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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Security Committee

COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

NSA review completed

10 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

SUBJECT : Definition of "Extremely Sensitive  
Information on Foreign Intelligence  
Sources and Methods".

REFERENCE : SECOM-M-194

1. At the Security Committee meeting of 21 June 1976, the Chairman asked the Chairman, Compartmentation Subcommittee, to have his Subcommittee begin considering those certain categories of SCI that would require restrictions being placed on travel. This charge was given to the Security Committee by the DCI subsequent to initial consideration by the NFIB of the proposed new DCID on "Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information".

2. Pursuant to this task, the Compartmentation Subcommittee submits the following recommendations for consideration:

a. In the SECOM version of paragraph 4., DCID 1/\_\_, the phrase, "extremely sensitive information on source and methods" be changed to read, "extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources and methods".

b. The following definition be added to the draft DCID 1/\_\_ as subparagraph f., to paragraph 3. Definitions:

"f. Extremely Sensitive Information on Foreign Intelligence Sources and Methods. Such information consists of specific and deep knowledge of the following categories:

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- technological structure, function and technique of sensitive intelligence collection or exploitation systems/methods; or
- designated system targets or sources; or
- method and purpose of target selection; or
- degree of success of collection or exploitation system/method; or
- collection or exploitation system/ method capabilities and vulnerabilities.



Colonel, USAF  
Chairman

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/\_\_\_\_  
SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF  
PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED  
INFORMATION<sup>1</sup>

(Effective )

1. General

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11905 and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, minimum<sup>2</sup> security policy applicable to assignment and travel of US Government civilian and military personnel, government consultants and employees of government contractors who have, or who have had, access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is hereby established.

2. Purpose

This policy is based upon the need to protect SCI from possible compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, exploitation or entrapment of personnel (stipulated in paragraph 1 above) by hostile or unfriendly nations or groups.

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<sup>1</sup> Existing directives, regulations (including pertinent provisions of the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations), agreements and such other references governing hazardous activities as defined herein shall be revised accordingly.

<sup>2</sup> While CIA has no objection to individual agencies attempting to impose a more restrictive policy on their own personnel, they do not believe it appropriate to lend the DCI's authority to such attempts; therefore, CIA recommends eliminating the word "minimum."

3. Definitions

a. Sensitive Compartmented Information. The term Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) includes all information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs (and their end products) for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

b. Hazardous Activities. Hazardous activities include, assignments or visits to, and travel through, nations listed in Appendix A, hereto. Hazardous activities also include assignment or travel in combat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking place, duties behind hostile lines, and duties or travel in isolated or exposed areas where individuals cannot reasonably be protected against hostile action.

c. Defensive Security Briefings. Defensive security briefings are formal advisories which alert personnel as to the potential for harassment, provocation or entrapment by local agencies/officials in designated areas of risk. These briefings are based on actual experience whenever feasible, and include information on courses

of action helpful in mitigating the adverse security and personal consequences of such acts.

d. Risk of Capture Briefings. Risk of capture briefings are formal advisories which alert personnel as to what may be expected in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured or detained and of suggested courses of action they should follow to avoid or limit such divulgence. These advisories include instructions/advice for advance preparation of innocuous, alternative explanations of duties and background.

e. Senior Intelligence Officers. Within the meaning of this policy directive, Senior Intelligence Officers (SIO) are those officials representing their individual departments and agencies on the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), including the Military Department Intelligence Chiefs.

"f. Extremely Sensitive Information on Foreign Intelligence Sources and Methods. Such information consists of specific and deep knowledge of the following categories:

- technological structure, function and technique of sensitive intelligence collection or exploitation systems/methods; or
- designated system targets or sources; or
- method and purpose of target selection; or
- degree of success of collection or exploitation system/method; or
- collection or exploitation system/ method capabilities and vulnerabilities.

Security Committee Version:

NSA Version:

CIA Version:

4. Policy

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a. Unofficial Travel: While US citizens are not restricted by US laws from traveling in foreign countries, persons granted authorization for access to certain categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources and methods of SCI incur a special security obligation and are to be discouraged by their SIO from engaging in unofficial visits to, or travel through, the countries listed in Appendix A. The DCI, in consultation with SIOs, will identify the categories having special sensitivity and the SIO concerned should advise persons with such access that travel in the listed countries may result in the withdrawal of clearance for continued access to SCI.

Unofficial Travel: Persons granted authorization for access to certain categories of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), especially sources and methods, incur a special security obligation which may require their refraining from unofficial visits to, or travel through, the countries listed in Appendix A. The DCI, in consultation with SIOs, will identify the categories having special sensitivity and the SIO concerned shall advise persons with such access that unauthorized travel in the listed countries may result in the withdrawal of access to SCI.

Unofficial Travel: While US citizens are not restricted by US laws from travelling in foreign countries, persons granted authorization for access to certain categories of extremely sensitive information on sources or methods of SCI incur a special obligation and are to be alerted by the SIO to the risks associated with their engaging in unofficial visits to, or travel through, the countries listed in Appendix A. The DCI, in consultation with the SIOs, will identify the categories having special sensitivity.

All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial travel to or through countries listed in Appendix A must:

(1) Give advance notice of such planned travel.

(2) Obtain a defensive security briefing from a specified official before traveling to such countries.

(3) Contact immediately the nearest United States consular, attache or Embassy official if they are detained or subjected to significant harassment or provocation while traveling.

(4) Report upon return from travel to their SIO any incidents of potential security concern which befell them.

(5) Be reminded annually of the foregoing obligations through security education programs.

b. Official Assignment/Travel: No person with access to SCI will be assigned to or directed to participate in hazardous activities until he has been afforded a defensive security briefing and/or risk of capture briefing as applicable.<sup>3</sup>

c. Individuals with Previous Access: Persons whose access to SCI is being terminated will be officially reminded of the risks associated with hazardous activities as defined herein and of their obligation to ensure continued protection of SCI.

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<sup>3</sup> Due consideration will be given to the relative protection enjoyed by US officials having diplomatic status.

5. Responsibilities

a. The DCI will cause to be prepared and disseminated to the SIOs a list of countries identified as posing a security risk bearing on this policy (Appendix A). The Security Committee will coordinate required support including source material concerning these risks.

b. SIOs will issue implementing directives concerning travel and assignment of personnel of their departments or agencies. Such directives will be consistent with the overall policy, definitions and criteria set forth herein and will provide for:

(1) Preparation and provision of defensive security briefings and/or risk of capture briefings to appropriate personnel of their departments/agencies as/when applicable.

(2) Institution of positive programs for the collection of information in reports obtained under the provisions of paragraph 4A(4) above and other means as feasible.

(3) Insuring that new information obtained by their departments or agencies on harassments or provocations, or on risk of capture situations, is provided to the DCI and to other interested NFIB agencies. (Where warranted by new information, changes to Appendix A will be made. Recommendations with supporting justification may be made for either addition or deletion of countries.)

(DRAFT)

George Bush  
Director of Central Intelligence



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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/\_\_\_

APPENDIX A

SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF  
PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED  
INFORMATION



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