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UNITED STATES
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

February 9, 1977

DOE review completed.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

FROM

H. Taylor

L. Taylor, ERDA Alternate
DCI Security Committee

SUBJECT : COMMENT ON PROPOSED DCID ON "SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION"

The following comments are furnished:

1. Paragraph 3.f.: Since the definition proposed as 3.f. is being included to clarify a phrase used in paragraph 4.a., it is recommended that the language be included in a new paragraph 4.b. to read as follows:

4.b. The categories of sensitive information or methods of SCI referred to in paragraph 4.a. include, but are not limited to the following:

- technological structure, function and technique of sensitive intelligence collection or exploitation systems/methods; or
- designated system targets or sources; or
- method and purpose of target selection; or
- degree of success of collection or exploitation system/method; or
- collection or exploitation system/method capabilities and vulnerabilities.

2. Paragraph 4.a.: It is recommended that the Security Committee version of 4.a. be revised to read as follows:

4.a. Unofficial Travel: While U.S. citizens are not restricted by U.S. laws from traveling in foreign countries, persons granted authorization to certain categories of extremely sensitive SCI on foreign

NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, 50 CFR 101.118, AND
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Indefinite
(Effective date or
event, if any)

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intelligence and foreign counterintelligence sources and methods incur a special security obligation and are to be alerted by the SIO to the risks associated with their engaging in unofficial visits to, or travel through, the countries listed in Appendix A. The DCI, in consultation with SIO's, will identify the categories having special sensitivity and the SIO concerned should advise persons with such access that travel in the listed countries may result in the withdrawal of clearance for continued access to SCI.

3. Paragraph 5.a.: Since paragraph 4.a. assigns to the DCI the responsibility for identifying the categories of information having special sensitivity, it is suggested that paragraph 5.a. be revised as follows:

5.a. The DCI will:

- (1) Cause to be prepared and disseminated to the SIO's a list of countries identified as posing a security risk bearing on this policy (Appendix A.). The Security Committee will coordinate required support including source material concerning these risks.
 - (2) In consultation with the SIO's, identify the categories of sensitive information on sources or methods having special sensitivity which will require a special alerting of the individual desiring unofficial foreign travel to the risks involved.
4. Appendix A.: The definition of "hazardous activities" which is applied in 4.b. "Official Assignment/Travel" is broader than the activities covered by the language in 4.a.

It is suggested that a review be made of Appendix A. (which is used in 4.a.) to assure that there are not other hostile, isolated, or exposed areas or countries that should be included in Appendix A.

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