24 July 1985

NOTE	FOR:	DCI
		DDCI

SUBJECT: First Meeting of Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism

25 July 1985

- 1. You both are scheduled to attend this meeting which will be held at 1615 Thursday, 25 July, in the Roosevelt Room. Attached, you will find the following background information:
  - TAB A A coordinated (DI, DO, and NIO/CT) paper on the issues that may come up as well as a recommended DCI position.
  - Your memo soliciting comments on Admiral Holloway's proposed staffing for the government-wide Task Force. Included here is Clair's response which proposes assignin as the CIA representative on the Senior Review Group, and Operating Group.
  - TAB C NSDD 179: This 20 July 1985 directive established the Vice President's Task Force.
  - TAB D NSDD 30: This 16 September 1983 directive was the initial Administration effort to manage terrorist incidents.
  - TAB E NSDD 138: This 5 April 1984 directive established the existing interagency organization to deal with terrorism.
  - TAB F NSDD 180: This 22 July 1985 directive deals with the Civil Aviation Antiterrorism Program.
- 2. A pre-brief has been scheduled for 1300 Thursday in the conference room. Charlie Allen and will represent NIO/CT (Charlie Allen will try to attend if he can reschedule a meeting with Senator Chiles); (if he has returned from a TDY will represent the DDO; Dick Kerr will represent the DDI. At this meeting those present will be able to advise you further on some of the machinations that have gone on/and continue to do so as well as how the Agency and Community is organized to deal with terrorism now.

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cc: DDI

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## VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM 25 JULY 1985 MEETING

There are several issues that will undoubtedly be raised at the first meeting of the Task Force. Investigation and review of these issues will probably constitute the working program for whatever action element/s of the Task Force are constituted to prepare recommendations for the President. The issues likely to arise, and the recommended DCI position (coordinated with the DDO, the DDI and the NIO/CT) are as follows:

Issue:

Is the U.S. Government's counterterrorism effort effectively coordinated, funded and managed?

Recommended DCI Position: The USG counterterrorism effort is effectively coordinated via the mechanisms of NSDD 30 and 138. If the funding requested in the NSDD 138 Initiatives Paper had been provided, more progress could have been made. There is a strong community agreement that focused leadership in counterterrorism intelligence matters is a good idea, and recent efforts by the NIO/CT to provide that focus through an invigorated IICT have been welcomed by the community.

Issue:

Is there a need for a national manager or "terrorism tsar" to manage the US effort and task its components? Should there be a standing body for countering terrorism and managing terrorist incidents, or are present (NSDD 30 and 138) procedures adequate? (We detect considerable interest in this option, both in the VP's staff and the NSC staff, with references to a NNBIS-like permanent structure)

Recommended DCI Position: Analogous to our position on the recurrent suggestion that a "counter intelligence tsar" be appointed, we feel that the present interagency coordination structure adequately provides for dealing with terrorism. The statutory responsibilities of the major components of the US counterterrorism effort are so disparate (intelligence, law enforcement, military action) that a "tsar", with line management and tasking authority, would not be practical. Under NSDD 30 and 138, there are ad hoc bodies (the TIWG, the SSG) which can and do provide coordination and guidance in a crisis.

Issue:

Are the government's policies and procedures on countering terrorism clear to the American people (and their representatives in Congress), and do they enjoy support, or is there need for a public diplomacy effort?

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Recommended DCI Position: We believe that a sober and objective explanation of the complexities of dealing with terrorism, a discussion of the limitations on the use of force, and a strong statement of the moral and legal basis for U.S. policy on terrorism, if presented by the President or Vice President, would be a very effective method for securing the approval of a vast majority of the American people.

Issue:

Does more need to be done, through diplomacy or intelligence liaison, to insure that our allies provide full and coordinated cooperation?

Recommended DCI Position: There is a need for 25X1 constant diplomatic and intelligence liaison pressure on our allies (and on those states who while not allies may be willing to cooperate in their own interest, to assure a freer flow 25X6 of information and intelligence, widespread adherence to international conventions, and common condemnation of terrorism in all forms. CIA is aggressively expanding its overseas liaison efforts. 25X1 , and we will continue to do this in close coordination with State. 25X1

Issue:

Is there need for additional or changed legislation to make U.S. counterterrorism programs more effective, 25X1 and to swiftly apprehend and punish terrorists, wherever they may operate?

Recommended DCI Position: It may be that additional legislation is required, and the Task Force could usefully review this issue. Some laws (eg. FISA) were drafted and passed in a climate conducive to restrictions on law enforcement and intelligence gathering activities. The urgency of the terrorist threat, and a changed political climate suggest that it may be time for new or changed laws.

Issue:

Is there a need for a national "fusion center" for counterterrorism?

Recommended DCI Position: There is no evident support for a co-located "fusion center" which, we believe, would duplicate existing efforts. A "wired" fusion center-type network is probably more acceptable; matters are developing in that direction anyway

Any proposal for a center which would meld foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement information should be examined very closely before approval.

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Issue:

Are national intelligence collection and dissemination procedures sufficient to support tactical military counterterrorist operations, or should the military have its own collection assets?

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Recommended DCI Position: Whether or not the military needs its own specialized collection assets for tactical support, it is imperative that all intelligence collection efforts be coordinated with national programs, and that the DCI as the President's senior intelligence officer retain the authority to task all assets. The question of the utility and deployment

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requires considerable coordination within the Department of Defense before it is proffered as a usable asset, strategic or tactical.

rethe DDO, DDI and NIO/CT are working together on a plan which will implement the appropriate SOPs. As regards tasking of SIGINT and Imagery, we believe that this is best handled by the DDI, in support of your NSPG responsibilities as well as the Agency role in supporting operations and military requirements.

Many of these issues have been exhaustively addressed in the past year or so, particularly in studies by the Intelligence Community Staff. Consistent with access approvals, these studies can and should be made available to the Task Force to speed their review and to help them avoid duplicative efforts.

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	S E I R E I	
	24 July 1985	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence	
FROM:	Clair E. George Deputy Director for Operations	
SUBJECT:	Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism	
1. I recomm	nend to be the CIA representative on the oup of the Vice President's task force on terrorism.	,
For the past year meetings here in	r, has represented this Directorate at all senior Washington concerning terrorism and has travelled	
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22 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Deputy Director for Operations >

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism

What are your recommendations on the attached?

William J. Casey

Attachment:
Memo to DCI from EA/DCI
dtd 22 July 85 re
above subject

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22 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

FROM:

EA/DCI

- 1. Admiral Holloway, who is chairing the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism, called and when you were not available asked for me. He is looking for people for his task force:
- Senior Review Group: Wants one CIA body at the Assistant Secretary of State level. This SRG will meet on call only, not permanently detailed.
- Staff Operating Group: This is to be composed of 6-10 detailees from government, at the Major to Colonel level, who will be detailed to SOG for six months full-time, probably working in one of the townhouses on Lafayette Square. He said he thought 4 of the 6-10 would come from Defense, already has someone from the Coast Guard. The person doesn't have to be knowledgeable about terrorism, but must be smart, able to communicate and write well, able to operate under pressure. He wants one person from CIA.
- 2. Holloway said he was not twisting anyone's arm, but that by having representation on these two groups Agency interests would be protected. A moment later he said he was resorting to "press gang" tactics, and tried to get a commitment from me for the two CIA people, to which I said only you could make that decision. I said we would get back to him. His number is 466-5388.

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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1985

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**Executive Registry** 

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#### CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III The Secretary of Treasury

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE EDWIN MEESE, III The Attorney General

THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH H. DOLE The Secretary of Transportation

THE HONORABLE DAVID A. STOCKMAN The Director, Office of Management and Budget

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY The Director of Central Intelligence

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT:

National Security Decision Directive: Task Force on Combatting Terrorism (NSDD-179) (C)

The President has signed the subject NSDD and it is transmitted herewith. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attachment

National Security Decision Directive

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

July 20, 1985

National Security Decision Directive 179

#### TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM (U)

International terrorism poses an increasing threat to U.S. citizens and our interests. Terrorists are waging a war against, not only the United States, but all civilized society in which innocent civilians are intentional victims and our servicemen are specific targets. (U)

The United States Government has an obligation to protect its citizens and interests against terrorists who have so little regard for human life and the values we cherish. To the extent we can, we should undertake action in concert with other nations which share our democratic institutions to combat the menace of terrorism. We must, however, be prepared to act unilaterally when necessary. It is, therefore, imperative that we develop a sustained program for combatting terrorism. (C)

To ensure that all appropriate resources of the United States Government are dedicated to this task, the Vice President is appointed to convene a government-wide task force on combatting terrorism. (U)

The Vice President's task force will:

- review and evaluate the effectiveness of current U.S. policy and programs on combatting terrorism, to include:
  - an assessment of national priorities currently assigned to effectively combat terrorism, especially earlier recommendations regarding organization in NSDD-30 and adequacy of intelligence responsibilities in NSDD-138 and Presidential Executive Order 12333;
  - the assignment of responsibilities and accountability for ensuring interagency cooperation and coordination before, during, and after a terrorist incident;
  - a review and evaluation of present laws and law enforcement programs dealing with terrorism;
  - the adequacy of public awareness and support;

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- provisions for funding and personnel; and
- an evaluation of current levels of programs of international cooperation and coordination.
- make recommendations as appropriate to the President by the end of 1985. (C)

The task force on combatting terrorism, chaired by the Vice President, will include the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, and Transportation; the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Chief of Staff to the Vice President; the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs; the Executive Director of the Task Force; and others as appropriate. (U)

The Vice President will appoint a senior Executive Director for the task force who will work under the direct supervision of the Vice President. The Executive Director may task any government department or agency, individual or organization to contribute to the work of the task force. To support the work of the task force, a working group will be established for which members may be drawn from departments/agencies represented on the Interdepartmental Group on Combatting Terrorism, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, and others as appropriate. The working group will prepare substantive recommendations to the task force for consideration. (U)

The task force will select a group of consultants which will provide advice to the task force as necessary. A Secretariat Staff for the task force may be established as appropriate. (U)

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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

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#### WASHINGTON

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April 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION

THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT:

Managing Terrorism Incidents (U)

The President has formally approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on Managing Terrorism Incidents. In order to ensure that the Terrorism Incident Working Group is fully capable of executing its function, the group will meet formally for the first time on April 20 at 2:00 p.m. in room 305 of the Old Executive Office Building. Each agency should identify a representative who can be called upon to serve on the Terrorism Incident Working Group and who will be present at the meeting on April 20. Names should be presented in writing by April 16 to Chris Shoemaker, NSC Staff. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

William Clark

Attachment: NSDD 30

cc Office of the White House Military Aide

Chairmán, PFIAB

REVISED

(September 15, 1983)

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WASHINGTON

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April 10, 1982

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 30

#### MANAGING TERRORIST INCIDENTS (U)

The United States is committed, as a matter of national policy, to oppose terrorism domestically and internationally. Efficient and effective management of terrorist incidents is crucial to this commitment. Successful management of terrorist incidents requires a rapid, effective response, immediate access to institutional expertise, and extensive prior planning. Because of these requirements, the management of terrorist incidents of duration will be handled in the following manner: (U)

- (1) Responsibilities. If the gravity of a terrorist incident situation warrants, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at the direction of the Vice President, will convene the Special Situation Group (SSG) to advise the President with respect to decision options on appropriate policies and actions. (C)
- The Lead Agency. The coordination of federal response to terrorist incidents will normally be the responsibility of the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency will be that agency with the most direct operational role in dealing with the particular terrorist incident at hand. It will coordinate all operational aspects of the incident, including press and intelligence. The Lead Agency will normally be: (C)
  - The State Department, for international terrorist incidents that take place outside of US territory. (U)
  - -- The Department of Justice for terrorist incidents which take place within US territory. Unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the FBI will be the Lead Agency within the Department of Justice for operational response to such incidents. (U)
  - -- The FAA for highjackings within the special jurisdiction of the United States. (U)

The Federal Emergency Management Agency will be responsible for planning for and managing the public health aspects of a terrorist incident and recovery from the consequences of such incidents. (U)

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will resolve any uncertainty on the designation of the Lead Agency or on agency responsibilities.

(3) The Terrorist Incident Working Group. To support the Special Situation Group, a Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) will be established. This group will consist of representatives from State, the DCI, DOD, FBI, FEMA and the NSC staff, with augmentation from other agencies, as required. The TIWG will be activated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It will be chaired by a senior representative from the NSC staff.

The purpose of the TIWG is to provide the SSG with direct operational support, to ensure interagency coordination, and to provide advice and recommendations during an incident. The Lead Agency will continue to manage the incident under the direction and coordination of the TIWG and the SSG.

- (4) The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Department of State, will be responsible for the development of overall US policy on terrorism, including, inter alia, policy directives, organizational issues, legislative initiatives, and interagency training programs.
- (5) White House Operations Group. The White House Operations Group, chaired by the Director of the White House Military Office, will have responsibility for issues relating to threats or acts of terrorism directed against the President or the Vice President or senior US officials and protectees as directed by the President. The NSC staff will effect liaison between this group and the IG/T and TIWG.
- The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism. The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, chaired by the DCI, will provide intelligence support to the SSG and the TIWG. It will focus and coordinate interagency intelligence efforts to counter terrorist threats. In anticipation of terrorist incidents, the Committee will concentrate on threat alerts, trend assessments, and required procedural improvements, such as more rapid dissemination of critical information.
- (7) Planning and Exercises. In order to ensure effective management of terrorism incidents, prior planning and exercise activity are essential. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism will be the primary mechanism within the US Government for planning and policy recommendations. To ensure the development of an effective, coordinated interagency exercise program, the Chairman of the IG/T

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will appoint an Exercise Committee which will coordinate the development of a multi-year exercise program and review all multiple agency counterterrorism exercises. This committee will assure that the government's counterterrorism capabilities are maintained in a high state of readiness and that duplication of exercises is avoided. No multiple agency exercise at the national level may be held without the recommendation of the IG/T and the approval of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (U)

This National Security Decision Directive supersedes all previous inconsistent directives and instructions on managing terrorism incidents. (U)

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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 5, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT

THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT:

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-138): Combatting Terrorism (S)

The President has formally approved the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-138) on measures to be taken by the USG to combat terrorism. Copies of this directive may not be reproduced. Please ensure proper handling of this document and the attached directive to prevent unauthorized disclosure. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment NSDD-138

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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

National Security Decision Directive 138 WASHINGTON

April 3, 1984

#### COMBATTING TERRORISM (U)

U.S. citizens and installations, especially abroad, are increasingly being targetted for terrorist acts. These attacks result from activities by state-sponsored terrorist movements, international terrorist organizations and groups, and individual terrorists operating without obvious support. Terrorist activities not only endanger our citizens and interests, but result in the destabilization and polarization of democratic and friendly governments. Of particular concern is the possibility that international terrorist movements and some of those which enjoy state sponsorship are receiving support and perhaps guidance directly or indirectly from the Soviet Union. International terrorist activity, as referred to in this directive, includes conspiring about planning for or conducting terrorist acts by trans-national groups, whether the activity occurs in the U.S. or abroad. (S)

The U.S. Government program to prevent, counter, and combat terrorism must be significantly enhanced to reduce the threat to U.S. citizens and foreign nationals in the United States who enjoy our protection. We must also seek to ameliorate the subversive effect of terrorism on foreign democratic institutions and pro-Western governments. Our program must include measures which will deter terrorist attacks, improve protection for those threatened, and reduce the effectiveness of those attacks which do occur. Domestic programs to deal with terrorist activities in the United States must be continuously reviewed and assessed in order to identify useful improvements. This policy must be supported by improved intelligence, by political and diplomatic actions, and by improved response capabilities. (TS)

This NSDD provides guidance for developing a long-term, two-phased program for achieving these objectives in accord with the provisions of Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, and other applicable laws and statutes. Phase I will commence immediately and conclude December 31, 1984. Phase II will consist of those measures to be taken after January 1, 1985. The following principles will guide implementation in both phases: (S)

 The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group in any cause a threat to our national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available. (U)

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- Terrorism is a common problem for all democratic nations. We will work intensively with others to eliminate the threat of terrorism to our way of life. States that practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence. All available channels of communication will be used to persuade those now practicing or supporting terrorism to desist. Assistance and support shall be provided to those democratic nations suffering intimidation because of terrorist threats or activities. (U)
- State-sponsored terrorist activity or directed threats of such action are considered to be hostile acts and the U.S. will hold sponsors accountable. Whenever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our citizens, property, and interests.
   (U)
- Intelligence collection against groups and states involved in international terrorism must be improved in order to better prevent or counter attacks; warn our citizens, friends, and allies; and, thereby, reduce the risk to them.
   (U)
- Acts of state-sponsored and organized terrorism should be appropriately exposed and condemned in every available forum. (U)

PHASE I. The following near-term actions, by key departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, are designed to immediately reduce the threat to U.S. citizens, interests, and property in accord with the guidance above. To this end, the following measures are directed to be fully implemented by December 31, 1984:

- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director OMB, shall: (C)
  - -- Secure expeditious passage of legislative instruments to implement the provisions of extant international accords on terrorism to which the United States is signatory. Measures should also be taken to carry out appropriate bilateral and multilateral exchanges leading toward improved cooperation on combatting terrorism, especially with those states having an established counter-terrorist capability. (C)

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- -- Provide, through applicable legislative authorities, resources, facilities, and services required to support expanded counter-terrorism training for the civil/domestic security services of other friendly governments. (C)
- -- Develop a full range of options for dealing directly with terrorism, both at the threat stage and after such acts are carried out. This should include a program for expanding existing sanctions against those organizations or states which support or export terrorism. It should also incorporate improved visa processing systems and procedures which will permit the U.S. to deny access to its territory to individuals who represent such organizations or states. (S)
- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence, and the Attorney General, shall:
  - -- Continue improvements in the U.S. capability to conduct military operations to counter terrorism directed against U.S. citizens, military forces, property, and interests. (S)
  - -- Develop a military strategy that is supportive of an active, preventive program to combat state-sponsored terrorism before the terrorists can initiate hostile acts. (S)
  - Develop a full range of military options to combat terrorism throughout the entire terrorist threat spectrum. (S)
  - Develop a broad range of defensive measures to protect military forces, dependents, and facilities worldwide.
     (S)
- The Attorney General shall enhance collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information on terrorist movements, organizations, and activities within the United States. To the extent necessary, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence shall maintain close liaison in these matters to ensure that the intelligence activities of their respective agencies are properly coordinated. (TS)

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- The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense and the Attorney General, shall: (C)
  - -- Enhance foreign collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on state-sponsored terrorist organizations and anti-Western international terrorist movements/ groups including relationships with hostile intelligence services. This effort shall include a prioritization of those terrorist organizations (whether or not state-sponsored) which are most threatening to the U.S. and an assessment of their potential vulnerabilities. (S)
  - Develop, in coordination with other friendly security services, capabilities for the pre-emptive neutralization of anti-American terrorist groups which plan, support, or conduct hostile terrorist acts against U.S. citizens, interests, and property overseas. (S)
  - -- Develop a clandestine service capability, using all lawful means, for effective response overseas against terrorist acts committed against U.S. citizens, facilities, or interests. (TS/S)
  - -- Provide a new Finding on combatting terrorism which includes, <u>inter alia</u>, lawful measures to:
    - Increase cooperation with the security agencies of other friendly governments. (S)
    - Unilaterally and/or in concert with other countries <u>neutralize or counter terrorist</u> organizations and terrorist leaders. (TS/S)
    - Develop an information exploitation program, aimed at disrupting and demoralizing terrorist groups.
       (S)

The Director of Central Intelligence is charged with the overall responsibility for developing a comprehensive and coordinated action plan to implement the steps above during CY-84. This action plan shall include milestones and attainable objectives aimed at commencing an active campaign to combat terrorism as soon as practicable. This plan shall be fully consistent with all provisions of Executive Order 12333 and other applicable laws and statutes. (S)

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Recommendations for increased resource requirements should accompany the plan. This plan, finding, and resource recommendations shall be forwarded for review by the NSPG no later than May 31, 1984. (S)

Once this plan, prepared by the DCI, has received Presidential approval, its implementation during Phase I will be monitored by the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG), established in NSDD-30. The mandate of the TIWG is hereby amended to include these responsibilities and the TIWG Chairmanship is hereby modified to include the Assistant to the President and Director of Special Support Services as co-Chairman. The TIWG will meet on a regular basis on these matters and provide periodic reports to the NSPG on implementation of these measures. (S)

A coherent effort and plan to combat terrorism requires that the United States Government not only take action against known terrorists, but improve its ability to protect its people and facilities as well. These initiatives shall be implemented concurrently to preclude unnecessary risk. Accordingly, in addition to those steps outlined above, the following protective, security, and enforcement measures are directed for implementation during Phase I: (S)

- The Secretaries of State and Defense shall accelerate security improvements in overseas locations to reduce the threat of terrorist action. (S)
- The Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, in coordination with the Attorney General, and other appropriate agency heads, shall take action to improve protection/security of personnel and facilities in the U.S. under their purview to reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attack. (C)
- The Secretaries of State and Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall strengthen procedures for dissemination of terrorist warning information to threatened missions and units. To ensure the effectiveness of these measures, the Director of Central Intelligence shall develop improved procedures for the continuous, systematic assessment of intelligence on terrorist groups, movements, and individuals. (C)
- Departments and agencies with personnel in areas vulnerable to terrorist action shall pursue mandatory programs for improved awareness and security training. (U)

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- The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and other agency heads as appropriate, shall develop streamlined operational plans for deterring and responding to terrorist threats against prominent locations/events in the United States which could be likely targets for terrorist attack. (C)
- The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and other appropriate agency heads, shall also continue to:
  - Enhance coordination, analysis, and dissemination of federal law enforcement information regarding terrorist activities and the presence of foreign or international terrorists in the United States. (C)
  - -- Enhance cooperation among federal law enforcement agencies and state and local authorities in the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by terrorists. (C)

A consolidated plan to implement these Phase I security, protection, and enforcement initiatives shall be prepared by the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) for review by the NSPG no later than May 31, 1984. This plan should include recommendations for increased resources required by the departments and agencies to implement this program. (S)

All plans submitted for review by the NSPG should describe actions already taken and resources applied in 1983, legislative initiatives, and programs currently planned and underway for 1984-1989. The strengths and weaknesses of currently planned programs should be delineated and analyses should be provided explaining the need for additional resources. Where appropriate, financing alternatives, including offset proposals, should be provided. (S)

#### Phase II

A second phase of this national program to combat terrorism shall commence on January 1, 1985. This phase is designed to improve capabilities, organization, and management that will further protect U.S. interests, citizens, and facilities from acts of terrorism. (S)

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The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will convene an interagency group comprised of representatives of the departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, the DCI, OMB, and White House Office of Special Support Services to develop recommendations on improving the overall management of national programs for assessing, combatting, and countering international terrorism. This group shall also recommend any changes that should be made in the planning, integration, and oversight arrangements for terrorism countermeasures. These recommendations to improve the program during Phase II should be presented for review by the NSPG by July 31, 1984. (S)

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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 22, 1985

SYSTEM II 90701

**Executive Registry** 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III The Secretary of Treasury

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE EDWIN MEESE, III The Attorney General

THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH H. DOLE The Secretary of Transportation

THE HONORABLE DAVID A. STOCKMAN
The Director, Office of Management and Budget

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central Intelligence

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT:

National Security Decision Directive: Civil Aviation Anti-Terrorism Program (NSDD-180) (S)

The President has signed the subject NSDD and it is transmitted herewith. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarland

Attachment

National Security Decision Directive

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National Security Decision Directive 180

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

July 19, 1985

### CIVIL AVIATION ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAM

International civil aviation is becoming a high visibility target for terrorist activities. Numerous terrorist acts directed against U.S. and other air carriers in recent weeks pose a significant threat to international commerce and our national interests. Recent violent terrorist acts have resulted in the murder, torture and kidnapping of U.S. citizens and the death of hundreds of others. It is imperative that the United States expeditiously implement procedures to prevent and/or respond to subsequent terrorist acts. Accordingly, the following extraordinary security and protective measures are directed for implementation:

- Expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Program. of Transportation, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is directed to immediately undertake actions necessary to expand the Federal Aviation Administration Federal Air Marshal Program to the extent necessary to assure safety aboard U.S. air carriers traveling in threatened international areas. At a minimum, the following actions shall be taken:
  - Within 14 days, the existing Federal Air Marshal complement shall provide coverage as determined necessary for those flights serving cities where the threat of hijacking is most severe.
  - Within 30 days, the Federal Air Marshal complement shall be expanded through the addition of Federal law enforcement officers from other Executive Branch agencies to provide coverage as determined necessary at the most threatened locations.
  - Within 60 days, action shall be initiated to fully expand the Federal Air Marshal complement through acquisition of new special agents to the level necessary to provide continuing coverage at the most threatened locations throughout the world.
  - Utilization of the expanded Federal Air Marshal complement shall continue until otherwise determined by the Secretary of Transportation. Each Federal Air Marshal's duties shall include airport and airline security system inspections and functional evaluations in order to fully utilize these highly specialized resources. (S)

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- -- Assessment of Security Effectiveness at Foreign Locations.
  The Secretary of Transportation shall immediately undertake an assessment of the level of security provided at foreign airports for all U.S. air carrier departures and departures of foreign air carriers serving the United States.
  - The existing complement of Federal Aviation Administration special agents shall immediately conduct on-site security evaluations at airports within areas of the highest risk to civil aviation served by U.S. air carriers. (C)
  - Within 30 days, the existing complement of Federal Aviation Administration special agents supplemented by Department of State employees shall conduct on-site security évaluations at all airports where the highest threat to civil aviation exists. (C)
  - Within 60 days, the Secretary of Transportation shall initiate action to increase the complement of Federal Aviation Administration special agents to the extent necessary to provide continuing, periodic assessment of security levels at all such foreign airports. (C)
  - Not later than July 30, 1985, and every 120 days thereafter, the Secretary of Transportation shall advise me of those airports where security levels do not meet International Civil Aviation Organization Security Standards and shall advise competent foreign government authorities. If the notified government does not undertake expeditious corrective action, the Secretary of Transportation shall notify me and shall apply the appropriate provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (as amended) whenever it is determined that a continuing condition exists that threatens the safety or security of passengers, aircraft, or crew travelling to or from a foreign airport. (S)
- Research and Development. The Department of Transportation, in coordination with the Interagency Working Group on Combatting Terrorism and the Technical Support Working Group, will carry out an expanded research and development program covering detection of explosive and incendiary devices, hijack prevention, and other security system enhancements. Projects presently planned will be accelerated and necessary additional projects will be initiated this fiscal year and thereafter. (C)

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- Foreign Technical Assistance. In coordination with the Department of State, the FAA training and assistance program for foreign governments will be expanded. The objective of this enhancement is to achieve heightened security for civil aviation worldwide and to prepare other governments to more effectively combat aviation-related terrorism. (C)
- Enhanced Airline Security Training. The Department of Transportation shall ensure that appropriately enhanced security training and threat awareness briefings are provided for all crewmembers of U.S. air carriers who serve on high-risk flights. The FAA shall further require that for such flights a designated security coordinator is responsible for monitoring security systems and advising the pilot in command that all necessary security requirements have been met prior to departure. (C)
- -- Crisis Management. The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration is directed to provide all necessary communications required to meet crisis management responsibilities. These shall include, but not be limited to:
  - secure communications for appropriate FAA crisis managers and secure communications between the appropriate FAA offices;
  - command, control, and communications not dependent on the switched public network; and
  - expedited implementation of the connectivity requirements specified in NSDD-95. (S)
- Coordination/Resources. The Secretary of Transportation shall coordinate the actions indicated above, as necessary, with the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice and other concerned departments and agencies of the USG to assure timely implementation. Heads of other departments/agencies shall provide appropriate support and assistance to the Department of Transportation on a temporary basis in order to effect the provisions of this directive. Within 14 days, the Secretary of Transportation shall identify and report to the Office of Management and Budget on requirements for additional or reprogrammed FY-85, FY-86, and FY-87 resources made necessary by this directive. The report shall specify any temporary support required from other agencies. (C)

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