gonzalez's	
stature as a Western statesman and undermine the hard-earned image of moderation that has boosted his political image at home.	
Budgetary considerations will also encourage Gonzalez to compromise once it is clear that a decreased US presence would lead to reductions in direct US aid as well as in the substantial indirect US contribution to the already badly strained Spanish defense budget.	
Gonzalez, moreover, has room for maneuver on the base issue despite gains in the parliamentary election on 22 June by the Communists and former Prime Minister Suarez's center-left party, both of which advocate pursuing a tough line with Washington.	
Unlike the question of NATO membership, the base issue does not have a yes or no answer, but is a matter of degree. Few Spanish voters are likely to follow closely a complicated debate about the relative merits of one or another formula for regulating the US presence.	
Cosmetic adjustments could reduce resistance to the US military presence—the authorized ceiling for US troops could be reduced by approximately 20 percent,	25X1 25X1
might be possible to find a formula that would identify the US military presence as part of the defense against what Spaniards view as potential challenges from North Africa; and US facilities could be redesignated as NATO installations.	20/(1
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A More Independent Foreign Policy

While Spain is firmly committed to a pro-Western policy, Gonzalez wants to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and pursue a more independent foreign policy in the Third World.

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Gonzalez recognizes that Madrid lacks the resources to exercise much authority in Latin America, but he has worked hard to cultivate regional leaders and is starting to play a more active role in the area--primarily in support of the Contadora process.

He has also fashioned himself at times as a potential interlocutor between the US and Cuba, and his interest in playing that part will probably increase this fall when he visits Havana as part of a larger trip to the region.

Spanish Democracy: Pluses and Minuses

Since Franco's death in 1975 and the abortive coup attempt in 1981 Spanish democracy has largely been consolidated. The Socialist Party's election victories in 1982 and in June 1986 and Gonzalez's moderate and generally popular performance have convinced skeptics that power can safely alternate between left and right.

Military leaders remain strongly conservative, but they respect, at least grudgingly, Gonzalez's record and his popular support. Their awareness of the King's commitment to democracy as well as their recollection of the failed coup plot has also convinced them to accept constitutionally mandated subordination to civilian authority.

The principal shortcoming in Spanish democracy is the failure of the center and right politicians to overcome policy and personal differences and to unite in an effective alternative to the Socialists.

The second leading problem facing Spanish democracy is ETA, the Basque terrorist organization. ETA has been in slow decline for several years as a result of increased regional autonomy after Franco's death, better police work, and improved French cooperation against terrorist leaders in their hideouts North of the Pyrenees.

Recent terrorist attacks have shown, however, that the terrorists still pack a punch and at least another five or six years will probably be necessary to eliminate the problem.

Voters reelected Gonzalez because they generally support his program and lack an effective alternative, but some recent

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developments are likely to erode enthusiasm for the new democracy and could in time generate wide cynicism about the political process. Much of the public is aware that the government has hired	
professional hit men to hunt down terrorists	25X
	25X1
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