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TREVI GROUP: ATTITUDES TOWARDS SYRIA

2 December 1986

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This paper was prepared for Attorney General Meese by the West European Division, Office of European Analysis, with [redacted] contributions from Latin America, Africa, Europe Division, Office of Leadership Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to [redacted] Chief, West European Division, [redacted]

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Belgium

1. Counterterrorism Policy

Belgium has done a good job of cracking down on domestic terrorists and faces little internationally-inspired terrorism. Following a rash of terrorist incidents in 1985 by the Belgian Fighting Communist Cells (CCC) group, Justice Minister Gol introduced an anti-terrorist reform package that included legalized wiretapping, stringent gun controls, freer use of arms by police, improved anti-terrorist training, and tougher licensing requirements for private security firms. This legislation is now being debated in the Senate, and Belgian officials have told US diplomats that they expect the measures to pass later this fall or early next year. Within the Justice Ministry, Gol has begun an information bank, modeled on the FBI's, and formed an elite anti-terrorist corps. He also plans to increase efforts to infiltrate terrorist groups. Embassy officials report that Gol is committed to defining terrorism as a criminal, rather than a political, act in the US-Belgian extradition treaty now being negotiated. An activist in the EC setting, Gol plans to push for increased contact between the Trevi Group and the United States and stronger security measures in Belgium and the EC countries. [redacted]

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

Some Belgian leaders apparently worry that punitive actions against Syria could damage European ties with moderate Arab states, but Belgian diplomats have privately regretted that the EC did not take even stronger and more unified action against Damascus. In any case, the sanctions have little effect on Belgian-Syrian relations. Brussels has no air links with Damascus, no high level visits scheduled, and a negligible amount of bilateral trade. There are only 11 Syrians with diplomatic status in Brussels, and they have concurrent accreditation to the EC, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Brussels is unwilling to reduce the Syrian diplomatic presence in Belgium for fear that Damascus will retaliate; Belgian leaders want to ensure a strong mission in Damascus to represent EC views to the Syrian leadership while Belgium has the EC presidency (January-June 1987). [redacted]

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Denmark

1. Counterterrorism Policy

Denmark takes a strong stand against terrorism, partly because its territory has been the site of numerous attacks and partly because it has few important ties to states that sponsor terrorism. The Danes, for example, have introduced a UN resolution condemning terrorism and have taken the lead on behalf of Western countries to secure Non-Aligned Movement support for the draft. Denmark has also forced staffing reductions at the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in Copenhagen and discouraged Danish firms from doing business in Libya. [redacted]

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

Denmark was among the strongest rhetorical supporters of the British call for strict EC sanctions against Syria, and promised to follow through with a demarche to Damascus expressing serious concern over Syrian support for terrorism. Because of its limited ties to Syria, Denmark can do little to punish Syria for sponsoring terrorism except support measures in EC and UN forums. And in the light of charges that Danish ships were used to transport arms to Iran, Copenhagen may be reluctant to back US calls for further measures against states sponsoring terrorism. [redacted]

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France1. Counterterrorism Policy

Paris follows a two-pronged policy against terrorism, tightening security measures at home while negotiating and exerting diplomatic pressure internationally to prevent terrorist attacks on French soil. Following a rash of bombings in Paris during September 1986, Paris beefed up its security services, introduced stringent identity and security checks as well as longer detention periods, and published photographs of suspected terrorists and reward offers. France has also promised to ratify the Council of Europe's Counterterrorism Convention. [redacted]

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Although Paris supports EC counterterrorism efforts and calls for increased cooperation, it remains skeptical of most multilateral cooperative efforts and prefers bilateral cooperation. Paris seems reluctant to have nations outside the EC forum involved in Trevi Group efforts. At French insistence, the Trevi Group has limited its contacts to the political directors level. [redacted]

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

Paris is unlikely to apply any unilateral sanctions against Damascus. Although the French will probably maintain a unified position with EC member nations, they will probably attempt to water down any new EC proposals. In keeping with its attempt to maintain contacts in the Middle East, Paris has pursued a policy of offering Damascus economic aid and increased security cooperation while pressing it to curb terrorists operating in areas under its control. Moreover, the French almost certainly believe that Syrian concern about the earlier EC meeting on sanctions

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caused Damascus to make additional efforts--probably in conjunction with Tehran--to free some hostages. While Paris voted in the EC for the sanctions, Foreign Minister Raimond watered down France's position by saying that he interpreted the EC statement as implicating some Syrian officials and not the government. After the results of the Hasi trial in Berlin, moreover, Chirac publicly stated that only a Syrian attack on French soil would cause France to change its relations with Syria. [REDACTED]

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Greece

1. Counterterrorism Policy

We believe that Greek thinking on terrorism is still fluid and that Papandreou has, to some extent, shifted his approach to fit the exigencies of the moment. Yet, to the extent that Papandreou has a policy, we suspect it is meant to reflect what he believes is a middle ground.

-- To uphold historical Greek ties to the Arab world and his own leftist credentials, Papandreou has set himself apart from the US and other EC countries by refusing to condemn Libya and Syria or support sanctions against them.

-- But to placate Greece's Western allies and counter the domestic terrorist problem, he has taken a number of steps suggesting a greater commitment to combating terrorism on Greek soil. Greece has explicitly condemned terrorism in general and moved to strengthen its counterterrorist capabilities at home. The government has, for example, upgraded airport security, begun participating in US counter-terrorist training programs, and been more cooperative in sharing intelligence. [redacted]

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

Greece did not accept the EC sanctions against Syria, but said it would adopt them "in practice" because it does not sell arms to Syria, plans no official visits, and already monitors Syrian diplomats and airlines. We have no evidence that Greece is selling arms to Syria and know of no planned high-level visits between Syria and Greece; Greek trade with Syria is negligible. [redacted]

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3. Meeting with Ministers

Greek decision making on anything important is largely concentrated in Papandreou's hands, and we believe he will maintain his current independent stance in the EC on terrorism. Nevertheless a meeting with the Minister of



Public Order Drossoyiannis could be useful. Since his appointment last April, he has reportedly been taking strong anti-terrorist positions and is trying to improve police responsiveness. Over the past year, Greece's counterterrorist effort has been increasingly centralized in his office to overcome longstanding intrabureaucratic problems. We believe that he does want to improve Greece's capabilities and a meeting with him might well reinforce his efforts and strengthen his hand.

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Ireland1. Counterterrorism Policy

Dublin's counterterrorist policy remains focused on preventing the depredations of the PIRA. The Irish have augmented their counterterrorism capabilities by accepting monetary and training assistance from the UK under arrangements resulting from the 1985 Anglo-Irish Accord on Ulster. Opposition parties, however, are using parliamentary debate over ratification of the European Convention on Terrorism to accuse Prime Minister FitzGerald of too readily "appeasing" London. Dublin believes that the main foreign terrorist threat to the Republic comes from Libya, and the Irish are particularly concerned -- and outraged -- at Qadhafi's recent professions of support for the "revolutionary aspirations and goals" of the PIRA. Foreign Minister Barry, in fact, publicly said that further such statements by Tripoli could prompt Ireland to break diplomatic relations. We believe, however, that Prime Minister FitzGerald's government would need irrefutable and publishable evidence of Libyan aid to the PIRA before it would move to break ties and thereby endanger Ireland's profitable meat exports to Libya. [redacted]

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2. Support for Actions Against Syria

Dublin has to date supported British actions against Syria in the EC context, and in general supports US efforts to combat international terrorism. Ireland is unlikely to support further EC measures against Damascus unless the recent West German court determination that there was direct and high level Syrian culpability in the Berlin bombing induces Bonn to urge action against Damascus. As a result of the recent US-Iranian episode, we believe that Dublin probably will be cool toward any near-term US requests to support Washington's campaign against terrorism. Irish official, media, and public opinion are resentful of what they perceive as the abuse of Irish neutrality implicit in the alleged use of Irish passports in the US mission to Tehran. [redacted]

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Italy1. Counterterrorist Policy

Divergent views within the Cabinet have made Rome's efforts to deal with Middle East-inspired terrorism increasingly controversial. For at least the past 18 months, however, Rome's approach has been marked by a mix of firmness and caution, in which firmness has generally prevailed. With strong backing from Prime Minister Craxi, Defense Minister Spadolini and Interior Minister Scalfaro have succeeded in pushing the government to respond firmly to Libyan involvement in terrorism -- most notably by expelling a number of Libyans. Although Foreign Minister Andreotti has gone along with these decisions, he generally has been the odd man out, arguing that moves aimed at isolating Qadhafi, Assad, and others are likely to lead to new terrorist attacks in Italy. [redacted]

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The revelations last week that Washington supplied arms to Iran appear to have temporarily weakened those Cabinet members who favor a tougher line. Andreotti's decision to meet with Libyan Foreign Minister Mansour on the margins of Craxi's visit to Malta last week--the first time that Rome has agreed to high level contact with the Libyans since sanctions were imposed--suggests that Rome's opposition to state-sponsored terrorism may be softening. Craxi, too, appears to be adopting a more ambivalent stand toward Libya and Syria. [redacted]

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Rome has been one of the strongest proponents of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism and views the Trevi group as an important forum for advancing new proposals. Rome recently has suggested to a number of its European Allies that they join Italy in establishing bilateral counterterrorism working groups patterned after the Italy/US arrangement. [redacted]

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

Rome has responded more gingerly to allegations against Syria than to those against Libya. Economic considerations, which are negligible, probably have not figured prominently in Italy's approach, however. Rather, we attribute Italy's attitude primarily to Rome's perception that Syria must figure prominently in any attempt to reach a Middle East peace settlement. Italy has agreed to enact the limited measures adopted by the EC in reaction to Syria's role in last summer's plot to destroy an El Al jet at Heathrow airport and has protested Syria's involvement through diplomatic channels. Barring new revelations of Syrian complicity in terrorism, however, Rome probably will try to avoid taking additional steps. [redacted]

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Luxembourg

1. Counterterrorism Policy

Terrorism did not affect Luxembourg until a series of unclaimed bombings beginning in April 1985 aroused popular concern. [redacted] has since begun to bolster its tiny police and gendarmerie forces to maintain its reputation as a safe nation and a good place to do business. Fifty soldiers have been detailed indefinitely to the gendarmerie to support it in its counterterrorism role. The Grand Duchy has taken a strong stand on terrorism in EC consultations--probably because its rather weak police force and porous borders make it particularly vulnerable. It has been extremely cooperative with the United States on security matters. Although Luxembourg has a realistic view of its limited influence within the EC, we expect it to continue to support increased contacts between the Trevi Group and the US on terrorism issues.

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

As a small state, Luxembourg follows the lead of the larger EC partners on most European issues. It supports the EC's sanctions against Syria, which have little impact on Luxembourg-Syrian relations and would almost certainly support further sanctions if larger EC countries pushed for them. [redacted]

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Netherlands1. Counterterrorism Policy

Dutch counterterrorism policy is very close to the EC norm. The Hague has a minor domestic terrorism problem--it admits, for example, that there is a threat to US installations in the Netherlands--but it perceives no links to international terrorist groups. Dutch officials have shown great willingness to discuss various measures with US officials and to cooperate with Washington on counterterrorism issues. US Embassy officials note that The Hague gave more public support to US actions against Libya last April than most other EC countries, even though Dutch officials were uneasy over what they saw as an excessively confrontational US approach. The Dutch in the past have supported increased contacts between the Trevi Group and the United States, and they are likely to maintain this forward-leaning posture. [redacted]

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

The Netherlands supports sanctions against Syria and, despite concern about damaging European ties with moderate Arab states, would probably agree to further EC actions against Syria if larger partners took the lead. The current sanctions are having little effect on Dutch-Syrian relations. There is no Syrian Embassy in the Hague; the Syrian Ambassador accredited to The Hague resides in Brussels. We do not know of any planned high-level visits. Bilateral trade is minimal. [redacted]

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Portugal

1. Counterterrorism Policy

Portuguese officials have publicly condemned terrorism and are generally sympathetic to US and Trevi Group efforts to deal with the problem. As a small, vulnerable country, however, Portugal clearly prefers to keep a low profile, particularly on Middle East-inspired terrorism. Although Lisbon has made progress on combating the indigenous FP-25 terrorist group, it has no established counterterrorist policy and lacks the manpower, financial resources, and experience to counter most international terrorist threats in an effective manner. [redacted]

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

Portugal supported the sanctions agreed to by the EC last month. Like many of its EC partners, however, it believes that maintaining contact with countries such as Syria is the best method for dealing with international terrorism. Lisbon is unlikely to get out ahead of its West European colleagues in adopting harsher measures. Its trade ties with Syria are miniscule. [redacted]

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Spain1. Counterterrorism Policy

Spain has developed a well-defined policy to combat indigenous terrorism focused primarily on the Basque separatist organization, ETA. Madrid maintains strong and effective police pressure on ETA terrorists while offering concessions to Basque nationalists in hopes of reducing popular support for ETA in the Basque region. The government's policy in dealing with international terrorism, however, is less well defined. Prime Minister Gonzalez has spoken out against Middle Eastern-inspired violence, assured US officials that he is willing to cooperate in combating terrorism, and supported greater multilateral cooperation within the Trevi Group context. At the same time, Madrid only supported mild sanctions against Libya and cautioned the EC and the US on the need to maintain open channels of communication with the Arab world. [redacted]

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

Spain's longstanding desire to serve as an intermediary between the Middle East and the West and its perceived need to compensate for Spanish recognition of Israel earlier this year have made Madrid reluctant to confront Damascus on terrorism. During a visit to Syria in August, the Spanish Foreign Minister reiterated Spain's opposition to international terrorism, but neither accused the Syrians of playing a role nor questioned their protestations of innocence. [redacted]

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Spanish leaders nonetheless were reportedly impressed with the evidence of Syrian complicity presented in the Nizar Hindawi trial in London and have asked Syria for an explanation. The government is also about to begin the trial of Nassar Hassan, who is accused of masterminding a bombing attempt against El Al airlines at Madrid airport last June. Hassan, a member of the Abu Musa terrorist group, was traveling on a Syrian passport [redacted]

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The Spanish, however, have given little public play to the Syrian connection in the London and Madrid bombings. They supported the EC consensus on the sanctions against Syria passed last month but argued strongly against adopting

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harsher measures -- such as severing diplomatic relations. They have also said they oppose economic sanctions, even though Spanish trade with Syria is minimal. Spanish leaders maintain they are concerned about Syrian involvement in terrorism but do not want to push Damascus into the arms of the Soviets. They also believe that Syrian cooperation is essential to any Middle East peace process and are worried that Israel might take advantage of Syria's isolation to further its own interests. [REDACTED]

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United Kingdom1. Counterterrorism Policy

Prime Minister Thatcher almost certainly believes -- in the wake of breaking diplomatic relations with Syria and the revelation of US dealings with Iran -- that she is now the Western leader in the fight against international terrorism. Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Howe have spoken frankly and often about British resolve to defeat terrorism in their effort to promote a durable anti-terrorism consensus in the EC and to improve the Tories' prospects in the election expected by mid-1987. Home Secretary Douglas Hurd has also done yeoman work in briefing his EC and Trevi Group colleagues on the recent Hindawi trial. In addition, Hurd currently is responsible for spending substantial increases in internal security funding; the money will be used primarily to promote domestic law and order but will almost certainly also improve British capabilities to monitor the movement and actions of potential terrorists in the UK. The British remain concerned to play down any impression that Washington and London are engaged in a drive to put pressure on the other Allies to conduct a more vigorous anti-terrorist policy. Recent publicity about US arms sales to Iran -- along with London's past willingness to sell "non-lethal" military equipment to Tehran -- are likely to reinforce British desires for a public posture by the EC on fighting terrorism, rather than one sponsored by only the US and UK. [redacted]

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

London approves recent US sanctions against Syria and appreciates Washington's decision to wait until the repercussions resulting from the break in Anglo-Syria relations after Hindawi's conviction had played themselves out. Tory strategists and UK officials apparently believe that Thatcher's government benefitted politically from taking the initiative against international terrorism, rather than following a US lead. Moreover, Thatcher probably will profit from recent US actions against Syria in so far as they are seen by the British public as being supportive of London's decision, and so long as statements by US officials or stories in the UK media do not create the impression that Washington is pressing Thatcher for further actions against Damascus. At this point, London probably is not interested in any further measures against Syria.

London traditionally opposes economic sanctions and is worried that such actions would create precedent for similar UK actions against South Africa; in the Syrian case Thatcher had to overrule strong Whitehall sentiment for more limited steps, and such cautious views still exist in London. The British especially object to the idea of sanctions against the reexport of US goods by third countries, fearing that such a plan would highlight -- to the detriment of Tory political fortunes -- several on-going US-UK disputes over extraterritoriality. [redacted]

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West Germany

1. Counterterrorism Policy

Bonn's approach to terrorism has toughened in recent months in response to the emergence of evidence linking Syria to a bombing in West Berlin and to an intensification of violence by indigenous groups, particularly the von Braunmuehl assassination in October. Shortly thereafter, the Kohl government proposed a new package of anti-terrorist measures, including a controversial bill that would allow accused terrorists to become state witnesses in return for immunity from prosecution. This last measure, however, has since been dropped because the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition has been unable to resolve internal differences over its constitutionality. The other measures include increasing the use of undercover agents, creating special anti-terrorist units, and changing the privacy and data protection laws to permit greater access to and exchange of information on citizens and residents. With respect to state-sponsored terrorism, the West Germans have demonstrated a greater willingness to take action against Libya and Syria -- provided that Bonn is not required to get too far in front of its European allies. Bonn, in fact, took a harder line with Syria than many considered likely, but the Kohl government has not abandoned its desire to keep open diplomatic channels even to states supporting terrorism. Instead of breaking diplomatic relations -- with Libya earlier and now with Syria -- Bonn has only reduced their diplomatic presence, tightened travel restrictions on their official staff, and increased surveillance over their remaining nationals. Bonn also relies on its excellent counterterrorist capabilities as a deterrent. Federal, state, and local police and the federal intelligence agencies all coordinate their activities against the terrorist threat. [redacted]

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2. Support for Sanctions Against Syria

Bonn's willingness to move against Damascus has already been influenced by the demonstrated involvement of Syria in the bombings of the German-Arab Friendship Society in West Berlin this March. Bonn approves of US actions to downgrade Western relations with Syria, but it continues to oppose economic sanctions on the ground that they are ineffective and unenforceable. Bonn also fears that President Assad's

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total isolation would drive Syria further into the Soviet sphere and that no settlement in the Middle East is possible without Syrian cooperation. The desire to maintain potentially useful ties to Syria is probably most pronounced in the Foreign Ministry, which appears to take the lead on relations with Damascus. As recently as last April, Foreign Minister Genscher met with President Assad to discuss a variety of topics including terrorism. We believe that Bonn's reluctance to break diplomatic relations with Syria may also be influenced by the fact that -- unlike the Hindawi case in the UK -- the accredited ambassador was not directly linked to the terrorist attack. This distinction permits the Kohl government to maintain its position that, although Syrian intelligence was clearly involved in the West Berlin attack, other members of the government, including President Assad, were probably unaware of these plans. [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: TREVI GROUP: ATTITUDES TOWARDS SYRIA

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Washington, D.C. 20505

EC: Counterterrorist Cooperation [redacted]

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2 December 1986

SUMMARY

Persistent terrorism in Western Europe has prompted the members of the European Community to make new efforts to improve EC cooperation on counterterrorist measures. After years of lethargy and lack of initiative in this area, the EC's Trevi group has begun meeting more frequently in an attempt to strengthen joint efforts against terrorism. In addition, the EC Foreign Ministers established a permanent Working Group on Terrorism in January 1986, which also is charged with beefing up antiterrorist measures. In spite of this upsurge in activity, progress is likely to be slow because of the desire of members to retain the flexibility to act in accordance with their perceived national interests. EC members will continue to be wary of undue US influence in these fora as well. [redacted]

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Office of European Analysis, Issues and Applications Division. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to John Gannon, Chief, Issues and Applications Division [redacted]

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Recent Developments

The new-found EC interest in counterterrorist cooperation has been channeled primarily through two vehicles, the so-called Trevi group and the EC Foreign Ministers Permanent Working Group on Terrorism.

The Trevi Group*

Trevi is an acronym for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence International--a group that brings together the Interior and Justice Ministers of the EC countries, as well as other senior security officials, for regular consultations at various levels on internal security and terrorism questions within Europe. The Trevi group actually dates back to 1976 but has had little impact until recently.

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EC leaders, prompted at least in part by signs of a coordination of terrorist activity across national borders, began to invigorate the Trevi group under the Italian presidency in 1985.** Recurrent and highly publicized terrorist acts and--at least equally important--the desire to convince their own publics and Washington of their determination to take effective action against terrorism have ensured a continuing focus on counterterrorist cooperation. In April 1986, largely in response to the US-Libyan crisis, the ministers decided in principle to meet semiannually and to hold extraordinary meetings at short notice when events require.

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There have been some follow-up actions. At the initiative of the Dutch, for example, a meeting of chief police officers from European airports was held in The Hague in late May 1986 to coordinate methods of dealing with "high-risk flights"--such as those from the Middle East. In London in late September at an emergency meeting convened at France's request, the ministers agreed to a wider exchange of intelligence information on terrorist activities and announced that a communications system dedicated to antiterrorist action would be set up to link their police

*See Appendix A

** The country which holds the rotating EC presidency also chairs the Trevi group.

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forces. More recently, the Interior Ministers created a working group to examine ways to coordinate national policies on entry visas and to toughen identity checks at external community frontiers. The working group also will consider ways to prevent abuse of the right of asylum. [redacted]

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Permanent Working Group on Terrorism*

In January the EC Foreign Ministers decided to replace an ad hoc committee on terrorism with a permanent group that will function as one of the regular working groups in European Political Cooperation--the member states foreign policy coordination system (see box). Organizational and procedural matters are still being resolved, and the working relationship with the Trevi group has yet to be clarified. Still, in preliminary discussions in March, the group agreed to reject all attempts at blackmail in connection with hostage-taking. Participants explored the possibility of greater uniformity in visa requirements, controls on the size of foreign missions, and measures to prevent abuses of diplomatic immunity, but no decisions were reached. [redacted]

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Contacts with the United States

Washington has no formal relationship with EC groups, but a more regularized liaison relationship appears to be developing with both Trevi and the EPC Working Group; this should ensure readouts of group deliberations on a more consistent basis. In 1982 Trevi member states reluctantly agreed that the chairing country could brief the United States on proceedings, but in practice the thoroughness of the briefing has varied according to the disposition of the presidency country. The Netherlands was quite forthcoming earlier this year after the Trevi Troika--the past, current, and next chairman--met with US Attorney General Meese in an attempt to expand contacts with third countries. In May the Working Group on Terrorism also agreed to support a formal mechanism for EC third country contacts. [redacted]

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*See Appendix B

Outlook

EC members recognize the utility of working-level contacts, but obstacles to more active cooperation remain high. In the past France has preferred bilateral cooperation, and Greece--because of its close ties to Arab states and fear of terrorist retaliation--has often taken obstructionist stances in ministerial debates. Coordination also has been hampered by rivalry and distrust among internal security, law enforcement, and foreign ministry officials within each country. Furthermore, member states do not share all available information. [redacted]

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Effective action is likely to be slow in coming. Visa controls, for example, run counter to the EC's policy of easing border controls for EC citizens, and most states are unlikely to emulate France's recent move requiring entry visas for non-EC nationals. Italy, for example, has quietly dropped visa requirements for some North African states it had initiated earlier this year. [redacted]

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Still, the apparent unanimity regarding the need for improved EC counterterrorist cooperation is a positive development. Moreover, continued terrorist violence in Europe may compel member states to agree to at least a few concrete measures. The French, for example, are displaying more interest in multilateral cooperation since the recent series of bombings in Paris. [redacted]

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In the short term, more progress is likely to be made in pooling information and in strengthening law enforcement capabilities than in controversial areas such as standardizing extradition legislation and visa controls. Most states, for example, lack the financial and personnel resources to implement far-reaching visa policies but may be willing to enforce stricter controls on specific countries and to explore other ways of curtailing the mobility of terrorists. In the long term, the real test of the effectiveness of these counterterrorist groups will depend on the willingness of members to agree on politically sensitive measures--such as sanctions against states sponsoring terrorism--and risk economic or political repercussions at home. [redacted]

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Appendix A

The Trevi Group

At the founding meeting of the Trevi Group of Justice/Interior Ministers and Other Officials on 29 June 1976, EC ministers agreed to:

- o Exchange information about past terrorist events.
- o Exchange information about police procedures, technology, training, and equipment.
- o Promote exchanges of police personnel.
- o Arrange for mutual aid and cooperation in combating future acts of terrorism.
- o Establish greater cooperation in other areas, including the security of civil aviation, the protection of nuclear facilities, and the management of emergencies arising from natural or accidental catastrophes, particularly fires. [redacted]

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Trevi holds meetings at several organizational levels:

- o At the top of the hierarchy are the ministers, who have some decisionmaking powers. [redacted]
- o At the next level is the Committee of Senior (High) Officials. It is composed of directors of police and security services and senior ministry officials. The Committee is primarily a consultative body that prepares the way for ministerial conferences. [redacted]
- o There are also four working groups currently active. Working Group I handles exchanges of intelligence and information and threat-analysis; Working Group II covers coordination of technical police activities; Working Group III deals with organized crime on an international level; and Working Group IV has just been established to deal with border control and immigration. [redacted]

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Appendix B

The EPC Working Group

EC Foreign Ministers' 27 January 1986 Terrorism
Statement setting up Permanent Working Group on
Terrorism:

"The twelve have now decided to intensify these efforts and to promote common action, particularly in the following areas, both to improve their own defenses against terrorism and to discourage those who support it:

-- Security at airports, ports and railway stations.

-- Control by member states of persons entering or leaving the community and circulating in it.

-- Visa policies with respect to the problem of terrorism.

-- Abuse of diplomatic immunity.

They have decided to establish a permanent working body with a precise mandate, within the European Political Cooperation, which will monitor and give impetus to the implementation of the above mentioned measures." [redacted]

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